INDIAN SUMMER IN FILIPINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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by
Philip T. Rosen
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INTRODUCTION

Henry Adams referred to the summer of the Spanish-American War as the "Indian Summer of life to one who had reached sixty years of life."¹ Dr. Bonifacio Salamanca, in his numerous lectures on Philippine-American relations, used Indian Summer to refer to the period preceding the outbreak of hostilities between American and Philippine forces, February 4, 1899, on San Juan Bridge.²

On that day, near the village of San Juan, Private Willie W. Grayson, shot and killed two Filipino soldiers who failed to heed his command to halt. Thus, began one of the most brutal wars in the history of the Western advance into Southeast Asia. The outbreak of hostilities was not created in a vacuum, rather it was preceded by a period of increased anxiety and frustration in the Filipino-American relationship. The major purpose of this thesis is two-fold: (1) to examine the Filipino reaction to American overseas expansion; and (2) to explore the antecedents of the Filipino-American War.

Nature of the Thesis

The aims of this study are to: (1) examine the Philippine society on the eve of the Spanish-American War; (2) scrutinize the initial encounters between American diplomatic personnel and the Filipino insurgents; (3) ponder the American advance into the Pacific and the relationship that developed between Admiral George Dewey and General Emilio Aguinaldo in Manila; (4) investigate the degeneration of the American-Filipino relationship after the land battle of Manila and the Spanish surrender; (5) ascertain the reaction of the Filipino leadership to the stabilization of American control in the Pacific; (6) consider the tension and antagonism that developed between American and Filipino troops and the drift toward conflict; and (7) place the Filipino resistance to American expansion in the broad context of Asian hostility to Western intrusion in the later part of the 19th century. The study conveniently falls into seven chapters to deal with the aforementioned aims.

Basic to an understanding of the Filipino reaction to the establishment of American influence in the Philippines is a comprehensive view of the Filipino society before the Spanish-American War. The first chapter of this study creates a perspective to view later events by reviewing the Filipino heritage of revolution against Spanish rule and by examining the rise of militant nationalism as an outgrowth of this
recalcitrant spirit. The next chapter is concerned with the initial efforts of American officials and Filipino representatives to establish an alliance. Also, an effort is made to analyze the Filipino reaction to the American proposals of cooperation.

In the third chapter the American advance into the Pacific and the establishment of American authority in the Philippines is explored. The relationship of Admiral Dewey and General Aguinaldo is also examined. The fourth section of this study describes the land battle of Manila and its effect on Philippine-American relations. An effort is made to explore the Spanish diplomatic offensive which was directed toward winning over the Filipinos to the Spanish side. The next chapter of the thesis is concerned with the Filipino reaction to the stabilization of American authority in the Islands.

The final aim of the study is to explore the development of tension and frustration between the United States and Filipino troops. Various incidents are examined which culminated with an outbreak of hostilities in 1899. The last chapter attempts to place the Filipino resistance to American overseas expansion in a proper perspective. The resistance of the Sudanese, the Chinese, and the Japanese to Western imperialism is examined with this aim and conclusions are
advanced as to the importance of the non-Western response to Western expansion.

The study is a diplomatic history which attempts to analyze the relationship that emerged between the United States and Filipino insurgents and the reasons for its disintegration. It centers upon the reaction of the "First Democratic Republic in the Far East" to American overseas expansion.

Sources

In order to assess the Filipino position the following material has been extensively utilized: (1) the captured documents of the Philippine Republic compiled by John R. M. Taylor; (2) the writings of the leaders of the Philippine Government; (3) the comments of Filipino historians, economists, and political scientists. The study also draws heavily upon the following materials available in the United States: (1) the personal observations of journalists, soldiers, diplomats, and government officials; (2) the works of American historians, economists, and political scientists; and (3) the vast amount of material from the War Department, Department of State, the United States Congress, and the Executive Department.

The very scope of this thesis necessitates a number of important restrictions. This is not a study of the McKinley
Administration or an examination of the American decision-making process during the Spanish-American War. Only in so far as United States Government policy related to the increase of tension in the Philippine-American relationship will it be considered. Furthermore, this study is not a consideration of American overseas expansion per se.

The Thesis

The contention herein is that the hostilities which erupted in 1899, were not created in a vacuum; indeed, they were the product of a growing sense of tension and frustration which permeated the relationship between the two former allies. This tension was caused by the clash of Filipino nationalism and American overseas expansion.

The Filipino leaders, fully aware of the delicate position in which they found themselves, sought to wage a political movement for diplomatic recognition. They employed a "science of alternatives" fully aware of possible military conflict with the United States. The insurgents hoped to avoid war with the United States by utilizing a series of political options available to them. Thus, in reality, the Filipino reaction to the American presence became one of increased diplomatic maneuvering. The leaders exhibited political

\[\text{3 Thomas A. Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People (New York, 1958), p. 477.}\]
nen by creating the first democratic republic in East
and by striving for political recognition in Europe,
and the United States.

Through the denouement of the science of alternatives
Filipino leadership found itself drifting into conflict
each of their successive efforts went unrewarded. As
alternatives and options became curtailed, tension and
increased in the Filipino-American relationship.

The tension and anxiety evinced in Filipino decision-
were further compounded by the hatred and distrust
which appeared between American and Filipino troops. Minor
incidents occurred regularly after the surrender of Manila and
led to major confrontations between United States authorities
and Filipino leaders. These tests of will were only resolved
by the most meticulous negotiations. But time was running
out, for on February 4, 1899, what could have been a minor
incident exploded into a major conflict between Philippine
nationalism and American imperialism. No longer was the fate
of the young republic to be decided in the diplomatic realm;
the test of survival would be on the field of battle. The
justice of its cause was not to be debated, for debate had
Once upon a time there were no people on earth; only gods and goddesses. They grew bored with their idle lives, so they began to make figures out of clay. The first batch they baked too long and came out black. The second was underdone, too pale and white. The third batch was just right, brown and beautiful. These were the Filipinos.

Philippine Legend
CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL SETTING

This section will explore those factors that contributed to the rise and maturation of Filipino nationalism. The Filipino perception of American overseas expansion was a product of a unique historical environment intimately connected with the pre-European and Spanish periods. This chapter will deal with the character of the Filipino society before the Spanish intrusion and the alteration of that society as it interacted with the Spanish colonial process.

Mainland and island Southeast Asia, a geographical area of cross-cultural contact, had varied and opulent societies long before the entrance of the European powers in the area. In what is now Burma the Mon Civilization and the Pagan Dynasty achieved stability and political integration that was similar to developments in the more well-known areas of China and India. Angor Wat and Borobudur stand as monuments to the high level of culture attained by Southeast Asians in the pre-European era. This general trend of political and social assimilation is not applicable to the Philippines before their

1Brian Harrison, Southeast Asia A Short History (London, 1964), p. x.
discovery\(^2\) by the Europeans. The Philippines, moreover, stand outside the mainstream of Southeast Asian historical developments.\(^3\)

Unlike the highly advanced peoples of Southeast Asian societies, the Philippine community achieved little political, social, or economic unification in the pre-European period. There was no centralized political structure, nor was there a native ruling elite.\(^4\) Each community or tribe remained isolated from and hostile to other groups in the islands.

The Philippines had also remained insulated from external contact. Little contiguity had developed between the Philippines and the cultural giants of Asia—India and China. Neither Buddhism, which advanced primarily northward from India, nor Hinduism much affected Philippine society. The Chinese influence was minor with few Chinese migrations to the Philippines. Islam, which had been a major force in the region for more than a century before the Spanish arrival, was mainly limited to Mindanao in the southern Philippines.\(^5\)

\(^2\)Agoncillo and Alfonso, *Short History of the Filipino People*, p. iii.


\(^5\)Harrison, *Southeast Asia*, p. 132.
The arrival of the Spanish in the Philippines made Filipino lack of cultural and political maturation strikingly apparent. It was the only area in Southeast Asia where Europeans were not faced with a highly integrated culture. This facilitated Spanish control of the society, and by the 19th century, after three centuries of continuous Spanish effort, the Filipinos had become Europeanized to a degree that distinguished them from the other peoples of Southeast Asia. Europeanization, combined with the tribalism and the truculent spirit of the Filipino people, eventually produced the first and most aggressive nationalists in Southeast Asia.

**Initial Reaction**

The Spanish attempt to solidify their rule and create a dominion was an expensive and drawn out process. The proclamation of Spanish sovereignty over the islands did not herald an accomplished fact, but rather obligated them to engage in protracted warfare to increase and ensure their holdings. The Spanish endeavored for more than three centuries to bring the diversified elements that existed in the islands

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6Ibid.
7Ibid., p. 133.
9Apolinar Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina Vol. II (Manila, 1931), p. 73.
together under their rule. Geography, as well as cultural and social division, hindered the Spanish efforts at unification.

The Filipino combated all efforts put forward by the European to subjugate him. Numerous tribes refused to succumb to Spanish hegemony, which created a heritage of opposition and resistance. Their spirit reflected the deep tradition


of antagonism to authority that appeared in the pre-colonial era. The renitence that occurred in the pre-19th century period was largely uncoordinated and, in most instances, stemmed from personal grievances. Filipino chiefs, who were relatively free of centralized domination in the pre-colonial period, often took up the initial banner of insurrection to protect their local autonomy. Thus, even though these initial attempts at resistance can be characterized as personal rather than national, a certain tradition developed which was centered around the resort to arms and force to deal with the Spanish.

The pre-19th century was not simply an era of violence and rebellion, it was also a training period for a more cosmopolitan leadership. The number of Spaniards in the Philippines available for minor positions was vastly less than in Spanish America or the West Indies. A Filipino elite emerged which assumed added responsibilities in religion, local politics, and secondary businesses. The major result was that, while the most profitable jobs were filled by the

12Agoncillo and Alfonso, A Short History of the Filipino People, p. 134.

13Ibid.

14War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Military Notes on the Philippines Document No. 81, Military Information Division (Washington, 1898), pp. 20-21, estimates the Spanish population at not more than twenty thousand, while the Filipinos numbered 8,000,000.
Spanish, many urban positions and most of those in the rural areas were occupied by Filipinos.15

The Catholic church was a cohesive force in the Philippines. Under the guidance and direction of the Spanish priests the Philippines became more unified. Despite the Moslem influence in the South, the Filipino majority practiced a religion which fused elements of Catholic worship with paganism. The missionary fathers contributed to reducing the number of language groupings in the Philippines. A few particular languages such as Tagalog, Bikol, Pampangan, and Ilokano emerged as leading, if not prevalent, languages in their respective areas.16 An important barrier to communication between Filipinos had been removed by the missionary need to carry their message.

Travelers from different nations spoke highly of the natives' social accomplishments. In 1788, the French explorer Perouse concluded the Filipinos were in no way inferior to Europeans.17 Dr. John Crawford, a physician, visited the islands in 1820, and found them impressive in civilization,

15Honacio de la Costa, Reading in Philippine History (Manila, 1965), pp. 244-245.
wealth, and populousness even though they were under the domi-
nation of a European country regarded as backward. Historian
Edward G. Bourne commented that in the early 17th century
Manila made provisions for the sick and helpless far in advance
of English cities.

Turning Point

The forces that ultimately shaped the development of
Filipine nationalism emerged in the 19th century. Political
and social restlessness led to numerous revolts in this period.
At the same time advances were being made in the areas of tech-
ology, education and economy. This period further enhanced
Filipino training. There was also increased unification among
Filipinos from the sense of a common past under foreign dom-
ination.

In 1811, key literary forces were set in motion when
the first printing press was constructed and the colonial
administration introduced the first gazette, Del Superior
Gobierno, to be printed in the Philippines. A host of

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Teodoro Agoncillo, The Revolt of the Masses The Story
of Bonifacio and the Katipunan (Quezon City, 1956), p. 11.
21 Teodoro M. Kalaw, Development of Philippine Politics
publications soon appeared and between 1822-1860, 16 magazines were distributed in Manila.\textsuperscript{22}

Napoleon's domination of Spain had important ramifications in the Philippines. In 1814 reforms were inaugurated by the mother country and restrictions on trade with Spanish America and other parts of Asia were lifted.\textsuperscript{23} The opening of the port of Manila to foreign trade brought increased prosperity to the islands. No less than 39 commercial houses were established throughout the islands and production was stimulated to meet the demand for commercial goods.\textsuperscript{24}

The triumph of liberalism in Spain in the 1860's brought about new reforms in the Philippines. The removal of Isabella II from her throne eventually led to the introduction of a liberal program in the islands.\textsuperscript{25} Paramount among these reforms was the education decree of 1863, which culminated in government-supervised, free, compulsory education with instruction in Spanish.\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{23}French Ensor Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain (New York, 1909), p. 109.

\textsuperscript{24}Agoncillo, Revolt of the Masses, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26}Wurfel, The Philippines, p. 684.
The opening of the Suez Canal, also in the 1860's, represented a dividing line between modern and medieval history in Southeast Asia. The canal shortened the distance between the colony and the mother country and resulted in an exodus from Spain to the islands, and then to the introduction of revolutionary ideas from Europe.

The technological innovations introduced into the islands after the canal opened improved transportation and communications in the Philippines. In the intellectual realm young men began to read of the American and French Revolutions. The Philippines was drawn together by technology, at the same time that new and dangerously explosive ideas were being introduced. The net result was the development of a common past and a common sense of enslavement.

In reality the introduction by the Spanish of superior technology and enlightened thought provided the impetus for change and eventual revolution. By introducing powerful new economic and political concepts, the Spanish set in motion

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27 Harrison, Southeast Asia Short History, p. 197.
28 Agoncillo, Revolt of the Masses, pp. 11-12.
process which would end in the demise of Spanish power. \footnote{Harrison, *Southeast Asia Short History*, p. 236.}

The groundwork was laid for the ideological revolution\footnote{Pilapil, *PHR*, p. 253.} under the leadership of the Propagandists, the "intellectual foreigners of the revolution."

### Revolution of Ideas

The Propagandist movement grew out of political development and an atmosphere of progress.\footnote{Pilapil, *PHR*, p. 250.} With the opening of the Suez Canal and the introduction of various educational reforms, many Filipino students traveled to Spain to continue their educational objectives. In Manila, censorship was strictly observed, but in Madrid students had opportunity to examine political and religious issues.\footnote{Wilcox (ed.), *Harper's History of the War*, p. 16.}

In Spain, Filipino students were introduced to various ideas and books that had been denied them in Manila.\footnote{Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother* (Garden City, 1961), p. 27.}

From this experience in Spain the Filipino created a movement for reform and political equality. Nationalism grew out of the attempt by the educated Filipino...
Spain to gain recognition for his homeland. In Spain three leaders emerged who gained recognition both in the Spanish university and the colony—Jose Protacio Rizal, the scholar; Marcelo H. del Pilar, the political analyst; and Graciano Lopez Jaena, the orator. These students best typify the temper of the Propagandist movement. They did not produce outstanding literary works, but political tracts to arouse concern and awareness. They did not advocate revolution or independence, only Philippine assimilation as a regular province of Spain. They urged the Filipino to play a more active role in the political affairs of the colony. Rizal went so far as to argue that the injustices and inequalities prevalent in the Philippines were as much the fault of Filipinos as the Spanish.

The reform movement was caught up with the two distinct levels of civilization that permeated the Spanish cultural and political scene; one level was endowed with liberal ideas

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37 Cesar Majul, Mabini and the Philippine Revolution (Quezon City, 1961), p. 7.
38 Agoncillo, Revolt of the Masses, pp. 23-24.
39 Ibid.
40 Wurfel, The Philippines, p. 684.
41 Costa, Reading in Philippine History, p. 231.
and intentions and the other with the profit motive which was the cause of corruption.\textsuperscript{42} The movement failed to appreciate the gap that existed in the Spanish way of life. But, the success of this movement transcends its failure to promote reform. By critically evaluating their society and its relationship to Spain, they shook the basic philosophical foundation upon which the colony was maintained. By attacking the church they undercut the basic institution of that society. And, by challenging the lethargy of the Filipinos, they forced a people to become more active and concerned.

