Abstract:
United States foreign policy objectives in ASIa became the focus of a crisis in 1953-1954. DU1-ing this period the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower became increasingly Involved in the conduct of the war In Indochina. Supporting the French, the Eisenhower administration sought to defeat the communist-inspired VIet MInh, and thereby pI-event the expansion of Soviet-led communism into yet another part of Asia. Several problems developed in the pursuit of this goal. The French, on whom the administration relied to defend Indochina showed an increasing reluctance to continue the war. and indeed pressed tor negotiations to settle the conflict. The United States, lacking leverage upon the French, was as a result forced to accept the negotiations at Geneva, in May 1954. The subsequent defeat of French armed forces at Dien Bien Phu, shortly after the beginning of the negotiations, essentially sealed the fate of the French in Indochina. Unwilling themselves to intervene militarily, the Eisenhower administration thus found itself in a difficult situation. United States foreign policy was adamantly opposed to communist expansion, but it appeared that the likely result of the Geneva Conference would be the establIshment of a communist state. The Americans thus refused to associate themselves with the settlement at Geneva, and subsequently paved the way for future American intervention.
