

The Congo question: Conflicting visions of independence

JONATHAN J. COLE -- *History Department, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720 (jjcole@berkeley.edu)*

INTRODUCTION

It was November 30, 1960. Only half a year prior, Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the Congo, had addressed thronging crowds in honor of the formal declaration of Congolese independence. But on this day, he bore no reminder of his status as the preeminent political figure in the nation. He no longer wore the maroon sash of the order of the Crown, Belgium's highest decoration, but rather the marks of a man beaten, tortured, and spat upon, the high fashion of the political prisoner. Yet in the face of death, Patrice Lumumba's last letter to his wife Pauline expressed his undying dream of independence, both for the Congo and the entire African continent. "Do not weep for me," he told his wife. "History will one day have its say; it will not be the history taught in the United Nations, Washington, Paris, or Brussels, but the history taught in the countries that have rid themselves of colonialism and its puppets. Africa will write its own history, and both north and south of the Sahara it will be a history full of glory and dignity."¹ The power of these words came not only from their refutation of the most basic logic of colonial rule, but because they countered the pervasive racism that had legitimated Africa's subjugation to foreign powers, even in the wake of independence. However, this passage has another compelling story to tell, for it is in this small statement that Lumumba presented not only his hopes for the future of Africa, but an indictment of the very process of decolonization that precipitated the Congo Crisis.

When the former Belgian colony of the Congo gained its independence on June 30, 1960, the struggle for an independent Africa had already claimed its first victories. Yet, with over sixteen states to achieve independence in the year 1960 alone, the pace of decolonization elicited some concern. "The wind of change is blowing through this continent," declared British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in an address to the South African Congress, "and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact."

Indeed, the British had been early to recognize this "political fact" and had already begun to transfer political power over to their former colonies in India and Pakistan (1947), Egypt (1952), and the Gold Coast, known today as Ghana (1957). Similarly, growing discontent amongst their colonial subjects forced the French to set in motion their own decolonization policy with the formation of the French Community (la

Communauté) in 1958, which offered autonomy as an intermediate step toward independence. Nevertheless, it would be wholly naive to say that Britain or France had willfully dismantled their empires simply to appease nationalist sentiments in the colonies or to avoid military entanglement with insurrectionary groups. In fact, both Britain and France had shown their resolve to retain their colonies in the face of such pressure in Kenya against the Mau Mau insurrection and in Algeria against the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale). Instead, the process of decolonization, as cultivated by Europe and the United States, represented the renegotiation of power on the continent, a means of preserving European and American interests and influence in the postcolony.

The conflict in the Congo represented the confluence of many socio-historical trajectories, namely the rise of African-led political movements, the decline of imperial power, and the growth of the non-aligned movement, which upset the balance of power between the two global superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result of this constellation of forces, the crisis became a hotly contested historical moment, a moment that had divergent meanings for its African, European, and American participants.

I intend to show that these divergent appraisals set the stage for the conflict between Lumumba's African nationalism and countervailing Euro-American policies towards independence, or more aptly, interdependence. To that end this essay will explore the motivations for U.S. intervention in the Congo and their implications for national self-determination in postcolonial Africa. Juxtaposing Lumumba's African nationalism with the logic of American intervention, I will argue that the United States purposely undermined the legitimacy of the democratic state of the Congo in order to promote its own definition of African independence and protect its interests and influence both on the continent and in the international political arena. Fueled by concerns ranging from the anti-colonialism of African nationalists to the anti-communism of Washington policymakers, the Congo thus became a battleground for competing internationalist visions of an independent Africa and a wider postcolonial world order.

THE CONGO QUESTION

As far as officials in the Eisenhower administration were concerned, the independence of the Congo, more than any

other country in Africa, represented a serious threat to American interests on the continent. Consequently, U.S. officials, in concert with Belgium and even the United Nations, made every attempt possible to manipulate the crisis in the Congo to suit their perceived interests. However, to explore fully the motivations for intervention it is necessary to go beyond the Cold War and its context, and to ask, Why did the United States single out Lumumba as the source of its problems in the Congo? Certainly Cold War competition can not be excluded—it was a crucial motivation for U.S. policy at this time—but its emphasis has been at the cost of other essential factors, namely the vision of Africa that Lumumba had articulated.

Foreign policy scholars often cite the Cold War as the determining factor for American intervention in the Congo. In this vein Madeline Kalb's *The Congo Cables* and Stephen R. Weissman's *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964* represent the dominant analytical perspective throughout much of the secondary literature on the crisis, even in studies examining the United Nations' role in the conflict.² Juxtaposing the policy objectives of the United States against the outcomes of intervention, both Kalb and Weissman offer analyses that consider the relative successes or failures of U.S. action in the context of the Cold War.

For Kalb, American policy in the Congo was a resounding success relative to the U.S.'s objectives in thwarting Communist intervention. The rise of General Joseph Mobutu to power in 1963 marked the victory of the United States over the Soviet threat in the Congo. As Kalb argues, "the radicals were out of power, a moderate government and an elected Parliament were functioning in Léopoldville, and the Katanga secession had been ended with comparatively little loss of life or property"; thus the goals of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations had been accomplished.³

Weissman, on the other hand, is far more critical of America's involvement in the Congo. He suggests that U.S. policy under all three administrations exaggerated the threat of Soviet intervention. Thus, the administration under Eisenhower and later Kennedy and Johnson fundamentally misunderstood the political situation on the ground and imposed policies that may have alienated or ignored far more palatable solutions to the conflict, including the possibility for a more democratic, African-led form of nation building. As Weissman's book clearly suggests, to limit the directives of American policy to their Cold War context overemphasizes the ideological concerns over practical and political realities of the Congo Crisis. To counter the inconsistency between policy and practice, recent studies have set aside the perceived threat of communism in favor of alternative explanations for intervention.

