

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONALITY NEEDS AND
MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN COLLEGE STUDENTS

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Kohlberg has devised a moral development theory consisting of six stages in irreversible sequence. An important construct of the theory is that moral development is more related to a cognitive developmental process than to personality. Rest developed the Defining Issues Test, a test of objectively measuring moral judgment using Kohlberg's theory. The subjects for this study were twenty-six males and thirty-four females in the junior or senior class at a small Midwestern university. The T-scores for college students for each need on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule were correlated with the moral judgment P scores on the Defining Issues Test. A t test was used to determine the significance of the correlations. None of the relationships between personality needs and the level of moral judgment were significant.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether man has a moral dimension has been debated for centuries. If one assumes that human beings do have a moral dimension, a presupposition of this study, how is it that they do? Is moral judgment innate, learned, or a combination of both? Does morality relate to personality, intelligence, or a combination of both, and if so, how does it relate to them?

These questions and other related questions have been formally discussed by theologians and philosophers, but psychologists, in a relatively new science, have only begun a direct study of morality. The field of psychology is replete with moral decisions; therefore, the question of moral judgment, and specifically whether it is learned, whether it relates to personality, and whether it is a combination of personality and learning should be, and is, within the scientific investigative area of psychology. Those in the mental health professions would benefit by a better understanding of the nature of morality.

Historically, the Greek culture was interested in the moral development of the personality. Kohlberg quoted Plato when Meno asked:

Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?¹

In the first half of the twentieth century, Piaget conducted experiments to determine the nature of moral development. He worked with adolescent and younger-aged children and usually limited his theories to that age. In his theories, two general moralities exist with a possible intermediate or third type. Piaget stated:

The conclusion we came to was that the morality prescribed for the individual by society is not homogenous because society itself is not just one thing. Society is the sum of social relations, and among these relations we can distinguish two extreme types: relations of constraint, whose characteristic is to impose upon the individual from outside a system of rules with obligatory content, and relations of people's minds the consciousness of ideal norms at the back of all rules.²

According to Piaget, the area of personality called morality could be expressed in two extreme ways, the first being more external and imposing and the second being more internal and cooperative. Since these are extremes of a continuum, he opened the door for varying degrees between these extremes. He clarified this by stating:

There seems to exist in the child two separate moralities, of which, incidentally, the consequences

¹Lawrence Kohlberg, "The child as moral philosopher," Psychology Today, 2, No. 4 (1968), pp. 25-30; see also B. Jowett (trans.), The Dialogues of Plato, from the works of Plato (Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E. C. 4, 1953), p. 265.

²Jean Piaget, Moral Judgment of the Child (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1948), p. 402.

can also be discerned in adult morality. These two moralities are due to formative processes which, broadly speaking, follow on one another without however, constituting definite stages. It is possible moreover, to note the existence of an intermediate phase. The first of these processes is the moral constraint which leads to heteronomy and consequently to moral realism. The second is cooperation which leads to autonomy. Between the two can be discerned a phase during which rules and commands are interiorized and generalized.

Moral constraint is characterized by unilateral respect . . . every command coming from a respected person is the starting point of an obligatory rule

Then comes the intermediate stage; . . . the child no longer merely obeys the commands given him by the adult but obeys the rule itself, generalized and applied in an original way Here, undoubtedly, is a manifestation of intelligence working on moral rules

How does the child ever attain to autonomy proper? We see the first signs of it when he discovers that truthfulness is necessary to the relations of sympathy and mutual respect. Reciprocity seems in this connection to be the determining factor of autonomy. For moral autonomy appears when the mind regards as necessary an ideal that is independent of all external pressure. Now, apart from our relations to other people, there can be no moral necessity. The individual as such knows only anomy and not autonomy. Conversely, any relation with other persons, in which unilateral respect takes place, leads to heteronomy. Autonomy therefore appears only with reciprocity, when mutual respect is strong enough to make the individual feel from within the desire to treat others as he himself would wish to be treated.³

The work done by Piaget is basic to many theories of moral development, and an understanding of his work is important. He did, however, relate much of his work in a philosophical rather than a scientific manner. His work has often been criticized in the areas of sample size, method, and cultural limitations.

³Ibid., pp. 193-94.

After Piaget, using better scientific methods, different investigators tried to reduce the types of criticism of Piaget and still test his basic theories. More recently, an increased interest in values and moral judgment has lead to a renewed interest in the study of morality. Kohlberg, Erikson, and Hogan have all developed theories based on Piaget's basic framework. Some interesting comparisons exist between the three theories, yet major differences appear.⁴

Table 1 gives an outline of Kohlberg's three levels and six stages of moral development. Kohlberg's theory states that people pass from one developmental stage to the next in sequence. Everyone begins at stage 1, and then proceeds upward to other stages. One cannot reach a particular stage of development until that person has passed through all of the "lower" stages. For example, if a person were operating at stage 4, according to Kohlberg's theory, that person has already passed through moral stages 1, 2, and 3 in sequence. Kohlberg did admit though that in reality a person's stage is not so precise and neat. One person at stage 4 may be operating in stages 2, 3, 4, and 5, while another person at stage 4 may be operating much

⁴M. Ann Cauble, "Interrelations among Piaget's formal operations, Erikson's ego identity, and Kohlberg's principled morality," Dissertation Abstracts International, 36, No. 2-A (1975), pp. 773-74A; see also Richard J. Haier, "Moral reasoning and moral character: Relationships between the Kohlberg and Hogan models," Psychological Reports, 40 (1977), pp. 215-26.

Table 1
Kohlberg's Levels and Stages of
Moral Development^a

Moral Levels	Moral Stages
<u>Level I</u> Preconventional	<u>Stage 1</u> Orientation toward punishment and power
	<u>Stage 2</u> Satisfaction of needs, people are commodities

<u>Level II</u> Conventional	<u>Stage 3</u> Behavior that pleases or helps others
	<u>Stage 4</u> Orientation toward authority, fixed rules and maintenance of social order

<u>Level III</u> Postconventional	<u>Stage 5</u> A social contract, legalistic and utilitarian overtones
	<u>Stage 6</u> Self chosen ethical principles in abstract form

^aLawrence Kohlberg, "The development of childrens' orientations toward a moral order: I Sequence in the development of moral thought," Vita Humana, 6, No. 1-2 (1963), pp. 11-33; see also Kohlberg, loc. cit.

more in stages 4 and 5. A person may be seen in transition through the stages and be classified at stage 4 or be more settled and be classified at stage 4. All individuals classified at stage 4 would be using stage 4 as their predominant stage.

Simpson⁵ did a study of the research of moral development which used Kohlberg's theory and stated that Kohlberg leans too much to the philosophical and too little toward the empirical for the belief that moral development is always good and is always universal. The criticism revolved around the idea that just because stages are more complex does not mean that they are higher in moral development; the stages may be equal in value but still use different value judgments. Simpson also stated that vocabulary ability is positively related to a higher score on the test and that Kohlberg ignores in his theory studies that suggested that no hierarchy of development exists. She questioned the inevitability of human sequence beyond conventional moral thought.

