AN INQUIRY INTO POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF APARTHEID IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

A Thesis
Presented to
the Division of Social Sciences
Kansas State Teachers College of Emporia

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science

by
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August 1971
Approved for the Major Department

Approved for the Graduate Council

316079
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincerest thanks to the late Colonel Thomas Badger who was extremely instrumental in helping to formulate many of the ideas for pursuing this investigation; to Mr. Earl Rohrbaugh for the hours spent in carrying this paper through to its conclusion; and to Dr. William Seiler and Mr. Robert Thompson for graciously consenting to serve on my Graduate Committee on such late notice so that I could complete graduation requirements earlier than would otherwise have been possible.
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Apartheid (the racial policies of South Africa) has been, and is, a topic of widespread debate. It has been almost universally condemned. The notable exceptions are the Republic of South Africa, Portugal, and the regime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia. The universality of condemnation has not foreclosed that debate. The problem of what to do about its continued practice remains unresolved. In the attempts to arrive at meaningful solutions, areas of agreement among opponents of such policies begin to diminish. For example, independent Africa, along with many Asian countries, prefers to maintain a more stringent position than those countries of the West. Foreign policy and economic, political, social, historical, and geographical factors prompt varying responses and attitudes and so the debate continues. Whether the emotional intensity permeating the debate will result in a world wide polarization of non-Whites against Whites is doubtful. It seems unlikely that either would allow their communications to deteriorate to such a degree as to make polarization the only option available. Furthermore, the policies being pursued by the South African government, although considered important, have not yet constituted a
problem of such magnitude that the world community is going to sever the channels of communication used to grapple with more pressing international problems.

For the present the question of apartheid remains another of the seemingly unsolvable international problems. Whether or not those working to provide a solution will arrive at one remains to be seen. The outlook is dim. Various approaches have been attempted. None has yet produced the desired effect. Through systematic analysis of existing conditions, both international and within South Africa, evidence will attempt to give credence to the idea that change in apartheid policies will not be radically altered by the methods now being implemented.

The investigation of existing conditions centers on the prevailing attitudes of those most concerned with apartheid and those most capable of instituting changes in such policies. Special emphasis will be given to those nations and organizations which have remained in the forefront of the debate regarding apartheid policies. Since apartheid policies constitute an elaborate network of interrelated social conditions, comprehensive analysis of such conditions will be left to others more concerned with apartheid as a sociological study. The purpose of this inquiry is to evaluate, as objectively as possible within the confines of the author's established prejudices, the potential solutions of apartheid. For those who are offended, as is the author, by the existence of such conditions perhaps the following
inquiry will help to reveal some of the causes of frustration faced by those attempting to alleviate the problems in southern Africa.

An investigation into the activities of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union), and the Republic of South Africa provides an overall view of the forces at work in southern Africa. Six major divisions will constitute the framework for investigation. First, the policy of apartheid as it is implemented by South Africa will be discussed. Attention will be given to the historical development of apartheid, the arguments used to defend the system, the theory of separate development, the attitude of the government with regard to criticisms leveled against them, and evaluation of Jewish acquiescence to apartheid policies. Second, consideration of United Nations' action and attitude will be explored. Third, because of its status as a world power, the United States' policy toward apartheid and southern Africa will be considered. Fourth, a look at the actions and attitudes of the OAU will indicate the general, if not specific, concerns of independent Africa. Because the Soviet Union's efforts have been directed to a large extent through the OAU, its position will be discussed in that section as well as being alluded to in the sections following it. Fifth, consideration will be given to factions within southern Africa which are opposed to the policies of apartheid and colonialism. Sixth, because of the dominance the South African government
maintains over the social order, special emphasis will be
given to the economic and military aspects of South Africa.
CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL STATUS OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA

Apartheid as it now exists has evolved over a several hundred year period. It has been developed in response to changes in political, economic, social, and international phenomena. An investigation into the history of South Africa serves well to illustrate one of the basic tenets upon which apartheid is defended. Defense of such policies goes beyond historical claims. Apartheid is deeply embraced by Whites and is supported by a composite of semi-rational, dogmatic, emotional, and inconsistent arguments. In order to make apartheid policies more operable the South African government has undertaken an ambitious program of "separate development" (a geographic separation of Whites and Blacks designed to provide economic, political, and social growth in their respective territories). Virtually none of the claims made by the South African government about the advantages of such racial policies has been acceptable to outside observers; yet the system remains firmly entrenched. The system is so firmly entrenched in fact that domestic groups that once were quite vocal in their opposition have found it politically, economically, and socially more advisable to adjust to the system. It is to these phenomena that this chapter will address itself.
Historical background of apartheid. Most Whites of South Africa assume that one must live there many years in order to understand apartheid. It is a policy which has taken centuries to develop and understand.¹ The first White settlement was established at Cape Town in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company. Unable to secure the help and cooperation of the indigenous natives (Hottentots and Bushmen), the Company decided to import slaves from the west coast of Africa. This was done in 1658. Eventually 29,000 slaves were brought to the settlement from West Africa. During the same period immigration from Europe was encouraged. Europeans continued migrating to South Africa. Except during the initial phase of settlement, South Africa did not hold a great deal of attraction for trading nations.²

Concentration of different races in a small area resulted in intermarriage. As early as 1685, the marriage of Europeans with freed slaves was prohibited. Whites were still allowed to marry half-breeds.³

It was not until the late eighteenth century that the British gained control of the southern tip of Africa. British attitudes toward non-Whites differed from those of other


³Ibid., p. 13.
Europeans and in 1807, Great Britain abolished slavery in the Cape. They, as had been their predecessors, were unable to induce the labor of Hottentots (indigenous tribal grouping in southern Africa). Therefore in 1809, the first pass law was introduced. It declared that all Hottentot males not working for Whites were to be classified as "vagrants." All "vagrants" had to carry a pass. The pass could be checked by any White man as well as police. 

The Dutch were becoming more and more dissatisfied with British methods. Because the Dutch felt that slaves were being "placed on an equal footing with Christians contrary to the laws of God and the natural distinction of race and colour," they began withdrawing from British controlled territories. The Great Trek, as it is known, started in 1834. Misunderstandings between British and Boer (French, Hollander, and German farmers) continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century. As Boers settled the interior of South Africa they established republics based on White supremacy. The Boer War was the culmination of hostilities between Europeans during the nineteenth century. The victorious British government annexed the Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State. 

The first decade of the twentieth century found the four colonies (Natal, Orange Free State, Transvaal, Cape of Good 

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4Ibid., pp. 15-17.

5Ibid., pp. 19-27.
Hope) exercising different prerogatives. Coloureds (those with mixed blood) and Asians (Indians) were receiving varied consideration depending on the colony in which they were residing. Inconsistency prompted an attempt at unification. A National Constitutional Convention was held and a draft constitution was drawn up and returned to the four Colonial Parliaments for their approval. On May 31, 1910, the Union of South Africa came into being. General Botha (former leader of the Boer--Het Volk--party) was asked to form the first Union Cabinet. It consisted of ten members, six of whom were to be of Afrikaner (European) descent. The first Parliament was elected September 15, 1910, with Botha's South African Party capturing the majority of seats. 6

The political apparatus had now been established for more rapid development of apartheid policy. Native Reserves had evolved for different reasons and under different circumstances since the mid-nineteenth century. Some had been established in an attempt to control the wandering of rootless Africans. Others had been created in an effort to help appease Africans. Many Reserves developed as a result of allocating land to various South African tribes.

By 1910, there were nearly three hundred Reserves scattered all over the Union. To alleviate the confusion created, political leaders began to establish plans for correcting the problems of administering the large number of Reserves. In 1912, four African lawyers launched a campaign

6 Ibid., pp. 28-38.
to organize the African National Congress (ANC) in an effort to bring about equitable representation for natives in Parliament which had been denied them by the new constitution. The native factions were beginning to exert themselves politically. This prompted increased action by other racial groupings such as the Coloureds and Asians. The increased activity was met by restrictive legislation.\(^7\)

General Smuts became Prime Minister in 1919 after the death of General Botha. Smuts had wanted to develop a better rapport with the increasingly vocal natives but he was unable to take any significant steps to alleviate the problem. Botha and Smuts had advocated conciliatory approaches. Internal disenchantment over the South African Party's policies developed. General Hertzog established the Nationalist Party in opposition to attempts at conciliation. A split among the Afrikaners resulted. Soon afterwards Nationalists began to align themselves with the Labour Party (disenchanted British) and a viable political organization began developing.\(^8\)

The Nationalist Party successfully spearheaded a campaign calling for a vote of no-confidence in 1923. In 1924 the Hertzog government came into power. A conservative posture was then assumed regarding the racial question. Hertzog's government passed a series of laws designed to elevate the status of Whites. Attempts by Africans to achieve greater

\(^7\)Ibid., pp. 39-45.

\(^8\)Ibid., pp. 45-47.
recognition were thwarted by Parliament. The trend continued until the outbreak of World War II, at which point foreign issues became a prominent concern among policy makers. Although there was little, if any, participation by South Africans in the war effort, the political ramifications of the event prompted considerable attention. Hertzog had favored neutrality. Smuts favored entering the war on the side of Great Britain. Many others felt that the Germans would win (including the present Prime Minister, Belthazar Vorster). Parliament chose to honor the Smuts proposal and Hertzog stepped aside. Smuts reorganized the government for a second time.\(^9\)

Hertzog's demise as leader of the Nationalist Party soon followed. He was succeeded by Dr. D.F. Malan. It had been the question of whom to support in World War II that unseated the Nationalists. By 1944, the race question had returned as the dominant issue. The Smuts government had tried to restore a policy of reconciliation toward non-Whites. A furor resulted over having official letters to Coloureds addressed in the same manner as to Whites, (i.e., the use of "Sir" or "Madam" in letters and "Mr." or "Mrs." on envelopes). A number of officials were dismissed (or resigned) for failure to comply. By this time, African nationalism had received great impetus from World War II. This nationalism had served only to polarize Whites and non-Whites in South Africa.

\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 47-67.
In the election of 1948, the Nationalists, under the leadership of Dr. Malan, gained control of Parliament. The Nationalists have never relinquished that control.\textsuperscript{10}

Defense of apartheid. The arguments used by the government of South Africa to defend apartheid constitute a mixture of semi-rationalism, dogmatism, emotionalism, and inconsistency. One of the credible arguments is based on the diversity of groups living in South Africa.

Five societies have to live with one another—a white society, a Bantu... society, a coloured—mixed blood society, an Indian society, and a Pakistani society. There are smaller, societies, such as the Malay-Moslem—society, the Griqua society, a mixture of races in the Griqua-land districts of Cape Province, the Rehoboth society [another racial mixture in South West Africa], plus the Hottentot and Bushman societies, also in that territory... The white and coloured societies speak two languages, the Bantu society speaks five main languages plus about sixty dialects, the Indian and Pakistani societies speak at least five languages. Each maintains a distinct way of life and, except for the whites and coloureds who share the Western culture, each way of life flows forth from another and separate culture. Each society treasures its own way of life and applies to it its own standards of living—even its own definitions as to what happiness means and does not mean.\textsuperscript{11}

All of the major religions of the world are represented in South Africa. Christianity has challenged the religious concepts of the Bantu (native) society yet only about half have been converted. There still remain approximately 1,500

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 67-77.

religious sects among the Bantu. Further, the native society is race conscious and remains loyal to tribal traditions. Even though many have been incorporated into the industrial community, they still have a deep-seated affinity for their tribal heritage. How can a reasonably harmonious society possibly be created with this kind of diversity, asks the government.

Wentzel du Plessis, a former South African ambassador to the United States, suggests that perhaps "it would be a good thing, not only for the friendly intercourse between people but also for the peace of the world, if more discrimination were to be applied to the use of the word 'discrimination'."

Is it true that differences between people based on race, color, language and sex are discriminatory? It need not be true and by and large it is not true. In the great majority of cases race, color and language, far from being discriminatory, can be identified as the unifying factor in any particular group.

Group identification is a perfectly natural phenomenon. ..it must be clear that what so often appears to be discrimination is only due to the fact that people of the same race, the same color, speaking the same language, through these associations cherish and preserve the same way of life and, consequently, group themselves together in a natural process.

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12Ibid., p. 74.


15Ibid., p. 76.

16Ibid.
In these terms, apartheid is not discrimination. It is not based on superiority or inferiority, but on the principle that people differ, particularly in their group associations, loyalties, cultures, outlook, mode of life and standards of development. It is on the premise of differentialism that apartheid exists.  

Whatever the Bantu wishes to accept from the white man's way of life he must do voluntarily, but neither is going to allow the other to force him into a common mold. Not all the immense pressure which the world can exercise will accomplish this because, in fact, if it is accomplished it will mean the death of white as well as of Bantu society. The resistance to this will, therefore, come not only from whites but also from the Bantu, except from those who do not cherish an own identity and who have lost their self-respect.  

In addition to diversity, the government points to the success that has been achieved through the efforts of Whites as justification for apartheid policies. In a recent letter to the United Nations, the Permanent Representative from South Africa to the United Nations stated:

It is generally accepted that the results achieved in South Africa in the various fields of economy, education, health, etc., for all groups are indeed spectacular. Can it be maintained that all these achievements were the result of a destructive, oppressive, and negative policy?  

The dominance of Whites is justified on the grounds that they have earned their pre-eminent position through their own

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efforts and have contributed extensively to the development of South Africa. When they arrived in South Africa, the land was poor. Much of the area was unoccupied. Over the years they have established their own distinctive nation-state. In so doing they have shared, in increasing amounts, their prosperity with all sections of the population. Per capita income among non-Whites is greater than most countries in tropical Africa. There are more hospital beds for non-Whites than in any other country in Africa. More non-White students are attending universities than in any other state in Africa.

The prison system is among the most modern and humane in the world today and considerably superior to many other countries. From state revenues and other sources, the South African Government provides more than $84 million annually for welfare and health services for the Bantu alone. Many of the country's welfare services are provided free of charge, or at a nominal fee only.

