

NORTH DAKOTA NONINTERVENTIONISTS AND

CORPORATE CULTURE

by

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"It required four generations and two world wars for the Middle West to come to some understanding of what foreign policy is about," a political scientist blandly noted in the year 1960. The epoch between 1945 and 1965 witnessed a near-unanimous commitment by American scholars and intellectuals to the doctrines of internationalism, collective security, and presidential initiative in foreign affairs. Resistance to such notions, particularly among Great Plains Republicans, usually found description as an irrational remnant of a discredited isolationist past. Indeed, a persistent spirit of noninterventionism in North Dakota prompted one impatient scholar to dismiss the entire state as a "living fossil."¹

Two sets of circumstances since 1965 have modified such precipitous judgments. First, the Vietnam War brought respectability to the notion that overseas military commitments might easily be overextended. Second, professional historians continued to produce well-conceived analyses of the relationship of material concerns to ideology. Some of these efforts focused upon political culture--a concept which took into account the more immediate political and economic motives for social behavior as well as longstanding ideological and cultural roots of such activity. Scholarship of this nature reinforced the idea that dissident perspectives could be majority views in particular communities. It also pointed to the logical consistency within any given set of ideas. Furthermore, scholarship on political culture stressed the manner in which groups and movements tended to combine rational self-interest with more elusive sets of allegiances, emotions, and ideals.²

This paper attempts to place the views of North Dakota opponents of Cold War interventionism in the framework of political culture: first, in the context of immediate political and economic exigencies within North Dakota itself; second, within the legacy of an ideological and cultural progressivism that was the product of the historical experience of the northern Great Plains.

North Dakota noninterventionism first surfaced with the growth of the Nonpartisan League during World War One. The NPL linked a program that sought to organize the marketing needs of independent farmers to a deep distrust of bankers, grain trade operators, eastern industrialists, and Wall Street diplomats. Both noninterventionist Senators Gerald P. Nye and Lynn Frazier emerged from the Nonpartisan movement. Both opposed United States membership in the League of Nations, participation in the World Court, cancellation of Allied war debts, and American military involvement in Latin America.³

By the 1930s the major issue of American foreign policy had shifted to one of war and peace. Governor William Langer, elected with Nonpartisan support, removed the Reserve Officer Training Corps from state campuses and openly promoted a federal constitutional amendment to require a vote of the American people before any declaration of war arising from overseas military difficulties. Meanwhile, Nye chaired the influential Senate investigation of the munitions industry and became a key architect of neutrality legislation passed in the mid-1930s. Congressmen William Lemke and Usher Burdick joined Nye and Frazier in pressing for the abolition of private production of munitions, enactment of stringent war profits taxes, and the war referendum embodied in the Ludlow Amendment. When Langer ran for Frazier's Senate seat in 1940 he joined Nye in opposing further modification of the neutrality laws, expansion of Selective Service, and lend-lease.⁴

Both Langer and Burdick continued to espouse noninterventionism through the Cold War years, frequently voting with a group of Republican nationalists in opposing the military and economic assistance programs of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Langer was one of two Senators to vote against United States membership in the United Nations. He voted against the Bretton Woods Monetary Fund and vehemently opposed the British Loan of 1946. Langer consistently objected to economic aid to Europe, opposing every single foreign aid bill from 1945 to his death in 1959. He argued that Truman Doctrine aid to Greece and Turkey was too costly, and called for an American recovery program as a substitute for the Marshall Plan. Langer was one of six Senators to oppose NATO, consistently fought against further mutual security arrangements in Europe and Asia, and strenuously objected to universal military training. The North Dakotan also called for withdrawal of American troops from Korea in 1951, opposed President Eisenhower's right to use troops during the Formosa Crisis of 1955, and supported the Bricker Amendment to provide congressional checks on the treaty-making powers of the President. Usher Burdick assumed a similar position in the House, distinguishing himself for adamant opposition to the Marshall Plan, NATO, the draft, and the Korean involvement.⁵