Both Kohlberg and Piaget used methods that are highly dependent upon judgments of the examiner. Kohlberg improved upon Piaget's method in degree but not in kind. Kohlberg gave subjects more complex situations in which to make decisions of moral judgment, while Piaget's work was

⁵Elizabeth L. Simpson, "Moral development research: A case study of scientific cultural bias," Human Development, 17, No. 2 (1974), pp. 81-106.

characterized as telling two or more stories about a person and asking which action was morally better (or worse) for the person in the story. Kohlberg's test involved putting the subject into a situation of moral dilemma and then asking the subject what they should have done and what reasoning they gave for doing what should have been done according to the subject. Both Kohlberg and Piaget used hypothetical situations, but Kohlberg's method had more options, and his testing seemed to indicate more types of moral judgment than Piaget's did. However, more options in Kohlberg's test could have lead to more subjective error since both Piaget's and Kohlberg's tests were scored subjectively. It is important to note here that there was a difference between the two tests. Kohlberg asked his subjects to give their own moral behavior in a hypothetical situation, while Piaget asked his subjects to chose the best of behaviors (usually two different behaviors) in comparative stories. Kohlberg asked his subjects their own behavior, while Piaget asked for judgments of others' behaviors.

Rest⁶ continued working within Kohlberg's theoretical framework and developed a more objective measure to determine stages of moral judgment. He worked

⁶James R. Rest, "New approaches in the assessment of moral judgment," (Personal correspondence, mimeographed.) Also found in Man and Morality, ed. T. Lickona, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1974).

to correct previous criticisms of both Piaget and Kohlberg especially in the area of testing. As a result of his efforts, a much more objective device, the Defining Issues Test, was developed. This test combined Kohlberg's theory and his type of format with much more objective multiple choice type answers.

THE PROBLEM

The point of examination in this study was the relationship or lack of relationship between moral judgment scores and personality need scores in order to determine if moral judgment is in any way related to a person's personality and especially his personality needs. The personality need scores were related independently with the moral judgment scores. Males and females were treated separately and in combination.

Statements of the Problems

In each of the following statements the P score refers to the moral judgment score of the Defining Issues Test and the specific need score is one of the fifteen needs measured on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule.

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Achievement Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Deference Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Order Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Exhibition Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Autonomy Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Affiliation Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Intraception Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Succorance Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Dominance Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Abasement Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Nurturance Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Change Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Endurance Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Heterosexuality Need T-score?

Is there a significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Aggression Need T-score?

Statements of the Hypotheses

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Achievement Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Deference Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Order Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Exhibition Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Autonomy Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Affiliation Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Intraception Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Succorance Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Dominance Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Abasement Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Nurturance Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Change Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Endurance Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Heterosexuality Need T-score.

There is no significant relationship between the moral judgment P score and the Aggression Need T-score.

Assumptions of the Study

Only college junior and senior students were used for the data in this study, and it was assumed that they did not differ significantly from college students in general on T-score norms for the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule scoring manual. It was also assumed that even though P scores and T-score norms for college students would vary from the general population scores, the relationships of personality needs and moral reasoning could be generalized from this sample. Both tests were assumed to be understandable to a degree that self-administration would not significantly affect the test scores. Juniors and seniors were used in this sample with the assumption that their maturity would help them respond to the tests more seriously than freshmen and sophomores.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to measure the relationships between each of the fifteen Manifest Needs' T-scores on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule and the moral judgment P score on the Defining Issues Test.

The results helped to clarify the relationship between moral judgment and personality.

Significance of the Study

This study was significant because it examined the relationship between moral judgment and personality characteristics. The position of Kohlberg was that moral judgment (also referred to as moral reasoning) is more closely related to cognitive development than to personality types. This study contributed to the further information of the relationship of moral judgment and personality. Another general question for mental health professionals is whether personality change affects the moral judgment of a person, and if so, are therapists doing moral counseling when a person's personality changes? This study contributed further information to this area as well. Finally, beyond these general areas, this study has also given exposure to and expanded study of a new testing instrument, the Defining Issues Test.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Terms peculiar to each test are treated separately in this section. The first section deals with the terms used to understand the Defining Issues Test and its measurement. The latter section is taken from the Manual of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule.

Terms Peculiar to the Defining
Issues Test

Moral judgment, moral reasoning. This is a person's problem solving capacities in the areas of values and right and wrong. In this study it was operationally defined as the P score.

Moral development. This is a construct describing the adequacy of conceptualization of relevant material and its implications toward problem solving in the areas of values and right and wrong. Development is said to have occurred as the subject realizes, considers, and includes relevant material. It was defined operationally as an increase in the P score.

P score. The P score is a score that was developed as part of the Defining Issues Test to replace stage type scoring, the original method of scoring by dominant stage. It is calculated from combining the scores of stages 5 and 6 and therefore it is a ratio of the scores of stages $5 + 6$ to $1 + 2 + 3 + 4$. The P score was used in this research because it was found to be a better indicator of moral judgment than stage type scoring.⁷

Moral levels. Moral levels are the three divisions within Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Each moral level is divided into two stages. The three moral levels

⁷James R. Rest, Defining Issues Test, Manual
(University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1974.)
(Mimeographed.)

are: I. Preconventional, II. Conventional, and III. Postconventional. (These levels are arranged from lowest to highest.)

Preconventional level. At the preconventional level right and wrong, good and bad are determined solely by personal reward or punishment. If reward is incurred, behavior is good; if punishment is incurred, behavior is bad.

Conventional level. At the conventional level right and wrong, good and bad are determined by the reward or punishment of the group with which the person identifies. This group may number from two to any number, and good and bad are defined by that group.

Postconventional level. This level defines right and wrong, good and bad as objective realities beyond the "me" or "my group." They are universal principles, independent of reward and/or punishment.

Moral stages. These are hypothetical continuous variables within the three levels of moral development. Each moral level consists of two moral stages.

Stage 1. This stage is typified by the infant who relates "feeling good" to "being alright" or obedience. The infant lacks autonomy and is in a stage of anomie. There is no way to distinguish between subjective and objective realities at this stage.

Stage 2. At stage 2 autonomy begins to develop and the person sees other people as individuals. The

subject is not the group, all others are not the group; the self, others, and the group become independent. Good and bad become what the subject thinks are good and bad for oneself.

Stage 3. Two new concepts must develop for stage 3: a reciprocal role understanding and an understanding of the "games people play." The former involves learning that the person's own wishes are matched with someone else's wishes, and the latter involves learning social tact. Good is being nice and predictable, playing the game, while bad is a lack of tact and not being predictable or playing the game.

