SMITH WILDMAN BROOKHART OF IOWA:

REPUBLICAN INSURGENT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM, DEFINITION OF TERMS, AND MAJOR HYPOTHESES

Two major historical "schools" are in conflict over reform from 1921 to 1933. Members of one "school" assert that a group of intransigent Western and Midwestern Republican senators with a genuine commitment to reform invoked insurgency against a conservative administration and regular party colleagues to sustain progressivism. Other historians insist that certain self-professed reformers articulated progressive philosophy and independence, but followed political expediency at crucial times. Some historians, notably Richard Hofstadter, elaborate on this interpretation and describe the rhetoric of these "pseudo-progressives" as exaggerated, personalistic, provincial, and nativistic in terms of imagined agrarian grievances. He asserted that these hypocritical reformers simply desired a larger share of the capitalistic affluence.¹

Some differences among historical "schools" over insurgency and progressivism result from reliance upon traditional historical inquiry.

Generalizations have too often been based on vague criteria for progressivism and insurgency and consequently inaccurate measurement both of their scope and intensity. Techniques derived from social sciences can be used to measure the degree of party regularity and progressivism, once a specific schema has been established for each, and test the verity of divergent interpretations of reform. Historians Richard P. McCormick and Albert Ludwig Kohlmeier, for example, have successfully applied quantitative techniques to two major historical controversies. Richard McCormick used 1824 election statistics to contradict the hypothesis of a great workingmen's vote turnout for Andrew Jackson's 1824 presidential candidacy in states where electors were directly chosen by the people. Albert Kohlmeier relied upon statistics of canal and river boat traffic in the Old Northwest to measure the shift of trade from the South to the Northeast, and the place and time of that shift.  

This thesis investigates United States Senator Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa) of the alleged group of Republican incorrigible reformers both to ascertain the scope and intensity of his insurgency and progressivism and thereby to provide an indirect gauge of the actual division among Republicans. Empirical analysis basically confirms that Smith W. Brookhart responded to the agricultural ills, sustained by farmers for nearly 20 years, with genuine reform zeal; and that Brookhart's life-style, voting habits, and ideology places him in the radical agrarian reform tradition with its origins in the Granger, Greenback, and populist movements. A historical reform perspective is necessary to clarify the

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the relationship between Brookhart's progressivism and insurgency.

Major hypotheses of this study are as follows: (1) Brookhart practiced chronic and intense insurgency; (2) he was a progressive; and (3) he exemplified a "type" of the Populist reformer in life-style, who like the "mythical agrarian" believed in the "Horatio Alger" myth, but whose polemics for reform were grounded in a real economic crisis. When seen from historical distance, Smith W. Brookhart is a genuine reformer whose style and ideology can be traced to past reform movements, but who also illustrated characteristics of those "soft" agrarians who interpreted their milieu in personalistic, provincial, and conspiratorial polemic.
CHAPTER II

SMITH WILDMAN BROOKHART: AGRARIAN POLITICIAN

Smith Wildman Brookhart emerged from the depressed agricultural situation in Iowa during the 1920's as the farmers' spokesman against railroads, middlemen, and monopolists. He could be called a demagogue in the Greek sense of the term because he achieved power in three senatorial elections by articulating the sentiments and needs of the "common people."

Brookhart, one of ten children in a family descended from English colonials, was born in a log cabin in Scotland County, Missouri, on February 2, 1869. His family lived in several locations: when Brookhart was ten, the family moved to a farm in the southwestern part of Jefferson County, Iowa; when he was sixteen, they settled in the northwest part of Van Buren County. Smith assisted in the farm chores, attended the country grade school and one year of high school, and studied to become a teacher at Iowa Normal in Bloomfield. He taught for two years in the county schools before he became principal at Bloomfield. During this time Brookhart studied law in Keosauqua and at Bloomfield, where he was admitted to the bar in 1892. It was at Keosauqua, through the influence of an English friend, that he became involved in politics and interested in agricultural cooperatives.1

Brookhart conducted his law practice in Washington County from 1894 to 1902 and established a farm just outside the city limits, where he lived with his wife, Jeannie Hem, whom he married on June 22, 1897, and their six children. Because he lacked business acumen, his professional earnings were small—he made only $2,002.26 in 1906 and no more than $4,433.97 in 1909. One critic described him as the "sort that files his papers in a barrel and chaws terbacker." 

Although Brookhart did not succeed as a lawyer, he excelled as a rifle expert when he served in the Iowa National Guard in 1894 and in the Spanish-American War as second lieutenant in the Fiftieth Regiment. In 1912 he captained the world champion American Palma Rifle Team. He was elected president of the National Rifle Association of America four times. 

Brookhart, large-framed, broad-shouldered, and short-necked, possessed abundant energy and vitality. As his campaign manager once said, "He can make a dozen meetings in a day, six days a week, and wind up as keen-eyed and clear-skinned as a child." He had a "round, stubborn, short-nosed face, with many fine wrinkles around a really
remarkable pair of grey eyes—those of a sharpshooter. Brookhart's
gifts of personality matched his physical vitality. His optimistic
outlook and calm disposition enabled him to endure rebuffs in the Senate
and many defeats and criticisms. He had enormous self-assurance to the
point of believing he was nearly infallible. Though sometimes short-
tempered and given to name-calling, he was usually good-humored and fair
in his dealings with colleagues.

He neither drank nor smoked, seldom took tea or coffee, seldom
attended teas or social engagements and, when he did, wore a dark,
shapeless, shiny business suit and polished broad-toed army shoes. His
statement, "I never wore a swallow-tail, never owned one, and never will
admit the necessity of such a uniform," was typical of Brookhart.
Washington wags often wondered what secret process he used to age his
suits. After attending a resplendent dinner graced by such wealthy per-
sonages as E. E. Loomis of the House of Morgan, Brookhart remarked,
"I was the only one there dressed like an American citizen." He
eschewed an expensive home during his senatorial years and, instead,
purchased a moderately-priced home in Maryland for his family. In
many respects, he represented the moral habits and character of the
mythical "agrarian"—an independent spirit, honesty, frugality in living


5 Ray Tucker and Frederick R. Barkley, Sons of the Wild Jackass
(Boston: L. C. Page and Company, 1932), p. 346; Cong. Record, 72nd
Shouting Progressive in Brookhart, of Iowa," Current Opinion, LXXIV,
No. 4, May 1923, p. 538; Reinhard H. Luthin, "Smith Wildman Brookhart
of Iowa: Insurgent Agrarian Politician," Agricultural History, XXV,
No. 4 (October, 1951), 190.
habits, industry, self-reliance, simplicity in human relations. 6

Brookhart displayed independence when he began his career in politics. During the 1890's and early 1900's, Iowa politics were usually controlled by the "standpat" or the regular Republican machine. One of the most influential lawyers and politicians of this organization was Joseph W. Blythe, general solicitor of the Burlington and Quincy railroads. Blythe and his henchmen controlled both the state politics and the railroad in the interests of a Democrat James J. Hill. Brookhart, spokesman of the people, sought his political fortune by opposing the Eastern-dominated interests which Blythe served and by supporting a candidate opposed to a railroad man. When Blythe summoned Brookhart before him and offered to take him under his wing, Brookhart refused. 7

Blythe managed to keep Brookhart submerged through adroit manipulation of local politicians for about five years until Brookhart had an opportunity to support Governor Albert B. Cummins in the Governor's struggle to initiate reform in Iowa. Brookhart helped Governor Cummins to disperse concentration of business control; free national, state, and local power from economic dominance; correct long and short-haul disparities; and to legislate for direct election of senators. 8 In the 1906


8 Luthin, "Brookhart of Iowa," p. 188; Elbert W. Harrington, "A Survey of the Political Ideas of Albert Baird Cummins," The Iowa Journal of History and Politics, XXXIX, No. 4 (October, 1941), 348.
gubernatorial election Brookhart exhorted Cummins to speak strongly for the direct primary, prohibition of free railroad passes, and the exclusion of railroad corporations from politics. Brookhart gave the Governor such strong support against corporations and the political machine that a close friend suggested he appoint Brookhart to fill the unexpired 1908 senatorial term of W. B. Allison. Albert Cummins did not, for he had his own senatorial ambitions. Brookhart later broke with the then Senator Cummins when the latter sponsored the Esch-Cummins transportation act. 9

In 1909 divisions existed between conservatives and progressives within the Republican party. This split deepened considerably when William Howard Taft signed the protectionist Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act. By 1910 Brookhart thought the divisions sufficient to try for a seat in Congress. He lost the First District primary election to his Republican opponent, Charles Kennedy, 4,406 to 7,405 votes. Brookhart then went back to work in the ranks for Charley Kennedy. 10

In 1911 Smith Brookhart, his brother James L. Brookhart, and Anna Lawson purchased part ownership of the Washington Press. For the most part, the editors took an independent political stand, although Brookhart idealized both Abraham Lincoln—he compared the slaveholding oligarchies of Lincoln's day with contemporary financial and transportation

9 Letter, Brookhart to Governor A. B. Cummins, September 3, 1906, Des Moines Historical Building, Archives, Cummins Manuscript Collection; Letter, W. R. McClean of Robstown, Texas, to A. B. Cummins, August 7, 1908, Des Moines Historical Building, Archives, Cummins Manuscript Collection.

monopolies—and Theodore Roosevelt as progressives. It was during this period that Brookhart first championed Robert M. La Follette's presidential cause in 1912, and then switched to Theodore Roosevelt. He even chaired the Republican State convention of Roosevelt's "Bull Moose" party.¹¹

In 1916 Brookhart foresook his journalistic career and went to Mexico with the Iowa National Guard in pursuit of the bandit Pancho Villa. He returned to the United States as an instructor of rifle training. Prior to this time, most military authorities believed that infantry marksmanship was insignificant and "that a poor shot would get more hits in battle than a good shot." Secretary of War Newton Baker finally bought Brookhart's idea that the Army needed excellent marksmen and made him chief instructor at Camp Benning and Camp Perry in Ohio and later the Director of Marksmanship of the Army, an achievement he was fond of recalling.¹²

When Brookhart returned to Iowa in 1919, he again plunged into politics. Senator Cummins was up for re-election in 1920; and, although the regular Republicans were willing to give him the nomination by default, progressive Republicans had other ideas. So did Brookhart, who became a candidate. At a state Farm Bureau meeting, Brookhart got his chance to speak against the Esch-Cummins Law, including the outlawed strikes for railroad workers. This won Brookhart the support of farmers,

¹¹Luthin, "Brookhart of Iowa," p. 188.

railway laborers, The Farmers' Union, and James M. Pierce, editor of the *Iowa Homestead*. Brookhart vigorously assailed the Esch-Cummins bill as injurious to the farmer because it would raise freight rates. He proposed several positive reforms, including the cooperative marketing for farms, based on the Rochdale system; comprehensive social insurance; a soldiers' bonus from the taxation of war profits—Iowa voters were to hear more of these issues in later years. Cummins accused Brookhart of being supported by Communists, socialists, International Workers of the World, and Democrats. Cummins' accusation was partially true in that Brookhart's campaign workers did attempt to gain Democratic support. Cummins, to strengthen his position on the railroad bill, called Brookhart an "economic illiterate." One Washington observer qualified this judgment by giving Brookhart recognition, at least, for a thorough knowledge of farm cooperatives.