Although the controversial Langer had a reputation as a "lone ranger" and a "nonconformist," his Senate postures were well suited to an agricultural and remote state with little economic diversification. Langer closely identified with his North Dakota constituency of small farmers and town laborers. "I do not represent any gang, or group, or clique," he told constituents in a state-wide radio hook-up in 1944, "but I represent the people, the men in the field, in the store, the folks who labor." In an undelivered speech prepared in 1943, Langer fantasized about forming a Producers and Consumers Governmental League to work cooperatively and vote for the interests of farmers, wage earners, and small business people. Langer's League would pit the wealth-producers against the wealth-absorbers, the "shirt sleeve" toilers against the "wealth-sucking vampires." Four years later Langer attempted to realize the fantasy in a call for a national nonpartisan grassroots effort in the 1948 presidential election.⁶

Although the movement never materialized, its aspirations reflected common views in a state whose resources were developed for outside consumption and profit.

Langer's farm policies demonstrated his sensitivity to the North Dakota economy. He favored high agricultural price supports, liberal farm credit, and rural electrification cooperatives. He fought the federal soil bank program in the 1950s because the operation proved of little value to family-sized farms. And it was Langer's desire to protect independent North Dakota farmers that prompted his skepticism toward the reciprocal trade agreements developed by the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.⁷

Langer joined Senate progressives Robert LaFollette, Jr. and Henrik Shipstead in opposing wartime extension of the reciprocal trade program in 1943. He argued that lowered duties on foreign vegetables and other produce destroyed domestic producers. One example of the consequences was investment by American financial speculators in Cuban vegetable cultivation. Langer's discomfort with reciprocal trade continued during the postwar period. He agreed with Nevada Senator George W. Malone that tariffs offset the cheaper costs of production prevalent in countries not enjoying American-style wage scales. Indiscriminate tariff reduction would mean lower wages in America and transfers of jobs and industry to foreign soil. Langer supported Malone's proposal for a sliding tariff that would reward increased overseas wage standards with lowered American import fees. He also endorsed South Dakota Senator Karl Mundt's call for an investigation of the effect of reciprocal trade on the parity price of grain.⁸

Like the reciprocal trade issue, the whole question of foreign aid had specific implications for North Dakota's independent businesses and farms. Langer opposed the extension of lend-lease in 1945, objecting to the program's transfer of 932 tractors and combines through North Dakota to Canada. Further incensed by the dispatch of badly needed farm machinery to the Soviet Union, Langer forced a Senate vote on an amendment which would have prohibited American manufacturers from sending agricultural machinery, implements, and equipment to foreign governments.

In a similar vein, Langer's opposition to the British Loans of 1946 and 1948 corresponded in part to the Senator's estimation of the economic needs of his own state. North Dakota did not host major industrial conglomerates seeking mass markets overseas. Objecting to the 1946 spending of \$4 billion to bolster British purchasing power, Langer quoted a Brookings Institute study that showed that overseas markets were unnecessary if purchasing power in the United States were sufficiently distributed. Langer preferred to spend the money on medical research, old age pensions, cancellation of all seed and feed loans, farm to market roads, rural electrification, and retirement of the inflation-inducing national debt. Constituent mail seemed to support the Senator's position. "If they can loan billions to Britain why can't they take better care of the dependents of the fallen heroes?" asked an impoverished couple whose two sons had died

in the war. If North Dakotans had survived the severe winter of 1946 without being dependent on anyone else, a Burlington constituent complained to Langer, "why in h--- can't England do the same?"¹⁰

Similar arguments surfaced in regard to the European Recovery Bill of 1948--the Marshall Plan. Langer told the Senate that raw materials, finished goods, and machinery essential for American food production would be diverted to Europe at a time when western farmers still were unable to secure an adequate supply. "We are struggling under the heaviest tax burden in the history of the world," Burdick complained, "and the least this government can do is to make essential materials available to those who produce." Langer quoted a Senate report on independent business which suggested that shortages arising from foreign commitments were resulting in the imposition of controls at home. The American economy now had to fit into "this new international pattern of Government-controlled cartel allocation of raw materials and markets." Trade policy and domestic allocation of scarce raw materials, the report noted, were forcing more investment in the development of foreign sources of materials and products.¹¹