Stage 4. This stage is often referred to as the "law and order" stage. It most commonly defines the average adult and consists of an orientation toward authority, the keeping of laws, and the keeping of social order and peace. The ultimate value or moral principle of this stage is an orderly society at any price.

Stage 5. Between stages 4 and 5 is the break between the Conventional and Postconventional Levels. There are similarities and yet subtle differences. Stage 5 has greater flexibility; there is a right to change and challenge the making of new laws, but the person must live by the laws in order to participate in their changing. There is a tendency for a person at this stage to believe that without social laws (group law) there is no social morality. Stage 5 was later divided into 2 substages,

5A and 5B.⁸ This was done to accomodate the anti-establishment, yet pro-social law, attitude that the Viet Nam war made visible. Before this stage was developed into two substages, many persons showed severe regression back to stage 2 that was not explainable.

Stage 5A. These persons still incorporate a social morality, but they also are open to an anti-establishment or minority view point. There is social morality, but the majority may be wrong, and one does not have to live by the majority rules to change the laws but may live by minority rules to change the laws. One still has to live by some group values in order to challenge another or one's own group's values.

Stage 5B. This is the more traditional view of stage 5 where the majority determines the morality and all must live by that morality until it is changed.

Stage 6. This stage consists of a universal ethic principle, for example, "the golden rule." The morality is the same for all people and that morality is objective.

Terms Peculiar to the Edwards
Personal Preference
Schedule

A personality need is defined as one of the fifteen manifest needs (below) on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. The operational definition of a personality

⁸Rest, op. cit.

need was the T-score for college students, male or female, for each subject's raw score.

1. ach Achievement: To do one's best, to be successful, to accomplish tasks requiring skill and effort, to be a recognized authority, to accomplish something of great significance, to do a difficult job well, to solve difficult problems and puzzles, to be able to do things better than others, to write a great novel or play.

2. def Deference: To get suggestions from others, to find out what others think, to follow instructions and do what is expected, to praise others, to tell others that they have done a good job, to accept the leadership of others, to read about great men, to conform to custom and avoid the unconventional, to let others make decisions.

3. ord Order: To have written work neat and organized, to make plans before starting on a difficult task, to have things organized, to keep things neat and orderly, to make advance plans when taking a trip, to organize details of work, to keep letters and files according to some system, to have meals organized and a definite time for eating, to have things arranged so that they run smoothly without change.

4. exh Exhibition: To say witty and clever things, to tell amusing jokes and stories, to talk about personal adventures and experiences, to have others notice and comment upon one's appearance, to say things just to see what effect it will have on others, to talk about personal achievements, to be the center of attention, to use words that others do not know the meaning of, to ask questions others cannot answer.

5. aut Autonomy: To be able to come and go as desired, to say what one thinks about things, to be independent of others in making decisions, to feel free to do what one wants, to do things that are unconventional, to avoid situations where one is expected to conform, to do things without regard to what others may think, to criticize those in positions of authority, to avoid responsibilities and obligations.

6. aff Affiliation: To be loyal to friends, to participate in friendly groups, to do things for friends, to form new friendships, to make as many friends as possible, to share things with friends, to do things with friends rather than alone, to form strong attachments, to write letters to friends.

7. int Intracception: To analyze one's motives and feelings, to observe others, to understand how others feel about problems, to put one's self in another's place, to judge people by why they do things rather than by what they do, to analyze the behavior

of others, to analyze the motives of others, to predict how others will act.

8. suc Succorance: To have others provide help when in trouble, to seek encouragement from others, to have others be kindly, to have others be sympathetic and understanding about personal problems, to receive a great deal of affection from others, to have others do favors cheerfully, to be helped by others when depressed, to have others feel sorry when one is sick, to have a fuss made over one when hurt.

9. dom Dominance: To argue for one's point of view, to be a leader in groups to which one belongs, to be regarded by others as a leader, to be elected or appointed chairman of committees, to make group decisions, to settle arguments and disputes between others, to persuade and influence others to do what one wants, to supervise and direct the actions of others, to tell others how to do their jobs.

10. aba Abasement: To feel guilty when one does something wrong, to accept blame when things do not go right, to feel that personal pain and misery suffered does more good than harm, to feel the need for punishment for wrong doing, to feel better when giving in and avoiding a fight than when having one's own way, to feel the need for confession of errors, to feel depressed by inability to handle situations, to feel timid in the presence of superiors, to feel inferior to others in most respects.

11. nur Nurturance: To help friends when they are in trouble, to assist others less fortunate, to treat others with kindness and sympathy, to forgive others, to do small favors for others, to be generous with others, to sympathize with others who are sick, to show a great deal of affection toward others, to have others confide in one about personal problems.

12. chg Change: To do new and different things, to travel, to meet new people, to experience novelty and change in daily routine, to experiment and try new and different jobs, to move about the country and live in different places, to participate in new fads and fashions.

13. end Endurance: To keep at a job until it is finished, to complete any job undertaken, to work hard at a task, to keep at a puzzle or problem until it is solved, to work at a single job before taking on others, to stay up late working in order to get a job done, to put in long hours of work without distraction, to stick at a problem even though it may seem as if no progress is being made, to avoid being interrupted while at work.

14. het Heterosexuality: To go out with members of the opposite sex, to engage in social activities with the opposite sex, to be in love with someone of the

opposite sex, to kiss those of the opposite sex, to be regarded as physically attractive by those of the opposite sex, to participate in discussions about sex, to read books and plays involving sex, to listen to or to tell jokes involving sex, to become sexually excited.

15. agg Aggression: To attack contrary points of view, to tell others what one thinks about them, to criticize others publicly, to make fun of others, to tell others off when disagreeing with them, to get revenge for insults, to become angry, to blame others when things go wrong, to read newspaper accounts of violence.⁹

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Although subjects for this study were limited to junior and senior college students, no age limitation was placed upon them. No control for intelligence was made; however, these subjects probably had above average intelligence. No distinction was made on a psychological level except by the two tests. All subjects attended a small Midwestern university in Kansas, and many of them were from the area.

⁹Allen L. Edwards, Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, Manual (New York: The Psychological Corporation, 1959), p. 11.

Chapter 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The purpose of this study was to test for relationships between moral reasoning and personality needs. This chapter is divided into two sections: Background of the Defining Issues Test, and Moral Reasoning and Personality Studies.