In *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention*, David Gibbs contends that economic interests were the guiding force behind U.S. policy in the Congo.⁴ Though Gibbs admits that the threat of Soviet intervention impacted U.S. policy towards the Congo, the commitment to anticommunism was secondary at best. Instead, Gibbs asserts that the U.S. policy towards the Congo reflected the complex and often contradictory economic concerns of individuals within the administration as well as Congress. By demonstrating that officials within both presidential administrations were intimately connected with pro-colonial and anti-colonial business interests in the Congo, Gibbs provides a compelling explanation of the motivations behind U.S. intervention and the shift in policy between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

Ludo de Witte's *The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba* adopts a slightly different approach to understanding both the motivations of the conflict and its relevance to the context of decolonization.⁵ Though, like Gibbs, de Witte emphasizes the economic prerogatives that motivated foreign interests to intervene in the crisis, de Witte tells the story of intervention through the life, or more appropriately, the death of the Congo's most significant protagonist following independence, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Tracing Lumumba's career from his rapid rise to power to his eventual arrest and execution, de Witte exposes the secret story of Belgian and American complicity in both the murder of Patrice Lumumba and the sabotage of Congolese independence.⁶

As de Witte suggests, the Congo Crisis was not a tribal or local conflict, nor was it a civil war. Rather, the conflict that emerged in the Congo was an engineered conflict, perpetrated and perpetuated by Belgian, U.S., and U.N. forces. Lumumba's death thus serves as a potent symbol of the conflict, a symbol of the death of a nation and the destruction of the dream of African independence at the hands of foreign powers.

Lumumba was a central character in the crisis that followed independence (Fig. 1). He embodied the struggle of African leaders to articulate their own vision of an independent Africa, conducive to the ideological concerns of the Western world but most importantly, in line with African needs and desires. Even prior to independence, Lumumba and his party, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), attracted the attention of both the U.S. and Belgian governments, but as progress towards independence quickened, Lumumba's powerful influence and national popularity thrust him onto the international stage and brought scrutiny upon his every move.

Analysts in the State department offered varying prognoses for the stability and security of post-independence Congo, but agreed that Lumumba threatened U.S. and European




Figure 1. Patrice Lumumba in Stanleyville, May 1960. Photo by Dr. D'Lynn Waldron. Reproduced with permission of the photographer.

“interests in the Congo and Africa generally.”⁷ Even as ambassadors and other administration officials noted Lumumba’s intelligence and charisma, the overall portrayal of Lumumba in U.S. State department correspondence is overwhelmingly critical. Conflicted over the role of Lumumba in the early phases of the movement for independence, the administration ultimately turned against him, labeling him “a Castro or worse,” as Alan Dulles suggested, and eventually attempted to eliminate him from the picture altogether.⁸

Focusing inordinately on economic or ideological motives for intervention, previous studies have failed to address why U.S. officials despised and distrusted Lumumba. Why, after repeated affirmations of his desire to cooperate with the West, did the United States government simply portray him as a Communist stooge? This disparity between the perceptions of administration officials and the professed intentions of Lumumba complicates the picture presented in the historical record. Though certainly the context of the Cold War played an important role in mobilizing U.S. policy against Lumumba’s regime, it is clear that the U.S. perceptions of African culture and the capability for self-government framed the logic of American intervention.

Responding to the overwhelmingly negative and often racist assumptions about the prospects for Congolese independence, Kevin Dunn’s *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity* presents a new analytical lens with which to understand the Eisenhower administration’s perceptions of the Congo crisis. Dunn’s work, while aimed at contextualizing the construction of Congolese identity within the history of international relations more broadly, incorporates a key theme that is absent in previous studies of the crisis: identity. In his chapter on Congolese independence, Dunn relates how conflicting perceptions of Congolese history and identity were at the root of the struggle between Lumumba and the United States. Acting upon different cultural “scripts,” Belgium, Lumumba and the Eisenhower administration interpreted the situation in the Congo in divergent ways. “Operating within its own scripted narrative of cold war competition and Congolese barbarity and chaos,” Dunn insists that the United States “pursued interventionist policies that included the forceful removal of Patrice Lumumba.”⁹ The silencing of Lumumba, and his alternative narrative of Congolese history and identity thus marked the triumph of the United States’ own vision of the Congo.

The issue of identity has significant implications for the post-independence struggle in the Congo. Yet, as Dunn emphasizes the cultural contexts that created the divide between Lumumba and the United States, he qualifies the significance of these cultural representations of “the Congo” in relation to other ideological factors, i.e., Cold War competition. In this respect, Dunn privileges the context of the Cold War over other factors and neglects the other contexts to the crisis, particularly the rise of the Afro-Asian block in the United Nations and the shifting tides of global public opinion towards African independence. Furthermore, as his focus centers solely on the Congo, he fails to address how these cultural assumptions affected U.S. policy toward African independence as a whole.

Predicated on representations of “barbarity and chaos” lifted from the colonial narrative of Congolese history, U.S. policy makers projected stereotypes of cultural backwardness, immaturity, and irrationality onto the post-colonial Congo, and more specifically, onto Patrice Lumumba. Ranging from criticisms of his ineptitude as an administrator to outright accusations of Communist intrigue, the U.S. portrayal of Lumumba embodied the key cultural assumptions that informed U.S. policy towards independence not simply for the Congo but for Africa as a whole. However, more than simply the racist rhetoric of Administration officials, American intervention in the Congo reflected an evolving policy towards the decolonization of Africa and America’s projected role in the region. Thus, the administration’s battle with Lumumba was not a conflict between East and West, but rather a conflict between competing international visions of a postcolonial world order.

THE BATTLE FOR AFRICA

By as early as July 17, 1960, little more than two weeks after the celebration of Congolese independence, U.S. officials concluded that the possibility for peace and stability in the Congo had nearly vanished. In a telegram to the Department of State, Ambassador Timberlake declared that

The Congo may be in its death throes as a modern nation. The Congo itself was never such a nation and no Congolese has any real comprehension of what makes a nation live. They consequently do not understand that it may be dying. The 100,000 Europeans were the ones who did know but they never managed to communicate either their knowledge or their higher skills to enough Congolese to make any significant difference.¹⁰

Timberlake, like many other officials within the Eisenhower administration, interpreted the situation as an “African” problem. Even as Timberlake acknowledged the fact that certain Belgians, particularly within the military, also contributed to the chaos in the Congo by behaving “worse than the worst Congolese,” the ambassador invariably devolved blame onto the shoulders of the Congolese. Seeing the populace, and the government itself, as unready and unprepared for the demands of nationhood and independence, Timberlake suggested that the best course of action in the Congo was intervention.