A more dogmatic argument for White dominance is the fear that the Blacks are seeking revenge. Critics of apartheid suggest that such fear is unwarranted. Neame suggests, however, that:

The policy of most nations is based upon fear—fear of attack; fear of the excessive infiltration of unassimilable foreigners; fear of trade competition weakening the national economy. What is

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branded as fear in South Africa is simply the desire of every race to survive and transmit its heritage to its children.\(^2\)

The Whites of South Africa are fearful of losing their dominant position. The government feels that any concession which it makes to Blacks is a partial surrender of its sovereignty and only encourages militants to exert greater pressure.\(^2\)

The Afrikaner is prepared to concede more rights in the homelands, but for him to concede any rights to the African in the 'white areas' is to concede the whole principle on which his survival depends; to concede, in fact, victory to the African.\(^2\)

The policy of apartheid must remain uncompromising to guarantee White domination.\(^2\) After twenty-two years of apartheid, the Afrikaner thinks that any concession would open the door for more and more concessions. Eventually the Bantu would be in a position to destroy White dominance.\(^2\)

Years of enforcing race discrimination against not a minority group but the overwhelming majority of the people of the Union have given white supremacy a new rationale for maintaining itself. There is now the fear of revenge, of the Africans turning on their oppressors, of the rise of a so-called black nationalism against which the whites must defend themselves. The traditional policy of segregation,


\(^2\)Tingsten, Problems of South Africa, pp. 60-61.


\(^2\)Uys, "White Ants."
or apartheid, is the only way, it is now argued with reinforced vigour, to avoid the clashes that must necessarily arise where different races live together.\textsuperscript{28}

The uncompromising position of the government was reiterated by Prime Minister Vorster in April of 1968.

South Africa does not want to go under and neither does it want to be changed. We want to stay as we are . . . . The demands being made upon us . . . we cannot and shall not meet, because it will mean the end of our existence in this part of the world.\textsuperscript{29}

The South African government also uses a historical argument for justifying apartheid policies and White domination. This defense is more emotional than rational. A comparison is often made concerning the right of the South African government to exist in South Africa as much as the American nation has the right to exist in North America. Both trace their origins to the 17th century. Both are fundamentally Christian nations. Both have origins in Western Europe. Both struggled for independence from Britain. Both built strong, prosperous countries out of formerly primitive environments.\textsuperscript{30}

The white man has a perfect right to be in South Africa and sees no need to excuse his presence here or to justify his intention to remain. There is no truth whatever in the belief, often encountered overseas, that when the white man arrived here he found a Bantu population settled from time immemorial on lands from which he brutally dispossessed them. On the contrary, both whites and


\textsuperscript{29}United Nations, Segregation in South Africa, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{30}Thompson, Republic of South Africa, p. 4.
Bantu were colonizing invaders who entered the country at about the same time, the white man being the first to arrive in the south and the Bantu in the north. If priority of occupation gives a claim to ownership, the Europeans have as good a claim as anybody, except the vanished aboriginal races of Hottentots and Bushmen.

... the white man intends to maintain the principles of western civilization and the way of life on which their survival depends. He is well aware that this attitude involves dangers of abuse, and therefore there are great numbers of people in South Africa who make it their business to watch vigilantly for every sign of oppression and to combat it vigorously when it appears. But there can be no question of placing the destinies of the country in the hands of a black majority and so converting South Africa into a state of the order of Haiti. 31

The weakest defense offered for the perpetuation of apartheid rests on the assumption that the White race is superior. They are better educated, possess more technical knowledge and have established a more complicated and efficient social and political structure. The White's attitude toward the Black community is reflected in this manner: "The natives are superstitious, dirty, unreliable, imitative, brutal, dishonest, quarrelsome, treacherous--this was the conclusion in a report of an inquiry carried out by a hundred Afrikaner students in South Africa some years ago." 32

All of the above arguments have been used to defend the policy of apartheid, but they represent more than just a defense. All countries cling to ideas that help to express

31 Gerdener, "Crux of Situation," p. 281. One of the earliest statements concerning apartheid as official policy. Indicates a more permissive attitude of policy during its embryonic stages.

32 Tingsten, Problems of South Africa, pp. 55-56.
identity. All countries make certain rationalizations as to the progress they have made and the excellence of their existing political systems. All nations have attempted, in varying degrees, to use history to unify their countrymen. The same is true of South Africa. She, as others, are convinced they are right.

**Theory of separate development.** One of the most important aspects of apartheid is the Bantustan policy or theory of separate development. It is the feeling of the Nationalist Party that the only way in which Whites and Blacks can live peaceably is if they live separately, as much as possible. Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, Prime Minister from 1958-1966, was the foremost developer of this so-called positive apartheid or separate development. The Bantustan policy is designed to provide opportunities for major African tribal groups to set up their own "homelands" on rural tribal reserves. The Transkei Reserve was the first experiment of the Bantustan policy. The South African government is convinced that this policy is to the best advantage of Blacks.

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33 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States-South African Relations, Hearings, before the subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2d sess., part 1, 1966, p. 66.


Segregation is not a measure against any particular group; on the contrary, it is the only way to ensure the parallel development of differing groups, and quite obviously serves to stimulate development. . . . It 'is designed to prevent race deterioration, to preserve race integrity and to give the different racial groups an opportunity to build up and develop their own race life; secondly, to protect each community against infiltration by the other; thirdly, to prevent racial animosity which would inevitably arise if the life of the different races were inextricably mixed up, and fourthly, to prevent unemployment and the overcrowding of urban areas with all their attendant evils. 36

It is the belief of Whites that the races were created separate and this separation must be maintained even when economic and other circumstances have prompted racial mixture. Since races were created separate, a sense of color must be developed among Whites in order to preserve the purity of the race. These objectives must be pursued in the Christian spirit, however. 37

There is among the whites in South Africa a large measure of goodwill for the Natives. A great deal of money is spent on housing, education, and social amenities, and the condition of the Natives is on the whole better than that of the mass of the people in any other part of Africa, or in Asia for that matter. If the Africans would accept the principle of separation there would be a stronger incentive upon the whites to subsidize the economic betterment of the Reserves and increase their population-carrying capacity. 38


For Whites in South Africa, the policy of separate development is not a denial of rights to Blacks. It provides an opportunity for that element to advance to its fullest extent. The government hopes to advance the indigenous peoples to their full capacity along their own tribal tradition. 39 "Just as the Whites have the right to national existence and self-fulfillment, so have the several non-white communities—and more particularly the Bantu communities, which are embryonic nations." 40 As one government official states:

We do not only seek and fight for a solution which will mean our survival as a white race, but we also seek a solution which will ensure survival and full development—political and economic—to each of the other racial groups, and we are even prepared to pay a high price out of our earnings to ensure their future. . . . We want each of our population groups to control and to govern themselves, as is the case with other Nations. Then they can cooperate as in a Commonwealth—in an economic association with the Republic and with each other. In the transition stage the guardian must teach and guide his ward. That is our policy of separate development. South Africa will proceed in all honesty and fairness to secure peace, prosperity and justice for all, by means of political independence coupled with economic interdependence. 41

The objectives pursued by South Africa are essentially those set out in the Charter of the United Nations. That is, to build up each people into a self-governing entity which will

39 Carter, Politics of Inequality, p. 384.
40 Thompson, Republic of South Africa, p. 5.
41 Ibid.
be in a position to effectively cooperate with others in both the political and economic spheres. 42

Critics of separate development point to the slowness with which the government is moving in turning over Reserves to the natives. Gradual withdrawal is necessary, say Whites of South Africa, to avoid the mistakes by other European governments. First, Europeans were not responsible to the electorate in Africa; therefore, they did not suffer the consequences of their errors. Second, Europeans abandoned their commitments to Africa after World War II leaving conglomerations of peoples unable to achieve unity and political stability. Third, European withdrawal prompted political opportunists to vie for power, many of whom lacked the self-discipline and experience to make effective statesmen. 43

The Whites of South Africa are determined not to repeat these mistakes.

Resiliency to criticism. "The South African government has shown a persistent determination to resist the external as well as the internal opposition to the South African political system. . . ." 44 Since 1946, South Africa has refused to participate in United Nations' (UN) discussions of apartheid and, on a number of occasions, has boycotted General Assembly meetings. It is her contention that the UN

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43 Thompson, Republic of South Africa, pp. 5-6.
44 Ibid., p. 213.
has "no legal competence to consider the domestic affairs of a member State." Its legal position rests on Article 2 of the UN Charter, which states:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.

The South African government has rejected virtually all decisions handed down by the UN concerning apartheid. It has frequently stated that any examination of its policies by the UN constitutes a direct violation of sovereignty.45

Other actions have been taken by South Africa to express its discontent over wide-spread criticism. Since 1956, it has withdrawn from the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), boycotted the 1960 session of the General Assembly, withdrawn from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Labor Organization (ILO). On May 31, 1961, it withdrew from the Commonwealth of Nations.46

In an effort to diminish the constant criticism, South Africa has undertaken the following actions:

(1) made a direct appeal to the racial emotions of Whites in America and Europe,


(2) attempted to play on Western fears of Communism,
(3) stressed the strategic and logistical importance
of South Africa, and
(4) placed great emphasis on the growth of the economy
and the value of South Africa to foreign investors.47 Each
has met with varying degrees of success.

The South African government feels that it has been
made the "whipping-boy of the world" as a result of what it
calls the ignorant, weak, and political opportunist
 criticism of several Western governments. The situation in
South Africa, says the Nationalist government, is more
critical for the White population than outside observers
realize and it is apartheid policies which have stabilized
the situation.

Subversive Bantu organizations in South Africa,
which enjoy the support of only a small percentage
of the Bantu people with active encouragement from
white Communist and ultraliberalist groups, have
realized that the active and progressive steps
taken by the Government are having a favorable
reaction among the Bantu and they have therefore
been doing their utmost to undermine the Government's
plan and to create discontent among the Bantu.
Expatriate members of these subversive organiza­
tions are very active in carrying out an anti-South
African campaign overseas, particularly in New York
and London.48

The government recognizes that the expatriated members of
the subversive Bantu organizations have the support of the
Afro-Asian states and claims that these very states which

47Thompson, Republic of South Africa, p. 5.
48Ibid., p. 6.
offer such support are themselves guilty of discriminatory
practices and oppression of large segments of their own
populations.\textsuperscript{49}

Such activity has prompted repressive measures and
firmness. All, says the government, are justified. The
Communist Party, the African Nationalist Congress (ANC), and
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) have been classified sub­
versive and banned in an effort to maintain law and order and
national security. The government has also taken steps to
prevent their revival under different names and curb their
members from committing acts of sabotage. The government is
convinced that the reputation of South Africa will improve.
It is certain that the acts of sabotage are on the decrease.
It is convinced that responsible American and European
businessmen have seen the true state of affairs and are
taking the message home. It is confident that sentiments are
changing and that eventually it will be realized that South
Africa is the only reliable ally of the West on the African
continent.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Acquiescence in evidence.} Theoretically, the Jewish
population in South Africa is considered part of the White
community with no distinctions. In practice, the Jewish group
is separated from both the English and the Afrikaners by the
conventional barriers placed on foreigners and those not of

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., pp. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., p. 7.
the pure race. Despite this trend there are signs of Jewish acquiescence to the system of apartheid. Before 1938 and the Nationalist Party's rise to power, the Jews had closely identified with the Union Party under the leadership of General Smuts and were quite critical of Nationalist Party policies. In a Jewish monthly publication called Jewish Affairs there appeared a number of articles criticizing Nationalist Party policy for racial discrimination and unjust treatment of the non-White population. The official spokesman for the Jewish community is the South African Jewish Board of Deputies and some observers note that the Jewish community has, in light of statements made by the Board, done an about-face during the past twenty-three years.51

The Jews have moved from initial revulsion against apartheid, through tolerance, to support. But for the Jews, this support means not only approval of a political philosophy making race or color the factor that determines a man's right to participate in the life of his country; it also means ignoring (or pretending to ignore) the fact that the Nationalist Party now in power was pro-Nazi before and during World War II and has manifested, and continues to manifest, anti-Semitic prejudice.52

Jews in South Africa have held a unique position. Most of the wealth of South Africa has always been in the hands of English or Jewish capitalists and the Jew, since the early 1950's, has been granted membership in all political parties.53

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52 Ibid.
53 Carter, Politics of Inequality, pp. 248, 302.
mine owners but do not, as a rule, employ Jews in the mines, nor are the businesses that supply Jews owned or run by them. They are increasingly becoming involved in manufacturing. They have become leaders in farming except for cattle breeding and wine producing. Although allowed membership in political parties, their influence is minimal largely because they have concentrated in one area--Johannesburg. The Jewish population in South Africa is estimated at between four and five percent of the White population. (the last census year that classified Europeans according to decent was 1926, and estimates are now made on the basis of religion). The percentage is likely to decrease for the following reasons. One, they are not readily allowed into the country. Two, some are returning to Israel.

It can be strongly argued, however, that acquiescence stems from integrated involvement in the economic structure of South Africa. The desire to maintain such status tends to override certain basic religious concepts (e.g.--the freedom of all men to choose their earthly destiny). It does not appear that Jews are willing to give up the benefits they now enjoy.

Conclusion. South Africa's history and heritage play a significant role in perpetuating apartheid policies. Most nations seek to reinforce a sense of nationalism or pride through historiography. Such activities attempt to give credence to those principles and policies upon which their

nation has and is functioning. South Africa does not differ from the norm in this respect. Coupled with the use of history, the government has resorted to other arguments to give substance and meaning to its policies. To most observers these arguments are repulsive, colored or distorted, and unrealistic. But to those who implement such policies and to those who are benefiting from such arrangements, it is not difficult to accept such defenses of apartheid. Considering the acceptance of such argumentation, the extensive control which the government may exercise over the legislative process (evidenced by the passage of a complicated network of pass laws and the creation of programs designed to further segregation, at least in a physical sense), and the decision by Jews to at least try to adjust to existing conditions prompts one to believe that apartheid policies are firmly entrenched.

If change is forthcoming, investigation thus far would seem to suggest that those who attempt to impose change will be confronted by more than just a casual social structure characterized by injustice.

