THE GEOGRAPHY OF APARTHEID

A Thesis

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

Apartheid is the traditional South African solution to the maintenance of white superiority in a country that is overwhelmingly African. Over the years, apartheid has involved a division of land between natives and whites, each group occupying specific geographic areas. A recent facet of apartheid policy, inaugurated by the South African government in 1960, and designed to strengthen territorial segregation, is "separate development."[1] This plan envisions the economic development of the native reserves to the extent that they will become the self-supporting homelands for all the Bantu in South Africa.

I. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. It was the purpose of this study to (1) trace the history of apartheid, emphasizing the development of territorial segregation; and (2) to determine, insofar as possible, the capacity of the agricultural and industrial resource base of the native reserves to support the entire African population.

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[1] Progress Through Separate Development. (n.d., n.p.).

Importance of the study. Because the ramifications of apartheid sentiment and policy extend into many areas of South African life, apartheid has been discussed in moral terms,[2] in relation to politics,[3] economics,[4] and international relations.[5] There has been little written, however, of the evolution of geographical apartheid, how it came about, and what it means in terms of the land and the natives who occupy the land. The attempt was made in this thesis, hence, to approach apartheid from a basic but heretofore neglected point of view.

Procedure. Beginning with the events and decisions which led to the creation of native reserves and present apartheid policy, the study will evolve into an investigation of the reserves themselves, the population, geographic features, agricultural and industrial productivity and potential. The geographical implications of apartheid, therefore, will develop from an investigation of the natural and productive

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[2]Wentzel C. DuPless, "Apartheid--Is It Really Race 'Discrimination'?," U.S. News and World Report, XLVIII (June 20, 1960), 138-139.

[3]C. M. Tatz, "Dr. Verwoerd's 'Bantustan' Policy," Australian Journal of Politics and History, VIII (May, 1962), 7-26.

[4]F. P. Sponner, South African Predicament: The Economics of Apartheid (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).

[5]News Item in The Kansas City Times, April 7, 1965, p. 30.

forces of the reserves in relation to their population.

II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

Afrikaans, Afrikaner. Afrikaans is a language, a combination of Dutch, French, and native dialects, but mainly Dutch in origin. In this study Afrikaner is used to designate a South African of European extraction who speaks Afrikaans as his primary language. The word, Afrikaner, has been appropriated to a large extent by the National Party, whose members are predominately Afrikaans speaking.

Apartheid. Introduced into the South African vocabulary in 1951, apartheid means "separation" or "segregation" in Afrikaans. Insofar as the word obviously refers to the racial separation of whites from natives, it often has been construed to mean "white supremacy." It will be used throughout this study to refer primarily to the territorial segregation of whites and blacks.

Bantu. The terms, native, Bantu, and African are used interchangeably in this study. Specifically, Bantu is a major African language group in South Africa, including five dominant tongues and sixty dialects. These three terms do not refer to the Hottentots, Bushmen, or any of the other indigenous tribes who were present in South Africa prior to the Bantu migration from central Africa in the seventeenth century.

Bantustan. Bantustans, Native States, Bantu homelands, are but three of a wide choice of terms being applied to those native areas which are scheduled to receive, under present government apartheid policy, a measure of political independence.

Separate development. This phrase has grown up in conjunction with Bantustan, referring to the plan to expand the political and economic independence of the Bantu homelands. Occasionally, the term "parallel development" is employed in the same manner. Apart from its use in Chapter II, where political connotations are attached, separate development will denote economic development.

Territorial segregation. This phrase denotes the separation of natives and whites into their respective geographic areas of occupation, the natives residing in districts officially "reserved" for them. Those areas heavily populated by natives but not officially demarcated as reserves are referred to in the literature as "Bantu areas." This meaning is carried over into this study.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter Two. The second chapter discusses the history of apartheid, in particular, the development of the native reserves. The first section stresses the origins of apartheid

beginning with the Dutch settlement at the Cape. It then moves into the introduction of English control of the Cape, and the influence the British exercised upon the development of territorial segregation. The section ends with the Boer War. The second part presents the continued development of apartheid after Union in 1910, noting the major pieces of apartheid legislation from 1913-1957. The chapter culminates with a brief discussion of the Nationalist Party and its decision to expand apartheid in South Africa.

Chapter Three. This chapter is concerned with the historical geography of the native reserves. This includes a resume of the climate, landforms, soil, and the population--its density, distribution, and social organization. The agricultural and industrial production of the reserves to the 1950's is examined, along with government programs aimed at the general improvement of the reserves.

Chapter Four. The fourth section begins with a brief summation of the salient points of the Tomlinson Report. The decision of the Nationalist Party to make the reserves the homelands for all Bantu is noted. In light of the government's commitment to improve the reserves, economic development in the reserves after 1957 is noted. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the reserve most highly developed thus far, the Transkei.

Chapter Five. This concluding chapter consists of a summary, a number of conclusions, and several implications.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF APARTHEID

Apartheid is entrenched in South African thought. In 1960, as a result of a race riot at Sharpeville, near Johannesburg, world attention was focused on the Union of South Africa. The Union policy of apartheid was exposed to scathing criticism.[1] Yet, neither the threat of additional rioting nor foreign censure[2] brought about a change in attitude on the part of the government or South African whites. Publicity in American publications and criticism by the United Nations[3] apparently only served to solidify South African opinion.[4]

To understand apartheid one must recognize that it is a vibrant credo that forms the white South African's personal raison d'etre. It is not a recent concept (although much of

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[1]Typical of the articles about this incident was the following account: "Wild race to flee a merciless slaughter: South African massacre of Negro demonstrators provokes Angry World Reaction," Life, April 4, 1960, pp. 26-28. See also Newsweek, May 16, 1960, p. 52ff.

[2]Time, April 4, 1960, pp. 18-19.

[3]"Security Council Calls on South Africa to Promote Racial Harmony and to Abandon Apartheid and Racial Discrimination," United Nations Review, VI (May, 1960), 16-19ff.

[4]William R. Frye, "Since 1960 Massacre, South African Discrimination," The Kansas City Star, March 29, 1965, p. 23.

the publicity concerning apartheid postdates 1956), nor are the policies of the National Party new or unique to Afrikaners alone. The force with which the precept of apartheid has shaped and continues to influence life in South Africa can be perceived best by tracing its development.

I. SETTING THE PATTERN: 1650-1910

Coming to the Cape in the 1650's, the Dutch were not confronted with native settlement for there was none. The country was virtually empty, yet, at approximately the same time settlement began by the Dutch in the Cape area, Bantu tribes began to move southward from the central part of the continent into South Africa.[5] Early white settlement, however, did not overlap into that part of South Africa occupied by the migratory Bantu, and the Cape was colonized by the Dutch while the natives were still a thousand miles away. The Dutch East India Company, moreover, advocated a policy of no-contact for their settlers at the Cape. The interior tribes of Bushmen and Hottentots were regarded as inferior, and the Dutch officials tried to discourage settlement in areas occupied by these tribes.[6]

Eventually, conflict occurred. Between 1700-1750, the

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[5]Wilhelm Ropke, South Africa: An Attempt at a Positive Appraisal, reprinted from the Schweizer Monatshefte, May, 1964, p. 7.

[6]L. E. Neame, The History of Apartheid, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 10-14.

farmers (Boers) moved into the interior along the river valleys between the Cape Ranges, clashing with the Bushmen to the north (and the Bantu in the east) who intended to graze their cattle in the same valleys.[7] Once beyond the limits of effective government, the Boers disregarded the instructions of the Cape officials and subdued many of the Bantu, employing them as farm laborers.[8]

During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, cattle graziers made contact with numerous Bantu in the area of the Great Fish River. Trade between black and white, frequent cattle raids, and periodic minor wars ended in weak peace treaties and ever-changing land boundaries which neither the Bantu nor the Boers were able to observe. Both sides wanted to trade; both wanted more grazing area. Various attempts were made to create permanent boundaries between Boer and Bantu. At one stage, a no-man's land was demarcated; another effort involved construction of a line of forts that proved to be expensive and inadequate. Treaties were a failure, mainly because European ignorance of tribal organization misled the farmers into making agreements with minor chiefs.[9]

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[7]Harm J. DeBlij, Africa South (Northwestern University Press, 1962), pp. 26-27.

[8]Leo Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 6.

[9]Leo Marquard, South Africa's Internal Boundaries, A Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Council of the South African Institute of Race Relations, January 13, 1958 (Johannesburg: The Institute, 1958), pp. 4-5.