Although Brookhart lost the primary election, 97,000 to 115,000 votes, he gained 45 per cent of the vote which made him a leader of the progressive faction in Iowa. An analysis of the votes revealed that the northern and southern boundaries voted heavily for Brookhart—a one-sixth plurality in the North and two-fifth in the South. Both were agriculturally depressed areas and the Farmers' Union, and the coal miner and railroad unions were strong in the South. Brookhart lost the

election because agriculture was generally on the crest of a boom.16

Prices of major farm products illustrated the agricultural boom. The price of wheat, supported by the Food Control Act, was $2.26 per bushel in 1918; corn was $2.00 per bushel at the central markets in Chicago; hogs per hundredweight averaged nearly $19.00; and beef cattle averaged $17.00 on the Chicago market in 1919. With 1913 as the base year, and assigning 100 to the items measured during that year, farmer incomes increased from 95 in 1910 to 260 in 1919. Measured in purchasing power, the crop value rose from 100.0 to 129.2 in 1919. Prices of farm products were similar in Iowa. In 1920 the average price of wheat per bushel was $2.00; in 1919 corn was $1.20; cattle per head was $52.60; swine per head was $27.50.17

Soon agricultural conditions worsened. The agricultural price index at 235 in the fall of 1920 fell to 140 in June 1921 and declined to 110 in December. This dramatic price deflation only presaged further agricultural crises. From 1920 to 1921 the agricultural income of Iowa dropped 38 per cent, from $792,000,000 to $487,000,000. During


the same time grain income fell 53 per cent, livestock 37 per cent, hogs 39 per cent, cattle 30 per cent. When William S. Kenyon resigned the Senate in 1922 to accept a federal judgeship, Brookhart had an excellent opportunity to become Senator.

In the early stages of the primary campaign Brookhart faced only the conservative Charles Pickett from Waterloo in the Third Iowa District. The Republican leaders had planned to concentrate their efforts on Pickett to secure his nomination. Two unforeseen circumstances thwarted their strategy. The liberal Burton E. Sweet, also from the Third District, entered the primary; and L. E. Frances, from Northwest Iowa, became a candidate. Pickett was not a strong candidate and Sweet's entry weakened Pickett's chances of securing the nomination. Meanwhile, Brookhart was gaining support. The Iowa primary law, which required a candidate to receive at least 35 per cent of the total vote cast, provided the conservatives an opportunity to deny Brookhart the nomination. If a candidate did not secure 35 per cent of the total vote cast in the primary, a state convention, where conservative Republicans were powerful, would select a nominee. If more candidates entered the campaign, Brookhart would be prevented from gaining the 35 per cent. Two other candidates entered the field. These were Claude M. Stanley, a liberal, whom conservative Republicans hoped to select as a "dark horse" candidate in a stacked state convention, and the liberal Clifford Thorne, who, along with Brookhart, had previously fought railroads and

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large corporations. Thorne did not enter the contest at the bidding of the conservative Republicans. 19

The campaign narrowed to Brookhart and Clifford Thorne, a former railroad commissioner and a progressive. The National Farm Bureau Federation and Wallace's Farmer aided Thorne, while labor and the Iowa Homestead supported Brookhart. When some of Brookhart's supporters began to join Thorne, Brookhart called Thorne a "Judas" who sold his principles to become a tool of Wall Street. Brookhart claimed to represent the farmers' bloc, the labor bloc, the soldier bloc, and the mothers' bloc in opposition to the "predatory blocs." He was the "only real Republican of the Bunch," a "Lincoln-Roosevelt-Kenyon Republican," with no organization, newspaper, or money to support himself—only some letters from "Old Bob" La Follette, William E. Borah, George W. Norris, and Edwin F. Ladd. He further assailed the Esch-Cummins Act as part of a conspiracy against the farmer. Brookhart desired to curb the power of the United States Supreme Court, enlarge the Federal Farm Board to include farm representation, establish a cooperative marketing program for the farmers, retain the federal excess profits tax, and to rid counties and states of Newberryism. He effectively characterized himself as "Brookhart against the field" and for the discontented farmer. 20


Brookhart received 133,102 of the 323,622 votes cast which was six per cent over the 35 per cent primary requirement. The Old Guard had failed to block his nomination. Agrarians and workers, angered at President Warren G. Harding's failure to support farm relief and repeal the Esch-Cummins Act, and the Old Guard's favoritism to Thorne, effectively stalled the Republican machine by voting for Brookhart. Harding's approach to the agricultural crises had been to call a National Agricultural Conference at Washington. The Conference urged a guaranteed price on important farm commodities, the reduction of freight rates, and undue retail profits. They also advised farmers to cut costs of production and to introduce diversification in subsistence crops. Traditional and conservative methods such as research, cooperative techniques, and better individual management were emphasized. Thus, many newspapers viewed the victory as a protest against Wall Street, a protest against high freight rates and financial inequities, and a protest against low farm prices and high living costs. As the Baltimore Sun aptly stated: "There is a riot, if not a revolution, among the Republican masses against the spirit and the unsatisfactory showing of Harding leadership or of Harding non-leadership."²¹

Charles E. Rawson, state chairman of the Republican party, who temporarily held Kenyon's seat, declared his support for Brookhart; and standpatters followed suit to prevent a party split. Rawson failed to

unify the party, because some Republicans, mainly from the Fifth District, defected to Clyde Herring, the Democratic candidate for the senate in the November election. The Cedar Rapids Gazette proclaimed its policy as "Independent Republican" and five former Republican governors worked for Herring. Republican delegates from Cedar Rapids refused to recognize Brookhart as the Republican candidate when they denied him the privilege of making a speech at the State Convention. Further, they denied him any part in formulating the platform and adopted resolutions repudiating Brookhart. 22

Herring charged that Brookhart was a socialist and not a Republican. Brookhart denied he was a socialist, arraying "class against class." But he expressed great opposition to imposing "class over class." In the remainder of his campaign he advocated three main policies: (1) the repeal of the Esch-Cummins Law, particularly its six percent guaranty; (2) revision of the Federal Reserve banking to enable small banks to enter the system to ensure more liberal farm credit; and (3) legislation providing cooperative production, marketing, purchasing, and credit for agriculture and labor patterned after the English Rochdale program. Brookhart also supported the "truth in fabric" bill, the anti-filled milk bill, the revision of the tariff downward, an excess profits tax, prohibition, and recognition of Soviet Russia. 23


Brookhart won the election with a majority of over 160,000 votes, 63.1 per cent of the total vote cast. His victory clearly illustrated agrarian dissatisfaction with "normalcy and prosperity" for industry and depressed agricultural conditions for farmers. The senatorial victories of Brookhart (Ia.), Henrik Shipstead (F.L.-Minn.), Edwin F. Ladd (R.-N.D.), Robert M. La Follette, Sr. (Wis.), and Robert B. Howell (R.-Neb.) increased the farm bloc membership. One newspaper noted that the new bloc was in a position to play havoc with the majority leaders and that, even without help from the Democrats, it would effectively dictate policies in the House. It commented that George Norris (Neb.) and William Borah (Id.) and Brookhart (Ia.) in the Senate bloc would repay their constituents by legislating easy rural credits, securing government operation of public utilities, repealing the ship subsidy bill, restricting the Supreme Court's powers, and restoring power to the people. 24

When the junior Senator from Iowa, Smith Wildman Brookhart, went to Washington, D. C., he did not follow the unwritten Senate rules, make peace with the Republican party, or become an orthodox Senator. On February 22, 1923, he effectively filibustered against the ship subsidy favored by President Harding. Soon afterward, in the early summer of 1923, Brookhart went to Europe and Russia for eight weeks to learn about cooperatives and agricultural systems. He returned home to laud Russia's cooperative system. Brookhart attempted to legislate the estab-

24 M. H. Hedges, "The Liberal Sweep in the West," Nation, CXV, No. 2994, November 22, 1922, p. 545; "Will the 'Insurgent Tail Wag the Party Dog'?" Literary Digest, LXXVI, No. 13, March 31, 1923, p. 8; George Creel, "What Do These Senators Want?" Collier's, LXXI, No. 9, March 10, 1923, pp. 9-10.
lishment of agencies to handle farm production, processing, transportation, marketing, and credit based on the English Rochdale cooperative system. Although Brookhart preferred complete government financing from the United States Treasury for cooperative enterprises, he settled for immediate relief for farmers, and later supported the McNary-Haugen farm-relief bills.

Finally, he chaired the Senate committee, including Wesley H. Jones (R.-Wash.), George H. Moses (R.-N.H.), Burton K. Wheeler (D.-Mont.), and Henry P. Ashurst (D.-Ar.), to investigate the nefarious activities of Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty and the motives for his alleged failure to prosecute Albert Fall, Harry Sinclair, E. L. Doheny, and C. R. Forbes. 25

Months before Brookhart began his 1924 primary campaign there was concern over the "thunder" he and other progressive contestants would raise over the deepening farm crisis. Some Senators thought that Magnus Johnson and Brookhart would raise the most noise and that they had eager ears among the proletariat—the farmers. 26

The Iowa "standpatters" opposed Brookhart and they made plans at a Des Moines meeting in January 1924 to defeat him by placing a single


strong, liberal candidate against him in the June primary. Because Brookhart did not receive a majority of the votes in the June 1922 primary, conservatives decided that a liberal candidate might secure the votes of moderate Brookhart voters and, thus, defeat him. Strong candidates refused the Old Guard offer, while Burton E. Sweet announced his unsolicited candidacy. The standpatters did not select him to oppose Brookhart because he ran fifth in a field of six candidates in 1922; but for fear of repeating the 1922 mistake, they did not ask other candidates to enter the field. 27

The contest moved at a slow pace. Sweet accused Brookhart of collaborating with "Reds" and socialists and of being a disloyal Republican with intentions to form a third party. He further accused Brookhart of exaggerating the Iowa agrarian depression and of injuring Iowa credit in the nation. Brookhart, in turn, charged that Sweet was supported by big business and corporations. It was true that Sweet had the support of most newspapers and magazines in the state, some of which did receive financial backing from railroads. Brookhart, however, enjoyed the influential support of Dante Pierce's Iowa Homestead, a farmers' journal.

