

AVOIDING THE BLOODY CONFRONTATION:
THE KANSAS NATIONAL GUARD'S EXPERIENCE
WITH CIVIL DISTURBANCES

by

Brian Fowles

The Kansas Militia/National Guard has dealt successfully with civil disturbances, actual or potential since 1880. Fortunately, the Guard has not had to fire a shot in anger. When compared to the record of many other states, this represents a significant achievement. This has been partially due to the lack of industry within Kansas for most of its history--a significant focus for labor-related disturbances--and the fact that until 1950, this state has been more rural than urban.

Despite those two positive factors, significant confrontations did occur both in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although technological advances increased the speed at which mobilization took place, gubernatorial and Guard response to crises have been remarkably similar in many different administrations.

In general, governors and guardsmen have been very cautious in the suppression of civil disturbances. Success in quelling civil disturbances was most often due to a reluctance to commit troops hastily, lessons of prior experience, competent leadership, and, to a lesser degree, historical circumstances.

The above combination of factors was demonstrated as recently as 1970 in Kansas. Governors of Kansas, as a rule, have been wary about committing guardsmen even in a steadily deteriorating situation. Governor Robert B. Docking, for example, acted judiciously in late 1968 and early 1969 at the height of student unrest over the Vietnam War in connection with incidents on the campuses of Kansas State University and Kansas University. Usually, the governor preferred to let authorities on the scene handle the problems while Kansas Bureau of Investigation agents monitored the situation.

Even actual intervention in Lawrence on 21 April 1970 occurred in response to an ever-increasing cycle of bomb scares, nuisance fires, and vandalism throughout April. The catalytic events, apparently, happened on 20 April when several arson incidents culminated in the burning of the University of Kansas Student Union. Reports of sniper fire directed at firemen who answered the alarms worsened an already complicated situation.

Given these circumstances, Governor Docking proclaimed a 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew on 21 April in Lawrence and called in the National Guard. Their period of service went through 25 April. The soldiers, working in three-to-four man detachments, helped local law enforcement officers and the

Kansas Highway Patrol enforce the curfew. Docking usually used the Highway Patrol as auxiliary policemen.¹

The National Guard was better equipped to deal with such circumstances as a result of practices instituted in the wake of the Detroit Riots in July 1967. Following those riots, President Johnson ordered all Guardsmen to receive 32 additional hours of riot training during August and September. This involved training in riot tactics, coordination of effort between military authorities and state and local police, preparation of detailed plans for troop use in potential areas of disturbance, and apprehension and arrest of rioters, looters, and arsonists amidst innocent bystanders. The Kansas Legislature supplemented these measures by creating the Military Support of Civil Authority, Army Guard Section, with legal provisions which would enable the Guard to restore order within a secure legal framework.²

However, theory is not fact or experience; and, fortunately, the Guard acquired both before 1970. During the riots in Kansas City, Missouri, April 1968, about 1000 Kansas Guardsmen mobilized for potential trouble in Kansas City, Kansas within a targeted time-limit of six hours. As it was, the activation became no more than a precautionary measure.³ It should be noted, though, that rapid mobilization has always been one of the keys to controlling riots and this ultimately served a very useful training purpose.

Secondly, both civilian and military authorities received significant experience during the Wichita disturbances of 20-24 August 1968. Although the racial difficulties there including vandalism, arson, and sniping, required the activation of 458 citizen-soldiers on 22 August, the employment of three-to-four-man groups attached to two-man police cars at 19 posts throughout the affected area in downtown Wichita sufficed to bring the problem under control. Random factors helped as well. These were (1) incidents occurred in a relatively small geographical area which had few large tenements so that troops faced small crowds rather than large ones and (2) civil and military authorities dealt only with one small group that was engaged in arson, rock-throwing, and sniping.

More importantly, though, the post-mortem assessment revealed deficiencies in civil-military communication procedures in addition to the normal reluctance of civil authorities to confront a civil disturbance as it unfolded. As a result, the procedures for providing and receiving assistance from the Kansas Highway Patrol and National Guard became standardized. Additionally, the Guard made clear what its own capabilities and limitations were to civil authorities.⁴

The final ingredient for success was quality of leadership. Superintendent William Albott (KHP) and Colonels Degraw and Tice, who supervised the operation, exercised police authority in a non-provocative manner. In fact, the triumvirate refused to employ large bodies of armed troops to "sweep the streets clean" so to speak despite such requests from the civilian authorities in Lawrence.⁵ The main

consideration--as in most civil disturbances--meant restraining the natural tendency to overreact in such circumstances, as happened a scant two weeks later at Kent State.