As a result of the Napoleonic Wars, control of Cape colony passed into the hands of the British at the beginning of the nineteenth century. With the English came new ideas. A new judicial system was installed, superceding Dutch law and custom. In addition, English was made the only official language. Gradually, the British came to be regarded with bitterness, and their first thirty years at the Cape precipitated an exodus of Boer settlers who moved into the interior of the colony. When, in 1834, slavery was abolished in the British Empire (and in the Cape), the Dutch farmers began to complain about the ensuing vagrancy of their Bantu workers. Independent of spirit and unable to affect a change in British policy, the Boers began to migrate out of the Cape altogether.[10]

This migration was called the Great Trek of 1836, and its purpose was to establish Boer republics free of British domination where slavery would not be prohibited. The Trek took place largely from the southern part of the Cape to the north, leading the Boers from the slopes of the Cape ranges, across the Orange River, and onto the highveld of the present Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Subsequent groups of farmers moved into Natal.[11]

Two characteristics in the development of apartheid

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[10] DeBlij, Africa South, pp. 33-34.

[11] Ibid., p. 40.

stem from the migration of the Boers. First, the Great Trek created a geographic boundary between Boer and Briton that helped to foster differing attitudes towards the natives. At one time a source of Anglo-Boer tension, these differences have ceased to be significant. Secondly, the net result of the migration was the creation of thousands of miles of interior boundaries that came to represent the system of native "reserves." It is this system that constitutes the core of apartheid today.

Initially, a "northern" (Boer) pattern and a "Cape" (Briton) pattern of apartheid existed in South Africa. By and large, the Boer pattern sought to justify apartheid from a non-racial point of view, at the same time favoring a strict separation of natives and whites in all aspects of life--political, economic, and social. The Cape pattern took a less harsh view of the political rights of the Bantu than did the Boers, but supported, nevertheless, a stand approximating that of the Afrikaners in the other areas.

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Charles A. W. Manning states that the apartheid policy of the National Party evolved in defense of the Afrikaner volk, not racialism. Manning claims that the "northern" policy rests not on a negative attitude toward the natives, but on a positive appraisal of South Africa's Boer heritage and the future of

the South African people.[12] This analysis is reinforced by George W. Shepherd who interprets apartheid as the extension of cultural and religious ideas of the Afrikaner volk spirit. As evidence he cites the constitution of the Broederbond: "The Afrikaner Broederbond is born out of a deep conviction that the Afrikaner nation was put in this land by God and is destined to continue in existence as a nation with its own nature and calling."[13] Both Manning and Shepherd imply, and with some pride, that the pattern of apartheid that prevails in South Africa today is derived from attitudes and actions set forth by the Dutch in the Boer republics.

That Boer policy toward the natives was harsher at the outset than that of the British is patent. In the three areas where Boer influence was pronounced, there was a general denial of voting rights to non-whites. Voting in the Transvaal, in the Orange Free State, and in Natal after 1865, was the exclusive right of adult, white males.[14]

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[12]Charles A. W. Manning, "In Defense of Apartheid," Foreign Affairs, (October, 1964), p. 140.

[13]The Broederbond was but one of several organizations formed during the First World War to promote Afrikaner nationalism. Literally, the word means "band of brothers." George W. Shepherd, Jr., The Politics of African Nationalism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 119. For a further discussion of the Bond and its influence in African politics see Marquard, The Peoples and Politics of South Africa, pp. 173-175.

[14]Hector Menteith Robertson, South Africa: Economic and Political Aspects (Durham: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 74.

The Transvaal, moreover, initiated the "pass system" in 1859, a method of control restricting the movement of the Bantu within the Province.[15]

In comparison with Boer restrictions, the British policy was more liberal. Only in the Cape Province was there a common roll for qualified voters without distinction of race. After Natal was annexed by the British in 1842, the franchise, as of 1856, was open to all British subjects, including the natives. This privilege lasted only until 1865, however, at which time the Natal natives became subject to special laws and were excluded from the franchise.[16]

Natal became the setting for the first attempt at establishing native reserves on a large scale. In 1845, Theophilus Shepstone was appointed Diplomatic Agent to the natives by Cape officials. Shepstone believed in territorial segregation. Of the 100,000 natives within Natal at the time, Shepstone was able to move 80,000 of them onto eight

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[15]Neame, The History of Apartheid, p. 23. As to the origins of this measure, Marquard, in Peoples and Policies of South Africa, p. 123, points out that a law of this kind was introduced in the Cape Colony by the British Government early in the nineteenth century to control roving Hottentots. So while it is accurate to state that the "pass system" was used first against the Bantu by the Boers in the Transvaal, due credit must go to the British for originating a practice that the Boers were surely familiar with before moving into the interior.

[16]Ibid., p. 27.

reserves. Further "civilizing" plans (medical care, education) were abandoned for lack of funds.[17] So even though Shepstone's plans were never completed, the concept of territorial apartheid on a grand scale had been introduced into South Africa and would be revived one hundred twenty-five years later.

Territorial segregation was also legally regularized for the first time in the mid-nineteenth century. To put an end to the periodic flare-ups between Bantu and settlers that constantly threatened the peace of the frontier, the Cape Colony officials took a new step. The British government decided to annex tribal lands in the Cape to be reserved for African occupancy only. Magistrates and police were sent in to over-see the tribes. Missionaries and traders were allowed access to the native areas. Dissatisfied because they had favored throwing all the land open to European occupancy, the Boers continued to isolate themselves by moving farther into the interior where they would not be hampered by British policy or officials.[18]

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the "Cape" pattern more and more resembled the "Boer" pattern. The non-white population in the Cape increasing, political restrictions

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[17]Eric Walker, A History of Southern Africa (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1957), pp. 223, 273-275.

[18]Marquard, South Africa's Internal Boundaries, pp. 5-6.

were applied against the Bantu through the Franchise Act of 1892 which tripled the property qualifications for voting from sixty dollars to one hundred eighty. In addition, a simple education test was made mandatory.[19] Taking up the problem of native reserves, the South African Native Affairs Commission declared in 1905, after the Boer War, that permanent lines of territorial segregation should be established by legislation and that Native political representation in the Cape should be abolished.[20]

Thus, while Manning and Shepherd may attribute the origins of apartheid to Afrikaner principles, it appears that the English were no less instrumental than the Boers in creating apartheid measures.

Apartheid, territorial segregation, political representation for the Bantu--these were not the paramount issues in South Africa as the nineteenth century drew to a close. The major source of tension in South Africa prior to Union was Anglo-Boer friction. For fifteen years before the Boer War and for about the same time afterwards, white society was too preoccupied with its own internal difficulties to consider the plight of the Bantu. In this sea of neglect there

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[19]Robertson, South Africa: Economic and Political Aspects, p. 73. The author states that this restriction imposed no intolerable handicap, but notes in the next sentence that the Cape colony couldn't run the risk of an unconditional universal suffrage.

[20]C. M. Tatz, "Dr. Verwoerd's 'Bantustan' Policy," p.26.

were only two reports and one legislative enactment. The latter, the Glen Grey Act of 1894, initiated a system of restricted self-government and a policy of individual land tenure in the Glen Grey district of the Transkei reserve. Overcrowding of the land gave the Act only a qualified success, but it meant that in the Cape colony, a halt had been called at one point to the increasing pressure on native land.[21]

Anglo-Boer tension finally erupted into war in 1899. At the conclusion of hostilities in 1902, the British faced the serious problems of native policy and political disunity. There was a significant incompatability between the two. To grant an unrestricted political liberty to whites only was to fasten social, economic, and political second-class citizenship on the natives. In the light of their somewhat more moderate attitude toward the natives concerning political privileges, the British were reluctant to adopt strict Afrikaner principles. On the other hand, to insist upon a higher place for the Bantu was to jeopardize the proposed political unification of the four colonies.[22] Thus, the Boer War compelled an important decision on native policy.

In the terms of the peace, the British Government promised that no attempt would be made to alter the political

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[21]C. W. DeKiewiet, A History of South Africa, Social and Economic (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 199-200.

[22]Ibid., p. 143.

status of the natives before self-government had been granted to the ex-Republics. Specifically, the eighth clause of the Treaty of Vereeniging read: "The question of granting the franchise to Natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government."[23] At this point, the Boer leaders won an important victory amid military defeat.

The Boer War also left South Africa politically divided. Self-government had been granted to the Cape colony in 1872. Natal possessed similar privileges. After subduing the Boers, the British Government was confronted by the recalcitrant governments of the Cape and Natal who were loath to give up their power and accept the lesser status of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State as Crown Colonies. The Cape Colony government refused to yield, and frequently, the prospects for union appeared hopeless. Finally, in 1906, self-government was granted to the Transvaal, and one year later to the Orange Free State.[24] At this point, South Africa consisted of four separate governments, each with its own native policy to which apartheid was central.