If, as mentioned earlier, apartheid is almost universally condemned, perhaps the United Nations has the means by which to impose change. The efforts of the United Nations is the next topic for consideration.
CHAPTER III

UNITED NATIONS: ATTITUDES AND ACTION

The United Nations has considered the problem of apartheid every year since its chartering. It has attempted to deal with the situation by following three main lines of activity. One, they have relied heavily on the passage of resolutions, the institution of an arms embargo, and the implementation of economic sanctions. Two, the UN has offered material, political, and moral assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa. Three, they have provided resource material and information about apartheid policies in hopes that UN proposals might meet with greater acceptance on the part of member states and thus, meaningful solutions implemented. The purpose in this chapter will be to examine not only what has been done but the effectiveness of such activity. Consideration will be given to the overall program of the UN, the specific efforts of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and, because of the frustration it has created, the problem of colonialism in Namibia (South West Africa) will also constitute the substance of the following investigation. Such inquiry will attempt to further support the concept that the racial policies of South Africa will not be resolved by continuing present methods.
General observations. From its very early stages institutionalized apartheid has been the subject of criticism in the UN. The intensity of criticism has been commensurate with increased apartheid legislation and the number of new Afro-Asian members admitted to the international organization.¹

The racial policies of the Government of South Africa have been under discussion in the United Nations, in one form or another, since the first session of the General Assembly in 1946. The matter was then raised by the Government of India in the form of a complaint to the Assembly that the South African Government had enacted legislation against South Africans of Indian origin in violation of agreements between the two Governments.²

Sparked by Prime Minister Harold MacMillan's "wind of change" speech condemning apartheid, the Sharpeville incident (a demonstration staged by dissatisfied Black Africans where hundreds of unarmed men, women, and children were slaughtered by police), and the admission of seventeen new African states in 1960, the confrontation between South Africa and most other countries of the world has intensified during the past decade.³ The criticism is not limited to the policy of apartheid. In essence, apartheid policies have affected the rest of southern Africa and the debate over apartheid policies has been

¹Thompson, Republic of South Africa, p. 11.
broadened to include this more inclusive area and the accompanying problems of colonialism.

The Asian-African members of the United Nations which commonly spark the debates on racial policy and colonialism, only recently have become free from colonial control. . . . To these countries, the racial issue, particularly in the form of the domination of Europeans over non-Europeans, is surcharged with emotion. 4

Further, the success of Rhodesia in maintaining its White government coupled with the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to accept South Africa as the mandatory power over South West Africa has prompted increased political opposition toward South Africa's apartheid policies. 5

The substance of the problem, as far as the UN is concerned, is not who got to the area first, rather, who is there now and what can be done to create and provide a just society in which all are provided with their full share of the success derived. 6 Also, two-thirds of humanity is non-White, largely poverty stricken, and comes largely from the underdeveloped areas of the world. This tends to indicate a correlation between color and poverty. With the gap between rich and poor widening, a great deal of frustration is created.

4Carter, Politics of Inequality, p. 380.

5Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 1. ICJ decision since has been replaced by UN resolution removing South West Africa from South Africa. The South West African problem will be discussed later.

The explosive implications are obvious. Further, the Red Chinese are exploiting the present condition by playing on the sympathies of the poor.\(^7\)

The UN passage of increasingly severe resolutions condemning apartheid has created increased frustration on the part of the newly independent African states because of the ineffectiveness of such measures to bring about meaningful change in policy.\(^8\) However,

Short of using force, which no one [at least in terms of a UN consensus] is willing to apply, the only way the United Nations can influence a Member State is to appeal to its conscience by marshalling the weight of world opinion against the policies it is pursuing. But in South Africa, this collective pressure has hardened the determination of the ruling Nationalist Party to pursue its own line of policy, it has also alienated white South African opinion in general.\(^9\)

The UN has attempted to deal with the problem of apartheid by following three main lines of activity:

(a) Arms embargo, economic sanctions and related measures, to oblige the South African Government to renounce the inhumane policies of apartheid and seek a peaceful solution in conformity with its obligations under the charter;

(b) Moral, political, and material assistance to oppressed people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle to achieve their inalienable rights; and

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 76.

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 68.

\(^9\)Carter, Politics of Inequality, p. 381.
(c) Dissemination of information to secure full understanding and support for the efforts directed towards the elimination of apartheid and avert the grave threat to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{10}

Of the three approaches, economic sanctions and related measures are felt to be the best means of providing a peaceful solution to the policy of apartheid.

A large majority of Member States have felt strongly that the only means to a peaceful solution is the imposition of economic sanctions against the South African Government under Chapter VII of the Charter [action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression]. Such sanctions require action by the Security Council and the full co-operation of all States, particularly the main trading partners of the Republic of South Africa. These trading partners, including three permanent members of the Security Council (United Kingdom, United States, and France) have contended that the situation in South Africa is not at present a threat to the peace under Chapter VII of the Charter, that economic sanctions are complicated and costly, and that they may not achieve the desired purposes. As a result, there has not been the necessary consensus for action by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{11}

A closer inspection indicates that the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan accounted for nearly 75 per cent of the total increase in South African exports between 1962 and 1967. The United Kingdom and Japan alone accounted for 56 per cent of the total increase. With regard to imports, similar observations are manifested. The same four countries accounted for 60 per cent of the total increase for South Africa during the same time period. The UN is doubtful that sanctions will be

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{United Nations, Office of Public Information, Objective: Justice (OPI/380), January, 1970, p. 12.}

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{United Nations, Segregation in South Africa, p. 29.}
effective unless these major trading partners of South Africa are willing to cooperate.\textsuperscript{12} To date the employment of economic sanctions has been ineffective largely because South Africa has built up large reserves of needed imports and her economy is growing rapidly toward self-sufficiency (see chapter VII). Precautions taken by South Africa and continued trade with economically developed nations have diminished the effectiveness of sanctions.

General Assembly's pursuit of the problem. Despite the frustration of ineffectualness, the General Assembly has tackled the problem with continued vigor. From 1946 to 1962, the General Assembly had been considering the question of race conflict and the treatment of the people of Indian origin in South Africa as separate issues.\textsuperscript{13} At regular sessions between 1948 and 1952, resolutions were passed concerning Indians in South Africa. The resolutions had invited roundtable discussions between the concerned parties. The discussions failed to materialize because of South African reluctance to participate. In 1952 the United Nations Good Offices Commission was established to help Indians (and Pakistanis) in negotiations with South Africa. It proved ineffective because South Africa refused to recognize the Commission.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12}United Nations, \textit{Objective: Justice}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{13}Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 56.
\textsuperscript{14}United Nations, \textit{Consideration of Apartheid}, p. 3.
In 1952 the "Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa" was considered. Resolution 616A was passed creating the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa. This commission was also rebuffed by South Africa and was discontinued in 1955. Resolutions continued to be passed by the General Assembly deploring South Africa's refusal to observe its obligations under the UN Charter and requesting the Secretary-General to pursue talks with South Africa. Direct consultations did take place during 1960-1961, but little progress resulted.\textsuperscript{15}

As indicated earlier, the items of race conflict in South Africa and "treatment of people of Indian and Indo-Pakistan origin" were considered—as of 1962—together. The combined topic was referred to as "the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa." In an unprecedented move the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa. The vote on the measure was 67 in favor, 16 opposed, and 23 abstentions or not voting. (Almost all of the 16 votes in opposition were cast by Western States.) Two days after the adoption of the resolution, South African Prime Minister Vervoerd asserted that it was a Communist plot and that South

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., pp. 4-8.
Africa was only an incidental target in communism's struggle with the West. Prior to 1967, the General Assembly alone had passed twenty-nine resolutions condemning apartheid in South Africa. In 1969, four resolutions (2506A, 2506B, 2507, and 2508) were passed condemning South Africa, calling for assistance to "national movements," plus widening sanctions against South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal. Those resolutions calling for assistance to national movements and wider sanctions (resolutions 2506B and 2508 respectively) are indications that the UN is beginning to rely on more emotionally charged measures in an attempt to bring about satisfactory solutions to the problems existing in southern Africa. Whether the trend will continue is a matter of speculation. Evidence would suggest that in the midst of increasing frustration over the obvious ineffectiveness of prior General Assembly resolutions, efforts are going to be stepped up and resolutions of the future are going to take on an increasingly harsher tone if present trends continue.

Security Council endeavors. The Sharpeville incident marked the first time the Security Council considered the policies of apartheid.


Before 1960, for 15 years of its [United Nations] existence, it had not proved possible for the United Nations to have the Security Council consider apartheid, because of the argument of domestic jurisdiction. Now the Council, and all its permanent members, do not dissent from such discussion and all permanent members, at one time or another, have voted for resolutions which state that the policies of apartheid and the situation in South Africa are disturbing international peace and security.\textsuperscript{18}

Less than a month following the Sharpeville incident, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling on South Africa to abandon its policies and further requested the Secretary General to consult with the South African government concerning steps which might be taken to "uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter."\textsuperscript{19} The most dramatic action taken by the Security Council occurred in 1963. Two resolutions, one adopted in August, the other in December, called for an arms embargo including "equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition." In 1964 another resolution was adopted urging that the South African government (1) renounce the execution of political leaders in opposition to policies of apartheid, (2) end the trial that was in progress, and (3) grant amnesty to all political prisoners. That same year the Expert Committee of the Security Council was established to determine effective measures that might be taken by the Council. Primarily, their function was to investigate the feasibility of further sanctions.

\textsuperscript{18}United Nations, Office of Public Information, Objective: Justice (OPI/371) n.d.p. 5.

\textsuperscript{19}Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 54.
The conclusions drawn from their investigation were met with both acceptance and rejection.20

The Security Council has not concerned itself with apartheid policies only. All of southern Africa has been considered in macrocosm to the policies of apartheid. That is, apartheid and the ramifications thereof have affected the whole policy of colonialism as it is implemented in southern Africa. Six resolutions were considered by the Security Council in 1969 concerning southern Africa. Five were adopted. Two involved Namibia (South West Africa). Three were concerned with colonialism in Angola and Mozambique. The other, which failed, dealt with the illegal regime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia.21 With regard to southern Africa, all members agree that:

1. Policies are evil, abhorrent to all and disturbing international peace and security;
2. South Africa has not fulfilled its Charter obligations regarding Namibia;
3. The Portuguese territories are colonies not part of European Portugal. As colonies they are entitled to the right of self-determination; and
4. Ian Smith's regime is illegal, racist, and without international status. The United Kingdom still has power over her as a territory and all trade with the Smith regime is illegal.22

The problems of southern Africa still remain unresolved. The major difficulty lies in the lack of agreement among the major

powers on methods, particularly with regard to the use of enforcement measures provided under the Charter.\textsuperscript{23}

The dilemma concerning Namibia. There is a direct correlation between the policies of apartheid as practiced in South Africa and the dispute over the control of Namibia. Because of the correlation, both in practice and debate, special consideration will be given to it.

The first important issue to complicate matters between South Africa and the United Nations concerned Namibia. South Africa had gained control of the area during World War I. It was taken from Germany. At the Peace Conference following the war, the South African government proclaimed the territory as a fifth province. President Wilson was opposed to outright annexation. A compromise was reached and South West Africa was placed in the hands of the Union of South Africa as a mandate by the League of Nations. As a mandate South West Africa was unique in two ways: (1) it shared a boundary with the mandatory power; (2) it included White inhabitants whose population structure was not unlike that of South Africa. By 1925 the Whites had assumed a significant share of governing power in the territory. The Germans by this time had reluctantly accepted British citizenship and the right of the British to use their own language in their schools. The rise of Hitler to power prompted the establishment of a German political party in South West Africa. This, in turn,

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid.
motivated other non-German Europeans of the already existing United South West Africa Party to petition for immediate incorporation into the Union of South Africa in 1934.24

South Africa rejected the initial request. On the eve of World War II it found it necessary to reinforce the South West African police force to prevent Nazi groups from staging a coup d'état. At the close of World War II the South West Africans again petitioned for incorporation. At the opening of the first session of the General Assembly held in London, General Smuts proposed that South West Africa "be internationally recognized as an integral part of the Union." The argument for incorporation was threefold: (1) it was a logical request because the two countries were so closely integrated geographically, economically, and ethnically; (2) General Smuts argued that any trusteeship agreement that might be concluded would be against the wishes of the South West Africans; (3) Article 77 of the Charter (pertaining to trusteeships) should be interpreted as "permissive not obligatory."25

Upon proposal by Smuts for incorporation, the United Kingdom was the only open supporter of the plan. Most others openly opposed it. The principal arguments in opposition centered around the legal interpretation of Article 77. Asian and African States, the Soviet Bloc and most Latin American countries felt it was the obligation of the Union of South

24 Carter, Politics of Inequality, pp. 382-83.
25 Ibid., p. 383.
Africa to place South West Africa under trusteeship. The United States, Western European and Commonwealth nations did not agree. In December of 1946, the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting South Africa not to proceed with incorporation and recommended that it submit a Trusteeship Agreement for the territory. A reply from South Africa in July of 1947 stated they would not proceed with incorporation, but neither would they place South West Africa under trusteeship. They did agree to submit annual reports while continuing to administer the territory as a mandate.26

Although there are essential differences in attitude between South Africa and most members of the UN, there are also significant differences in the mandate and trusteeship systems. The mandate system is largely negative in approach and is designed to guard against abuses by the administering power. In contrast, the trusteeship system is based on positive principles and stresses the duty of the administering body to advance the indigenous population towards self-government.27

A notable shift in emphasis took place in South Africa between 1946 and 1947 regarding South West Africa. Concern had changed from a strong desire for incorporation to a strictly legal argument over Article 77. The legal arguments involved the review of annual reports and the authority of the

26Ibid., pp. 383-84.
27Ibid., p. 384.
UN (plus various organs and commissions) to investigate South West Africa. These arguments continue to exist. In 1949 in a letter to the Secretary General, the South African government gave formal notification that it would no longer send reports to the UN. The following reasons were given:

1. the UN did not understand the uniqueness of the situation;
2. the information being voluntarily supplied was used for 'unwarranted criticism';
3. there had been no recognition that South Africa would be allowed to administer South West Africa as a mandate; and
4. did not agree that its submission of reports was indicative of its accountability to the UN for the administration of the territory.28

The problems existing over legal interpretation of Article 77 were ultimately submitted to the ICJ. On July 6, 1950 an advisory opinion was handed down by the Court. The tenor of the decision offered a means by which South Africa and the United Nations could help reconcile differences. The Court concluded that South Africa was not obligated to place South West Africa under trusteeship but was obligated to submit annual reports since the territory was still a mandate. The ruling of the ICJ failed to bring about reconciliation of differences. In 1961, further attempts were made. In November of that year, the "Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" was established. The committee is more commonly referred to as the Special Committee of Twenty-four. Since its creation

28Ibid., pp. 384-86.
it has been the primary organ working for settlement of the Namibia question as well as dealing with other dependent territories. In 1966, after twenty years of failure to resolve the Namibia dilemma, the General Assembly voted to terminate South Africa's control over Namibia. General Assembly action was rejected by South Africa. Since that time the UN has continued to condemn South Africa's defiance. The dilemma is still unresolved.

