AN INQUIRY INTO POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM

OF APARTHEID IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Apartheid (the racial policies of South Africa) has
been, and is, a topic of widespread debate. It has been
almost universally condemned. The notable exceptions are
the Republic of South Africa, Portugal, and the regime of
Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia. The universality of condem-
nation has not foreclosed that debate. The problem of what
to do about its continued practice remains unresolved. In
the attempts to arrive at meaningful solutions, areas of
agreement among opponents of such policies begin to diminish.
For example, independent Africa, along with many Asian
countries, prefers to maintain a more stringent position than
those countries of the West. Foreign policy and economic,
political, social, historical, and geographical factors
prompt varying responses and attitudes and so the debate con-
tinues. Whether the emotional intensity permeating the debate
will result in a world wide polarization of non-Whites against
Whites is doubtful. It seems unlikely that either would allow
their communications to deteriorate to such a degree as to
make polarization the only option available. Furthermore, the
policies being pursued by the South African government,
although considered important, have not yet constituted a

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problem of such magnitude that the world community is going
to sever the channels of communication used to grapple with
more pressing international problems.

For the present the question of apartheid remains
another of the seemingly unsolvable international problems.
Whether or not those working to provide a solution will arrive
at one remains to be seen. The outlook is dim. Various
approaches have been attempted. None has yet produced the
desired effect. Through systematic analysis of existing con-
ditions, both international and within South Africa, evidence
will attempt to give credence to the idea that change in
apartheid policies will not be radically altered by the
methods now being implemented.

The investigation of existing conditions centers on
the prevailing attitudes of those most concerned with
apartheid and those most capable of instituting changes in
such policies. Special emphasis will be given to those
nations and organizations which have remained in the forefront
of the debate regarding apartheid policies. Since apartheid
policies constitute an elaborate network of interrelated
social conditions, comprehensive analysis of such conditions
will be left to others more concerned with apartheid as a
sociological study. The purpose of this inquiry is to
evaluate, as objectively as possible within the confines of
the author's established prejudices, the potential solutions
of apartheid. For those who are offended, as is the author,
by the existence of such conditions perhaps the following

inquiry will help to reveal some of the causes of frustration faced by those attempting to alleviate the problems in southern Africa.

An investigation into the activities of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union), and the Republic of South Africa provides an overall view of the forces at work in southern Africa. Six major divisions will constitute the framework for investigation. First, the policy of apartheid as it is implemented by South Africa will be discussed. Attention will be given to the historical development of apartheid, the arguments used to defend the system, the theory of separate development, the attitude of the government with regard to criticisms leveled against them, and evaluation of Jewish acquiescence to apartheid policies. Second, consideration of United Nations' action and attitude will be explored. Third, because of its status as a world power, the United States' policy toward apartheid and southern Africa will be considered. Fourth, a look at the actions and attitudes of the OAU will indicate the general, if not specific, concerns of independent Africa. Because the Soviet Union's efforts have been directed to a large extent through the OAU, its position will be discussed in that section as well as being alluded to in the sections following it. Fifth, consideration will be given to factions within southern Africa which are opposed to the policies of apartheid and colonialism. Sixth, because of the dominance the South African government

maintains over the social order, special emphasis will be given to the economic and military aspects of South Africa.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL STATUS OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA

Apartheid as it now exists has evolved over a several hundred year period. It has been developed in response to changes in political, economic, social, and international phenomena. An investigation into the history of South Africa serves well to illustrate one of the basic tenets upon which apartheid is defended. Defense of such policies goes beyond historical claims. Apartheid is deeply embraced by Whites and is supported by a composite of semi-rational, dogmatic, emotional, and inconsistent arguments. In order to make apartheid policies more operable the South African government has undertaken an ambitious program of "separate development" (a geographic separation of Whites and Blacks designed to provide economic, political, and social growth in their respective territories). Virtually none of the claims made by the South African government about the advantages of such racial policies has been acceptable to outside observers; yet the system remains firmly entrenched. The system is so firmly entrenched in fact that domestic groups that once were quite vocal in their opposition have found it politically, economically, and socially more advisable to adjust to the system. It is to these phenomena that this chapter will address itself.

Historical background of apartheid. Most Whites of
South Africa assume that one must live there many years in
order to understand apartheid. It is a policy which has
taken centuries to develop and understand.[1] The first White
settlement was established at Cape Town in 1652 by the Dutch
East India Company. Unable to secure the help and coopera-
tion of the indigenous natives (Hottentots and Bushmen), the
Company decided to import slaves from the west coast of Africa.
This was done in 1658. Eventually 29,000 slaves were brought
to the settlement from West Africa. During the same period
immigration from Europe was encouraged. Europeans continued
migrating to South Africa. Except during the initial phase
of settlement, South Africa did not hold a great deal of
attraction for trading nations.[2]

Concentration of different races in a small area
resulted in intermarriage. As early as 1685, the marriage of
Europeans with freed slaves was prohibited. Whites were still
allowed to marry half-breeds.[3]

It was not until the late eighteenth century that the
British gained control of the southern tip of Africa. British
attitudes toward non-Whites differed from those of other

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[1]Herbert Lars Gustaf Tingsten, The Problem of South
Africa, trans. by Daniel Viklund (London: Victor Gollancz
Ltd., 1955), p. 51.

[2]Lawrence Elwin Neame, The History of Apartheid: The
Story of the Colour War in South Africa (London: Pall Mall
Press, c. 1962), pp. 10-11.

[3]Ibid., p. 13.

Europeans and in 1807, Great Britain abolished slavery in the Cape. They, as had been their predecessors, were unable to induce the labor of Hottentots (indigenous tribal grouping in southern Africa). Therefore in 1809, the first pass law was introduced. It declared that all Hottentot males not working for Whites were to be classified as "vagrants." All "vagrants" had to carry a pass. The pass could be checked by any White man as well as police.[4]

The Dutch were becoming more and more dissatisfied with British methods. Because the Dutch felt that slaves were being "placed on an equal footing with Christians contrary to the laws of God and the natural distinction of race and colour," they began withdrawing from British controlled territories. The Great Trek, as it is known, started in 1834. Misunderstandings between British and Boer (French, Hollander, and German farmers) continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century. As Boers settled the interior of South Africa they established republics based on White supremacy. The Boer War was the culmination of hostilities between Europeans during the nineteenth century. The victorious British government annexed the Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State.[5]

The first decade of the twentieth century found the four colonies (Natal, Orange Free State, Transvaal, Cape of Good

[4]Ibid., pp. 15-17.

[5]Ibid., pp. 19-27.

Hope) exercising different prerogatives. Coloureds (those with mixed blood) and Asians (Indians) were receiving varied consideration depending on the colony in which they were residing. Inconsistency prompted an attempt at unification. A National Constitutional Convention was held and a draft constitution was drawn up and returned to the four Colonial Parliaments for their approval. On May 31, 1910, the Union of South Africa came into being. General Botha (former leader of the Boer--Het Volk--party) was asked to form the first Union Cabinet. It consisted of ten members, six of whom were to be of Afrikaner (European) descent. The first Parliament was elected September 15, 1910, with Botha's South African Party capturing the majority of seats.[6]

The political apparatus had now been established for more rapid development of apartheid policy. Native Reserves had evolved for different reasons and under different circumstances since the mid-nineteenth century. Some had been established in an attempt to control the wandering of rootless Africans. Others had been created in an effort to help appease Africans. Many Reserves developed as a result of allocating land to various South African tribes.

By 1910, there were nearly three hundred Reserves scattered all over the Union. To alleviate the confusion created, political leaders began to establish plans for correcting the problems of administering the large number of Reserves. In 1912, four African lawyers launched a campaign

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[6]Ibid., pp. 28-38.

to organize the African National Congress (ANC) in an effort
to bring about equitable representation for natives in
Parliament which had been denied them by the new constitution.
The native factions were beginning to exert themselves politi-
cally. This prompted increased action by other racial group-
ings such as the Coloureds and Asians. The increased activity
was met by restrictive legislation.[7]

General Smuts became Prime Minister in 1919 after the
death of General Botha. Smuts had wanted to develop a better
rapport with the increasingly vocal natives but he was unable
to take any significant steps to alleviate the problem. Botha
and Smuts had advocated conciliatory approaches. Internal
disenchantment over the South African Party's policies
developed. General Hertzog established the Nationalist Party
in opposition to attempts at conciliation. A split among the
Afrikaners resulted. Soon afterwards Nationalists began to
align themselves with the Labour Party (disenchanted British)
and a viable political organization began developing.[8]

The Nationalist Party successfully spearheaded a cam-
paign calling for a vote of no-confidence in 1923. In 1924 the
Hertzog government came into power. A conservative posture
was then assumed regarding the racial question. Hertzog's
government passed a series of laws designed to elevate the
status of Whites. Attempts by Africans to achieve greater

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[7]Ibid., pp. 39-45.

[8]Ibid., pp. 45-47.

recognition were thwarted by Parliament. The trend continued until the outbreak of World War II, at which point foreign issues became a prominent concern among policy makers. Although there was little, if any, participation by South Africans in the war effort, the political ramifications of the event prompted considerable attention. Hertzog had favored neutrality. Smuts favored entering the war on the side of Great Britain. Many others felt that the Germans would win (including the present Prime Minister, Belthazar Vorster). Parliament chose to honor the Smuts proposal and Hertzog stepped aside. Smuts reorganized the government for a second time.[9]

Hertzog's demise as leader of the Nationalist Party soon followed. He was succeeded by Dr. D.F. Malan. It had been the question of whom to support in World War II that unseated the Nationalists. By 1944, the race question had returned as the dominant issue. The Smuts government had tried to restore a policy of reconciliation toward non-Whites. A furor resulted over having official letters to Coloureds addressed in the same manner as to Whites, (i.e., the use of "Sir" or "Madam" in letters and "Mr." or "Mrs." on envelopes). A number of officials were dismissed (or resigned) for failure to comply. By this time, African nationalism had received great impetus from World War II. This nationalism had served only to polarize Whites and non-Whites in South Africa.

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[9] Ibid., pp. 47-67.

In the election of 1948, the Nationalists, under the leader-
ship of Dr. Malan, gained control of Parliament. The
Nationalists have never relinquished that control.[10]

Defense of apartheid. The arguments used by the
government of South Africa to defend apartheid constitute a
mixture of semi-rationalism, dogmatism, emotionalism, and
inconsistency. One of the credible arguments is based on the
diversity of groups living in South Africa.

> Five societies have to live with one another--a
> white society, a Bantu. . . society, a coloured--
> mixed blood society, an Indian society, and a
> Pakistani society. There are smaller, societies,
> such as the Malay-Moslem--society, the Griqua
> society, a mixture of races in the Griqua-land
> districts of Cape Province, the Rehoboth society
> [another racial mixture in South West Africa],
> plus the Hottentot and Bushman societies, also in
> that territory. . . . The white and coloured
> societies speak two languages, the Bantu society
> speaks five main languages plus about sixty dia-
> lects, the Indian and Pakistani societies speak
> at least five languages. Each maintains a dis-
> tinct way of life and, except for the whites and
> coloureds who share the Western culture, each
> way of life flows forth from another and separate
> culture. Each society treasures its own way of
> life and applies to it its own standards of
> living--even its own definitions as to what
> happiness means and does not mean.[11]

All of the major religions of the world are represented in
South Africa. Christianity has challenged the religious
concepts of the Bantu (native) society yet only about half
have been converted. There still remain approximately 1,500

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[10]Ibid., pp. 67-77.

[11]Wentzel C. du Plessis, "The South African Government's
Case," in South Africa, ed. by Grant S. McClellan, The
Reference Shelf, Vol. 34, No. 2 (New York: H.W. Wilson
Company, 1962), pp. 73-74.

religious sects among the Bantu.[12] Further, the native society

is race conscious and remains loyal to tribal traditions. Even

though many have been incorporated into the industrial commu-

nity, they still have a deep-seated affinity for their tribal

heritage.[13] How can a reasonably harmonious society possibly

be created with this kind of diversity, asks the government.

Wentzel du Plessis, a former South African ambassador

to the United States, suggests that perhaps "it would be a good

thing, not only for the friendly intercourse between people

but also for the peace of the world, if more discrimination

were to be applied to the use of the word 'discrimination'."[14]

> Is it true that differences between people based
> on race, color, language and sex are discrimin-
> atory? It need not be true and by and large it
> is not true. In the great majority of cases
> race, color and language, far from being discrim-
> inatory, can be identified as the unifying factor
> in any particular group.[15]

Group identification is a perfectly natural phenomenon.

> . . .it must be clear that what so often appears
> to be discrimination is only due to the fact that
> people of the same race, the same color, speaking
> the same language, through these associations
> cherish and preserve the same way of life and,
> consequently, group themselves together in a
> natural process.[16]

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[12]Ibid., p. 74.

[13]G.B.A. Gerdener, "The Crux of the Racial Situation in South Africa," The International Review of Missions, 1949, p. 282.

[14]Du Plessis, "South African Case," p. 73.

[15]Ibid., p. 76.

[16]Ibid.

In these terms, apartheid is not discrimination. It is not based on superiority or inferiority, but on the principle that people differ, particularly in their group associations, loyalties, cultures, outlook, mode of life and standards of development. It is on the premise of differentialism that apartheid exists.[17]

> Whatever the Bantu wishes to accept from the white man's way of life he must do voluntarily, but neither is going to allow the other to force him into a common mold. Not all the immense pressure which the world can exercise will accomplish this because, in fact, if it is accomplished it will mean the death of white as well as of Bantu society. The resistance to this will, therefore, come not only from whites but also from the Bantu, except from those who do not cherish an own identity and who have lost their self-respect.[18]

In addition to diversity, the government points to the success that has been achieved through the efforts of Whites as justification for apartheid policies. In a recent letter to the United Nations, the Permanent Representative from South Africa to the United Nations stated:

> It is generally accepted that the results achieved in South Africa in the various fields of economy, education, health, etc., for all groups are indeed spectacular. Can it be maintained that all these achievements were the result of a destructive, oppressive, and negative policy?[19]

The dominance of Whites is justified on the grounds that they have earned their pre-eminant position through their own

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[17]United Nations, Office of Public Information, Segregation in South Africa: Questions and Answers on the Policy of Apartheid, (Sales No.: E. 69. I. 15), May, 1969, pp. 22-23.

[18]Du Plessis, "South African Case," p. 75.

[19]United Nations, Segregation in South Africa, p. 23.

efforts and have contributed extensively to the development
of South Africa. When they arrived in South Africa, the land
was poor. Much of the area was unoccupied. Over the years
they have established their own distinctive nation-state.[20]
In so doing they have shared, in increasing amounts, their
prosperity with all sections of the population. Per capita
income among non-Whites is greater than most countries in
tropical Africa. There are more hospital beds for non-Whites
than in any other country in Africa. More non-White students
are attending universities than in any other state in Africa.[21]

> The prison system is among the most modern and
> humane in the world today and considerably
> superior to many other countries . . . . From
> state revenues and other sources, the South
> African Government provides more than $84 million
> annually for welfare and health services for the
> Bantu alone. Many of the country's welfare
> services are provided free of charge, or at a
> nominal fee only.[22]

A more dogmatic argument for White dominance is the fear that
the Blacks are seeking revenge. Critics of apartheid suggest
that such fear is unwarranted. Neame suggests, however,
that:

> The policy of most nations is based upon fear--
> fear of attack; fear of the excessive infiltration
> of unassimilable foreigners; fear of trade competi-
> tion weakening the national economy. What is

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[20]Waldemar A. Nielsen, African Battleline: American
Policy Choices in Southern Africa, (New York: Harper & Row,
c. 1965), p. 61.

[21]Leonard M. Thompson, The Republic of South Africa,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 4.