Political conciliation of the four provinces was not easy. The Act of Union (1910) illustrates the strong current of Afrikaner nationalism which had plagued first the Dutch administrators and then the British officials at the Cape.

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[23]Neame, The History of Apartheid, p. 27.

[24]DeKiewiet, A History of South Africa, p. 144.

Each province admitted its common allegiance to the Union. The individuality of the originally separate provinces was respected by the creation of provincial councils with authority over education (other than higher education), hospitals, and municipal institutions.[25] The native question was skillfully avoided.[26] Had the Cape delegates or the British Government sought to gain significant guarantees for the natives, the plans for union probably would have failed. As it is, the Union Constitution represented the triumph of the frontier, and it was the underlying conviction of the frontier that the "foundations of society were race and the privileges of race."[27]

II. APARTHEID IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

After 1910, political leadership resided in three Boer

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[25] Ibid., p. 150.

[26] Henry John May, The South African Constitution (3rd ed.; London: Juta & Company, 1955), pp. 10-12. As May points out, the stormiest sessions of the National Convention were those involving the franchise. Dissension was staved off by leaving the voting rights in each colony as they existed at the time, but entrenching the franchise rights of the non-Europeans of the Cape in the Constitution. To compensate for this concession, the Cape delegates to the Convention assented to the clause which prevents non-Europeans from sitting in Parliament. The South Africa Act, 1909, clauses 26d, 44c, Part VI of The South African Constitution, pp. 587-592.

[27] DeKiewiet, A History of South Africa, p. 151.

War leaders, Generals Louis Botha, J. B. M. Hertzog, and Jan Smuts. Originally acting in concert for a united South Africa (meaning a reconciliation of Boer and English opinion), General Hertzog, within two years of the Act of Union, broke away from Botha and Smuts to promote Afrikaner nationalism. The policies of Botha and Smuts, however, did not repudiate apartheid. The South African Party, dominating politics from 1910-1919, stated clearly that the races could not be placed on equal footing.[28]

It was the Opposition, however, led by Hertzog, that revived a fundamental of apartheid that has since become basic to the major political parties of South Africa. In a speech made in 1912 at Smithsfield, Orange Free State, General Hertzog stated that the solution of the native problem was territorial segregation between the whites and blacks, each to occupy a sphere of complete influence, although he would not exclude natives from the field of labor in white areas.[29] This plan found a receptive audience in the South African parliament, and thus, one of the first major acts of the Union Government under Prime Minister Botha in the field of native affairs was the Land Act of 1913 which placed the

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[28]D. W. Kruger (ed.), South African Parties and Policies, 1910-1960: A Select Source Book (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1960), p. 361.

[29]Ibid., pp. 361-362.

stamp of legislative approval on the existing reserves and made provision for more land to be added to them in the future.[30]

A shift in the power and influence of the South African political parties did not mean an end to apartheid legislation. When the National Party under Hertzog swung into power in 1924, more restrictive measures were applied against the natives. The Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926, for example, shut out the Bantu under a statutory color bar that prohibited them from working in skilled and semi-skilled trades.[31] After an interval of ten years, during which time no significant native laws were created, Hertzog (now Prime Minister of the United Party) sponsored the Representation of Natives Bill into law. By this act the qualified Cape Bantu retained the right to the individual vote, but were entered on a separate roll. In addition, their right to acquire land anywhere in the Cape Province was removed.[32]

The question of the native reserves was examined also in 1936. At this time, the combined influence of Hertzog and Jan Smuts persuaded Parliament to make more effective provision for the purchase of additional land for the reserves.[33]

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[30]Marquard, South Africa's Internal Boundaries, pp.5-6.

[31]Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p. 619.

[32]Ibid., pp. 645-646.

[33]Marquard, South Africa's Internal Boundaries, p. 7.

This Native Trust and Lands Act of 1936, described as a "'final settlement,'"[34] was the last important piece of apartheid legislation until the National Party of Prime Minister Malan officially adopted apartheid as the fundamental principle of its race relations policy following the Second World War.[35]

In the post war period, the United Party led by Smuts was pulled in several directions. One segment of the party was dissatisfied that the Smuts Government was doing little to restrict the movement of Africans to the towns. The government, therefore, set up the Fagan Commission to inquire into the situation. In its report of 1948, the Commission came to the following conclusions: (1) more than half the African population lived in European areas; (2) an analysis of the carrying capacity of the reserves indicated that it was impossible to put the whole native population into the reserves; and (3) the urbanization of the African population in European areas must be accepted, and the trend could not be reversed.[36]

The National Party rejected the conclusions of the Fagan Report and came forth with the policy of parallel

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[34]United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5497) (New York, 1963), p. 44.

[35]Kruger, A Select Source Book, pp. 403-404.

[36]Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa, pp. 149-150.

development. Stating its Native policy before the general election of 1948, the Party made clear that the reserves were to be the national homelands of the Bantu, and that separate residential areas in urban communities were to be established for those Bantu already settled there.[37] Facing the United Party, which was divided within itself and could not furnish effective or clear opposition to the National apartheid program, the National Party won the election.

Although the victory was a close one and not exactly what might be termed a "mandate from the people," the party, nevertheless, wasted no time in implementing legislation that reflected its commitment to apartheid. Inter-marriage between the races was prohibited by the Mixed Marriages Act of 1949.[38] More important, the Population Registration Act of 1950, which recorded the racial origins of each voter in South Africa, was referred to frequently by Prime Minister Malan, as a fundamental basis of apartheid.[39] Exercising its influence outside the field of legislation, the party served notice that churches and missions must not frustrate the policy of apartheid.[40]

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[37]Kruger, A Select Source Book, pp. 403-404.

[38]Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa, p. 151.

[39]Ibid., p. 78.

[40]Kruger, A Select Source Book, p. 403.

When J. G. Strydom became Prime Minister in 1954, he further defined racial separation through the Group Areas Act of 1957, a giant step in the evolution of territorial segregation. This law allowed the government to begin a division of all residential land in all South African cities into sectors, one for each racial group. Through this law it became illegal for a person of one race to purchase land in a residential area set aside (though not necessarily occupied) for another racial group.[41]

Prior to Strydom's tenure as Prime Minister, however, a more important development was taking shape. In 1950, Prime Minister Malan appointed a commission to study "'the rehabilitation of the Native areas.'"[42] Headed by an agricultural specialist, Professor F. R. Tomlinson, the Commission, after a five year study, recommended a vigorous program of economic development for the reserves so that they might become the home for part of South Africa's Bantu population.[43] The basic, though not new, premise of territorial segregation recommended by this government commission has been the primary factor influencing the National Party in its course of action concerning the Bantu since 1956.

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[41] Ibid., p. xv.

[42] Ronald Segal, African Profiles (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 17.

[43] Ibid., p. 17. The Report of the Commission on the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (Pretoria: 1955), shall be referred to throughout this study by its popular name, The Tomlinson Commission.

When Dr. Hendrick Verwoerd, who had served as Minister of Native Affairs in Malan's cabinet,[44] became Prime Minister in 1958, his first speech to Parliament in January, 1959, made clear his ideas about apartheid:

> Development cannot be prevented but the lesser danger is for the white man at least to control his own areas and to live in friendship with the Native areas, either as their guardian or as neighbors who have common interests with them and who therefore follow his leadership, without the white and non-white sitting in one Parliament or in one government.[45]

The program of separate development was announced in 1960, followed by the granting of a measure of self-government to the Transkei Territory in 1963.[46] The National Party, thus, under the leadership of Prime Minister Verwoerd, seems intent on implementing apartheid politically as well as geographically.

Summary. South Africa's traditional policy of apartheid has its beginnings in the pronouncements first by the Dutch and then by English officials at the Cape. The initial attempt at territorial segregation on a large scale took place sixty-five years before Union. Various pieces of apartheid legislation in the political, social, and territorial phases of life were introduced in all four of the South

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[44] Ibid., p. 16.

[45] Kruger, A Select Source Book, p. 438.

[46] "Transkei Self-Government Bill," Facts on File, (May, 1963), p. 19532A.

African territories before 1910. Following Union, apartheid became an even more permanent part of South Africa. Official reserves were demarcated in 1913, and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 was expected to be the "last word" concerning the extent of the native areas. Conditions precipitated by the Second World War, however, necessitated a re-evaluation of the entire native problem, giving the National Party a means by which to appeal to the South African voting population. The most recent general election (1962) gave the National Party one hundred five seats out of one hundred sixty in Parliament,[47] an indication that apartheid has been accepted by the white population as a way of life in South Africa.