BACKGROUND OF THE DEFINING ISSUES TEST

Kohlberg¹ reported some of the research that lead to his theory of moral development and the six stage process. His basic study was of seventy-five boys between the ages of ten and eighteen years old, over a twelve year period. Other related studies from Great Britain, Canada, Taiwan, Mexico, and Turkey supported his studies in cross cultural settings. Early studies seemed to indicate that everyone cheats some of the time, but because a person cheats in some situation does not mean that he will cheat regularly. Those who do the cheating may disapprove of it as much as others do. Some studies related superego strength to morality, but these studies also showed this to

¹Lawrence Kohlberg, "The child as moral philosopher," Psychology Today, 2, No. 4 (1968), pp. 25-30.

be relative to each individual. Ego strength could be used for honesty or for dishonesty. By studying the seventy-five boys and presenting them with moral dilemmas, six stages of moral development emerged. These six stages seemed invariant and developmental in sequence. One may move through the stages in varying speed and be between stages, but one must, under normal development, move in sequence. Moral judgment was related to cognitive thought and development. Development through the six stages was characterized by increasing differentiation and increasing integration. This process was similar to scientific theory and other structured thought. Moral thought expands in an experiential field so that those who understand justice more fully tend to act more justly and also create a moral climate beyond themselves that goes beyond their own personal needs.

Turiel² tested the invariant sequentiality and the concept that upper stages involve more learning than the lower stages of Kohlberg's moral development theory. Subjects for his study were forty-four seventh grade boys between twelve years and zero months to thirteen years and seven months old from a middle-class background.

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview was administered with

²Elliot Turiel, "An experimental test of the sequentiality of developmental stages in the child's moral judgment," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3 (1966), pp. 611-18.

scoring by dominant stage only. In a test-retest situation, each subject was stage-scored after the first administration then exposed to moral reasoning either one stage below (-1), one stage above (+1), or two stages above (+2) his own dominant stage. The results indicated that (+1) exposure affected the subjects the greatest, with the (+2) exposure affecting the subjects the least, using the retest to determine effectiveness. This study supported Kohlberg's sequential moral development.

Partly to repeat Turiel's previous study, and to gather new data, Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg³ studied the level of moral development as determined by preference and comprehension of moral judgments made by others. They tested three basic hypotheses: that stages of thinking above a subject's predominant stage would be preferred to those below the subject's own stage if the subject were asked to choose between them; that stages of thinking above a subject's predominant stage are increasingly more difficult to understand than stages below the subject's own level and, therefore, they will not be as correctly reproduced as the lower stages by the subject; and that these two principles interact in such a way that subjects accept into their own thinking the one stage above their

³James Rest, Elliot Turiel, and Lawrence Kohlberg, "Level of moral development as a determinate of preference and comprehension of moral judgments made by others," Journal of Personality, 37 (1969), pp. 225-52.

dominant stage more readily than one stage below or two stages above. The forty-five subjects used in their study were eleven males and eleven females between the ages of ten years six months and twelve years three months, and twelve males and eleven females between the ages of thirteen years four months and fourteen years six months from a Catholic parochial school in New York. The mean Otis IQ was 119 with a range from 95 to 150. The subjects were pretested using dominant stage scoring and were then presented with arguments one stage above, two stages above, and one stage below their dominant stage score. The subjects were then allowed to use these moral arguments to respond to moral dilemmas. The results indicated that the children preferred concepts above their dominant stage; that they found thinking two stages above their dominant stage more difficult to comprehend than one stage above, and that one stage above was more difficult to comprehend than one stage below; that the children assimilated one stage above thinking more readily than two above or one below; and that assimilation is a result of the subject's preference and the current level of moral judgment. This study supported Kohlberg's moral development theory.

Continuing within Kohlberg's framework and expanding the above study, Rest⁴ reasoned that in

⁴James Rest, "The hierarchical nature of moral judgment: A study of patterns of comprehension and preferences of moral stages," Journal of Personality, 41 (1973), pp. 86-109, 197.

Kohlberg's hierarchically related stages of moral development, each stage was a transformation to a new stage, not something that was added on or something that replaced previous thinking but a newly created method of thinking. He reasoned that since each stage was more complex it would be more difficult to comprehend. He wondered if a person usually operates at the highest stage of development or if different situations were indicative of different stages of response. Would there be consistency between a person's dominant stage score and a statement chosen from a list of prototypic statements which included all stages? The subjects for Rest's study were forty-seven twelfth grade students from a middle-class suburb of Chicago. They were pretested for their own moral stage using Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, and scoring was by dominant stage. Then the subjects were presented statements and asked to give a recapitulation of each statement, state how it compared with their own ideas, evaluate and criticize it, rate it on a scale of one to five as to how convincing or persuasive an argument it presented, and rank order all of the statements in terms of their comparative convincingness. The results indicated that the subjects tended to score all hits or misses in understanding each of the stages' prototypic statements, and that if a subject had high comprehension at a given stage, there was also a high comprehension for all preceding stages. This study

again supported Kohlberg's basic moral developmental theory.

After the success with the prototypic statements, Rest developed the Defining Issues Test and developed a manual for it which included a number of published and unpublished studies relating the reliability and validity of the test.⁵ In using the Defining Issues Test and in discussing the optional methods of scoring, Rest stated: ". . . the P score has been the most useful way to index development To correlate moral judgment with another variable, use the P score."⁶ (The P score was used as the moral judgment score in this study.)

Cooper⁷ did a comprehensive psychometric analysis of Rest's Defining Issues Test. His subjects ranged from ninth grade to college graduate level students with ages from fourteen to thirty-eight years. The technique of factor analysis was used to examine the data through item clusters and independence of means. No clear index of stages was found, but using the broader categories of levels (stages 1 and 2 are level I, stages 3 and 4 are level II, and stages 5 and 6 are level III) produced

⁵James Rest, Defining Issues Test, Manual (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1974.) (Mimeographed.)

⁶Rest, pp. 2-3.

⁷Douglas Cooper, "The analysis of an objective measure of moral development," Dissertation Abstracts International, 33, No. 10-A (1973), pp. 5545-46A.

significant item clusters. The principled morality stages (5 and 6 combined, or level III) gave the best index of stages and showed significant differences on the basis of age group means, supporting stage theory. Construct validation with a moral comprehension test was also demonstrated.

In a similar study, Rest et al.⁸ used 193 subjects: seventy-three students from ninth grade, forty senior high students, forty college and graduate school students, with about equal males and females from each class, plus twenty-five male seminarians and fifteen male doctoral students. The basic purpose of the study was to test the P score; however, other areas were also examined such as intelligence scales and socioeconomic data and how they effect the P score. The results of the study included a .81 test-retest reliability (using only the ninth grade subjects). A very clear negative linear correlation existed between the P score (stages 5 and 6 combined, principled morality) and stage 2 (the satisfaction of needs, people are commodities stage). A significant relationship was shown between the P score and each of the following: stage type scoring, Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, comprehension of social-moral concepts, and Differential Ability Tests.

⁸James R. Rest et al., "Judging the important issues in moral dilemmas--An objective measure of development," Developmental Psychology, 10, No. 4 (1974), pp. 491-501.

The study indicated that the P score was more closely related to cognitive development than to socioeconomic status. Substantial correlations were also found between the P score and stances on current social-moral-political issues. A correlation of .68 between the P score and Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview indicated a high degree of similarity but not equivalency.