[22]United Nations, Segregation in South Africa,
pp. 23-24.

branded as fear in South Africa is simply the
desire of every race to survive and transmit
its heritage to its children.[23]

The Whites of South Africa are fearful of losing

their dominant position. The government feels that any

concession which it makes to Blacks is a partial surrender

of its sovereignty and only encourages militants to exert

greater pressure.[24]

The Afrikaner is prepared to concede more rights
in the homelands, but for him to concede any
rights to the African in the 'white areas' is to
concede the whole principle on which his survival
depends; to concede, in fact, victory to the
African.[25]

The policy of apartheid must remain uncompromising to guar-

antee White domination.[26] After twenty-two years of

apartheid, the Afrikaner thinks that any concession would

open the door for more and more concessions. Eventually the

Bantu would be in a position to destroy White dominance.[27]

Years of enforcing race discrimination against not
a minority group but the overwhelming majority of
the people of the Union have given white supremacy
a new rationale for maintaining itself. There is
now the fear of revenge, of the Africans turning on
their oppressors, of the rise of a so-called black
nationalism against which the whites must defend
themselves. The traditional policy of segregation,

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[23]Lawrence Elwin Neame, "The Case for Apartheid,"
The Contemporary Review, 1954, p. 336.

[24]Tingsten, Problems of South Africa, pp. 60-61.

[25]Stanley Uys, "White Ants in the Apartheid Ediface,"
New Statesman, 1970, p. 402.

[26]Seth M. Mokitimi, "Apartheid and the Christian Spirit,"
The International Review of Missions, 1949, p. 277.

[27]Uys, "White Ants."

or apartheid, is the only way, it is now argued
with reinforced vigour, to avoid the clashes
that must necessarily arise where different
races live together.[28]

The uncompromising position of the government was reiterated

by Prime Minister Vorster in April of 1968.

South Africa does not want to go under and neither
does it want to be changed. We want to stay as we
are . . . . The demands being made upon us . . .
we cannot and shall not meet, because it will mean
the end of our existance in this part of the world.[29]

The South African government also uses a historical

argument for justifying apartheid policies and White domina-

tion. This defense is more emotional than rational. A

comparison is often made concerning the right of the South

African government to exist in South Africa as much as the

American nation has the right to exist in North America.

Both trace their origins to the 17th century. Both are

fundamentally Christian nations. Both have origins in

Western Europe. Both struggled for independence from Britain.

Both built strong, prosperous countries out of formerly prim-

itive environments.[30]

The white man has a perfect right to be in South
Africa and sees no need to excuse his presence
here or to justify his intention to remain. There
is no truth whatever in the belief, often encoun-
tered overseas, that when the white man arrived
here he found a Bantu population settled from time
immemorial on lands from which he brutally dispos-
sessed them. On the contrary, both whites and

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[28]Ruth First, "South Africa Today," in Africa Speaks
ed. by James Duffy and Robert A. Manners, (Princeton, New
Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961), pp. 187-88.

[29]United Nations, Segregation in South Africa, p. 30.

[30]Thompson, Republic of South Africa, p. 4.

Bantu were colonizing invaders who entered the
country at about the same time, the white man
being the first to arrive in the south and the
Bantu in the north. If priority of occupation
gives a claim to ownership, the Europeans have
as good a claim as anybody, except the vanished
aboriginal races of Hottentots and Bushmen.
. . . the white man intends to maintain the
principles of western civilization and the way
of life on which their survival depends. He is
well aware that this attitude involves dangers
of abuse, and therefore there are great numbers
of people in South Africa who make it their
business to watch vigilantly for every sign of
oppression and to combat it vigorously when it
appears. But there can be no question of placing
the destinies of the country in the hands of a
black majority and so converting South Africa
into a state of the order of Haiti.[31]

The weakest defense offered for the perpetuation of
apartheid rests on the assumption that the White race is
superior. They are better educated, possess more technical
knowledge and have established a more complicated and efficient
social and political structure. The White's attitude toward
the Black community is reflected in this manner: "The natives
are superstitious, dirty, unreliable, imitative, brutal, dis-
honest, quarrelsome, treacherous--this was the conclusion in
a report of an inquiry carried out by a hundred Afrikaner
students in South Africa some years ago."[32]

All of the above arguments have been used to defend
the policy of apartheid, but they represent more than just a
defense. All countries cling to ideas that help to express

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[31]Gerdener, "Crux of Situation," p. 281. One of the
earliest statements concerning apartheid as official policy.
Indicates a more permissive attitude of policy during its
embryonic stages.

[32]Tingsten, Problems of South Africa, pp. 55-56.

identity. All countries make certain rationalizations as to the progress they have made and the excellence of their existing political systems. All nations have attempted, in varying degrees, to use history to unify their countrymen. The same is true of South Africa. She, as others, are convinced they are right.

Theory of separate development. One of the most important aspects of apartheid is the Bantustan policy or theory of separate development. It is the feeling of the Nationalist Party that the only way in which Whites and Blacks can live peaceably is if they live separately, as much as possible.[33] Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, Prime Minister from 1958-1966, was the foremost developer of this so-called positive apartheid or separate development.[34] The Bantustan policy is designed to provide opportunities for major African tribal groups to set up their own "homelands" on rural tribal reserves. The Transkei Reserve was the first experiment of the Bantustan policy.[35] The South African government is convinced that this policy is to the best advantage of Blacks.

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[33]U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States-South African Relations, Hearings, before the subcommittee on Africa of the Co-mittee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2d sess., part 1, 1966, p. 66.

[34]Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas Karis, and Newell M. Stultz, South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 36.

[35]Ibid., p. 3.

> Segregation is not a measure against any partic-
> ular group; on the contrary, it is the only way
> to ensure the parallel development of differing
> groups, and quite obviously serves to stimulate
> development. . . . It is designed to prevent race
> deterioration, to preserve race integrity and to
> give the different racial groups an opportunity
> to build up and develop their own race life;
> secondly, to protect each community against
> infiltration by the other; thirdly, to prevent
> racial animosity which would inevitably arise if
> the life of the different races were inextricably
> mixed up, and fourthly, to prevent unemployment
> and the overcrowding of urban areas with all their
> attendant evils.[36]

It is the belief of Whites that the races were

created separate and this separation must be maintained even

when economic and other circumstances have prompted racial

mixture. Since races were created separate, a sense of color

must be developed among Whites in order to preserve the purity

of the race. These objectives must be pursued in the Christian

spirit, however.[37]

> There is among the whites in South Africa a large
> measure of goodwill for the Natives. A great deal
> of money is spent on housing, education, and social
> amenities, and the condition of the Natives is on
> the whole better than that of the mass of the
> people in any other part of Africa, or in Asia for
> that matter. If the Africans would accept the
> principle of separation there would be a stronger
> incentive upon the whites to subsidize the economic
> betterment of the Reserves and increase their
> population-carrying capacity.[38]

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[36]Gwendolen Margaret Carter, The Politics of
Inequality: South Africa Since 1948 (New York: Preager
Inc., 1959), pp. 386-87.

[37]United Nations, Segregation in South Africa,
p. 22.

[38]Neame, "Case for Apartheid," p. 338.

For Whites in South Africa, the policy of separate development is not a denial of rights to Blacks. It provides an opportunity for that element to advance to its fullest extent. The government hopes to advance the indigenous peoples to their full capacity along their own tribal tradition.[39] "Just as the Whites have the right to national existence and self-fulfillment, so have the several non-white communities--and more particularly the Bantu communities, which are embryonic nations."[40] As one government official states:

> We do not only seek and fight for a solution which will mean our survival as a white race, but we also seek a solution which will ensure survival and full development--political and economic--to each of the other racial groups, and we are even prepared to pay a high price out of our earnings to ensure their future. . . . We want each of our population groups to control and to govern themselves, as is the case with other Nations. Then they can cooperate as in a Commonwealth--in an economic association with the Republic and with each other. In the transition stage the guardian must teach and guide his ward. That is our policy of separate development. South Africa will proceed in all honesty and fairness to secure peace, prosperity and justice for all, by means of political independence coupled with economic interdependence.[41]

The objectives pursued by South Africa are essentially those set out in the Charter of the United Nations. That is, to build up each people into a self-governing entity which will

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[39]Carter, _Politics of Inequality_, p. 384.

[40]Thompson, _Republic of South Africa_, p. 5.

[41]_Ibid._

be in a position to effectively cooperate with others in
both the political and economic spheres.[42]

Critics of separate development point to the slow-
ness with which the government is moving in turning over
Reserves to the natives. Gradual withdrawal is necessary,
say Whites of South Africa, to avoid the mistakes by other
European governments. First, Europeans were not responsible
to the electorate in Africa; therefore, they did not suffer
the consequences of their errors. Second, Europeans abandoned
their commitments to Africa after World War II leaving con-
glomerations of peoples unable to achieve unity and political
stability. Third, European withdrawal prompted political
opportunists to vie for power, many of whom lacked the self-
discipline and experience to make effective statesmen.[43]
The Whites of South Africa are determined not to repeat these
mistakes.

Resiliency to criticism. "The South African govern-
ment has shown a persistent determination to resist the
external as well as the internal opposition to the South
African political system. . . ."[44] Since 1946, South Africa
has refused to participate in United Nations' (UN) discussions
of apartheid and, on a number of occasions, has boycotted
General Assembly meetings. It is her contention that the UN

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[42]United Nations, Segregation in South Africa, p. 23.

[43]Thompson, Republic of South Africa, pp. 5-6.

[44]Ibid., p. 213.

has "no legal competence to consider the domestic affairs of a member State." Its legal position rests on Article 2 of the UN Charter, which states:

> Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.

The South African government has rejected virtually all decisions handed down by the UN concerning apartheid. It has frequently stated that any examination of its policies by the UN constitutes a direct violation of sovereignty.[45]

Other actions have been taken by South Africa to express its discontent over wide-spread criticism. Since 1956, it has withdrawn from the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), boycotted the 1960 session of the General Assembly, withdrawn from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Labor Organization (ILO). On May 31, 1961, it withdrew from the Commonwealth of Nations.[46]

In an effort to diminish the constant criticism, South Africa has undertaken the following actions:

(1) made a direct appeal to the racial emotions of Whites in America and Europe,

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[45]United Nations, Segregation in South Africa, p. 28.

[46]Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 69.

(2)   attempted to play on Western fears of Communism,

(3)   stressed the strategic and logistical importance of South Africa, and

(4)   placed great emphasis on the growth of the economy and the value of South Africa to foreign investors.[47]   Each has met with varying degrees of success.

The South African government feels that it has been made the "whipping-boy of the world" as a result of what it calls the ignorant, weak, and political opportunistic criticism of several Western governments. The situation in South Africa, says the Nationalist government, is more critical for the White population than outside observers realize and it is apartheid policies which have stabilized the situation.

> Subversive Bantu organizations in South Africa, which enjoy the support of only a small percentage of the Bantu people with active encouragement from white Communist and ultraliberalist groups, have realized that the active and progressive steps taken by the Government are having a favorable reaction among the Bantu and they have therefore been doing their utmost to undermine the Government's plan and to create discontent among the Bantu. Expatriate members of these subversive organizations are very active in carrying out an anti-South African campaign overseas, particularly in New York and London.[48]

The government recognizes that the expatriated members of the subversive Bantu organizations have the support of the Afro-Asian states and claims that these very states which

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[47]Thompson, Republic of South Africa, p. 5.

[48]Ibid., p. 6.

offer such support are themselves guilty of discriminatory practices and oppression of large segments of their own populations.[49]

Such activity has prompted repressive measures and firmness. All, says the government, are justified. The Communist Party, the African Nationalist Congress (ANC), and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) have been classified subversive and banned in an effort to maintain law and order and national security. The government has also taken steps to prevent their revival under different names and curb their members from committing acts of sabotage. The government is convinced that the reputation of South Africa will improve. It is certain that the acts of sabotage are on the decrease. It is convinced that responsible American and European businessmen have seen the true state of affairs and are taking the message home. It is confident that sentiments are changing and that eventually it will be realized that South Africa is the only reliable ally of the West on the African continent.[50]

Acquiescence in evidence. Theoretically, the Jewish population in South Africa is considered part of the White community with no distinctions. In practice, the Jewish group is separated from both the English and the Afrikaners by the conventional barriers placed on foreigners and those not of

[49]Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[50]Ibid., p. 7.

the pure race. Despite this trend there are signs of Jewish
acquiescence to the system of apartheid. Before 1938 and
the Nationalist Party's rise to power, the Jews had closely
identified with the Union Party under the leadership of
General Smuts and were quite critical of Nationalist Party
policies. In a Jewish monthly publication called Jewish
Affairs there appeared a number of articles criticizing
Nationalist Party policy for racial discrimination and unjust
treatment of the non-White population. The official spokesman
for the Jewish community is the South African Jewish Board of
Deputies and some observers note that the Jewish community
has, in light of statements made by the Board, done an
about-face during the past twenty-three years.[51]

> The Jews have moved from initial revulsion against
> apartheid, through tolerance, to support. But for
> the Jews, this support means not only approval of
> a political philosophy making race or color the
> factor that determines a man's right to participate
> in the life of his country; it also means ignoring
> (or pretending to ignore) the fact that the
> Nationalist Party now in power was pro-Nazi before
> and during World War II and has manifested, and
> continues to manifest, anti-Semitic prejudice.[52]

Jews in South Africa have held a unique position.
Most of the wealth of South Africa has always been in the
hands of English or Jewish capitalists and the Jew, since
the early 1950's, has been granted membership in all political
parties.[53] Jews constitute the majority of leadership among

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[51]Leslie Rubin, "South African Jewry and Apartheid,"
Africa Report, February, 1970, p. 22.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Carter, Politics of Inequality, pp. 248, 302.

mine owners but do not, as a rule, employ Jews in the mines,
nor are the businesses that supply Jews owned or run by them.
They are increasingly becoming involved in manufacturing.
They have become leaders in farming except for cattle breeding
and wine producing. Although allowed membership in political
parties, their influence is minimal largely because they have
concentrated in one area--Johannesburg. The Jewish population
in South Africa is estimated at between four and five percent
of the White population. (the last census year that classified
Europeans according to decent was 1926, and estimates are now
made on the basis of religion). The percentage is likely to
decrease for the following reasons. One, they are not readily
allowed into the country. Two, some are returning to Israel.[54]

It can be strongly argued, however, that acquiescence
stems from integrated involvement in the economic structure
of South Africa. The desire to maintain such status tends to
override certain basic religious concepts (e.g.--the freedom
of all men to choose their earthly destiny). It does not
appear that Jews are willing to give up the benefits they now
enjoy.

Conclusion. South Africa's history and heritage play
a significant role in perpetuating apartheid policies. Most
nations seek to reinforce a sense of nationalism or pride
through historiography. Such activities attempt to give
credence to those principles and policies upon which their

[54]Sarah Millin, The People of South Africa (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), pp. 233-34.

nation has and is functioning. South Africa does not differ
from the norm in this respect. Coupled with the use of
history, the government has resorted to other arguments to
give substance and meaning to its policies. To most observers
these arguments are repulsive, colored or distorted, and
unrealistic. But to those who implement such policies and to
those who are benefiting from such arrangements, it is not
difficult to accept such defenses of apartheid. Considering
the acceptance of such argumentation, the extensive control
which the government may exercise over the legislative process
(evidenced by the passage of a complicated network of pass
laws and the creation of programs designed to further segre-
gation, at least in a physical sense), and the decision by
Jews to at least try to adjust to existing conditions prompts
one to believe that apartheid policies are firmly entrenched.
If change is forthcoming, investigation thus far would seem
to suggest that those who attempt to impose change will be
confronted by more than just a casual social structure
characterized by injustice.

If, as mentioned earlier, apartheid is almost univer-
sally condemned, perhaps the United Nations has the means by
which to impose change. The efforts of the United Nations is
the next topic for consideration.

CHAPTER III

UNITED NATIONS: ATTITUDES AND ACTION

The United Nations has considered the problem of apartheid every year since its chartering. It has attempted to deal with the situation by following three main lines of activity. One, they have relied heavily on the passage of resolutions, the institution of an arms embargo, and the implementation of economic sanctions. Two, the UN has offered material, political, and moral assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa. Three, they have provided resource material and information about apartheid policies in hopes that UN proposals might meet with greater acceptance on the part of member states and thus, meaningful solutions implemented. The purpose in this chapter will be to examine not only what has been done but the effectiveness of such activity. Consideration will be given to the overall program of the UN, the specific efforts of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and, because of the frustration it has created, the problem of colonialism in Namibia (South West Africa) will also constitute the substance of the following investigation. Such inquiry will attempt to further support the concept that the racial policies of South Africa will not be resolved by continuing present methods.