Hence, a speech made by General Smuts in London, 1917, seems to have been born out:

> There is now shaping in South Africa a policy which is being expressed in our institutions, and which may have very far-reaching effects in the future civilization of the African continent. . . . A practice has grown up in South Africa of giving the natives their

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[47]Segal, African Profiles, p. 22. Lest one come to the conclusion that the native question has been paramount in South African politics, Peter Ritner, The Death of Africa (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 38, notes that the race issue has never been the crux of any election campaign in South Africa. He points out that the burning issue up to 1961 was the Commonwealth connection, and now that the connection has been broken, the only issue of any proportions is "moderate" apartheid as opposed to Afrikaner apartheid (a distinction this author finds difficult to detect in modern South Africa today).

own separate institutions on parallel lines. . . . On these parallel lines we may be able to solve a problem which otherwise may be insoluable. . . . We have felt more and more that . . . it is useless to try to govern black and white in the same system. . . . Their political institutions should be different, while always proceeding on the basis of self-government. In land ownership, settlement and forms of Government, (our policy is) to keep them apart. . . . Thus in South Africa you will eventually have large areas cultivated by blacks and governed by blacks . . . while in the rest of the country you will have whites who will govern themselves according to accepted European principles.[48]

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[48]Eric N. Louw, Changing Continent, (n.d., n.p.), pp. 14-15. The statement of Smuts concerning the practice of giving natives their own separate institutions probably was a reference to the small degree of self-government held by districts in the Transkei Territory under the Glen Grey Act of 1894.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE NATIVE RESERVES

I. THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

The system of native reserves in South Africa developed gradually and without much planning. The Bantu reserves are more or less coincident with areas which either did not attract European settlers or which the Bantu succeeded in keeping from them.[1]

The first official division of land between European and Bantu was fixed by the 1913 Natives Land Act. Prior to Union in 1910 it was legally possible for natives to purchase land in all the provinces except the Orange Free State. The 1913 Act, however, defined more clearly the territorial relationship between black and white settlement by restricting the natives to 22.7 million acres. Independent agriculture and cattle raising by the Bantu could be carried out only in the native areas.[2]

Thus, the 1913 Act became a means of purging the European land of native occupants. The greatest difficulty in accomplishing this aim, however, was the lack of land to

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[1]Marquard, The People and Policies of South Africa, p. 39.

[2]DeKiewiet, A History of South Africa, p. 205.

which the natives could move. The Native Land Commission in 1916 proposed that an additional 17.6 million acres be set aside for further native settlement, a proposal that was frustrated by public opinion which balked at the return of so much land to the natives.[3]

Provision was made finally for the expansion of the reserves by the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. Between 1936 and 1955 nearly 14.6 million acres were purchased by the Native Trust so that by 1955 the total area in native ownership (including the Native Trust) was 37 million acres, about 13 per cent of the total area of South Africa.[4]

The reserves are not located in any one particular part of the Republic. Rather, there are some seven thousand miles of internal boundary lines separating the reserves from the rest of South Africa.[5] The reserves themselves form 264 irregularly shaped blocks of land, ranging in size from small bits of land to one reserve the size of New Jersey and Massachusetts combined.[6] If consolidated, the reserves of the Cape, the Transvaal, and Natal would form a rough horseshoe

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[3]Ibid., p. 206.

[4]United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee, p. 57.

[5]Marquard, South Africa's Internal Boundaries, p. 2.

[6]William A. Hance, The Geography of Modern Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 552.

around the Orange Free State.[7]

The reserves exhibit a diversity of natural geographic features. Approximately one-quarter of them, because of rainfall deficiency (less than 15 inches per year) are regarded as semi-arid steppe lands.[8] These are located in the northern Cape Province, western and norther Transvaal. The Kalahari extends into these reserves, giving the appearance of a sparse grassland instead of an expanse of sand. Precipitation is unreliable and minute. The sandy soils and intermittent streams, together with the variability of rainfall, severely limit agricultural activity, and the reserves are sparsely settled, the semi-arid valleys of the Limpopo River having a population density of less than 10 persons to the square mile.[9]

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[7]As the map of this reference also makes clear, there are no native reserves in the Orange Free State. Hence, the horseshoe appearance. DeBlij, Africa South, p. 250.

[8]What constitutes a steppe land is not always clear. As used by Arthur N. Strahler, Physical Geography (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951), pp. 182, 198, steppe refers to both a vegetative and climatic type. The latter is characterized by a zone receiving 10-30 inches annual rainfall. A preferable definition is that of L. Dudley Stamp, Africa: A Study in Tropical Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959), p. 454, who considers 15 inches the minimum amount of rainfall necessary for cultivation without irrigation, thus emphasizing the human-use aspect of the term.

[9]L. P. Green and T. J. D. Fair, Development in Africa: A Study in Regional Analysis with Special Reference to Southern Africa (Witwatersrand University Press, 1962), p. 77.

Conditions in the reserves in the northern part of the Transvaal are slightly improved over those in the northern Cape and western Transvaal. Although the soils are sandy, some reserves are suited to the raising of cattle, though at least 80 acres must be allotted to graze one head. The climate is not unduly severe, and along part of the Limpopo frost is completely absent or rare.[10]

The remaining three-fourths of the Bantu lands receive more than 20 inches of rainfall a year.[11] Their temperate climate is considered to be one of the most productive climatic types in the world.[12] Yet, even the better watered reserves contain, for the most part, agriculturally difficult terrain. The reserves include the most readily eroded lands in the Republic due to backward methods of farming and overgrazing. Given proper management, nevertheless, they are, according to Cole and government opinion, potentially productive lands.[13]

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[10]Stamp, Africa: A Study in Tropical Development, pp. 478-479.

[11]Hance, The Geography of Modern Africa, p. 552.

[12]Monica M. Cole, South Africa (London: Methuen and Company, 1961), p. 517.

[13]Ibid., p. 516. See also Progress Through Separate Development, p. 89. Before taking too literally the word "productive" in relation to the Bantu reserves, consider what DeKiewiet said, speaking of South Africa as a whole: "'Agriculture in South Africa is poor and precarious. . . . The

In comparison with the reserves in the Transvaal and the northern Cape, the reserves in the eastern part of the Cape Province, eastern Transvaal, and in Natal are favored areas. They lie below the Drakensberg escarpment and extend northward from East London into the Transvaal. The water resources are more than adequate, the rainfall averaging 35 to 45 inches a year, rising to 75 inches along major escarpments.[14] In Natal there are forests in some parts, but many of the slopes are covered with grass. The rainfall is adequate most everywhere for agriculture.[15]

There are drawbacks in these areas, nevertheless.

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expenditure and effort required to overcome many of its handicaps are too great to be profitable. Indeed South Africa is not an agricultural country. . . . Without subsidy and under conditions of free competition much of the land could not be economically cultivated.'" Quoted in Stanley Trapido, "Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structure in the Republic of South Africa," The American Political Science Review, LVII (March, 1963), 76. It also would be well to keep in mind that, "About five-sixths of the total land surface or roughly 253 million acres are available for farming. Much of this land is, however, too arid, stony or mountainous to permit cultivation, with the result that only about ten per cent is under the plough today, including land under irrigation. In the light of the accepted criteria of today, it seems unlikely that the area cultivated will ever exceed fifteen per cent." Agriculture in the Economic Development of South Africa, (Pretoria: Department of Agricultural Technical Services, 1963), p. 4.

[14]Green and Fair, Development in Africa, p. 71.

[15]Stamp, Africa: A Study in Tropical Development, p. 480.

Reserves lying within the Ladysmith Basin in Natal receive too little precipitation for even subsistence agriculture.[16] The moister reserves of the eastern Cape and Natal are, in addition, situated in a region of rough topography, with only 11 and 23 per cent of their lands classified as flat to gently rolling.[17]

The Bantu population is decidedly rural--73 per cent of the natives live on farms either in the reserves or on those belonging to whites. In spite of the heavily eroded land, the Bantu population of the reserves is concentrated in the eastern half of South Africa. Within these moister areas live 3.6 million Bantu, representing, in 1951, 43 per cent of the total Bantu population. The remainder live on European farms, in urban areas, and in other reserves throughout the Republic.[18] There are no native cities or towns except for those in the Transkei and Ciskei which are of European creation.[19]

The concentration of Bantu in the wetter, eastern reserves brought about a pressure on the land that over the years has reduced many Bantu to subsistence living or less.

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[16]Cole, South Africa, p. 517.