White⁹ did a study to examine the possibility of objectively measuring moral development, the relationship between moral judgment and biographical data, and the relationship between the year in college and moral judgment. Using 186 male college students (freshmen, sophomore and seniors) he administered the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (using only four dilemmas) and an objective form of the same test (an early form of the Defining Issues Test). The students also filled out biographical data which divided them into five subgroups. The results of the study indicated that there were no significant differences between the three levels of college students, although being a senior was the greatest predictor of highest moral maturity. There was no significant difference between biographical subgroups and moral maturity. On the objective form of the test, the students rated items that

⁹Charles Borden White, "Moral judgment in college students: The development of an objective measure and its relationship to life experience dimensions," Dissertation Abstracts International, 34, No. 7-B (1974), p. 3480B.

represented their dominant stage score as the highest. These findings supported the use of objective prototypic testing and added reliability and validity to both Kohlberg's theory and Rest's test.

In a study of stage structure, Davison, Robbins, and Swanson¹⁰ used the Defining Issues Test to duplicate a similar study done in 1974 by Rest et al. The test was given to forty junior high students, forty senior high students, forty college undergraduate students, and forty college graduate students who consisted of fifteen male philosophy doctoral students and twenty-five male seminary students. The other students were evenly divided by sex. The study used the stage divisions of 2, 3, 4, 5A, 5B, and 6 and ran intercorrelations between all of the stages. With few minor exceptions the correlations were higher as the stages were closer together. This study supported hierarchical and stage ordering theories.

Much of the Kohlberg-Rest thesis depends on the concept of sequential stages or levels of the moral developmental process. Holstein¹¹ tested the idea of invariant sequence and irreversibility of the stages of moral

¹⁰Mark L. Davison, Stephen Robbins, and David B. Swanson, "Stage structure in objective moral judgments," Developmental Psychology, 14, No. 2 (1978), pp. 137-46.

¹¹Constance Boucher Holstein, "Irreversible, stepwise sequence in the development of moral judgment: A longitudinal study of males and females," Child Development, 47 (1976), pp. 51-61.

development. The subjects for her study were fifty-three upper middle-class families with a thirteen year old son (N = 24) or daughter (N = 29) from intact homes. All of the subjects were White and had IQ's of 100 or more (California Test of Mental Maturity). Five of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas were presented to each parent and the son or daughter. Three years later the subjects again took the shortened version of the Moral Judgment Interview. The results indicated that scores were significantly higher the second time for the boys, girls, and mothers but not for the fathers. The issue of stepwise invariant sequence was not supported on the specific stage progression but was supported in the more general level progression (each level being two stages). This could have been explained by the three year interval which may have been too long and allowed the younger subjects to advance more than one stage. Lower stage subjects tended to show more advancement than higher stage subjects, and higher stage subjects tended to regress. The correlation between stage score and liberalism was high for males but not for females. Holstein stated that love and compassion are considered admirable traits but not logical, cognitive ways of making moral decisions. Females tended to use these "emotional" reasons more frequently than males in making moral judgments. Both of these inequalities between male and female subjects may have reflected a sexual bias. The most difficult result to understand was the tendency for the

higher score subjects to regress. This may have been due to either measurement error, which is greater on the less objective Moral Judgment Interview, and/or dominant stage scoring, which tends to be less accurate and less definitive than the P score. More investigation is needed on the invariant sequence aspect of Kohlberg's theory using the experimental model of the above study.

MORAL REASONING AND PERSONALITY STUDIES

No studies were available for specific relationships between the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule and either the Defining Issues Test or the Moral Judgment Interview. Most of the studies summarized in this section had some personality variables comparable to the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. The Defining Issues Test (Rest) and the Moral Judgment Interview (Kohlberg) were used most often to obtain moral judgment relationships, but not exclusively, in this chapter.

Haan, Smith, and Block¹² did a study on the relationship between moral reasoning and political-social behavior, family background, and personality. An original group of 957 college students or Peace Corp volunteers took Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, filled out a five page

¹²Norma Haan, M. Brewster Smith, and Jeanne Block, "Moral reasoning of young adults: Political-social behavior, family background, and personality correlates," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10, No. 3 (1968), pp. 183-201.

bibliographical sheet with many questions about political activity, ethics, and morality, and each subject also filled out a Child Rearing Practice Report for each parent. No freshmen or graduate students participated, and the male to female ratio was about equal. The Peace Corp sample was significantly older than the college student sample. The test of morality was scored by stage type scoring. The findings indicated comparatively few females in stages 2 and 6. Those in stages 5 and 6 (principled morality) saw themselves as separate from their parents, while stage 3 and 4 subjects (conventional morality) saw themselves as stably attached to their parents. Lower stage persons were the most likely to change. A high correlation existed between political action, social protest, and stage 6 (principled morality); stage 6 persons viewed themselves as empathetic, sensitive, and altruistic. Those subjects involved in more different situations tended to change more.

Schnurer¹³ did an experiment to measure the interaction between personality, moral dimensions, and the sexes. The subjects were fifty male and fifty female college students between the ages of nineteen and twenty-five years. The subjects took a battery of tests including

¹³Greeta H. Schnurer, "Sex differences and personality variables in the moral reasoning of young adults," Dissertation Abstracts International, 37, No. 7-A (1977), pp. 4244-45A.

the Moral Judgment Interview, the Marlowe-Crowne Scale, the Rotter I - E Scale, and the California Personality Inventory. Some of the findings included males scoring higher than females on the moral reasoning, and certain personality variables correlating with the moral maturity score. The study did not support Kohlberg's theory because it indicated relationships between moral judgment levels and personality variables. However, the personality variables used in the study were inadequately explained.

A study was done by Sawyer¹⁴ to determine whether moral development was unidimensional or multidimensional and to determine if there was a correlation between development in personality and moral judgment. Only females (N = 34) between the ages of seventeen and twenty-seven years were used. Each subject took a written form of the Moral Judgment Interview and four personality measures: the Berkowitz Social Responsibility Scale, the Christie and Geiss Test of Machiavellianism, Schwartz's Test of Ascription of Responsibility, and Easeman's Measure of Personality Development. The findings indicated that one overall factor was measured throughout the test, but another statistical test revealed two issue dimensions (social role responsibility and legal rules) with the

¹⁴John Clinton Sawyer, "A factor analytic study of the dimensional structure within stages of moral development and that structure's relationship to specific personality traits," Dissertation Abstracts International, 38, No. 4-A (1977), p. 2009A.

possibility of a third dimension (punishment) as being factors measured in the test. No significant relationships occurred between either the personality measure or the difficulty of the items and the issue dimension. The study supported the Kohlberg position.