<u>General observations</u>. From its very early stages institutionalized apartheid has been the subject of criticism in the UN. The intensity of criticism has been commensurate with increased apartheid legislation and the number of new Afro-Asian members admitted to the international organization.[1]

> The racial policies of the Government of South
> Africa have been under discussion in the United
> Nations, in one form or another, since the first
> session of the General Assembly in 1946. The
> matter was then raised by the Government of India
> in the form of a complaint to the Assembly that
> the South African Government had enacted legis-
> lation against South Africans of Indian origin
> in violation of agreements between the two
> Governments.[2]

Sparked by Prime Minister Harold MacMillan's "wind of change" speech condemning apartheid, the Sharpeville incident (a demonstration staged by dissatisfied Black Africans where hundreds of unarmed men, women, and children were slaughtered by police), and the admission of seventeen new African states in 1960, the confrontation between South Africa and most other countries of the world has intensified during the past decade.[3] The criticism is not limited to the policy of apartheid. In essence, apartheid policies have affected the rest of southern Africa and the debate over apartheid policies has been

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[1]Thompson, <u>Republic of South Africa</u>, p. 11.

[2]United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, <u>Review of United Nations Consideration of Apartheid</u>, (ST/PSCA/Ser. A/2), 1967, p. 1.

[3]U.S. House, <u>US-South African Relations, Hearings</u>, 89th Cong., 1966, pp. 66-67.

broadened to include this more inclusive area and the
accompanying problems of colonialism.

> The Asian-African members of the United Nations
> which commonly spark the debates on racial policy
> and colonialism, only recently have become free
> from colonial control. . . . To these countries,
> the racial issue, particularly in the form of the
> domination of Europeans over non-Europeans, is
> surcharged with emotion.[4]

Further, the success of Rhodesia in maintaining its White
government coupled with the decision of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) to accept South Africa as the manda-
tory power over South West Africa has prompted increased
political opposition toward South Africa's apartheid policies.[5]

The substance of the problem, as far as the UN is
concerned, is not who got to the area first, rather, who is
there now and what can be done to create and provide a just
society in which all are provided with their full share of
the success derived.[6] Also, two-thirds of humanity is non-
White, largely poverty stricken, and comes largely from the
underdeveloped areas of the world. This tends to indicate a
correlation between color and poverty. With the gap between
rich and poor widening, a great deal of frustration is created.

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[4]Carter, Politics of Inequality, p. 380.

[5]Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 1.
ICJ decision since has been replaced by UN resolution removing
South West Africa from South Africa. The South West African
problem will be discussed later.

[6]U.S., House, US-South African Relations, Hearings,
89th Cong., 1966, p. 88.

The explosive implications are obvious. Further, the Red Chinese are exploiting the present condition by playing on the sympathies of the poor.[7]

The UN passage of increasingly severe resolutions condemning apartheid has created increased frustration on the part of the newly independent African states because of the ineffectiveness of such measures to bring about meaningful change in policy.[8] However,

> Short of using force, which no one [at least in terms of a UN consensus] is willing to apply, the only way the United Nations can influence a Member State is to appeal to its conscience by marshalling the weight of world opinion against the policies it is pursuing. But in South Africa, this collective pressure has hardened the determination of the ruling Nationalist Party to pursue its own line of policy, it has also alienated white South African opinion in general.[9]

The UN has attempted to deal with the problem of apartheid by following three main lines of activity:

> (a) Arms embargo, economic sanctions and related measures, to oblige the South African Government to renounce the inhumane policies of apartheid and seek a peaceful solution in conformity with its obligations under the charter;
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> (b) Moral, political, and material assistance to oppressed people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle to achieve their inalienable rights; and

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[7]Ibid., p. 76.

[8]Ibid., p. 68.

[9]Carter, Politics of Inequality, p. 381.

(c) Dissemination of information to secure full understanding and support for the efforts directed towards the elimination of <u>apartheid</u> and avert the grave threat to international peace and security.[10]

Of the three approaches, economic sanctions and related measures are felt to be the best means of providing a peaceful solution to the policy of apartheid.

A large majority of Member States have felt strongly that the only means to a peaceful solution is the imposition of economic sanctions against the South African Government under Chapter VII of the Charter [action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression]. Such sanctions require action by the Security Council and the full co-operation of all States, particularly the main trading partners of the Republic of South Africa. These trading partners, including three permanent members of the Security Council (United Kingdom, United States, and France) have contended that the situation in South Africa is not at present a threat to the peace under Chapter VII of the Charter, that economic sanctions are complicated and costly, and that they may not achieve the desired purposes. As a result, there has not been the necessary consensus for action by the Security Council.[11]

A closer inspection indicates that the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan accounted for nearly 75 per cent of the total increase in South African exports between 1962 and 1967. The United Kingdom and Japan alone accounted for 56 per cent of the total increase. With regard to imports, similar observations are manifested. The same four countries accounted for 60 per cent of the total increase for South Africa during the same time period. The UN is doubtful that sanctions will be

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[10]United Nations, Office of Public Information, <u>Objective: Justice</u> (OPI/380), January, 1970, p. 12.

[11]United Nations, <u>Segregation in South Africa</u>, p. 29.

effective unless these major trading partners of South Africa are willing to cooperate.[12] To date the employment of economic sanctions has been ineffective largely because South Africa has built up large reserves of needed imports and her economy is growing rapidly toward self-sufficiency (see chapter VII). Precautions taken by South Africa and continued trade with economically developed nations have diminished the effectiveness of sanctions.

General Assembly's pursuit of the problem. Despite the frustration of ineffectualness, the General Assembly has tackled the problem with continued vigor. From 1946 to 1962, the General Assembly had been considering the question of race conflict and the treatment of the people of Indian origin in South Africa as separate issues.[13] At regular sessions between 1948 and 1952, resolutions were passed concerning Indians in South Africa. The resolutions had invited roundtable discussions between the concerned parties. The discussions failed to materialize because of South African reluctance to participate. In 1952 the United Nations Good Offices Commission was established to help Indians (and Pakistanis) in negotiations with South Africa. It proved ineffective because South Africa refused to recognize the Commission.[14]

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[12]United Nations, Objective: Justice, p. 31.

[13]Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 56.

[14]United Nations, Consideration of Apartheid, p. 3.

In 1952 the "Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Union of South Africa" was considered. Resolution 616A was passed creating the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa. This commission was also rebuffed by South Africa and was discontinued in 1955. Resolutions continued to be passed by the General Assembly deploring South Africa's refusal to observe its obligations under the UN Charter and requesting the Secretary-General to pursue talks with South Africa. Direct consultations did take place during 1960-1961, but little progress resulted.[15]

As indicated earlier, the items of race conflict in South Africa and "treatment of people of Indian and Indo-Pakistan origin" were considered--as of 1962--together. The combined topic was referred to as "the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa." In an unprecedented move the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa. The vote on the measure was 67 in favor, 16 opposed, and 23 abstentions or not voting. (Almost all of the 16 votes in opposition were cast by Western States.) Two days after the adoption of the resolution, South African Prime Minister Vervoerd asserted that it was a Communist plot and that South

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[15]Ibid., pp. 4-8.

Africa was only an incidental target in communism's struggle with the West.[16] Prior to 1967, the General Assembly alone had passed twenty-nine resolutions condemning apartheid in South Africa. In 1969, four resolutions (2506A, 2506B, 2507, and 2508) were passed condemning South Africa, calling for assistance to "national movements," plus widening sanctions against South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal.[17] Those resolutions calling for assistance to national movements and wider sanctions (resolutions 2506B and 2508 respectively) are indications that the UN is beginning to rely on more emotionally charged measures in an attempt to bring about satisfactory solutions to the problems existing in southern Africa. Whether the trend will continue is a matter of speculation. Evidence would suggest that in the midst of increasing frustration over the obvious ineffectiveness of prior General Assembly resolutions, efforts are going to be stepped up and resolutions of the future are going to take on an increasingly harsher tone if present trends continue.

Security Council endeavors. The Sharpeville incident marked the first time the Security Council considered the policies of apartheid.

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[16]Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 17.

[17]A.G. Mezerik, ed. "1969 Chronology of the United Nations," International Review Service, Vol. XV, No. 105, 1970, p. 114.

> Before 1960, for 15 years of its [United Nations]
> existence, it had not proved possible for the
> United Nations to have the Security Council con-
> sider apartheid, because of the argument of
> domestic jurisdiction. Now the Council, and all
> its permanent members, do not dissent from such
> discussion and all permanent members, at one time
> or another, have voted for resolutions which state
> that the policies of apartheid and the situation
> in South Africa are disturbing international
> peace and security.[18]

Less than a month following the Sharpeville incident, the
Security Council adopted a resolution calling on South Africa
to abandon its policies and further requested the Secretary
General to consult with the South African government concern-
ing steps which might be taken to "uphold the purposes and
principles of the Charter."[19]   The most dramatic action taken
by the Security Council occurred in 1963. Two resolutions,
one adopted in August, the other in December, called for an
arms embargo including "equipment and materials for the
manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition." In 1964
another resolution was adopted urging that the South African
government (1) renounce the execution of political leaders in
opposition to policies of apartheid, (2) end the trial that
was in progress, and (3) grant amnesty to all political
prisoners. That same year the Expert Committee of the
Security Council was established to determine effective
measures that might be taken by the Council. Primarily, their
function was to investigate the feasibility of further sanctions

[18]United Nations, Office of Public Information,
Objective: Justice (OPI/371) n.d.p. 5.

[19]Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 54.

The conclusions drawn from their investigation were met with both acceptance and rejection.[20]

The Security Council has not concerned itself with apartheid policies only. All of southern Africa has been considered in macrocosm to the policies of apartheid. That is, apartheid and the ramifications thereof have affected the whole policy of colonialism as it is implemented in southern Africa. Six resolutions were considered by the Security Council in 1969 concerning southern Africa. Five were adopted. Two involved Namibia (South West Africa). Three were concerned with colonialism in Angola and Mozambique. The other, which failed, dealt with the illegal regime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia.[21] With regard to southern Africa, all members agree that:

1. Policies are evil, abhorrent to all and disturbing international peace and security;
2. South Africa has not fulfilled its Charter obligations regarding Namibia;
3. The Portuguese territories are colonies not part of European Portugal. As colonies they are entitled to the right of self-determination; and
4. Ian Smith's regime is illegal, racist, and without international status. The United Kingdom still has power over her as a territory and all trade with the Smith regime is illegal.[22]

The problems of southern Africa still remain unresolved. The major difficulty lies in the lack of agreement among the major

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[20]United Nations, Consideration of Apartheid, pp. 14-19.

[21]Mezerik, "1969 Chronology," p. 97.

[22]United Nations, Objective: Justice (OPI/371), p. 1.

powers on methods, particularly with regard to the use of
enforcement measures provided under the Charter.[23]

The dilemma concerning Namibia. There is a direct
correlation between the policies of apartheid as practiced in
South Africa and the dispute over the control of Namibia.
Because of the correlation, both in practice and debate,
special consideration will be given to it.

The first important issue to complicate matters
between South Africa and the United Nations concerned Namibia.
South Africa had gained control of the area during World War I.
It was taken from Germany. At the Peace Conference following
the war, the South African government proclaimed the territory
as a fifth province. President Wilson was opposed to outright
annexation. A compromise was reached and South West Africa
was placed in the hands of the Union of South Africa as a
mandate by the League of Nations. As a mandate South West
Africa was unique in two ways: (1) it shared a boundary with
the mandatory power; (2) it included White inhabitants whose
population structure was not unlike that of South Africa.
By 1925 the Whites had assumed a significant share of govern-
ing power in the territory. The Germans by this time had
reluctantly accepted British citizenship and the right of the
British to use their own language in their schools. The rise
of Hitler to power prompted the establishment of a German
political party in South West Africa. This, in turn,

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[23]Ibid.

motivated other non-German Europeans of the already existing

United South West Africa Party to petition for immediate

incorporation into the Union of South Africa in 1934.[24]

South Africa rejected the initial request. On the eve

of World War II it found it necessary to reinforce the South

West African police force to prevent Nazi groups from staging

a coup d'etat. At the close of World War II the South West

Africans again petitioned for incorporation. At the opening

of the first session of the General Assembly held in London,

General Smuts proposed that South West Africa "be interna-

tionally recognized as an integral part of the Union." The

argument for incorporation was threefold: (1) it was a

logical request because the two countries were so closely

integrated geographically, economically, and ethnically;

(2) General Smuts argued that any trusteeship agreement that

might be concluded would be against the wishes of the South

West Africans; (3) Article 77 of the Charter (pertaining to

trusteeships) should be interpreted as "permissive not

obligatory."[25]

Upon proposal by Smuts for incorporation, the United

Kingdom was the only open supporter of the plan. Most others

openly opposed it. The principal arguments in opposition

centered around the legal interpretation of Article 77. Asian

and African States, the Soviet Bloc and most Latin American

countries felt it was the obligation of the Union of South

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[24]Carter, Politics of Inequality, pp. 382-83.

[25]Ibid., p. 383.

Africa to place South West Africa under trusteeship. The
United States, Western European and Commonwealth nations did
not agree. In December of 1946, the General Assembly passed
a resolution requesting South Africa not to proceed with
incorporation and recommended that it submit a Trusteeship
Agreement for the territory. A reply from South Africa in
July of 1947 stated they would not proceed with incorporation,
but neither would they place South West Africa under trustee-
ship. They did agree to submit annual reports while continuing
to administer the territory as a mandate.[26]

Although there are essential differences in attitude
between South Africa and most members of the UN, there are
also significant differences in the mandate and trusteeship
systems. The mandate system is largely negative in approach
and is designed to guard against abuses by the administering
power. In contrast, the trusteeship system is based on
positive principles and stresses the duty of the administering
body to advance the indigenous population towards self-
government.[27]

A notable shift in emphasis took place in South Africa
between 1946 and 1947 regarding South West Africa. Concern
had changed from a strong desire for incorporation to a
strictly legal argument over Article 77. The legal arguments
involved the review of annual reports and the authority of the

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[26]Ibid., pp. 383-84.

[27]Ibid., p. 384.

UN (plus various organs and commissions) to investigate South West Africa. These arguments continue to exist. In 1949 in a letter to the Secretary General, the South African government gave formal notification that it would no longer send reports to the UN. The following reasons were given:

(1) the UN did not understand the uniqueness of the situation;
(2) the information being voluntarily supplied was used for 'unwarranted criticism';
(3) there had been no recognition that South Africa would be allowed to administer South West Africa as a mandate; and
(4) did not agree that its submission of reports was indicative of its accountability to the UN for the administration of the territory.[28]

The problems existing over legal interpretation of Article 77 were ultimately submitted to the ICJ. On July 6, 1950 an advisory opinion was handed down by the Court. The tenor of the decision offered a means by which South Africa and the United Nations could help reconcile differences. The Court concluded that South Africa was not obligated to place South West Africa under trusteeship but was obligated to submit annual reports since the territory was still a mandate. The ruling of the ICJ failed to bring about reconciliation of differences. In 1961, further attempts were made. In November of that year, the "Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" was established. The committee is more commonly referred to as the Special Committee of Twenty-four. Since its creation

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[28]Ibid., pp. 384-86.

it has been the primary organ working for settlement of the
Namibia question as well as dealing with other dependent
territories.[29] In 1966, after twenty years of failure to
resolve the Namibia dilemma, the General Assembly voted to
terminate South Africa's control over Namibia. General
Assembly action was rejected by South Africa. Since that
time the UN has continued to condemn South Africa's defiance.
The dilemma is still unresolved.[30]

Conclusion. Obviously the efforts of the UN and its
component parts have met with discouraging failure. Resolution
after resolution has been passed by the General Assembly and
the Security Council. The content of such resolutions has
ranged from condemnation of apartheid policies to diplomatic
and economic sanctions of South Africa. A failure of member
states to agree as to the limits the UN should go to bring
about the demise of apartheid remains a major obstacle in
making such resolutions operable and meaningful. To supple-
ment the use of resolutions, various commissions, study groups,
committees, and ICJ decisions have been utilized in an effort
to impress upon South Africa the degree of world opposition
that exists and the illegality of her actions. The end result
has been either to (1) prompt greater rigidity in South Africa's
position, or (2) to completely disregard or ignore such action.
An attempt to deal with the problem of colonialism has also

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[29]United Nations, Objective: Justice (OPI/371), p. 7.