[17]Hance, The Geography of Modern Africa, p. 552.

[18]Marquard, South Africa's Internal Boundaries, p. 3.

[19]Cole, South Africa, pp. 660-661.

In the course of inquiries by the Government following the 1913 Land Act, the Eastern Transvaal Local Committee calculated that a minimum of 38½ acres per family was necessary to provide adequate means of living off the land. Yet the typical land holding in 1944, estimated by the Union Government Social and Economic Planning Committee, was but 10 to 12 acres. The population density was as high as the land holdings were low. An estimate in 1944 gave 79.5 Bantu per square mile in the Transkei area, 95.4 in the Ciskei, and 41.6 in Zululand. The population density was as high as the land holdings were low. An estimate in 1944 gave 79.5 Bantu per square mile in the Transkei area, 95.4 in the Ciskei, and 41.6 in Zululand. The population density in the Union as a whole at the same time was only 21 persons per square mile.[20]

The generally high population density and the concomitant low standard of living in the reserves is linked to several inter-related factors; the traditional system of land holding and peasant agriculture; the rapid increase in the Bantu population during the 1920's and 1930's; and the dependence of the Bantu upon cattle as an indispensable part of their way of life.

Traditionally, the area occupied by a tribe means that the land belongs to the tribe as a whole. The failure of the Boers to take this fact into account when dealing with the

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[20]William Malcolm Hailey, An African Survey (Rev. 1956; New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 761.

Bantu gave rise to considerable difficulty. The Bantu believed the land was being more or less rented to the settlers; the Boers had permanent possession in mind. Frequent skirmishes over the land resulted. European influence was slight, however, and the tribal land-holding system persisted in most of the native areas. Each tribesman receives from the chief a homestead allotment for residential purposes and an arable allotment for cultivation. The remainder of the tribal holding is used as common pasturage from which, as membership of the tribe increases and new households are formed, further residential and arable allotments are made.[21]

The customary pattern of land tenure was altered only slightly by the Glen Grey Act of 1894. To assist the natives in making a transition from communally held land to individual ownership, the European system of private landholding was initiated in eight districts of the Transkei Territory. Ultimately, 50,000 individual titles were registered. There was not enough land for such a program, however, and it was discontinued in 1911.[22]

The population in the reserves increased markedly, 1921 to 1936. In the Orange Free State, for example, the per cent increase of the native population was nearly five times

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[21]Cole, South Africa, p. 519.

[22]DeKiewiet, A History of South Africa, pp. 199-200.

as great as the per cent increase of the European population.[23] Native areas which once had good arable land, like the Witzieshoek location in the Orange Free State, lost their fertility so that they were compelled to import grain to make good an annual deficiency.[24]

The increasing Bantu population meant that throughout the 1940's and early 1950's, large numbers of Bantu families were without any arable land whatsoever. In the Transkei Reserves during this period, 19,690 families were without land suitable for cultivation. And in all regions except the northern Cape and northern Zululand, the cattle population was in excess of the estimated carrying capacity of the land.[25]

The dependence of the Bantu upon cattle has further retarded agricultural development of the reserves. Tradition has dictated that cattle are the most important form of investment. For the Bantu, cattle constitute real wealth. Men returning from work in the mines and factories cannot, by virtue of tribal organization, invest their savings in land; an arable allotment is given only for a wife. Cattle, however, can be grazed on the commonage, and there is no restriction

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[23] Ibid., p. 205.

[24] Ibid., p. 200.

[25] Hailey, An African Survey, p. 761.

on the number anyone may acquire. Thus, as the Bantu population increased, land was withdrawn from the commonage; the area of grazing diminished but the number of cattle increased.[26]

With the establishment of Union and of the subsequent delimiting of the areas available to the Bantu in 1913, it became impossible for the natives to migrate from place to place in search of better land. The mounting population pressure on the reserves, moreover, was such that a 1945 report of the Social and Economic Planning Council estimated that the reserves were producing less than 20 to 25 years previously.[27] Even with the increase in area of the reserves after 1936, the total number of cattle in 1950 stood at 3.3 million head, half a million head less than in 1939,[28] and testimony to the declining productivity of the land.

II. AGRICULTURE IN THE RESERVES

Apart from the introduction of the plough, giving the male Bantu a role in crop production and making cultivation easier, little change has taken place in the methods of tillage or in crops grown. Cultivation, with the exception of ploughing, has been the task of women using hand hoes.

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[26]Cole, South Africa, p. 520.

[27]Hailey, An African Survey, p. 762.

[28]Cole, South Africa, p. 520.

Fields in the reserves were rarely fenced, and it was common for cattle to eat up the stalks after a harvest. This in turn led to the compacting of the earth on the maize fields during the winter, making cultivation difficult in the spring and encouraging sheet erosion after the first summer rains. Additional soil deterioration resulted from the lack of crop rotation.[29]

One crop agriculture has been the rule, maize normally occupying 90 per cent of the arable acreage. In the drier districts of northwestern Transvaal and the northern Cape, maize is replaced by Kaffir corn and millets. Generally, crop yields are low, averaging one and one-half bags of maize per acre. On European farms the average is two to three times as high. Except on irrigation projects, unfamiliar to most Bantu, fruits and vegetables were rarely grown.[30]

Given the rural character of the Bantu economy, family incomes derived from the traditional peasant agriculture are very low, although income does vary according to the nature of the land and with the density of population. The lowest incomes prevail in the climatically favored reserves where overpopulation places a heavy burden on land that is also eroded. The over-all average farm is approximately $112 a year, ranging from a low of $25 in reserves of low rainfall to a high of

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[29]Cole, South Africa, pp. 519-520.

[30]Ibid., p. 521.

$460 in areas of irrigation schemes under European supervision.[31]

In all the reserves, farm income is insufficient for the purchase of additional food, clothing, and household goods. In 1925 it was reported that the Transkei, which was regarded as one of the most prosperous native areas, could not support its inhabitant from its own resources.[32] Thus, at any given moment nearly one-half the able-bodied men were absent in European employ.[33]

The reserves have received, in the past, a limited amount of government assistance. Between 1936 and 1940 the Union Government spent over a half million dollars for soil conservation measures in native areas, including reclamation projects, fencing, and water supplies.[34] No plan of action involving expenditure on any considerable scale was taken by the government, however, until 1944 when the Minister for Native Affairs forecast the operation of a twelve-year program that would employ large numbers of South African ex-soldiers on soil reclamation works, fencing, and the building

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[31] Ibid., p. 520.

[32] DeKiewiet, A History of South Africa, p. 195.

[33] Van Der Horst, "Union of South Africa: Economic Problems in a Multiracial Situation," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, CCXCVIII (March, 1955), 77.

[34] Hailey, An African Survey, pp. 1012-1022.

of dams.[35] Thus, between 1945 and 1950 an additional two million dollars was spent on soil conservation and an additional three million dollars on reclamation. By 1950, the Department of Native Affairs controlled 126 minor irrigation projects, serving more than 30,000 acres in all.[36]

One reserve in the Ciskei Territory illustrates conditions typical of the native areas in the eastern Cape. Through the 1940's and 1950's the population density was 77 persons to the square mile. Part of the reserve is forest and not inhabited so that the real density of the occupied part was 117 per square mile--high for a relatively infertile area. There was no industry, the major occupations being stock farming (sheep and cattle, with a preponderance of the latter) and agriculture.[37] The staple products were maize and Kaffir corn, and in a normal season all of the crops were consumed by the population.[38] The value of the wool purchased by traders in the district was estimated roughly at $9,000 in 1947-1948. In fact, it is unlikely that the total value of produce purchased in 1947-1948 exceeded $22,000, contrasted with sales

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[35] Ibid., p. 762.

[36] Ibid., pp. 1021-1022.

[37] D. Hobart Houghton and B. Forsdick, "Trade in a Ciskei Native Reserve," The South African Journal of Economics, XVIII (March, 1950), 65-66.

[38] Houghton and Forsdick, "Trade in a Ciskei Native Reserve," p. 81.

to the natives of about $383,000.[39]

III. INDUSTRY IN THE RESERVES

Industrial development in the reserves has been very slow. The principal sources of industrial power in South Africa are situated in European areas.[40] But more important, industrial development has dragged because none, with the exception of minor coal deposits in the Transkei, of the four main minerals of South Africa (gold, diamonds, coal, and copper) are found within the reserves.[41] There are, however, limited amounts of asbestos, platinum, and chrome[42] which were mined to the value of 13 million dollars in 1952, providing employment for approximately 15,000 Bantu.[43]

In 1944, the idea of building industrial towns in native areas was considered seriously by the Department of Native Affairs. These towns were to house persons displaced from white cities and farms, and Bantu living in reserves for

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[39] Ibid., p. 81.