The Marshall Plan also raised complex issues of inflation at home. Foreign spending, Burdick insisted, was the principal cause of high prices and excessive taxation, problems which plagued North Dakota small property holders in the postwar era. Increased European purchasing power, Burdick argued, raised the prices of commodities such as lumber and beef in the United States. In a resolution sent directly to Langer, the National Association of Retail Grocers contended that the nation was dissipating its resources in a futile attempt to bring about economic recovery in Western Europe. The grocers worried about the inflationary effect on food prices and the possible re-imposition of price controls and rationing. Both Burdick and Langer also pointed out that foreign aid spending forced the federal government to borrow to finance its European subsidies. The resulting exodus of dollars and ballooning of the national debt further aggravated inflation, they contended. At the same time, Langer believed that foreign aid cut into the selling price of grain and other farm commodities by enabling European producers to capture American markets once held by domestic farmers. Foreign subsidy programs were siphoning off money that might be going to North Dakota farmers, Langer thundered.¹²

Langer's constituent mail on the Marshall Plan focused on the fear that the Truman administration placed the needs of Europeans above Americans. The concern was well-grounded. North Dakota's heavily taxed farmers and independent entrepreneurs sold to domestic markets instead of European consumers. Foreign aid, which subsidized European consumers at the expense of American taxpayers, may have served the needs of corporate manufacturers and labor in the urban-industrial sector. But it simply worked against North Dakota interests by requiring its taxpayers to subsidize foreign competition. When foreign aid was tied to a reciprocal trade policy, Langer argued, Americans found themselves paying billions of dollars to develop competitive forces overseas

which then were allowed to sell below cost-of-production prices in the beleaguered American market. Americans were using billions in subsidies to keep the domestic price structure sound, Langer proclaimed, while continuing to subsidize foreign competition which undermined the American standard of living. "It simply does not make sense," he concluded. Langer's answer to the dilemma was that of the traditional isolationist: it was time for the United States to get out of Europe. Yet his reasoning was partly economic and tied to the needs of North Dakota constituents. Somehow, the Senator noted in 1954, "we will have to get these people off our necks, and their hands out of our pockets."¹³

North Dakota resistance to universal military training also reflected political and economic realities in the state. Langer was famous for his amendments to draft legislation. In 1948 he attempted to embarrass draft advocates with a series of civil rights amendments which would have desegregated the Army and public accommodations in any state training draftees. During 1951 and 1955 Langer introduced amendments to conscript all corporate profits as well as personal income over \$25,000 during a draft emergency. Langer equated conscription with autocracy and feared the consequences of militaristic government at home and abroad. But he also realized that many North Dakotans were of families that had fled from Germany, Norway, or Russia to escape heavy taxation and military service requirements. These Americans had little use for European power politics or dynastic rivalries. The people of the northwest, Langer explained in 1945, had come to America to "escape the continuous struggle between peoples who hated each-other; to live in peace and security and to find some measure of opportunity and contentment."¹⁴

Yet North Dakotans had an even more specific reason for hostility to universal military training. In a region with a sparse population, harsh winters, and an unstable agricultural economy, it was hard to maintain an adequate supply of farm labor. The draft took young men just when they were most helpful to a farm operation. As Burdick pointed out, it was the younger men, not the older men used to horse-drawn machinery, who were most experienced in running and servicing power tractors. These young mechanics were precisely the men the Army needed. Many farmers had to cease operations when their sons were drafted, Burdick explained. "There is no hope for us," a middle-aged couple confided to the congressman during the Korean War. "We know we are not able to do all our farm work alone any more." Langer introduced a bill providing for the temporary deferment of farmers just before the outbreak of the Korean War but withdrew it with the start of hostilities. Nevertheless, he and Burdick continued to insist that food production was more important than ammunition or standing armies in preserving peace and world security.¹⁵