Without financial aid and little editorial support, Brookhart, involved with the Daugherty investigation, largely conducted his campaign from Washington, D.C. He easily won the primary with 30,000 votes more than Sweet which was 55 per cent of the total Republican vote. Some of his support was due to the continued depression in agricultural prices between 1922 and 1924. Wheat fell to 98.0 cents a bushel in

27 Neprash, Brookhart Campaigns in Iowa, pp. 45-47.
1922 and remained somewhat stationary in 1923. The price of corn stood at 76.7 cents a bushel in 1922, and at 84.0 cents in 1923. Beef cattle prices per hundredweight stood at $5.43 in 1922 and at $5.57 in 1923. In 1922 the average price per hundredweight of hogs stood at $7.93, and in 1924 the price rose slightly to $11.59. Brookhart's comment on his victory shows that he was well-attuned to popular discontents. "The great mass of farmers are oppressed to desperation by economic conditions. Labor is the only other element in full sympathy with them." Brookhart faced formidable opposition from Daniel F. Steck, the Democratic candidate, in the November general election. Most of the conservative Republicans, however, expected that Brookhart would win, and apparently declared a truce with Brookhart. Although Brookhart favored the La Follette-Wheeler ticket for Presidential candidacy, he avoided an open stand on the ticket until October when he was forced to publicly express his position due to the entry of the independent Luther A. Brewer from Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and to pressure from friends and supporters of Brookhart. Brewer had worked against Brookhart in the 1922 State Convention.

On September 30, Brookhart wrote to William Butler, Chairman of the National Republican Committee, to demand that Charles E. G. Dawes resign as the Vice-Presidential candidate to be replaced by Senator


30 Neprash, Brookhart Campaigns, pp. 48-49.
George W. Norris to gain farmers' votes. He expressed negative attitudes toward Calvin Coolidge and the Republican platform. On October 3, 1924, his criticism of Dawes was expanded to include the President in his Emmetsburg speech. In that speech he labeled President Coolidge as a candidate of the Wall Street bloc. Brookhart asserted that the Coolidge Republican machine refused to recognize him at the Republican State Convention in 1922 because he opposed the ship subsidy, the Esch-Cummins Law, and the Mellon tax bill and favored governmental ownership of the Muscle Shoals. After flaying the machine, Brookhart reiterated his intention of remaining in the Republican party, the party of "Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Kenyon," to oust a "small group of crooked and irresponsible dictators set up by the Nonpartisan League of Wall Street from the control of the Republican Party."\(^\text{31}\)

Immediately the standpatters went into session and issued the following statement on October 4, 1924: "The repudiation of the Republican nominees by Senator Brookhart is repudiation and bolt from the Republican Party." The standpatters stated that Brookhart should not be considered a Republican candidate, and then secretly gave their support to Steck. Many influential Republican newspapers indicated how a Republican might vote for Steck by making an arrow next to his name on the ballot. This Republican aid, plus Steck's own vigorous campaign aimed toward those Republicans dissatisfied with Brookhart,

nearly won the election for Steck. Brookhart received only 1,300 votes more than Steck. Steck insisted he would have been elected if the ballots marked by an arrow had been counted; but, for the time, Brookhart was given his certificate of election by the Secretary of State.

When Brookhart returned to the Senate, conservative Republicans were ready to read him out of the party. The "renegade Republicans," Robert M. La Follette, Jr., Edwin Ladd, Lynn Frazier, and Brookhart were excluded from Republican conferences, not allowed to fill vacancies on Senate committees, and lost seniority on committee assignments.

Brookhart took the action in good humor, commenting that he was a better Republican than James Watson, Chairman of the Republican Committee on Committees. When the Senate voted after long and bitter discussion on April 12, 1926, to seat Steck, Brookhart's humor darkened. Steck was made the first Democratic Senator from Iowa since the Civil War by the vote of 16 "die-hard" Republicans and 29 Democrats. Charles Curtis (Kan.) headed the group of 31 Republicans who voted for Brookhart, along with 9 Democrats. Both James Watson (R.-Ind.) and Richard Ernst (R.-Ky.), Chairman of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, frankly admitted that the regular Republicans saw an opportunity to

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make Brookhart an example to future insurgents and used it. 35

In a rage, Brookhart hurried back to Iowa to oppose Cummins who was up for re-election. The Republican strategy had been to discipline insurgents and force Brookhart out of the Senate for four years. Had Brookhart stayed in the Senate, Cummins would have had a clear field. As it turned out, Brookhart conducted a vigorous campaign against Cummins for failing to support the laws of Iowa, i.e., for asking to be excused from voting on the Brookhart-Steck case. Brookhart used many of the old issues in this campaign: the Esch-Cummins law, the unfair Federal Reserve system, and depressed agricultural prices. The Iowa Homestead, the Farmers' Union, and labor did not actively support Brookhart in this campaign; and only late in the campaign did the Iowa Homestead publish an editorial urging support for him. But the lack of support was insignificant both because many who had previously voted for Brookhart would again in 1926, and Cummins, due to ill health, was unable to campaign actively. The state Republican organization conducted a "doorbell-ringing" campaign based on Cummins' voting record in the Senate. Brookhart's forces, on the other hand, asserted he was "the voice of the West" against the East. Brookhart insisted that he "was the only candidate with the interest of the corn belt at heart."

Finally, Senators Norris, Howell, Frazier, Nye, La Follette, Jr., and Shipstead made an all-out appeal to the Iowa voters urging that

farm-relief legislation was dependent upon Brookhart's election.\footnote{36}

The farm crisis was desperate. Although farm prices were up slightly in 1926, they were still low. Wheat stood at 145.9 cents per bushel in 1925; corn at 71.0 cents per bushel in 1926; beef cattle per hundred pounds at \$6.46; and hogs per hundredweight at \$12.18 in 1925. In Iowa the average value of winter wheat stood at \$1.20 in 1926, spring wheat at \$1.19, corn at .56 cents, cattle at \$44.27, and swine at \$18.36. The fall in prices began a serious number of both farm bankruptcies and bank failures. In the West North Central states farm bankruptcies rose from 1,066 in 1922 to 2,005 in 1923, to 2,889 in 1925, and then leveled off to about 2,404 in 1927. In all, there were 1,111,314 farm bankruptcies between 1922 and 1925. From 1920 to 1924 there were 1,960 bank failures compared to only 202 failures from 1910 to 1913. Between 1921 and 1926, the annual bank failures averaged 463, primarily among rural banks.\footnote{37}

Vote returns demonstrated that Brookhart capitalized successfully upon the failure of the administration to give equality to agriculture and used the National Industrial Conference Board's report on the agricultural conditions to advantage, and Brookhart won by a 70,000 plurality, or 49.5 per cent of the total vote. More votes were cast in the 1926 primary than in any previous primary. Cummins received only 32.5 per cent of the votes. Howard J. Clarke, a relatively unknown \footnote{36}Nebraska, Brookhart Campaigns, pp. 53-54; C. C. Clifton, "Silent Vote Expected To Pick Winner," Des Moines Sunday Register, June 6, 1926, p. L-1; \textit{Ibid.}, p. L-3. \footnote{37}U.S. Department of Agriculture, \textit{Yearbook}, 1930, pp. 611, 636, 831, 853.
candidate from Audubon County, received only 15.2 per cent. Two obscure candidates received the remaining 2.8 per cent.\textsuperscript{38}

Most journalistic analyses of the campaign agreed that farm relief in itself was not the issue of the campaign because both candidates supported the McNary-Haugen plan. The issue was loyalty to the administration which had failed to come up with adequate farm relief legislation. The farmers voted against Cummins to express disapproval of administration "standpatism" because he was considered an administration man. There was little mention of prohibition and the World Court, although opponents of the World Court were unhappy with Cummins who supported the Court; but much was made of the voter's right to select his own Senator. Many voters knew Brookhart did not possess the mental acumen, ability, or personality to command complete support for legislation he initiated. Brookhart, however, represented the handiest brick to throw at the administration.\textsuperscript{39}

The November campaign was uneventful, although there were rumors of an attempt of fifth district conservative Republicans to "knife" Brookhart. Democrat Claude R. Porter supported the same progressive platform, except the tariff, as Brookhart. Porter tried to show he was safe for conservative votes, while Brookhart tried not to be too radical. When the votes were counted, Brookhart won with 323,409 votes

\textsuperscript{38}Nepash, \textit{Brookhart Campaigns}, p. 56.

out of 571,278 total votes cast, 56.6 per cent. 40

When Brookhart returned to the Senate, he was reinstated to former committees and to full seniority. Smith W. Brookhart reiterated the need for agricultural equality and an end to economic discrimination against farmers. He illustrated the inequity between business and agriculture from Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover's bulletin which stated that national wealth increased 5\% per cent from 1912 to 1922, while Iowa's grew only 2 3/4 per cent. He compared New York with Iowa. New York had 9.83 per cent of the population, produced 9.81 per cent of the wealth, and received 14.79 per cent of the income. Whereas Iowa possessed 2.27 per cent of the population, produced 3.49 per cent of the wealth, it received only 1.99 per cent of the national income.