Conversely, Lumumba’s address to the Congolese Chamber of Deputies made on July 15, 1960, presented a radically different version of events. For Lumumba, the chaos of the Congo was not a product of African ineptitude or even tribal animosities. Rather the real problem that the Congo faced was unwarranted and unsolicited foreign intervention.

In a speech to the Congolese national assembly, Lumumba recalled that he and president Kasavubu had set out on their own diplomatic mission to Katanga in order to address the deteriorating situation following the mutiny of the army and the Katangese secession. However, their attempts proved futile as Belgian troops and Katangese officials denied their requests to land at the Elizabethville airport, and without their knowledge told the pilot of their plane to return to Léopoldville. During another attempt to secure air transport into the interior of the country, Lumumba recollected how he and the president were ambushed by a mob of Europeans, both civilians and military personnel, who shouted insults and epithets at them calling them, “‘apes,’ ‘murderers,’ ‘hoodlums,’ and ‘thieves,’ and so on. . . . Some of them,” Lumumba noted, “spat in my face and pulled my beard, and one of them jostled me and took my glasses.” Continuing with his speech, Lumumba further expressed his disbelief at the situation saying, “Dear deputies, you cannot imagine the

scenes we have witnessed in the last ten days! Can you imagine a chief of state and a head of government of an independent country dragged in the mud, insulted, and publicly vilified by foreigners on their own territory like that?”¹¹

While both Lumumba and Timberlake were privy to the same information about the state of the country, their perceptions of the conflict diverged significantly. Timberlake’s portrayal of the situation in the Congo emphasized the perceived backwardness of the African against the backdrop of Western civilization. In his mind, the “nation” was a concept utterly foreign and perhaps even unattainable for the Congolese people. Europeans were the bearers of civilization, of nationhood and independence, but those 100,000 Europeans who had brought the light of modernity and progress to the Congo had left, leaving only chaos in their wake. Lumumba, on the other hand, projected a different narrative of Congolese history onto the crisis. Even as Lumumba adopted Western constructions of political authority, human rights, and international law to support the cause of independence, he repudiated the colonial project as the source for the current plight and privation of the Congolese people and more importantly, singled out Belgian intervention as the root cause of the problems post-independence.

Based on opposing perspectives of Congolese history and identity, Lumumba and the United States envisioned Congolese independence in contradictory ways. For Lumumba, the independence of the Congo necessitated a definitive break with Belgium. While this did not rule out close cooperation with Belgium or the West, such cooperation had to be based on the equality and friendship of nations and could not violate the country’s right to economic and political self-determination. The United States, however, pursued a vision of Congolese independence based upon an elaboration of Africa’s future interdependence with Europe: EurAfrica. Within this model of Congolese nationhood, Africa was to remain, as Secretary of State Dulles put it, “the hinterland of Europe.” It was this contradiction that informed the United States’ objectives to displace, discredit, and destroy Lumumba.

THE WORLD ACCORDING TO WASHINGTON

In the decade prior to the independence of the Congo, the African continent, particularly south of the Sahara, assumed the lowest priority on the United States’ foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade, as demands for independence gathered momentum, the United States had begun to reevaluate its policy to respond to a changing geopolitical climate. Assuming only a supporting role in the process of decolonization, the United States essentially pledged its close cooperation with its NATO allies, i.e., the European colonial powers, in developing the political and

economic resources deemed necessary to the devolution of political power. Often this assistance took the form of economic aid as well as educational grants and scholarships for Africans to study in the United States. However, the peculiar circumstances of the Congo warranted a more direct involvement in the decolonization process.

Reports charting the progress of African decolonization singled out the Belgian Congo early on as a potential site of conflict. In 1958, after a 10-week tour of the continent, U.S. diplomat Julius C. Holmes warned in his report that "The virus of self-government has reached the Congo," and even though Belgium had initiated the first steps towards self-government with the formation of municipal advisory councils, these elections were but a "small concession to African political aspirations."¹² In the following year, as news of rioting in the Congo's capital, Léopoldville, reached Washington, officials once more expressed their concerns over the prospects for a peaceful transition. Alarmed by what he called the "rapidly evolving revolution in Africa," Henry Cabot Lodge, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, insisted that the United States respond more vigorously to the deteriorating situation in Africa.¹³

Up to that point the U.S. managed to sidestep issues of African independence, allowing colonial powers to manage the transfer of authority according to their own schedules, as in Ghana or French West Africa. Yet as the prevailing opinion on the continent came to embrace the slogan, "better the ragged shirt of independence than the warm blanket of colonial protection,"¹⁴ officials increasingly found themselves in a difficult position. On one hand, U.S. officials were concerned about alienating the United States' NATO allies by directly supporting nationalist aspirations in the colonies. On the other hand, the United States also feared becoming too closely associated with European imperialism.

Concerns over the question of "nationalism versus colonialism" certainly tested the United States relationship with the Belgian government. As Karl G. Harr, Jr. suggested in a report on the situation in Africa, "the Belgians have become so suspicious of all U.S. activities in the Belgian Congo that it has been necessary to approach them at a high level and tell them frankly the reasons for increased U.S. activity in Africa."¹⁵ Yet as this statement also suggests, the United States invariably set the interests of Europe before any real concern for the interests of Africans. While the United States maintained friendly relations with emerging African leaders and continued visibly to press for the cause of independence, behind the scenes the United States supported a more conservative vision of independence: EurAfrica.