[40] Marquard, South Africa's Internal Boundaries, pp. 2-3.

[41] The Republic of South Africa, (n.d., n.p.), p. 3.

[42] Christopher R. Hill, Bantustans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 27.

[43] The Progress of the Bantu Toward Nationhood: No. 3, Self-Development--Economic Advancement (Johannesburg, 1960), p. 12.

whom there was inadequate land. Industries were to be constructed in association with the towns to provide employment.[44]

The first site selected was located a few miles outside King William's Town, near East London, on land belonging to the South African Native Trust. Given the name, Zwelitsha, construction began in 1946. By 1953 a total of 993 homes had been built, but in that same year the program was discontinued. Settlement, which began in 1948, totaled a population of 2,356 by 1951.[45]

Industry that developed in connection with Zwelitsha was not extensive. On land close to the town, but not within its limits, a large cotton textile factory was established. It began operations in 1947 and by 1956 employed over 2,000 Bantu.[46]

Summary. The areas reserved for and occupied by the Bantu in South Africa are, for the most part, geographically deficient. Sandy soils, heavy erosion, and low effective precipitation characterize many of the reserves. Of those

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[44]Hobart D. Houghton (ed.), Economic Development in a Plural Society: Studies in the Border Region of the Cape Province (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 293.

[45]Ibid., pp. 293-294.

[46]Ibid., p. 295.

areas that receive more than 20 inches of rainfall a year, continually increasing population pressure on the land has reduced the natives to a living of subsistence agriculture. Even in areas where the density of population is low, geographic conditions have served to make existence a tenuous proposition.

Bantu agricultural methods and tribal customs have helped to perpetuate the traditional way of life in the reserves. Attempts to improve agricultural production in the reserves must take into account the conservatism of the Bantu, their ritual attitude toward cattle, and the practice of labor migration which drains these areas of their manpower.

Industrial development has been limited by the absence of deposits of the major minerals and the absence of developed power sources. Thus, through the mid-1950's, the Bantu retained their traditional way of life and the reserves remained a predominantly pastoral, agricultural, and undeveloped part of South Africa.

CHAPTER IV

THE AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIVE RESERVES

I. THE TOMLINSON COMMISSION REPORT

The Tomlinson Commission made an exhaustive study of the native reserves and produced a report contained in eighteen volumes. In 1955 the Commission published a summary of the Report. The Government then issued its own views in a White Paper and two days were set aside during the 1956 legislative session for a full scale parliamentary debate on the subject.[1]

Divided into five sections, the core of the Report is contained in Parts III and IV. In Part III, the Commission analyzes the ideological assumptions on which the policy of apartheid is to be determined. It examines the consequences of the integration of the Bantu into the socio-economic life of the European community and draws the conclusion that continued integration must inevitably lead to cultural assimilation, the removal of all color bars, followed by political and social equality, and ultimately to complete racial assimilation. The Commission is convinced that a peaceful

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[1]"Native Areas in the Union: The Tomlinson Report," The Round Table, (December, 1956), p. 25.

Commission's Report. This program includes the agricultural and industrial development of the reserves (now called Bantustans); the re-location of Bantu from white, urban areas to the reserves, and re-location within the reserves themselves; and the granting of limited territorial autonomy to at least one native area, the Transkei.

The Tomlinson Report stated that the reserves can support decently only one-half of the population attributed to the native areas, recognizing thereby that the average family arable land holdings and grazing rights had been reduced by the population growth to a size insufficient to provide an adequate support for a man and his family even if improved methods were adopted.[4]

For the sake of efficient agriculture, the conservation of the soil, and the benefit of the natives, the Commission recommended that the land in the reserves should be divided among the inhabitants in economic units. An economic unit was defined as a holding which would produce an annual gross family income of $168 (the average family consisting of six people). The land holding itself varied in size according to the type of land, the largest being 456 acres in the dry ranching country of the Transvaal and 864 acres in the Kalahari areas. Using the economic unit as a measure, the

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[4]D. Hobart Houghton, "Land Reform in the Bantu Areas and its Effects Upon the Urban Labor Market," The South African Journal of Economics, XXIX (September, 1961), 167.

carrying capacity of the reserves was estimated at 307,000 families, just over 50 per cent of their total 1951 population.[5]

By 1961, Africans made up 68 per cent of the total population of South Africa. The estimated native population of the reserves as of 1962 was 4.7 million, an increase of over one million in a ten year period. Projected estimates for 1971 calculate the reserve population at 6.9 million, or 57 per cent of the natives of South Africa.[6]

The population density currently averages 87 persons per square mile in the reserves, compared with about 30 per square mile for the remainder of the country.[7] The density is generally highest in the reserves of the eastern Cape, rising to over 200 persons per square mile in certain districts of the Transkei and Ciskei Territories.[8]

Typically, relief from the increasing pressure on the land is found by the migration of natives from the reserves to the mines and industries of the South African whites. In reserves situated near industrial areas, the incidence of absenteeism from the reserves now runs as high as 60 per cent

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[5]Hill, Bantustans, pp. 22-23.

[6]Van Der Horst, "Union of South Africa: Economic Problems in a Multiracial Situation," p. 96.

[7]Hance, The Geography of Modern Africa, p. 552.

[8]Green and Fair, Development in Africa, pp. 76-77.

of all able-bodied male workers who are employed in mines and factories for as long as six months out of the year.[9]

This perpetual migration, which began in the 1870's with the discovery of gold in the Rand area, has had a deleterious effect on agriculture in the reserves. Population pressure in the reserves lowers agricultural production. As this occurs, more men must go into industrial wage employment to earn a living, in turn leading to further decline of the agricultural output of the reserves. Thus, pressure to migrate is again increased.[10]

In order to further realize its policy of territorial segregation, the South African government is re-locating numbers of Bantu within the country. The Tomlinson Commission estimated that approximately 50 per cent of the population should be removed from the reserves to permit optimum land utilization. As an interim measure, the Commission advocated establishing non-agricultural villages in Bantu areas to

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[9]Ibid., p. 81. According to a report delivered at a conference of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, June, 1963, only 56,000 of 7,000,000 natives near or in reserves are employed in industry. United Nations, Report of the Special Committee, p. 54. This is in strange contrast to the figures of the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association, an organization of mineowners which alone brings 400,000 Africans every year to the gold mines. See Anthony Sampson, "From Veld to City, the Bantu Drama," New York Times Magazine, (May 22, 1960), p. 77. The disparity in numbers may be explained by interpreting the conference statement to mean that industry within or near the reserves employs but 56,000 natives, not that industry employs only 56,000 natives.

[10]Houghton, "Land Reform in the Bantu Areas," pp. 165-166.

house families displaced by agricultural reforms. Ultimately these natives would be supported by locally established industry, but in the meantime their incomes would have to be derived from earnings of migrant workers employed in the major industrial centers.[11]

Three such villages have been established in the Ciskei reserves. Of these, Kayaletu was studied in detail in 1960, revealing that in fact the greater part of the incomes of the families in the village comes in the form of remittances from men employed in industrial centers, some as far away as the Rand. The average monthly family income in the village is almost $17, approximately one-half of what the study estimated was necessary to provide for a family with no income from farming. As yet, no local industry has been established.[12]

Within Natal, "black spots," that is, Africans living in areas surrounded by whites, amounted to 69,976 acres in 1962. These natives are being removed to equivalent land areas adjoining existing Natal reserves, the original land then settled by whites. "White spots," are also being eliminated, the land being purchased gradually by the Native Trust. In 1962, for example, 26 white farms consisting of approximately 36,000 acres were purchased for the removal of "white

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[11] Ibid., p. 168.

[12] Ibid., pp. 169-174.

spots" in Natal.[13]

In addition to eliminating "racial enclaves," the Government is constructing townships to accommodate surplus native population near urban areas. Border areas near the reserves in Natal where Africans seek employment are Newcastle, the Durban-Pinetown complex and Pietermaritzburg. South of Durban, the township of Umlazi is being built on nine thousand acres of the former Umlazi mission reserve. At the end of 1963, houses were being constructed at the rate of twelve a day. Eventually the township will house 150,000 natives, displacing 5,000 rural persons, some of whom may be entitled to live in the new township on the basis of work skills. The remainder will be settled elsewhere.[14]

Even government irrigation projects for white, rural areas take into account the possibilities for territorial segregation. Multi-million dollar development plans for the Pongola, the Orange and adjacent Fish and Sundays river valleys propose to attract not only whites into the areas, but also to settle some 75,000 Bantu on that part of the Pongola valley to be developed within the adjacent Bantu reserves.[15]

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[13]Hill, Bantustans, p. 95.