"High cost of transportation . . . , high cost of credit . . . , the deflation of agriculture by the Federal Reserve banking system, and the high cost of public utility"—according to Brookhart, these were the causes of economic discrimination. 41

Brookhart and other defenders of farm interests agitated for farm relief from the Federal Government. In 1926 at Memphis, Tennessee, farm leaders drafted a McNary-Haugen bill based on the Dickinson measure. Although the bill contained the equalization fee, it was not to go into effect until three years later, and only under congressional authorization. Cooperatives, if at all possible, were to handle the surplus

40 Neprash, Brookhart Campaigns, pp. 57-60.
orops. This bill failed to pass the House by 55 votes and the Senate by 6 votes. In 1927 a new McNary-Haugen bill was proposed which included an immediate equalization fee for cotton and rice and omitted cattle and butter. An advisory council for each commodity was initiated, means for loans were provided for cooperatives, and storage facilities set up. The bill passed the House 214 to 178 and the Senate 51 to 43. President Coolidge vetoed this bill and the subsequent 1928 McNary-Haugen Bill, an improved legislative and administrative document that included all agricultural commodities and surpluses with an equalization fee in reserve if buying and storage facilities failed. Appropriations were increased to $400,000,000.42

By 1928, a presidential election year, agriculture was sinking further into depression, as seen in an examination of the price index. The wholesale price index of agricultural products fell from 221 in 1920 to 133 in 1929. The wholesale price index of non-agricultural goods held slightly longer; the decline was more gradual. In 1920 that index stood at 241, and from 1924 a steady decline began: for in 1924 the price index stood at 162 and in 1927 at 152. Thus wholesale prices did not drop as soon as agricultural prices. After 1920 the index of farm land values fell. In Iowa the index stood at 213 in 1920, 143 in 1924, and 117 in 1928. Mortgage debts for farm owners between 1920 and 1925 increased from approximately $4,004,000,000 to $4,517,000,000. The North Central area had 60 per cent of the

national farm mortgages with Iowa, Illinois, and Nebraska holding half of them.43

Both political parties found it necessary to highlight farm problems in their campaign efforts. Meanwhile, farm leaders and farm organizations were determined to carry the McNary-Haugen issue into the presidential campaign and, if Republicans again failed to endorse McNary-Haugenism, they were willing to lend considerable aid to the Democratic candidate, provided he supported McNary-Haugen principles. As anticipated, the Republican national convention omitted the equalization fee principle from the farm plank, though the party pledged to support a Federal Farm Board that would establish farm marketing machinery to control and distribute agricultural surpluses. The dissatisfied McNary-Haugenites left for Houston, Texas, to lobby the plank into the Democratic platform. The Democrats endorsed the principle of separating farm surpluses, namely, the surplus above the domestic market would be separated to be sold in the export market at world prices; but they did not endorse the equalization fee. Nor was Smith any more definite. He favored cooperative marketing, but was vague on surpluses. Later, much to the chagrin of George Peek, who was instrumental in the attempt to secure Republican farm votes for Al Smith, the Democratic candidate, Smith announced that the equalization fee in the 1924, 1927, and 1928 bills was unacceptable. Smith's weak position cleared the way for many Republican McNary-Haugenites to back

In 1928 Brookhart supported Hoover which appears to have been political expediency. Brookhart, Nye, Norbeck, and Shipstead refused to support Al Smith because of his farm stand. It has been asserted that these men had little to gain and much to lose by supporting Al Smith. Certainly the dirt farmer was highly suspicious of Smith's wetness and Catholicism; and the tendency was strong to place prohibition, religion, and party loyalty before economic interest, particularly since Smith's economic assurance was, at best, vague. It may well have been simple political opportunism that led Brookhart to support Hoover. Yet, the prohibition, religious, and eastern-city issues raised an interesting question. Did Brookhart oppose Smith because he symbolized urbanity, Catholicism, and the "demon rum"? An affirmative answer to this query lacks substantial historical proof, though there is much in Brookhart's statements—later to be discussed—to support an affirmative answer.

Brookhart's views on prohibition were clearly linked to his financial monopoly—Wall Street syndrome. He said that high finance was "an association of tax dodgers looking for an opportunity to transfer their tax to the backs of the laboring people and the common people of


the country by the nullification of the 18th Amendment." When Brookhart was campaigning for Hoover in Milwaukee, his campaign manager asked him to avoid the prohibition issue, since Milwaukee was not completely in favor of the Volstead Act. Brookhart complied, that is, until he delivered about three sentences; then he let loose and called Al Smith "a boisterous booze booster from brewery backing Broadway . . ." Such a volley was typical of Brookhart in the campaign.

Brookhart was up for re-election in 1932. He returned to Iowa early in May of 1932 and entered the field against six candidates, among them Henry Field from Shenandoah, Iowa. Field proved to be the most formidable opponent for Brookhart. Brookhart was vulnerable on the issue of nepotism—a not uncommon practice among legislators—and Henry Field used the issue more effectively than the other candidates. At an East Des Moines club, Field lined up the Brookhart family payroll: Smith W. Brookhart, $10,000; Charles E. Brookhart, a son, received $5,400 as a commercial attache at Bangkok, Siam; Smith W. Brookhart, Jr., $3,900 as his father's secretary; Edith L. Brookhart, $2,200 as her father's clerk; T. L. Brookhart, a brother, $2,500 as a referee in bankruptcy; O. E. Brookhart, a brother, $1,000 as a federal court bailiff. Also, in May, the Des Moines Sunday Register printed an open letter from Orville Burrows, publisher of Polle Plain Union, which accused Brookhart of illegal collection of salary while being absent


from the Senate sessions for more than fifty days to give Chautauqua lectures for $150 a day during May and June 1930. Field mentioned the letter and also accused Brookhart of failing to accomplish anything in Washington. This, at a time when farm prices were at their lowest ebb, did not help Brookhart's cause. 48

Brookhart refused to apologize for his family and indicated that no one accused them of not doing their work. He suggested that J. Darling, a cartoonist, might go before Judge Dewey to demand that Brookhart's crippled brother, a court bailiff, be discharged. Earlier the same day at the Rotary Club, Brookhart had lashed into old familiar issues. Again big business was to blame for the nation's ills. Wall Street gambling produced the cycles of inflation and deflation that caused 92 per cent of American businesses to fail. He insisted that agricultural parity with industry and additional funds to the Farm Board were needed to relieve unemployment. He asserted that the New York financial crowd had maneuvered other Iowa candidates into the campaign to split the vote, to make Brookhart lose the 35 per cent, and bring the decision to the convention. Field's candidacy—he was long a personal friend of Brookhart—was like a "Judas kiss." Field's platform, more conservative than the Senator's, emphasized a World Court, only with reservations to protect agrarian interests; payment of the soldiers' bonus only after the return of business prosperity;

and continued payment of war debts.\textsuperscript{49}

Some papers defended Brookhart against the charge of nepotism. The \textit{Wall Lake Blade} asserted that "... it is all right for everyone to find jobs for their family, that is, everyone but Brookhart."

Brookhart's defeat, however, was imminent; it had also been fore-shadowed. As early as 1926, the \textit{Iowa Homestead}, long a staunch Brookhart supporter, presaged that "the time for mere protests is passed," and that a constructive ability to remedy some of the evils was necessary. Somehow the Senator seemed to have lost touch with the Iowans.\textsuperscript{50}

The campaign assumed a carnival atmosphere as it gained momentum. Iowa witnessed a campaign unlike any in its history. Iowans watched Field's steam calliope, torch-light parades, play-acting, homey talks, and side-show antics. The nurseryman, radio-order merchant, with automobiles, radio-receivers, dress goods, shoes, sparrow-traps, canned meats, and Bibles bested Brookhart in nearly every verbal volley. When Brookhart tried to belittle Field by quipping, "If you want chicken stew, vote for Henry Field," his opponent immediately retorted, "If they want the same old baloney, they should vote for Senator Brookhart." Regardless of what Brookhart said or did, Henry was able to outlaugh him.

Smith called Henry a tool of Wall Street, but Henry in his caravan


countered by exhibiting his family as "Henry's Wall Street Gang," just ordinary folks in overalls and gingham. 51

When Brookhart's position grew desperate, progressive leaders came to his aid. Norbeck urged the farmers to vote for Brookhart to preserve the progressive group in the Senate in its battle to improve the government and national economics. The colorful New York Congressman, Fiorello LaGuardia, came to Des Moines and hurled a barrage of invective at Field, calling him among other things a "political cockroach" and "cornborer." Field handled the epithets well, commenting that cockroaches infest damp places, probably the New York delegation. La Follette, too, spoke in Iowa on Brookhart's behalf. But Field wryly quipped that the sleek, rather portly Brookhart of 1932 was not quite the same as the wild-eyed, gaunt apostle of 1922. 52

Brookhart lost to Field by over 50,000 votes. Immediately, Brookhart filed as an independent candidate in the November election but lost again by a sizeable majority to Field and Louis Murphy of Dubuque, who became the Democratic Senator from Iowa. Ironically, when agricultural conditions were most severe—the general index of farm prices in Iowa, which stood at 205 in 1920, given the 1909-1914 base, fell to 136 in 1926 and to 63 in January 1932—the man who perhaps best articulated agrarian dissatisfaction was relieved of office. Iowan voters had tired of Brookhart's bombastic tirades against "Wall Street," "seven


billions of water in the railroads," and "the crime of 1920." They listened to the matter of family incomes from the federal payroll and Chautauqua lecture fees.53

"The economic illiterate"—once so described by the late Albert B. Cummins—soon made his way to Washington and maneuvered himself into an A.A.A. position as an economic or "special advisor" on Russian trade. His job was to seek trade markets with the Soviet Union and advise the Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. Brookhart had often before urged recognition of Russia. Although he now bragged "that he was the only government official who recognized Russia," Brookhart had little more than a desk, wooden file, two tables, and a hat rack in a drab Agriculture Department office. Those Iowans formerly suspicious of Smith Brookhart's attitudes and intentions toward Russia increased their hostility when Brookhart changed his residence from Iowa to Washington, D.C.54

In 1935 after three years in the Department of Agriculture, Brookhart quit the position to return to Iowa to try again for the Senate. The incumbent Lester Jesse Dickinson was up for re-election. Brookhart, the fifth contestant against Dickinson, hoped to split the vote in the June primaries. He unleashed a volley of progressivism geared to outdo even the A.A.A. According to Brookhart, the Republican party must


design a platform that went beyond export dumping and price-fixing of agricultural products. He proposed that Dickinson be ousted because he was in league with the DuPont industry. But Brookhart's senatorial opportunities were at an end. The articulate Arcadian could barely be heard thundering in the distance.55

Dickinson won, and Brookhart returned to private law practice in Washington, D.C. On December 30, 1943, his wife died and soon afterwards Brookhart's own health failed. For a year he lived with a daughter in Prescott, Arizona, and then was hospitalized nearby. Brookhart died November 14, 1944, when 75 years of age. The life of a not-so-drab progressive leader had ended. Ivan L. Pollock, a colleague, eulogized Brookhart: "His energy, his physical strength, his courage, his self-confidence, his innate democracy, his desire to serve the best interests of his people have enabled him to achieve a position of real influence in the United States Senate."56 Certainly he well typified the mythical "agrarian" who was at the same time an influential progressive leader in the decade of the 1920's.