[30]Ibid., pp. 29-31.

met with failure. Potentially, a solution to the colonial problems of southern Africa could provide greater possibilities for abolishing apartheid. At present South Africa is able to more or less isolate herself as long as she can maintain a series of colonies with White minority governments in close geographical proximity. A solution to colonial problems could break down a portion of this protective barrier. But again the UN has been ineffective.

At present it does not appear that the UN has the authority or the power to impose changes in the racist policies of South Africa. Investigation thus far continues to suggest that apartheid is based on the wishes of the government of South Africa and its willingness to alleviate existing injustices. Unless the UN can initiate a different and more viable approach in dealing with apartheid, it would appear that a potential solution rests elsewhere. Because the United States maintains a position of extensive influence, perhaps a solution can be imposed by her efforts. A discussion of U.S. attitude constitutes the substance of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNITED STATES AND APARTHEID

In the world political arena the United States
(because of its status as a superpower) commands a consider-
able degree of influence. Her military superiority, economic
power, and technological and industrial development have
prompted many nations throughout the world to study very care-
fully if not align themselves along U.S. foreign policy lines
for the sake of political expediency. The United States has
the capability of determining the destiny of a number of
nations through her use of various economic and political
controls. Considering the potential of U.S. influence, her
activities and attitudes toward South Africa warrant some
investigation. Perhaps a solution to apartheid lies in the
power and influence wielded by the U.S.

Attitudes are subject to change. Unlike many African
states in the United Nations, the United States' approach has
remained far less vociferous. In 1958, for example, the U.S.
was reluctant to condemn South Africa for its failure to
comply with UN recommendations. The U.S. position was that
regret and concern should be expressed rather than condemna-
tion. George Harrison, former U.S. Representative to the
General Assembly, stated:

> The problem of racial relations that we are now
> considering for the seventh consecutive year con-
> cerns one of the members of the organization and
> to that extent is primarily the concern of that
> member. At the same time it is related to the
> vast problem of human rights, a matter that con-
> cerns all members of the United Nations.[1]

Harrison further states:

> We in the United States consider that in working
> toward a solution of our own racial problems we
> are fulfilling part of our obligations under the
> Charter. The imperfect observance of human rights
> is not a phenomenon peculiar to any one nation.
> Each member of the United Nations, as it strives
> to overcome inequalities of rights and freedoms,
> is fulfilling its international human rights
> obligations. To the extent that it is not, it
> is shirking or avoiding those obligations, and
> that is a matter of concern to all of us.[2]

By 1959, the U.S. had begun to stress the positive

potentialities of newly independent African States. Official

spokesmen of U.S. policy had begun to abandon their admonish-

ment of African nationalist movements to proceed with caution.

The U.S. by 1960 was beginning to welcome any steps taken by

European countries having control over territories to prepare

their colonies--particularly African--for self-government.

Prior to 1960 the U.S. attitude toward Africa had been based

on her relationships to European metropoles.[3]

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[1]"UN Committee Considers Question of Race Conflict in
South Africa," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX,
No. 1013, 1958, p. 842. Note the term concern.

[2]Ibid., p. 843.

[3]Nielsen, African Battleline, pp. 6-8.

With more and more African States acquiring independence, the U.S. attitude toward apartheid began to harden as indicated by the following statement made by a former U.S. Representative to the UN in a meeting of the Special Political Committee:

> Apartheid is repugnant to the United States. Our deeply felt opposition is not only one of principle. It is also based on our concern for the present and future lives of millions of men, women, and children who are suffering under the harsh application of apartheid . . . . The United States also irrevocably opposes apartheid on the ground that this policy clearly violates Articles 55 and 56 of the (United Nations) Charter . . . . Even if there were no Charter and even if South Africa were not a member of this organization, the United States would still condemn the policy of apartheid in the strongest of terms.[4] (Underlining not in original).

The U.S. has maintained this more stringent view throughout the past decade, but has still managed to keep foreign policy options open. After the Sharpeville tragedy, the U.S. supported a resolution deploring apartheid and has continued, for the most part, to support such resolutions.[5] The U.S. has complied with the arms embargo.

> To our knowledge no major country trading with South Africa has implemented the UN arms embargo regulations more strictly than the United States and the evidence is that some have been considerably less stringent. The total U.S. trade loss resulting from our firm enforcement of the arms embargo is difficult to estimate, but is substantial . . . . In considering the application to export or requests to re-export any commodity to

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[4]Francis T.P. Plimpton, "The Official American View," in South Africa, ed. by Grant S. McClellan, The Reference Shelf, Vol 34, No. 2, (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1962), p. 132.

[5]U.S., House, US--South African Relations, Hearings, 89th Cong. 1966, p. 7.

the Republic of South Africa, the policy of the
office of Export Control is generally to deny
applications covering arms, munitions, military
vehicles, or items used primarily in the manu-
facture or maintenance of arms, munitions, or
implements of war.[6]

This does not preclude re-evaluation.

The United States as a nation with many respon-
sibilities in many parts of the world, naturally
reserves the right in the future to interpret
this policy [arms embargo] in the light of
requirements for assuring the maintenance of
international peace and security. If the
interests of the world community require the
provision of equipment for use in the common
defense effort, we would naturally feel able to
do so without violating the spirit and the
intent of this resolve.[7]

The U.S. policy has been to implement dissuasion and per-

suasion concerning apartheid and the ramifications of that

policy such as colonialism. At the same time it has tried

to keep channels of communication open.

The U.S. has been more critical of activities in

other parts of southern Africa than it has of apartheid

per se. Arthur Goldberg, for example, was critical of the

trials conducted by the South African government against

South West Africans.

Mr. President, the United States has made its view
clear with respect to these trials. It is a view
which we share with the international community,
including jurists and lawyers of high repute
throughout the world. We believe that South Africa's
action in applying its own Terrorism Act to South
West Africa—an international territory over which
South Africa's mandate has been terminated by its
own violations—is contrary to the international

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[6]Ibid., p. 46.

[7]Ibid., pp. 7-8.

obligations of the Government of South Africa,
to the international status of the territory,
to international law, and to the fundamental
rights of the inhabitants.[8]

The U.S. made the following suggestions to prevent similar

occurrences on the part of South Africa:

(1) continue UN persuasion of South African wrong
     doing--and secure release of the 33 men con-
     victed and reparations to South West Africans
     detained in South Africa,
(2) break down the legal facade used by South
     Africa,
(3) send personal representatives of Security
     Council to undertake all possible humanitarian
     measures to alleviate the unfortunate condi-
     tions now prevailing in the area, and
(4) request International Committee of the Red
     Cross to have full, continuing, and unimpeded
     access to each South West African who has at
     any time been detained under the Terrorism
     Act of 1967.[9]

One alternative the U.S. has refused to implement is

the ultimatum. The U.S. has stated on several occasions that

she cannot "support the concept of an ultimatum" to the South

African government which could be interpreted as threatening

the application of coercive measures in the situation now

prevailing, since in her view the Charter clearly does not

empower the Security Council to apply coercive measures in

such a situation.[10] U.S. opposition to such action is based

on three assumptions:

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[8]"Security Council Censures South Africa for
Defiance of UN Authority," U.S. Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. LVIII, No. 1502, 1968, p. 474.

[9]Ibid., p. 475.

[10]Nielsen, African Battleline, p. 83.

(1) they may lead to other ultimatums and
    eventually force,
(2) it can't be assumed that racial policies
    alone are a 'threat to peace' thereby
    requiring mandatory measures--it is
    unacceptable on constitutional grounds,
    and
(3) mandatory measures enforced by UN would
    cause undue strain on the existence of
    the organization.[11]

Apartheid not a high priority issue. Although the

U.S. has made quite clear her position on South Africa's

apartheid policies, very little, if anything, has been decided

as to what the U.S. should do except express disapproval and

implement the arms embargo. In her direct relationships with

South Africa, the United States continues, in most respects,

to deal on a normal and "business as usual" basis. The U.S.

still maintains a consulate and embassy in South Africa.

Travel, educational, and cultural exchanges are encouraged.

There are few restrictions with regard to trade and invest-

ment. There are various forms of military and scientific

cooperation carried on between the U.S. and South Africa.[12]

Although not essential to national security, the scientific,

economic, and strategic aspects of her bilateral relationships

are useful to her and continue to exist.[13]

Apartheid, at present, is low on the list of U.S.

foreign policy priorities. There are several reasons for this.

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[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid., pp. 65-69.

[13]U.S., House, U.S.-South African Relations, Hearings,
89th Cong., 1966, p. 5.

South Africa is far away and there are problems closer to
home that must be solved first. She has no territorial
interests in South Africa. The economic benefits received
from South Africa are relatively small on a world-wide scale.
The military importance of South Africa, at present, is small.
Last, South Africa is not contiguous to the communist sphere,
therefore not pertinent to the policy of containment.[14] The
position of South Africa and the seaports near and around the
Cape of Good Hope make it important logistically for support
of the U.S. Navy fleet moving to and from Vietnamese waters,
but not absolutely essential. If the Mediterranean route
were to close, the priority of South Africa would probably
be reassessed.[15]

Other than the arms restrictions, the U.S. has been
unwilling to support UN economic sanctions because:

(1) it's questionable whether there is a legal
     basis for such sanctions;
(2) it's questionable whether they provide the
     desired economic effectiveness; and
(3) there is a question regarding the psycho-
     logical effectiveness.[16]

American investment in South Africa is minor compared with
that of the United Kingdom. It remains in doubt how much
leverage could be exercised by the U.S. alone. Further,
South Africa is not dependent on U.S. trade. Considering
these factors, there are serious questions concerning the

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[14]Ibid., p. 75.

[15]Ibid., p. 6.

[16]Ibid., p. 8.

psychological impact on South Africa. There is considerable room to doubt that White South Africans would gain greater appreciation of the worldwide opposition to their policies through additional sanctions.[17]

The Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique have been condemned for practicing policies similar to that of South Africa. The U.S. has been, as a result, confronted with another foreign policy dilemma. American bases in the Azores have been granted to the U.S. in a treaty directly negotiated with Portugal. The lease for these bases expired in 1962. Negotiations, or preparations for such, are still continuing. Uncertain as to the outcome of such negotiations, the U.S. has been reluctant to offend Portugal unnecessarily.

> We in the United States are deeply committed to
> self-determination for all people. We believe
> Portugal should recognize publicly that the
> principle of self-determination is applicable
> to its territories. Our policy is to encourage
> both Portugal and the Africans to come to a
> workable understanding.[18]

Although the bases in the area are not considered indispensable, they are important for air transportation and refueling; and U.S. naval missions there serve as a communication center for submarine operations in the eastern Atlantic.[19]

Portugal, because of its membership in NATO, complicates the degree of mobility the U.S. may exercise in respons to demands for self-government for Angola and Mozambique.

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[17]Ibid., p. 9.

[18]Nielsen, _African Battleline_, p. 29.

[19]Ibid., pp. 30-31.

> The United States would like to remain in the
> Azores as long as it can. On the other hand,
> in the present judgement of some American defense
> officials, if a flat choice had to be made between
> retaining the Azores or retaining U.S. military
> assets and relationships on the African continent,
> the latter would take precedence over the former.
> This is a choice which the United States has not
> so far had to make and which it would obviously
> prefer not to have to make.[20]

By attempting to maintain rapport with both Africans and Europeans, the U.S. has become the target of criticism for both. To Africans U.S. policy is disappointing at a time when the quest for national independence is critical. To Europeans the U.S. represents an irritating influence pushing them to make concessions to African demands for self-government.[21]

A summary of the U.S. position toward apartheid, taken from speeches and votes at the UN, indicates flexibility and caution. Apartheid is an offensive doctrine, contrary to a member state's obligations with respect to human rights under the UN Charter. Second, the South African situation is increasingly dangerous and could seriously trouble peace and progress in Africa and throughout the world if present trends continue. Third, the U.S. accepts the desirability of voluntary sanctions against South Africa in arms, machinery for their manufacture, and strategic materials and will continue to cut off the sale of such items. Fourth, the U.S. is prepared to have the Security Council study the possible feasibility of further sanctions against South Africa. Fifth, the

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[20] Ibid., p. 27.

[21] Ibid., p. 7.

U.S. will continue to make financial contributions for the
education of South African exiles and political refugees
abroad.[22]

> Hitherto, it has been possible for the United
> States to attempt to reconcile its intersecting
> European and African interests by avoiding or
> deferring clear choices. But in Angola,
> Mozambique, and South Africa, middle ground is
> disappearing, and the stark outline of ultimate
> alternatives becomes progressively more visible
> through the murky atmosphere of dispute.[23]

Conclusion. It appears that the potential for
effecting change possessed by the U.S. has been used, to
date, to help perpetuate existing conditions in South Africa.
Although not openly and catagorically condoning such policies,
the U.S. has by virtue of a complicated foreign policy dilemma,
in essence, opted in favor of South Africa. The U.S. has been
willing to support the arms embargo; but it has refused to
support any coersive measures to impose change. The U.S.
considers apartheid offensive but there are considerably more
vital areas of concern that must be resolved first. Further,
the tenable position over use of the Azores has caused U.S.
foreign policy decision makers to proceed with caution. On
the other hand, the number of independent African states
created in the 1960's found the U.S. having to provide some·
appeasement to this potentially viable economic market. Thus,
fence straddling appears to be the policy the U.S. chooses to
pursue. In the absence of any firmer commitment by the U.S.

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[22]Ibid., p. 69.

[23]Ibid., p. 11.

to pressure South Africa into changing apartheid policies
another external pressure on the system is virtually
eliminated.

CHAPTER V

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND APARTHEID

Examination of United Nations and United States
activity provides little encouragement in the hopes of
alleviating apartheid policies through external pressures.
Another viable option, in terms of external application of
pressure, exists. The member states of the OAU have, on many
occasions, expressed their disgust over apartheid and the
related problems of colonialism. With the increased desire
for establishing a unified Africa, prompted in part by the
acquisition of independence by many African states, there
exists the potential for those independent states to combine
their resources and talents and prove a formidable power in
dealing with South Africa. Because of its potential, con-
sideration will be given to the principles of the OAU, the
methods employed in fulfilling those principles, and the
degree of success experienced by the OAU. An examination of
communist attitudes and activities will also be considered
in this chapter. The purpose for including Communist attitude
in this chapter is twofold. One, the foreign policy decision
making process in the Soviet Union is very obscure. Any
elaborate analysis of Soviet foreign policy with regard to
apartheid policies would be highly speculative. Two, it is

known that almost all assistance from the Soviet Union is channelled through the OAU.

Combining the efforts of the OAU with one of the world's two superpowers makes the potential for imposing change in the racist policies of South Africa equally, if not more, awesome than the external pressures already considered.

The Charter as indicator. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia the 25th of May, 1963. The substance of the Charter does much to express member states' attitudes toward apartheid. The preamble points to the recognition of "the inalienable rights of all people to control their own destiny, also freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples." A stronger conviction is the passage stating that heads of the African states and governments are "determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms."[1] (Underlining not in original)

The sections concerning "Purposes" and "Principles"-- Articles II and III respectively--provide additional insight into prevailing attitudes. One purpose of the organization

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[1]The Charter of the Organization of African Unity, cited by Scipio in Emergent Africa, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 181.

is "to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa."
The Charter elaborates on method only to the extent that
member states recognize equal sovereignty among its members,
implement peaceful approaches, and remain aloof of internal
affairs of member states. Paradoxically, these principles
would appear to apply specifically to the settlement of
disputes among member states. If more militant recourse
were deemed necessary to alleviate the problems of southern
Africa, the Charter would not appear to inhibit such action.[2]

Modes of expression. Those African States subsequently
signing the Charter had previously adopted strongly worded
resolutions condemning apartheid. The resolutions had little
effect on South Africa in terms of bringing about any changes
in apartheid policies. They met with much the same fate as
have numerous UN proposals. The resolutions did help to
clarify positions of the embryonic African States.[3] Since
adoption of the Charter, the OAU has continued adopting
resolutions. Many have called for various kinds of boycotts
against South Africa. The administration of such boycotts
was left to the Sanctions Bureau which was created under the
Secretariat of the OAU.