Despite the rhetoric of independence, democracy, equality, and self-determination, the administration's new Africa policy

offered only a circumscribed freedom for these African nations. New colonial policies encouraging "development" and "cooperation" simply replaced the former paternalism of the colonial enterprise with new euphemisms for foreign domination. Thus, independence was once more deferred to fit the prerogatives of foreign powers, namely Europe and the United States.

Support for this policy of mediated independence reflected the administration's apprehension over the prospects for African self-rule, particularly in the Congo. Yet, even as U.S. officials criticized the shortcomings of Belgium's program of development, intelligence reports stressed internal factors as the primary cause for the political and economic backwardness. As one intelligence report concluded, only months before the formal declaration of Congolese independence,

The African population of this area is poorly prepared for self-government. Despite the spectacular postwar quickening of economic activity in such places as the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo, most Africans still live the primitive life of the hinterland. Tribal loyalties and jealousies continue to play a major political role throughout the area, thereby handicapping the efforts of African leaders to develop unified political movements and provoking sometimes violent intertribal conflicts.¹⁶

Even the opposite trajectory, detribalization, i.e., the weakening of these tribal ties, elicited troubled reactions from State Department officials. As one report noted, "These traditions, while breaking up at an accelerated pace, remain strong, and even the urban African looks for a source of authority to replace the head of the tribe or family. Until some new loyalty is provided, the detribalized African will be an easy target for elements eager to exploit his traditional need for leadership and guidance."¹⁷

Referring to the situation of the "detribalized African" relative to the unstated, but assumed counterpoints of Western modernity, progress, civilization, and even nationalism, these statements embodied the negative cultural assumptions that shaped America's policy towards the Congo and African independence more generally. For these officials, even the most modern African, i.e., "the urban African," could not escape his or her own "primitive" cultural roots nor elude the "traditional need for leadership and guidance," making him or her a likely "target" for foreign subversion and influence, particularly at the hands of Communists.

The problem of premature independence was a serious concern for policy makers in Washington. As one American commentator noted,

The greatest problem confronting Central Africa was the human problem. The Spirit of 1776 was running wild throughout the area. The various states and colonies want independence now, whether they are ready for it or not. In some respects this phenomenon was rather terrifying, as one deduced from reading the biography of Nkrumah.¹⁸

Essentially, American officials identified these demands for independence as part of a larger African epidemic, a result of the “virus of self-government.” Approaching the question of independence from a normative perspective, as a question of intellectual and psychological health, U.S. officials dictated the course of independence, defining the discursive boundaries of “constructive” and “destructive” nationalist movements.¹⁹ As a result, African leaders walked a fine line to allay U.S. fears regarding the destructive tendencies of African nationalism.

The perceived instability of the African consciousness led many within the administration to conclude that expressions of Pan-Africanism and African nationalism, if not properly guided, posed a significant danger to the continued stability of the African continent. Commenting on the significance of the 1958 All African Peoples’ Conference in Accra, Robert Murphy cautioned that the “drive towards self-rule presented the free world with a challenge to accommodate themselves to it and ensure a continuing and fruitful association between Africa and the West.”²⁰ “Above all,” Murphy concluded,

the United States wished to avoid the African nationalism turning into a massive anti-European movement which the Communists could exploit. The Africans were on the whole immature and unsophisticated and were subject to many pressures — Communist, Pan-African, Islamic — all of which made it difficult for those African leaders who were Western-minded to keep the followers on the right path.²¹

Nowhere was the threat of African nationalism more apparent than in the recently liberated African nation of Guinea. U.S. officials continually cited Sekou Touré’s Guinea as the prime example of the problem of premature independence, given the rupture of relations with its colonial Metropole, France, and the new nation’s subsequent entreaties for Soviet aid.²² Ultimately, U.S. officials tolerated African nationalism, and Lumumba as its symbol, as long as it coincided with U.S. interests in preserving its vision of EurAfrica.

The administration’s anxiety about the prospects of African independence involved more than just concerns about African cultural and political sensibilities, American officials also cited the lack of technical, professional, and administrative knowledge required for self-rule. The situation thus predicated the need for continued presence of European forces even after

independence. In talks with the Belgian ambassador, for instance, Secretary of State Dulles supported Belgium’s desire to temper the pace towards an independent Congo citing that “although the U.S. believed in the basic proposition that ‘governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,’ this did not mean that wholly untrained people exercise these powers until they were prepared to assume them.”²³ In this statement Dulles clearly endorsed Belgium’s program for a gradualist approach towards independence; a policy that not only reaffirmed stereotypes of African inferiority and instability, but also legitimized the continuation of colonial power under the auspices of “development.”

In this same meeting with the Belgian ambassador, Dulles clarified the United States position on African independence affirming that “It is coming more and more to be realized that independence, which each of our nations rightly cherishes, can only be preserved by the practice of interdependence.” This was a striking statement in the context of a conversation about African and more specifically Congolese independence. Referring to the “larger framework of EurAfrica” envisioned by Minister Wigny, Secretary Dulles ultimately concluded that “the future greatness of Europe depended on the greater unity of continental Europe and on the greater unity of continental Europe and Africa. Africa was the hinterland of Europe.”²⁴

The pretext of Communist subversion in the Congo therefore justified the logic of American intervention in the Congo. However, the divide between the United States and Lumumba stemmed not from Cold War calculations but rather from the clash of two distinct visions of postcolonial Africa. In this “world according to Washington,” Cold War competition loomed large in discussions over policy, yet the overwhelming consensus about the situation in the Congo did not hinge upon the shared assessments over the threat of Communist infiltration. Rather the consensus in Washington centered on the perception that African independence was utterly premature and thereby posed a serious threat to the interests of both the United States and Europe.