CHAPTER III

BROOKHART: INSURGENCY AND PROGRESSIVISM

While Brookhart's life-style characterized him as a progressive and radical agrarian champion, his progressivism and insurgency remains to be tested. Precise definitions provide guides to measure the scope and intensity of insurgency and progressivism. Insurgency involves a politician's relationship to his party. Partisanship is measured according to the frequency and extent to which a politician fulfills the well-defined obligations of party membership. An insurgent is remiss in fulfilling party obligations. Certain issues reflect significant progressive legislation during the 1920's; among them are the farm bloc programs, prohibition measures, immigration restriction, and public power bills. Although debate exists as to how progressive these issues were, many historians include them among progressive legislation. If a politician consistently and vigorously favored such legislation, it can be assumed he was a progressive. Because it has been illustrated that insurgency among several midwestern Senators is a matter of degree, and that some progressive Senators were in reality pseudoprogressives, Brookhart's voting record must be examined to determine the extent of progressivism and insurgency.1

As to what constitutes a reliable criteria of insurgency the following points seem essential: (1) explicit statements contrary to one's

one's party platform, or criticism of the executive or party associates; (2) consistent failure to vote with one's party; and (3) refusal to comply with party obligations. Since Brookhart's rhetoric will be developed in the final chapter, discussion of it can be omitted now. It is sufficient at this time to say that there is a high correlation between Brookhart's rhetoric and insurgency and his progressivism. This conclusion is based upon Brookhart's voting position on 70 Senate roll-call votes encompassing 13 fundamental issues from the 67th through the 72nd Congress (1922-1933). Throughout the era Brookhart consistently practiced voting irregularity, the second criterion of insurgency. According to one voting study among Senate Republicans from 1921 to 1929, Brookhart had the lowest loyalty percentage. Brookhart voted with a Republican majority against the Democratic majority on only 12 of the 33 votes. In the present study for the years 1922 through 1933, Brookhart voted with his own party majority against a Democratic majority 26 times out of 70, for a 37 loyalty percentage.

The third criterion, which indicates insurgency more accurately than voting irregularity, which of itself does not always conflict with party policy, is remission in regard to party obligations. Among the require-

\[\text{2Ibid., p. 94.}\]
\[\text{3Ibid.}\]

\[\text{4A loyalty index is based on the number of times a legislator votes with a majority of his party against a majority of the other party. The 70 roll-call votes of this index include six on tax bills, three on prohibition, six on civil service, three on Muscle Shoals and one on Boulder Dam, five on tariff issues, five on internal improvements, nine on veterans' benefits, thirteen on farm issues, four on welfare, eight on foreign issues, three on the military, one on labor, and three on finance. Selectivity was geared to significant areas of legislation including thirteen major categories.}\]
ments of party regularity are to: (1) support party candidates for committees and legislative offices; (2) vote for the party presidential nominee; (3) support major partisan appointments; (4) vote with the party on partisan issues. In each of these requirements Brookhart displayed noticeable and consistent party intransigence.

Brookhart violated the first rule of partisanship when he joined the insurgent revolt at the beginning of the 68th Congress in 1923 to block the party caucus decision to retain fellow Iowan A. B. Cummins as chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee. Cummins had sponsored the Esch-Cummins Transportation Act of 1920, and as Interstate Commerce Committee Chairman he was particularly odious to the insurgent Republicans. Brookhart and other insurgent Republicans attempted unsuccessfully to secure the chairmanship for Robert M. La Follette. A voting deadlock resulted until January 9, 1924, when some members of the insurgent bloc who held the balance of power changed their votes, from La Follette to Ellison D. Smith, a Democrat from South Carolina. Brookhart's action was already genuinely insurgent in that he voted for La Follette against the Republican caucus; and when he voted for Smith of the minority party, his insurgency was irreparable.

Again, in March of 1925, Brookhart exhibited party disloyalty when he voted for Edwin F. Ladd against the regular Republican choice, Robert


Nelson Stanfield of Oregon, for the chairmanship of the Public Lands and Surveys Committee. Ladd, who had been the previous chairman, had been demoted in consequence of his insurgency. Insurgent Republicans, including Brookhart, failed to block the election of Stanfield and retain Ladd as chairman.

Finally, 14 Republicans, Brookhart included, refused to support Senator George H. Moses, president pro temp, for reelection in December 1931 because he had, because of their insurgent opposition to the 1929 tariff bill, called them "sons of the wild jackass." Brookhart joined with 4 insurgent Republicans in first supporting Wesley L. Jones for the office and later, with 12 insurgents, switched to Arthur H. Vandenburg. Although the voting was deadlocked after 23 ballots, Moses remained in office because the Senate rules stated that a president pro temp retained office until displaced.7

As to the support of party presidential candidates, Brookhart repudiated the Vice-Presidential candidate Charles G. Dawes both quietly to the Republican National Committee Chairman William Butler and openly in the Emmetsburg speech. Brookhart did not campaign for the Progressive Party candidate La Follette, but he suggested that Senator George Norris should be the Vice-Presidential candidate. Shortly thereafter, he expressed opposition to Presidential candidate Coolidge whom he thought to be in league with Wall Street. For this renegade action Brookhart was read out of his party prior to the November election. Immediately upon Brookhart's return to the Senate, he and other disloyal Senators

were denied attendance at party conferences and seniority status in committee assignments. Brookhart received further discipline to dissuade future insurgence when the Senate voted to give Democrat Steck the contested Iowa seat. In the 70th Congress, however, Brookhart was reinstated to former committee positions and full seniority status as a Republican in good standing.

Although Brookhart supported Hoover in the 1928 Presidential election—Senators John J. Blaine, La Follette, and Norris bolted the party to campaign for Smith—a pattern does emerge to explain his regular party behavior in this case. Brookhart was an ardent prohibitionist. The anti-prohibitionists were connected with the Wall Street financial monopoly crowd, and certain individuals from the crowd supported Al Smith. Brookhart adamantly disapproved of these men. In the 71st Congress he assailed the "Raskob-Mellon" combination for conspiring to elect "wet" Republicans and Democrats, among them of course the Democratic candidate, Al Smith. John J. Raskob, a manager of General Motors, had financed Smith in his 1924 Presidential bid. Nor did Brookhart possess special affection for George Peek, who labored for Smith's cause among Midwestern farmers in 1928, because he, according to Brookhart, had earlier supported Vice-President Charles G. Dawes for the 1928 Presidential nomination. Brookhart opposed Dawes because of his connections with both the banking and oil interests and support of the McFadden bill, which deflated the

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Federal Reserve Policy. Brookhart further stated that Peek, involved with banking interests, had slowed action on the McNary-Haugen bill and actually desired its veto because it would aid Smith. Finally, Brookhart's loyalty to Hoover in 1928 seems less regular because Smith was vague in his promise to secure the equalization fee for farm relief.

When Hoover became President in 1929, he frustrated any proposal for direct governmental subsidy of agriculture. Instead, the Agricultural Marketing Act was passed. The major weakness of the Act was that it emphasized marketing organizations with little focus on production controls, ignored rising farm taxes and mortgage rates, and failed to raise prices or benefit farmers who were unable to offer security for loans. By the 1932 Presidential campaign, Hoover's indifferent record on agricultural reform and regular Republican insistence in running Hoover on a conservative platform had split Republican ranks. Brookhart, along with Senators Norris, La Follette, Jr., Hiram Johnson (Calif.) and Bronson Cutting (N.M.), endorsed F. D. Roosevelt's candidacy. 10

In voting for partisan appointments, Brookhart retained a fairly consistent obstructionist voting pattern. Out of 23 Senate roll-call votes on a variety of significant executive appointments, he supported only 4 from the 67th Congress through the 72nd Congress (1922-1932). Brookhart, for example, was the sole dissenting voice against Hanford McNider as Ambassador to Canada. His objections to McNider included his obstruction of veterans' compensation, propensity for liquor, and other

private reasons. He voted against the other appointments for similar reasons or because such men were not likely to support crucial farm bloc measures.

Finally Brookhart failed to vote the party position when partisanship itself was an issue. Frequently, however, as in the following cases, namely, on votes to override presidential vetoes and in Senate investigations of party corruption, insurgents simply joined regular Republicans on partisan issues, even when such issues became liabilities to the party. Brookhart was among the 10 Republicans to support the motion that Edwin Denby resign as Secretary of the Navy for alleged fraud and corruption. The party majority voted to retain Denby. Although the resolution to investigate the notorious Attorney General Daugherty case was partisan,

only one Republican, Davis Elkins voted against it. Brookhart chaired the investigative committee.\footnote{Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1925, LXV, Part 3, p. 2245; Republican votes against Denby were 35-33; Ibid., Part 4, p. 3410; Republican votes to investigate Daugherty were 34-1.}

To sustain or override presidential vetoes is an indicator of partisanship. Brookhart evidenced implacable insurgency on this indicator when he voted to override the executive on the nine votes selected for analysis. These nine votes were on major issues, including four on veterans' benefits, two postal salaries, one postal hours and rural post roads, and one on the Federal Farm Board.\footnote{The Republican votes were as follows: 30-17 for Veterans' compensation, Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 9, p. 8871; 32-12, sustained the veto on veterans' pensions, Ibid., Part 8, p. 8422; Postal salaries failed passage by a vote of 22-28, Ibid., 68th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1928, LXVI, Part 2, p. 1285; Veterans' compensation passed 24-13, Ibid., 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1928, LXIX, Part 9, p. 9674; Postal Work Hours and Salaries overrode the veto by 28-9 and 23-14 respectively, Ibid., p. 9667; Rural Post Roads overrode the veto by 18-17, Ibid., p. 9673; McNary-Haugen bill sustained the veto by 20-19, Ibid., pp. 9879-80; Federal Farm Board failed passage by 20-19, Ibid., p. 9680; Veterans' compensation overrode the veto, Ibid., 71st Cong., 3rd Sess., 1931, LXXIV, Part 6, p. 6230.} It should also be noted, that Brookhart was absent on several vital roll-call votes to override vetoes, such as the Philippine Independence and the 1927 McNary-Haugen bills. The examination of votes to override presidential vetoes shows that Brookhart voted more often with a Republican majority than against a party majority.