This gestation of ideas,\textsuperscript{43} while not successful enough to produce reforms in the political, economic, or social life of the Philippines, nevertheless created a widespread consciousness which laid the foundation for new unity among Filipinos. Through the works of the Propagandists, Filipinos realized that, regardless of race, language, or religion, they were undergoing a common experience—Spanish oppression. Thus, the ultimate force of their ideas was a revolution aimed at the basic institutions that supported the colonial relationship.

\textsuperscript{42}Rafael Atlamira y Creva, "Share of Spain in History of the Pacific Ocean," in Papers and Addresses Presented at the Panama-Pacific Historical Congress, ed. H. Morse Stephens and Herbert E. Bolton (New York, 1917), p. 49.

\textsuperscript{43}Mabini, \textit{La Revolucion Filipina}, Vol. II, p. 53.
The Propagandists organized an Hispanic-Filipino association in Spain which demanded the reduction of the number of Spanish priests, the reform of the administration, representation in the Cortes, and the admission of Filipinos to government posts. In Manila, the rising Filipino middle class organized into societies to give aid to the students in Spain. A direct outgrowth of this attempt at organization was the importation of the Freemasonry into the Filipino system. The Masonic lodges would later become secret societies dedicated to out-right Philippine separation from Spain. The most ardent allies of the Propagandists among the Filipinos became the native clergy. Their inferior position with respect to the other religious orders put them in the fore-


45Agoncillo, Revolt of the Masses, pp. 32-34.

46Margherita Hamm, "Filipinos and the Friars," Independent Vol. L (September 15, 1898), p. 749. The author presented the church establishment as follows: first, the church proper, which is controlled throughout by the Dominicans, and, second, the five brotherhoods, which have convents and monasteries as follows: the Austin Friars at Manila, Cebu, and Guadalupe; the Dominicans at Manila, Dagupan, Cavite, Liganayan, and Vigan; the Recollects at Manila, Cavite, San Sebastian, Cebu, and Imus; the Franciscans at Manila, San Francisco, Sampaloc, Vailon and Camarines de Sul; the Capuchins at Yap, Palaos and Ponape.
front of the movement for equality. This in turn earned them the hatred and distrust of the Spanish friars in the Philip-

pines. 47

Revolution-First Phase

With the alliance between the Propagandists and the Filipino priests in mind, the events in 1872 become meaning-

ful. Filipino soldiers in San Felipe in Cavite, rose in a mutiny on the night of January 20, 1872. The rebellion, a localized affair, was easily suppressed by the Spanish offi-

cials. The hostility of the Spanish, especially the religious orders, was directed toward the Filipino priests in the area, who were accused of having organized the revolt. As the result of an official inquiry into the mutiny, on February 17, 1872, Filipino Fathers Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora were executed by the Spanish government. 48 Leaders in the revolt of 1896 looked back to the death of these priests as the starting point for militant nationalism. 49

Actually, the incident stands as a transition from the quest for reform under the Spanish government to agitation for complete separation. As in the case of revolution in Latin  

America, "revolt in behalf of liberal rule, to revolt in behalf of independence, was an easy and natural step."\textsuperscript{50}

The failure to achieve reform led to the creation of the Katipunan with its separatist ambitions. The leaders of the more radical elements, after an apparent lull in activity, created a secret society to spread their beliefs and coordinate their activities. The organization was developed upon the lines of a Masonic lodge. The seeds of the Katipunan were initially planted on Spanish soil when Lopez Jaena, under the influence of contacts with the leading Masons in Spain, developed the exclusive Filipino lodge Revolucion in Barcelona on April 1, 1889. Using the lodge Revolucion as an example, in July, 1892, a secret society was created outside Manila, which became known as the Kataastaasan Kayalanggalang Katipunan ng nga Anag ng Buyan or the Katipunan.\textsuperscript{52}

A period of militant nationalism was ushered into existence.\textsuperscript{53}

Secret oaths were employed by the Katipunan and the organization used the same methods of terrorism and fear.

\begin{itemize}
\item Agoncillo, \textit{Revolt of the Masses}, p. 33.
\item Agoncillo, \textit{Revolt of the Masses}, p. 1.
\end{itemize}
developed by the Spanish government to maintain control over the Philippines. The secret society mimicked the character of the Spanish administration in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{54} The aims of the society were expressed in the following oath and edict to which each member had to swear allegiance:

\textbf{Magangon Seccion (Lodge)}

We the undersigned, declare and have taken oath, for the sake of closer unity, to the effect that, from the date of this agreement, we swear before God, that because of the cruelties which they have inflicted upon us, we will not take a backward step in the revolution against Spain.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{An Edict for All}

By virtue of mutual desires we swear that we will rise up in force and free ourselves from the slavery which, for a period of more than three hundred years, we have suffered without complaint, as, when you realize the wretched condition of the Philippines, all, with one accord, will be ready to make war on account of our grievances.\textsuperscript{56}

The growth of the society was extremely rapid. During the four year period preceding the outbreak of hostilities between the Spanish and the Filipinos, 10,000 active members were on its rolls.\textsuperscript{57} The society was surrounded by nativistic revivalism. It became messianic in its objectives and claims,

\textsuperscript{54}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{56}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{57}Wilcox (ed.), Harper's History of the War, p. 16.
magical in its methods.\textsuperscript{58} For this reason, and because its revolutionary nature, many of the more educated ele-
ments refused to become members. The organization appealed
individually who had little contact with the Propagandists.
Fires Bonifacio, a porter in the warehouse of a German firm
Manila, became the leader of the Katipunan.\textsuperscript{59}

The Spanish government employed various devices against
Katipunan, but the most successful measures were institu-
ted by the Catholic church. The friars proclaimed the vows
the secret society were anti-Christian and could not be
ved in the confession.\textsuperscript{60} Members and suspects of the
rat organization were denounced, and hundreds of indivi-
duals were banished from their homes and sent to the uninhab-
ed islands in the southern section of the Philippines.\textsuperscript{61}

Reports and rumors poured into Manila about plots for
olution against Spanish authority. On July 5, 1896,
uel Sitzar of the Guardia Civil, stationed at Pasig, urged
the government to take military action against the towns of

\textsuperscript{58}Cady, \textit{Southeast Asia}, p. 642.

\textsuperscript{59}Wilcox (ed.), \textit{Harper's History of the War}, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{60}Edwin Wildman, \textit{Aguinaldo A Narrative of Filipino
bitions} (Boston, 1901), p. 23.

\textsuperscript{61}Albert G. Robinson, \textit{The Philippines, The War and the
pple A Record of Personal Observations and Experience
ew York, 1901), p. 27.
ndalayan and San Juan del Monte, where the Katipunan was reported to have gathered a strong military force. 62 On August 19, the society was exposed by the sister of one of the leading members of the organization. The information she provided in a church confession served as the foundation for government counter-action, and many Katipunan members in Manila were quickly arrested. 63 The Spanish counter moves forced the Katipunan leadership to utilize force and armed resistance at a time when they were unprepared for open conflict.

The "first national struggle" 64 at first remained localized and involved few from the Filipino community, but the movement was soon enlarged as a result of fearful and incompetent acts by the Spanish. 65 On September 16, 22 peaceable citizens of Manila, well known for their wealth, social position, and culture, were arrested and placed in prison. 66 The arresting officials confiscated their wealth. Leading men in every community in central Luzon were now faced with

65 Agoncillo, *Revolt of the Masses*, p. 5.
crucial decision, either they could face arrest and prison or death at the hands of Spanish troops or they could in the rebellion. Many wealthy and talented men, who normally would have been closer to the Propagandist position of assimilation, now actively moved into the separatist camp.

Spanish inability to distinguish between separation and assimilation was the mistake that determined the difference between success and failure of their colonial policy.

As more and more sophisticated individuals entered the movement for separation, leadership shifted from Bonifacio to the more astute Emilio Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo, a school teacher from the province of Cavite and a municipal official who had served the Spanish in central Luzon, had the respect of many leading citizens in Manila. It was not Aguinaldo's military or political ability that gained him leadership of the independence movement, but his ability to bridge the gap between the middle class and the peasantry.

The opening conflict in 1896, was in Balintawak, in it is today Rizal province. Within a month, the situation

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67 Wilcox (ed.), Harper's History of the War, p. 18.


69 George Malcolm, First Malayan Republic Story of the Philippines (Boston, 1951), p. 97.

70 Kalaw, Philippine Revolution, p. 18.
central Luzon became extremely tense as the revolution spread to the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, Nueva Ecija, Nacan, and Morong.

The Spanish counter-offensive centered upon Cavite where the revolt had gained widespread support. Spanish Governor-General Primo de Rivera, after great effort, managed to drive the meagerly armed rebels out of the area. With the suppression of the revolution in Spanish hands, Aguinaldo shifted his operation and tactics. Cut off from their major area of men and supplies, the rebels employed the Cuban pattern of resistance with some success. In a declaration issued September 6, 1897, Aguinaldo concluded:

We must take the offensive on propitious occasions adopting the Cuban system of ambush and guerilla warfare. The Cubans with their guerilla system, avoiding combat when they would have an unfortunate result, have succeeded in wearing out the Spanish, who, decimated by the climate are dying there in great numbers.

As the revolt entered a new phase with the rebels utilizing guerrilla tactics, the Spanish effort bogged down in the rainy season. Pacification became even more difficult as the Cuban revolt continued to eat up the more seasoned Spanish troops. Rivera had to rely largely upon Spanish

71 Fernandez, Philippine Republic, pp. 24-25.
72 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
73 Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 44, lILYP, Vol. I.
volunteers and young boys with little experience in guerrilla warfare.  

A military stalemate developed after the rebels took refuge in the mountain fortress of Biak-na-bato in Bulacan. The Spanish, short of men and material, were unable to advance, but the rebels, also short of weapons and without a base of operations, were unable to take advantage of the situation. The Spanish could continue to wage limited military operations and wait for victory in Cuba, or accept the military stalemate and negotiate. Realizing that the Spanish government was unable to defeat the rebels with their present resources, Rivera decided to ask for peace and hold out the proposal for reform.

Aguinaldo also was faced with two basic alternatives. His first option was to secure outside aid to break the military stalemate, and his second alternative was to sue for peace and regroup and reorganize his forces. Aguinaldo attempted to simultaneously pursue both courses. In Hong Kong, Felipe Agoncillo, Aguinaldo's personal representative, established contact with U.S. Consul Rounseville Wildman. During the secret negotiations Agoncillo proposed an alliance between the two governments. The naive offer did not affect

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74 Teodoro Agoncillo, Crisis of the Republic (Quezon City, 1960), p. 11.

75 Kalaw, Development of Philippine Politics, p. 89.
political judgement of Wildman, who on November 3, 1897, presented the following information to the Department of State:

... Mr. Agoncillo offers on behalf of his government alliance offensive and defensive with the United States when the United States declares war on Spain, which in Mr. Agoncillo's judgement, will be very soon. In the meantime he wishes the United States to send to some port in the Philippines 20,000 rounds of ammunition for the use of his government, to be paid for on the recognition of the United States. 76

Secretary William Day replied to Wildman on December 15 that the United States did not negotiate such treaties and toward no further communication on the matter. 77 Thus, six months before the outbreak of American hostilities with Spain, the United States was offered an alliance which it categorically rejected.

Aguinaldo's second option, recognition of the military stalemate, implied peace talks with the Spanish. As early June, 1897, he was approached by Father Pio Pi, a Jesuit, and Mr. Rafael Comenge, a Spanish representative, on possible negotiations with the Spanish. 78 Their proposals were not acted upon immediately, but the rebels maintained an open venue of communication with the Spanish. In August, the

77 Ibid.
78 Kalaw, Philippine Revolution, p. 67.
As entered into serious negotiations with the Spanish, A. Paterno, the go-between, visited Aguinaldo to persuade the insurgents to surrender "being certain of the noble sentiments of the Spanish." 

A pact was negotiated from August to December 15, when the document was signed. The conditions which the Filipinos hired for a ceasefire were pardon for all the rebels and the departure of the rebel chiefs to either China or Japan, exchange for laying down their arms. Rivera accepted the stipulations and consented to pay the Filipinos 1,700,000 pesos, sensibly as an indemnity to Filipino widows, orphans, and aliens who had suffered during the conflict.

In addition the Spanish government verbally agreed to institute the following reforms:

1. The expulsion of the religious orders;
2. Philippine representation in the Spanish Cortes;
3. Equal treatment of Filipinos and Spanish in the application of justice;
4. The liberty of the press and the right to form organizations;
5. The employment of Filipinos in the high posts of the government service.

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82 Blair and Robertson, *Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, LII, p. 198.  
83 Forbes, *Philippine Islands*, p. 35.
ra contended that if the proposed reforms were made public, the Spanish government could be subjected to severe criticism and ridicule from the more conservative elements in Madrid. The reforms, therefore, were not mentioned in any official document. 84

In December, 42 rebel leaders left their mountain retreat for Hong Kong. 85 They issued the following declaration when they arrived in the British colony:

Those who were the Filipino rebels, on leaving the land of their birth, send their farewell greetings, leaving in the hands of Your Excellency the guardianship of their homes and the protection of their soul. All are confident that Spain, impelled by right and justice, will grant reforms. 86

The Pact of Biak-na-bato did not completely end opposition to Spanish rule. Numerous conspiracies broke out in Manila and Cavite, while Francisco Macabulos and Isidro Torres continued to fight the Spanish in central Luzon. 87

Whatever may have been the intention of Aguinaldo in arming his soldiers and going to Hong Kong, some of his followers did not believe that their leaders signed the agreement in good faith. A subordinate wrote Aguinaldo that:

84 Kalaw, Development of Philippine Politics, p. 93.
86 Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 65, 23LY, Vol. I.
87 Kalaw, Development of Philippine Politics, pp. 97-98.
... I firmly believed that the peace whose conditions I did not know, was really only a trap planned by you in order to give an opportunity to re-establish your forces which had grown weak. 88

Definition of a Diplomatic Spokesman

Mentir et dementir.
(Lie and Deny)

Baron Jacques Baeyens
CHAPTER II

QUEST FOR SOLIDARITY

According to the American anti-imperialists at the turn of the century, their government's early contact with the Filipino insurgents was "a story of deceit, false pretense and brutal treachery to friends without parallel in the history of the Republic." This emotional contemporary charge does little to clarify the diplomatic exchanges between the Filipino insurgents and American consular officials. The Filipino statesmen were no novices in dealing with Western diplomats and military officers and were not led down the path of deceit without being fully aware of the consequences.

Initial Efforts

A close relationship had developed between the two potential allies after the first contact. In 1898, messengers repeatedly passed between American officials and Aguinaldo in Hong Kong. The Filipino agents pressed the United States consul-general and other Americans to urge their government to support the Filipino cause.

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2 H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire War With Main and Overseas Expansion (New York, 1965), pp. 89-90.
3 Wildman, Aguinaldo, pp. 57-58.
Aguinaldo and his followers organized a junta, the Philippine Patriotic League in Hong Kong, to co-ordinate Filipino efforts and to handle finances. A number of alternative policies were discussed by the insurgents and, after great deal of debate, the following options appeared especially attractive:

1. To purchase arms and ammunition immediately with the money given to them by the Spanish, and thus equipped, return to the islands to resume the conflict;
2. To explore the possibility of assistance from the Japanese (Japan's emergence as a power in East Asia inspired Filipino nationalists' hopes that in their struggle against Spain, help might come from fellow Asians);
3. To create an alliance with the United States.