The roots of North Dakota noninterventionism also may be found within a political culture that first found expression in the Nonpartisan League and the progressive politics of LaFollette, Hiram Johnson, and William Borah. One facet of that ideology was a strong American nationalism, one which contrasted the republican virtues of the New World with the corrupt and tyrannical politics of Europe. Langer approvingly

quoted Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg's tribute to nationalism years after Vandenberg had converted to the internationalist cause. "America has separate and different standards of life and government," the Michigan Republican had written, "and it refuses either to merge these advantages in a general averaging of the standards of other lands, or to expose them by any untoward degree, to the mandate of massed foreign pressure or duress." Langer spared no language in condemnation of State Department internationalists. "No one fought Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman on their foreign policies more than Bill Langer of North Dakota," the Senator explained to a constituent in 1953:

I voted against Stettinius of the Internationalists who gave us Alger Hiss. I voted against George Marshall, a great friend of Great Britain who sent them billions more. I also voted against Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, who we just got rid of, and I did that with the leading Republicans, Vandenberg, Taft, and others supporting them.¹⁶

Like his progressive predecessors, Langer viewed the United States as a virile republic that historically shunned the imperialism and colonialism practiced by European super-states. Although 90% of Langer's mail expressed support of the United Nations in 1945, the North Dakotan voted against American membership. Like the progressives of the early 1920s, Langer opposed any international organization that would use force to maintain the territorial status quo. "The United States will be dedicated to back up Great Britain in her frankly predatory and imperialistic schemes all over the world," he proclaimed. Langer believed that the British were using the United Nations alliance to drag the United States into a third world war, this time with the Soviet Union. We were being "sucked into a power bloc on the side of colonial imperialism against Communist imperialism," he noted, a struggle which had nothing to do with American security. Langer warned that the State Department was backing a corrupt system of European colonial exploitation already on its last legs. Communist success in Asia and Africa, he predicted in 1946 and 1948, would be a direct result of the oppressive European presence. The United States should not assume the impossible task of defending the imperial possessions of bankrupt Western Europe against civil and guerrilla warfare.¹⁷

Langer's tirades against colonialism were replicas of those of the twenties progressives. Most of the earlier insurgents had represented Plains and Mountain states in which agriculture and mining were dominated by outside interests. The historical experience of North Dakota provided continuity for that model, for millers, commodity speculators, farm machinery manufacturers, railroads, and banks continued to profit from the labor of the independent farmer. "In many respects," Glenn Smith suggested, "North Dakotans looked upon themselves as colonials, the victims of exploitation by alien interests."¹⁸

If Great Plains farmers were colonial subjects who procured real material wealth for "foreign corporations," Great Britain appeared as a huge non-productive middleman which exploited the labor and resources of its colonies.

Midwestern antipathy to Britain stemmed partly from the ethnic hostilities of the region's numerous people of German, Irish, and Scandinavian origin. But it also had roots in the Populist suspicion of the late nineteenth century that English bankers were part of a network which controlled the processing, transportation, and financing of American agricultural production. When Langer or Burdick condemned Britain's "antiquated machinery of imperialism," they were striking a rich chord in Plains political culture. It made no sense to grant billions in foreign aid to the British when portions of the funds only found their way to Britain's efforts to maintain its colonies through military power. As late as 1954 Langer was denouncing Britain's combination of socialism at home and imperialism abroad as National Socialism without racial ideology.¹⁹

Noninterventionists saw Great Britain as the most flagrant example of decaying European culture. Langer referred to the "age-long hatreds, the social neuroticisms, deep-rooted suspicions, the bloody tyrannies, egoisms, and exploitations which had always characterized the life of Europe." Europe meant militarism, large standing armies, and the "curse" of conscription. No wonder Langer was adamant in his opposition to NATO. President Truman's commitment was the product of secret diplomacy, it constituted a permanent military alliance, and it inextricably involved the United States in the tangled web of European affairs. The Marshall Plan, Langer wrote to a constituent, was ill-advised because the money would fall into the hands of unreliable European governments instead of the poor people who really needed it.²⁰

Langer's noninterventionism was closely tied to the suspicion of Europe long a part of traditional American republican ideology. Another facet of this progressive political culture was a deep-seated hostility toward aristocratic pretension at home. Langer was a master at detecting such tendencies in the Foreign Service and Department of State. He protested the nomination of James Bruce as ambassador to Argentina in 1947 because Bruce was a millionaire and a former officer of a dairy monopoly. Langer cast the only negative vote against the confirmation of Secretary of State Edward Stettinius in 1944 because the nominee was associated with the House of Morgan. In a speech on the United Nations Langer questioned the relationship of banking power to diplomacy:

Look at the head of the American delegation, the wealthy scion of the Morgan family,--Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.--he of the flashing eyes, the shiny teeth and the silver hair and the charming smile. Stettinius comes from a long line of men who have manipulated the destiny of this nation to their own end. These are the mighty men of Wall Street. The men who ride two horses on two sides of the street. They never lose but the public loses no matter what happens.²¹

Langer's objections to upper-class diplomacy went beyond the facets of wealth to a sociological critique of the nation's ruling families. The State Department, he insisted,

was dominated by "a clique of appeasement-minded cookie pushers," sons of the rich who did not understand the problems of the masses. Furthermore, the Department employed "diplomatic circumlocution" to distance itself from the American people. The problem, Langer suggested in a 1954 report on the Mutual Security Act, was that the Department was "a refuge for career people of the social register." These people, he contended, saw their "highest destiny in the acceptance provided by the British and French social circles." Corrupted by "Europeanism" and "shop-worn social theories," they were more intent on social superiority than diplomacy. They were "cosmopolites and less American than international toward the interests of their European friends." Langer hoped that ambassadors and diplomats might be more representative of the average American, particularly those from the West.²²

The class and regional animosities expressed by Langer figured in the Senator's intense dislike of Dean Acheson. Langer was one of six senators to oppose Acheson's nomination as Secretary of State in 1949. In a speech draft which he never delivered, the North Dakotan castigated the nominee as an inept blunderer who held an "alien internationalist philosophy." Langer caustically described Acheson's career as an attorney associated with the Morgans and DuPonts and charged him with being one of the architects of Bretton Woods--an "internationalist superstate financial scheme." Connecting Acheson's Wall Street orientation to his diplomatic role in forcing the Nationalist Chinese to embrace the Communists during World War Two, Langer concluded that "Acheson believes in secret diplomacy, government by indiscretion and a commitment of the United States to internationalist schemes which cannot help but destroy our form of government and our way of life."²³

Langer distrusted career diplomats in the permanent bureaucracy who were removed from the voters. The Department placed too much emphasis on expertise and not enough on common sense, he believed. Likewise, the North Dakotan had little tolerance for academic and technical experts in the federal bureaucracy. During World War Two he took after "academic bureaucrats" pushing for re-enactment of the reciprocal trade treaties. First Langer denied such people were experts. Then he accused them of expropriating the prerogatives of Congress as well as the judicial and administrative functions of government. Government bureaucrats, he charged,

have grand ideas of setting up a world to their own liking. They do not seem to care what it costs the workers and farmers of America. They have set up over the years a secret super government, within the government, which has successfully pulled the wool over the eyes of the people, and these bureaucrats now feel they control all political parties. They have convinced themselves that they can do as they please.

The administrative bureaucracy, Langer continued, wanted to "rule the Nation by directive, decrees, regulations, and dictatorial practices." He dismissed them as "wastrels of the people's money who have wormed their way into high places of

non-elective government policy-making positions." But in a passage which anticipated the anti-subversion crusades of the postwar period, Langer linked upper-class privilege, internationalism, and violation of the national interest:

They have loaded the various divisions of the Federal Government with their sixth columnists, represented by the young callow college graduate fledglings, most of whom never worked a day with their hands, and who do not know what it means to earn an honest dollar by the sweat of your brow. I call upon every farmer to . . . see how many tax dollars he has had to pay for being deceived by these sixth columnist internationalists into thinking he is being benefitted.²⁴

Langer's distrust of the "Economic One Worlders" in the administrative bureaucracy carried over into a concern for the power of the Presidency. Both Burdick and Langer feared that the all-important power over war-making had been usurped through collective security agreements, foreign aid programs, and presidential control over troop deployments. Truman has stated that "he will send troops anywhere in this world, where he thinks it is necessary to send them, regardless of Congress," Burdick complained in 1951. Discomfort with presidential power figured strongly in the opposition both North Dakotans expressed over NATO, the Korean War, "secret" presidential treaty making, mutual security agreements, and SEATO. "Who sent our boys to fight in Korea?" Langer asked in exasperation. "Was any Senator in this body consulted about having a war in Korea?" North Dakotans appeared to agree. Stung by the costly draft and an unpopular war, the North Dakota Senate passed two resolutions in early 1951 which urged Congress to withdraw all troops from Korea and to insist on conscription of wealth any time it was necessary to draft men for a military emergency.²⁵