Another study measured the relationship between authoritarianism and several other personality variables as well as moral judgment. Weber¹⁵ used the Defining Issues Test and an item pool of four conceptualizations of authoritarianism with eight abbreviated scales of personality dimensions. The subjects of this study were two large independent groups of college students and rural adults. The Defining Issues Test was correlated for "core" authoritarianism factors. The findings indicated that stage 4 (the law and order stage) was related to authoritarianism and moderately to authority acceptance. Females had a different relationship (curvilinear) with authoritarianism. In the rural population, age and authoritarianism were positively related for both sexes. However, other than the above mentioned findings, there was little relationship with personality variables and moral judgment. The study concluded with the view that stages of moral development and

¹⁵Richard Glenn Weber, "The nature of authoritarianism and its relationship to other personality variables and stages of moral judgment," Dissertation Abstracts International, 35, No. 7-B (1975), p. 3603B.

authoritarianism were not the same constructs because of low correlations and dissimilar age effects. This supported Kohlberg's position.

In a study specifically relating guilt to moral judgment, other investigators examined the relationship of sociometric nomination and two measures of conscience development in 235 ninth grade students in Honolulu. Porteus and Johnson¹⁶ gave half of the subjects stories with female central figures, while the other half had stories with male central figures. A cognitive (C) and affective (A) measure of moral judgment was used as well as a sociometric rating scale. The more specific purpose of this study was to measure the relationships between the three areas of cognitive measures, affective measures, and sociometric ratings and then to determine if there were sexual differences in the three areas. According to Piaget, the greater the moral development, the greater the guilt. This study indicated that the opposite was true. The only variable which had a significant effect on both the affective and cognitive measure was intelligence. The only variable which had a significant effect on the affective measure was the sex of the subjects; girls seemed to show more guilt than boys.

¹⁶B. D. Porteus, and R. C. Johnson, "Children's responses to two measures of conscience development and their relation to sociometric nomination," Child Development, 36 (1965), pp. 703-11.

In another study of the relationship of guilt to moral development, Ruma and Mosher¹⁷ used thirty-six male delinquent subjects, adjudged so by the court, between the ages of fifteen and seventeen years. They used the Moral Judgment Interview, the Mosher Guilt Scale, and a "transgression interview" consisting of the subject's feelings about the act which caused him incarceration and analyzing the content and speech disturbance of the interview. The highest stage score (stage 6) was not achieved by any subjects, and only one subject achieved a stage 5 score. The study clearly indicated a positive relationship between guilt and moral judgment, but since stages 5 and 6 combine to form the highest level of moral development (principled morality), the lack of higher stage subjects limited the correlation to stages 1 - 4 with guilt. Also, stages 3 and 4 are associated with guilt and are known as the law and order, pleasing others, and conventional level stages. When the study is viewed from the context of lacking higher stage subjects, it supported Kohlberg's theory.

In yet another study of guilt and moral development, thirty-four males and thirty-four females who ranged in age from fifteen to thirty years were used to

¹⁷Eleanor Harter Ruma, and Donald L. Mosher, "Relationships between moral judgment and guilt in delinquent boys," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 72, No. 2 (1967), pp. 122-27.

take the Moral Judgment Interview and a guilt-experience interview. Mandel's¹⁸ study showed three types of guilt emerging with guilt focused on: restitution, reinstating a pre-transgression concept of self, and avoiding repetitions of transgressions by introspection and self correction. These three concepts clearly paralleled the three highest stages of moral development, so that as one morally developed there occurred a less punitive and more corrective concept and response to guilt.

McCordick¹⁹ did a study on the relationship of adjustment, maladjustment, and the generation gap to guilt and moral reasoning. Using Kohlberg's Moral Maturity Scale, she tested thirty neurotic and thirty psychotic patients in a Denver Veterans Hospital, and twenty-three maladjusted and thirty-two adjusted college students and fifty-two of their parents. The results indicated that moral judgment levels were positively related to adjustment and educational level but not related to guilt, but that guilt was positively related to maladjustment.

In a study of aggression, punishment, guilt, and moral judgment, three hypotheses were tested: that harsh punishment, guilt, and aggression would all be related;

¹⁸Margaret Mandel, "Conceptualizations of guilt in adolescence and adulthood," Dissertation Abstracts International, 38, No. 2-B (1977), pp. 879-80B.

¹⁹Sharon Maxine McCordick, "Moral reasoning and guilt in adjusted and maladjusted adults," Dissertation Abstracts International, 31, No. 3-B (1969), p. 1544B.

that higher moral judgment would not be related to the former three areas; and that the situation a subject is in would be related to the advocacy of punishment. The subjects for this study done by Davis²⁰ included student men and women, and nonstudent men and women who were given the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, the F - Scale, the Buss Aggression, Hostility and Guilt Inventories, the Socialization and Rigidity Scales of the California Psychological Inventory, and the Hogan-Dickstein Measure of Moral Maturity. The subjects also had two "news items" to read, one with an "outrageous act" occurring in the United States and the other with a similar act occurring outside of the United States in a distant location. After reading each "news item," the subject was asked to complete a mood-adjective list of personal feelings. The results of the study indicated no relationship between the moral values and the other scales, but guilt oriented morality was related to aggression, hostility, and the advocacy of harsh punishment.

Most of the above studies of guilt and moral reasoning development have indirectly supported the Kohlberg model by not contradicting it and by relating guilt to less than the higher stages of moral development.

²⁰George Hightower Davis, "Advocacy of punishment, moral development, and personality," Dissertation Abstracts International, 34, No. 12-B (1974), p. 6193B.

In a study of empathy, social interest, and critical thinking, Cruce-Mast²¹ found that social interest was not a predictor of moral development levels, but that critical thinking and empathy were. She used 108 adult volunteers in courses in Southern Illinois University. Each subject was given the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal, the Empathy Test by H. C. Smith, the Social Interest Index, and the Defining Issues Test.

Horowitz²² hypothesized that manipulating the feedback to a subject regarding his or her level of moral development would influence their resolution of moral problems. The subjects for his experiment were 160 male college students. When a subject entered the experimental area, that subject was told that the taking of the Moral Judgment Interview was being videotaped. Soon after, half of the subjects were told that the taping machine had broken, although it was still working. One group of the subjects had a face to face encounter with a doctoral student petitioner who asked for volunteers in a request for time and help, while others worked behind a screen and had no face to face contact with the petitioner. Some

²¹Ada Lou Cruce-Mast, "The interrelationship of critical thinking, empathy, and social interest with moral judgment," Dissertation Abstracts International, 36, No. 12-A (1976), p. 7945A.

²²Irwin A. Horowitz, "Effects of experimentally manipulated levels of moral development and potential helper's identifiability on volunteering to help," Journal of Personality, 44, No. 2 (1976), pp. 243-59.

of these subjects had a "chance meeting" with the petitioner outside of the room in the hallway, while others had a "chance meeting" with a confederate who did no petitioning. Some of the subjects were told that they were in a high level of moral development, while others were told they were average. The many variables were analyzed and the findings indicated that volunteering was related to the three variables of the videotape working, the previous encounter with the petitioner, and the false information that the subject was in a morally advanced group. No relationship existed between volunteering and actual level of moral development.