As the possibility of war between the United States and Spain grew more probable, the Filipinos in Hong Kong moved in the direction of a United States-Filipino alliance. To bring this alliance to fruition, the junta gathered a swarm of adventures, press agents, and sycophants around itself to keep the Associated Press and the magazines full of pro-Aguinaldo literature. Unlike the Cuban rebels, however, the

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4Karl Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines (San Francisco, 1899), p. 42.
Philippines had not set up a propaganda agency in New York City or Washington, D.C. Aguinaldo, throughout this early maneuvering, remained unaware of the American public apathy toward his cause.

While these preliminary explorations were under way, the insurgents first established contact with the American Navy. Aguinaldo had a number of conferences with the Captain of the U.S.S. Perel. Aguinaldo later recounted the event:

[The Captain] urged me to return to the Philippines to reassemble my army and, with American advice and arms to be supplied by Dewey, liberate my country from the Spaniards. Swearing me to absolute secrecy, he confided that the American fleet would soon proceed to the Philippines to attack the Spanish fleet there...

This initial interchange with American naval authorities was cut short early in April when Aguinaldo was forced to flee to Singapore because of a threatened legal suit by Mr. Isabelo Artacho. For his services in the 1896 revolt against Spain, Artacho had demanded over half the reparations the insurgents received from Spain. More than likely, Artacho was now a Spanish agent who was sent to Hong Kong to freeze the revolutionary government funds.

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8 Wolff, Little Brown Brother, p. 35.
9 Aguinaldo, Second Look at America, pp. 30-32.
10 Fernandez, Philippine Republic, p. 52.
11 Aguinaldo, Second Look at America, p. 31.
with our fleet, then at Hong Kong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire. I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows: Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hong Kong arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired. The Commodore's reply reading thus: Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.15

In the second and last interview described by Pratt

former impressed upon the insurgent leader:

On the eve of his departure for Hong Kong, I enjoined upon him [Aguinaldo] the necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction, of exerting absolute control over his forces in the Philippines.

To this General Aguinaldo assented, assuring me that he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers . . . 16

Pratt then submitted the following despatch to the department of State to show his influence with the insurgents:

I have the honor to submit for your consideration a proclamation in Spanish, issued prior to the departure of our fleet for Manila by the insurgent leaders in Hong Kong calling upon the Filipinos not to oppose the Americans . . .

We, your brothers, are very much afraid that you may be induced to fire on the Americans. No, brothers never make this mistake. Rather blow your own brains out than fire a shot or treat as enemies those who are your liberators . . . 17

15Pratt to Day, April 28, 1898, Consular Despatches, Singapore, Vol. XXII.

16Pratt to Day, April 30, 1898, Consular Despatches, Singapore, Vol. XXII.

17Pratt to Day, May 20, 1898, Consular Despatches, Singapore, Vol. XXII.
On June 16, 1898, the Department of State instructed to "avoid unauthorized negotiations with Philippine insurgents." Also, Washington explained its position regarding cooperation with the insurgents:

The Department observes that you informed General Aguinaldo that you had no authority to speak for the United States; and, in the absence of the fuller report, which you promise, it is assumed that you did not attempt to commit the Government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents.

In July, the Department received the June 19th report from Pratt which included the following information:

I have the honor to report that this afternoon I was waited upon by the Philippine residents in Singapore and presented an address which I replied to.

The reports of the proceedings sent me by the editors of the Singapore Free Press and Straits Times, both of whom were present are included.

To the Honorable Edward Spencer Pratt:

Our warmest thanks are especially due to you for having been the first to cultivate relations with General Aguinaldo, and arrange for the cooperation with Admiral Dewey.

The United States Consul-General Replies

You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion.

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18 Day to Pratt, June 16, 1898, Consular Despatches, Singapore, Vol. XXII.
19 Ibid.
20 Pratt to Day, June 9, 1898, Consular Despatches, Singapore, Vol. XXII.
On July 20, the Department of State replied to "Mr.\n\nPratt's Serenade:"

[1 am] enclosing printed copies of report from the
\n\nStraits Times entitled "Mr. Pratt's Serenade," with a
view to its communication to the press, has been received
and considered.

By Department's telegram of the 17th of June you were
instructed to avoid unauthorized negotiations with the
Philippine insurgents. The reasons for this instruction
were conveyed to you in my No. 78 of the 16th of June,
by which the President's views on the subject of your
relations with General Aguinaldo were fully expressed.

The address presented to you by the twenty-five or
thirty Filipinos who gathered about the consulate dis­
closes an understanding on their part that the object
of Admiral Dewey was to support the cause of General
Aguinaldo, and that the ultimate object of our action
is to secure the independence of the Philippines . . .

Your address does not repel this implication and it
moreover represents that General Aguinaldo was "sought
out by you," whereas it had been the understanding of the
Department that you received him only upon the request
of a British subject named Bray, who formerly lived in
the Philippines. Your further reference to General
Aguinaldo as the "man for the occasion" and to your
"bringing about" the arrangement between General Aguin­
aldo and Admiral Dewey, also represents the matter in
a light which causes apprehension lest your action may
have laid the ground of future misunderstandings and
complications . . . 21

The Department of State's position of non-recognition
of the Philippine representatives remained consistent before
the outbreak of hostilities as well as during the war with
Spain. Washington had ordered Consul Wildman in Hong Kong,

21 Day to Pratt, July 20, 1898, Consular Despatches,
Singapore, Vol. XXII.
early as 1897, not to enter into negotiations for an alliance with the insurgents and it assumed a similar position to Pratt. The Department of State disavowed Pratt's conduct because it only lay the foundation for future misunderstanding and complications.

On April 26, Aguinaldo left Singapore for Mirs Bay to meet Admiral Dewey. Wildman met Aguinaldo with the news that Dewey, upon orders from Washington, had already rushed to Manila. The Admiral had asked the consul to inform Aguinaldo that other transportation would be arranged for him later. 22

It is germane at this point to determine whether Wildman's conduct violated the instructions sent to him by the Department of State in 1897. On July 18, Wildman sent the following report to Washington:

On the 3d of November Mr. F. Agoncillo, late minister of foreign affairs in Aguinaldo's cabinet, called upon me and made a proposal which I transmitted to the State Department in my despatch No. 19, dated November 3, 1897. In reply the State Department instructed me "to courteously decline to communicate with the Department further regarding the alleged mission." I obeyed these instructions to the letter until the breaking out of the war when, after consultation with Admiral Dewey, I received a delegation from the insurgent junta, and they bound themselves to obey all laws of civilized warfare and to place themselves absolutely under the orders of Admiral Dewey if they were permitted to return to Manila. At this time their presi-

22 Aguinaldo, Second Look at America, p. 35.
dent, Aguinaldo, was in Singapore negotiating through Consul-General Pratt with Admiral Dewey for his return.

On April 27, in company with Consul O. F. Williams, we received another delegation, composed of Senor Sandico, Jose Maria Basa, Thomas Mascardo, Lorenzo L. Zialcita, Andres E. de Garchitorena, Manuel Malvar, Mariano Llanza, Salvatore Estrella. We agreed on behalf of Dewey to allow two of their number to accompany the fleet to Manila, consequently on the same day I took in the tug Fame Alizandrino and Garchitorena, accompanied by Mr. Sandico, to the Olympia in Mirs Bay. On May 2 Aguinaldo arrived in Hongkong and immediately called on me. It was May 16 before I could obtain permission from Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to return to the Philippines... 23

On July 25 Wildman wrote General Aguinaldo the following letter:

If you stand shoulder to shoulder with our forces and do not allow any small differences of opinion and fancied slights to keep you from the one set purpose of freeing your island from the cruelties under which you claim it has been groaning for so many hundred years, your name in history will be a glorious one. There are greater prizes in the world than being the mere chief of a revolution. Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they were suffering, and not for the love of conquest or the hope of gain. Whatever the final disposition of the conquered territory may be you can trust to the United States that justice and honor will control all their dealings with you... 24

The Department of State learned of the letter from a report in the Daily Mail, a Hong Kong based newspaper. On August 6, the Department of State informed Wildman that he was "forbid-

23 Wildman to Moore, July 18, 1898, Consular Despatches, Hong Kong, Vol. XIX.

24 Wildman to Moore, August 9, 1898, Consular Despatches, Hong Kong, Vol. XIX.
On August 8, Wildman attempted to defend his actions:

Never made pledges or discussed policy of America with Aguinaldo further than to try to hold him to promises made before Dewey took him to Cavite, believing it my duty, it being understood that my influence is good. If report contrary, I disavow it.

If the Department of State consistently opposed pledges and joint cooperation, why did Pratt and Wildman continue to press for such type of action? Partially it was due to the fact, as Wildman suggests in his report of July 18, that the war between the United States and Spain had produced a new situation. But this action also stemmed from the two men's personalities and the excitement of the time.

It must not be forgotten that the American officials in Singapore and Hong Kong, in bringing Aguinaldo and Dewey together, felt that they had made an important contribution to the war effort. Wildman presented a very pragmatic outlook in defending his action toward Aguinaldo when he observed:

In my despatch of July 18, 1898, I tried to briefly outline my position taken toward insurgents. I believed that they were a necessary evil, and that if Aguinaldo was placed in command, and was acceptable to the insurgents as their leader, that Admiral Dewey would have someone whom he could hold responsible for any excesses. I considered that Aguinaldo had more qualifications for

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25 Moore to Wildman, August 6, 1898, Consular Despatches, Hong Kong, Vol. XIX.

26 Wildman to Moore, August 8, 1898, Consular Despatches, Hong Kong, Vol. XIX.
leadership than any of his rivals. I made him no pledges, and extracted from him but two: to obey the command of the United States forces in the Philippines, and to conduct his warfare on civilized lines.27

Aguinaldo offers the most interesting and plausible explanation for the conduct of Pratt and Wildman. He advances the idea:

...in the crisis in which the nation (United States) found itself, all the United States consular and diplomatic officials in Southeast Asia were vying with each other in serving their country in general and Dewey in particular.28

Wildman and Pratt had become overwhelmed by their own importance and ability to influence the course of events. Wildman, in a despatch to the Department of State, went so far as to claim, "I know that I can influence Aguinaldo, and can hold him and his provisional government absolutely in line with American policy and American interests."29 Furthermore, both had been moved by the greatness of the United States mission. They had been impressed by the altruism of our declared policy; indeed, the crisis leading up to the American rupture with Spain was interpreted as a United States crusade to free almost any oppressed people almost anywhere.

27Wildman to Moore, August 9, 1898, Consular Despatches, Hong Kong, Vol. XIX.

28Aguinaldo, Second Look at America, p. 32.

29Wildman to Moore, October 12, 1898, Consular Despatches, Hong Kong, Vol. XIX.
Pratt and Wildman's conduct was related to the general feeling maturing in the United States to help the starving, tortured masses of Cubans; and if it applied to them it should also apply to the Filipinos, who were also suffering from Spanish oppression. George Kennan's analysis of the reasons behind the American resort to war with Spain also describes the actions of Pratt and Wildman: "... there was not much of solemn and careful deliberation, not much prudent and orderly measuring of the national interest."  

The Junta  

While Pratt and Wildman were alternately swayed by self-righteousness, self-importance, and pragmatism, Aguinaldo and his cohorts closely examined their precarious position. Upon returning to Hong Kong from Singapore, Aguinaldo and the other Filipino members of the Junta immediately entered into a laborious debate over the course of action to pursue during the war between Spain and the United States. On May 4, the Junta executive committee met. Those present included Emilio Aguinaldo, Don Felipe Agoncillo, Don Mariano Llanera, Don Miguel Malvar, Don Andres Garchitora, Don Servo Buenaven-

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The President (Aguinaldo) opened the meeting by describing the negotiations in Singapore with the American Consul-General Pratt. The question to be considered hinged upon the American proposal of cooperation. The decisions to be made were whether to return to the Philippines and how to respond to the offer of cooperation.33

Sandico argued that a critical situation existed in the Philippines. He urged the President to return to Manila and form a provisional government. The opposite view was taken by Aguinaldo, who thought it dangerous for him to return without a written agreement with the Americans. He then proposed that the following dilemma might arise over the offer of cooperation:

1. If he accepts cooperation with Americans he undoubtedly executes an unpatriotic act, and his name will be justly eternally cursed by the Filipinos.
2. If he refuses, the break between the two is evident.
3. The Admiral, there being no previous contract, may not provide the necessary armaments to guarantee the happiness of the fatherland.34

32The following are the minutes of that meeting held on May 4. Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 91, 43LY, Vol. I.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.
President concluded that:

The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, will be the victim of the demands and exactions of the United States, but provided with arms will be able to oppose themselves to them and struggle for independence, in which consists the true happiness of the Filipinos.\(^{35}\)

Senor Agoncillo had contended that the possible difficulties which the President had indicated had to be measured against the beneficial aspects of his return to the Philippines. First, the President must not forget his monumental prestige acquired from leading the last rebellion. Second, his prestige would enable him to arouse the masses against the United States if it attempted to colonize the Philippines, and lead them, if circumstances required, in war against the United States to preserve Philippine independence. Agoncillo concluded that:

\[\ldots\text{ failure to go to the Philippines at the present critical moment would be charged to want of patriotism; the fatal consequences of such a charge are evident. Inaction, even momentary, could be attributed to criminal weakness, and all these things would destroy the glory which the President so worthily conquered in the last rebellion. It must be known that he who consecrates himself to the well-being of his country must risk his life in a thousand ways, and if it be sacrificed it will be well spent and will be eternally blessed.}\(^{36}\]

The Executive Junta then voted unanimously that the President should return to the Philippines. He was given

\(^{35}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{36}\text{Ibid.}\)
absolute freedom to select the individuals to return with him. 37

The stage was ready for Aguinaldo to return to the Philippines and resume the revolution. After an extended appraisal of the situation, the Hong Kong Junta had agreed to the President's return without a written agreement with Dewey, Pratt, or Wildman. They seemed fully aware of the possibility of conflict with the Americans and were prepared for it. Their experience with Spain taught the Junta members a valuable lesson: to scrutinize the actions of every government official and to consider all possible policy alternatives and options. 38

On the McCulloch's second trip to Hong Kong, according to Admiral Dewey's orders, Aguinaldo was given passage to return. Aguinaldo wrote his brother that, "Perhaps we will never find an occasion so propitious as this; therefore we must take advantage of it." 39

37 Ibid.
38 Kalaw, Development of Philippine Politics, p. 105.
39 Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 4, 8MG, Vol. III.
O Dewey at Manila
That fateful first of May,
When you sank the Spanish squadron
In almost bloodless fury,
And gave your name to deathless fame;

O glorious Dewey, say,
Why didn't you weigh anchor
And softly sail away?

*Boston Transcript*
It was not a new idea in 1898 to Americans, Europeans, Filipinos that the United States might become a Pacific power or take a direct interest in the Philippines. Thomas Jefferson foresaw that some day the United States would become a major Asian power, as did Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri who, in a speech on the Senate floor in March, 1825, dedicated a close relationship between the United States and the nations of eastern Asia.

Charles Wilkes, leader of the United States expedition to the Pacific from 1838-1842, observed:

This future state Oregon is admirably situated to become a powerful maritime nation, with two of the finest ports in the world, that within the straits of Juan de Fuca, and San Francisco. These two regions have in fact, within themselves everything to make them increase, and keep up an intercourse with the whole of Polynesia, as well as the countries of South America on the one side, and China, the Philippines, New Holland, and New Zealand, on the other .