Conclusion. Obviously the efforts of the UN and its component parts have met with discouraging failure. Resolution after resolution has been passed by the General Assembly and the Security Council. The content of such resolutions has ranged from condemnation of apartheid policies to diplomatic and economic sanctions of South Africa. A failure of member states to agree as to the limits the UN should go to bring about the demise of apartheid remains a major obstacle in making such resolutions operable and meaningful. To supplement the use of resolutions, various commissions, study groups, committees, and ICJ decisions have been utilized in an effort to impress upon South Africa the degree of world opposition that exists and the illegality of her actions. The end result has been either to (1) prompt greater rigidity in South Africa's position, or (2) to completely disregard or ignore such action. An attempt to deal with the problem of colonialism has also

30 Ibid., pp. 29-31.
met with failure. Potentially, a solution to the colonial problems of southern Africa could provide greater possibilities for abolishing apartheid. At present South Africa is able to more or less isolate herself as long as she can maintain a series of colonies with White minority governments in close geographical proximity. A solution to colonial problems could break down a portion of this protective barrier. But again the UN has been ineffective.

At present it does not appear that the UN has the authority or the power to impose changes in the racist policies of South Africa. Investigation thus far continues to suggest that apartheid is based on the wishes of the government of South Africa and its willingness to alleviate existing injustices. Unless the UN can initiate a different and more viable approach in dealing with apartheid, it would appear that a potential solution rests elsewhere. Because the United States maintains a position of extensive influence, perhaps a solution can be imposed by her efforts. A discussion of U.S. attitude constitutes the substance of the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV

THE UNITED STATES AND APARTHEID

In the world political arena the United States (because of its status as a superpower) commands a considerable degree of influence. Her military superiority, economic power, and technological and industrial development have prompted many nations throughout the world to study very carefully if not align themselves along U.S. foreign policy lines for the sake of political expediency. The United States has the capability of determining the destiny of a number of nations through her use of various economic and political controls. Considering the potential of U.S. influence, her activities and attitudes toward South Africa warrant some investigation. Perhaps a solution to apartheid lies in the power and influence wielded by the U.S.

Attitudes are subject to change. Unlike many African states in the United Nations, the United States' approach has remained far less vociferous. In 1958, for example, the U.S. was reluctant to condemn South Africa for its failure to comply with UN recommendations. The U.S. position was that regret and concern should be expressed rather than condemnation. George Harrison, former U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, stated:
The problem of racial relations that we are now considering for the seventh consecutive year concerns one of the members of the organization and to that extent is primarily the concern of that member. At the same time it is related to the vast problem of human rights, a matter that concerns all members of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{1}

Harrison further states:

We in the United States consider that in working toward a solution of our own racial problems we are fulfilling part of our obligations under the Charter. The imperfect observance of human rights is not a phenomenon peculiar to any one nation. Each member of the United Nations, as it strives to overcome inequalities of rights and freedoms, is fulfilling its international human rights obligations. To the extent that it is not, it is shirking or avoiding those obligations and that is a matter of concern to all of us.\textsuperscript{2}

By 1959, the U.S. had begun to stress the positive potentialities of newly independent African States. Official spokesmen of U.S. policy had begun to abandon their admonishment of African nationalist movements to proceed with caution. The U.S. by 1960 was beginning to welcome any steps taken by European countries having control over territories to prepare their colonies—particularly African—for self-government. Prior to 1960 the U.S. attitude toward Africa had been based on her relationships to European metropoles.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1}"UN Committee Considers Question of Race Conflict in South Africa," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1013, 1958, p. 842. Note the term concern.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 843.

\textsuperscript{3}Nielsen, African Battleground, pp. 6-8.
With more and more African States acquiring independence, the U.S. attitude toward apartheid began to harden as indicated by the following statement made by a former U.S. Representative to the UN in a meeting of the Special Political Committee:

Apartheid is repugnant to the United States. Our deeply felt opposition is not only one of principle. It is also based on our concern for the present and future lives of millions of men, women, and children who are suffering under the harsh application of apartheid . . . . The United States also irrevocably opposes apartheid on the ground that this policy clearly violates Articles 55 and 56 of the (United Nations) Charter . . . . Even if there were no Charter and even if South Africa were not a member of this organization, the United States would still condemn the policy of apartheid in the strongest of terms.4 (Underlining not in original).

The U.S. has maintained this more stringent view throughout the past decade, but has still managed to keep foreign policy options open. After the Sharpeville tragedy, the U.S. supported a resolution deploring apartheid and has continued, for the most part, to support such resolutions.5

The U.S. has complied with the arms embargo.

To our knowledge no major country trading with South Africa has implemented the UN arms embargo regulations more strictly than the United States and the evidence is that some have been considerably less stringent. The total U.S. trade loss resulting from our firm enforcement of the arms embargo is difficult to estimate, but is substantial . . . . In considering the application to export or requests to re-export any commodity to


the Republic of South Africa, the policy of the office of Export Control is generally to deny applications covering arms, munitions, military vehicles, or items used primarily in the manufacture or maintenance of arms, munitions, or implements of war.6

This does not preclude re-evaluation.

The United States as a nation with many responsibilities in many parts of the world, naturally reserves the right in the future to interpret this policy [arms embargo] in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenance of international peace and security. If the interests of the world community require the provision of equipment for use in the common defense effort, we would naturally feel able to do so without violating the spirit and the intent of this resolve.7

The U.S. policy has been to implement dissuasion and persuasion concerning apartheid and the ramifications of that policy such as colonialism. At the same time it has tried to keep channels of communication open.

The U.S. has been more critical of activities in other parts of southern Africa than it has of apartheid per se. Arthur Goldberg, for example, was critical of the trials conducted by the South African government against South West Africans.

Mr. President, the United States has made its view clear with respect to these trials. It is a view which we share with the international community, including jurists and lawyers of high repute throughout the world. We believe that South Africa's action in applying its own Terrorism Act to South West Africa—an international territory over which South Africa's mandate has been terminated by its own violations—is contrary to the international

6Ibid., p. 46.

7Ibid., pp. 7-8.
obligations of the Government of South Africa, to the international status of the territory, to international law, and to the fundamental rights of the inhabitants.  

The U.S. made the following suggestions to prevent similar occurrences on the part of South Africa:

1. continue UN persuasion of South African wrongdoing—and secure release of the 33 men convicted and reparations to South West Africans detained in South Africa,
2. break down the legal facade used by South Africa,
3. send personal representatives of Security Council to undertake all possible humanitarian measures to alleviate the unfortunate conditions now prevailing in the area, and
4. request International Committee of the Red Cross to have full, continuing, and unimpeded access to each South West African who has at any time been detained under the Terrorism Act of 1967.  

One alternative the U.S. has refused to implement is the ultimatum. The U.S. has stated on several occasions that she cannot "support the concept of an ultimatum" to the South African government which could be interpreted as threatening the application of coercive measures in the situation now prevailing, since in her view the Charter clearly does not empower the Security Council to apply coercive measures in such a situation. U.S. opposition to such action is based on three assumptions:

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9Ibid., p. 475.
10Nielsen, African Batteline, p. 83.
they may lead to other ultimatums and eventually force,
(2) it can't be assumed that racial policies alone are a 'threat to peace' thereby requiring mandatory measures--it is unacceptable on constitutional grounds, and
(3) mandatory measures enforced by UN would cause undue strain on the existence of the organization.11

Apartheid not a high priority issue. Although the U.S. has made quite clear her position on South Africa's apartheid policies, very little, if anything, has been decided as to what the U.S. should do except express disapproval and implement the arms embargo. In her direct relationships with South Africa, the United States continues, in most respects, to deal on a normal and "business as usual" basis. The U.S. still maintains a consulate and embassy in South Africa. Travel, educational, and cultural exchanges are encouraged. There are few restrictions with regard to trade and investment. There are various forms of military and scientific cooperation carried on between the U.S. and South Africa.12 Although not essential to national security, the scientific, economic, and strategic aspects of her bilateral relationships are useful to her and continue to exist.13

Apartheid, at present, is low on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities. There are several reasons for this.

11Ibid.
12Ibid., pp. 65-69.
South Africa is far away and there are problems closer to home that must be solved first. She has no territorial interests in South Africa. The economic benefits received from South Africa are relatively small on a world-wide scale. The military importance of South Africa, at present, is small. Last, South Africa is not contiguous to the communist sphere, therefore not pertinent to the policy of containment. The position of South Africa and the seaports near and around the Cape of Good Hope make it important logistically for support of the U.S. Navy fleet moving to and from Vietnamese waters, but not absolutely essential. If the Mediterranean route were to close, the priority of South Africa would probably be reassessed.

Other than the arms restrictions, the U.S. has been unwilling to support UN economic sanctions because:

(1) it's questionable whether there is a legal basis for such sanctions;
(2) it's questionable whether they provide the desired economic effectiveness; and
(3) there is a question regarding the psychological effectiveness.

American investment in South Africa is minor compared with that of the United Kingdom. It remains in doubt how much leverage could be exercised by the U.S. alone. Further, South Africa is not dependent on U.S. trade. Considering these factors, there are serious questions concerning the

14 Ibid., p. 75.
15 Ibid., p. 6.
16 Ibid., p. 8.
psychological impact on South Africa. There is considerable room to doubt that White South Africans would gain greater appreciation of the worldwide opposition to their policies through additional sanctions.17

The Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique have been condemned for practicing policies similar to that of South Africa. The U.S. has been, as a result, confronted with another foreign policy dilemma. American bases in the Azores have been granted to the U.S. in a treaty directly negotiated with Portugal. The lease for these bases expired in 1962. Negotiations, or preparations for such, are still continuing. Uncertain as to the outcome of such negotiations, the U.S. has been reluctant to offend Portugal unnecessarily.

We in the United States are deeply committed to self-determination for all people. We believe Portugal should recognize publicly that the principle of self-determination is applicable to its territories. Our policy is to encourage both Portugal and the Africans to come to a workable understanding.18

Although the bases in the area are not considered indispensable, they are important for air transportation and refueling; and U.S. naval missions there serve as a communication center for submarine operations in the eastern Atlantic.19

Portugal, because of its membership in NATO, complicates the degree of mobility the U.S. may exercise in response to demands for self-government for Angola and Mozambique.

17 Ibid., p. 9.
18 Nielsen, African Batteline, p. 29.
19 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
The United States would like to remain in the Azores as long as it can. On the other hand, in the present judgement of some American defense officials, if a flat choice had to be made between retaining the Azores or retaining U.S. military assets and relationships on the African continent, the latter would take precedence over the former. This is a choice which the United States has not so far had to make and which it would obviously prefer not to have to make. 20

By attempting to maintain rapport with both Africans and Europeans, the U.S. has become the target of criticism for both. To Africans U.S. policy is disappointing at a time when the quest for national independence is critical. To Europeans the U.S. represents an irritating influence pushing them to make concessions to African demands for self-government. 21

A summary of the U.S. position toward apartheid, taken from speeches and votes at the UN, indicates flexibility and caution. Apartheid is an offensive doctrine, contrary to a member state's obligations with respect to human rights under the UN Charter. Second, the South African situation is increasingly dangerous and could seriously trouble peace and progress in Africa and throughout the world if present trends continue. Third, the U.S. accepts the desirability of voluntary sanctions against South Africa in arms, machinery for their manufacture, and strategic materials and will continue to cut off the sale of such items. Fourth, the U.S. is prepared to have the Security Council study the possible feasibility of further sanctions against South Africa. Fifth, the

20 Ibid., p. 27.
21 Ibid., p. 7.
U.S. will continue to make financial contributions for the education of South African exiles and political refugees abroad.\textsuperscript{22}

Hitherto, it has been possible for the United States to attempt to reconcile its intersecting European and African interests by avoiding or deferring clear choices. But in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa, middle ground is disappearing, and the stark outline of ultimate alternatives becomes progressively more visible through the murky atmosphere of dispute.\textsuperscript{23}

**Conclusion.** It appears that the potential for effecting change possessed by the U.S. has been used, to date, to help perpetuate existing conditions in South Africa. Although not openly and catagorically condoning such policies, the U.S. has by virtue of a complicated foreign policy dilemma, in essence, opted in favor of South Africa. The U.S. has been willing to support the arms embargo; but it has refused to support any coersive measures to impose change. The U.S. considers apartheid offensive but there are considerably more vital areas of concern that must be resolved first. Further, the tenable position over use of the Azores has caused U.S. foreign policy decision makers to proceed with caution. On the other hand, the number of independent African states created in the 1960's found the U.S. having to provide some appeasement to this potentially viable economic market. Thus, fence straddling appears to be the policy the U.S. chooses to pursue. In the absence of any firmer commitment by the U.S.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 69.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 11.
to pressure South Africa into changing apartheid policies
another external pressure on the system is virtually
eliminated.
CHAPTER V

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND APARTHEID

Examination of United Nations and United States activity provides little encouragement in the hopes of alleviating apartheid policies through external pressures. Another viable option, in terms of external application of pressure, exists. The member states of the OAU have, on many occasions, expressed their disgust over apartheid and the related problems of colonialism. With the increased desire for establishing a unified Africa, prompted in part by the acquisition of independence by many African states, there exists the potential for those independent states to combine their resources and talents and prove a formidable power in dealing with South Africa. Because of its potential, consideration will be given to the principles of the OAU, the methods employed in fulfilling those principles, and the degree of success experienced by the OAU. An examination of communist attitudes and activities will also be considered in this chapter. The purpose for including Communist attitude in this chapter is twofold. One, the foreign policy decision making process in the Soviet Union is very obscure. Any elaborate analysis of Soviet foreign policy with regard to apartheid policies would be highly speculative. Two, it is
known that almost all assistance from the Soviet Union is channelled through the OAU.

Combining the efforts of the OAU with one of the world's two superpowers makes the potential for imposing change in the racist policies of South Africa equally, if not more, awesome than the external pressures already considered.

The Charter as indicator. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia the 25th of May, 1963. The substance of the Charter does much to express member states' attitudes toward apartheid. The preamble points to the recognition of "the inalienable rights of all people to control their own destiny, also freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples." A stronger conviction is the passage stating that heads of the African states and governments are "determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms."¹ (Underlining not in original)

is "to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa."
The Charter elaborates on method only to the extent that member states recognize equal sovereignty among its members, implement peaceful approaches, and remain aloof of internal affairs of member states. Paradoxically, these principles would appear to apply specifically to the settlement of disputes among member states. If more militant recourse were deemed necessary to alleviate the problems of southern Africa, the Charter would not appear to inhibit such action.²

**Modes of expression.** Those African States subsequently signing the Charter had previously adopted strongly worded resolutions condemning apartheid. The resolutions had little effect on South Africa in terms of bringing about any changes in apartheid policies. They met with much the same fate as have numerous UN proposals. The resolutions did help to clarify positions of the embryonic African States.³ Since adoption of the Charter, the OAU has continued adopting resolutions. Many have called for various kinds of boycotts against South Africa. The administration of such boycotts was left to the Sanctions Bureau which was created under the Secretariat of the OAU.