[14]Ibid., p. 99.

[15]T.J.D. Fair and Manfred N. Shaffer, "Population Patterns and Policies in South Africa, 1951-1960," Economic Geography, XL (July, 1964), p. 272.

II. AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NATIVE RESERVES

In line with its views on apartheid, the Government of South Africa is implementing measures to provide for the "separate development" of native areas. The Department of Native Affairs selected certain areas, previously demarcated, to be improved. These "Betterment Areas," through a threefold program of stabilization, reclamation, and rehabilitation, will be improved gradually in order to support a larger population and produce more in the way of crops. The Department stabilized five million acres in 1957 alone, demarcating residential areas, selecting arable land suitable for cultivation, and protecting water resources.[16]

A five-year plan calling for "the expenditure by the South African government of 160 million dollars in the Transkei and other Bantu homelands"[17] was set forth by the National Party in 1961. Government publications indicate that early efforts of the plan appear promising. Because overgrazing is a major cause of soil erosion and general decline of the reserves, conservation works are constructed by the State in consultation with the Bantu Authorities. Under this five-year plan, many abusive farming practices have been

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[16] The Progress of the Bantu Peoples Towards Nationhood: No. 4, Self-Development--Land and Agriculture (Johannesburg, 1960), p. 21.

[17] Progress Through Separate Development, p. 29.

eliminated, erosion brought under control and orderly farming patterns developed by judicious land use planning.[18]

Further publicity notes that reclamation procedures, such as the construction of contour banks, the erection of fences, and the building of stock dams are increasing in number. During the last few years, between 500 to 600 miles of fencing have been erected annually, and 200 conservation dams built each year.[19] By the end of 1962, construction of 36,370 miles of fencing, 8,715 miles of contour banks, 16,480 miles of roads, 140,000 miles of contour grass strips, and 3,680 stock-drinking dams had been completed in both the Betterment Areas and other reserves.[20]

Land improvement by increasing the acreage under irrigation is continuing in the reserves. Recent estimates note that 130,000 to 140,000 acres can be placed under irrigation farming, providing a full-time living for some 36,000 families on three to four acre plots. At present, 42,000 acres are under irrigation, about 80 per cent in cereals and legumes, the remainder in vegetable and fruit trees.[21]

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[18] Ibid., p. 94.

[19] The Progress of the Bantu Peoples Towards Nationhood, p. 21.

[20] Hailey, An African Survey, p. 12.

[21] The Progress of the Bantu Peoples Towards Nationhood, p. 30.

A diversification of crops is taking place in the reserves. Where once corn and other basic food grains were grown almost exclusively, the reserves are producing wheat, legumes, vegetables, sugar cane, and fruits. The Bantu areas in 1958 produced 5.5 million pounds of vegetables and 3.6 million pounds of fruits--Natal, Zululand, northern and eastern Transvaal reserves being the most favorable for vegetable growing. Sugar cane has been introduced into the reserves, and currently 20,000 acres are planted to this crop in Zululand and other Natal reserves.[22]

To encourage farmers to earn a cash income from their cattle, and to encourage them to improve the quality of their stock, a number of village dairies have been established by the Department of Native Affairs. Total receipts thus far have been small, but the dairies represent an important new development in the Bantu economy.[23]

In Bantu homelands the elimination of undesirable stock is encouraged by subsidizing the purchase of improved strains of cattle and sheep adapted to the particular environment. Moreover, in order to serve as demonstrations of good livestock husbandry to Bantu stockowners, Departmental breeding schemes are operated. For this purpose 20 herds are kept in different areas in addition to seven cooperative breeding

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[22]Ibid., pp. 32-34.

[23]Houghton, Economic Development in a Plural Society, p. 86.

stations.[24]

Despite the introduction of new crops, new farming methods, and improved land management, the reserves still face serious problems. Even though sheep now outnumber cattle in the Transkei and Ciskei reserves,[25] in Natal the land is over-stocked. Grain production is under 25 per cent of the requirement, and there is a shortage of male laborers.[26] The weather of the 1963-1964 South African crop year was abnormal, a severe drought in the Transvaal reducing sharply the production of important crops like corn and millets.[27] Even with normal weather conditions, the best climatic area, the Transkei, must import nearly 30 per cent of its corn.[28]

The Bantu, moreover, are not always willing to accept improvements. A 1962 meeting of 4,000 Bantu farmers at Bergville, Natal rejected a betterment scheme.[29] Accustomed to

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[24]Agriculture in the Economic Development of South Africa, p. 26.

[25]The Transkei, (Pretoria, n.d.), p. 2.

[26]Hill, Bantustans, p. 97.

[27]"Bad Weather Slows Rate of South Africa's Agricultural Advance," Foreign Agriculture, II (October 12, 1964), 8.

[28]Robert Conley, "Self-Rule Near for First Bantu Province," The New York Times, November 19, 1963, p. 3.

[29]Hill, Bantustans, p. 99.

their traditional agricultural "practices," the Bantu are often unwilling to accept cattle dipping, grazing control, stock culling and other methods that encroach upon their customary way of life.

III. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NATIVE RESERVES

There are three major ways in which industrial-commercial development is being promoted in native areas: (1) businesses owned and operated by Africans (generally limited to small trading shops in the Transkei); (2) the construction of "border industries," and (3) the building of industry within the reserves, the last two operated and subsidized by the Government.

African businessmen are being encouraged by loans and advice from the Bantu Investment Corporation[30] to follow the first course (the establishment of private concerns). The capital with which the Investment Corporation operates comes from the Africans themselves. In four months of operation, over $350,000 was deposited with the organization by natives in the Transkei. The Bantu are paid interest, and the money is made available for equity investment. Reasonable requests

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[30]"The Bantu Investment Corporation is a statutory body established by the Government in 1959 for the purpose of promoting industrial and other undertakings among the Bantu in the Bantu areas of the Republic. The Corporation acts as a development, financing and investment institution. It is controlled by a board of ten directors appointed by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development." See The Transkei, p. 31.

for loans to Africans for business purposes, however, amounted to only 20 per cent of the capital available in the first year of the Corporation. The difficulty that occurs from this type of commercial promotion does not seem to be the lack of capital but trading skill and fiscal responsibility.[31]

"Border industries" are those which the Government permits to be established by private capital in white areas bordering the reserves. The Government does not permit industrial development by white, private investors within the reserves on the grounds that it would necessitate the entry of more whites into native areas.[32] It is possible that markets could be developed in the reserves. The Bantu Trade Fair Association, a Government organized company whose purpose is to promote trade fairs for the Bantu in their homelands, estimates Bantu purchasing power at $11,200,000 per year (1963), and expects this to increase to approximately $16,800,000 by 1968.[33]

"Border industries" are located near existing white,

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[31]Edwin S. Munger, The Problems of the Transkei, X, No. 3 (New York: American University Field Staff, 1962), 12.

[32]Tatz, "Dr. Verwoerd's 'Bantustan' Policy," p. 17.

[33]South African Scope, VI, No. 6 (July, 1963), 7.

urban-industrial areas. The "parallel development" by the decentralization of industry throughout the reserves, hence, has not developed as anticipated. There is one notable exception to this at Phalaborwa, in northeastern Transvaal where phosphate production and copper mining are expanding rapidly. There is, however, no reserve near Phalaborwa, and it is only by describing the African township there as a Bantu area (that is, part of a proposed Bantustan) that the development can be construed as a "border industry." Other development areas include an industrial estate near a reserve at Rosslyn, northwest of Pretoria, and a similar area at Hammarsdale, Natal.[34]

Industrial expansion within the reserves is slow. An increase of the textile industry is planned for the Ciskei Reserves. The 1962 Ciskei Territorial Report noted that five industrial undertakings received government assistance totaling approximately $6,000,000, and a further seven projects received tax concessions totaling $36,000. Employment resulting from these ventures amounted to 1,850 new jobs for Bantu workers.[35]

IV. THE TRANSKEI

The most highly publicized Bantu homeland is the

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[34]Hill, Bantustans, pp. 31-32.

[35]Ibid., p. 32.

Transkei, a region stretching from the Indian Ocean to the eastern border of Basutoland, and from north of East London to the southern boundary of Natal. Granted a measure of political autonomy in 1963, including its own constitution and parliament,[36] the Transkei has become the epitome of "parallel development" thus far of the native areas.