3Ibid., pp. 36-37.
In 1859-1860, Feodor Jagor, a German naturalist and explorer, predicted that American influence would be felt in the Pacific Ocean and dominate the Philippines.\(^4\) The Philippine Jose Rizal contended that the Philippines would either or later succumb to the American influence.\(^5\)

The United States, for well over a century, had developed commercial contacts in the Philippines and these had solidifying into tenuous ties.\(^6\) The American Consul in the Philippines in 1897, Mr. Oscar F. Williams, was portrayed by central New York newspapers as an individual who would look after the growing United States economic interests in the Philippines.\(^7\) In an interview with a Rochester newspaper, Williams stated:

> ... the number of American ships entering and departing from Manila is many times greater than the volume of American shipping at Havre, France. Manila exports about $4,000,000 worth of produce per year. So far as I am able to learn about one-fifth of this comes to the United States.\(^8\)

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\(^5\)George Malcom, *First Malayan Republic*, p. 67.


\(^7\)Williams to Day, November 20, 1897, *Consular Despatches*, Rochester, Vol. XII.

\(^8\)Ibid.
In one of the most interesting comments on American expansionism, Secretary Richard Olney pointed out:

... historians will probably assign the abandonment of the isolation policy of the United States to the time when the country went to war over Cuba, and though the abandonment may have been precipitated by that contest, the change was inevitable, had been long prepared and could not have been long delayed.  

**American Acquisition of the Spanish East Indies**

The United States attack on the Philippines was planned at the Navy Department as a portion of a general war against Spain. Plans for an assault on the Philippines had been completed well before the arrival of Theodore Roosevelt at the Navy Department. In 1896, Lieutenant William W. Kimball, an officer in naval intelligence, completed a comprehensive plan for operations against Spain in the Caribbean, in Europe, and in the Far East. An exponent of Alfred T. Mahan's theories, Kimball urged an offensive war of harassments, blockades, and attacks on exposed colonies to sever the flow of Spanish revenue from the Far East, and cut supply lines between Cuba and Spain. Kimball estimated that, against the weak Spanish forces, the American fleet in the Far East was strong enough

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10 Williams to Department of State, *Consular Despatches*, U.S.S. *Baltimore*, Vol. XII.
reduce and hold Manila. Once in American hands, Manila could be held until a satisfactory indemnity was arranged.

The Naval War Board, formed by Secretary John D. Long, followed the logic developed by Kimball and recommended that an American attack should be primarily directed against Spain's outlying and inadequately defended colonies. The attack on the Spanish fleet in the Philippines was designed to provide the American Asiatic Squadron with a base in the Far East and to preclude the danger of Spanish raids on American shipping in the Pacific. McKinley was informed of his naval strategy as early as September, 1897.

The naval plan reflected the strategic importance placed on the Philippines by the United States Navy. Lying about midway between Singapore and Japan, only about 400 miles from the coast of China, and occupying an advantage position in the Far East sea lanes, the Philippines were a necessary objective in any all-out war with Spain. Military necessity,

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and not the Roosevelt-Lodge conspiracy, demanded that Dewey take and hold Manila. Military necessity, and not the vision of an American Hong Kong in the Pacific, forced McKinley to take military action against Manila. Military necessity took precedent over the wishful thinking of those who urged Dewey to sail away and return home.

Dewey was about to depart for the "Summer City of the Far East" when Prince Henry of Prussia went to the Olympia to bid him farewell. At the parting the Prince said, "Goodbye, Commodore; I fear I shall never see you again," and he added, "You are going on a desperate undertaking." The Asiatic squadron, a little armada of six ships, sailed for Manila to take the offensive and engage the Spanish fleet. On May 1, 1898, the Americans attacked the Spanish in the first of

15 Howard Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956), p. 38. Beale concludes that the "Roosevelt-Lodge expansionists took the American people into an imperialist struggle for world power . . ."


three battles fought in the vicinity of Manila. 20 Within those dramatic seven hours a new balance of power appeared in the Pacific, 21 and Manila Bay was enshrined forever in the military history of the nation. 22 The doctrine of the strenuous life had been ushered into American history. 23

The news from the Philippines was not totally unheralded. The press had made numerous announcements on the movements of the Asiatic Squadron. But the public was disinterested in the distant operation until it learned on May 1, 1898, Manila Bay was ours. The humiliation of Spanish sea power sent the nation reeling with astonishment and pride. 24 Dewey's victory took the nation by surprise, but the Navy Department and the chief executive quickly recovered. Charles Dawes, comptroller of the currency in the McKinley administration, reported that the President, "was much pleased with the outcome of this movement at Manila." 25 The President decided that Manila

21 Dulles, America in the Pacific, p. 207.
22 Millis, Martial Spirit, p. 171.
24 Leech, In the Days of McKinley, pp. 203-204.
uld be immediately occupied. The intrusion of American naval power into Southeast Asia was to be quickly followed by American land forces, as the President ordered:

The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, followed by the taking of the naval station at Cavite, the patrolling of the garrisons, and the acquisition of the control of the bay, have rendered it necessary, in the further prosecution of the measures adopted by this Government for the purpose of bringing about an honorable and durable peace with Spain, to send an army of occupation to the Philippines for the two-fold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter, and of giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States...

United States would soon find it extremely difficult to escape the consequences of its own conduct.

Diplomatic Offensive

Spain's dependence upon Filipino support against foreign intervention in the Philippines had been previously demonstrated in 1762-1763, when a rebellion occurred in the islands simultaneously with the capture of Manila by British forces. The capture of Manila was a part of William Pitt's abortive anti-Spanish campaign undertaken at the end of the Seven Years War. The Filipino rebellion centered in


27 Olcott, McKinley, pp. 166-167.

28 Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York, 1968), p. 239.
The Ilokano section of Luzon and involved a real threat to Spanish control. Fortunately for the Spanish, with the British occupation of Manila, the Pampangan constabulary held firm, and the Filipino people rallied to the aid of the Spanish. The conquering British forces under Admiral Cornwall and General Draper were unable, in the face of Filipino hostility, to extend their control much beyond the bounds of the city walls of Manila. 29 The Spanish in 1898, in the midst of an island rebellion, again attempted to mobilize Filipino support against the foreign intruder.

Spanish civil and religious authorities appealed to the Filipino people for loyalty to Spain. Governor-General Augustín, on April 23, issued the following manifesto:

Filipinos, prepare yourselves for the fight and united under the glorious flag of Spain, let us fight in the conviction that victory will crown our labors and let us answer the enemy's intimidations with the cry of the Christian and the patriot—Long Live Spain. 30

A few days later, Archbishop Nozaléda published on his part an appeal to the sentiments of the Catholic Filipino people:

A heterodox people, possessed of black rancors and by all object passions engendered by heresy, are trying to attack us; they hate that in us which we most esteem, namely our religion, the religion of our fathers, handed down like a precious heirloom, and which we are bound to maintain inviolate, even at the cost of blood. 31

29 Cady, Southeast Asia, p. 255.
30 Kalaw, Philippine Revolution, pp. 84-86.
31 Ibid.
At first the Spanish were amazed that Aguinaldo could join with the forces of the United States. A Spanish official who had been organizing the former rebels stated:

I am the first to confess that in the matter I made a mistake, I did not believe that Aguinaldo was going in a boat of the Yankee Squadron; I did not believe he would take up arms and place them in the hands of his partisans, to be turned against Spain.32

The Spanish argued that the United States was "taking advantage of our disgraces"33 and that Filipinos who aided the Americans were traitors to the Spanish crown. To counteract Aguinaldo's influence the Spanish listed the following as traitorous acts:

1. Those who consort with representatives of the United States Army or North American citizens to bring about the triumph of its armies.
2. Those who aid the landing of American forces on Spanish territory.
3. Those who provide the United States with provisigns.
4. Those who provoke public disorders or rebellion.34

After the destruction of the Spanish fleet the Spanish government was forced to institute a number of remarkable measures. A scheme of Spanish sovereignty and Philippine autonomy was proposed with the following components:

32Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 37, 8LY, Vol. I.
33Williams to Department of State, April 23, 1898, Consular Despatches, Manila, Vol. XII.
34Williams to Department of State, April 24, 1898, Consular Despatches, Manila, Vol. XII.
1. General government under Spanish Sovereignty;
2. A popularly elected assembly with Filipino representation;
3. A council of ministers responsible to both Spain and the Philippines.

Next, the Spanish government organized a Philippine militia and attracted influential insurgent leaders to promote the war against the United States. 36

There was a great deal of initial support given to the Spanish program of conciliation as Artemio Ricarte, Pio del Pilar, Emiliano Riego de Dios, and many other insurgent leaders immediately offered their services to Spain. 37 There were a number of important reasons for this shift of Filipino support. The Spanish had intimate relationships with the Filipinos, while the Americans were strangers. Beyond the ties of blood and inter-marriage there existed an acquaintance of centuries, solidified by common religion, language, and government. 38 Until Aguinaldo arrived in the Philippines, the ardently adopted Spanish policy of attraction through promises of reform was making headway. 39

37 Agoncillo, Crisis of the Republic, p. 113.
39 Ibid.
Admiral Dewey and General Aguinaldo

Of all the controversies in United States diplomatic history, there are few to match that concerning Dewey's alleged commitments to General Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo's interpretation is that the Admiral stated "the United States would unquestionably recognize the independence of the people of the Philippines..." Dewey explains "from my observations of Aguinaldo and his advisers I decided that it would be unwise to co-operate with him or his adherents in an official manner." This breakdown in diplomacy resulted in a disaster in the history of colonialism which compares with the Sepoy Mutiny or France's 1830 Algerian intrusion.

The "unofficial" cooperation in the Philippines was initially based upon Dewey's assessment of the situation.

Secretary Long wrote to Dewey on May 26, 1898:

You must exercise discretion most fully in all matters, and be governed according to circumstances which you know and we cannot know. You have our confidence entirely. It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for your success and safety not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future.

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42Wolff, Little Brown Brother, pp. 66-68.
Dewey replied:

... Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with 13 of his staff, arrived May 19, by permission. Established self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunitions, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needs. Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The United States has not been bound in any way to assist insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they not yet having guns. 44

Dewey recognized the necessity of cooperation with Aguinaldo as the first detachment of American troops would not arrive in the Philippines until June 30, 1898. 45 It would seem that from the very first Dewey had given Aguinaldo every encouragement. 46 Dewey basically regarded popular unrest and rebellion in the Philippines as an embarrassment for

44 Ibid.
45 Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines, p. 71.
Dewey had refused to deal with Aguinaldo, more than likely the Spanish program of reconciliation would have been successful and Spanish resistance would have stiffened. Dewey's policy was one which sought the maximum of Filipino assistance with the minimum of American commitment. Dewey advanced the contention that the insurgents fought well and that their success

... was of material importance in isolating our marine force at Cavite from Spanish attack and in preparing a foothold for our troops when they should arrive. By the end of May they had entirely cleared Cavite Province of the enemy.

An American correspondent reported in Harper's:

The insurgent army has driven the Spanish back over nearly twenty miles of country practically impossible for our men. It is covered with thick jungle or filled with paddy fields. Whatever the outcome of the insurgent problem here, Aguinaldo has saved our troops a lot of desperately hard campaigning ...

Admiral Dewey, in cooperating with the insurgents, secured a number of important military objectives. First, and foremost, he prevented the solidification of a Filipino-Spanish alliance. Second, he gained protection for his marines and a base of operation in Cavite. And, lastly,

47Braisted, United States Navy in the Pacific, p. 42.
50Wilcox (ed.), Harper's History of the War, p. 47.
Admiral Dewey provided American troops with the Spanish enemy conveniently contained at Manila. In this situation, as Admiral Chadwick pointed out, the United States Navy acted as the right hand of the Department of State. 51

The Americans secured a number of important objectives from the Dewey-Aguinaldo relationship, but how did the Filipinos fare? Dewey contended "... Aguinaldo had enormous prestige with the Filipino people." 52 This was not entirely correct. As Alegandrinio and Garchitorena prepared for Aguinaldo's return, they found that the Peace of Biak-na-bato had greatly injured the prestige of those who were commonly related to have reaped the greatest political advantage from it. 53 Filipino officers who were not chosen to accompany the insurgents to Hong Kong felt slighted. The populous, moreover, looked upon the reparations agreement in the treaty as nothing more than a bribe to the top insurgent leaders. Thus, the reputation of those insurgents who had fled to Hong Kong was badly tarnished.

51 Chadwick, United States and Spain, p. 177.


53 LeRoy, Americans in the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 189. Vera might have had this in mind in proposing the treaty.
When Aguinaldo arrived in Cavite he was not especially encouraged by the reports from his old companions and intimates. After a number of conferences, he decided to utilize a most important political asset—the American presence—to repair his image. The American Filipino alliance was born out of his effort to bolster the prestige of the returning Filipino insurgent leaders and bring about the collapse of the Spanish policy of conciliation.

From the base at Cavite, protected by the American Navy and the marines, Aguinaldo issued three proclamations in which he identified himself and his cause with the Americans. He gave as the reason for his return to Luzon, in the first proclamation, the fact that the Spanish seemed powerless in the hands of the priests, who constantly place obstacles in the way of progress. Furthermore, none of the promised government reforms had been carried out. He also stated that in the earlier rebellion he had surrendered his arms and disbanded a strong army in the belief that it would be more beneficial to the country than an attempt to carry on an insurrection with inadequate resources. Now, he said, as the great and powerful United States had come forward to offer support so that the natives could gain liberty for their nation, he had returned to take command of the army, and proposed

54 Ibid.
to establish a dictatorship, with an advisory council, until the islands were completely independent. 55

In the second proclamation he forbade all peace negotiations between the rebels and the Spanish in view of the failure, both civil and military, of all previous negotiations. Aguinaldo also announced that all Spaniards coming to parley without credentials and a flag of truce would be shot. If a Filipino undertook such a commission he would be condemned to be hanged. 56

The third and most important proclamation addressed directly to the Filipinos, read as follows:

The great North American nation, a lover of liberty, and therefore desirous of liberating our country from the tyranny and despotism to which it has been subjected by its rulers, has decided to give us disinterested protection, considering us sufficiently able and civilized to govern ourselves.

In order to retain this high opinion of the never to be too highly praised and great nation of North America, we should abominate such acts as pillage and robbery of every description, and acts of violence against persons and property.

To avoid international complications during the campaign, I decree:

1. Lives and property of all foreigners are to be respected, including Chinese and those Spaniards who neither directly nor indirectly have taken up arms against us.

55 Joseph Stickney, Admiral Dewey at Manila (Philadelphia, 1899), pp. 74-75.

56 Ibid.
2. The lives and property of our enemies who lay down their arms to be equally respected.

3. In the same way, all hospitals and all ambulances, together with the persons and effects therein, as well as their staffs, are to be respected, unless they show themselves hostile.

4. Those who disobey what is set forth in the three former articles shall be tried by summary court-martial and shot, if by such disobedience there has been caused assassination, fires, robbery, or violence.57

Aguinaldo's effort to regain popular support by projecting an illusion of American aid provided to be successful. General Diego de Rios, a Spanish diplomat and military figure, abruptly abandoned his campaign in the South in May, and proceeded to establish a more secure capital of the central and southern Philippines in Iloilo. Rios quickly discharged many native troops as rumors swept through the South, and even into Moro country, that native soldiers were revolting.58 The Filipino militia, which Governor-General Bosilio Augustin had created, caught the spirit of resistance generated by Aguinaldo and soon deserted to the insurgents with valuable arms and ammunition.59 In the zone of Tarlac the militia raised insurgent banners and placed themselves under the command of Aguinaldo. The Spanish officials in the area were

57Ibid.