Thus, the Lawrence confrontation demonstrated the necessity for training and experience in the handling of civil disturbances. It also illustrated that such occurrences do not happen in a vacuum, that they tend to "cluster" within a certain space of time; and, that state as well as national authorities have to rethink or resurrect procedures and methods that may not have been employed for many years.

There were similar precedents earlier in Kansas history. Comparable "cluster periods" were 1878-1889, 1919-1923, and 1933-1935. These periods echoed far more violent and bloody events on the national scene. Guard handling of these events reflected similar procedures and, indeed, set the pattern for the successful operations at Lawrence.

For example, the period 1878-1889 confronted Kansas with railroad strikes and county seat wars (disputes over the siting of county seats which sometimes provoked violence). Although 1877 saw massive and violent railroad disputes in the country, they were not duplicated in Kansas. But, Governor George T. Anthony did mobilize the militia in connection with a train slowdown on the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe in April 1878. Briefly described, the operation placed soldiers in Topeka and Emporia and it turned into a political disaster for Anthony. He had been too quick to listen to railroad officials' pleas for help and had overridden objections to troop use by Emporia's city officials. Worse, the intervention resulted in the accidental death of a civilian while a militiaman cleaned his rifle. Consequently, Governor Anthony lost his party's re-nomination and was consigned to the political wilderness.⁶

By both overreacting and blatantly favoring the railroad, Governor Anthony provided his successors a lesson to ponder. Governor John P. St. John, for instance, responded in April to a coal miner's strike in Cherokee County by placing militia companies on alert, while dispatching Adjutant General Peter S. Noble to the area to mediate. A like occurrence there in 1893 was resolved in the same manner. Similarly, Governor John A. Martin in 1885 averted another rail strike by employing his Adjutant General, Alexander B. Campbell, as a mediator. Campbell also reported to the governor on the actual problem rather than taking the Missouri Pacific officials' word on the matter. Thus, there was no confrontation and an equitable settlement was reached between workers and management.⁷

However, another disagreement involving the same protagonists in March and April of 1886 necessitated Guard use, but only after Martin had exhausted every other possibility. When the attempt to reach a wage and worker rehiring settlement failed, Martin delegated the power to arrest strikers on Federal and State courts' writs of injunction to civil authorities. Despite this pressure, strikers still prevented the trains from running. So, the

Governor again sent Campbell to Parsons to mediate. Only after that measure, too, had failed, did Martin mobilize and send the entire 1st Regiment, saying that a small force might provoke violence, while a large one might have to use little force. This proved to be the case; the bulk of the forces served only three days.⁸

Governor Martin continued to use this strategy also to handle county seat wars during the remainder of his terms. In other words, the process of identifying the problem, negotiating, and as a last resort, using the Kansas National Guard to intimidate and forestall violence firmly. This approach worked well in four out of seven county seat scuffles between 1886 and 1889. Only three required the use of citizen-soldiers to overawe the opposition.

The Guard appeared twice in Stevens County during the dispute between Woodsdale and Hugoton in June and August of 1888. The first intervention which was successful followed an on-site inspection by Campbell and it prevented violence during the canvass of a railroad bond election. The second occurred after the murder of four Woodsdale partisans by Hugotonian residents. In that instance, the Guard occupied Hugoton and conducted a house-to-house search for weapons while the U.S. Marshal who accompanied them arrested the murder suspects.

Similarly, a killing in Gray County in January 1889 was the last county seat war incident that required the state's use of troops. Response was swift, soldiers being sent as soon as news reached Topeka. Duty lasted for twelve days before the soldiers withdrew, and violence did not reoccur.⁹

Thereafter, aside from a few limited uses of citizen-soldiers to prevent lynchings and the Legislative War of 1893 which does not properly fit the civil disturbance classification due to its unique circumstances, there was little need for the Guard until 1919-1923. During this time span, Governor Henry J. Allen activated the Kansas National Guard for one railroad and two coal strikes; the organization performed effectively though not without controversy.