Passage of resolutions is one of several techniques
employed by OAU to bring about change in southern Africa.

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[2]Ibid., pp. 182-88.

[3]T.O. Elias, "The Charter of the Organization of
African Unity," The American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 59, No. 2, 1965, p. 245.

Technique is in part determined by the particular area under

consideration. For example, the OAU has long advocated that

the British use force to overthrow the Ian Smith regime.

Until such time as they are adequately equipped to offer

meaningful resistance against the White minority government,

they are content to call upon Great Britain, who possesses

the viable strength, to utilize it in Southern Rhodesia. The

OAU has attempted political persuasion also. The rapid

development of the independent African states in the north

have provided the OAU with political leverage. OAU member

states are beginning to approach leading trading partners of

southern Africa with sharper choices. Are those trading

nations willing to choose southern Africa in preference to

the independent African states? Will they choose the pre-

servation of their assets and future economic opportunities

in independent Africa or the protection of its economic

interests in southern Africa?[4] Another alternative supported

by the OAU, as discussed at the UN, is the policy referred to

as "isolation." (the attempt to remove South Africa from the

mainstream of international trade and politics) The theory is

that "isolation" serves much the same kind of punishment as a

criminal faces when forced to occupy a jail cell.

> South Africa is viewed as an offender, if not of
> the law of nations, certainly of the cannons of
> the new international morality. But the inter-
> national society--unlike the society of say,

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[4]Nielsen, _African Battleline_, pp. 11-12.

Great Britain or Tanganyika--has no jail to which
it can send its worst offenders.[5]

"Isolation" is defended on two counts. First, it serves as
retribution for committing the offense. Second, it may act
as a deterrent against repeating the offense or preventing
the offender from continuing it. The major drawback to the
theory is that the dilemma that now permeates the seating of
Red China would be transferred to South Africa. China is
out; should she be in? South Africa is in; should she be out?[6]

Considerable activity against the policies of apartheid
has been undertaken by the OAU's African Liberation Committee
(ALC). The creation of such an organ had been requested by
several nationalist movements.

> No African country or nation is really free until
> all Africa is free. Accordingly, we urge most
> strongly that in all African countries no forms
> of discrimination or differentiation of status
> should ever be entertained among us African peoples.
> We are all African freedom fighters. The fact that
> we are not yet free is not due to any lack of
> revolutionary spirit in our movements. It is due
> to the oppressive tactics of the imperialists as
> well as some historical and political realities in
> our territories. We urge sincerely that in this
> Summit Conference [held in Addis Ababa, May, 1963]
> we be accorded a status commensurate to our position
> as brothers and comrades of the African freedom
> fighters who have already won their independence.
> We request that the opportunity be given to us to
> participate in and address the Summit Conference
> as associate members.[7]

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[5]Ali A. Mazrui, "The United Nations and Some African
Attitudes," International Organization, Vol. XVIII, No. 3,
1964, p. 507.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Immanual Maurice Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics
of Unity, (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 154.

The ALC, sometimes known as the Committee of Nine, was created in May of 1963, to combat colonialism. All OAU members contribute to the success of the ALC in three ways. One, they contribute funds. Two, they provide territory for nationalists heading liberation movements so that they might receive special training. Three, all members promote the transportation of material aid.[8] The ALC, although resolutions passed at Addis Ababa stopped short of outward endorsement of the use of violence, has decided that in certain colonial situations in southern Africa violence is essential in securing liberation. It has interpreted its responsibility as being one of organizing an overall African strategy on liberation and is pursuing that role. To accomplish such liberation, four basic principles have been formulated. One, overall effectiveness would best be served by collective action and mutual assistance. Two, there would be virtually no tactics left unconsidered. Three, the ALC would be the organ responsible for coordinating the struggles for national liberation. Four, in attempts to achieve total liberation for Africa it would delegate, when advantageous, its own responsibilities to its neighbors in an attempt to broaden its nationalist movement.[9]

The most recent declaration of OAU attitude toward apartheid is found in the form of the Lusaka Manifesto. The

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[8]Robert O. Matthews, "Interstate Conflicts in Africa," International Organization, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, 1970, p. 338.

[9]Wallerstein, Politics of Unity, pp. 155-56.

document is, in large measure, the result of efforts put
forth by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. The Manifesto,
since its proclamation in April of 1969, has been accepted
and adopted by the East and Central African States, the OAU,
the General Assembly, and the Security Council.[10] The tenor
of the document is reflected in the following excerpt:

> We wish to make clear. . . our acceptance of the
> belief that all men are equal, and have equal
> rights to human dignity and respect, regardless
> of colour, race, religion, or sex. We believe
> that all men have the right and the duty to
> participate, as equal members of the society,
> in their own government. We do not accept
> that any other group has any right to govern
> any other group of sane adults, without their
> consent, and we affirm that only the people
> of a society, acting together as equals, can
> determine what is, for them, a good society
> and a good social, economic, or political
> organization.[11]

The Manifesto urges a peaceful settlement to the problems in
southern Africa. While the impasse continues, support for
nationalist movements will continue. Each country in southern
Africa possesses different problems. The Manifesto approaches
them with differing attitudes. Each problem area is considered
on its own merits and the Manifesto addresses itself to each
problem separately.

The Manifesto deplores apartheid policies on grounds
of their inhumanity. It refers to the fact that "a position
of privilege or the experience of oppression" is dependent on

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[10]B.V. Mtshali, "Zambia's Foreign Policy," Current
History, Vol. 58, No. 343, 1970, p. 149.

[11]United Nations, Objective: Justice (OPI/380),
p. 46.

man's colour, his parentage and his ancestors. It deplores

the idea that a Black millionaire or brilliant political

scientist is still subjected to vicious pass laws and excluded

from political activity. It points out that apartheid policies

are regularly condemned by the United Nations and others but

that many nations have opted in favor of international law at

the expense of humanitarian action. To alleviate such injus-

tice the Manifesto suggests that:

> . . . South Africa should be excluded from the
> United Nations agencies, and even from the United
> Nations itself. It should be ostracized by the
> world community until it accepts the implications
> of man's common humanity. It should be isolated
> from world trade, patterns and left to be self-
> sufficient if it can. The South African Government
> cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept
> of mankind's unity, and to benefit by the strength
> given through friendly international relations.
> And certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the main-
> tenance of the present policies against people of
> African descent.

Soviet foreign policy and the fight against apartheid.

Determining the process by which foreign policy is formulated

in the Soviet Union is a speculative endeavor.

> It is an established practice of the chancelleries
> of the world to hide as much as possible of their
> policy-making processes, in order to maintain a
> facade of unity and in order to conceal their sources
> of information, their techniques, and their final
> decisions before their actual execution. This is
> the practice even in democratic countries. But in
> the latter states the instruments for formulating
> foreign policy are usually defined by law and are
> well known. In the free give-and-take of debate
> over foreign policy and in the subsequent memoirs
> of the participants much·of the actual process of
> decision-making is exhibited for scholars to study.
> In the Soviet Union the efforts to conceal the tech-
> niques and results of policy formulation go much
> farther. Here even the instruments for making policy

are hidden behind a deceiving democratic facade.
The Presidium of the Party is known to be the
central forum for decisions, but, except for its
personnel little else is known about this body.
There is no free debate over foreign policies,
and when the 'line' has been set a strict adherence
to it is maintained by all discussants. Further-
more, none of the Soviet leaders since Stalin's
domination of the Soviet apparatus has written any
memoirs that provide an insight into the inner
workings of the government and Party. Consequently
the story of policy formulation in the USSR must be
presented as a hypothesis rather than as a docu-
mented body of information.[12]

Ascertaining exact patterns of foreign policy develop-

ment are difficult. This does not preclude the observation

of several general trends in Soviet policy. The goals of

Soviet leadership in formulating foreign policy are closely

tied to Communist ideology and the way such ideology relates

to international politics. That is, Communist attitudes

toward world revolution, the tradition of expansion, ambition

and nationalism, internal instabilities, and the like,

motivate Soviet leadership to respond with a reasonable degree

of consistency. To help keep in touch with developments on

the international scene, the Communist Party network has been

established.[13]

The Communist Party maintains its own channels to
the outside world through its agents and through
legal and underground Communist parties in most
countries of the world . . . . Absolute obedience
was expected of members to orders from above,
especially to directives issued by the Central

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[12]David T. Cattell, "The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics," Control of Foreign Relations in Modern Nations,
ed. Philip Buck and Martin B. Travis Jr., (New York: W.W.
Norton Co.), 1957, pp. 656-57.

[13]Ibid., pp. 676-82.

Executive Committee of the Communist International
(Comintern), which from the beginning was under the
control of the Russian Communist Party . . . .
. . . .
One of the many services performed by members of
foreign Communist parties on behalf of the Soviet
Union is the collection of intelligence information.
The leaders of these parties make occasional visits
to Moscow not only to receive new orders but also
to report on their activities and on conditions at
home.[14]

With regard to apartheid the Soviet Union has been

quite consistent in its performance at the UN. Taking the

results of seventy votes on colonial and related issues

during the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Twentieth,

and Twenty-first sessions, the Soviet Union voted sixty-seven

times against southern Africa with three abstentions. The

votes sampled represented votes on full resolutions as well

as sections of resolutions. Compared with the U.S. voting

record on the same issues, a firmer opposition to the racist

policies of South Africa can be detected on the part of Soviet

leadership. The U.S. voted only eight times against southern

Africa, thirty times in support, abstained twenty-seven times,

and, although present, failed to vote five times.[15]

United Nations voting patterns are not the only factor

to be considered in examining Soviet behavior. An isolated

look at the voting pattern with reference to apartheid can be

deceiving. Although the Soviet Union policy appears to

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[14]Ibid., p. 667.

[15]David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations:
1960-1967, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970),
appendixes D, E, and F.

coincide with UN principles, a fundamental difference remains. It is very difficult for the Soviet Union to accept fundamental obligations of membership in the UN because of basic incompatibilities in Communist doctrine and the principles of the UN charter. Among the areas of conflict are the use of coercive measures to solve problems, theories of constitutional development, financing, international ajudication, peacekeeping and disarmament, and economic and social cooperation.[16] This conflict of principles limits the effectiveness of the Soviet Union in dealing with apartheid. Its performance on paper is consistent with the principles of the UN; the ends to which each is willing to go to get results are subject to considerable debate. To avoid direct confrontation over basic differences, neither the Soviet Union nor the UN has exploited too forcibly these areas of disagreements. It does not appear that significant changes in this area will occur. The Soviet Union will most likely continue to maintain the status quo.[17]

There are for the Soviet Union other means to combat apartheid policies. Much of what is being done by the Communists occurs covertly, largely in the form of front organizations. The role of such organizations according to Otto Kuusinen, former Finnish Communist leader, is:

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[16]For examination of conflicts see Richard N. Gardner, In Pursuit of World Order: U.S. Foreign Policy and Internationa Organizations, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), pp. 47-58.

[17]Max Beloff, "Russia's Foreign Policy: Cycle of Mistrust," Interplay, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1971, p. 13.

> to create a whole solar system of organizations
> and smaller committees around the Communist
> Party--smaller organizations working actually
> under the influence of the Party, although not
> under its mechanical leadership.[18]

Front organizations are necessary to attract the necessary outside support and such organizations have been used for over fifty years. The Soviet Union is very cautious about publicly affirming its association with "front organizations." For example it has repeatedly rejected the charge that the Communist Party controls the ANC; but most readily has accepted the idea that both adhere to very similar positions regarding the tactics and strategy for liberating the African people.[19]

William Pomeroy, in his introduction to Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism, points to the fact that national liberation movements in southern Africa have had extensive assistance from the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Cuba and Algeria. Further, "Marxist methods of class analysis, of agitation and mass organization, and of political work have influenced these armed struggles considerably."[20] The national liberation movement in South Africa has moved very cautiously. All forms of non-violent means were exhausted before the ANC, the Communist Party of South Africa, the South African Indian

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[18]Ian Greig, The Assault on the West, (Surrey, England: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd. 1968), p. 39.

[19]David L. Morison, The USSR and Africa, (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 112-13.

[20](New York: International Publishers), p. 40.

Congress, and various trade unions resorted to armed force. The first guerrilla activities were undertaken by a group known as Umkonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation). Such activity was geared toward sabotage. The fighting force had difficulty with training personnel because the government has barred Africans from possessing firearms and from participating in extensive military or police training.[21]

Communist support of front organizations has occured, to a great extent, through support of the OAU. Because of efforts by the OAU to plan liberation for all of oppressed Africa, the Soviet Union can render support to a much wider revolution. There is also a great deal of diversity in individual movements. The coordinated efforts of OAU offer potentially greater success than support for independent movements.

> Although there have been proposals for a continental strategy and armed coordination in the anti-imperialist struggle in Africa, diversity is also a feature of African countries and of their conditions, and affects the nature of that coordination. Attempts were made to achieve continental unity for complete liberation through the Organization of African Unity, set up in 1963 largely on the initiative of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. An OAU Liberation Committee was created to give active aid to armed African liberation movements.[22]

Further evidence of the diversity in southern African liberation movements is seen by the number of organizations in operation. In eight southern African countries there are

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[21]Ibid., p. 42-43.

[22]Ibid., p. 247.

sixteen different Communist or Communist influenced organizations or movements. By country and organization they are:

(1) Angola

Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA)

Uniao dos Populacoes de Angola (UPA)

(2) Basutoland (Lesotho)

Communist Party of Lesotho

(3) Mozambique

Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO)

Comitato Revolucionario de Mozambique (COREMO)

(4) Rhodesia

Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)

(5) South Africa

Communist Party of South Africa

African Nationalist Congress (ANC)

Pan-African Congress (PAC)

Umkonto We Sizwe

Poqo

(6) South West Africa (Namibia)

South West African National Union (SWANU)

South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)

(7) Swaziland

Communist Party of Swaziland

(8) Zambia

United National Independence Party (UNIP)[23]

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[23]Greig, _Assault on the West_, appendix.

Such fragmentation appears to suggest that OAU, even with Communist support, has fallen considerably short of its objective of establishing a "continental strategy."

Statements made by the Communist Party of South Africa reflect various attitudes. Some express a necessity for greater dedication to the Communist ideology and participation on the part of Communist sympathizers.

> . . . study groups can be very important. They should study the conditions in their own country, in the light of Communist theory. They should take part as loyal members in the national liberation struggle. They should work for the brotherly unity of all Communists in each country, preparing the way for eventual formation of a Communist party to advance the cause of the workers and help in building a united front of national liberation, comprising all parties and classes, and people of all patriotic views. An important task which can and should be undertaken by an African Communist study group is to prepare articles for this journal based upon a study and analysis of conditions in their own country, and the solution proposed for its problems.[24]

Some reflect division within their own ranks.

> The revolutionary way forward is not provided by the blind rioting and indiscriminate Poqo--style attacks on white civilians and property, or in the irresponsible claims of certain leaders of the Pan Africanist Congress, which no longer exists as an organized force within South Africa. Rather, what the situation demands is "organized and planned mass defense and resistance"; actions which are both militant and principled and which do not yield to desperation tactics or opportunistic concessions to backward elements.[25]

Some indicate the necessity to continue the propaganda war. Apparently there are still many who are not convinced of the need for armed revolution.

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[24]Ibid., p. 223.

[25]Morison, The USSR and Africa, p. 113.