The noninterventionism of Burdick and Langer during the Cold War era was based on both the constituent needs of North Dakotans and adherence to an historical legacy of Great Plains populism and progressivism. Animosity toward internationalism, Old World colonialism, aristocracy, expert bureaucracy, presidential prerogative, and military collectivism shaped the noninterventionist view toward the events of the Cold War. This was a viewpoint consistent with the world view of independent farmers and business people threatened by external centers of power. Instead of perceiving these developments as the by-products of an emerging corporate society, Burdick and Langer tended to portray them as the extension of the historical privileges of the east coast aristocracy. The vacillation which noninterventionists and Republican nationalists attributed to Cold War policy under Truman and Acheson was in their minds a natural outgrowth of upper-class subversion of the State Department. The diseases of internationalism and collectivism, they suggested, were responsible for America's inability to protect its national interests in the Cold War. "Our whole foreign policy," Langer cried in 1949, "is crumbling around our heads, our most vital interests are being forsaken, our prestige is being irreparably undermined, our

security is increasingly threatened, and our principles have been trampled under foot." At fault was a "super-internationalism" that in the case of SEATO, Langer later warned, "would immediately drag us into a jungle war 10,000 miles away."²⁶

During 1948 Langer was the Republican Senator most often voting against his own party (52%). Yet, as he wrote a constituent in 1955, "I have never voted with the Democrats on foreign policy in my life." Langer's explanation was simple: "I usually try to vote the way the people who elected me three times would want me to vote and I have followed that policy for fourteen years now."²⁷ The nature of the noninterventionism expressed by both Langer and Burdick suggests that both were able to express the constituent needs and ideological affinities of North Dakotans in the Cold War era. For North Dakotans as well as other Americans of the period, however, the roots of these affinities were not always clear.

NOTES

1. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., "Southern Congressmen and the 'New Isolationism,'" Political Science Quarterly, 75 (September 1960), 337; Selig Adler, Remarks at Foreign Policy Session, 1956 Annual Meeting of American Historical Association, quoted by Robert P. Wilkins, "Senator William Langer and National Priorities: An Agrarian Radical's View of American Foreign Policy, 1945-1952," North Dakota Quarterly, 42 (Autumn 1974), 59n.

2. For examples of scholarship employing the concept of political culture, see LeRoy Ashby, The Spearless Leader: Senator Borah and the Progressive Movement in the 1920s (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), Don Kirschner, City and Country: Rural Responses to Urbanization in the 1920s (New York, 1970), James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1967), Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great Depression (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), and Justus D. Doenecke, Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1979).

3. Robert P. Wilkins, "The Non-Partisan League and Upper Midwest Isolationism," Agricultural History, 34 (April 1965), 102-109. See Wayne S. Cole, Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962).

4. Wilkins, "Senator William Langer," 42-43. Nye was defeated for re-election in the Republican primary of 1944. Milton Young assumed the seat in 1945. Although Young followed a mildly internationalist approach to foreign policy, he joined Langer and Burdick in condemnation of U.S. conduct of the Korean War.

5. Wilkins, "Senator William Langer," 43, 44-49; Agnes Geelan, The Dakota Maverick: The Political Life of William Langer (Fargo: Geelan, 1975); Glenn H. Smith, Langer of North Dakota: A Study in Isolationism, 1940-1959 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), 183-96, 55-62, 198-205. See Robert Griffith, "Old Progressives and the Cold War," Journal of

American History, 66 (September 1979), 334-47 and Doenecke, Not to the Swift.