Random factors materially contributed to success in the coal strikes of 1919 and 1921-1922. For example, intensely cold weather in 1919 deterred strikers from disrupting coal shipments from Cherokee and Crawford Counties far more effectively than the 2,273 soldiers who protected the volunteer miners.¹⁰

Because the 1919 strike confronted Kansas with a potentially life-threatening coal shortage at the onset of winter, Allen established the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations. It was a three-man board (public-service commission) which could arbitrate differences between management and labor where the public interest was concerned, such as those industries producing food, fuel, and clothing or dealing with transportation and utilities. Combined with existing vagrancy ordinances in Crawford and Cherokee Counties so that any striker might receive a jail sentence, the net effect ensured legal suppression of labor disputes.¹¹

More specifically, the xenophobia generated by World War I and the "Red Scare" of the early 1920s conditioned Kansan indifference to labor needs in the two counties. Both had been the focus of renewed and large-scale immigration to the state between 1895 and 1918. The Slav and Italian immigrants who came were similar to others coming to the U.S. at that time,¹² and worked in industries with a high probability of labor disputes. Unfortunately for them, the fear of "red revolution" became entwined with many Kansans' anti-labor biases. Further complicating the matter was these immigrants' cultural background which accepted alcoholic beverages as normal in a strongly prohibitionist state.

Thus, liquor raids on the coal-mining camps were accompanied by actual intervention between 14 December 1921 and 27 February 1922. According to an Arthur Capper editorial in the Topeka Daily Capital of the time, the "aliens" who worked the mines were not sufficiently "Americanized" and such activity was justified.¹³ Given the prevailing atmosphere, then, the lack of violent incidents might be surprising. Perhaps, though, in situations where the "tyranny of the majority" holds sway, minority groups prefer discretion as being the better part of valor.

The railroad shopmen's strike which was part of a national strike in July 1922 contrasted sharply with the coal disputes. Allen mobilized Guardsmen to keep open key shops at Parsons, Herington, and Holsington. Unlike the previous duty, intervention proved both more necessary and controversial. The substitute workers imported from the outside by the railroads were mostly blacks and latent racism precipitated acts of violence directed at these workers. Since the potential for severe disturbances existed, citizen-soldiers imposed martial law upon Parsons and Holsington to forestall more serious trouble.¹⁴

Only quick thinking on the part of Colonel Charles S. Browne, Sr. and a junior officer, prevented imposition of martial law in Herington. Following a shooting incident on 23 August, the junior officer rushed a wounded guard fireman to a hospital while arresting the Rock Island guard responsible, and then transferring him to the county jail in Abilene. Rumors spread quickly about the shooting and shop workers walked off their jobs at midnight in protest. Negotiations the next day brought the workmen back by 6:30 p.m., but a drunken brakeman who struck an unarmed guard and insulted soldiers on the depot platform threatened stability again. Colonel Browne arrested the brakeman on the spot, thus preventing any further trouble.

As these incidents occurred close to Labor Day and in a Kansas election year, Browne instituted another preventive measure. He abrogated the right of free speech of a Democratic candidate for Congress. He specifically forbade the candidate to mention anything about the Industrial Court, Governor Allen or issues involved in the strike in a speech to the Woodmen Lodge. Although the man protested,¹⁵ he complied. It was necessary considering the circumstances.

The overall legacy of this strike duty served the Kansas National Guard well. The lessons learned were (1) rapid and secret, if necessary, mobilization of the most mobile troops available, (2) swift removal of sources of trouble from the scene with backup readily available, (3) possible curtailment of free speech, (4) maintaining as low a profile as possible consistent with public order and no fraternization with locals, (5) avoiding the use of local units, (6) gradual resumption of law enforcement by civilians.

These mobilizations provided the organization and its individuals with enough experience to meet the challenges of the 1930s, the Wichita Relief Riots of 10-13 May 1934 and the Cherokee County Miners' Strike of June-August 1935. Both instances were major in import but only one turned serious in event.