U.S. officials interpreted the events following independence, particularly the mutiny of the Congolese army and the Katangese secession, as a product of internal factors, more specifically, the byproduct of tribal rivalries and Africa’s general political and economic backwardness. Even as President Eisenhower denounced “Russia’s unilateral intervention” in the Congo, he declared that such actions simply exacerbated what he referred to as “an already serious situation which finds Africans killing Africans.” Furthermore, the president condemned the Soviet entreaties on behalf of the constitutionally elected Lumumbist government by declaring that “the constitutional structure of the Congo republic is a question which should be worked out by the

Congolese themselves,” and therefore Soviet intervention would simply be at odds with the political will of the Congolese people.²⁵

Yet, as Eisenhower fervently decried “the Soviet Union’s political designs in Africa,” in conjunction with Belgium and the white Settler states in the region, the United States actively pursued its own designs for the Congo, offering not only diplomatic support for Belgium’s occupation of Katanga, but also funding for anyone who would openly challenge the central government headed by Lumumba. Undeniably, the rhetoric of the administration simply did not measure up to the political realities on the ground.

DEFINING INDEPENDENCE

The Eisenhower administration’s early portrayals of Lumumba were marked by this same characteristic duality. On one hand, officials depicted Lumumba as “a highly articulate, sophisticated, subtle and unprincipled intelligence.”²⁶ Furthermore, they stressed Lumumba’s importance to the success of independence, citing the “imminent danger of widespread chaos if government of national unity, including Lumumba, cannot be formed.”²⁷ Even as officials like Secretary Dulles insisted that Lumumba was irrefutably a communist, many within the administration dismissed these charges, arguing that “leaders, such as Gizenga, Lumumba, and Kashamura, who are tarred with the communist brush, cannot be considered seriously committed to the communist camp.”²⁸

Yet, as the situation in the Congo progressed another side of Lumumba’s character displaced these positive appraisals. Consonant with the assumptions about the political and cultural immaturity of “the African,” U.S. officials questioned Lumumba’s political, psychological, and moral dependability. Prior to Congolese independence, Alan Dulles had already concluded that Lumumba was a threat, insisting “he was irresponsible, had been charged with embezzlement, was now being offered bribes from various sources and was supported by Belgian Communists.”²⁹ A report by the American ambassador in Belgium conspicuously noted Lumumba’s tardiness, arriving “about a half an hour late for the appointment (which had been postponed twice before),” and added that, “from a financial point of view, it is worth noting that Lumumba kept a taxi waiting in front of the embassy for the forty minutes or so which was covered by our conversation.”³⁰

In the wake of independence, the attacks upon Lumumba’s character continued, accusing him of being inept, opportunistic, duplicitous, authoritarian, “a dope fiend,” and simply “crazy.” These ad hominem attacks demonstrated the administration’s growing hostility towards Lumumba.

Lacking any concrete evidence of corruption or malfeasance on the part of the democratically elected Prime Minister, U.S. officials resorted to personal attacks as a means of discrediting Lumumba’s authority and justifying his removal. More significantly though, the administration’s suspicions of Lumumba stemmed from a fundamental distrust of African nationalism.

Based upon an assumption that “Africa was the hinterland of Europe,” it is unsurprising that the United States adopted such a skewed perception of Patrice Lumumba. Although the contexts of Cold War competition and economic interests abound in these and other policy statements, the great divide between the United States and Lumumba hinged upon this supposition about the future of independence, or “interdependence,” as it was. Given the United States’ alignment with the colonial powers and their assertions about African cultural inferiority and political and administrative inexperience, their devotion to an independent Africa was resoundingly hollow. If Africa would indeed remain an appendage of Europe, what kind of African “nation” would follow in the Congo?

Lumumba, in fact, had struggled with just such a question. International involvement in the Congo had been an accepted and even assumed condition of independence by both Belgian and Congolese leaders. Congolese leaders, both radical and moderate, considered Belgian economic and administrative aid as essential to the formation of an independent Congolese state. However, the disintegration of relations between the newly formed state of the Congo, headed by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, and the Belgian government highlighted how African independence was a hotly contested issue. Ironically, both sides of this divide spoke in terms of development, cooperation, nationalism, and decolonization, yet their interpretations of these terms and their use of the language of independence diverged. While the United States and Belgium defined independence within the continuing narrative of colonial development – *la mission civilisatrice* – Lumumba had rejected the very premise of this policy and identified Belgian colonialism as the prime cause not only of the post-independence crisis but also of Congo’s state of underdevelopment.

Lumumba’s early thoughts on national unity and independence were influenced a great deal by European thought and culture. Like many of the Congolese leaders involved in the movement for independence, Lumumba came from an elite class of Congolese called the *évolués*.³¹ His identity as an *évolué* stemmed from this association with European rather than African culture. Yet, he adopted European ideals of liberty, equality, democracy, and human rights consciously as a means of protesting against Belgian colonialism. In his posthumously published book, *Congo*,

My Country, Lumumba proposed several reform measures to promote equality and justice in colonial administration, encourage economic and political development, and eventually prepare the Congo for independence. He further argued that the problem of Congolese identity could be traced to the problem of colonialism. "The Africans of the Congo," he notes, "are neither Congolese (because they have lost their Congolese nationality as a result of the annexation of the Congo to Belgium) nor Belgians (because they do not have Belgian citizenship)."³² Thus through colonialism, the native people of the Congo had been unduly stripped of their identity and therefore their legal rights under international law.

Contrary to Euro-American perceptions of tribalism, Lumumba suggested that ethnic divisiveness in the Congo and Africa emerged not from the backwardness of African political sensibilities but from colonial manipulations of African traditions. At a seminar held by the University of Ibadan, for instance, Lumumba warned of the dangers of tribalism exclaiming, "All our compatriots must be persuaded that they will not serve the general interest of the country if they are divided or if they foster such division, any more than they would serve it by balkanizing our country and partitioning it into weak little states."³³ Only by maintaining the unity and integrity of the nation could the Congolese hope one day to create "a rich, free, and prosperous country, with regard to both its domestic and its foreign relations," Lumumba argued.