59Fernandez, Philippine Republic, p. 73.
forced to flee and the operation of the colonial government ceased to function.  

Most native units deserted from the Spanish forces to the insurgents within less than two weeks after Aguinaldo's arrival. Day after day, more and more Filipino economic and religious leaders drifted over to the cause of rebellion.\(^\text{61}\)

The Spanish effort for conciliation had completely failed as Aguinaldo, utilizing the American held Cavite base, urged Filipinos to resist Spain.

War between the Spanish and the Filipino insurgents recommenced on May 28, when a detachment of Spanish marines, sent to capture the arms which had arrived from Hong Kong for the use of the insurgent army, was engaged by Aguinaldo's forces near Cavite and forced to surrender after five hours of brutal combat. In the two or three weeks that followed, the fighting became general in the area near Manila. The Filipinos made themselves masters of the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Pampanga, Morong, Bulacan, and Bataan with surprising rapidity effectively shutting off communication between the provinces and Manila.\(^\text{62}\)

\(^{60}\)Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 66, 24LY, Vol. I.


\(^{62}\)Fernandez, Philippine Republic, pp. 74-75.
had surrounded the city of Manila with fourteen miles of trenches, and cut off the water and food supply, paralyzed internal trade, and reduced the inhabitants of the city to near starvation. 63

The Filipinos waged effective military campaigns throughout the entire Luzon area. Their effort was materially aided by protection provided by the United States Navy and arms and ammunition furnished by Dewey. By utilizing the American relationship as an effective propaganda tool, Aguinaldo had resumed his place at the head of the insurrection and successfully dealt with the Spanish diplomatic counter-offensive. The American presence had provided the Filipino leadership with a military and political foundation for the resumption of the revolution—phase two.

An old Castilian proverb has it that God granted Spain warm skies, good grapes, and beautiful women. When entreated also to provide good government, He refused, saying that if Spain had that too, it would be heaven on earth.

(Spanish proverb)
CHAPTER IV

CARVING THE FILIPINO MELON

Department of the East

The first United States expeditionary force to serve outside the Western hemisphere arrived in the Philippines in the later part of June, 1898. The first wave of a six-part expeditionary force, under the command of General Thomas Anderson, entrenched at Camp Dewey—a former peanut farm located on Manila Bay near the native town of Malate, almost midway between Cavite and Manila.

General Anderson's orders were to land his forces, establish a base, and wait within the zone of naval cooperation for General Wesley Merritt, the over-all commander of the expeditionary force. On July 4, General Anderson notified Aguinaldo:

I have the honor to inform you that the United States, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the kingdom of Spain, has

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1 Walter Millis, Martial Spirit, p. 225.
entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands.

For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people co-operate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces. Anderson decided it was expedient to continue the policy of cooperation with the insurgents that Admiral Dewey inaugurated after the battle of Manila Bay.

Anderson and Dewey called on Aguinaldo in July. The Filipino leader requested that Anderson recognize his government and consent to joint military operations against the Spanish in Manila. General Anderson replied that he was simply operating in a military capacity, and he had no authority to engage in political matters. The insurgents, however, continued to press the United States military officials for recognition of their government. The American officers followed Anderson's lead and argued that as military men they lacked the authority to recognize the insurgent government and that they were sent to the Philippines to defeat the

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5U.S. Congress, Senate Document No. 280, Vol. XII, 56th Congress First Session (1899-1900), p. 4.

6Karl Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines, p. 63.


8Edwin Wildman, Narrative of Filipino Ambitions, p. 115.
common enemy—the Spanish. Until the battle of Manila, this pattern of interaction was the predominate theme in Filipino-American relations.

The intrusion of an American land force into the vicinity of Manila brought the American military leaders into closer contact with the insurgents and furnished the United States with a clearer perception of the Filipino objectives. Anderson took exception to Williams' repeated assurances that the "natives are eager to be organized and led by United States officers." Anderson advanced the contention in a report to the adjutant-general: "... the establishment of [American] provisional government on our part will probably bring us in conflict with the insurgents." Washington was thus provided with a more critical evaluation of the insurgent aims and a more realistic assessment of the difficulties involved in stabilizing American authority in the area.

On July 25, General Merritt, commanding the Department of the East, arrived in the Philippines. The President had directed Merritt not to enter into an alliance with the

Insurgents. American authority was to be supreme and undivided in the Philippines. His mission was to take and hold the city of Manila. A rapid increase in American troop strength allowed Merritt more maneuverability than Dewey and Anderson had had.

Merritt ordered Anderson to take control of Manila's port and to exclude armed Filipinos from the port area. He also decided that the attack against Manila should be made along the shore line; therefore, nearly ten thousand insurgents would have to be persuaded to abandon their fortified positions. Without holding any direct communication with Aguinaldo, Merritt ordered General Francis Greene to negotiate with General Noriel, the Filipino commander of the shore line area. During the course of negotiations between Greene and Noriel, General Anderson ferried American troops across the bay and landed near Tambo, a village on the east shore, three miles

12 Margaret Leech, McKinley, pp. 210-212. In Washington, the War Department was unable to provide Merritt with such basic information as topography, the availability of horses, and the prospects for the successful use of artillery in the Philippines.

13 Foster Rhea Dulles, Prelude, p. 186.


below Manila. Noriel and Aguinaldo were then faced with an fait accompli as the American troops proceeded to "dig in;" thereby placing the Filipino troops between the United States lines and the Spanish fortified positions. As the American commander intended to take and hold Manila without insurgent cooperation he felt free to adopt a sterner attitude toward the Filipinos.

To combat Merritt's assertiveness, General Aguinaldo, with a force of about 15,000 men, adopted a dual policy to stabilize his position: he pressed for diplomatic recognition of his government from Merritt; and he began to search for measures to fortify his political position. General Aguinaldo would not be so easily out-flanked in the next round with Merritt.

Filipino Consolidation

Aguinaldo was also able to assume a more independent attitude in his relations with the Americans. The insurgent army, under the command of General Antonio Luna, was an efficient military instrument. Never again would it be better

17Dulles, American in the Pacific, p. 217.
organized, more adequately equipped, and better supplied. The extraordinary success which Luna's forces had in wresting the most important parts of Luzon from the Spanish infused the insurgent army with almost excessive enthusiasm. Aguinaldo presented the following picture of the situation:

... Our morale was the highest possible. Never before did we have such an abundance of arms, such universal support from our people and the active backing of a powerful nation ... The people rallied perfervidly around us as they had never done before. In our previous revolutions, many of our wealthy and educated citizens had shown no sympathy for our cause, preferring to play safe by not antagonizing the Spaniards. Now believing perhaps that the Spanish could not escape defeat, they joined our ranks with apparent sincerity and patriotism. There was unity among ourselves the equal of which had never been witnessed before.

From this position of strength, Aguinaldo was able to push for recognition from the United States and to reform the Spanish colonial government.

Reform was first made in government re-organization. The dictatorial government* which Aguinaldo established on his arrival in the Philippines was provisionl. The insurgents regarded the dictatorship as a temporary expedient

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21 Aguinaldo, Second Look at American, p. 270.
*See Appendix I, end of this chapter, p. 81.
22 Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 6, 8MG, Vol. III.
based upon the necessity of concentrating military and civil powers in one person to enable him "to repress with a strong hand the anarchy which is the inevitable sequel of all revolutions."  

After careful deliberation, Aguinaldo announced the formation of the Revolutionary Government to replace the dictatorship.* The chief officer of the new government was the President. The first article of the constitution defined the objective of the Revolutionary Government as a struggle for the independence of the Philippines. On July 25, after the appointment of his cabinet, Aguinaldo wrote Admiral Dewey and General Anderson, enclosing the decrees of June and July which explained the governmental reorganization. Aguinaldo urged the military leaders to forward the information to McKinley.  

General Merritt quickly grasped the importance of the message and sent the following assessment of the situation to Washington:

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23 Fernandez, Philippine Republic, p. 65.

*See Appendix II, end of this chapter, p. 82.

24 U.S. Congress, Senate Document No. 208, p. 95.

There is not a particle of doubt what Aguinaldo and his leaders will resist any attempt of any government to reorganize a colonial government here. They are especially bitter toward Spain, but equally determined not to submit any longer to being a colony of any other government. What they would like best of all would be a Filipino Republic.  

On January 21, 1899, the Filipino insurgents did fulfill Merritt's prophecy and formed a republic.

From an improved political and military position, Aguinaldo increased the tempo of agitation for political recognition. After Merritt's moves in Tombo, Aguinaldo shifted his ground to exploit America's military vulnerability. The American army was in an especially exposed position; although numerically strong, logistical problems made the United States forces dependent on their insurgent allies. General Greene reported: "The difficulties of getting established on the shore were not slight. Not an animal or wagon of any description had been brought from America..."  

Aguinaldo decreed that fuel, horses, ox carts, and bamboo could no longer be traded to the Americans. Direct aid could not be sent to the Americans without his written consent. Aguinaldo's reasons were simple. He wished to turn the United States military disadvantages into a Filipino political asset. The Americans,


conscious that he alone could provide them with supplies in
the Philippines, would be forced to recognize his political
authority. Anderson wrote the adjutant-general:

Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an
elaborate system of military government. Under his as-
sumed authority as dictator he has prohibited any supplies
being given us, except by his order ... 29

The embargo on materials almost led to open conflict
between the two allies when General Merritt was denied the
use of the insurgent telegraph line. General Anderson was
ordered to take direct action and the line was commandeered
for American use. Vigorous Filipino protest and a threat of
the native population raising against the Americans, forced
Merritt to return the telegraph line and build his own. 30

The American troops were forced to seize most materials they
needed. 31

Aguinaldo's strategy on supplies, put the United States
and the insurgents in a dangerously antagonistic position and
one which might have led to an outbreak of hostilities even
before the attack on Manila. Attention was diverted from the
supply question to the approaching battle of Manila, when

28Kalaw, Philippine Politics, p. 103.
30Wilcox (ed.), Harper's History of the War, p. 50.
31John Nankivell, Military Organization of Colorado
Merritt appointed Aguinaldo's brother-in-law purchasing agent for the American forces. 32

Mock Battle of Manila

The Spanish problem was not how to gain victory, for this was impossible, but how to appear gallant in defeat. 33 Spanish military tradition forbade the surrender of a fortified position, no matter what the odds against it, until there had been a military encounter which actually demonstrated the futility of their resistance. 34 Besides the matter of honor, the practical problem of the "undisciplined insurgents" 35 capturing the city confronted the Spanish. With the arrival of the American expeditionary force, the two Spanish problems appeared to be solvable, as talks were initiated between the United States and the Spanish.

General Fermin Jaudenes, Spanish military commander of Manila, stated that he would not surrender except under attack. The Spanish batteries, however, would fire neither on the American ships in the Bay nor the United States infantry positions, unless the city were bombarded. It was also under-

33Wolff, Little Brown Brother, p. 54.
34Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines, p. 76.
35Millis, Martial Spirit, p. 356.
stood that once the Americans attacked and they flashed the international signal--DWHB-- asking for surrender, General Jaudenes would hoist a white flag.36 The Spanish would remain honorable in defeat and, more important, would surrender to the United States, rather than Aguinaldo.*

On August 9, Admiral Dewey presented the following letter to the British naval authorities for transmission to the Spanish officials in Manila.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a joint demand from General Merritt and myself, for the surrender of Manila, and request that you will immediately deliver it in person to the Governor-General and Captain-General. 37

On August 12, General Anderson informed Aguinaldo of the insurgents role in the Battle of Manila:

Serious trouble threatening between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your forces should not force themselves in the city until we have received full surrender. Then we will negotiate with you. 38

36Ibid.

*General Anderson's view of the "Mock" battle--"There was no agreement as the memorandum was read to me that our land forces would not be fired on. On the contrary, there was a statement that the honor of Spain required that there should be resistance, and that under the Spanish code, surrender without resistance would subject the Spanish officers to court-martial."


The stage was now prepared for the three-sided drama between Spain, the United States, and the insurgents. On August 13,* Admiral Dewey and General Merritt fought one of the most unusual battles in American naval and military history.39

The insurgents quickly proved to be the major problem during the battle for both the Spanish and Americans. Although American forces were to keep the insurgents bottled up so that they could not enter the city, nearly 4,000 Filipino troops managed to gain admittance into Manila. General Greene presented the following picture:

... two or three thousand insurgents had managed to cross the Paco Bridge beyond MacArthur's right flank and massed themselves on the avenue between my troops and the river. I rode up to the officer in command, and requested him to move aside. This he declined to do, stating his intention was to enter the city with us. I told him that this was impossible; but he stood firm. It would have been very awkward if a conflict had been precipitated, for the walls were covered with Spanish troops, and if firing broke out they would probably take part in it. I decided to handle them (insurgents) the way mobs are handled in large cities; and bringing up the leading regiment, the First Nebraska, I formed it in a column of companies in close order, and putting the men at port arms, wheeled each company in succession to the right, and pushed the insurgents bodily into the fields and lanes to one side of the road.40

General Anderson reported the following:

*See Appendix III, end of this chapter, pp. 83-84.


40Francis Greene, Century, p. 930.
... I sent a battalion of North Dakota Volunteers to hold a bridge the insurgents would have to cross if they followed us to Manila when we made our assault, but when the battle began they broke in by way of Santana and got in to the city as soon as we did. After the white flag was raised and the firing ceased, it was found that fully four thousand armed insurgents had taken possession of Paco and part of Malata, two important suburbs on the south of the Pasig. To hold them within these limits and stop any attempt at looting, a cordon of troops was thrown around them. The situation was exceedingly tense. Our soldiers believed that the Filipinos had fired on them, and the Filipinos were almost beside themselves with rage and disappointment. 41

The insurgent could not understand why an attempt had been made to exclude them from the battle for their own capital city. In spite of American and Spanish opposition, General del Pilar had captured the suburbs of Pretio, Tondo, Divisoria, and Paseo de Azcarraga. 42 General Noriel occupied Singalon and Paco, which were actually within the area of Manila. Noriel found himself in an extremely exposed position and wired Aguinaldo: "The Americans wish to put us out." 43 Later Noriel reported to General del Pilar:

... our soldiers at the barrio of Concepcion are not allowed to go out and we are prohibited from moving any further. ... Come here or there will be trouble, since they are driving me away and refusing to listen to what I say. 44

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43 Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 115, 47MG, Vol. III.
44 Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 59, 37MG, Vol. III.
The American troops also became frustrated as they were forced to deal with both the insurgents and the Spanish. Anderson wired Aguinaldo that unless he withdrew his troops there would be serious consequences. Merritt and Dewey importuned Washington for explicit instructions as to what policy to adopt toward the insurgents. The adjutant-general replied:

The President directs that there must be no joint occupation with the insurgents. The United States, in the possession of Manila City, Manila Bay and Harbor, must preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory occupied by their military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President.

The American military authorities immediately notified General Aguinaldo:*

We cannot permit joint occupation of the city. The city surrendered to the United States forces, and all the headway that you have been able to make was due entirely to the assistance furnished you by the United States. . . . We desire most sincerely to remain friendly with the Filipinos and have nothing but their best interests at heart.  

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**General Garcia was not allowed joint occupation of the city of Santiago. General Shafter did, however, let Garcia take part in the surrender ceremonies.**

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46 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. X, p. 354.