Nevertheless, Brookhart's voting behavior can be classified as chronically and intensely insurgent. The question remains, however, as to the degree of correlation between his insurgency and progressivism. In Brookhart's case there is a close relationship, particularly in the following progressive issues: farm bloc programs, prohibition legis-
lation, immigration restriction, and the public power controversy. Although authors disagree as to how progressive some of these proposals were in actuality, many concur that such areas were included in the gambit of progressive legislation.14

Midwestern and western insurgents often joined with southern Democrats to pass legislation beneficial to agrarian interests. Throughout most of the decade this alliance, known as the Farm Bloc from 1921 to 1924, succeeded in enacting rural credits measures, a Federal Farm Board, higher tariffs for agricultural products, curbs on railroad monopolistic practices, such as inequitable rates on long and short hauls, government subsidizing of agricultural products through an equalization fee, and tax equalization bills. The Farm Bloc did not achieve action on the Truth in Fabrics bill, merely delayed action on the Ship Subsidy, and continued hearings on the Muscle Shoals project. After the 67th Congress the Farm Bloc had dissolved, but efforts at farm relief legislation continued.

In the Senate Brookhart supported Farm Bloc measures and later farm reform bills. He was among the 4 Republicans who voted against acceptance of President Coolidge's Agricultural Conference Report. Leaders of farm interests defeated the Capper-Haugen cooperative marketing bill which embodied main ideas of the conference report and substituted the Dickinson bill. Brookhart did not vote on the 1926 and 1927 McNary-Haugen bills but did vote for the 1928 bill, and he voted to override the presidential veto. He voted for the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act, and was

among the insurgent group who voted to retain the export debenture and flexible provision of the tariff against President Hoover's wishes. The provisions, however, were removed from the final bill. Finally, Brookhart voted against the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, but favored the Federal Home Loan Bank Act which made credit easier in the form of home mortgage discounts.

On all votes selected from the 67th Congress through the 72nd Congress, Brookhart voted to satisfy agricultural needs. He voted with a Republican majority against a Democratic majority only four out of 18 times for a 20 loyalty percentage on farm bloc issues. Those bills in which the Senator joined Republican forces were: a rural credits bill, a public roads bill, a tariff bill, and an oleomargarine tax bill.15

That Brookhart was an ardent prohibitionist can scarcely be disputed.

Not only did he polemicize, but he voted consistently in support of prohibitionist legislation, whether that bill involved prevention of smuggling liquor, enforcement of violations, or retaining the 18th Amendment. So emphatic was Brookhart in favor of prohibition that it not only colored his personal philosophy but also his political viewpoint, particularly in connection with monopolistic and financial interests. Generally Brookhart supported regular Republicans on prohibitionist legislation except the repeal of the 18th Amendment. 16

Republicans, including Brookhart, supported the 1924 permanent immigration restriction bill. Brookhart's motivation in support of the bill does not seem to reflect the nativism, anti-Semitism, and racism that characterized much of the public discussion. There seems to be little xenophobia in any of his public statements. Thus it can be assumed that he saw immigration restriction as a decisive benefit to labor. 17

The controversy over private versus government ownership of the nitrate and hydroelectric facilities of Muscle Shoals in Alabama divided Republicans. This is well illustrated in three major roll-call votes: the first for private operation to secure cheap fertilizer; and the remaining two to gain a source both for cheap nitrates and electric power through governmental operation. Brookhart voted against private operation and favored governmental control in both instances. On two of the


three roll call votes he voted against a Republican majority. 18

Because Brookhart might well be progressive on the above issues and not on others, eight other categories usually not identified as causing progressive-conservative alignments have been included in this study which includes votes on three foreign policy, three military, five veterans' benefits, three welfare measures, two civil service bills, two tax measures, one labor bill, and three emergency relief bills. On the three foreign policy bills, Brookhart favored an isolationist position for the United States. On only one vote, American entrance into the World Court, did he vote against a Republican majority. In military affairs Brookhart favored limited naval development. Brookhart voted with the Republican majority on four of five veterans' pensions, one of three emergency relief bills, one of two postal salary increases, and all three welfare measures. He voted consistently against a Republican majority to give tax reductions favorable to big business. Brookhart, with the Republican majority, favored the Anti-Injunction bill. 19 He exhibited a


voting record of 55 loyalty percentage which indicated a higher degree of party regularity on issues that seemed to generate less insurgent voting. Brookhart's voting record for enacting progressive legislation, however, illustrated a high degree of consistency.

On the basis of the above study of Brookhart's voting behavior in reference to insurgency and progressivism, several conclusions seem self-evident. First, Brookhart maintained a chronic insurgent stance, albeit with some inconsistency. His insurgency was intense, particularly in relation to other Republican Senators. Second, Brookhart exhibited one-hundred per cent support of progressive legislation selected for examination. Third, the correlation, in the case of Brookhart, between irregular party behavior and progressivism is high. Such a correlation, however, does not necessarily cause one or the other. This is even more evident when a comparison is made between regular party voting on progressive legislation with Brookhart's record. It has been illustrated that regular Republicans often supported progressive issues. Thus Brookhart's support of progressive legislation cannot be said to have directly influenced his insurgency. The cause or relationship between the two must be sought elsewhere, namely, his ideology, assuming that his political beliefs had a decisive impact on his voting behavior. If such a relationship exists, then the assumption may, indeed, have some historical weight.

 CHAPTER IV

BROOKHART: AGRARIAN RADICAL

An intense drive for reform permeates Brookhart's ideology. He continually sought legislation for greater equality, individual freedom, and representation in government for dispossessed classes, namely, the farmer, soldier, and laborer. A just society was one in which the advantages of technology, commerce, transportation, and finance would be managed by the government to insure individual self-fulfillment. In short, society and its institutions existed for the common good, while government served that good.

Real economic grievances made a just society for farmers nearly impossible. Ever-present, giant, capitalistic combinations were garnering huge profits for themselves: bankers raised their rates of interest; manufacturers fixed the cost of machinery; and railroads determined high rates of transportation. According to Brookhart, the farmer failed to realize any profit from the sale of his agricultural produce by the time he paid transportation, machinery, interest rates, taxes, and production costs. Added to his difficulties was a predetermined price for agricultural produce by the boards of trade, the "gamblers" and speculators—the middlemen.1 Seldom had reformers or agrarian spokesmen been so aware of their depressed human condition.

Brookhart identified unjust laws and moneied interests as primarily responsible for depressing the human condition and destroying individual freedom. First, inequitable laws oppressed the individual in a variety of ways. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act protected manufactured goods at high rates and raised rates of agricultural products. Yet as long as the farmers overproduced, the price of the exportable surplus would still determine the price of farm products at home or abroad. The tariff operated to the farmer's benefit when he produced a scarcity of exports. Further, he had to pay a higher price for manufactured products. The Transportation Act of 1920 raised railroad rates on agricultural products to over 60 per cent prior to 1920. The Interstate Commerce Commission gave the railroads a 5 3/4 per cent return, based on watered stock, or a value of $19,000,000,000 when the market value was only $12,000,000,000. Financial interests, too, discriminated against the farmer. The Federal Reserve Board passed the restrictive credit act of 1920, which Brookhart said charged a 6 to 8 per cent interest to farmers and only a 1 to 3 per cent interest to speculators. Finally, the Mellon tax law pressed agriculture into "economic slavery." Brookhart asserted that corporations protected by the Mellon tax law dodged the law with tax-free bonds and thus accumulated surpluses denied to individual citizens. He thought that Congress ought to tax their income and give the "little fellows" a chance, which in turn would allow more money for veterans' benefits, internal improvements,

or unemployment relief. All such laws aided special interests by adding increment to their wealth, while systematically destroying those who produced the wealth.

Secondly, a financial or credit system abetted by the law further usurped the gain of those who toiled. Thus, the National City Bank in New York was able to reap a 8.34 per cent profit as a direct result of the national and state banking acts. A banking system centered in New York and connected with Pittsburg not only devised short term credit policies, but denied low interest loans to the farmer and gave them, instead, to the "Wall Street crowd." Nor could the farmer, under the law, organize cooperative banks. He was at the mercy of New York speculators and of the manipulation of credit and bonds by such agencies as the Federal Reserve Bank and the War Finance Corporation. Brookhart stated that this manipulation adversely affected agricultural prosperity and in turn the stability of state banks.

But for Brookhart, the forces of law and money were concomitant forces through which great trusts, railroad corporations, credit systems, Wall Street, and government agents exploited the people. The following illustrates the collusion of the railroads with the government and the money power. Brookhart repeatedly criticized the Esch-Cummins bill because it gave the Interstate Commerce Commission power to fix the

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value of railroads at $7,000,000,000 above their market value, $400,000,000 of which was spent in the purchase of rails, cars, and locomotives at high cost from an inside corporation owned and operated by the rails. The Act gave the Commission power to fix rates up to six per cent of the estimated value of the railroads, high enough to pay operating expenses and to yield a return. Brookhart felt the law unjustly benefited the rails because the gross national wealth of the United States from 1919 to 1922 increased at an annual rate of 5 1/2 per cent which after 1922 increased annually at only 4 1/2 per cent. Thus, private interests received an income greater than the market value warranted. To add further injury to the farmer, the railroads received 158,000,000 acres of land throughout the United States, nearly equal to one-fifth of the land area of the State of Iowa. Meanwhile, on the national scene, rails paid only 7 per cent of their gross income in taxes, while farmers paid nearly 28 per cent. Thus, the "haves" through a shrewd manipulation of law and credit in a competitive economy exploited and enslaved the farmers.