The theme of national unity thus permeated Lumumba's thought and speech. Lumumba realized the dangers of tribalism in the struggle against independence. He thought only in terms of the nation. He referred to his fellow Congolese leaders as "brothers" and worked fervently to cobble together a coalition of political parties to demand independence. Lumumba knew that tribal loyalties threatened not only the achievement of independence but also the viability of the nation post-independence. If the Congolese people wanted true independence and freedom, their struggle would require them to maintain solidarity in the face of external pressures both from the East and the West. Maintaining national unity thus became a central aim of Lumumba's government. By promoting unity, both nationally and internationally (with the aid of independent states such as Ghana and Guinea), Lumumba hoped to avoid the dangerous entanglements and intrigues by Belgium or the Cold War powers.

As expressed throughout his political career, Lumumba never wished to sever ties diplomatically, economically, or otherwise with Belgium or the West. If anything, Lumumba actively encouraged Western investment and aid. Constantly, Lumumba found himself having to respond to charges that he wished to deport white settlers or forcibly confiscate their property. Yet even in the fiercest of tirades against colonialism, he always held out the hand of collaboration

proclaiming, "The Congo has wanted to be independent, but this does not mean that it wants to be isolated from the rest of the world. To all those who are willing to collaborate loyally with it, the Congo extends the hand of friendship. And it is my profound and sincere desire, as it is that of my government and of the entire Congolese nation, that Belgium be the first to take this hand held out to her and thus seal an indissoluble pact of brotherhood between you and us."³⁴

Despite these pleas for cooperation, the continued presence of Belgium troops and the refusal of the Belgian government to adhere to the agreements signed after independence strained relations between the Congo and Belgium. Supporting secessionist forces in Katanga and ignoring the demands of the democratically elected central government, the actions by the Belgian state convinced Lumumba that Belgium was set upon destroying the unity of the nation. Unable to travel freely within his own country, then assaulted and harassed by Belgian armed forces, Lumumba decided to turn to foreign powers for help.

After the United States denied Lumumba's requests for intervention, the United Nations seemed the only logical place to seek assistance. Lumumba turned to the United Nations primarily because he wished to keep the Cold War out of Africa. Consistently, Lumumba had used international law and the U.N. charter as a means to advance the cause of independence. Moreover, Lumumba and other African nationalists looked to the international body as an ally in the struggle against colonialism. Like Kwame Nkrumah, Lumumba advocated a policy of positive neutralism, non-alignment with either West or East. However, accusations that he was part of a Communist conspiracy or that he had been schooled in "revolutionary techniques" forced him continually to affirm his neutrality. "We are not now communists and we never will be," Lumumba asserted,

despite the campaign of destruction and obstruction that enemies of our independence have waged throughout the country. We are simply Africans. We do not want to subject ourselves to any foreign influence, we want nothing to do with any imported doctrines, whether from the West, from Russia, or from America. The Congo remains the Congo. We are Africans. We want to make the Congo a great free nation. We do not want to escape one dictatorship only to fall beneath another. We are not what people think we are, because we are a decent people.³⁵

Furthermore, Lumumba on several occasions took the opportunity to confront the inconsistencies and racial assumptions behind this Cold War paranoia. "King Baudouin's grandmother, Queen Elizabeth of the Belgians, is president of the Belgo-Russian friendship society. Is she a

communist?" asked Lumumba. "I remember a time not long ago, when the president of the chamber of representatives, M. Kronacker, went to Moscow. Radio Prague announced the fact. Was he considered a communist? Was he accused because of his trip of having sold Belgium to Russia? But now, if Lumumba or Gizenga or anyone else from the Congo goes to Moscow, the press goes wild. Anyone else can go, but not the niggers!"³⁶ In this respect, Lumumba had suggested that the charges of communism leveled against him had less to do with the political realities of the Congo than with the designs of Belgium and the United States to impose their own vision of Congolese independence.

Lumumba's anti-communist and pro-Western rhetoric did not engender the support that he desired, nor did the situation in the Congo improve with the onset of United Nations operations. Instead, occupied by foreign forces, Lumumba became a prisoner in his own country. Belgian forces denied Lumumba and President Kasavubu access to their own airports, limiting their ability to address the secession crisis in Katanga. Moreover, after Kasavubu, backed by the United States, unilaterally deposed Lumumba as Prime Minister on September 5, 1960, United Nations troops prevented Lumumba from using the Congolese national radio station to broadcast his protests of Kasavubu's actions. Within the course of only a few months, Lumumba's dream of an independent Congo crumbled before him.

Examining Lumumba's speeches and writings against the backdrop of documents from the U.S. State department exposes the divide between policy and reality. In numerous instances the U.S. officials expressed the need to cultivate ties to African nationalists, including Lumumba, yet this policy was inevitably circumscribed by U.S. prerogatives. American intervention in the Congo illustrates the United States' desultory policy towards African nationalism and the unabashed use of political and diplomatic influence in dominating international relations. While the administration professed its support for African independence and African nationalism, American anti-colonial rhetoric belied the administration's apprehension about African independence. Even as Lumumba promised cooperation with the West and economic and social stability within the Congo, his ardent support for Pan-African and African nationalist ideals threatened the United States' vision of EurAfrica.

Lumumba may have made several errors in his handling of the crisis, but it is clear that even prior to independence, U.S. opinions had begun to harden against his leadership. While one may easily point to Lumumba's request for Soviet aid as a turning point in his relationship with the United States, many officials had predicted such an outcome based on the United States' continued support for Belgian intervention.³⁷ Instead, the picture that emerges from the documents reveals

the Eisenhower administration's active policy to discredit Lumumba by any means necessary.

Threatened by Lumumba's principled African nationalist stance on foreign intervention and his ties to other African nationalist and Pan-Africanist leaders, particularly Kwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré, the Eisenhower administration decided to oust Lumumba in order to regain control over the course of independence. Though Lumumba's political sophistication and maturity stood in sharp contrast to the imagined "African" of U.S. policy discussions, U.S. officials nevertheless projected many of these same stereotypes in an effort to discredit and delegitimize Lumumba's political authority and more importantly, his vision of an independent Africa.