6. "Lone Ranger from North Dakota," Economist, 173 (25 December 1954), 1084; "Judiciary's 'Wild Bill,'" New York Times Magazine (19 April 1953), 20; Wilkins, "Senator William Langer," 42-43; Radio Address, 16 October 1944, 2, William Langer, 1944-47, Papers of Jewish Community Relations Council of Minnesota, Minnesota Historical Society; Langer manuscript, 3 September 1943, Folder 3: Speeches, 1949-50, Box 274, Langer Papers, Orin G. Libby Manuscripts Collection, Chester Fritz Library, University of North Dakota; "A Call to Action," Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st session, 93, 25 July 1947, A3904-3905.

7. Geelan, Dakota Maverick, 109.

8. Langer speech manuscript, 27 May 1943, Folder 14: Speeches and Addresses, 1947-48, Box 223, Langer Papers; Langer to Malone, n.d., Folder 18: Trade/Truman Doctrine 1949-50, Box 275, Langer Papers; Geelan, Dakota Maverick, 119.

9. *Ibid.*, 109, 119; Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 154-55.

10. Wilkins, "Senator William Langer," 44; Geelan, Dakota Maverick, 117; Mr. and Mrs. Herman Steinke to Langer, 11 March 1946 and J.V. Anderson to Langer, 19 March 1946, Folder 6: British Loan, Mar-Apr. 1946, Box 144, Langer Papers.

11. Wilkins, "Senator William Langer," 45-46; Burdick, "The Marshall Plan: 'Stop Communism in Europe' and Build it Here," Folder 36: The Marshall Plan, Box 23, Burdick Papers, Orin G. Libby Manuscripts Collection, Chester Fritz Library, University of North Dakota; Senate Document NO. 7, "Independent Business--Its Struggle for Survival," quoted by Langer, "American Foreign Policy--A Blueprint for Our Own Destruction," Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 95, 17 February 1949, 1343.

12. Burdick to Mrs. C.H. Frissell, 17 July 1951, Folder 44; Economics: Price Stabilization, 1945-52, Box 6 Burdick Papers; Burdick, "The Marshall Plan," 2; Langer to R.M. Kiefer and attachments, 6 February 1948; Folder 1: Marshall Plan/Maternity Bill, 1949-50, Box 262, Langer Papers; Smith, 177-80. The question of exports, inflation, and agriculture is a complex one. While Langer complained that European competition depressed domestic grain prices, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio told Nebraska livestock dealers that the Marshall Plan export program had raised the price of grain so that it was impossible to feed livestock and provide an adequate supply of meat. Both the National Grange and the Farmers Union supported the European Recovery Program, lending credence to the theory that Marshall Plan subsidies improved farm commodity selling prices. Yet the staff director of the Republican Policy Committee told Senate Majority Leader Kenneth Wherry that export demand played only a small part in raising domestic prices. The true culprit was the domestic demand for products by people with spendable cash. See Taft Press Release, 13 February 1948, 7. Agriculture-Brannon, 1948, Box 484, Taft Papers, Library of Congress; A.S. Goss to Langer, 2 May 1950, Folder 1; Marshall Plan/Maternity Bill, 1949-50, Box 262, Langer Papers; Memo, George H.E. Smith to Wherry, 6 June 1947, attached to Smith to Taft, 10 June 1947, Marshall Plan, 1947, Box 714, Taft Papers.

13. Langer constituent mail, Folder 6; Marshall Plan, 1947-48, Box 218, Langer Papers; Doenecke, Not to the Swift, 156; Langer, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on H.R. 9678, the Mutual Security Act of 1954,

Report No. 1799, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 13 July 1954, 49. The files of Ohio's Senator John W. Bricker illustrate another way in which the Marshall Plan worked against small and medium-size business: European recipients insisted on spending their subsidies on products manufactured by the largest American industrial concerns and refused to patronize the smaller companies. See E.C.A., 1949, Box 88, Papers of John W. Bricker, Ohio Historical Society. For the connection between noninterventionist thought in the Cold War era and rural and small business hostility to eastern finance and corporate dominance see Joan Lee Bryniarski, Against the Tide: Senate Opposition to the Internationalist Foreign Policy of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, 1943-1949 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 1972).

14. Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 16-18, 52-54; Earl J. Brekke, Usher L. Burdick and Mid-West Isolationism: A Study in Foreign Policy (Grand Forks: Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, UND, 1964), 4-5; Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 107.