Passage of resolutions is one of several techniques employed by OAU to bring about change in southern Africa.

²Ibid., pp. 182-88.

Technique is in part determined by the particular area under consideration. For example, the OAU has long advocated that the British use force to overthrow the Ian Smith regime. Until such time as they are adequately equipped to offer meaningful resistance against the White minority government, they are content to call upon Great Britain, who possesses the viable strength, to utilize it in Southern Rhodesia. The OAU has attempted political persuasion also. The rapid development of the independent African states in the north have provided the OAU with political leverage. OAU member states are beginning to approach leading trading partners of southern Africa with sharper choices. Are those trading nations willing to choose southern Africa in preference to the independent African states? Will they choose the preservation of their assets and future economic opportunities in independent Africa or the protection of its economic interests in southern Africa? Another alternative supported by the OAU, as discussed at the UN, is the policy referred to as "isolation." (the attempt to remove South Africa from the mainstream of international trade and politics) The theory is that "isolation" serves much the same kind of punishment as a criminal faces when forced to occupy a jail cell.

South Africa is viewed as an offender, if not of the law of nations, certainly of the cannons of the new international morality. But the international society--unlike the society of say,
Great Britain or Tanganyika—has no jail to which it can send its worst offenders. 5

"Isolation" is defended on two counts. First, it serves as retribution for committing the offense. Second, it may act as a deterrent against repeating the offense or preventing the offender from continuing it. The major drawback to the theory is that the dilemma that now permeates the seating of Red China would be transferred to South Africa. China is out; should she be in? South Africa is in; should she be out? 6

Considerable activity against the policies of apartheid has been undertaken by the OAU's African Liberation Committee (ALC). The creation of such an organ had been requested by several nationalist movements.

No African country or nation is really free until all Africa is free. Accordingly, we urge most strongly that in all African countries no forms of discrimination or differentiation of status should ever be entertained among us African peoples. We are all African freedom fighters. The fact that we are not yet free is not due to any lack of revolutionary spirit in our movements. It is due to the oppressive tactics of the imperialists as well as some historical and political realities in our territories. We urge sincerely that in this Summit Conference [held in Addis Ababa, May, 1963] we be accorded a status commensurate to our position as brothers and comrades of the African freedom fighters who have already won their independence. We request that the opportunity be given to us to participate in and address the Summit Conference as associate members. 7


6Ibid.

The ALC, sometimes known as the Committee of Nine, was created in May of 1963, to combat colonialism. All OAU members contribute to the success of the ALC in three ways. One, they contribute funds. Two, they provide territory for nationalists heading liberation movements so that they might receive special training. Three, all members promote the transportation of material aid. The ALC, although resolutions passed at Addis Ababa stopped short of outward endorsement of the use of violence, has decided that in certain colonial situations in southern Africa violence is essential in securing liberation. It has interpreted its responsibility as being one of organizing an overall African strategy on liberation and is pursuing that role. To accomplish such liberation, four basic principles have been formulated. One, overall effectiveness would best be served by collective action and mutual assistance. Two, there would be virtually no tactics left unconsidered. Three, the ALC would be the organ responsible for coordinating the struggles for national liberation. Four, in attempts to achieve total liberation for Africa it would delegate, when advantageous, its own responsibilities to its neighbors in an attempt to broaden its nationalist movement.

The most recent declaration of OAU attitude toward apartheid is found in the form of the Lusaka Manifesto. The

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The Manifesto urges a peaceful settlement to the problems in southern Africa. While the impasse continues, support for nationalist movements will continue. Each country in southern Africa possesses different problems. The Manifesto approaches them with differing attitudes. Each problem area is considered on its own merits and the Manifesto addresses itself to each problem separately.

The Manifesto deplores apartheid policies on grounds of their inhumanity. It refers to the fact that "a position of privilege or the experience of oppression" is dependent on

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man's colour, his parentage and his ancestors. It deplores
the idea that a Black millionaire or brilliant political
scientist is still subjected to vicious pass laws and excluded
from political activity. It points out that apartheid policies
are regularly condemned by the United Nations and others but
that many nations have opted in favor of international law at
the expense of humanitarian action. To alleviate such injus-
tice the Manifesto suggests that:

... South Africa should be excluded from the
United Nations agencies, and even from the United
Nations itself. It should be ostracized by the
world community until it accepts the implications
of man's common humanity. It should be isolated
from world trade, patterns and left to be self-
sufficient if it can. The South African Government
cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept
of mankind's unity, and to benefit by the strength
given through friendly international relations.
And certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the main-
tenance of the present policies against people of
African descent.

Soviet foreign policy and the fight against apartheid.

Determining the process by which foreign policy is formulated
in the Soviet Union is a speculative endeavor.

It is an established practice of the chancelleries
of the world to hide as much as possible of their
policy-making processes, in order to maintain a
facade of unity and in order to conceal their sources
of information, their techniques, and their final
decisions before their actual execution. This is
the practice even in democratic countries. But in
the latter states the instruments for formulating
foreign policy are usually defined by law and are
well known. In the free give-and-take of debate
over foreign policy and in the subsequent memoirs
of the participants much of the actual process of
decision-making is exhibited for scholars to study.
In the Soviet Union the efforts to conceal the tech-
niques and results of policy formulation go much
farther. Here even the instruments for making policy
are hidden behind a deceiving democratic facade. The Presidium of the Party is known to be the central forum for decisions, but, except for its personnel little else is known about this body. There is no free debate over foreign policies, and when the 'line' has been set a strict adherence to it is maintained by all discussants. Furthermore, none of the Soviet leaders since Stalin's domination of the Soviet apparatus has written any memoirs that provide an insight into the inner workings of the government and Party. Consequently the story of policy formulation in the USSR must be presented as a hypothesis rather than as a documented body of information.12

Ascertaining exact patterns of foreign policy development are difficult. This does not preclude the observation of several general trends in Soviet policy. The goals of Soviet leadership in formulating foreign policy are closely tied to Communist ideology and the way such ideology relates to international politics. That is, Communist attitudes toward world revolution, the tradition of expansion, ambition and nationalism, internal instabilities, and the like, motivate Soviet leadership to respond with a reasonable degree of consistency. To help keep in touch with developments on the international scene, the Communist Party network has been established.13

The Communist Party maintains its own channels to the outside world through its agents and through legal and underground Communist parties in most countries of the world . . . . Absolute obedience was expected of members to orders from above, especially to directives issued by the Central


13Ibid., pp. 676-82.
Executive Committee of the Communist International (Comintern), which from the beginning was under the control of the Russian Communist Party.

One of the many services performed by members of foreign Communist parties on behalf of the Soviet Union is the collection of intelligence information. The leaders of these parties make occasional visits to Moscow not only to receive new orders but also to report on their activities and on conditions at home.14

With regard to apartheid the Soviet Union has been quite consistent in its performance at the UN. Taking the results of seventy votes on colonial and related issues during the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first sessions, the Soviet Union voted sixty-seven times against southern Africa with three abstentions. The votes sampled represented votes on full resolutions as well as sections of resolutions. Compared with the U.S. voting record on the same issues, a firmer opposition to the racist policies of South Africa can be detected on the part of Soviet leadership. The U.S. voted only eight times against southern Africa, thirty times in support, abstained twenty-seven times, and, although present, failed to vote five times.15

United Nations voting patterns are not the only factor to be considered in examining Soviet behavior. An isolated look at the voting pattern with reference to apartheid can be deceiving. Although the Soviet Union policy appears to

14Ibid., p. 667.

coincide with UN principles, a fundamental difference remains. It is very difficult for the Soviet Union to accept fundamental obligations of membership in the UN because of basic incompatibilities in Communist doctrine and the principles of the UN charter. Among the areas of conflict are the use of coercive measures to solve problems, theories of constitutional development, financing, international adjudication, peacekeeping and disarmament, and economic and social cooperation.¹⁶ This conflict of principles limits the effectiveness of the Soviet Union in dealing with apartheid. Its performance on paper is consistent with the principles of the UN; the ends to which each is willing to go to get results are subject to considerable debate. To avoid direct confrontation over basic differences, neither the Soviet Union nor the UN has exploited too forcibly these areas of disagreements. It does not appear that significant changes in this area will occur. The Soviet Union will most likely continue to maintain the status quo.¹⁷

There are for the Soviet Union other means to combat apartheid policies. Much of what is being done by the Communists occurs covertly, largely in the form of front organizations. The role of such organizations according to Otto Kuusinen, former Finnish Communist leader, is:


to create a whole solar system of organizations and smaller committees around the Communist Party—smaller organizations working actually under the influence of the Party, although not under its mechanical leadership.18

Front organizations are necessary to attract the necessary outside support and such organizations have been used for over fifty years. The Soviet Union is very cautious about publicly affirming its association with "front organizations." For example it has repeatedly rejected the charge that the Communist Party controls the ANC; but most readily has accepted the idea that both adhere to very similar positions regarding the tactics and strategy for liberating the African people.19

William Pomeroy, in his introduction to Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism, points to the fact that national liberation movements in southern Africa have had extensive assistance from the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Cuba and Algeria. Further, "Marxist methods of class analysis, of agitation and mass organization, and of political work have influenced these armed struggles considerably."20 The national liberation movement in South Africa has moved very cautiously. All forms of non-violent means were exhausted before the ANC, the Communist Party of South Africa, the South African Indian

Congress, and various trade unions resorted to armed force. The first guerrilla activities were undertaken by a group known as Umkonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation). Such activity was geared toward sabotage. The fighting force had difficulty with training personnel because the government has barred Africans from possessing firearms and from participating in extensive military or police training.\textsuperscript{21}

Communist support of front organizations has occurred, to a great extent, through support of the OAU. Because of efforts by the OAU to plan liberation for all of oppressed Africa, the Soviet Union can render support to a much wider revolution. There is also a great deal of diversity in individual movements. The coordinated efforts of OAU offer potentially greater success than support for independent movements.

Although there have been proposals for a continental strategy and armed coordination in the anti-imperialist struggle in Africa, diversity is also a feature of African countries and of their conditions, and affects the nature of that coordination. Attempts were made to achieve continental unity for complete liberation through the Organization of African Unity, set up in 1963 largely on the initiative of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. An OAU Liberation Committee was created to give active aid to armed African liberation movements.\textsuperscript{22}

Further evidence of the diversity in southern African liberation movements is seen by the number of organizations in operation. In eight southern African countries there are

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 42-43.

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 247.
sixteen different Communist or Communist influenced organizations or movements. By country and organization they are:

(1) Angola
   Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA)
   Uniao dos Populacoes de Angola (UPA)

(2) Basutoland (Lesotho)
   Communist Party of Lesotho

(3) Mozambique
   Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO)
   Comitato Revolucionario de Mozambique (COREMO)

(4) Rhodesia
   Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
   Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)

(5) South Africa
   Communist Party of South Africa
   African Nationalist Congress (ANC)
   Pan-African Congress (PAC)
   Umkonto We Sizwe
   Pogo

(6) South West Africa (Namibia)
   South West African National Union (SWANU)
   South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)

(7) Swaziland
   Communist Party of Swaziland

(8) Zambia
   United National Independence Party (UNIP)²³

²³Greig, Assault on the West, appendix.
Such fragmentation appears to suggest that OAU, even with Communist support, has fallen considerably short of its objective of establishing a "continental strategy."

Statements made by the Communist Party of South Africa reflect various attitudes. Some express a necessity for greater dedication to the Communist ideology and participation on the part of Communist sympathizers.

... study groups can be very important. They should study the conditions in their own country, in the light of Communist theory. They should take part as loyal members in the national liberation struggle. They should work for the brotherly unity of all Communists in each country, preparing the way for eventual formation of a Communist party to advance the cause of the workers and help in building a united front of national liberation, comprising all parties and classes, and people of all patriotic views. An important task which can and should be undertaken by an African Communist study group is to prepare articles for this journal based upon a study and analysis of conditions in their own country, and the solution proposed for its problems.24

Some reflect division within their own ranks.

The revolutionary way forward is not provided by the blind rioting and indiscriminate Pogo--style attacks on white civilians and property, or in the irresponsible claims of certain leaders of the Pan Africanist Congress, which no longer exists as an organized force within South Africa. Rather, what the situation demands is "organized and planned mass defense and resistance"; actions which are both militant and principled and which do not yield to desperation tactics or opportunistic concessions to backward elements.25

Some indicate the necessity to continue the propaganda war. Apparently there are still many who are not convinced of the need for armed revolution.

24 Ibid., p. 223.
Today in many parts of the country, government policy is driving people into resistance to a stage where they are clamoring for action. Local leaders cannot lag behind the people, or they will cease to be leaders and the blind forces of destruction and revenge will take over. But local action must always be principled, in accordance with the established policy and general direction of the national leadership. No desperation, no adventurism, but firm, resolute and revolutionary action! That should be the watchword of the oppressed people and their leaders in the difficult days ahead. That is the policy of the Communist Party. ...  

also:

A minority, however heavily armed, cannot prevail over the great majority of the people when the majority is organized, determined and clear in its purpose. Every new act of tyranny and oppression by the government calls forth acts of revolutionary protest and resistance by the masses. Often such acts may be unplanned, desperate and unsuccessful. They may be answered by heavy and costly reprisals. But in the process the forces of liberation are being forged. They are becoming more steeled in their determination. They are building effective and indestructible organizations. They are achieving ever greater clarity of purpose and direction. 

Again an indication of frustration:

Another important lesson which the oppressed people are fast learning from the present crucial phase of our history is that every attempt to redress or rectify a local or partial grievance is necessarily connected with, and can only be won by, the defeat of the Nationalist government itself, and the ending of white minority rule. Where every protest and every demand is met merely by bloody suppression by the state, it becomes clear to one section of the people after another that the state itself is the obstacle to any sort of advance, and that no sort of happy or tolerable future is possible without

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26 Pomeroy, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 273.