SILENCING LUMUMBA

On July 15, as Lumumba recalled the foul and humiliating treatment that he and president Kasavubu endured at the hands of a Belgian forces, Secretary of State Dulles and Belgian Ambassador Louis Scheyven met to discuss Lumumba's future. Relaying the concerns expressed by Foreign Minister Wigny in Belgium, Ambassador Scheyven conveyed the official Belgian position that Lumumba was "a source of trouble and an instrument of Soviet takeover" and thus it was imperative to "undermine Lumumba's position and pave the way for other better people to take his place."³⁸ During this same meeting, the Secretary also commented on Lumumba's shift in attitude following the recent incident at the Elizabethville airport. The Ambassador concurred; however, he insisted that Lumumba's change in attitude could be traced back to his "very disagreeable speech in front of the King of Belgium at the time of independence." Clearly, the shift that both these men perceived was real. Lumumba, in response to the ongoing Belgian occupation of his country indeed had turned against the Belgian government, and in frustration had sent a communiqué to Moscow urging the Soviets to come to the aid of the Congo should the conflict escalate. Moreover, Lumumba's outrage at the brazen disregard for Congolese sovereignty quickly overshadowed his once conciliatory attitude toward Belgium. Yet, neither the United States nor the Ambassador recognized these pretexts for Lumumba's actions. Instead, they concurred that Lumumba's hostile posture towards Belgium and his entreaties for Soviet aid demanded action.

In a communiqué issued several days following the Secretary's meeting with the Belgian Ambassador, the U.S. ambassador in Belgium echoed the concerns about the increasingly tense situation in the Congo and succinctly laid out new plans to deal with Lumumba:

Whatever circumstances and motivations may have led to present situation, Lumumba has maneuvered himself

into position of opposition to West, resistance to United Nations and increasing dependence on Soviet Union and on Congolese supporters (Kashamura, Gizenga) who are pursuing Soviet's ends. Only prudent, therefore, to plan on basis that Lumumba threatens our vital interests in Congo and Africa generally. A principal objective of our political and diplomatic action must therefore be to destroy Lumumba government as now constituted, but at same time we must find or develop another horse to back which would be acceptable in rest of Africa and defensible against Soviet attack.³⁹

However, as the ambassador recognized in his telegram, discrediting Lumumba would not be an easy task. Besides "his adroitness as a politician and propagandist," U.S. officials also had to contend with the fact that he was the legitimate, democratically elected Prime Minister. Moreover, he was the most eminent national leader in all the Congo, controlling the majority of seats in the Congolese Chamber and eliciting the support of numerous other African leaders. Even as Lumumba met with U.S. officials, repeating his pleas for cooperation with the West and disavowing any predilection to communism, the administration frantically sought to eliminate him from the picture.⁴⁰

Administration officials scoured the Congo for political leaders that they perceived could replace the Prime Minister. President Kasavubu seemed unwilling or unable to move against Lumumba, and other leaders such as Joseph Ileo, Justin Bomboko, and Cyrille Adoula simply could not rival Lumumba's popularity or eloquence. Convinced of the need to eliminate Lumumba at all costs, the United States set in motion plans to assassinate him. In a cable to the Léopoldville CIA station officer, Dulles wrote:

In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if [Lumumba] continues to hold high office, the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worse pave the way to Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of the U.N and for the interests of the free world generally. Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action.⁴¹

Though the plans for assassination failed, the United States rejected any possibility of Lumumba's continuing leadership in the Congo and continued to throw their support, financial and otherwise, to any leader that could neutralize Lumumba. With the confrontation between Lumumba and Kasavubu and the arrival of Soviet airplanes, trucks, and technicians in early September, the events in the Congo reached a fever pitch. However, the climax came on September 14, when General Joseph Mobutu, with the support and blessing of the United

States, decided to "neutralize" the civilian government and seize control of the seat of government in Léopoldville. Lumumba, with a warrant out for his arrest and fearing for his safety, then placed himself under the protection of United Nations troops in the capital. Yet, seeing the opportunity to regroup and reassert his rightful place as the democratically elected head of state, Lumumba decided to flee to Stanleyville. In early December, however, he was captured, tortured, and beaten in front of journalists and photographers and delivered into the hands of his enemies in Katanga, where he was killed on January 17, 1961.

CONCLUSION

The fight for African independence was more than a struggle for political control; it contested the very meaning and direction of African history. For Lumumba, the ability of Africa to "write its own history" represented an assertion of authorship and agency over both the past and the future. Lumumba's affirmation of an African past "full of glory and dignity" assailed the colonial master narrative of Western civilization by challenging the marginalization of African history as the "unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe."⁴² More importantly, by proclaiming that African history was more than "the history of Europe in Africa," Lumumba pronounced a new declaration of independence, a claim of authorship over Africa's postcolonial future. Yet as the case of the Congo demonstrates, these claims were not uncontested.⁴³

Though the United States government supported nationalist movements on the continent, U.S. officials, whether consciously or unconsciously, subscribed to certain assumptions about African political and cultural maturity that subverted any real commitment to African nationalist policies. This is not to say that the United States did not back nationalist movements, but rather that U.S. policymakers, particularly in the case of the Congo, adopted a far more conservative policy towards African independence; one that invariably favored its partners in the region, i.e., the former colonial metropolises, over emerging nationalist leaders. Thus by wedding itself to the interests of the European colonial powers, the United States not only helped to set the stage for chaos in the Congo but also helped create an international political climate that was inimical to competing visions of independence, be they nationalist or internationalist.

While the Congo Crisis itself crystallized tensions amongst African states over the course of decolonization, the plight of Lumumba raised serious questions about the nature of independence, particularly Africa's relations to the United Nations, the United States, and the European powers. In conversation with Assistant Secretary of State J.C. Satterthwaite, Sékou Touré, a staunch ally of Lumumba,

observed that the situation of the Congo was not simply about “any individual Congolese who was important but the independence and unity of the country.” Touré insisted that “the ‘legality’ of the Congo, as established through free elections, must be respected.”⁴⁴ These issues of sovereignty and control were paramount to the issue of African independence. However, the intervention by Belgium, the United Nations, and the United States challenged this vision of self-government and self-determination so cherished by Lumumba and fellow African nationalists.