Today in many parts of the country, government
policy is driving people into resistance to a
stage where they are clamaring for action. Local
leaders cannot lag behind the people, or they will
cease to be leaders and the blind forces of des-
truction and revenge will take over. But local
action must always be principled, in accordance
with the established policy and general direction
of the national leadership. No desperation, no
adventurism, but firm, resolute and revolutionary
action! That should be the watchword of the
oppressed people and their leaders in the diffi-
cult days ahead. That is the policy of the
Communist Party. . . .[26]

also:

A minority, however heavily armed, cannot prevail
over the great majority of the people when the
majority is organized, determined and clear in
its purpose. Every new act of tyranny and oppres-
sion by the government calls forth acts of revolu-
tionary protest and resistance by the masses.
Often such acts may be unplanned, desperate and
unsuccessful. They may be answered by heavy and
costly reprisals. But in the process the forces
of liberation are being forged. They are becoming
more steeled in their determination. They are
building effective and indestructible organizations.
They are achieving ever greater clarity of purpose
and direction.[27]

Again an indication of frustration:

Another important lesson which the oppressed people
are fast learning from the present crucial phase of
our history is that every attempt to redress or
rectify a local or partial grievance is necessarily
connected with, and can only be won by, the defeat
of the Nationalist government itself, and the
ending of white minority rule. Where every protest
and every demand is met merely by bloody suppression
by the state, it becomes clear to one section of the
people after another that the state itself is the
obstacle to any sort of advance, and that no sort
of happy or tolerable future is possible without

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[26]Pomeroy, _Guerrilla Warfare_, p. 273.

[27]_Ibid._, p. 271.

the removal of this tyrannical state and its
replacement by one which embodies the will of
the majority of the people.[28]

Conclusions: Resolutions passed by the OAU have not

met with much more success than those passed by the UN.

Diversity of interests, even within this smaller organization,

pose much the same problem as the diversity within the UN.

The attempt to apply economic leverage has not as yet been

heeded by major trading partners of South Africa. It would

appear that until independent Africa is as economically

viable as South Africa such attempts at economic coercion

will be diplomatically put aside. Efforts of the ALC appear

to have fallen well short of their intended goal of full

liberation for all African peoples. Again, diversity appears

the major nemesis. Coupled with the support of one of the

two superpowers, the OAU has faired little better, if any,

than the UN and United States in bringing about the demise

of apartheid policies. Whether pursuit of such tactics will

eventually produce desired ends remains a test for history.

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[28]Ibid., p. 272.

CHAPTER VI

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND DOMESTIC RESISTANCE

The most viable alternatives in terms of external
solutions to South African racial policies have been largely
exhausted in the previous three chapters. There is, however,
considerable opposition to existing conditions on the domestic
front. Disenchantment exists among Whites as well as Africans.
What are the forces at work within South Africa to bring
about the demise of apartheid? What are the ramifications of
such movements and activities? What are some of the tactics
being utilized to achieve desired goals? What are the prospects
for success among dissident groups? What are the reasons for
the existence of such groups? What has been the government's
position toward these forms of dissent? These are some of
the questions which will be dealt with in the following
examination.

Opposition within the legal framework. Opposing
political parties have continued to reject the policy of
apartheid in varying degrees since 1948. The United Party
constitutes the major opposition to the Nationalist Party.
Since the election of 1953, the United Party's chances of
regaining control of the government have continued to

diminish, especially since the right to vote has been taken
from the Coloureds. Further, the Nationalist Party controls
the South African Broadcasting Company (SABC) and has con-
tinued to play on anti-British sympathies by labeling the
United Party as the party of the English. Although the
United Party has remained the least critical, it has been
unable to appeal to broad sections of the Afrikaner popula-
tion. It seeks to preserve White "leadership" throughout
South Africa, but advocates a milder approach. It would
provide limited non-White representation in Parliament.

The Progressive Party is more liberal than either the
Nationalist or United parties. It seeks radical constitutional
reforms which would guarantee fundamental rights to all
individuals. The Liberal Party was, until banned in 1960,
the most radical of the political opposition. Liberals had
been advocating a totally democratic state "based on the will
of the people." All South African opponents of the govern-
ment, with the exception of the United Party, are critical of
both the performance of the Nationalist government within the
existing framework and the system itself.[1] There has been a
significant contingent of White opposition. This segment of
the population, however, is subject to repressive legislation
just as are Black South Africans.

> Members of the Liberal Party, led by Alan Paton
> and other advocates of non-racial democracy, have
> been banned, prohibited from attending meetings

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[1]Thompson, Republic of South Africa, pp. 8-9.

and gatherings and from publishing any statement
or writing in South Africa. Liberal members of
university faculties have similarly been silenced.[2]

Being subjected to increased harassment in the form of repres-

sive legislation tends to stifle the efforts of Whites who

are not sympathetic with the injustices inherent in the

system. This sense of frustration permeates virtually all

attempts to rectify existing conditions. Since all attempts

to alter the system have been eventually thwarted (at least

the viable ones), serious consideration must be given as to

whether or not the pursuit of such ends are worth life in

prison or possibly the death sentence. It is a possibility

that the present government would not hesitate to implement

if it felt threatened.

The not so silent majority. Although subjected to

very repressive legislation the nationalist movements in

southern Africa continue the fight for liberation. They have

become bored and impatient with ineffectiveness. Where con-

cessions have been made, they have always been too little and

too late. In recent years there have been no meaningful con-

cessions at all.[3] The trend for nationalist movements during

the last decade has been toward more militancy.

> The 1960's saw the introduction of a new element
> in the strategy of the anti-colonial forces on the
> continent of Africa. Having formerly rejected
> violence as a means of struggle against imperialism,
> the nationalist movements and the newly independent

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[2]Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 50.

[3]First, "South Africa Today," p. 191.

states were led by the intransigence of the
remaining colonial powers to the conclusion
that armed resistance remained the only alter-
native left to bring about change in the regions
still subjected to white rule. Supported and
abetted by member states of the OAU, African
nationalists from Portuguese Africa, South Africa,
Southern Rhodesia, and South West Africa have begun
guerrilla-type actions in an effort to dislodge
the remaining white rulers from their territories.[4]

Nationalist movements in Angola and Mozambique have made it
clear that they are willing to accept any help, economic or
military, from any and all who are concerned about self-
government for Africans.

Joshua Nkomo, former leader of ANC and former leading
Southern Rhodesian political figure, commented on the attitude
of Africans toward the West's complacency.

Today the 250,000 Europeans in Southern Rhodesia
sit tightly on a smoldering volcano aware of the
consequences but consoled by the knowledge that
the Western world will be on their side. Can
the West, they ask, betray their kith and kin?
On the other hand, Africans are asking whether
the West will choose justice and freedom, and
thus ally themselves with the rest of Africa,
or decide that blood is thicker than water.
Does the West have to lose the friendship of
over 200 million Africans in order to protect
the special interests of five million whites
in Africa?[5]

The reasons for discontent among Black Rhodesians are much
the same as those experienced by South Africans. The Blacks
outnumber Whites ten to one. Power is currently in the hands
of the White minority. Whites also control most of the land.

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[4]Matthews, "Interstate Conflicts," p. 337.

[5]Joshua Nkomo, "Southern Rhodesia: Apartheid Country,"
Africa Speaks, ed. by James Duffy and Robert A. Manners,
(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961), p. 139.

Rhodesia has a Land Apportionment Act which divides land into European and African areas. The African majority enjoys only forty-one per cent of the territory in Southern Rhodesia. Europeans control the most productive land and that which is situated along the vital transportation routes. Blacks are subjected to vicious pass laws. These criteria coupled with the detention of key nationalists have created an unstable situation in Southern Rhodesia.

> While my colleagues are in detention I shall not rest. I shall tell the world the truth about Central Africa. While those men are in detention the souls of even the most reactionary Europeans or of their African stooges shall not sit at rest. And until true democracy is practiced in Southern Rhodesia no man's heart shall sit at rest. The injustices of the present administration and system of government, the sufferings of hundreds of people in detention, in rustication, in jail, and of their relatives and children will be the foundations on which our nationhood will be built. . . . History teaches us that man's yearning for freedom have never been conquered by the swords of dictators and that, though the seekers after freedom may often be set back temporarily, they have in the end always been triumphant.[6]

In South Africa a most eloquent and articulate expression of the non-White position was provided by Nelson Mandela during his trial in 1964. The following is an excerpt from his testimony at that trial:

> I would say that the whole life of any thinking African in this country drives him continuously to a conflict peculiar to this country. The law as it is applied, the law as it has been developed over a long period of history, and especially the law as it is written and designed by the Nationalist government is a law which, in our view, is immoral,

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[6]Ibid., pp. 142-43.

unjust, and intolerable. Our consciences dictate
that we must protest against it, that we must
oppose it and that we must attempt to alter
it. . . .[7]

Mandela contends that the government's reliance on

violence serves only to breed counterviolence. Things have

deteriorated to such an extent that violence appears the

only alternative. Because all other efforts have failed,

an organization known as Umkonto We Sizwe--Spear of the

Nation--was created to carry on the liberation movement.

Mandela states that it was not a choice they desired to make

but the government had given them no choice.[8]

The government of South Africa has indicated that

during the past several years there have been widespread and

efficient attempts on the part of internal revolutionaries.

Leaflets have been dispersed throughout South Africa advocat-

ing revolution and the use of guerilla tactics to bring down

the Nationalist government. There have recently been reports

of protests on college campuses. "In August of 1968, 290

students of an entire student body of 461 were suspended and

forcibly removed from the all-Black Fort-Hare University."

All but 29 were later re-admitted.[9]

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[7]Thompson, _Republic of South Africa_, pp. 10-11.

[8]Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 45.

[9]United Nations, _Segregation in South Africa_, p. 19.

> A vigorous underground is operating in South Africa
> to overthrow white apartheid supremacy. One piece
> of evidence for this is the recent wave of arrests
> of Africans. But all the evidence points to a
> home-grown opposition not instigated from abroad.[10]

Virtually all attempts by the underground movements have been

countered by the Nationalists with more repressive measures.

The ANC and its more militant factions have begun to expand

its organization. The South African Defense Department has

attempted to categorize the activity as prompted by outside

influences. The ANC considers such charges as evidence of

inability on the part of White leadership to recognize that

apartheid will not be tolerated indefinitely without revolt.[11]

The major reasons for internal opposition to apartheid

can be summarized as follows:

(1) The Nationalists have a distorted view of the

nature of South African society.

(2) The peoples of South Africa are not separate

nations. It was not fate that caused an intermingling of

groups.

(3) Most South Africans participate in one economic

system but are prevented from participation in the only

sovereign government.

(4) Since 1948 apartheid has had the opposite effect

for which it was intended. The program of separate develop-

ment has increased the number of non-Whites in industrial

towns rather than diminished it.

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[10]"Black Underground at War," _Atlas_, October, 1969,
p. 52.

[11]_Ibid._, pp. 52-53.

(5) There can be no justification for discriminating against non-Whites in seven-eights of South Africa.

(6) The Bantustan policy is fraudulent in three ways: (a) it accounts for only one-eighth of the territory; (b) Reserves are small and scattered and could not possibly become viable states; (c) territory which natives occupy is inferior land.[12]

A major drawback to the liberation movement is the lack of unity and coordination among the differing groups.

> The Indian and Coloured populations each support
> their respective organizations. The segregation
> of the races, the separate administration of each
> racial group, and the different regulations to
> which each is subject create problems peculiar to
> each race. There have been no successful attempts
> to forge a common leadership or concerted action
> among all non-whites opposed to apartheid.[13]

Conclusions. Examination of internal dissonance tends to suggest that forces on the domestic front are more inhibited than external forces. The United Nations, United States, and OAU are at least in a position to exercise free debate over the problems. Dissonance within South Africa may result in serious repercussions. The Nationalist party maintains the political apparatus to effectively control, stifle, and eliminate virtually all forms of political opposition. To continue opposing government policies, organizations have been forced to operate underground movements.

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[12]Thompson, Republic of South Africa, pp. 9-10.

[13]Mezerik, "Apartheid in South Africa," p. 50.

Those that have moved underground have been unable to coordinate an effective liberation movement. Various interests groups have chosen to support their own organizations. As a result, a concerted effort has not as yet been established. Whether these various interest groups can unite behind a common leadership remains a question. It does not appear to be a possibility at the present time.

Domestic resistance does not appear to have the solution to apartheid at least at the present. It suffers from much the same foible as do external forces. There is a lack of agreement among participants. Such absence of agreement is prompted by varying political, economic, and social interests. The cause of frustration among dissident groups cannot be attributed to diversity alone however. The South African government has succeeded in developing a near self-sufficient military and economic base from which to launch its fight against opposition. The next chapter is an inquiry into the military and economic aspects of the South African social structure.

CHAPTER VII

SOUTH AFRICAN DOMESTIC MACHINERY

If a sense of futility over trying to change South
African domestic policies has been induced by the discussion
thus far, the analysis to follow may well expand such futility
to a feeling of almost hopelessness. Aspects of the political
control exercised by the Nationalist government have already
been alluded to. Keeping those in mind, analysis of the
economic and military structures of South Africa will be
considered. Herein lies the most formidable test for altering
the racist policies of South Africa. To alter the social
injustices inherent in apartheid one must contend with the
economic and military establishments because they also are an
integral part of the system. "In military and economic terms,
the Republic of South Africa is the most powerful state in
sub-saharan Africa."[1] The following chapter is devoted to
an analysis of that power.

The military establishment. Developments in the area
of military preparedness have caused considerable alarm among
those working to alter apartheid and related problems.

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[1]Irving Kaplan, et al., Area Handbook for the Republic
of South Africa, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1971), p. v.

The Special Committee found conclusive evidence that
the military activities and arrangements by colonial
Powers in Territories under their administration, far
from benefiting the colonial peoples concerned, con-
stituted one of the most serious impediments to the
implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and
in several cases posed a grave and ever-increasing
threat to international peace and security. In
Territories which possessed rich economic resources
and sizable populations, the colonial power had
created a network of military strong points for the
purpose of subjugating the people and providing pro-
tection for the foreign economic interests which
were exploiting the Territory's resources. Later,
those same military forces had been used to surpress
the emergent national liberation movements. In
Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the African Territories
under Portuguese control the colonial regimes were
now engaged in ever-increasing military activities
aimed at denying by force the legitimate aspirations
of the people to freedom and independence. In
Namibia, the Government of South Africa continued
to defy the authority of the United Nations and had
intensified its military preparations in order to
maintain its illegal presence in the Territory. In
Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, called Portuguese
Guinea, the Portuguese authorities were waging a
war of colonial repression on an ever-increasing
scale against the liberation movements. Portugal
had deployed an army of between 120,000 and 150,000
troops in the Territories under its control and had
constructed a network of over 400 airfields in
Angola and nearly 300 airfields in Mozambique from
which it carried out military operations against
the liberation movements. One of the main reasons
that Portugal had intensified military activities
and arrangements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea,
called Portuguese Guinea, was the close military
co-operation between Portugal and its military allies
in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
It was within the framework of that bloc that the
military contingents of Portugal, which it used in
its devastating war against the people of the above-
mentioned Territories, were trained. The Special
Committee further concluded that Portugal, one of
the most backward countries in Europe, could not
carry out such a prolonged and extensive war in
Africa if it were not receiving economic, financial
and military assistance from its NATO allies. In
Southern Rhodesia, the illegal racist minority regime
had succeeded in obtaining supplies of weapons and
military equipment despite the embargo imposed by

the Security Council in November 1965. The infor-
mation available to the Special Committee further
showed that there was increasing co-operation
between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal
and the illegal racist minority regime. A military
entente had been formed and the representatives of
the three countries met regularly to exchange infor-
mation and to draw up joint plans for military
activities against the liberation movements in
Africa.[2]

Such preparations have prompted severe condemnation by the

Special Committee.

The Special Committee strongly condemned as a crime
against humanity, and as a serious threat to inter-
national peace and security, the wanton use of
military force by colonial Powers to suppress the
legitimate aspirations of colonial peoples to
self-determination and independence. In particular,
it vehemently condemned the Governments of South
Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority
regime in Southern Rhodesia for the continuing
intensification of their co-ordinated military
aggression against the liberation movements and
peoples in Territories under their domination. It
also condemned the formation in southern Africa of
a military entente between the Governments of South
Africa and Portugal and the illegal racist minority
regime in Southern Rhodesia, aimed at suppressing
the armed force, the inalienable right of the
oppressed people of the area to self-determination
and independence, and called upon the States to
withhold all support and assistance, including the
supply of arms and military equipment, to that
entente, whose existence and activities ran counter
to the interests of international peace and security.[3]

The concern expressed by the Special Committee is not unfounded

As a result of the arms embargo, OAU activities, and the

"potential Communist threat," defense expenditures in South

Africa have increased to approximately one-fourth the entire

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[2]United Nations, Annual Report of the Secretary General
on the Work of the Organization: 16 June 1968 - 15 June 1969
A/7601, 1969, pp. 80-81.