27 Ibid., p. 271.
the removal of this tyrannical state and its replacement by one which embodies the will of the majority of the people.28

Conclusions: Resolutions passed by the OAU have not met with much more success than those passed by the UN. Diversity of interests, even within this smaller organization, pose much the same problem as the diversity within the UN. The attempt to apply economic leverage has not as yet been heeded by major trading partners of South Africa. It would appear that until independent Africa is as economically viable as South Africa such attempts at economic coercion will be diplomatically put aside. Efforts of the ALC appear to have fallen well short of their intended goal of full liberation for all African peoples. Again, diversity appears the major nemesis. Coupled with the support of one of the two superpowers, the OAU has fared little better, if any, than the UN and United States in bringing about the demise of apartheid policies. Whether pursuit of such tactics will eventually produce desired ends remains a test for history.

28Ibid., p. 272.
CHAPTER VI

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND DOMESTIC RESISTANCE

The most viable alternatives in terms of external solutions to South African racial policies have been largely exhausted in the previous three chapters. There is, however, considerable opposition to existing conditions on the domestic front. Disenchantment exists among Whites as well as Africans. What are the forces at work within South Africa to bring about the demise of apartheid? What are the ramifications of such movements and activities? What are some of the tactics being utilized to achieve desired goals? What are the prospects for success among dissident groups? What are the reasons for the existence of such groups? What has been the government's position toward these forms of dissent? These are some of the questions which will be dealt with in the following examination.

Opposition within the legal framework. Opposing political parties have continued to reject the policy of apartheid in varying degrees since 1948. The United Party constitutes the major opposition to the Nationalist Party. Since the election of 1953, the United Party's chances of regaining control of the government have continued to
diminish, especially since the right to vote has been taken from the Coloureds. Further, the Nationalist Party controls the South African Broadcasting Company (SABC) and has continued to play on anti-British sympathies by labeling the United Party as the party of the English. Although the United Party has remained the least critical, it has been unable to appeal to broad sections of the Afrikaner population. It seeks to preserve White "leadership" throughout South Africa, but advocates a milder approach. It would provide limited non-White representation in Parliament.

The Progressive Party is more liberal than either the Nationalist or United parties. It seeks radical constitutional reforms which would guarantee fundamental rights to all individuals. The Liberal Party was, until banned in 1960, the most radical of the political opposition. Liberals had been advocating a totally democratic state "based on the will of the people." All South African opponents of the government, with the exception of the United Party, are critical of both the performance of the Nationalist government within the existing framework and the system itself.1 There has been a significant contingent of White opposition. This segment of the population, however, is subject to repressive legislation just as are Black South Africans.

Members of the Liberal Party, led by Alan Paton and other advocates of non-racial democracy, have been banned, prohibited from attending meetings

1Thompson, Republic of South Africa, pp. 8-9.
and gatherings and from publishing any statement or writing in South Africa. Liberal members of university faculties have similarly been silenced.²

Being subjected to increased harassment in the form of repressive legislation tends to stifle the efforts of Whites who are not sympathetic with the injustices inherent in the system. This sense of frustration permeates virtually all attempts to rectify existing conditions. Since all attempts to alter the system have been eventually thwarted (at least the viable ones), serious consideration must be given as to whether or not the pursuit of such ends are worth life in prison or possibly the death sentence. It is a possibility that the present government would not hesitate to implement if it felt threatened.

The not so silent majority. Although subjected to very repressive legislation the nationalist movements in southern Africa continue the fight for liberation. They have become bored and impatient with ineffectiveness. Where concessions have been made, they have always been too little and too late. In recent years there have been no meaningful concessions at all.³ The trend for nationalist movements during the last decade has been toward more militancy.

The 1960's saw the introduction of a new element in the strategy of the anti-colonial forces on the continent of Africa. Having formerly rejected violence as a means of struggle against imperialism, the nationalist movements and the newly independent

states were led by the intransigence of the remaining colonial powers to the conclusion that armed resistance remained the only alternative left to bring about change in the regions still subjected to white rule. Supported and abetted by member states of the OAU, African nationalists from Portuguese Africa, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and South West Africa have begun guerrilla-type actions in an effort to dislodge the remaining white rulers from their territories. 4

Nationalist movements in Angola and Mozambique have made it clear that they are willing to accept any help, economic or military, from any and all who are concerned about self-government for Africans.

Joshua Nkomo, former leader of ANC and former leading Southern Rhodesian political figure, commented on the attitude of Africans toward the West's complacency.

Today the 250,000 Europeans in Southern Rhodesia sit tightly on a smoldering volcano aware of the consequences but consoled by the knowledge that the Western world will be on their side. Can the West, they ask, betray their kith and kin? On the other hand, Africans are asking whether the West will choose justice and freedom, and thus ally themselves with the rest of Africa, or decide that blood is thicker than water. Does the West have to lose the friendship of over 200 million Africans in order to protect the special interests of five million whites in Africa? 5

The reasons for discontent among Black Rhodesians are much the same as those experienced by South Africans. The Blacks outnumber Whites ten to one. Power is currently in the hands of the White minority. Whites also control most of the land.

4Matthews, "Interstate Conflicts," p. 337.

Rhodesia has a Land Apportionment Act which divides land into European and African areas. The African majority enjoys only forty-one per cent of the territory in Southern Rhodesia. Europeans control the most productive land and that which is situated along the vital transportation routes. Blacks are subjected to vicious pass laws. These criteria coupled with the detention of key nationalists have created an unstable situation in Southern Rhodesia.

While my colleagues are in detention I shall not rest. I shall tell the world the truth about Central Africa. While those men are in detention the souls of even the most reactionary Europeans or of their African stooges shall not sit at rest. And until true democracy is practiced in Southern Rhodesia no man's heart shall sit at rest. The injustices of the present administration and system of government, the sufferings of hundreds of people in detention, in rustication, in jail, and of their relatives and children will be the foundations on which our nationhood will be built. . . . History teaches us that man's yearning for freedom have never been conquered by the swords of dictators and that, though the seekers after freedom may often be set back temporarily, they have in the end always been triumphant.6

In South Africa a most eloquent and articulate expression of the non-White position was provided by Nelson Mandela during his trial in 1964. The following is an excerpt from his testimony at that trial:

I would say that the whole life of any thinking African in this country drives him continuously to a conflict peculiar to this country. The law as it is applied, the law as it has been developed over a long period of history, and especially the law as it is written and designed by the Nationalist government is a law which, in our view, is immoral,

6Ibid., pp. 142-43.
unjust, and intolerable. Our consciences dictate that we must protest against it, that we must oppose it, and that we must attempt to alter it. . . .

Mandela contends that the government's reliance on violence serves only to breed counterviolence. Things have deteriorated to such an extent that violence appears the only alternative. Because all other efforts have failed, an organization known as Umkonto We Sizwe--Spear of the Nation--was created to carry on the liberation movement. Mandela states that it was not a choice they desired to make but the government had given them no choice. 8

The government of South Africa has indicated that during the past several years there have been widespread and efficient attempts on the part of internal revolutionaries. Leaflets have been dispersed throughout South Africa advocating revolution and the use of guerilla tactics to bring down the Nationalist government. There have recently been reports of protests on college campuses. "In August of 1968, 290 students of an entire student body of 461 were suspended and forcibly removed from the all-Black Fort-Hare University." All but 29 were later re-admitted. 9

7Thompson, Republic of South Africa, pp. 10-11.
A vigorous underground is operating in South Africa to overthrow white apartheid supremacy. One piece of evidence for this is the recent wave of arrests of Africans. But all the evidence points to a home-grown opposition not instigated from abroad.  

Virtually all attempts by the underground movements have been countered by the Nationalists with more repressive measures. The ANC and its more militant factions have begun to expand its organization. The South African Defense Department has attempted to categorize the activity as prompted by outside influences. The ANC considers such charges as evidence of inability on the part of White leadership to recognize that apartheid will not be tolerated indefinitely without revolt.  

The major reasons for internal opposition to apartheid can be summarized as follows:

(1) The Nationalists have a distorted view of the nature of South African society.

(2) The peoples of South Africa are not separate nations. It was not fate that caused an intermingling of groups.

(3) Most South Africans participate in one economic system but are prevented from participation in the only sovereign government.

(4) Since 1948 apartheid has had the opposite effect for which it was intended. The program of separate development has increased the number of non-Whites in industrial towns rather than diminished it.


11 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
(5) There can be no justification for discriminating against non-Whites in seven-eights of South Africa.

(6) The Bantustan policy is fraudulent in three ways: (a) it accounts for only one-eighth of the territory; (b) Reserves are small and scattered and could not possibly become viable states; (c) territory which natives occupy is inferior land.\textsuperscript{12}

A major drawback to the liberation movement is the lack of unity and coordination among the differing groups.

The Indian and Coloured populations each support their respective organizations. The segregation of the races, the separate administration of each racial group, and the different regulations to which each is subject create problems peculiar to each race. There have been no successful attempts to forge a common leadership or concerted action among all non-whites opposed to apartheid.\textsuperscript{13}

Conclusions. Examination of internal dissonance tends to suggest that forces on the domestic front are more inhibited than external forces. The United Nations, United States, and OAU are at least in a position to exercise free debate over the problems. Dissonance within South Africa may result in serious repercussions. The Nationalist party maintains the political apparatus to effectively control, stifle, and eliminate virtually all forms of political opposition. To continue opposing government policies, organizations have been forced to operate underground movements.

\textsuperscript{12} Thompson, Republic of South Africa, pp. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{13} Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 50.
Those that have moved underground have been unable to coordinate an effective liberation movement. Various interests groups have chosen to support their own organizations. As a result, a concerted effort has not as yet been established. Whether these various interest groups can unite behind a common leadership remains a question. It does not appear to be a possibility at the present time.

Domestic resistance does not appear to have the solution to apartheid at least at the present. It suffers from much the same foible as do external forces. There is a lack of agreement among participants. Such absence of agreement is prompted by varying political, economic, and social interests. The cause of frustration among dissident groups cannot be attributed to diversity alone however. The South African government has succeeded in developing a near self-sufficient military and economic base from which to launch its fight against opposition. The next chapter is an inquiry into the military and economic aspects of the South African social structure.
CHAPTER VII

SOUTH AFRICAN DOMESTIC MACHINERY

If a sense of futility over trying to change South African domestic policies has been induced by the discussion thus far, the analysis to follow may well expand such futility to a feeling of almost hopelessness. Aspects of the political control exercised by the Nationalist government have already been alluded to. Keeping those in mind, analysis of the economic and military structures of South Africa will be considered. Herein lies the most formidable test for altering the racist policies of South Africa. To alter the social injustices inherent in apartheid one must contend with the economic and military establishments because they also are an integral part of the system. "In military and economic terms, the Republic of South Africa is the most powerful state in sub-saharan Africa."\(^1\) The following chapter is devoted to an analysis of that power.

The military establishment. Developments in the area of military preparedness have caused considerable alarm among those working to alter apartheid and related problems.

The Special Committee found conclusive evidence that the military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration, far from benefiting the colonial peoples concerned, constituted one of the most serious impediments to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and in several cases posed a grave and ever-increasing threat to international peace and security. In Territories which possessed rich economic resources and sizable populations, the colonial power had created a network of military strong points for the purpose of subjugating the people and providing protection for the foreign economic interests which were exploiting the Territory's resources. Later, those same military forces had been used to suppress the emergent national liberation movements. In Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the African Territories under Portuguese control the colonial regimes were now engaged in ever-increasing military activities aimed at denying by force the legitimate aspirations of the people to freedom and independence. In Namibia, the Government of South Africa continued to defy the authority of the United Nations and had intensified its military preparations in order to maintain its illegal presence in the Territory. In Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the Portuguese authorities were waging a war of colonial repression on an ever-increasing scale against the liberation movements. Portugal had deployed an army of between 120,000 and 150,000 troops in the Territories under its control and had constructed a network of over 400 airfields in Angola and nearly 300 airfields in Mozambique from which it carried out military operations against the liberation movements. One of the main reasons that Portugal had intensified military activities and arrangements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, was the close military co-operation between Portugal and its military allies in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It was within the framework of that bloc that the military contingents of Portugal, which it used in its devastating war against the people of the above-mentioned Territories, were trained. The Special Committee further concluded that Portugal, one of the most backward countries in Europe, could not carry out such a prolonged and extensive war in Africa if it were not receiving economic, financial and military assistance from its NATO allies. In Southern Rhodesia, the illegal racist minority regime had succeeded in obtaining supplies of weapons and military equipment despite the embargo imposed by
the Security Council in November 1965. The information available to the Special Committee further showed that there was increasing co-operation between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority regime. A military entente had been formed and the representatives of the three countries met regularly to exchange information and to draw up joint plans for military activities against the liberation movements in Africa.  

Such preparations have prompted severe condemnation by the Special Committee.

The Special Committee strongly condemned as a crime against humanity, and as a serious threat to international peace and security, the wanton use of military force by colonial Powers to suppress the legitimate aspirations of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence. In particular, it vehemently condemned the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia for the continuing intensification of their co-ordinated military aggression against the liberation movements and peoples in Territories under their domination. It also condemned the formation in southern Africa of a military entente between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, aimed at suppressing the armed force, the inalienable right of the oppressed people of the area to self-determination and independence, and called upon the States to withhold all support and assistance, including the supply of arms and military equipment, to that entente, whose existence and activities ran counter to the interests of international peace and security.  

The concern expressed by the Special Committee is not unfounded. As a result of the arms embargo, OAU activities, and the "potential Communist threat," defense expenditures in South Africa have increased to approximately one-fourth the entire

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\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 81-82.
national budget. In the last ten years expenditures for defense have increased by six times and the proposed budget for 1970 was R 276.2 million (1 rand = $1.40 U.S.). By 1965, South Africa had the capability of producing or manufacturing almost every type of plant and machinery in the area of heavy equipment. In 1968 the Armaments Development and Production Corporation was created by the government at a cost of R100 million. Its purpose is to "meet as effectively and economically as feasible South Africa's armament requirements, including the armaments requirements for export and firearms or ammunition required by the public." In early 1970 the Republic was self-sufficient in the manufacture of rifles, handguns, machineguns, mortars, ammunition, rockets, grenades, smoke bombs, aerial bombs, and explosives. It had developed its own napalm ordinance entirely from local raw materials and new types of antitank and anti-personnel mines. Uniforms, shoes, blankets, and parachutes were produced exclusively by the nation's textile industries. All food products required by the armed forces came from local sources. The country possessed the most highly developed and capable defense industry in Africa.