As with the period immediately before the Lawrence trouble in 1970, thought preceeded action, yet action stimulated refinement in policy. For example, the Kansas Guardsman magazine expressed concern in 1931 over a possible societal breakdown as a result of the Depression, recommending a fresh look at riot-duty training.¹⁶ However, that concern only took on urgency because Governor Landon employed the Guard as auxiliary police to reduce the rash of bank robberies in Kansas that occurred in 1933 and 1934.¹⁷

Although this service may not have been responsible for the decrease in the number of bank robberies in 1934, the ripple affects were quite important. First, it spurred Adjutant General Milton McLean to compile a Manual for Riot Duty which was published in late 1933. Second, this duty field-tested the trucks then just being introduced into artillery units. Third, the planning for apprehending fleeing bank robbers and the actual experience, which on the average occurred three times a month between June 1933 and June 1934, proved invaluable. Finally, McLean's Manual had emphasized the importance of test mobilizations and exercises.¹⁸ These started in the fall of 1933 and the largest one occurred in Wichita on 31 October 1933 and involved over 400 men.

From the Wichita test, officers concluded that units should have city and street guides with them, that riot sticks were more effective than rifles, that more automobiles were needed to increase mobility, and that those who donated such vehicles should be reimbursed for gas and oil. Also, a combined jail and command-post was deemed unsatisfactory; the command could not operate well amid such noise and confusion.¹⁹

Proof of troop effectiveness became evident the next year. During the Wichita Relief Riots many of the participants in the test were mobilized to face a mob of about 400 people around county buildings. The key confrontation took place on 10 May 1934 when a force of 250 citizen-soldiers quickly dispersed the mob by means of tear gas and an advance with bayonets. Remaining service consisted of patrolling county buildings.²⁰ The affect of this service was immediate. Even though it was successful, those units which had not taken riot training seriously began to train. It was none too soon,

for the Cherokee County Miners' Strike the next year became the organization's most serious challenge.

Citizen-soldiers intervened twice in and around Baxter Springs and Galena between 7-27 June and 29 June--6 August 1935. Both times Colonel Browne imposed martial law. However, violence erupted right after the Kansas National Guard left the first time. Apparently, it sprang from the activity of outside agitators and local law enforcement merely heightened the tension. At that time, the deputy sheriffs were appointed by the mine owners--an obvious conflict of interest that made an explosive situation worse.

Colonel Browne and Governor Landon defused the crisis on their respective levels. The former arrested the disturbers of the peace and tried them in provost court while confiscating some 600 weapons during house to house searches. The latter pressed the sheriff's office to pay for the deputies, and Landon pushed the matter so vigorously that the sheriff resigned. This action cleared the way and the mine guards were then disarmed and dismissed. That ended the confrontation.²¹

As should be readily apparent, the Cherokee County trouble illustrated once more the importance of quick, decisive action in preserving civil peace. It also conformed to previous patterns in that its results were the sum total of previous experience during the "cluster period" of 1933-1935. It only differed from previous instances in that Landon introduced martial law from the beginning, and, despite misgivings on his part, events proved him correct.

After all, Guard use has always been and should always be a last resort in civil disturbances. With few exceptions, this has been the case in Kansas. Both governors and guardsmen have employed their powers judiciously, carefully graduating measures to forestall a civil disturbance from developing or worsening. The usual procedure has been mediation (perhaps by the Adjutant General if it was serious enough), court action, use of auxiliary police (either newly appointed deputies and the Kansas Highway Patrol), placing National Guard companies on alert, and then lastly, direct intervention.

Once troops were actually present the Guard itself applied graduated pressure. In many cases, the mere presence of armed force was sufficient to intimidate potential opposition. When that has not worked, Guardsmen have subordinated themselves to and cooperated closely with police authority. The establishment of the Kansas Highway Patrol in 1934 removed the citizen-soldier one step further from direct contact with civilians and this added another intermediate rung to the ladder until full-scale confrontation was reached. In most of the cases considered here, this step was usually adequate--sometimes with martial law provisions--to intimidate the opposition. In only one case, the Wichita Relief Riots, have whole units been deployed en masse to face a mob on the street.

Key to the success of the National Guard in dealing with civil disturbances in Kansas has been the mastery of lessons learned over the years even though there were only a few disturbances, and massive interventions were the exceptions rather than the rule. Yet, that minor experience allowed the Guard to test, analyze and adjust the procedures and processes of mobilization. Generally, written procedures have followed after the fact.

Finally, Kansas has had excellent leaders. Most have exercised their authority cautiously and competently in the handling of crises. Collectively, they have generally avoided the pitfalls of overreaction and have been careful to be perceived as being impartial in disputes with but slight variation. Also, and most important, Guard leaders have performed their civil disturbance duties in a professional manner despite prevailing currents of opinion and their own prejudices.