The insurgents were placed in a tenuous position. American behavior in the occupation of Manila was sufficient reason, according to General Antonio Luna, to enter into hostilities against the United States. Apolinario Mabini, with his characteristic far-sightedness, was able to tone down the high excitement within the insurgent camp. He contended that the war with Spain still had to be completed and that they must not enter into another conflict with the United States. 48

The insurgents, moreover, had some room for optimism. The United States held only Cavite and Manila. The surrender terms suggested that America was barred from extending her control in the islands. And, more important, the American occupation of Manila allowed the insurgents the opportunity to take firmer control over the central and southern Philippines. 49 Furthermore, during the peace negotiations, the Filipinos could conduct a propaganda effort for European and Asian recognition of their independence.

The insurgents adopted a "wait-and-see" policy. 50 A major effort would be undertaken to gain recognition for their cause at Paris. If conflict were to occur, it would develop

49 Ibid.
50 Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 275, 85MG, Vol. III.
after this alternative was exhausted. The Filipino troops withdrew to the following lines around Manila; to the south, Pasay and Santa Ann; to the east, Mandaloyon, San Francisco del Monte, and Calocan.51

Aftermath

After the battles of Santiago (in Cuba) and Manila an unusual phenomena appeared in Spanish-American relations. In Cuba, the United States troops quickly began to fraternize with the defeated Spanish soldiers and share their scorn for the inferior "natives."52 A letter from a Spanish soldier to the American troops in Cuba dramatically displays the about-face that occurred:

Soldiers of the American army: We would not be fulfilling our duty as well-born men in whose breasts live gratitude and courtesy should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending to you our most cordial and good wishes and farewell... You fought us as men, face to face with great courage... You have given honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished; have cured their wounded with great humanity; have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort, you have given freely of food, of your stock of medicines; and you have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony.53

51Ibid.
52Freidel, Splendid Little War, p. 304.
After the battle of Manila similar attitudes emerged in the Philippines. Spanish resistance to Filipino military operations had increased the admiration and brotherhood between the two former enemies. In one instance, for more than eight months in Baler, a straggling town on the east coast of Luzon, 50 Spanish officers and men held out against 500 Filipinos. Their stand against the "native" troops won respect from the American fighting men in the Philippines. 54 A gradual antagonism between the American troops and the insurgents began to emerge as an indistinct, undefined color-line developed between them. The Filipino troops learned rather quickly that there could be no social relations between them and the Americans. 55

The aftermath of the battle of Manila was a maturing dysphoria between the Filipino and American troops. Gradually, this combination of racial hatred, frustration, and anxiety would grow into a major test of will between the "natives" and the most recent intruder into Southeast Asia.

55 Karl Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines, p. 85.
APPENDIX I

Rizal's Proclamation of June 18, 1898, establishing the Dictatorial Government.

To the Philippine Public:

Circumstances have providentially placed me in a position for which I cannot fail to recognize that I am not properly qualified; but since I cannot violate the laws of Providence nor decline the obligations which honor and patriotism impose upon me, I now salute you, Oh my Beloved People.

I have proclaimed in the face of the whole world that the aspiration of my whole life, the final object of all my efforts and strength, is nothing else but your independence, for I am firmly convinced that that constitutes your constant desire, and that independence signifies for us redemption from slavery and tyranny, regaining our liberty, and entrance into the concert of civilized nations.

I understand, on the other hand, that the first duty of every government is to interpret faithfully popular aspirations; with this motive although the abnormal circumstances of the war have compelled me to institute this dictatorial government which assumes full powers, both civil and military, my constant desire is to surround myself with the most distinguished persons of each province, to the end that, the true necessities of each being known by them, measures may be adopted to meet those necessities and apply the remedies in accordance with the desires of all.

I understand, moreover, the urgent necessity of establishing in each town a solid and robust organization, the strongest bulwark of public security and the sole means of securing that union and discipline which are indispensable for the establishment of the Republic, that is, government of the people for the people, and warding off the international conflicts which may arise.
Guinaldo's Proclamation of June 23, establishing the Revolutionary Government.

This government desiring to demonstrate to the Philippine people that one of its ends is to combat with a firm hand the inveterate vices of the Spanish administration, substituting for personal luxury and that pompous ostentation which have made it a mere matter of routine, cumbersome and slow in its movements, another administration more modest, simple, and prompt in performing the public service, I decree as follows:

Article I. The dictatorial government will be entitled hereafter the revolutionary government, whose object is to struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations, including the Spanish, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country so that a true republic may be established.

Article II. Four secretaryships of government are created—one of foreign affairs, navy, and commerce; another of war and public works; another of police and internal order, justice, education, and hygiene; and another of finance, agriculture, and manufacturing industry. (Then follow 33 articles concerning the revolutionary congress, military courts and justice, and additional clauses.)
APPENDIX III

(The following Armistice Protocol was signed on August 12, 1898; Manila surrendered, owing to the difference in time, on August 13, 1898.)

Armistice Protocol of August 12, 1898

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and his Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority from the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms on which the two Governments have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries, that is to say:

Article I

Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

Article II

Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.

Article III

The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

Article IV

Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint Commissioners, and the Commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each
Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint Commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.

Article V

The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five Commissioners to treat of peace, and the Commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

Article VI

Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.
Thou shall strive for a Republic, never for a Monarchy for thy country; for the latter exalts one or several families and founds a dynasty; the former makes a people noble and worthy through reason, great through liberty, and prosperous and brilliant through labor.

Apolinario Mabini
CHAPTER V

PHILIPPINE OCEANA

After the "Mock Battle of Manila" the city returned to normal almost overnight. Native shops, banks, and custom houses opened for business, little tramcars chattered along as though nothing had happened, and there was no looting, no disorder. But this return to "normalcy" was deceptive. Manila was not the Philippines.

The period from the United States occupation of Manila to the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Filipino forces was filled with hectic insurgent activity. The Filipino reaction to the American presence in Manila was to "await the decision of the Peace Commission." While the Peace Commission met in Paris from October to December, 1898, General Aguinaldo initiated a number of steps to insure his political authority, while at the same time maintaining an impressive military force. The insurgents, not blind to the possibilities of conflict with the United States, sought to


strengthen their position in every possible way. They did this chiefly by:

1. convoking the national congress;
2. propaganda and diplomatic activities; and
3. extension of the insurgent authority to distant provinces.

The "half civilized Filipinos" as one Christian missionary portrayed them, attempted to establish a solid foundation upon which to wage either a concerted effort in the diplomatic realm or protracted warfare in the military area.

**Political Constitution of the Philippine Republic**

Aguinaldo convoked the Revolutionary Congress at Barasoain, Malolos, on September 15, 1898. The insurgent leader clearly stated the purpose of this Congress when he observed "... we witness the truth of what the famous President Monroe said to the effect that the United States is for the Americans, now I say that the Philippines is for the Filipinos."

The same day Aguinaldo addressed the Congress:

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Representatives: The work of the revolution being happily terminated and the conquest of our territory completed, the moment has arrived to declare that the mission of arms had been brilliantly accomplished by our heroic army and now a truce is declared in order to give place to councils which the country offers to the service of the government in order to assist in the unfolding of its program of liberty and justice, the divine message written on the standards of the revolutionary party.

The first significant act of the Congress was the ratification on September 29, of the independence proclaimed at Kawit on June 12, 1898. The first act read as follows:

Summoning as a witness of the rectitude of our intentions the Supreme Judge of the Universe, and under the protection of the Mighty and Humane North American Nation, we proclaim and solemnly declare, in the name and by the authority of the inhabitants of all these Philippine Islands, that they are and have the right to be free and independent; that they are released from all obedience to the crown of Spain; that every political tie between the two is and must be completely severed and annulled; and that, like all free and independent states, they have complete authority to make war, conclude peace, establish alliances, regulate commerce, and execute all other acts and things that independent states have the right to do.9

From September through January the Congress worked on a document which is generally referred to as the Malolos Constitution. It became the most important legislative achievement of the Revolutionary Congress. The Constitution's principal characteristics were: ministerial responsibility to Parliament; the unicameral system; lengthy enumeration of

8Ibid.
9Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 28, 25MG, Vol. III.
the rights and liberties of individuals; the subordination of the President of the Republic to the national legislature; a permanent legislative committee to act in the name of Congress during the period of recess; local autonomy; a Council of State composed of the President and his secretaries; and the designation of extraordinary representatives who, together with the regular members, would form the Constituent Assembly.¹⁰

The major purpose of writing a constitution went beyond the area of law into the realm of practical politics. Aguinaldo felt that a constitution would put the Filipinos on equal footing with other nations. He argued in a message to the Revolutionary Congress:

"We are no longer insurgents, we are no longer revolutionists, that is to say armed men desirous of destroying and annihilating the enemy. We are from now on Republicans, that is to say, men of law, able to fraternize with all other nations, with mutual respect and affection."¹¹

By introducing a fairly up-to-date constitution, the Filipino insurgents hoped to gain support and eventual recognition from other powers.¹² Thus, the Malolos Constitution, in reality, was supposed to provide legitimacy for Aguinaldo's government.

It is significant in the wider context of Asian history that the creation of a Philippine Republic marked the Filipinos

¹⁰Kalaw, *Philippine Revolution*, pp. 139-140.
¹¹Taylor, *Insurgent Records*, Exhibit 410, 19KU, Vol. III.
as the first Asian people to try to throw off established European colonialism.\(^{13}\) Moreover, this was the first Republican constitution proclaimed in Asia.\(^{14}\)

**Propaganda**

The Propaganda effort undertaken by Aguinaldo and his government sought to arouse Filipinos against foreign rule and to encourage their absolute adherence to the Republic being constituted at Malolos.\(^{15}\) The Filipino people were being prepared ultimately for a conflict with the United States forces. Sentiment was crystallizing in the Philippines against outside domination, while at Paris and Washington, the final disposition of the islands was being debated.\(^{16}\)

To enhance the Filipino government's position among the people, a number of revolutionary periodicals and newspapers were created. The government founded the official newspaper *El Heraldo de la Revolucion*, which first appeared on September 29, 1898. This newspaper published the official texts of government decrees. Privately owned newspapers also appeared


\(^{14}\)Farwell, *Mask of Asia*, p. 50.

\(^{15}\)Fernandez, *Philippine Republic*, pp. 94-95.

to urge Filipino unity against foreign domination. Most outstanding of these was *La Independencia*, edited by General Luna. 17

Propaganda activity in support of the Filipino government was also conducted abroad. 18 Aguinaldo issued two decrees, in June and August, for the creation of a Hong Kong Junta to represent the Philippines in different nations. 19 Filipino officials were assigned to Paris, London, the United States, Australia, and Japan. 20

The Junta at Hong Kong was charged with the most important propaganda work outside the Philippines. Its two chief duties were to engage in negotiations with foreign governments and to obtain and ship arms and ammunitions to the Revolutionary Government. The crucial task of the Junta was the latter. The Filipino representatives in Japan, Don Mariano Pona and Don Faustino Lichauco, appealed to the Japanese people to support Philippine independence, but con-


20 Taylor, *Insurgent Records*, Exhibit 89, 37MG, Vol. III.
trated their main efforts on securing munitions. This stockpiling of arms implies that the Filipino leaders foresaw the possible American aim of annexation. 21

The most dramatic undertaking of the Filipino government was the Agoncillo mission to the United States. Aguinaldo stated:

Our greatest effort towards preventing the Philippine-American War was probably the sending to Washington and Paris of one of our ablest men at the time, Don Felipe Agoncillo, on a mission of peace. 22

The mission was probably the brainchild of Mabini, who believed that the time had come to deal directly with McKinley. 23

The Filipino representative arrived in Washington on September 28, 1898. In an interview he presented the following picture of his mission:

I was in Hong Kong attending to some important business for the Revolutionary government of the Philippines when I received a special message from our leader requesting me to lay before President McKinley our claims for representation upon the Paris Peace Commission. . . . 24

On October 1, 1898, Agoncillo called on President McKinley. After making it clear that he could not receive Agoncillo as


an official representative of the islands because this might imply United States recognition of the insurgent cause, the President invited him to proceed with the statement the young Filipino had brought with him. Agoncillo presented the following information:

Spain had from the earliest times pursued toward the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands the same systematic course of oppression and wrong as she had followed with the inhabitants of all her former vast colonial possessions, and her policy in the American hemisphere had driven them one by one to revolt and become independent of Spanish rule. The inhabitants of the Philippines had suffered as the Peruvians and other South Americans had suffered. They had endured humiliations; all rights of natives in the local government had been removed; they had been exploited and taxed and had suffered from every form of cruelty and perfidy, until submission was no longer endurable. In these circumstances General Aguinaldo had initiated the revolt of the Filipinos against Spain in 1896 and raised the standard of independence.

At the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Spain, General Aguinaldo was invited by Admiral Dewey to proceed to the Philippines and to renew the insurrection. He went there and faithfully fulfilled his part of the engagement, operating with his forces against the Spaniards and deferring in all matters to the superior judgment of Admiral Dewey, his sole desire being to cooperate with him for the achievement of the independence of the Filipinos.

Agoncillo withdrew after reading this statement; to further clarify and strengthen the Filipino case, he dispatched the following memorandum on October 4, for President McKinley's consideration:

\[25\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 113-114.}\]
First. As soon as war broke out between America and Spain, the American officials in Singapore, Hongkong and Manila invited the natives of the Philippines to supplement the action of American arms, which they did with pleasure and loyalty, in the guise of allies, confidently relying upon the recognition of their personality and their political, autonomous, and sovereign rights.

Second. In order that their action should be effective it was necessary to (a) organize the army of the Philippines; (b) create its military hierarchy; (c) organize a government, independent from American and Spain.

Third. All this was done with the assent of Admiral Dewey, and other military officials from the United States.

Fourth. In the Protocol between the United States of North America and Spain, it was agreed, nevertheless, that a commission composed of members appointed by both nations should negotiate and conclude a Treaty of Peace (Article 5) in which should be determined the control of the Philippines and its form of government (Article 3).

Fifth. Neither nation had apparently given attention to the right of the Filipinos to intervene in this decision.

Sixth. The legal government of the natives, then in action, had been sanctioned by the only legitimate source of public power, by the votes of its citizens.

Seventh. The revolutionary government under General Aguinaldo believed also that the time had come to make known its existence.

Eighth. The Philippine people had unanimously asserted their independence, and were relying upon the recognition of this fact by the people of North America.

Ninth. The Philippine people hoped that pending a permanent understanding regarding the evacuation of their territory, the present de facto legal government would be granted the rights of belligerency.

Tenth. The Philippine people, and their government and its legitimate representative, asked and implored the President of the Republic of North America, and its public
authorities, that they heed the aspirations, acknowledge the rights, and sanction and proclaim their sentiments of justice and honor. 26

After his effort in Washington, Agoncillo left for Paris to defend his case before the Peace Commission. The American delegates refused him even a conference. On December 10, 1898, the futility of Agoncillo's efforts were indicated in article 3 of the Peace Treaty between the United States and Spain which ceded the Philippine Islands to the North American Republic. 27

Extension of Insurgent Authority

The military assistance extended by the Luzon revolutionists to the central and southern Philippines obtained more results than the Filipino propaganda efforts abroad. 28 After the fall of Manila, when Spaniards and Americans ceased fighting, General Aguinaldo carried the war against Spanish domination throughout most of the archipelago. 29

Before their advance into outlying areas of the Philippines, the Filipino insurgents fell back to secure their lines

26 Ibid.


28 Fernandez, Philippine Republic, p. 129.

around Manila. First, they retired to the following defensive positions:

... in Malate, the continuation of the Calyada of Singalon to the bridge that joins the road; from this bridge in straight line to that of Paco; from this last bridge, following the Creek Paco, and leaving outside the suburb Tandue, to the Pasig River; following this river and entering by the creek that goes to the bridge of Aviles; from this bridge, following the road (Calzada) and that of Santa Mesa, that are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the village of Pandacan, to the jurisdictional limit of the suburbs of Sampaloc, Trozo and Tondo.