[3]Ibid., pp. 81-82.

national budget. In the last ten years expenditures for

defense have increased by six times and the proposed budget

for 1970 was R 276.2 million (1 rand = $1.40 U.S.).[4] By 1965,

South Africa had the capability of producing or manufacturing

almost every type of plant and machinery in the area of heavy

equipment. In 1968 the Armaments Development and Production

Corporation was created by the government at a cost of R100

million. Its purpose is to "meet as effectively and economi-

cally as feasible South Africa's armament requirements,

including the armaments requirements for export and firearms

or ammunition required by the public."[5]

> In early 1970 the Republic was self-sufficient in
> the manufacture of rifles, handguns, machineguns,
> mortars, ammunition, rockets, grenades, smoke bombs,
> aerial bombs, and explosives. It had developed its
> own napalm ordinance entirely from local raw materials
> and new types of antitank and anti-personnel mines.
> Uniforms, shoes, blankets, and parachutes were pro-
> duced exclusively by the nation's textile industries.
> All food products required by the armed forces came
> from local sources. The country possessed the most
> highly developed and capable defense industry in
> Africa.[6]

South Africa has not always enjoyed such self-sufficienc

France has not supported the arms embargo imposed by the UN

and has continued to supply South Africa. But perhaps more

importantly, other Western nations have supplied South Africa

by means of a loophole in the UN arms embargo resolution.

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[4]Kaplan, Area Handbook, pp. 737-41.

[5]Ibid., pp. 574, 739.

[6]Ibid., p. 749.

Licensing agreements were established between South Africa
and other nations allowing South Africa to manufacture the
military supplies domestically. In essence it was acquiring
foreign-designed military equipment; although actual manu-
facturing was done by South Africa. By 1965 South Africa had
acquired 127 licenses with other countries permitting it to
manufacture foreign-designed equipment. Such agreements have
not constituted a direct violation of the arms embargo.[7]

The increase in defense expenditures has both
strengthened and stimulated the economy of South Africa,
particularly in the field of manufacturing.

> An important stimulus to growth in manufacturing in
> the 1960's has been government expenditure designed
> to build up domestic capacity for production of
> military equipment. The embargo on arms shipments
> to South Africa imposed by the United States and
> other leading members of the United Nations has been
> somewhat ineffective because of nonparticipation by
> other producers such as France. Nevertheless, the
> government is seeking to develop greater self-
> sufficiency in production of arms, vehicles, and
> equipment for the military and the police.
>
> In mid-1969 the minister of defense told Parliament
> that the country had been able either to import or
> to manufacture almost everything it needed in the
> way of defense equipment. Domestic factories were
> supplying all the vehicles requirements as well as
> some of the most modern and sophisticated equipment.
> In early 1969, the government took over the country's
> only aircraft factory, Atlas Aircraft.[8]

More will be mentioned later about the role of manufacturing
in the economy.

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[7]Ibid., pp. 738-39.

[8]Ibid., pp. 576-77.

The increase in military expenditures has initiated development in related areas of defense as well.

> The nation's large and rapid increase in military
> expenditure was accompanied by strong emphasis on
> an accompanying program of defense research.
> Established under the direction of the Defense
> Research Council, the National Institute for Defense
> Research was active in the fields of physics, chem-
> istry, and electronics. Work in progress by the
> institute's scientists included research on missiles,
> chemical warfare agents, and nuclear physics.[9]

Continued development in these areas has elevated the status of the military as a career profession and improved the morale of those involved in it.

> Since the early 1960's the armed forces has been
> markedly strengthened in a material sense and also
> in morale. Among the men in uniform, rivalry
> between the two national language groups had
> largely disappeared, and the military forces had
> joined in the common cause of protecting the white
> minority's forward position with the Republic.
> Moreover, despite the existence of a strong defense
> industry of relatively recent influence, the nation
> did not face the threat of a potentially dangerous
> military-civilian power group.[10]

There is some evidence available to support the idea that South Africa is not far from the atomic age and it may well be there now. It established its first surface-to-air missile in late 1968 against possible attack from supersonic aircraft. An air-to-air missile was tested late in 1969 and is to become a standard armament for the air force. Beyond this, Brian Bunting suggests:

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[9]Ibid., p. 741

[10]Ibid., p. 750.

There is no reason why South Africa should not
ultimately make its own atom bomb. It would give
her dominance in a continent which she fears, and
a standing in international affairs which she does
not rate at present. It would be in line with
present government policy to make South Africa
self-sufficient in every possible sphere, so as to
become invulnerable to outside pressure.[11]

In light of such developments it is little wonder that the

Special Committee has become alarmed.

Since 1968, the top priorities for South Africa have

been the improvement of its defense posture and dealing with

guerrilla attacks from outside the country. Five special

antiterrorist training schools have been established at

strategic sites for training in camouflage, tracking, and

ambush drill. Trainees are instructed in counter-measures

against current guerrilla tactics. The government of South

Africa feels that the "potential Communist threat" has

crystallized into a real one.

In early 1970, virtually real or potential threats
to internal security were based on the Nationalist
government's determination to defend the social
order and its apartheid policies and the struggle
by opponents to change the system. Many in govern-
ment and citizens of all groups have long held the
view that violence was to be expected and that it
would eventually lead to racial civil war. Fear of
revolution pervaded much of the national life. Among
the 3.6 million white citizens, there were approxi-
mately 2 million privately owned firearms. Every
able-bodied white man or woman between the ages of
seventeen and sixty-five was subject to military
training during times of emergency. The strength of
both the armed forces and the police increased
materially each year.[12]

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[11]The Rise of the South African Reich, (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, Inc., 1964), pp. 302-03.

[12]Kaplan, Area Handbook, p. 727.

The ultimate significance of South Africa's military preparedness lies in the manpower available to provide an adequate defense for the government. Two organizations are maintained. The South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defense Force (SADF) constitute the organizations providing military manpower. As of early 1970, the SAP consisted of 34,226 regulars and 19,442 reservists and was the largest, best equipped nonmilitary law enforcement group south of the Sahara. A breakdown of the regular forces reflected the following composition:

18,515 White NCO's, constables, and officers

1,535 Coloured NCO's, and constables

646 Asian NCO's, and constables

13,530 African NCO's, constables and laborers

Although further breakdown of above statistics are not available, there is an indication of some racial assimilation. One must not imply from this, however, that there is any degree of equality. In the SAP Whites only are issued or allowed to carry handguns.[13]

The SAP, a voluntary enlistment organization, has placed considerable emphasis on training and specialized instruction. Such programs have provided a high level of professional competence. In early 1970 the SAP operated four separate training institutions. To continue the specialization program a new suprapolice organization was created in 1970—the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). The organization was

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[13]Ibid., pp. 701-09.

created under provisions of the Public Service Amendment Bill.
The Bureau will be answerable solely to the Prime Minister and
will function outside the structure of the SAP. Its primary
function will be to handle all matters pertaining to internal
security and to help fulfill those responsibilities it has
taken over some of the functions formerly assigned to the
Armed Forces.[14]

The SAP is also well equipped. In 1970 it had at
its disposal 4,000 motorized vehicles including trucks, buses,
pickup vans, jeeps, station wagons, radio patrol sedans,
motorcycles, tanks, helicopters, and light, fixed-wing aircraft.

> A small Air Wing was established in 1965, and equipped
> with light aircraft for reconnaissance operations.
> Pilots were hired under contract to the SAP. A six-
> seat Cessna was purchased in 1965 for use by the
> commissioner of police. A few helicopters were later
> added to the aircraft inventory, and others were
> obtained from the South African Air Force when
> needed.[15]

Maintainance of the equipment is handled in SAP garages
scattered throughout the country, and a school for training of
mechanics and drivers of equipment is run by the government.

In addition to the well disciplined, well organized,
and well equipped SAP, the SADF carries the major load of
defense and is the strongest military power south of the Sahara.
The combined branches of SADF (Army, Navy, and Air Force) boasts
manpower of between 40,000 and 45,000 with the capability of
increasing to a strength of 200,000 men on two days' notice.

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[14]Ibid., p. 710.

[15]Ibid., p. 711.

The SADF is highly trained, extremely mobile, and possesses impressive firepower both on land and in the air. It is equipped with jet aircraft, missiles, modern ground force weapons, and a growing complement of current naval vessels protected by an expanding air defense system that includes an early warning radar network. Defense research is receiving generous government backing for work on improved military equipment and techniques. It has an effective logistics system assuring all fighting units reliable support in supplies and equipment maintenance. The Army inventory includes over two hundred heavy and medium tanks manufactured in the United Kingdom, United States, and France. It also possesses French designed (but manufactured in South Africa) surface-to-air missiles.[16]

The Navy is the weakest branch of the SADF. Mounting concern over the threat of undersea attacks has prompted the government to establish an antisubmarine-warfare training school. It has also installed a radio navigational system to improve South Africa's maritime defenses. In 1967 an agreement was made with France for the purchase of three submarines, each with a capability of carrying twelve torpedoes. Final delivery date is scheduled for the end of 1971. To supplement existing defense systems the Navy is examining the possibility of arming its coastal patrol with missiles.[17]

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[16]Ibid., pp. 731-45.

[17]Ibid., p. 747.

The Air Force is one of the strongest and best equipped in Africa. It is equipped with the most modern tactical weapons systems including jet aircraft and air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles. Of its more than 500 aircraft, one-half are equipped for combat and the remainder are used for security operations.

The defense establishment of South Africa is rapidly approaching superiority on the African continent. (Egypt is not far behind). Its technological development, resources for manufacturing and elaborate defense are going to offer formidable opposition to all those who at present are willing to resort to force to alter apartheid policies.

The economic superstructure. It is virtually impossible to determine the exact significance of the South African economy on perpetuating racist policies. A study of its economy reflects a series of domestic and international interdependencies. The growth of the South African economy has been perhaps the most important aspect in its social structure.

When considering the economy of South Africa it is also necessary to take into account the important role played by the government's racial policies. Apartheid has a considerable bearing on the whole economy.[18]

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[18]Alexander Hepple, South Africa, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, c. 1966), p. 17.

> The economic basis of Nationalist power is strong
> and is growing stronger all the time. Nationalist
> politicians and economists determine the direction
> which is taken by the whole economy. The Nationalist
> control of government is used to bolster Nationalist
> power and influence in the private sector of the
> economy.[19]

In an economic sense, White and Black are interdependent and they are becoming more so with every passing year. It has resulted because of the necessity for Black labor not because the government is trying to correct major injustices. Blacks do occupy professional positions. There are approximately 23,500 Black professors and teachers, 14,000 Black nurses and nurses aids, 3,200 Blacks in other medical services, 260 Black draftsmen and technicians, and 35 Black jurists. Individuals of any racial group are accepted as customers in domestic markets. Although the economic status of Africans is low, their size as a consumer group make them an integral part of the economic system. In 1963 African consumption totaled about one-fourth the total. Buying power has continued to grow as the number of Africans employed has risen.[20] Trade in the Reserves is largely controlled by Whites. The government has been buying out non-African store owners in these areas and leasing their businesses to Africans. Further, it has been the policy of late for the government to issue trading licenses in Reserve areas to Africans only. Placement of Africans in jobs is not quite as freely offered

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[19]Bunting, Rise of South African Reich, p. 279.

[20]Kaplan, Area Handbook, pp. 590-615.

outside of the Reserves. The procedure for placing Africans is a complicated network of labor bureaus established on an urban, district, regional, and central basis. The government has attempted to expand programs of economic assimilation. It has encouraged technical and vocational training for Africans to enhance Black participation in the economy and also because they need additional skilled labor.[21]

It appears that programs of assimilation are working to the advantage of the government.

> The country's excellent natural endowment for economic growth and the high rate of expansion achieved in the developed sector in recent years may have the effect of eroding resistance to change traditionally found among the tribal villagers of the reserves and also, in a different form among the Afrikaner segment of the white population. Africans are participating in the developed economy in increasing numbers and, despite their very limited wage incentives, employment trends seem to support surveys showing that urban African workers are very responsive to wage differentials. On the reserves, where tradition is more firmly entrenched and apparent opportunities even more severely limited by land scarcity and other factors, response to change has been slow.[22]

In addition to domestic interdependence there are continuing signs of the same among the countries of southern Africa. South Africa is protected on its borders by states that are either economically dependent on South Africa or are in general sympathy with its position. The government of South Africa has continued to exploit this advantage. Geographically and ethnically Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland

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[21]Ibid., pp. 595-621.

[22]Ibid., pp. 493-94.

(BLS) are closely related to South Africa. They have had very close economic ties for many years. South Africa at one time assumed that these nations would eventually become part of the Republic. With the advent of official apartheid policies voluntary incorporation was out of the question, and by the early 1960's the idea of incorporation was abandoned, but the pursuit of greater economic dependency continued.[23]

> The economic integration of BLS with South Africa operates at several levels. In the first place, there exists a form of common market and customs union between them and South Africa. In the second place, there is a de facto currency union, and banking and other financial links are close. Thirdly, a substantial part of the labour force of the three countries is employed in the Republic, mainly in the mines. Finally, there are close links in transport and other services.[24]

The economic ties of the southern African nations to South Africa are the most integrated of those doing business with South Africa. They are not the only economic ties that exist. South Africa's international economic ties are also being strengthened despite continued firmness with regard to racial policies. The major trading partners are, it appears, unwilling to break their profitable economic ties particularly since there has been no clear program adopted to bring about change in the internal environment.[25] South Africa has

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[23]Peter Robson, "Economic Integration in Southern Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1967, p. 469.

[24]Ibid., p. 473.

[25]Kaplan, Area Handbook, pp. 400-01.

continued, for the most part, to enjoy a favorable balance of trade if the exports of gold are included. Newly mined gold constitutes about thirty-five to forty percent of South Africa's total exports. The United Kingdom is South Africa's most important export market. South Africa has broadened its range of commodities and is diversifying its trade market. Other major markets include Japan, West Germany, other African States, and the United States. More than 375 U.S. companies have investments in South Africa. In 1966, the American Committee on Africa published a study of U.S. economic involvement in South Africa. The 1966 study indicated the following observations:

(1) South Africa was moving rapidly toward self-sufficiency;

(2) The U.S. and the Western World were increasingly dependent on strategic minerals from South Africa;

(3) South Africa was dependent upon cheap African labor;

(4) South Africa's reluctance to employ Africans in skilled positions threatened to create a serious shortage.[26]

United States economic involvement in South Africa was reevaluated in 1970 by the American Committee on Africa and the following observations were made:

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[26]Blyden B. Jackson, "Apartheid and Imperialism: A Study of U.S. Corporate Involvement in South Africa," *Africa Today*, Vol. 17, No. 5, pp. 1-2.

(1) South Africa has developed, with U.S. corporate
    assistance, into a major industrial power in
    Africa and reached nearly total integration into
    the Western economic system;

(2) The African labor base has developed into an
    urbanized working class;

(3) The U.S. will continue to play an increasingly
    greater role in the South African economy.[27]

Although it is questionable whether there is the
degree of economic integration suggested by the above obser-
vations, there is little doubt that South Africa has made
significant strides forward in establishing a broader based
and more self-sufficient economy. It is true that South
Africa enjoys economic cooperation with the U.S.; but the U.S.
share of trade is of far greater importance to South Africa
than the South African share to the United States. It is
doubtful that the U.S. would suffer irreparably from loss of
South African trade.[28]

Helping perpetuate the domestically and internationally
integrated economy is a sophisticated and growing industrially
based economy. South Africa is considered to have a private
enterprise economy. It is limited by virtue of apartheid
policies.

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[27]Ibid.

[28]Kaplan, Area Handbook, p. 663.