Schwartz et al.²³ studied the relationship between moral thought, achievement, and affiliation in situation conflict. The subjects were thirty-five male freshmen who were given a form of the Moral Judgment Interview. They were put into a situation where cheating was made easy on a vocabulary test, and they were also rewarded by being paid some money for each correct answer. They were also told that the vocabulary test was quite simple, although it was not. All of the subjects who cheated in this situation were contacted to be in a second testing situation and were offered more money to participate. This time they took a puzzle test with a confederate

²³Shalom H. Schwartz et al., "Some personality correlates of conduct in two situations of moral conflict," Journal of Personality, 37 (1969), pp. 41-57.

subject and were again told that the test was quite easy, although it was not, and that they would be scored by and paid for each correct placement of a piece. The confederate was trained to express difficulty on five levels from indirect comment to a direct plea for help. Helpfulness was measured by the subject's response to the confederate's expression of difficulty. The subjects were then given the Achievement Risk Preference Scale which measured the need for achievement and affiliation. The results of this study included: that the three variables of level of moral thought, achievement, and affiliation were not related; and that those subjects with higher levels of moral thought were less likely to cheat and more likely to help.

A summary of the preceding studies indicates that a positive relationship was shown between moral development and each of the following: autonomy from parents; stability (less movement from one stage to another); political action and social protest; being sensitive, empathetic, and altruistic; less punitive and more corrective guilt; psychological adjustment; educational level; critical thinking; not cheating; and helping. Other preceding studies indicated no relationship between moral development and each of the following: guilt; varied personality measures; volunteering; achievement; and affiliation. Some of the other interesting findings in the previous studies indicated the following:

relationships between stage movement (which were usually upward) and experiencing varied situations; and some indications that the Moral Judgment Interview and the Defining Issues Test are biased toward males, at least males show a higher development than females in some of the studies.

This chapter has shown some of the reasons for Kohlberg's thesis of moral development being an independent construct worthy of further investigation. It has also shown the validity of an objective test to measure moral development. Many issues remain in question but sufficient evidence exists to continue and begin other studies.

Chapter 3

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

This chapter is divided into five sections: Population and Sampling, Materials and Instrumentation, Design of the Study, Data Collection, and a brief summary of the Data Analysis. These divisions explain the processes used in this study.

POPULATION AND SAMPLING

The population sample for this study was drawn from a small Midwestern university of approximately 6,000 students. The sample consisted of twenty-six male and thirty-four female subjects in either the junior or senior class. These students were approached to volunteer for a thesis study relating moral values and personality types. Some of the subjects were approached individually, but most were approached in a classroom situation with the permission of the instructor. The subjects were told that they would be given two tests, the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule and the Defining Issues Test, an unpublished test that measures values. Instructions were given for each test which pertained to how to take the tests, how long the test taking would take, how to fill in the information about themselves on the test, and where to

return them. They were asked to use either their own name or a pseudonym if they desired to remain anonymous. They were told to complete both tests within one month after beginning the first one. Each volunteer who took test booklets signed his or her name to a list with the booklet number which was serially placed on each Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. The Defining Issues Test was typed and mimeographed by this author from a copy sent by Rest and used only the booklet itself with answers to be written in it. Ninety-six subjects agreed to take both tests but only seventy-two returned tests, eight females and three males turned in invalid Edwards Personal Preference Schedule tests, and one female completed only one of the paired tests. A total of twelve subjects who returned tests had to be eliminated from the study. There were twenty-four persons who returned no tests. The entire process of giving and receiving the tests took approximately one year, with the goal being to receive a minimum of twenty-five male and twenty-five female subjects' valid tests.

MATERIALS AND INSTRUMENTATION

Two test instruments were used in this study, the Defining Issues Test, an unpublished test of moral judgment development that was secured directly from its author, and the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, a commonly used test of manifest needs. The Defining Issues Test is an

objective test that originated from Kohlberg's theory of moral development, and it is similar to Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview which is a more subjective test. With the Manual for the Defining Issues Test, Rest sent some of the reliability and validity findings of earlier studies regarding the test; they were:

1. The test powerfully discriminates these groups: junior high school students, senior high school [students], college and graduate students (one way ANOVA $F = 48.5$).

2. It correlates in the .60's with moral comprehension.

3. It correlates in the .60's with stances on current political-moral controversies.

4. It correlates .68 with Kohlberg's test.

5. It has a two week test-retest stability of .81.

6. The correlation over two years is .57.

7. It shows significant pre-post test gains in response to some educational experiences, (i.e. ethics course, a Deliberate Psychological Education program) but not to other courses (art, logic, religion).

8. In a two year longitudinal study, subjects show significant upward movement ($p \leq .0001$) with college students showing twice as much progress as non-college subjects.

9. With directions to fake low, subjects can depress their scores, but with directions to fake high, scores do not increase.¹

The Defining Issues Test has six stories. Each story is read by the subject, and each subject is put into a hypothetical moral decision-making situation. The subject then makes a decision about the situation in the story, but that is not what is scored. The moral judgment score is derived from a list of twelve statements which have each been rated from the six stages at a specific

¹James R. Rest, a letter received with the Defining Issues Test, Manual (Mimeographed, 1974).

stage of moral development. The subject first rates all twelve statements as great, much, some, little, or no importance to the decision making process in the dilemma. Then the subject chooses the four statements that influence the subject's decision making the greatest. These four statements are then rank ordered from greatest to least importance by the subject.²

Originally, the stage which had the most concepts chosen by the subject as most important was considered to be the subject's stage of moral development. Rest disliked the idea of a person being at a stage of moral development, so after working with various methods of scoring, the P score was developed, and it is scored in the following manner. If a stage 5 or 6 concept is one or more of the four ranked, it is given a score of 4, 3, 2, or 1, according to whether it is ranked first, second, third, or fourth. All other stages receive a score of zero, even if they are ranked. The raw P score is the sum of all six of the stories' individual scores. Each story's score is the sum of the ranking scores (4, 3, 2, or 1) of all stage 5 or 6 statements for that story. The raw P score was used exclusively in this study.

²In actuality there are no stage 1 type statements; two stage 5 type statements, labelled 5A and 5B; a stage A type statement which has been compared to a stage $4\frac{1}{2}$ with anti-establishment perspectives; an M stage which is a meaningless statement that sounds impressive; and only three stories have stage 6 statements.