Because of its relatively favored climate, the Transkei has always contained a large population. Consequently, pressure on the land has been great. Of the 2.3 million natives of the Transkei, 700,000 credited to the reserves live and work elsewhere in South Africa.[37]

Essentially a farming area, although only 24 per cent of the Transkei land is arable,[38] the Tomlinson Commission recommended that each family in the better farming regions be allowed not more than 50 acres of agricultural land, of which only one-quarter could be arable. Each family, in addition, would receive two acres for a residential plot. A square mile would thus carry between 11 to 12 families. The Commission recommended further that in the coastal area a family should receive 65 acres, giving a density of under 10 families

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[36] "Transkei Self-Government Bill," p. 19532A.

[37] Ray Vicker, "South Africa's Experiment," The Wall Street Journal, November 5, 1963, p. 14.

[38] The Transkei, p. 2.

to the square mile. The even less productive areas adjacent to the coastal strip were allotted 115 acres per family--only five families to the square mile.[39]

The 1962 agricultural report on the Transkei stated that the average number of native families, including fertile and infertile land, was over 16 to the square mile--1,387,444 permanent residents in an area, according to the Tomlinson Report, capable of supporting only one-half that number.[40] Numerous families, moreover, are settled on half, or even quarter economic units.[41]

According to figures given to the South African parliament in 1962, there were only 20,592 persons in paid employment within the Transkei in 1961, two-fifths of whom were in domestic service. One hundred fifteen thousand Transkei natives seek work in the mines every year, 28,000 to 30,000 work on European farms, and an additional 1,000 work in other industries.[42]

A dent has been made in the traditional agricultural pattern of the Transkei. At stock sales held during 1962 the Transkeian farmers disposed of cattle to the value of

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[39]Hill, Bantustans, p. 85.

[40]Ibid., p. 85.

[41]Ibid., p. 25.

[42]Ibid., p. 85.

$270,000. After two years (at the end of 1962) the agricultural division of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development indicated that an area of 600,000 acres in the Transkei had been planned for reclamation. To combat soil erosion in lands of the hilly area, over 2,200 miles of contour walls had been built. More than 9,400 miles of fencing wire had been put up; and more than 200 dams built.[43]

Although the main crop of the Transkei is corn, new crops, such as a fiber (Phormium tenax) for use in gunny sacks, are being planted on an experimental scale. Two types of cotton are being tried out in 11 districts of the Transkei and favorable preliminary results are indicated. The Government has a progressive forestry program under way, and forest plantations now cover 160,000 acres. (1963).[44]

The forestry program has given rise to the only industry that has been established in the Transkei--logmills and a furniture factory. Both these activities center near Umtata, the capital of the Transkei; in both, employment is limited. The Vulindela furniture factory is located at Highbury, outside Umtata. While sales for 1960-1961 appear impressive ($86,000), only 130 jobs have been created by the factory.[46]

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[43] The Transkei, pp. 30-31.

[44] Munger, The Problems of the Transkei, p. 9.

[45] South African Scope, VI, No. 5 (June, 1963), 5.

[46] The Transkei, p. 23.

As in the other Bantu homelands, the major stumbling block to the establishment of new industries is the regulation that no "white" capital can be invested in native areas. This runs contrary to the Tomlinson Report which stated that "white" capital and entrepreneurship are essential to significant industrialization of the reserves.[47] If this policy were to be applied, industrial development of the Transkei still appears to be limited. There is marble to be quarried, but there are few significant minerals to be mined. What little coal is present is not likely to compete with European coal production in Natal. Labor, moreover, is lacking in skills and would have to be trained from "scratch."[48]

Summary. At the same time that native population increases in the reserves, population densities rise, and pressure on the land mounts, the Government of South Africa, acting partially on the recommendations of the Tomlinson Report, is moving to further the "parallel development" of the Bantustans.

Erosion control, crop diversification, and efforts to improve the quality of cattle are among the agricultural programs in progress. "Border industries" are being established through Government assistance. A limited amount of investment

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[47]"Native Areas in the Union: The Tomlinson Report," p. 27.

[48]Munger, The Problems of the Transkei, pp. 13-14.

in commercial ventures by natives living in the reserves is being made possible by the Bantu Investment Corporation.

Concurrent with agricultural and industrial undertakings, the Government is implementing apartheid further by moving natives from white areas, eliminating "white spots," and separating blacks from whites in urban areas by building townships.

The apex of apartheid policy is represented in the degree of political autonomy and financial assistance given to the Transkei, marking it as the most forward Bantu area in South Africa.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

I. SUMMARY

As the study has shown, the apartheid policy of South Africa has evolved over a period of 300 years. It cannot be traced, moreover, to Afrikaner attitudes alone, but should be viewed as a result of English and Boer efforts alike to remain politically and geographically separate from the Bantu.

Territorial segregation in South Africa has taken the form of native reserves, blocks of land occupied by the natives who, by and large, have pursued a pastoral, agricultural, and subsistence way of life. With the findings of the Tomlinson Commission to support its policy, the National Party, in 1960, committed itself to a planned program of apartheid, aimed at the parallel but separate development of the reserves as national homelands for all the Bantu of South Africa.

Financial support to fulfill the party program has not been forthcoming, and despite plans for increased aid, the industrial and agricultural progress within the reserves has been slow. In order to honor its pledge, however, the National Party gave a measure of political autonomy to the

Transkei in 1963, publicizing this area as an example of what all the reserves might expect to accomplish in the future.

II. CONCLUSIONS

There are two classes of natives--those who reside permanently in the reserves and the urban workers. The official native policy of the National Party ignores this fact. Yet, the plan to develop the reserves as national homelands is undercut by the government itself whenever a township near an industrial center is constructed, a tacit admission that the reserves cannot support all the natives therein, and a recognition that the Bantu are an integral part of the South African labor force.

There is no evidence that the urban Bantu are being returned to the reserves from the industrial centers. Relocation is taking place to be sure, but it seems to consist of a shuffling of natives from one reserve to another, from a "black spot" to a reserve, or perhaps to a township.

It appears, also, that the government is hesitant about a full financial commitment to the "parallel development" of the reserves. In comparison with the amount of money recommended by the Tomlinson Commission, the total amount planned for allotment by the government comes to but one-half the Commission's figure. As government publications studiously avoid mentioning the actual amount spent on the reserves, one

may conclude that actual expenditure has been slight. Thus far, the only significant expenditure for agricultural development in South Africa has been directed at white, rural areas, a move which suggests that the government is trying to strengthen Afrikaner nationalism by improving the economy of rural Afrikaners. If a project like the Orange River Valley irrigation scheme can, in part, encompass neighboring Bantu areas (as the government has stated it will), then two objectives will be met at the same time, with an obvious gain in publicity for the official native policy.

Government programs do not seem to be making inroads quickly enough to improve agricultural conditions in the reserves to meet the mounting population pressure on the land. Forty-two thousand irrigated acres represents almost one-third of the irrigable land in the reserves. But the amount of land that can be irrigated, however, comprises only .005 per cent of the total area reserved for native occupancy.

Separate development is meant to include industrial as well as agricultural expansion, but insofar as industry near or within the reserves employs only approximately .03 per cent of the permanent reserve population (those not migrating to industrial centers) the outlook is not encouraging. It should be remembered that only in the last few years has the government prohibited private investment in the reserves, indicating that industry may not view the reserves as potential

centers of industrialization any way.

The apparent answer to the basic question, "Can the reserves become self-supporting homelands for all the natives of South Africa?," would seem to elicit a negative answer at this time. It has been indicated that crop diversification is possible and that production can be increased, but given the amount of land, which remains static, the number of Bantu, who are increasing in numbers, and the agricultural and industrial development, which is progressing slowly, all-inclusive homelands for 68 per cent of the South African population on an impoverished 13 per cent of the land are not a logical reality.

III. IMPLICATIONS

The implications of apartheid are two-fold. In regard to official policy as promulgated by the actions of the National Party, apartheid is designed to appeal to those who always have had the most to benefit from a segregation policy --the whites of South Africa. The native areas constitute a reservoir of unskilled laborers whose value is determined by the white minority. Separate development, hence, is but a synonym for the racist program of a government that has no intentions of allowing the Bantu to reach a level of political and economic sophistication comparable to that of South African whites. Only a major social revolution of violent proportions could bring about a change in this situation.

Geographically speaking, the reserves do not, and cannot support even one-half the Bantu of South Africa. The program of separate development, at best, will be able to overcome only part of the geographic handicaps inherent in the reserve system. The reserves should never be expected to support more than one-quarter of the 1962 Bantu population above the subsistence level.

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