Next, to retain some force within the city of Manila itself, Filipino clubs were organized in September. Ostensibly, they were popular clubs for recreation and athletic exercise, but in reality they were centers of the revolutionary propaganda, and the nucleus of a militia to be used in an uprising inside the city if the occasion should arise. With his position secure in and around Manila, Aguinaldo now moved to consolidate his authority in the rest of the Philippines.

He sent expeditions under the command of trusted lieutenants into north-western and north-eastern Luzon. By the end of August the Spanish forces in Luzon had surrendered.

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30 U.S. War Department, Annual Report of E.S. Otis, Commanding Department of Pacific and 8th Army Corps, Military Governor in Philippine Islands (July, 1898-August 31, 1899) (Manila, 1899), pp. 7-8. (henceforth to be cited as Otis, Report)

and the Filipino government assumed control of the area. 32

The extension of the Filipino government's authority to the Bicol region in south-eastern Luzon, occurred without military intervention on the part of Aguinaldo. In Ambos Camarines and Albay conditions had been unsatisfactory since 1896, and the people in the chief towns of Nueva Caceres, Daet, and Albay were ready to join the insurgent camp. Spanish officials abandoned the area in September and the local residents formed a provisional government which placed itself under the control of Aguinaldo. 33

The Spanish government appeared helpless, as rebellion spread throughout Luzon and threatened to ignite the neighboring islands. 34 On September 7, the Spanish notified the French charge d'affaires in Madrid that occupation of Manila by America did not nullify Spanish law.

The government of His Majesty, which preserves full sovereignty in the Philippines, has perfect right to and should combat the armed rebellion which, without reason and without sufficient organization, has broken forth in those islands, and for this purpose it is proposed to utilize the forces which garrisoned Manila and to send from the Peninsula any troops considered necessary. 35

32 Fernandez, Philippine Republic, pp. 129-130.
33 Ibid., p. 131.
34 Leech, McKinley, p. 327.
The United States was informed of the situation by Mr. Jules Cambon, the French representative, who asked on behalf of the Spanish for permission to use their troops now in Manila to combat the spread of Filipino activities.\textsuperscript{36} Mr. John B. Moore replied:

United States cannot agree to liberate Spanish prisoners or allow the sending of fresh troops to wage hostilities with the rebels. \textsuperscript{37}

With Luzon under Filipino control, Aguinaldo attempted to penetrate the remaining military posts in the central Philippines. During October and November, Spanish reports from the Visayan region—central Philippines—indicated that they were being engaged in the area by the insurgents.\textsuperscript{38} In November, for lack of outside assistance, the remaining Spanish garrisons were compelled to surrender to the insurgent forces. A Provisional Government of the Visayans was established and the following officials were elected:

- President—Roque Lopez
- Vice President and Secretary of Interior—Vicente Franco
- Secretary of Finance—Venancio Concepcion
- Secretary of State—Ramon Avancena
- Secretary of Justice—Jovito Yusay
- Secretary of War—Julio Hernandez
- General Secretary—Fernando Salas\textsuperscript{39}

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\textsuperscript{36}Presidents Messages and Foreign Relations, 1898 House Documents, Vol. I, 55th Congress, 3rd Session (1898–1899), p. 808. \\
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 810. \\
\textsuperscript{38}Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 64, p. 317. \\
\textsuperscript{39}Kalaw, Revolution, pp. 131-132. 
\end{flushright}
In short order, Samar, Cebu, and Bohol pledged allegiance to the Provisional Government of the Visayan region. Thus, Luzon and the central Philippines were either firmly in Aguinaldo’s camp or had formed provisional governments which pledged support to the Filipino Republic and sent delegates to Malolos.

Aguinaldo’s most impressive move to unite the Filipino people occurred in December, when the following message was sent to the Sultan of Jolo in the southern Philippines.

The President of the Philippine Republic very cordially greets his great and powerful brother the Sultan of Jolo, and makes known: that the Filipinos, after having thrown off the yoke of foreign domination cannot forget their brothers of Jolo to whom they are bound by the ties of race, interests, security, and defense in this region of the Far East.

The Philippine Republic has resolved to respect absolutely the beliefs and traditions of each island in order to establish on a solid basis the bonds of fraternal unity. . . .

The Christian North and central regions were corresponding with the Muslim South which had for 300 years bitterly opposed Spanish control.

It is extremely difficult to estimate the support and area which Aguinaldo controlled. Wildman indicated that the revolutionary government was "universally recognized throughout

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40Fernandez, Philippine Republic, p. 133.
41Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 1426, 6MV, Vol. IV.
the Philippines." Blount contended that, by the end of December, 1898, with the exception of Zamboanga under the control of Muslim chiefs, all military stations outside Luzon had been turned over to the insurgents by the Spanish. General E. S. Otis, who had replaced Merritt as the commander of the United States forces in the Philippines, reported that the insurgents maintained control in northern and south-eastern Luzon, in Mindore, Leyte, Panay, Samar, the coast of Mindanao, and in some of the smaller islands.

While the matter of Philippine control was being debated at Paris, Aguinaldo had achieved nearly full political control in the Philippines themselves. In December, when the Treaty of Paris was signed and the Philippines were placed under United States jurisdiction, the Filipino insurgents dominated most of the islands. The Americans occupied only Manila and Cavite, the Spanish were prisoners of either the Filipinos or the United States, and the soldiers of Aguinaldo waited for the next step on their road to independence.

42Wildman, Aguinaldo, p. 142.


44Otis, Report, p. 126.
Damn, damn the Filipino
Rock-marked Khadiac ladrone;
Underneath the starry flag.
Civilize him with a Krag
and return us to our own beloved home!

American Campaign Song
On December 12, 1898, two days after the signature of the Treaty of Paris, Agoncillo filed his official protest with the American delegation in the French capital stating that the "agreement cannot be accepted as binding by my government inasmuch as the commission did not hear the Filipinos."\(^1\) Aguinaldo contended that the Paris decision "hit us with devastating effect . . ."\(^2\) But, as in the past, the Filipino leadership displayed a remarkable adaptability.

It would have been easy for the Filipinos at this juncture in the Filipino-American relationship to initiate hostilities with the United States. Aguinaldo remained calm, however, and his government continued to follow the wait-and-see policy adopted after the battle of Manila. From Paris, Agoncillo cautioned that the treaty had yet to be acted upon by the United States Senate, and until it was ratified, United States sovereignty over the Philippines was not binding.\(^3\)


\(^1\)Taylor, *Insurgent Records*, Exhibit 526, 25KU, Vol. III.


Filipinos followed their original plan to resort to arms only after employing all possible alternatives. Until the treaty was actually ratified, the Filipinos would follow a policy of restraint.

For there’s many a man been murdered in Luzon

With the Spanish surrender on August 13, the area of Manila was placed under United States military occupation. A provisional government was created to maintain order and ensure respect for persons and property. The United States military authorities established a constabulary system under the control of the Provost Marshall-General’s department. One of the first measures instituted by the Provost Marshall was a reorganization of the city government. The major feature of this reform was the creation of a Board of Health, composed of American army surgeons, which began at once to clean up Manila. It established a meat inspection system and

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5Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines, p. 112.


supervised military police raids on opium dens. The imposi-
tion of American regulations by a contemptuous occupational
force made daily life a distasteful experience for the Fili-
pino resident of Manila.

American soldiers quickly grew tired of the monotony
of camp life and garrison duty, as fever and sickness took
their toll in this strange land. Otis reported:

... many soldiers became ill from too free indul-
gence in fruits and manufactured drinks of the country,
and indifference to that care and attention of persons
which a tropical climate makes necessary.

The weather also proved to be frustrating. As one Utah volun-
teer remarked: "Rain! Every afternoon there was a downpour.
Most of the time was spent in trying to dry out clothes."

With characteristic energy and enterprise the American
troops started to "Americanize" the city of Manila. Yankee
soldiers were reported to have aroused Manila from its

8Faust, Campaigning in the Philippines, p. 90.
9Ibid., pp. 200-201.
10Metcalfe Diaries, 1898-1899 (Manuscript Division-Kansas
State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas).
11Otis, Report, p. 65.
12A. Prentiss (ed.), The History of the Utah Volunteers
in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Islands
(Salt Lake City, 1900), p. 169.
13Ibid., pp. 200-201.
Filipinos in the city scrambled to catch the loose American dollars. Music, prostitution, and drinking were provided by the native inhabitants for the pleasure and enjoyment of the Americans.  

From August 13, to the actual outbreak of hostilities on February 4 and 5, 1899, tension and frustration between the Filipinos and American troops grew in an uncontrollable crescendo. Chaplin James Mailley of the First Nebraska Volunteers complained "... our relations with the insurgents are somewhat strained. We do not understand them nor they us." An officer of the Idaho Volunteers felt that the antagonism of the American volunteers toward the Filipinos went back to the battle of Manila:

The battle of Manila was a sore disappointment to the invading army; it tended to engender erroneous ideas as to the awfulness of war, and it weakened that espirit de corps which should exist in order to resist the evil effects of such tedious and monotonous inactivity as that endured by the army of occupation. ...  

The Harper's correspondent in the Philippines reported:

17Wilcox (ed.), Harper's History of the War, p. 65.
Filipino unreliability and the persistency with which he disobeys orders are irritating beyond description; besides this, his small stature and color invite abuse. There can be no doubt that our soldiers are spoiling for a fight. They hate and despise the native for the manner in which he has lied to and cheated them. . . .

The Filipino troops were not free of obnoxious behavior in the tense situation developing at Manila. James LeRoy, author of *Americans in the Philippines*, contended that the Filipinos were over-confident of their military power.

Looking upon themselves, in their period of inflated military glory, as real conquerors of all this territory, the Filipinos were not inclined to pause to consider formalities. . . .

Honacio Costa, a Filipino Jesuit, presents the following picture of the Filipino troops from the pages of a Filipino captain's diary:

Owing to the lack of discipline in the soldiers . . . they committed many abuses and misdeeds which, for the lack of evidence, I was not able to punish, although I knew of these abuses but had no proof, and as a lover of my country and of the prestige of the revolutionary army, I took care not to disclose the secret of anyone, in this avoiding the formation of an atmosphere against the cause of our independence to the grave injury of us all. . . .

The conduct of both armies contributed to an atmosphere conducive to violence in Manila. The city grew panic-stricken

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18Ibid., pp. 56-57.
as the Filipino troops awaited instructions from Aguinaldo.

Incidents, generally of a violent nature, occurred regularly between the two camps. Colonel C.I.W. Martin of the Kansas Volunteers described the following scene:

We had a call to arms the other day. The natives expect trouble, they are all moving out in the country. Day before yesterday all of a sudden a bell commenced ringing and the natives all rushed in to their houses and closed the door. I don't know what it was for they stayed in awhile and then came out again and everything went on just as usual.

A native soldier slipped upon one of the South Dakota outpost guards and cut off his ear, there were three natives. The South Dakota guard killed the one that cut off his ear and shot the others, but didn't kill them.21

"Trooper Huntington" presented another incident between the two armies:

As I was coming in with a cart loaded with brick I noticed that two companies were lined up in front of quarters. Thinking it was a drill, I was going through the line when an officer shouted to drop the cart and fall in. When we were lined up on the parade-ground, we could hear several shots. When two bodies were carried across the parade-ground, we knew it was no practice alarm. We had not waited long before three insurgent officers came across the green and went to the officers' quarters. The whole affair appeared to be a blunder. A squad of insurgents had shot down two drunken men who were recklessly discharging their six-shooters on the way home from town. The insurgents made matters worse by firing without reason at several outposts. The feeling tonight is one of great excitement, for there is liable to be friction at any time. ...22

21C.I.W. Martin, Martin Papers (1892-1898)(Manuscript Division-Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas).

Any one of the numerous incidents between the two armies could have exploded into an all-out encounter. It is a mistake, however, to assume that either side wanted a conflict to force the issue of who exercised sovereignty over the Philippines.23 By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had decided to await the Senate vote on the treaty, and informed his subordinates that conflict was to be avoided. McKinley had on numerous occasions also urged Merritt, and later Otis, to avoid a rupture with the insurgents. But, as Aguinaldo indicated, "good will among the officers and men on both sides was drying up so fast"24 that only a spark was needed to start a general conflagration.

**Iloilo and the McKinley Proclamation**

In December, 1898, and January, 1899, two incidents occurred which were indicative of the growing antagonism in the Philippine-American relationship. The first incident was directly connected with the extension of insurgent authority in the Visayan area of the central Philippines. Spanish authority in this area was confined to the city of Iloilo, the second largest port in the Visayan Islands. General Rios, the commander of the port, had requested that Spanish troops confined to Manila be allowed to aid in the defense of Iloilo.

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24 Aguinaldo, *Second Look at America*, p. 82.
In line with the American policy, Otis ordered that no Spanish troops be allowed to leave Manila or to participate in the defense of the area. In December, therefore, Rios was forced to surrender and evacuate Iloilo. He unofficially had come to terms with the insurgent forces around the city to permit a Spanish withdrawal without losing further troops. After the Spanish retreated from the city, the insurgent troops occupied Iloilo and its environs.25

While the Spanish withdrawal was being negotiated with the insurgents, foreign bankers and businessmen in Iloilo requested protection. Otis wired Washington soliciting instruction on December 14.26 On December 21, the Department of the Army replied:

Answering your message of December 14, the President directs that you send the necessary troops to Iloilo to preserve the peace and protect life and property. It is most important that there should be no conflict with insurgents. Be conciliatory, but firm.27

Otis ordered General M.P. Miller to sail to Iloilo and reiterated the President's instructions to him: "No conflict with insurgents. Be conciliatory but firm."28 If Miller


27Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. X, p. 358.

found Iloilo occupied by insurgent forces, he was to "proceed with great caution avoiding all manifestations of meditated forcible action and undue display of force." He was to land only after negotiations with the Filipinos had convinced them that their interests would be protected by the United States.  

Upon Miller's arrival, the foreign business houses, which had originally petitioned for the expedition, asked him not to land his troops for fear of conflict and the destruction of the town. As the prospect of conflict became eminent, President McKinley wired Otis that:

... a conflict brought on by you [should] be avoided at this time, if possible. Cannot Miller get into communication with insurgents assuring them that while the United States will assert its sovereignty its purpose is to give them a good government and security in their personal rights.

The news that the Americans intended to seize Iloilo unified the various Visayan factions and brought them closer to the Malolos Government. The Filipino citizens of Iloilo decided in a mass meeting to repel any American effort to land

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29Ibid.
30Ibid.
32Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. X, p. 359.
troops in the city with force. Aguinaldo issued the following proclamation to clarify his position on the American action in Iloilo:

My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated [To] itself the title of champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the Americans attempt to take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands. . . . 34

Also, the Revolutionary government at Malolos sent the following characterization of the American soldier:

I must tell you something for the people of Iloilo: that is, the American by himself is feeble, and fears bolos very much; at first he appears strong and valiant, but if he meets valor and resolution on our part he yields; this has happened more than twenty times in Luzon. We can calculate one of our soldiers being worth four of theirs. 35

Hostilities, at this point, would have surely erupted if Miller had attempted to land his troops at Iloilo. Indeed, the Filipinos assumed an increasingly provocative attitude and two soldiers of the Sixth Artillery were attacked in the Iloilo Harbor by a mob of angry citizens. 36 Miller sent the following assessment of the situation to Otis:

33Kalaw, Revolution, p. 136.
34Otis, Report, p. 77.
35Wilcox (ed.), Harper's History of the War, p. 65.
I have the honor to report for the information of the Major General commanding that the situation here is not improving since my last report. I have not landed the 51st Iowa on the island opposite to Iloilo, as two boat crews of troops of the 51st Iowa landed on the 5th instant, and were met by over seventy-five to one hundred natives armed with various weapons, rifles, shot guns and knives, who asked them their business and warned them off with threats of bringing out more troops if they did not go away. . . .