South Africa has not always enjoyed such self-sufficiency. France has not supported the arms embargo imposed by the UN and has continued to supply South Africa. But perhaps more importantly, other Western nations have supplied South Africa by means of a loophole in the UN arms embargo resolution.

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4 Kaplan, Area Handbook, pp. 737-41.
5 Ibid., pp. 574, 739.
6 Ibid., p. 749.
Licensing agreements were established between South Africa and other nations allowing South Africa to manufacture the military supplies domestically. In essence it was acquiring foreign-designed military equipment; although actual manufacturing was done by South Africa. By 1965 South Africa had acquired 127 licenses with other countries permitting it to manufacture foreign-designed equipment. Such agreements have not constituted a direct violation of the arms embargo. 7

The increase in defense expenditures has both strengthened and stimulated the economy of South Africa, particularly in the field of manufacturing.

An important stimulus to growth in manufacturing in the 1960's has been government expenditure designed to build up domestic capacity for production of military equipment. The embargo on arms shipments to South Africa imposed by the United States and other leading members of the United Nations has been somewhat ineffective because of nonparticipation by other producers such as France. Nevertheless, the government is seeking to develop greater self-sufficiency in production of arms, vehicles, and equipment for the military and the police.

In mid-1969 the minister of defense told Parliament that the country had been able either to import or to manufacture almost everything it needed in the way of defense equipment. Domestic factories were supplying all the vehicles requirements as well as some of the most modern and sophisticated equipment. In early 1969, the government took over the country's only aircraft factory, Atlas Aircraft. 8

More will be mentioned later about the role of manufacturing in the economy.

7 Ibid., pp. 738-39.
8 Ibid., pp. 576-77.
The increase in military expenditures has initiated development in related areas of defense as well.

The nation's large and rapid increase in military expenditure was accompanied by strong emphasis on an accompanying program of defense research. Established under the direction of the Defense Research Council, the National Institute for Defense Research was active in the fields of physics, chemistry, and electronics. Work in progress by the institute's scientists included research on missiles, chemical warfare agents, and nuclear physics.\(^9\)

Continued development in these areas has elevated the status of the military as a career profession and improved the morale of those involved in it.

Since the early 1960's the armed forces has been markedly strengthened in a material sense and also in morale. Among the men in uniform, rivalry between the two national language groups had largely disappeared, and the military forces had joined in the common cause of protecting the white minority's forward position with the Republic. Moreover, despite the existence of a strong defense industry of relatively recent influence, the nation did not face the threat of a potentially dangerous military-civilian power group.\(^{10}\)

There is some evidence available to support the idea that South Africa is not far from the atomic age and it may well be there now. It established its first surface-to-air missile in late 1968 against possible attack from supersonic aircraft. An air-to-air missile was tested late in 1969 and is to become a standard armament for the air force. Beyond this, Brian Bunting suggests:

\(^9\)Ibid., p. 741
\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 750.
There is no reason why South Africa should not ultimately make its own atom bomb. It would give her dominance in a continent which she fears, and a standing in international affairs which she does not rate at present. It would be in line with present government policy to make South Africa self-sufficient in every possible sphere, so as to become invulnerable to outside pressure.\textsuperscript{11}

In light of such developments it is little wonder that the Special Committee has become alarmed.

Since 1968, the top priorities for South Africa have been the improvement of its defense posture and dealing with guerrilla attacks from outside the country. Five special antiterrorist training schools have been established at strategic sites for training in camouflage, tracking, and ambush drill. Trainees are instructed in counter-measures against current guerrilla tactics. The government of South Africa feels that the "potential Communist threat" has crystallized into a real one.

In early 1970, virtually real or potential threats to internal security were based on the Nationalist government's determination to defend the social order and its apartheid policies and the struggle by opponents to change the system. Many in government and citizens of all groups have long held the view that violence was to be expected and that it would eventually lead to racial civil war. Fear of revolution pervaded much of the national life. Among the 3.6 million white citizens, there were approximately 2 million privately owned firearms. Every able-bodied white man or woman between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five was subject to military training during times of emergency. The strength of both the armed forces and the police increased materially each year.\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{12}Kaplan, Area Handbook, p. 727.
The ultimate significance of South Africa's military preparedness lies in the manpower available to provide an adequate defense for the government. Two organizations are maintained. The South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defense Force (SADF) constitute the organizations providing military manpower. As of early 1970, the SAP consisted of 34,226 regulars and 19,442 reservists and was the largest, best equipped nonmilitary law enforcement group south of the Sahara. A breakdown of the regular forces reflected the following composition:

- 18,515 White NCO's, constables, and officers
- 1,535 Coloured NCO's, and constables
- 646 Asian NCO's, and constables
- 13,530 African NCO's, constables and laborers

Although further breakdown of above statistics are not available, there is an indication of some racial assimilation. One must not imply from this, however, that there is any degree of equality. In the SAP Whites only are issued or allowed to carry handguns.\(^\text{13}\)

The SAP, a voluntary enlistment organization, has placed considerable emphasis on training and specialized instruction. Such programs have provided a high level of professional competence. In early 1970 the SAP operated four separate training institutions. To continue the specialization program a new suprapolice organization was created in 1970—the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). The organization was

\(^{13}\)Ibid., pp. 701-09.
created under provisions of the Public Service Amendment Bill. The Bureau will be answerable solely to the Prime Minister and will function outside the structure of the SAP. Its primary function will be to handle all matters pertaining to internal security and to help fulfill those responsibilities it has taken over some of the functions formerly assigned to the Armed Forces.  

The SAP is also well equipped. In 1970 it had at its disposal 4,000 motorized vehicles including trucks, buses, pickup vans, jeeps, station wagons, radio patrol sedans, motorcycles, tanks, helicopters, and light, fixed-wing aircraft. A small Air Wing was established in 1965, and equipped with light aircraft for reconnaissance operations. Pilots were hired under contract to the SAP. A six-seat Cessna was purchased in 1965 for use by the commissioner of police. A few helicopters were later added to the aircraft inventory, and others were obtained from the South African Air Force when needed. 

Maintenance of the equipment is handled in SAP garages scattered throughout the country, and a school for training of mechanics and drivers of equipment is run by the government. 

In addition to the well disciplined, well organized, and well equipped SAP, the SADF carries the major load of defense and is the strongest military power south of the Sahara. The combined branches of SADF (Army, Navy, and Air Force) boasts manpower of between 40,000 and 45,000 with the capability of increasing to a strength of 200,000 men on two days' notice.

\[14\] Ibid., p. 710. 
\[15\] Ibid., p. 711.
The SADF is highly trained, extremely mobile, and possesses impressive firepower both on land and in the air. It is equipped with jet aircraft, missiles, modern ground force weapons, and a growing complement of current naval vessels protected by an expanding air defense system that includes an early warning radar network. Defense research is receiving generous government backing for work on improved military equipment and techniques. It has an effective logistics system assuring all fighting units reliable support in supplies and equipment maintenance. The Army inventory includes over two hundred heavy and medium tanks manufactured in the United Kingdom, United States, and France. It also possesses French designed (but manufactured in South Africa) surface-to-air missiles.\(^{16}\)

The Navy is the weakest branch of the SADF. Mounting concern over the threat of undersea attacks has prompted the government to establish an antisubmarine-warfare training school. It has also installed a radio navigational system to improve South Africa's maritime defenses. In 1967 an agreement was made with France for the purchase of three submarines, each with a capability of carrying twelve torpedoes. Final delivery date is scheduled for the end of 1971. To supplement existing defense systems the Navy is examining the possibility of arming its coastal patrol with missiles.\(^{17}\)

\(^{16}\)Ibid., pp. 731-45.

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 747.
The Air Force is one of the strongest and best equipped in Africa. It is equipped with the most modern tactical weapons systems including jet aircraft and air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles. Of its more than 500 aircraft, one-half are equipped for combat and the remainder are used for security operations.

The defense establishment of South Africa is rapidly approaching superiority on the African continent. (Egypt is not far behind). Its technological development, resources for manufacturing and elaborate defense are going to offer formidable opposition to all those who at present are willing to resort to force to alter apartheid policies.

The economic superstructure. It is virtually impossible to determine the exact significance of the South African economy on perpetuating racist policies. A study of its economy reflects a series of domestic and international interdependencies. The growth of the South African economy has been perhaps the most important aspect in its social structure.

When considering the economy of South Africa it is also necessary to take into account the important role played by the government's racial policies. Apartheid has a considerable bearing on the whole economy.\textsuperscript{18}

The economic basis of Nationalist power is strong and is growing stronger all the time. Nationalist politicians and economists determine the direction which is taken by the whole economy. The Nationalist control of government is used to bolster Nationalist power and influence in the private sector of the economy.\textsuperscript{19}

In an economic sense, White and Black are interdependent and they are becoming more so with every passing year. It has resulted because of the necessity for Black labor not because the government is trying to correct major injustices. Blacks do occupy professional positions. There are approximately 23,500 Black professors and teachers, 14,000 Black nurses and nurses aids, 3,200 Blacks in other medical services, 260 Black draftsmen and technicians, and 35 Black jurists. Individuals of any racial group are accepted as customers in domestic markets. Although the economic status of Africans is low, their size as a consumer group make them an integral part of the economic system. In 1963 African consumption totaled about one-fourth the total. Buying power has continued to grow as the number of Africans employed has risen.\textsuperscript{20} Trade in the Reserves is largely controlled by Whites. The government has been buying out non-African store owners in these areas and leasing their businesses to Africans. Further, it has been the policy of late for the government to issue trading licenses in Reserve areas to Africans only. Placement of Africans in jobs is not quite as freely offered

\textsuperscript{19}Bunting, \textit{Rise of South African Reich}, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{20}Kaplan, \textit{Area Handbook}, pp. 590-615.
outside of the Reserves. The procedure for placing Africans is a complicated network of labor bureaus established on an urban, district, regional, and central basis. The government has attempted to expand programs of economic assimilation. It has encouraged technical and vocational training for Africans to enhance Black participation in the economy and also because they need additional skilled labor. 21

It appears that programs of assimilation are working to the advantage of the government.

The country's excellent natural endowment for economic growth and the high rate of expansion achieved in the developed sector in recent years may have the effect of eroding resistance to change traditionally found among the tribal villagers of the reserves and also, in a different form among the Afrikaner segment of the white population. Africans are participating in the developed economy in increasing numbers and, despite their very limited wage incentives, employment trends seem to support surveys showing that urban African workers are very responsive to wage differentials. On the reserves, where tradition is more firmly entrenched and apparent opportunities even more severely limited by land scarcity and other factors, response to change has been slow. 22

In addition to domestic interdependence there are continuing signs of the same among the countries of southern Africa. South Africa is protected on its borders by states that are either economically dependent on South Africa or are in general sympathy with its position. The government of South Africa has continued to exploit this advantage. Geographically and ethnically Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland

21 Ibid., pp. 595-621.
22 Ibid., pp. 493-94.
(BLS) are closely related to South Africa. They have had very close economic ties for many years. South Africa at one time assumed that these nations would eventually become part of the Republic. With the advent of official apartheid policies voluntary incorporation was out of the question, and by the early 1960's the idea of incorporation was abandoned, but the pursuit of greater economic dependency continued.23

The economic integration of BLS with South Africa operates at several levels. In the first place, there exists a form of common market and customs union between them and South Africa. In the second place, there is a de facto currency union, and banking and other financial links are close. Thirdly, a substantial part of the labour force of the three countries is employed in the Republic, mainly in the mines. Finally, there are close links in transport and other services.24

The economic ties of the southern African nations to South Africa are the most integrated of those doing business with South Africa. They are not the only economic ties that exist. South Africa's international economic ties are also being strengthened despite continued firmness with regard to racial policies. The major trading partners are, it appears, unwilling to break their profitable economic ties particularly since there has been no clear program adopted to bring about change in the internal environment.25 South Africa has


24Ibid., p. 473.

25Kaplan, Area Handbook, pp. 400-01.
continued, for the most part, to enjoy a favorable balance of trade if the exports of gold are included. Newly mined gold constitutes about thirty-five to forty percent of South Africa's total exports. The United Kingdom is South Africa's most important export market. South Africa has broadened its range of commodities and is diversifying its trade market. Other major markets include Japan, West Germany, other African States, and the United States. More than 375 U.S. companies have investments in South Africa. In 1966, the American Committee on Africa published a study of U.S. economic involvement in South Africa. The 1966 study indicated the following observations:

(1) South Africa was moving rapidly toward self-sufficiency;
(2) The U.S. and the Western World were increasingly dependent on strategic minerals from South Africa;
(3) South Africa was dependent upon cheap African labor;
(4) South Africa's reluctance to employ Africans in skilled positions threatened to create a serious shortage.  

United States economic involvement in South Africa was reevaluated in 1970 by the American Committee on Africa and the following observations were made:

(1) South Africa has developed, with U.S. corporate assistance, into a major industrial power in Africa and reached nearly total integration into the Western economic system;

(2) The African labor base has developed into an urbanized working class;

(3) The U.S. will continue to play an increasingly greater role in the South African economy.27

Although it is questionable whether there is the degree of economic integration suggested by the above observations, there is little doubt that South Africa has made significant strides forward in establishing a broader based and more self-sufficient economy. It is true that South Africa enjoys economic cooperation with the U.S.; but the U.S. share of trade is of far greater importance to South Africa than the South African share to the United States. It is doubtful that the U.S. would suffer irreparably from loss of South African trade.28

Helping perpetuate the domestically and internationally integrated economy is a sophisticated and growing industrially based economy. South Africa is considered to have a private enterprise economy. It is limited by virtue of apartheid policies.

27Ibid.

28Kaplan, Area Handbook, p. 663.
The country is usually regarded as having a private enterprise economy, both because the private sector accounts for about three-fourths of the GDP [Gross Domestic Product] and because white-owned private property is usually respected and the profit motive encouraged wherever it does not come into conflict with overriding political or racial policies. The moderate incidence of personal taxation and opportunities for material prosperity have encouraged immigration and the transfer of capital from countries such as the United Kingdom since World War II.  

South Africa has an immigration program which is designed to attract White immigrants, particularly skilled workers and managerial personnel, and there is an abundance of jobs available for such people. Assistance is given by providing aid in expenses for travel plus fully paid expenses while traveling in the country to obtain employment. It will also provide accommodations until the head of the family obtains employment. Such programs have stimulated an increase in immigration. Between 1961 and 1967 immigration resulted in a net gain of 172,000 in the White population.