Brookhart believed in an extensive conspiracy, entrenched in high places through financial backing, that reached not only into economic realms but also into the elective process. The Association Against Prohibition financially supported by John J. Raskob, who was also the Democratic National Chairman; Mr. W. W. Atterbury, the railroad operator and Republican committeeman from Pennsylvania; and by Mr. DuPont,
renowned chemical entrepreneur, illustrated such a conspiracy. Apart from the obvious moralistic implications of prohibition, Brookhart castigated the Association Against Prohibition, which he also linked to Mellon and the New York Union League Club because they lobbied to secure legislation to tax beer and to legalize the saloon to secure a fortune. Here, too, Brookhart noted that the wet "...high society of Philadelphia..." circumvented the law.6

Possibly no other incident so well exemplified the secret policy of business and government than the Federal Reserve credit restriction act of May 1920 which Brookhart never tired of labeling the "crime of 1920." That crime was a forced deflationary policy by raising the discount rate. But it was more. At a secret meeting on May 18, 1920, the Federal Reserve Board raised discount rates, effective October 1920, and did not notify the press or Congress until October. The galling realization for Brookhart was the evident knowledge of Armour and Company, Swift and Company, Sinclair Oil, and others who secured substantial loans for themselves at lower rates of interest prior to October. The delayed public meetings in October 1920 hurt the farmers who, had they known in advance of the change in policy, could have borrowed earlier at less interest.7

Nor was this the only area where secret policies distorted by a propaganda machine of nationally prominent newspapers financed by large


7 Ibid., 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, Part 10, p. 10842; Ibid., Part 14, pp. 14975-76.
corporations discriminated against the common citizen. Predatory interests, including members of the American Legion, in an effort to legislate Mellon's tax-reduction bill on surtaxes and estate taxes, frustrated the farm bloc's attempt to secure soldiers' bonuses or adjusted compensation. Again and again, Brookhart flayed the gamblers and "the Wall Street crowd," the predatory interests of a competitive industrial society, corrupt government representatives, and the huge financial crowd in the East as robbers of toilers who produced the wealth. Finally, Brookhart saw this conspiracy by the owners of wealth in highly personalistic terms, either by naming individuals outright or by inferring negative class conceptions to the group, both of which have been elucidated.

All of Brookhart's utterances and proposals for reform were based upon certain underlying assumptions about man, economics, and government. His assumptions can be identified as the concept of a "producer ethos" economic system, much of which has previously been discussed; the labor value theory of wealth; a harmony of interests among farmers and workers arising in part from the labor value theory and in part from the aggrieved agricultural conditions; a belief in the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideas of equality and democracy; and a distrust of the competitive system with a concurrent belief in the cooperative endeavor.9

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Without question these assumptions are directly related to Brookhart's interest in agriculture, which provides the key to all his reform thought and behavior. Nor can the very real depressed conditions of farmers be ignored since they were in large measure the impetus for Brookhart's articulated reform efforts.

Agricultural equality was Brookhart's goal. Agriculture formed the secure basis for lasting prosperity; it was the greatest business producing over 56 per cent of the gross value of the nation's products. To Brookhart, the farmer and laborer produced the nation's wealth and consumed the others' product. The farmer had not only to help produce the wealth but also to determine a cost-of-production price plus a slight profit, namely, to figure how much it would cost to produce the farm product, plus shipping rates, and add a moderate return on the sale of his produce. Instead, Brookhart observed that 10 per cent of the people—capitalists, middlemen, and profiteers—had "...control of most of the machinery of production, of processing, of credit, of transportation, and of marketing." This constituted a "producer ethos" situation, one in which the producers of the nation's wealth were enslaved by the select owners of wealth.

Brookhart's concept of work and man's relation to it supported his idea of a producer ethos. In this theory Brookhart, like earlier agrarian reformers, found justification for his opposition to corporate capitalism. The Senator frequently referred to the idea of the

10 Speech delivered to the Council of Foreign Relations of New York City, January 26, 1923, pp. 2-3, Des Moines Historical Building, Archives, Brookhart Manuscript Files; "Nomination of Eugene Meyer," Speech by Brookhart to the Senate, February 24, 1931, p. 1, Des Moines Historical Building, Archives, Brookhart Manuscript Files.
"rewards of their labor," or to the wealth "produced by the toil of hand or head." Therefore the people who have the best title to the wealth and the best right to its accumulation are those who toil with head or hand. Labor produced the wealth and should reap the profit, and capital had little or no value. The farmer personified the small, independent producer; the incipient capitalist, who with habits of toil, frugality, honesty, and independence would receive a modest return of 5 per cent of the invested capital plus an added 4 or 5 per cent increment. But the corrupt speculators, Wall Street gamblers, and large corporations destroyed the modest profit of labor and the republican virtues necessary to produce the wealth.

Brookhart articulated ambivalent attitudes toward a competitive economic system. He frequently denounced speculation and the competitive system, as when he spoke against the tax reduction bill. "We ought to kill this gambling business in this country . . . I do not mean compromise or regulate it or anything of the kind. Speculation must be destroyed if we are to have stability and soundness in our finance in the United States." He observed how the selfish interests created inequality for agriculture through "cut-throat competition" and through clever manipulation of finances by speculators and the nonpartisan league of Wall Street gamblers. In his motion picture industry bill, however,

Brookhart wished to preserve for "... the American people the remaining vestige of competition in the motion picture industry and to create conditions under which it is hoped new competition may spring up."14

A concern, then, was to legislate a just profit for labor in the existing competitive economic system. Just as the corporation was considered an individual before the law and through special privilege able to accumulate profits, so too the individual citizen should receive the same protection and opportunity for profit. In this way unfair practices would become unlawful, simultaneously giving the government a strong hand in securing economic equality.15

Brookhart repeatedly affirmed this principle of equality as enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, which he considered the basic principle of "Americanism." The Jeffersonian formulation of equal opportunity provided the inspiration for Brookhart's rhetoric in his fight against the evils of corporate capitalism. As Jefferson foresaw the possible disequilibrium between agriculture, commerce, and manufacture, so did Brookhart, who was dealing with the situation; and he demanded economic and political power for the people to redress wrongs committed by special privileges.

The following excerpt in a letter from Jefferson to Madison illustrates further similarities of thought between Brookhart and Jefferson:

Brookhart, January 17, 1924, p. 12, Des Moines Historical Building, Archives, Brookhart Manuscript Files; "The Merchant Marine," Speech by Brookhart, December 18 and 19, 1922, p. 3, Des Moines Historical Building, Archives, Brookhart Manuscript Files.


Whenever there is in our country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a common stock for man to labor and live on. If, for the encouragement of industry we allow it to be appropriated, we must take care that other employment be provided to those excluded from the appropriation. If we do not the fundamental right to labor the earth returns to the unemployed. 16

Both believed that wealth derived from labor, that human rights were secured in economic rights, and that if there were no other recourse the government owed redress to the individual and the means of a livelihood.

Brookhart, far more than Jefferson, subscribed to a concept of government as the guarantor of man's rights. Legislation derived from the power of the people, and it was their right to alter or abolish unjust laws. Brookhart said, "... the basis of our political system is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government." 17 It was from his concept of democracy and its frustration through the inequities of a market economy that Brookhart's harmony of interests among farmers and workers arose. Precisely because their dream of incipient entrepreneurship was not being fulfilled, the farmers and workers possessed mutual interests. Only by uniting their efforts could the farmers and workers achieve economic and political power. 18 Thus, Brookhart, like Jefferson and Jackson, affirmed a belief in man's ability to chart his own destiny through politics.


18 Ibid., 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, LXXV, Part 7, p. 7283; "Prosperity on the Farm Will Assure Prosperity Throughout the Nation," Speech by Brookhart to Senate, January 17, 1924, p. 4, Des Moines Historical Building, Archives, Brookhart Manuscript Files.
Brookhart thought that a cooperative system founded on the principles of justice and humanity would be more successful than the competitive system, and he designed his cooperative economics as a rival to competitive economics. Cooperatives then had to engage in production, processing, distribution, marketing, transportation, and credit. To insure endurance of cooperatives, the system had to be taught to subsequent generations. 19

According to Brookhart, three basic principles would support the cooperative system and prevent speculation and competition: (1) each member producer or consumer would have only one vote, while capital would not vote; (2) the earnings of capital would be fixed to a limit of 5 per cent; and (3) three-fourths of the net earnings would be distributed to members and one-fourth would remain in the industry. Minor principles included that goods be sold for cash only and at the market prices; that cooperative societies be federated; and that each society educate the others in cooperative rules. The basic support of the cooperative system was to be Federal Cooperative banks under the Federal Reserve system. The reserve bank, however, was to be under cooperative control. Thus, if the "cooperative store" should fail, the cooperative bank would succeed, due to the established law. 20


20 Ibid., pp. 2-3; Speech by Brookhart to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York City, January 26, 1923, p. 4, Des Moines Historical Building, Archives, Brookhart Manuscript Files; "Natal Day of Cooperation," Speech by Brookhart to the Senate, December 21, 1929, p. 3, Des Moines Historical Building, Archives, Brookhart Manuscript Files; Senate Bill 3024, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., Des Moines Historical Building, Archives, Brookhart Manuscript Files.
Needless to say, Brookhart failed to realize his utopic vision of a national cooperative. The nation was unwilling to adopt a "socialistic" scheme, even in the face of a grave depression. Yet it was precisely due to the direct influence of an extended depression that Brookhart sought certain governmental reforms. His concept of reform was often negative and preventive, but primarily positive. Brookhart tried to limit unnecessary governmental expenditures in his opposition to the naval cruiser bill and to restrain governmental grants of special ownership to private concerns in the Muscle Shoals issue. He also sought to prevent abuses of corporate monopolies through antitrust acts and an excess profits tax on monopolies.  