> The country is usually regarded as having a private
> enterprise economy, both because the private sector
> accounts for about three-fourths of the GDP [Gross
> Domestic Product] and because white-owned private
> property is usually respected and the profit motive
> encouraged wherever it does not come into conflict
> with overriding political or racial policies. The
> moderate incidence of personal taxation and oppor-
> tunities for material prosperity have encouraged
> immigration and the transfer of capital from coun-
> tries such as the United Kingdom since World War II.[29]

South Africa has an immigration program which is
designed to attract White immigrants, particularly skilled
workers and managerial personnel, and there is an abundance
of jobs available for such people. Assistance is given by
providing aid in expenses for travel plus fully paid expenses
while traveling in the country to obtain employment. It will
also provide accommodations until the head of the family
obtains employment. Such programs have stimulated an increase
in immigration. Between 1961 and 1967 immigration resulted
in a net gain of 172,000 in the White population.[30]

The government has had other effects on the economy
in addition to stimulating immigration. The political control
which it exercises is greatly manifested in the economy and
the direction it takes.

> State control over a certain sector of the economy
> is common to a number of capitalist countries, but
> in few has it progressed as far as in South Africa,
> where the State owns or controls land and forests,
> post, telegraphs and telephones, railways and air-
> lines, broadcasting, and a host of other public
> services. In addition the State has entered the
> field of private industry in electric power

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[29]Ibid., p. 495.

[30]Ibid., pp. 111-12.

generation (Escom), printing, the manufacturing
of arms and ammunition, the production of iron and
steel (Iscor), heavy engineering (Vecor), insecti-
cides (Klipfontein Organic Products), oil, gas and
chemicals from coal (Sasol), and fertilizers
(Foskor). The State has launched the Industrial
Development Corporation, which has become, together
with private capital, a permanent shareholder in
a host of industries, like the Zwelitsha textile
mill in Kingwilliamstown, the National Finance
Corporation, to provide short-term loans for
development; and the Fisheries Development
Corporation, to build up a modern fishing industry.[31]

Further:

The primary impetus in promoting the growth of
manufacturing since World War II has probably come
from government action. By direct investment and
control of the steel industry, by important par-
ticipation in other major industries, by increas-
ingly protective manipulation of tariffs and import
controls, and by the use of tax incentives and other
instruments of policy, the government has consistently
taken the lead in restructuring the country's money
economy, ensuring that an important share of growing
domestic market for both consumer and producer of
goods has been used to generate the rapid growth of
domestic manufacturing capacity.[32]

Government controls appear to be working. Government

projected estimates in growth for the five year period 1968-

1973 indicated a growth rate of 5.5 percent a year at constant

prices with already available production facilities and an

annual net immigration of 30,000 Whites. With either an

increase in foreign capital or immigration in excess of 30,000

Whites a year, the growth rate could exceed the projected

5.5 percent.[33]

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[31]Bunting, Rise of South African Reich, p. 286.

[32]Kaplan, Area Handbook, pp. 548-49.

[33]Ibid., p. 493.

Since South Africa has in many ways been forced into semi-isolation (due to arms embargo, UN resolutions, etc.), it has geared as much of its economy as possible toward self-sufficiency, particularly in areas and types of manufacturing that hold strategic potential. Knowing that world opinion is against it, it has attempted to solidify its economy, as well as other areas of the social structure, in the event that the U.S. and others decide to go against it with meaningful effectiveness. For the time being it is in a very advantageous position.

> Thus the country's industry is in a sense situated advantageously between two worlds--the world of the industrially mature nations, which serve as export markets and with which it has close financial technological and entrepreneurial links, and the world of underemployment in sub-sistence African agriculture, from which it draws the bulk of its low-cost labor force. Having started from a position of very limited manufacturing capacity and substantial underutilization of resources at the outbreak of World War II, the country exhibited a rate of postwar industrial growth that materially surpasses that of the more mature economies of the United States and Western Europe.[34]

As mentioned earlier, the question of sanctions has pretty much lost its momentum--due largely to their failure against Rhodesia. South Africa has further frustrated those wishing to impose sanctions. Because it has continued to maintain economic cooperation with major nations, it has been able to stockpile several years' supply of strategic materials. Coupled with its growing self-sufficiency, it becomes less and less vulnerable to the effect of sanctions.

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[34]Ibid., p. 548.

There is obviously a whole series of interdependencies at work in the South African economy. One other important aspect deserves consideration. Indications are that South Africa has the natural resources to provide an even greater rate of growth than it experienced in the 1960's. The Republic is currently the source of two-thirds of the estimated world supply of newly mined gold.

> . . . Some observers also believe that the country's international importance as a source of gold and other minerals has played a part in inhibiting the further deterioration of its foreign political relations in the 1960's. The country produces about two-thirds of estimated world gold output and furnishes asbestos, uranium, ferroalloys,* and a number of other minerals to major industrial users abroad.

For one hundred years South Africa has been the leading source of gem-quality diamonds and is the center of the diamond sales monopoly. It channels diamonds produced in other countries through the Central Selling Organization in London which in turn distributes them to diamond exchanges in Amsterdam, Antwerp, and New York.

> Diamond and gold mining has been the core of economic development and the leading source of foreign exchange since before the turn of the century. Since World War II the country has developed a broad industrial base and a sophisticated range of manufactures, including most consumer goods and a wide variety of capital equipment and supplies for both agriculture and industry.[35]

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*A crude alloy of iron with some other metal, used for deoxidizing molten steel and making alloy steels.

[35]Kaplan, _Area Handbook_, p. 547.

Gold and diamonds are not the only minerals in
abundance in South Africa.

> The country ranks as a leading world supplier of
> a number of minerals in addition to gold and dia-
> monds. In 1967 it either had among the largest
> deposits or ranked among the world's largest
> producers of platinum, uranium, coal, iron ore,
> chromite, manganese, asbestos, antimony, and
> corundum. Its goldfields are thought to offer
> potential uranium resources second only to those
> of Canada--one report said second to none.
> Although it ranked below the Democratic Republic
> of the Congo (Kinshasa) and probably below the
> Soviet Union in production of industrial diamonds,
> its sales of gem diamonds were still the highest
> in the world. It was thought to rank with
> Communist China in production of antimony and
> close behind the Soviet Union in production and
> reserves of chromite. It's probably the world's
> largest commercially exploited reserves of
> manganese with the exception of the Soviet Union.
> The enormous platinum reserves of the Transvaal
> Bushveld extend hundreds of miles, and at full
> capacity the Rustenburg Mine was the world's
> largest platinum producer.[36]

The value of any mineral resource is dependent upon
the ability of a country to extract such resources. The
government has also taken care of this.

> The country's unusually rich mineral resource
> endowment, in combination with its low-cost
> unskilled labor supply advanced mineral technology,
> low-cost fuel and power, and well-developed economic
> infrastructure, have made possible a very extensive
> range of mineral production, both for export and
> domestic use. At the prices and factor costs pre-
> vailing in 1968, there were reported to be nearly
> fifty commercially exploitable minerals in the
> republic, some of them found in combination or
> extracted as a by-product of gold, copper or other
> minerals. Bauxite was the only industrially impor-
> tant mineral not found in the country.[37]

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[36]Ibid., p. 554.

[37]Ibid., p. 551.

Conclusions. Examination of the military and economic structure of South Africa provide the greatest understanding as to why present practices to resolve apartheid have proven ineffective. Further, it does much to suggest that change may have to be initiated by the South African government. The military establishment is the most powerful in Africa and continues to get stronger. Its industrial capabilities have rendered the country almost self-sufficient in the production of any and all armaments necessary to carry on a war effort if one should manifest itself. It would be exceedingly difficult, for other African nations particularly, to meet effectively the arsenal possessed by South Africa. Those who are equipped to match such a repository of arms and munitions have been reluctant to deploy them against the government. Bolstering the military establishment of South Africa is a viable and growing economy. It is an economy which has provided advantages to Africans they have not enjoyed until recently. It is an economy that has become highly industrialized affording it an opportunity for flexibility unlike that of other African states. The impetus behind both the military establishment and the economy, in no small measure, is a powerful political apparatus. It is an apparatus with the capability to determine almost at will the direction the nation will move. If a solution to apartheid policies is within reason, it appears that the government of South Africa will have much to say about the kind and substance of proposed reforms.

CHAPTER VIII

FINAL ASSESSMENTS

In an attempt to bring the preceeding investigation into proper perspective, a recapitulation of major observations will preempt the development of final conclusions.

Apartheid constitutes a complicated social phenomena which permeates virtually every aspect of the South African social structure. It is a policy which has evolved over a long period of time and one that cannot be traced to Afrikaner attitudes alone. To fully appreciate the complexity of apartheid, due consideration must also be given to English and Boer attitudes as they have evolved over the last 300 years. The degree to which basic principles of apartheid are ingrained in the lives of White South Africans are reflected in the arguments used to defend such policies. Differentialism success under the existing system, the threat of Black retaliation, the history of European colonialization, and White superiority are among the principal arguments used. To perpetuate prevailing attitudes the theory of separate development has been designed to provide areas of self-government for non-Whites. In practice the theory of separate development has failed to realize the potential for which it was created but the government is confident that given time the policy will work.

The government has displayed remarkable resiliency to world-wide condemnation. For White South Africans the precepts which dictate the philosophy behind apartheid have been grossly oversimplified by critics. Many critics, according to the government, lack appreciation of the progress accrued under apartheid. Most White South Africans accept apartheid much as do devoutly religious people accept "faith" and although apartheid policies are not always founded on rational judgements the commitment to such policies is devoutly followed. Apartheid has become an integral part of the social order and the government has and will continue to resist change imposed by external forces.

Potential external pressures to alleviate injustices in apartheid policies, as they have been investigated in this paper, lie in the power and ambition of the United Nations, the United States, and combined efforts of the Organization of African Unity and the Soviet Union. Let us recall the attitudes and effectiveness of these external forces. One, the United Nations has served as the major outlet for both expression and action in condemning apartheid. It has discussed the problem every year since its founding and its condemnation of apartheid and related problems has been most emphatic. Numerous resolutions have been adopted in both the General Assembly and Security Council deploring conditions in southern Africa and calling upon those governments to abandon such policies. Although the Security Council has been discussing apartheid only since 1960, active measures

have been taken by that organ. Particular action has been
expressed in the form of boycotts. The UN's most dramatic
decision was to terminate South Africa's control over South
West Africa. All UN efforts to abolish apartheid have met
with failure. They have either (1) prompted South Africa to
become more inflexible or (2) simply led South Africa to
ignore UN actions. Efforts to deal with colonialism have
met a similar fate. To date the UN has been ineffective in
meeting the challenge to resolve the problems of South Africa.

Two, the U.S. has proceeded with more caution than
the UN in its dealings with problems surrounding apartheid.
She has attempted to maintain as many foreign policy options
as possible. The U.S. has pressed harder for a change in
South West Africa than in the remainder of southern Africa.
She remains opposed to the use of force as was indicated when
she used the veto power for the first time in the Security
Council in the Spring of 1970. Essentially her attitude is
subject to change. Economic and political considerations
with respect to independent Africa, Portugal, South Africa,
and Europe will be carefully weighed before further U.S.
commitments are made. Until now it appears that U.S. efforts
have served more to perpetuate existing conditions in South
Africa rather than to bring about their demise. Caught
between various economic interests and foreign policy
priorities on the one hand and involvement in a nation's
domestic problems on the other, the U.S. has opted in favor
of its own foreign and economic interests. There is little

indication that radical change in attitude is forthcoming
in the near future.

Three, the OAU considers the policies of apartheid
and colonialism as moral issues, not political and economic.
The policies of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal
are flagrant abuses of human equality, dignity, and freedom.
The OAU has been more receptive to the use of force and has
resigned itself to the idea that it may be the only workable
alternative. Its establishment of the ALC and endorsement
of the Lasaka Manifesto are expressions of the frustration
which it feels over the ineffectiveness of current policy.
Working with and through the OAU has been one of the two
major superpowers. Even their cooperative efforts have had
little success in altering South African racist policies.
Much diversity of opinion exists with regard to the imple-
menting of tactics. The result has been continued but
ineffective efforts.

External pressures have not been the only forces at
work in attempting to abolish apartheid policies. There has
been and is considerable domestic criticism to such policies.
Internal resistance has been largely exemplified through
token opposition by political parties and liberation move-
ments. Neither of these internal attempts have met with
success. Attempts by political parties have been virtually
meaningless in light of the extensive control over the
political apparatus enjoyed by Nationalists. Liberation move-
ments have turned to revolutionary tactics in the absence of

success by opposing political parties and external pressures
but have likewise encountered the awesome political machine
in the form of increasingly repressive legislation. In
addition to being victimized by the use of power politics
the ineffectiveness of liberation movements has been stifled
by diversity within its own ranks. There has been a notable
inability of such movements to rally behind a common leader-
ship. The result has been a number of different movements
designed to accomplish the same ends. This diversity has
served to weaken potentially greater successes.

One of the most descriptive illustrations as to why
the efforts of the United Nations, the OAU, and internal
national liberation movements have proved unsuccessful is
the extent to which the South African government has gone to
prepare itself against virtually any attempt to impose a
change in the system. Both its military establishment and
economy have grown toward almost self-sufficiency and the
government is continuing to prepare itself against future
attempts at abolishing apartheid. Because of what the
government considers to be a "real" Communist threat to its
survival, the government has spared little in making necessary
preparations. Its budget for defense purposes amounts to
approximately one-fourth of its total. It maintains a well
equipped and highly trained police force and military organ-
ization and its capacity to provide logistical support to
those units continues to improve. Its accomplished level
of growth militarily makes it vulnerable to relatively few

nations. Those who possess such capabilities have displayed
reluctance to utilize the power necessary to bring about the
demise of the existing government. Meanwhile, the gap
between South Africa and other African nations widens in
terms of military capabilities.

The comparative strength of South Africa's economy
parallels that of its military. The economy, like the
military, is becoming increasingly more self-sufficient. It
enjoys the luxury of having most of the nations that are in
close geographical proximity to it dependent upon its economy.
South Africa's economy is further enhanced by the trading
relationships it is able to maintain with the major economic
powers of the world. Its capabilities with regard to manu-
facturing are steadily increasing and its potential for
continued economic growth is very favorable. At the present
time South Africa enjoys about a 5.5 percent rate of growth
and the potential for more rapid growth increases as manu-
facturing capabilities increase. In addition to developments
in the manufacturing industry, its abundance of natural
resources, the technology to extract those resources, and its
importance as a major supplier of gold and diamonds makes
it among the most viable economies in the world. If current
growth patterns continue, South Africa will become to Africa
what the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have become to the world--a
superpower. They will become a political power to be reckoned
with rather than shunned, harassed, and ridiculed.

The preceeding investigation brings us to a number of conclusions. One, efforts of the UN, the United States, the OAU, and the Soviet Union have produced insignificant results. Maximum efficiency has been thwarted by diversity of opinion and purpose. It would appear that until such diversity can be resolved, attempts by these external groups to resolve the problems of apartheid will continue to fail. Two, as time continues to elapse the potential for imposing change by external means diminishes largely because of the continued development of the economic and military aspects of the South African social structure. Three, internal opposition lacks the viable strength to cope with the government in power. The overwhelming political, economic, and military dominance of the South African government provide it with the capacity to stifle virtually all efforts initiated by internal dissonant groups. Four, it would appear that strength does not appear in numbers, at least on this issue. Condemnation of apartheid has been almost universal yet attempts to abolish the system have met with dismal failure. Five, except for those nations close to the influences of apartheid policies the issue is not one of high priority. Those who possess the viable strength to impose change in South Africa have displayed a reluctance to utilize the necessary power to do so.

In addition to the conclusions drawn, the author's prejudices prompt the following observation of a speculative nature. In the absence of external pressure adequate enough

to impose change in apartheid policies, the apparent inability of domestic opponents, and the comparative strength of the South African government, this observer is inclined to believe that meaningful changes in apartheid policies will ultimately be initiated by the government in power. Such an observation, by its very nature, will be tested by things to come. At this point, and because of the time the considerations given the topic, such an idea has almost become a truism for this observer.

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