The government has had other effects on the economy in addition to stimulating immigration. The political control which it exercises is greatly manifested in the economy and the direction it takes.

State control over a certain sector of the economy is common to a number of capitalist countries, but in few has it progressed as far as in South Africa, where the State owns or controls land and forests, post, telegraphs and telephones, railways and airlines, broadcasting, and a host of other public services. In addition the State has entered the field of private industry in electric power.

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generation (Escom), printing, the manufacturing of arms and ammunition, the production of iron and steel (Iscor), heavy engineering (Vecor), insecticides (Klipfontein Organic Products), oil, gas and chemicals from coal (Sasol), and fertilizers (Foskor). The State has launched the Industrial Development Corporation, which has become, together with private capital, a permanent shareholder in a host of industries, like the Zwelitsha textile mill in Kingwilliamstown, the National Finance Corporation, to provide short-term loans for development; and the Fisheries Development Corporation, to build up a modern fishing industry.31

Further:

The primary impetus in promoting the growth of manufacturing since World War II has probably come from government action. By direct investment and control of the steel industry, by important participation in other major industries, by increasingly protective manipulation of tariffs and import controls, and by the use of tax incentives and other instruments of policy, the government has consistently taken the lead in restructuring the country's money economy, ensuring that an important share of growing domestic market for both consumer and producer of goods has been used to generate the rapid growth of domestic manufacturing capacity.32

Government controls appear to be working. Government projected estimates in growth for the five year period 1968-1973 indicated a growth rate of 5.5 percent a year at constant prices with already available production facilities and an annual net immigration of 30,000 Whites. With either an increase in foreign capital or immigration in excess of 30,000 Whites a year, the growth rate could exceed the projected 5.5 percent.33

31Bunting, Rise of South African Reich, p. 286.
32Kaplan, Area Handbook, pp. 548-49.
33Ibid., p. 493.
Since South Africa has in many ways been forced into semi-isolation (due to arms embargo, UN resolutions, etc.), it has geared as much of its economy as possible toward self-sufficiency, particularly in areas and types of manufacturing that hold strategic potential. Knowing that world opinion is against it, it has attempted to solidify its economy, as well as other areas of the social structure, in the event that the U.S. and others decide to go against it with meaningful effectiveness. For the time being it is in a very advantageous position.

Thus the country's industry is in a sense situated advantageously between two worlds—the world of the industrially mature nations, which serve as export markets and with which it has close financial technological and entrepreneurial links, and the world of underemployment in sub-sistence African agriculture, from which it draws the bulk of its low-cost labor force. Having started from a position of very limited manufacturing capacity and substantial underutilization of resources at the outbreak of World War II, the country exhibited a rate of postwar industrial growth that materially surpasses that of the more mature economies of the United States and Western Europe.\textsuperscript{34}

As mentioned earlier, the question of sanctions has pretty much lost its momentum—due largely to their failure against Rhodesia. South Africa has further frustrated those wishing to impose sanctions. Because it has continued to maintain economic cooperation with major nations, it has been able to stockpile several years' supply of strategic materials. Coupled with its growing self-sufficiency, it becomes less and less vulnerable to the effect of sanctions.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., p. 548.
There is obviously a whole series of interdependencies at work in the South African economy. One other important aspect deserves consideration. Indications are that South Africa has the natural resources to provide an even greater rate of growth than it experienced in the 1960's. The Republic is currently the source of two-thirds of the estimated world supply of newly mined gold.

... Some observers also believe that the country's international importance as a source of gold and other minerals has played a part in inhibiting the further deterioration of its foreign political relations in the 1960's. The country produces about two-thirds of estimated world gold output and furnishes asbestos, uranium, ferroalloys,* and a number of other minerals to major industrial users abroad.

For one hundred years South Africa has been the leading source of gem-quality diamonds and is the center of the diamond sales monopoly. It channels diamonds produced in other countries through the Central Selling Organization in London which in turn distributes them to diamond exchanges in Amsterdam, Antwerp, and New York.

Diamond and gold mining has been the core of economic development and the leading source of foreign exchange since before the turn of the century. Since World War II the country has developed a broad industrial base and a sophisticated range of manufactures, including most consumer goods and a wide variety of capital equipment and supplies for both agriculture and industry.35

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*A crude alloy of iron with some other metal, used for deoxidizing molten steel and making alloy steels.

35Kaplan, Area Handbook, p. 547.
Gold and diamonds are not the only minerals in abundance in South Africa.

The country ranks as a leading world supplier of a number of minerals in addition to gold and diamonds. In 1967 it either had among the largest deposits or ranked among the world's largest producers of platinum, uranium, coal, iron ore, chromite, manganese, asbestos, antimony, and corundum. Its goldfields are thought to offer potential uranium resources second only to those of Canada—one report said second to none. Although it ranked below the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa) and probably below the Soviet Union in production of industrial diamonds, its sales of gem diamonds were still the highest in the world. It was thought to rank with Communist China in production of antimony and close behind the Soviet Union in production and reserves of chromite. It's probably the world's largest commercially exploited reserves of manganese with the exception of the Soviet Union. The enormous platinum reserves of the Transvaal Bushveld extend hundreds of miles, and at full capacity the Rustenburg Mine was the world's largest platinum producer.36

The value of any mineral resource is dependent upon the ability of a country to extract such resources. The government has also taken care of this.

The country's unusually rich mineral resource endowment, in combination with its low-cost unskilled labor supply advanced mineral technology, low-cost fuel and power, and well-developed economic infrastructure, have made possible a very extensive range of mineral production, both for export and domestic use. At the prices and factor costs prevailing in 1968, there were reported to be nearly fifty commercially exploitable minerals in the republic, some of them found in combination or extracted as a by-product of gold, copper or other minerals. Bauxite was the only industrially important mineral not found in the country.37

36Ibid., p. 554.
37Ibid., p. 551.
Conclusions. Examination of the military and economic structure of South Africa provide the greatest understanding as to why present practices to resolve apartheid have proven ineffective. Further, it does much to suggest that change may have to be initiated by the South African government. The military establishment is the most powerful in Africa and continues to get stronger. Its industrial capabilities have rendered the country almost self-sufficient in the production of any and all armaments necessary to carry on a war effort if one should manifest itself. It would be exceedingly difficult, for other African nations particularly, to meet effectively the arsenal possessed by South Africa. Those who are equipped to match such a repository of arms and munitions have been reluctant to deploy them against the government. Bolstering the military establishment of South Africa is a viable and growing economy. It is an economy which has provided advantages to Africans they have not enjoyed until recently. It is an economy that has become highly industrialized affording it an opportunity for flexibility unlike that of other African states. The impetus behind both the military establishment and the economy, in no small measure, is a powerful political apparatus. It is an apparatus with the capability to determine almost at will the direction the nation will move. If a solution to apartheid policies is within reason, it appears that the government of South Africa will have much to say about the kind and substance of proposed reforms.
CHAPTER VIII

FINAL ASSESSMENTS

In an attempt to bring the preceding investigation into proper perspective, a recapitulation of major observations will preempt the development of final conclusions.

Apartheid constitutes a complicated social phenomena which permeates virtually every aspect of the South African social structure. It is a policy which has evolved over a long period of time and one that cannot be traced to Afrikaner attitudes alone. To fully appreciate the complexity of apartheid, due consideration must also be given to English and Boer attitudes as they have evolved over the last 300 years. The degree to which basic principles of apartheid are ingrained in the lives of White South Africans are reflected in the arguments used to defend such policies. Differentialism, success under the existing system, the threat of Black retaliation, the history of European colonialization, and White superiority are among the principal arguments used. To perpetuate prevailing attitudes the theory of separate development has been designed to provide areas of self-government for non-Whites. In practice the theory of separate development has failed to realize the potential for which it was created but the government is confident that given time the policy will work.
The government has displayed remarkable resiliency to world-wide condemnation. For White South Africans the precepts which dictate the philosophy behind apartheid have been grossly oversimplified by critics. Many critics, according to the government, lack appreciation of the progress accrued under apartheid. Most White South Africans accept apartheid much as do devoutly religious people accept "faith" and although apartheid policies are not always founded on rational judgments the commitment to such policies is devoutly followed. Apartheid has become an integral part of the social order and the government has and will continue to resist change imposed by external forces.

Potential external pressures to alleviate injustices in apartheid policies, as they have been investigated in this paper, lie in the power and ambition of the United Nations, the United States, and combined efforts of the Organization of African Unity and the Soviet Union. Let us recall the attitudes and effectiveness of these external forces. One, the United Nations has served as the major outlet for both expression and action in condemning apartheid. It has discussed the problem every year since its founding and its condemnation of apartheid and related problems has been most emphatic. Numerous resolutions have been adopted in both the General Assembly and Security Council deploRing conditions in southern Africa and calling upon those governments to abandon such policies. Although the Security Council has been discussing apartheid only since 1960, active measures
have been taken by that organ. Particular action has been expressed in the form of boycotts. The UN's most dramatic decision was to terminate South Africa's control over South West Africa. All UN efforts to abolish apartheid have met with failure. They have either (1) prompted South Africa to become more inflexible or (2) simply led South Africa to ignore UN actions. Efforts to deal with colonialism have met a similar fate. To date the UN has been ineffective in meeting the challenge to resolve the problems of South Africa.

Two, the U.S. has proceeded with more caution than the UN in its dealings with problems surrounding apartheid. She has attempted to maintain as many foreign policy options as possible. The U.S. has pressed harder for a change in South West Africa than in the remainder of southern Africa. She remains opposed to the use of force as was indicated when she used the veto power for the first time in the Security Council in the Spring of 1970. Essentially her attitude is subject to change. Economic and political considerations with respect to independent Africa, Portugal, South Africa, and Europe will be carefully weighed before further U.S. commitments are made. Until now it appears that U.S. efforts have served more to perpetuate existing conditions in South Africa rather than to bring about their demise. Caught between various economic interests and foreign policy priorities on the one hand and involvement in a nation's domestic problems on the other, the U.S. has opted in favor of its own foreign and economic interests. There is little
indication that radical change in attitude is forthcoming in the near future.

Three, the OAU considers the policies of apartheid and colonialism as moral issues, not political and economic. The policies of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal are flagrant abuses of human equality, dignity, and freedom. The OAU has been more receptive to the use of force and has resigned itself to the idea that it may be the only workable alternative. Its establishment of the ALC and endorsement of the Lasaka Manifesto are expressions of the frustration which it feels over the ineffectiveness of current policy. Working with and through the OAU has been one of the two major superpowers. Even their cooperative efforts have had little success in altering South African racist policies. Much diversity of opinion exists with regard to the implementing of tactics. The result has been continued but ineffective efforts.

External pressures have not been the only forces at work in attempting to abolish apartheid policies. There has been and is considerable domestic criticism to such policies. Internal resistance has been largely exemplified through token opposition by political parties and liberation movements. Neither of these internal attempts have met with success. Attempts by political parties have been virtually meaningless in light of the extensive control over the political apparatus enjoyed by Nationalists. Liberation movements have turned to revolutionary tactics in the absence of
success by opposing political parties and external pressures but have likewise encountered the awesome political machine in the form of increasingly repressive legislation. In addition to being victimized by the use of power politics the ineffectiveness of liberation movements has been stifled by diversity within its own ranks. There has been a notable inability of such movements to rally behind a common leadership. The result has been a number of different movements designed to accomplish the same ends. This diversity has served to weaken potentially greater successes.

One of the most descriptive illustrations as to why the efforts of the United Nations, the OAU, and internal national liberation movements have proved unsuccessful is the extent to which the South African government has gone to prepare itself against virtually any attempt to impose a change in the system. Both its military establishment and economy have grown toward almost self-sufficiency and the government is continuing to prepare itself against future attempts at abolishing apartheid. Because of what the government considers to be a "real" Communist threat to its survival, the government has spared little in making necessary preparations. Its budget for defense purposes amounts to approximately one-fourth of its total. It maintains a well equipped and highly trained police force and military organization and its capacity to provide logistical support to those units continues to improve. Its accomplished level of growth militarily makes it vulnerable to relatively few
nations. Those who possess such capabilities have displayed reluctance to utilize the power necessary to bring about the demise of the existing government. Meanwhile, the gap between South Africa and other African nations widens in terms of military capabilities.

The comparative strength of South Africa's economy parallels that of its military. The economy, like the military, is becoming increasingly more self-sufficient. It enjoys the luxury of having most of the nations that are in close geographical proximity to it dependent upon its economy. South Africa's economy is further enhanced by the trading relationships it is able to maintain with the major economic powers of the world. Its capabilities with regard to manufacturing are steadily increasing and its potential for continued economic growth is very favorable. At the present time South Africa enjoys about a 5.5 percent rate of growth and the potential for more rapid growth increases as manufacturing capabilities increase. In addition to developments in the manufacturing industry, its abundance of natural resources, the technology to extract those resources, and its importance as a major supplier of gold and diamonds makes it among the most viable economies in the world. If current growth patterns continue, South Africa will become to Africa what the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have become to the world—a superpower. They will become a political power to be reckoned with rather than shunned, harassed, and ridiculed.
The preceding investigation brings us to a number of conclusions. One, efforts of the UN, the United States, the OAU, and the Soviet Union have produced insignificant results. Maximum efficiency has been thwarted by diversity of opinion and purpose. It would appear that until such diversity can be resolved, attempts by these external groups to resolve the problems of apartheid will continue to fail. Two, as time continues to elapse the potential for imposing change by external means diminishes largely because of the continued development of the economic and military aspects of the South African social structure. Three, internal opposition lacks the viable strength to cope with the government in power. The overwhelming political, economic, and military dominance of the South African government provide it with the capacity to stifle virtually all efforts initiated by internal dissonant groups. Four, it would appear that strength does not appear in numbers, at least on this issue. Condemnation of apartheid has been almost universal yet attempts to abolish the system have met with dismal failure. Five, except for those nations close to the influences of apartheid policies the issue is not one of high priority. Those who possess the viable strength to impose change in South Africa have displayed a reluctance to utilize the necessary power to do so.

In addition to the conclusions drawn, the author's prejudices prompt the following observation of a speculative nature. In the absence of external pressure adequate enough
to impose change in apartheid policies, the apparent inability of domestic opponents, and the comparative strength of the South African government, this observer is inclined to believe that meaningful changes in apartheid policies will ultimately be initiated by the government in power. Such an observation, by its very nature, will be tested by things to come. At this point, and because of the time the considerations given the topic, such an idea has almost become a truism for this observer.
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