The severity of the depression impressed Brookhart with the need for governmental management of the economy. He sought a positive role for government, as in his agricultural credits program through intermediate credit banks. He voted to inflate the currency to allow easier credit, and he intended to use the labor commodities index guide to help stabilize the money standard, rather than a fluctuating gold standard. To summarize: Brookhart wanted to "...balance the Budget, provide farm relief, unemployment relief, and pay the soldiers' bonus; pay the obligations of the Government ... "  

In an effort to give more control over finances to farm representatives, Brookhart supported an increase in the revolving fund of the Farm Board to raise the price level to a cost of production and to

21 Cong. Record, 70th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1929, LXX, Part 4, p. 3932;  
Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 7, p. 6892;  

22 Ibid., 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1933, LXXVI, Part 3, p. 2361;  
support any losses in the world market through a debenture. Treasury notes rather than bonds were to be used to raise commodity prices in an effort to limit unnecessary taxes on the farmer. Brookhart thought these programs were necessary to stop the banking practices of lowering interest notes to benefit eastern concerns and of redepositing surplus funds into Federal Reserve banks without guaranteeing an interest rate paid on the redeposits to the member banks.23

Brookhart favored direct governmental subsidy of agriculture. He supported the McNary-Haugen bills only as a means of immediate relief because they did not insure a cost-of-production profit plus a reasonable return and because prices on dumped products only were determined according to the world competitive market which generally lowered farm prices. Instead, Brookhart drafted a bill based on the original Norris-Sinclair bill, which set up a corporation with greater powers and finances to handle surplus goods than the McNary-Haugen bill and which retained the equalization fee of the earlier McNary bill. Brookhart consistently opposed, however, any attempt to control agricultural production because it would cost the consumer more than an equalization fee or debenture plan.24


Nor did he slight agrarian interests that might also aid Southern farmers. He supported the Cotton and Grain Futures bill, saying "If speculation is wrong, I am for striking at it whenever I get an opportunity. If monopoly, if a combination to beat down the farmers' prices is wrong, I am for striking at that."\textsuperscript{25} Hence, Brookhart exhibited a type of Jacksonian democracy to protect southern needs.

Finally, Brookhart proposed to extend governmental power through actual operation and control of public utilities and natural resources. He said, "I believe it is the duty of the Government to protect its citizens against monopoly always. I believe that it has a right to go into a business that has organized into a monopoly and which is practicing extortion in profits against the people of the country. I especially believe this is true when it applies to natural resources and to public utilities."\textsuperscript{26} Brookhart desired that government ownership and operation be extended to the merchant fleet because "... as long as the Government owned and operated the ships, they looked after the farmer and gave him a low rate of transportation ..."\textsuperscript{27} In this way, the Senator attempted to legislate and to utilize governmental powers to insure equality for agriculture.

The political and social inferences of Brookhart's reform philosophy can be identified primarily as an attempt to make the voice of the government that of the people. Congressional members were to pass positive reform measures both to conquer the evils in society and to

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., 70th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1929, LXX, Part 3, p. 3300.
\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., 68th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1925, LXVI, Part 5, p. 1124.
\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 1929, LXXI, Part 1, p. 434.
promote the common good. This could be accomplished, however, only when
the farmers and workers, once they realized their mutual interests, had
united to secure political power. Then they could break financial
monopolies to gain economic and social security. Thus, Brookhart, like
earlier populists, thought that political power was the first step to
economic and social equality. Then the people would become a dynamic
force to protect property and secure their rights. But Brookhart's
ideology had its origins not only in the Populist reform movement, but
also in the Granger and Greenback movements.

Without question, the Greenback movement contributed heavily to
the history of reform in its proposal for currency inflation and a
cooperative economy. The Granger cause added a consumers' cooperative
inspired by the English Rochdale plan as propagated by the Knights of
Labor. The Grangers also promoted a governmental agency to nationalize
public utilities and to fix transportation rates through legislative
channels. Both movements favored congeries of antimonopolistic schemes
to combat the trinitarian monopoly.

One forceful political personality who partially influenced the
Greenback and Granger reforms and contributed substantially to the
Populist cause in 1892 was James B. Weaver. The Iowan leader was the
Greenback's presidential candidate in 1880 and the People's Party in
1892. He served as a Greenback congressman for three consecutive terms
from 1878 to 1887. In 1892 Weaver won the Populist Party's candidacy
for president. Weaver articulated many major issues of Populist reform
forces for both midwestern farmers and eastern laborers. Gifted with a
messianic zeal and vision, he educated a national constituency on land
speculation, tight money controlled by the eastern financial class,
oppressing debts for farmers and soldiers, inequitable taxation on the poor, corruption in the Senate and the courts, accumulated capital by the great monopolies, and labor problems.

Brookhart was not original in his development of major themes regarding land, transportation, and money; he borrowed ideas from James B. Weaver, whom he had personally known. Weaver assumed a social dualism and harmony of interests among the working classes when he spoke of the oppression of trusts and moneyed class upon the toilers. He thought farmers and workers should unite to organize into cooperative units to gain their just rewards and a cost of production profit. His apocryphal vision of class struggle was intense. He opposed national banks and wanted law to establish easier credit. He also opposed railroad usurpation of the peoples' land and thought that preservation of the public domain would help restore prosperity and rights to the people.\textsuperscript{28}

Weaver, in his effort to curb "criminal" practices of large combinations, was the precursor of those insurgent Republicans of the 1920's who sought similar legislation. Although Weaver and Brookhart differed on innumerable issues and in qualities and gifts of personality, their essential similarities as to legislative philosophy simply cannot be disregarded. Weaver, like Brookhart, supported an excise and graduated income tax, soldiers' pensions, relief for debtors, an oleomargarine tax, the enlargement of the department of agriculture, prohibition, monetary reform, and governmental control of railroads and rates. Both attempted

to extend democracy: Weaver through direct election of Senators; Brookhart through curbing the Supreme Court powers and in voting to extend farm representation on the Federal Farm Board. Finally, both tried to restore the land to the people.29

Because Weaver and Brookhart were labeled demagogues, one can assume that they fit into the radical continuum of history. If radicalism embodies a militant rhetoric and a rejection of a laissez-faire economic system in preference to governmental operation and ownership of national utilities and governmental management of national institutions for common equity, then Brookhart was a twentieth century radical. Brookhart's radicalism was expressed in his dogged, often intense, efforts to increase the power of the people in their government so that government would in reality represent their interests. Government would then continually reform to achieve equality among all classes of people. Lastly, because the difference between Brookhart's ideology and voting habits is slight, it is the contention of this writer that it was his whole complex of values and attitudes, in large measure influenced by his background and experiences—not the least of which was the agricultural depression—that motivated Brookhart's progressivism and insurgency.

29Tindall, A Populist Reader, p. 69; Haynes, James Baird Weaver, pp. 131, 248, 244 respectively; James Albert Woodburn, "Western Radicalism in American Politics," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIII (September, 1926), pp. 159-60.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Still the question remains as to where Smith W. Brookhart fits into the historiographical discussion regarding the reform impetus of the 1920's. Was the senator a genuine dissident against the regular Republican administration and party, a descendent in the tradition not only of Populist reform, but also Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy; or was he a political opportunist and an agrarian capitalist out for further gain? Was Brookhart one of those radical humanists, who armed with Republican virtues of honesty, simplicity, and self-reliance represented the disinherited in political, economic, and social realms; or was he a reactionary who imagined agrarian exploitation at the hands of a ruthless group of conspirators in finance, government, and great corporations? Lastly, did Smith Brookhart propose a realistic reform program in response to a severe economic crisis that aimed toward the extension and growth of democracy and equality; or was he an anti-intellectual crank who outlined a simplistic and unrealistic utopia built on an idyllic past? The answer to such queries lies somewhere between the extremes.

The conclusions drawn from an investigation of Smith W. Brookhart's insurgent and progressive voting habits suggest that both historical "schools" possess tenets of validity. Brookhart exhibited chronic insurGENCY; few so-called intractable Republicans practiced the same degree of independence. In regard to progressivism, Brookhart habitually favored
liberal reform measures, but so too did many regular Republicans, though their voting record is not consistent. This supports the assertion that the relationship between progressivism and insurgency is tenuous, at best, and that the interpretation of Republican insurgency might well profit from a reanalysis, even though Brookhart's insurgent stance seems to be related to his progressivism. Although Brookhart was a genuinely "independent" reformer of the 1920's, especially given the evidence of his response to an extensive agricultural depression and his eccentric lifestyle, an examination of his ideology adds further support to either of the contending historical sides.

A selection of the following themes will suffice to illustrate the above statement. Brookhart too often oversimplified the causes of the agricultural depression and attributed it to a conspiracy of interests; but the economic crisis was real, not imaginary. Secondly, Brookhart was mistaken in his assumption of a complete harmony of interests among workers and farmers. Yet he did prognose that government must care for both their needs and so, in a sense, was a precursor of the positive governmental action in the New Deal. Thirdly, although the senator railed against the capitalistic system, his belief in a "labor-cost" theory whose premise espoused small commercial entrepreneurship in agriculture, in effect, provided a safe bulwark for the existing economic system. Fourthly, like his Populist predecessors, Brookhart responded to abuses experienced by laboring classes with specific and realistic legislation designed to curb selfish practices of trusts, rail monopolies, banks, and the Wall Street crowd. Granted, his cooperative program was an ineffective remedy because he failed to understand the complexities of a market economy. Finally,
although Brookhart attempted to modify the economic milieu by cooperative enterprises, he failed to change its laissez-faire character nor did he attempt to destroy the present political structure but, rather, worked through it.

No doubt, some of the confusion regarding the nature of reform thought during the 1920's lies in the inherent paradoxes expressed in the rhetoric of political leaders. Brookhart's ideological efforts are illustrative. He habitually championed the causes of greater equality, freedom, and democracy. Yet he promoted reform measures such as consumers' cooperatives that in their very nature restricted freedom of competition, because they strengthened a central government which, if it so desired, could exert totalitarian control over the people for purposes diametrically opposed to democratic society. Thus, in seeming contradiction, although Brookhart desired a strengthened government, its strength resided on an ethical premise that called for the full realization of humanistic values, the well-being of the people. Indeed, the spectrum of democracy had been broadened beyond political spheres, and political and social problems had been confronted by Brookhart as evidenced in the legislation he favored to secure economic equality for farmers. But in the process, Brookhart, like so many urban intellectual reformers of his day, created a confusion between politics and culture; cultural problems were solved with political solutions, and conversely. Lastly, the senator drew inspiration for his thought and polemics from past reform tradition, from Jefferson to James B. Weaver; but he did not seek a new model to restructure society from an idyllic past. Rather he sought a future vision permeated by democratic principles. Brookhart's reform zeal was positive.
The examination, then, of Smith W. Brookhart's insurgency, progressivism, and ideology seems to open the historical period of the 1920's for a revisionist interpretation of dissident Republican senators, and demonstrates the need for empirical methods and techniques as applied to such historical investigation. The discovery that Brookhart embodied tenets from both historical "schools" makes this need more readily apparent.
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