15. Ibid., 220-21; Burdick, "The Selective Service Draft," Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 98 (27 February 1952), 1561; Mr. and Mrs. William Gruebels to Burdick, 20 January 1951, attached to Burdick to Gruebels, 26 January 1951, Folder 15: Foreign Affairs Misc., 1951-58, Box 7, Burdick Papers; Michael R. Sponberg, North Dakota and the Korean War, 1950-1951: A Study in Public Opinion (Grand Forks: Unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of North Dakota, 1969), 24; Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 22.

16. Langer, "American Foreign Policy," 1343; Langer to R.A. Stenson, 2 January 1951, Folder 1: Foreign Policy, 1953-54, Box 505, Langer Papers.

17. Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 99n, 118-28; Extract of Address . . . on the United Nations Charter, n.d., p. 3, Folder 16: Speeches and Addresses, 1947-48, Box 223, Langer Papers; Wilkins, "Senator William Langer," 43-44, 51. Langer occasionally attacked U.S. economic imperialism. See his assertion that the UN would permit the Morgan interests to establish banks "in the four corners of the earth," in Wilkins, Senator William Langer, 43. Also see a powerful excerpt from a 1945 radio speech in Griffith, "Old Progressives," 344-45. On the UN vote, Langer told a constituent that seven other Senators privately had said that he had voted right in opposing U.S. membership. See Langer to Jane Mann, 4 October 1945, Folder 4: United Nations Charter, 1945, Box 146, Langer Papers.

18. Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 129. Langer's virulent anti-colonialism bears out the contention of Robert Wilkins that the Senator "was a carbon copy of the isolationist of world War I and the years leading up to Pearl Harbor." See Wilkins, "Senator William Langer," 58-59.

19. Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 116-119, 130; Wilkins, "Middle Western Isolationism: A Re-examination," North Dakota Quarterly, 25 (Summer 1957), 71; Speech Manuscript, "The Loan to England," n.d. (1945), Folder 3: Speeches, 1949-50, Box 274, Langer Papers; Minority Views on H.R. 9678, 13 July 1954, 16, Folder 10: Mutual Security, 1953-54, Box 510, Langer Papers. Forty-eight per cent of rural midwesterners expressed anti-British sentiments in a government poll take in 1942. See Bureau of Intelligence, Office of Facts and Figures, Survey of Intelligence Materials, No. 28 (17 June 1942), PSF, OWI, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library.

20. Langer, Minority Views on H.R. 9678, 7; Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 73; Wilkins, "Senator William Langer," 47; Langer to James J. Hill, 22 January 1948, Folder 6: Marshall Plan, 1947-48, Box 218, Langer Papers.

21. Langer, "Diplomatic and Foreign Service," Congressional Record, 43 (11 July 1947), 8691-8704; Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 49-50; Extract of Address on United Nations Charter, 2.

22. Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 109-110, 44-45; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report on H.R. 9678, the Mutual Security Act of 1954, Report NO. 1799, Part II, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 13 July 1954, 47, 49-50.

23. Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 51-52; Speech draft, n.d., Folder 5, Speeches, 1949-50, Box 274, Langer Papers.

24. Smith, Langer of North Dakota, 48; Congressional Record, 78th Congr., 1st sess., 89, 28 May 1943, 5025.

25. Burdick Press Release, 12 April 1951, Folder 43: Truman's Refusal to Consult Congress on Sending Troops Overseas--UMT, Box 31, Burdick Papers; Langer, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d ses., 96, 23 September 1950, 15656-7. For a discussion of economic one-worlders and the reciprocal trade issue, see Langer to Malone and attachments, Folder 18: Trade/Truman Doctrine, 1949-50, Box 275, Langer Papers. For Langer's view on presidential power and military commitments, see Smith, Langer of North Dakota, iv, 189. For North Dakotan congressional and constituent response to the Korean War, see Sponberg, 30, 115, 117, 228.

26. "American Foreign Policy," 1341; Geelan, Dakota Maverick, 120.

27. Langer to D.C. Ridings, 24 March 1944, Folder 4: Foreign Aid Speech, 1955-56, Box 533, Langer Papers.