NOTES

1. Relevant material on student disturbances in Kansas and at Kansas University in particular are based on Kansas Highway Patrol intelligence reports, Kansas Bureau of Investigation reports, and summaries in Box 41 of the Docking Papers, Spencer Library, Kansas University, under the heading "Civil Disorders (K.U. Campus), 1970" and "Civil Disorders-Correspondence, January-June 1970." For the Guard's role the various after-action reports, summaries, and documents are in "Lawrence Disturbance Reports," Manuscript, Kansas State Defense Building (Topeka). See also the Lawrence Journal World and the Topeka Daily Capital for the period in addition to Ralph Gage, "Kansas University: It was a Very Active Year," Lawrence Journal World, 30 May 1970.

2. Major General Charles P. Stone, "The Lessons of Detroit, Summer 1967" in Robin Higham, ed., Bayonets in the Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1969), 191-193, 195-201. "Annual Report of Major General Joe Nickell to the National Guard Association of Kansas," 20 April 1968, Nickell Papers, Collection 98.5, Manuscript, Kansas State Historical Society. "Riot Training Ordered for All," Kansas National Guard Newsletter, 13: 10 (October 1967), 10-12. See also State of Kansas, 1968 Session Laws of Kansas, Topeka, 1968, 153, 161-163, 176, 245, 525-527.

3. "Annual Report of Major General Nickell to the National Guard Association of Kansas," 20 April 1968, Nickell Papers, Collection 98.5, Manuscript, Kansas State Historical Society. Adjutant General's Department, "Emergency State Duty Since 1946," Manuscript, Kansas State Defense Building, unpaginated. See also "Guardsmen Called Up For Riot," Kansas National Guard Newsletter, 13: 5 (May 1968), 5.

4. Major Jack R. Robertson, "Final Report for Riot Duty for the Period 22 August 68 to 25 August 68--Wichita, Kansas," 26 August 1968 in Wichita Disturbances, Manuscript, Kansas State Defense Building, 2-3, 18. Report, J.R. Hasdall to Colonel R.N. Woodson, 21 August 1968, Report on Civil Disturbances--Wichita; Report, Colonel R.N. Woodson to Governor Robert Docking, 26 August 1968; Memo, Brigadier General Philip W. Smyth to Adjutant General Nickell, 23 August 1968; Letter, Adjutant General Nickell to Governor Robert Docking, 4 September 1968; Letter, Superintendent R.N.

Woodson to Governor Robert Docking, 3 September 1968, Docking Papers, Civil Disturbances, August-December, 1968, Box 15, 1968, Spencer Library, Kansas University. "Wichita Guard on Riot Duty," Kansas National Guard Newsletter, 13: 9 (September 1968), 7, 10-11. See also Adjutant General's Department, "Emergency State Duty Since 1946," Kansas State Defense Building, unpaginated.

5. Interview, Adjutant General Ralph Tice with Author, 9 August 1982.

6. George T. Anthony, "Strike of Railroad Employees on Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe, 1878," in Kansas State Historical Society, ed., Kansas State Governor Messages, 1857-1943, 6 vols., Kansas State Historical Society Library, 1: 45-52. Topeka Daily Commonwealth, 6, 8, 9, 11 April 1878. Letter, Governor George Anthony to Superintendent C.F. Morse, 5, 9 April 1878, Governor Letter Books, 11: 237-238, 299, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society. See also Robert W. Richmond, Kansas: A Land of Contrasts (Saint Charles, Mo.: Forum Press, 1970), 170.

7. Kansas-Adjutant General, Second Biennial Report of the Adjutant General, Covering the Years 1879 and 1880 (Topeka, 1881), 48-51. Letter, Governor John A. Martin to the Board of Railroad Commissioners, 10 March 1885; Letter, Governor John A. Martin to Adjutant General Alexander Campbell, 10 March 1886; Letter, Adjutant General Campbell to Governor John A. Martin, 17 May 1885; Missouri Pacific Circular, 15 March 1885; Governor's Correspondence, 1885-1889, Strike-Missouri Pacific Railroad, Box 26, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society. See also Kansas-Adjutant General, Ninth Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Kansas, 1893-1894 (Topeka, 1894), 46-47.