Hoping to ease the tension developing in Iloilo and Manila, President McKinley issued the following statement relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands.

... It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or as conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or honest submission, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity, so far as possible. . . .

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to

37 Otis, Report, p. 112.
in the most public manner, to the inhabitants of these islands that in the war against Spain the United States forces came here to destroy the power of that nation and to give the blessings of peace and individual freedom to the Philippine people; that we are here as friends of the Filipinos; to protect them in their homes, their employments, their individual and religious liberty, and that all persons who, either by active aid or honest endeavor, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect of these beneficent purposes, will receive the reward of its support and protection.

The President of the United States has assumed that the municipal laws of the country in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in force in so far as they be applicable to a free people and those in thorough sympathy with them in their desires for good government; that the functions and duties connected with civil and municipal administration are to be performed by such officers as wish to accept the assistance of the United States, chosen in so far as it may be practicable from the inhabitants of the islands; that while the management of public property and revenues and the use of all public means of transportation are to be conducted under the military authorities, until such authorities can be replaced by civil administration, all private property, whether of individuals or corporations, must be respected and protected. If private property be taken for military uses it shall be paid for at a fair valuation in cash if possible, and when payment in cash is not practicable at the time, receipts therefor will be given, to be taken up and liquidated as soon as cash becomes available. The ports of the Philippine Islands shall be open to the commerce of all foreign nations, and goods and merchandise not prohibited for military reasons by the military authorities shall be admitted upon payment of such duties and charges as shall be in force at the time of importation.

The President concludes his instructions in the following language:

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the Administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by insuring to them in every possible way the full measure of individual rights and liberty which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent
assimilation. There must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippines under the free flag of the United States.\footnote{Richardson, \textit{Messages and Papers of the Presidents}, Vol. X, pp. 356-358.}

The entire text of the message was wired to General Otis when the news from Iloilo was most critical.\footnote{LeRoy, \textit{Americans in the Philippines}, pp. 401-402.} He therefore took the following course of action:

After fully considering the President's proclamation and the temper of the insurgents with whom I was daily discussing political problems and the friendly intentions of the United States Government towards them, I concluded that there were certain words and expressions therein, such as "sovereignty," "right of cession," and those which directed immediate occupation, etc., though most admirably and tersely expressive of actual conditions, might be advantageously used by the Filipino war party to incite widespread hostilities among the natives.\ldots\ It was my opinion therefore, that I would be justified in so amending the paper that the beneficent object of the United States Government would be brought clearly within the comprehension of the people.\ldots\footnote{Otis, \textit{Report}, p. 111.}

On January 4, 1899, Otis published this amended version of McKinley's instructions:

\begin{center}
\textbf{Office of the Military Governor}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Instructions of His Excellency the President of the United States relative to the administration of affairs in the Philippines have been transmitted to me by direction of the honorable the Secretary of War, under date December 28, 1898. They direct me to publish and proclaim,}
\end{center}
the mission of the United States is one of beneficent assimilation, which will substitute the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, while upholding the temporary administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there will be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbances, and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands.

From the tenor and substance of the above instructions of the President, I am fully of the opinion that it is the direct intention of the United States Government, while directing affairs generally, to appoint the representative men now forming the controlling element of the Filipinos to civil positions of trust and responsibility, and it will be my aim to appoint thereto such Filipinos as may be acceptable to the supreme authorities at Washington. 41

General Aguinaldo replied very unfavorably to the proclamation issued by General Otis on January 4.

A proclamation of Mr. E.S. Otis, Major General of the United States Volunteers, appeared in Manila papers yesterday compelled me to issue the present, with a view to expose to all who read and understand the present document my most solemn protest against the whole contents of the said proclamation . . .

The General Otis called himself in the said proclamation Military Governor of the Philippine Islands. I protest one and a thousand times with all the energy of my soul against such authority.

I solemnly declare that neither at Singapore, Hong Kong nor here in the Philippines did I ever agree by word or in writing to recognize the sovereignty of America in this our lovely country . . .

As in General Otis' proclamation he alluded to some instructions edited by H.E. the President of the United States, referring to the administration of the matters

in the Philippine Islands, I in the name of God, the root and fountain of all justice, and that of all the right which has been visibly granted to me to direct my dear brothers in the difficult work of our regeneration, protest most solemnly against this intrusion of the United States Government on the sovereignty of these Islands.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 103-104.}

The President's instructions, without directions as to their public dissemination, had also been sent to General Miller in Iloilo. Miller immediately transmitted the complete text of McKinley's statement to the Filipino authorities there. The Iloilo insurgents forwarded Miller's report to Malolos where it was discovered the General Otis, in issuing the McKinley Proclamation, had veiled the American intention to assert complete sovereignty over the archipelago.\footnote{LeRoy, \textit{Americans in the Philippines}, Vol. I, pp. 402-403.}

Filipino newspapers did not miss the opportunity to revel in the "American bad faith." The ablest of insurgent newspapers, which was issued at Malolos and edited by General Luna, violently attacked the subterfuge. The women of Cavite sent a petition to Otis which declared that even should all the Filipino men be killed fighting the United States, they themselves would then be prepared to shed their blood for liberty.\footnote{Otis, \textit{Report}, pp. 115-116.}

These two episodes, although not totally responsible...
for the outbreak of hostilities in February, increased the tension and mistrust between the two camps. When the two incidents are combined with the various incidents occurring in and around Manila, neither the wish to avoid conflict nor the plans of McKinley or Aguinaldo seemed important. The tide of events occurred independently of any set plan, and the momentum created by the increasing tension in Manila and Iloilo was extremely difficult to stem from either Malolos or Washington.

San Juan Bridge

January, 1899, proved to be the decisive month in the disintegration of the Philippine-American relationship. The American volunteers, chafing under restraint and taunted by the Filipinos, were difficult to control. The insurgent newspapers were uncompromising and vociferous, and accused the Americans of indiscriminate use of force against Filipinos. Tension was so high that a dog fight in the streets of Manila one day was mistaken for an uprising, and brought forth a call to arms. 45

C.I.W. Martin reported in a letter to his wife that on January 14, 1899, the Kansas Volunteers were mobilized and ready to move on Filipino positions. 46 In another instance,

45 Wildman, Aguinaldo, pp. 184-185.

46 C.I.W. Martin, Martin Papers, 1892-1898.
on January 21, an American sentry shot and killed a Filipino soldier in the district of Tondo. The Filipinos there attempted to enter American lines, but after an exchange of shots, an American force overwhelmed and arrested the Filipinos.47

The Filipino insurgents continued to carry on clandestine operations within Manila. Filipino citizens who were friendly to the Americans were seized and either beaten or killed by Aguinaldo's agents. The recreation clubs operated at full capacity distributing literature hostile to the American troops.48 United States military police raided one of these clubs and found a map which divided the city into districts. A Filipino officer outside the city had been appointed for each district to maintain contact with insurgents within Manila. In the case of attack, the plan provided for coordinated efforts between the Filipino military units surrounding Manila and the recreation clubs inside the city.49

While the tension continued to mount, both sides advanced renewed efforts to find a peaceful solution to the issues confronting the Americans and the Filipinos. Otis and Aguinaldo agreed to form an integrated commission to examine

48 Olcott, McKinley, p. 184.
the explosive situation. The American commander reported that the conferences between the two camps "seem to have quieted the atmosphere very much." The Filipinos, however, viewed the conferences as a United States delaying tactic to assure that American reinforcements could arrive before the outbreak of any new hostilities. Otis detected the Filipino mistrust of United States motives and reported on January 19, the "insurgents say we are only trying to prolong conferences until we can receive more troops. . . ."

From January 11 to 31, Americans and Filipinos attempted to head off the impending crisis. On January 21, the Malolos government received the following summary of the views concerning its conferences with the Americans from Filipino leaders in the Visayans, Mindano, and Zamboanga:

Negotiations are being carried on in great secrecy. It is advisable that you should inform our government so that we may not continue passing for the fools they [Americans] say we are. . . .

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50 Kalaw, Development of Philippine Politics, p. 172.
52 Kalaw, Development of Philippine Politics, pp. 172-173.
54 Kalaw, Development of Philippine Politics, p. 148.
55 Taylor, Insurgent Records, Exhibit 402, 18KU, Vol. III.
The Luna faction also pressured the Malolos Government to drop out of the conferences, and they continued to press for military action against the United States. Aguinaldo, with the aid and encouragement of Mabini, continued to urge caution because the treaty was still being debated in the Senate. The McKinley Proclamation and the Iloilo experience augmented the Filipino mistrust of American motives in the January conferences.

By the beginning of February, 1899, the Filipino-American relationship was strained to the utmost. Since the attempts at peaceful settlement of differences had failed previously, no active negotiations were working at any point to ease the tension between the adversaries. Otis reported that the insurgents "along their established lines and within the city exhibited increased aggressiveness..." Moreover, serious friction occurred over the question of the outer lines of the American military force in the city of Manila. The issue had been a sore point in the relationship since the surrender of Manila.

The Nebraska Regiment bore the brunt of Filipino pressure on this question of the outer lines. It had been encamped

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57 Otis, Report, p. 152.
in a forward position at Santa Mesa about a mile beyond the outskirts of the city, on the left bank of the Pasig River. The Filipino troops were so close to the American lines that the Nebraska sentinel occupied one end of the San Juan bridge and the Filipino sentinel occupied the other. 59

On February 2, a detachment of Colonel San Miguel's troops penetrated the Nebraska forward positions at San Juan del Monte. Shots were exchanged, but conflict did not erupt. 60 The men of the Nebraska Regiment remained calm, but they generally felt that if the "niggers" 61 tried to enter the area again, the regiment would take the necessary action.

On February 4, 1899, in an incident similar to many that had occurred since the surrender of Manila, a United States sentry on San Juan bridge fired into a group of Filipino troops who were attempting to enter San Juan. Firing broke out all along the Filipino and American lines and continued on into the next day. 62 A relatively common occurrence on the outer lines had erupted into the bloodiest conflict in the

61 W.S. Metcalf, Diary (1855-1935).
annals of Philippine history which eclipsed even World War II in duration and cost of Filipino lives. On February 5, Aguinaldo issued the following declaration of war against the United States:

I command and order:

1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American Forces of Occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.
2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.
3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to Congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of war.

The United States had become a Southeast Asian power. Now, she would have to deal with Southeast Asian nationalism in a country were it had began to manifest itself early and violently.

63 Wolff, Little Brown Brother, p. 221.
64 Otis, Report, pp. 159-160.
65 Harrison, Short History of Southeast Asia, p. 238.
The Revolution has a final aim, to maintain alive and resplendent, the torch of liberty and civilization, in order to give light to the gloomy night in which the Malay race finds itself degraded, so that it may be led to the road of social emancipation.

Apollinario Mabini
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Most studies of the antecedants of the Filipino-American conflict concentrate on the political maneuverings in Washington and Paris, rather than the events which were unfolding in the Philippines. Although a great deal of material salient to this problem can be found in the intricate political environments of Washington and Paris, the crucial focus of the issue lies elsewhere. No matter how McKinley and his colleagues proceeded in Washington, events in Manila and its environs were unfolding independently of any outside manipulation. Indeed, even Otis and Aguinaldo found it extremely difficult to regulate the emotions, frustrations, and boredom of Filipino and American troops.

Once the United States had established a military government in Manila and Cavite, American sovereignty was for all practical purposes a daily reality for the Filipinos. The vacuum that had existed after the removal of Spanish power was filled by yet another foreign power. The Filipino leaders who had tasted autonomy were exceedingly reluctant to relinquish their authority. Thus, the real problem revolved around the Filipino efforts to deal with the establishment of American authority in Manila and Cavite.
The tension, which emanated from the close proximity of the two armies, both desirous of power and influence, led to the outbreak of the Filipino-American War. Thus, a shot fired on San Juan Bridge exploded into a war between the two adversaries. It is then important to focus on Manila, rather than concentrating on the events in Washington and Paris; for it was the daily relations between the two powers in the Philippines which proved to be decisive.

The Filipino resistance to Spain and the United States in the later part of the 19th century must not be considered as an isolated event; rather, it was part of a general response in the non-Western world to European and American penetration. The "natives" employed various levels of resistance to stem the tide of the Western intrusion.

In 1881, the Sudanese rallied around an extraordinary religious movement which became known as Mahdism. The main purpose of this movement was to drive out the British and free the land from foreign influence. From 1885 onward, the followers of the Mahdi successfully frustrated the British plans and became the undisputed masters of the entire Sudan.¹ In Northeast Africa, the response of the "native" to European penetration was religious fanaticism and armed resistance.

The Japanese, on the other hand, followed a policy of political and military adaptation to preserve their territory from European and American domination. In fact, the Japanese adapted so quickly, that their nation became a major participant in European affairs.²

The Chinese, in contrast, were unable to decide on any particular course of action to counteract the Western advance into East Asia. They half-heartedly attempted to reform in the same manner as Japan, but internal pressure and court intrigue curtailed this effort. At the turn of the 20th century the Chinese declared war on the "powers" and attempted to forcibly drive out the "devils."³ The so-called Boxer Rebellion proved to be unsuccessful, and the Chinese were forced to wait until the 1911 revolution, which would prove to be a turning point in Chinese history.

In their struggle for nationhood, the Filipino patriots displayed a remarkable degree of flexibility. They employed various policy alternatives to deal with the vacuum created by the removal of Spanish power from the area. After the American military victories in and around Manila, the Filipinos


³Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 692-693.
assumed a more defiant attitude toward the United States. The insurgents attempted to secure a strong foundation to wage either an aggressive diplomatic effort or a protracted war against the new intruder into Southeast Asia. After the results of the Treaty of Paris became known, the Filipino continued to wait for the result of the debate in the United States Senate. Throughout this political and military maneuvering, the Filipinos remained aware of their delicate position. The alternative of open warfare against the United States had been considered in Hong Kong and after the land battle of Manila. They felt, however, that independence could come without a resort to arms. Furthermore, the Filipinos were aware that a protracted military campaign against the Americans would be expensive and might be unsuccessful. The Filipino intentions to avoid conflict were frustrated, however, by the growing tension and racial hatred developing between the two armies. The antagonism between the United States and Filipino troops would curtail plans for a non-violent settlement of the issues between the two camps. Thus, on the San Juan Bridge, sheer military power became the determinant of the Filipino aspirations. The struggle that ensued between the United States and the Filipinos became one of the most brutal wars in the history of colonialism.

The American view of the Filipino conflict was remarkably similar to the British attitude concerning the war with
the two Boer Republics. William Langer observed:

When Britain embarked upon war with the two Boer Republics, both the statesmen and the soldiers were convinced that what was before them was just another sporting war as Bismarck called England's colonial conflicts. All that was necessary was a slap on the face for Kruger and the thing would be over. Yet the most serious disillusionment was in store for them. It soon turned out that they had miscalculated on almost every count. 4

The United States totally underestimated the capacity of the Filipinos to resist American military power. The United States failed to grasp the complexities of the Philippine revolutionary movement or to appreciate the depth of Aguinaldo's efforts to achieve political independence. As was the case with His Majesty's Government in the Boer War, the United States paid dearly in manpower and prestige in their struggle against Filipino nationalism.

4 Ibid., p. 651.
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