To suggest that U.S. policy had been an unequivocal success overlooks alternate political possibilities for the Congo that belie projections of chaos and instability foreseen by those within the State Department. Lumumba’s perspective, thus, presents an alternative reading of the conflict, one that fundamentally challenged the structures of power that kept Africans in bondage, both politically and economically, to Euro-American interests.

From the moment of independence Lumumba had challenged the premise of decolonization. When King Baudouin, during his speech at the formal declaration of the Congo’s independence, trumpeted the birth of the republic of the Congo as the fruition of a benevolent project begun under King Leopold II and maintained by the Belgian government, Lumumba responded with his own narrative of Congolese history, which stressed not the benefits but the brutality and repression of the Belgian colonial regime. He applauded the fierce struggle of the brave Congolese men and women “who amid tears, fire, and blood” made the moment of independence possible, a struggle whose wounds were “still too fresh and painful” to forget.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Lumumba recognized the deficiencies and inconsistencies of colonial policies towards development and criticized the limits of the independence being prescribed for the Congo. “We are not alone,” Lumumba said in his final letter to his wife, Pauline. “Africa, Asia, and the free and liberated peoples in every corner of the globe will ever remain at the side of the millions of the Congolese who will not abandon the struggle until the day when there will be no more colonizers and no more of their mercenaries in our country.”⁴⁶ In Lumumba’s mind decolonization was a global struggle, one that framed the contestations of power and identity in a post-colonial world.

END NOTES

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3. Madeleine G. Kalb, *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa—From Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 373.
4. David N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
5. Ludo de Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba* (London; New York: Verso, 2001).
6. In fact, de Witte’s book was so damning that the Belgian government undertook their own investigation into the role of the Belgian government in the death of Patrice Lumumba and subsequently issued an apology to his family admitting “moral responsibility” for his murder.
7. Telegram from the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State, 19 July 1960, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 330.
8. Memorandum of Discussion, 452d Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 July 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 338.
9. Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity* (New York, N.Y., 2003), 65.
10. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 17 July 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 318.
11. Lumumba, *Lumumba Speaks*, 251.
12. Memorandum from the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Holmes) to Secretary of State Dulles, 6 February 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 5-6.
13. “Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State,” Mar. 17, 1959, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 43.
14. Memorandum from the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Holmes) to Secretary of State, 6 February 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 2.
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16. National Intelligence Estimate, ‘The Outlook On East, Central and South Africa,’ 20 October 1959, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 61.
17. National Security Council Report, ‘Statement of U.S. Policy Towards Africa South of the Sahara Prior to the Calendar Year 1960,’ 26 August 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 36.
18. Memorandum of Discussion at the 365th Meeting of the National Security Council, 8 May 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 15.
19. See National Security Council Report, Statement on U.S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to the Calendar Year 1960, 26 August 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 27, 29.
20. Memorandum of Conversation, Tripartite Talks between U.S., France, and Britain, 16 April 1959, *FRUS*, 1958-

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21. Memorandum of Conversation, Tripartite Talks between U.S., France, and Britain, 16 April 1959, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 47.
 22. Memorandum of the 456th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 August 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 272.
 23. Memorandum of Conversation, between Secretary of State Dulles and Belgian Ambassador and Belgian Foreign Minister, 8 October 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 251-252.
 24. Memorandum of Conversation, between Secretary of State Dulles and Belgian Ambassador and Belgian Foreign Minister, 8 October 1958, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 251-252.
 25. Quoted in Thomas Kanza, *Conflict in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba* (London: Penguin, 1972), 301.
 26. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Ambassador in Belgium (Burden) and Patrice Lumumba, 25 February 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 263.
 27. Telegram From the Consulate General at Leopoldville to the Department of State, 14 June 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 275.
 28. Telegram From the Consulate General at Leopoldville to the Department of State, 14 June 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 275.
 29. Editorial Note, Quoted from statement made at 443d Meeting of the National Security Council, 5 May 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 274.
 30. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Ambassador in Belgium (Burden) and Patrice Lumumba, 25 February 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 262-263.
 31. These Western educated elites comprised only a small portion of the population, numbering about one hundred thousand in a population of about twelve million in the Congo (Patrice Lumumba, *Congo, My Country* [New York, 1962], 47).
 32. Lumumba, *Congo, My Country*, 66.
 33. Lumumba, *Lumumba Speaks*, 71.
 34. Lumumba, *Lumumba Speaks*, 221.
 35. Lumumba, *Lumumba Speaks*, 283.
 36. Kanza, *Conflict in the Congo*, 300.
 37. Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 26 July 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 356.
 38. Position conveyed in telegram sent that morning by Belgian Foreign Minister Wigny, Memorandum of Conversation Between U.S. Secretary of State and Belgian Ambassador Louis Scheyven, 15 July 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 315.
 39. Telegram From the Embassy in the Belgium to the Department of State, 19 July 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 330.
 40. Memorandum of Conversation, between Patrice Lumumba and the Secretary of State, 27 July 1960, *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), 359.
 41. United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders : An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate: Together With Additional, Supplemental, and Separate Views* (Washington D.C., 1975), 15.
 42. Quotation attributed to Hugh Trevor-Roper, Oxford Regius Professor of History, cited in Joseph Miller, "History and Africa/Africa and History" (Presidential Address, American Historical Association Washington D.C., January 8, 1999). [<http://www.ecu.edu/african/sersas/jmahapa.htm>].
 43. The full quotation by Hugh Trevor-Roper is as following, "Perhaps in the future there will be some African history to teach. But at present there is none, or very little: there is only the history of Europe in Africa. The rest is largely darkness, like the history of pre-Columbian America, and darkness is not a subject for history." Full quotation can be found in Hugh Trevor-Roper's obituary, "Lord Dacre of Glanton," *Telegraph*, January 27, 2003. [<http://www.telegraph.co.uk>].
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 46. Lumumba, *Lumumba Speaks*, 422.