8. Executive Department Memo of Kansas, 22 March 1886; Letter, C.E. Faulkner to Governor Martin, 1 April 1886, Governor's Correspondence, 1885-1889, Strike-Missouri Pacific Railroad, Box 26, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society. Edith Walker, "Labor Problems During the First Year of Governor Martin's Administration," The Kansas State Historical Quarterly, 1 (February 1936): 36-44. Dorothy Leibengood, "Labor Problems in the Second Year of Governor Martin's Administration," The Kansas State Historical Quarterly, 2 (May 1936): 196-201. See also Kansas-Adjutant General, Fifth Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Kansas, 1885-1886, Topeka, 1886, 59-60.

9. Homer E. Socolofsky, "County Seat Wars in Kansas," The Trail Guide, 9 (December 1964), 1-4. Homer Socolofsky and Huber Self, Historical Atlas of Kansas (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), 41, 49. Kansas-Adjutant General, Sixth Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Kansas, 1887-1888, Topeka, 1888, 38-43, 46-49, 63-65, 67-69. Kansas Adjutant-General, Seventh Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Kansas, 1889-1890, Topeka, 1890, 7-8, 71. See also Kansas-Adjutant General, Sixteenth Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Kansas, 1907-1908, Topeka, 1908, 226-227, 231-233, 237.

10. Kansas-Adjutant General, Twenty-Second Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Kansas, 1919-1920, Topeka, 1921, 40, 45, 60-61.

11. Domenico Gagliardo, The Kansas Industrial Court (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1941), 232-233. Hereafter cited as Gagliardo, Kansas Industrial Court.

12. J. Neale Carman, Foreign Language Units of Kansas, 1. Historical Atlas and Statistics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1962), 313.

13. Gagliardo, Kansas Industrial Court, 144-145, 201. See also Topeka Daily Capital, 17, 18 December 1921.

14. Philip Taft and Philip Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character and Outcome" in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives; A Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York, 1969), 340. Topeka Daily Capital, 11, 12, 13, 20 July 1922. Kansas-Adjutant General, Twenty-Fourth Biennial Report of the Adjutant General for the State of Kansas, 1923-1924, Topeka, 1925, 73-75, 81-83, 85, 87-88, 264-265, 375. Hereafter cited as Adjutant General Report, 1923-1924.

15. Adjutant General Report, 1923-1924, 78-80.

16. Kansas Guardsman, 7 (December 1931), 1-3.

17. Topeka State Journal, 28 February 1933. Al F. Williams, "Governor Landon Wages War Against Crime and Criminals," N.D., Adjutant General Correspondence, January 1930-April 1933, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society. See also, Donald R. McCoy, Landon of Kansas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 152-153. Hereafter cited as McCoy, Landon.

18. Letter, Adjutant General McLean to Commanding Officers of the Kansas National Guard, 9 June 1933, Subject File: Adjutant General, Governor's Correspondence, 1933-1937, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society. Letter, M.R. McLean to Mr. Robert Cram, Cheyenne County Attorney, 10 October 1933; Letter, Adjutant General Milton McLean to Adjutant General Ellard A. Walsh of Minnesota, 23 July 1934, Adjutant General Correspondence, May 1933-December 1934, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society. Francis W. Schruben, Kansas in Turmoil, 1930-1936 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 215. L.L. Edge, Run the Cat Roads: A True Story of Bank Robbers in the 30s (New York: Ombner Books, 1981), 15. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: MacMillan Co., 1967), 409-411. See also Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 416.

19. Lieutenant Colonel Harrie S. Mueller, "Report on Test Mobilization, Wichita Station, 8 November 1933," Captain Arthur Alexander, "Report of Mobilization," 31 October 1933; Captain Joseph McVicar, "Report of Mobilization," 31 October 1933, Adjutant General Correspondence, May 1933-December 1934, Archives, Kansas State Historical Society.

20. Topeka Daily Capital, 11 May 1934. Topeka State Journal, 10, 11 May 1934. See also Kansas Guardsman, 10 (May 1934), 2.

21. McCoy, Landon, 194. Topeka Daily Capital, 8, 9 June 1935. Topeka State Journal, 8, 28, 29, 30 June and 3, 11, 23 July 1935. See also Kansas-Adjutant General, Thirtieth Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Kansas, 1935-1936, Topeka, 1937, 25.