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule has fifteen categories of manifest needs, and the Defining Issues Test has a continuum of moral development scores through the use of the P score. A test of linear correlation was employed between each of the fifteen needs' scores on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule and the moral development score on the Defining Issues Test. This was done by converting each of the fifteen needs' scores to T-scores for college students for both males and females. Three sets of fifteen (or a total of forty-five) Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient tests were run between each of the fifteen needs' T-scores and the P scores. The three sets were as follows: one for males, one for females, and one for males and females combined. A t test for the significance of the correlation was run on each of the forty-five correlation scores. If any of the scores had been significant, an r^2 coefficient of determination would have been evaluated to determine the proportion of predictable variance. The use of college junior and senior students was not an important variable in this study, but they were chosen for maturity which should have resulted in taking the testing more seriously than freshman and sophomore students.

DATA COLLECTION

Both tests were to be completed within thirty days of each other to avoid any significant change on one test that would not be reflected on the other. All of the dates on the tests were within the one month period.

The check for valid tests was unique to each test. The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule had a consistency check which consisted of fifteen repeated pairs of statements. A raw score of 10 or more consistent was included in this study, and it has a .15 occurrence by chance.³ A faked Defining Issues Test was less easy to determine than a faked Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. One check used was to make certain that the four statements rank ordered and chosen by the subject were consistent with the four greatest important statements marked of the twelve original statements. There is a moral judgment phenomena that prevents a subject from faking high on the test. No check was made for a subject deliberately faking bad on the test, but it seemed unnecessary and unlikely for a subject to fake if that subject had not done so on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. Most subjects enjoyed taking this test, and the assumption was made that they would want to do well on it.

³Allen L. Edwards, Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, Manual (New York: The Psychological Corporation, 1959), p. 15.

All tests were scored manually. The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule had a quantitative check that all of the raw scores should add up to 210; this check was accomplished on each test. The Defining Issues Test was double checked for both accuracy in scoring and addition.

DATA ANALYSIS

The \underline{T} -score for each manifest need for each sex and for both sexes was paired with its corresponding raw P score. The first test was the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r) using the following formula:

$$r = \frac{N\Sigma XY - \Sigma X\Sigma Y}{\sqrt{((N\Sigma X^2 - (\Sigma X)^2)) ((N\Sigma Y^2 - (\Sigma Y)^2))}}$$

Where: N = the number of paired scores

X = the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule need score for each subject

Y = the Defining Issues Test P score for each subject

A second test, the \underline{t} test, was used to determine if a significant relationship (correlation) existed between any of the personality need scores and the P scores. The formula for the \underline{t} test was:

$$\underline{t} = r \sqrt{\frac{N - 2}{1 - r^2}}$$

A .05 level of significance was used with a two-tailed test.

Chapter 4

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The purpose of this study was to determine if a significant relationship between personality needs and moral development existed. This chapter is an analysis of the data divided into two sections: Response Analysis and Statistical Analysis. The Response Analysis section consists of a brief analysis of the subjects themselves, and the Statistical Analysis section consists of the analysis of their responses as they pertained to this study.

RESPONSE ANALYSIS

A total of ninety-six students volunteered to take part in this study. Only sixty of the students returned usable test data (62.5 percent). A total of seventy-two students of the original ninety-six (seventy-five percent) returned tests. Of the seventy-two students who returned tests eleven (15.3 percent) were inconsistent on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule and were not used for study data. One subject returned only one of the tests so that subject was not included in the study data. Of the twelve subjects who returned invalid or incomplete tests nine were female and three were male.

The subjects were asked to give some personal information besides completing the tests. Table 2 summarizes that information given by those sixty subjects who participated in this study. The information included age, year in school, grade point average, and area of major study.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

The specific purpose of this study was to determine the correlation coefficients between the raw P scores and each of the fifteen needs' T-scores and to test for significant relationships. Table 3 includes all of the means, standard deviations, correlation coefficients and t test results.

The means and standard deviations of the P scores and the T-scores, and the correlation coefficients between the P scores and T-scores were done using three samples: males, females, and males and females combined. The means and standard deviations were determined, and then the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients¹ were run. A test of the significance of the correlation coefficients was then made using the t distribution.² Had any of the correlations been significant, an r^2 coefficient of

¹George A. Ferguson, Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education (2d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 111.

²Ibid., p. 186.

Table 2
Response Analysis of the
Sixty Subjects

		<u>RANGE</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>S. D.</u>
Age in years	male	19 - 31	23.19	3.26
	female	19 - 30	21.29	2.30

G. P. A. (max. 4.00)	male	2.00 - 3.80	2.38	0.53
	female	2.40 - 3.96	3.24	0.38

		<u>JUNIOR</u>	<u>SENIOR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Year in college	male	8	18	26
	female	<u>12</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>34</u>
	total	20	40	60

MAJOR AREA OF STUDY

<u>AREA</u>	<u>MALES</u>	<u>FEMALES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
psychology	10	8	18
sociology	4	2	6
business	3	4	7
education	2	17	19
speech	1	0	1
phys. ed.	1	1	2
art	1	2	3
biology	1	0	1
no response	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>
total	26	34	60

Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations of P Scores and Need Scores; Correlations^a
and t Tests Between P Scores and Each Need's Scores

MALES (N = 26)	P	ACH	DEF	ORD	EXH	AUT	AFF	INT
Mean	22.423	48.192	51.423	47.115	52.885	50.000	50.846	49.423
S. D.	7.569	10.237	9.074	11.260	10.382	9.637	7.928	9.957
r		.306	-.243	-.183	-.117	.132	.026	.069
<u>t</u>		1.575	1.227	0.912	0.577	0.652	0.127	0.339
FEMALES (N = 34)								
Mean	22.176	51.118	45.647	46.500	49.765	49.000	50.412	49.118
S. D.	7.200	9.467	8.679	8.589	10.448	8.250	11.171	8.786
r		.212	.059	.142	-.187	.250	-.326	.219
<u>t</u>		1.228	0.336	0.809	1.075	1.460	1.956	1.273
COMBINED MALES AND FEMALES (N = 60)								
Mean	22.283	49.850	47.983	46.767	51.117	49.433	50.600	49.250
S. D.	7.300	9.832	9.511	9.752	10.448	8.813	9.822	9.231
r		.250	-.110	-.024	-.152	.193	-.195	.148
<u>t</u>		1.966	0.845	0.180	1.168	1.500	1.516	1.140

Table 3 (Continued)

MALES (N = 26)	SUC	DOM	ABA	NUR	CHG	END	HET	AGG
Mean	51.500	45.846	50.846	54.269	52.731	49.115	47.801	48.538
S. D.	10.723	10.023	10.007	8.142	8.915	9.467	9.851	9.184
r	-.081	.124	-.358	.023	.347	-.137	.083	.017
<u>t</u>	0.398	0.612	1.878	0.112	1.814	0.677	0.406	0.085
FEMALES (N = 34)								
Mean	55.118	46.853	51.412	54.147	52.059	44.735	53.735	47.706
S. D.	12.796	8.931	9.850	12.068	9.155	7.609	9.333	9.504
r	-.097	.043	.098	-.161	.106	-.200	-.094	.241
<u>t</u>	0.553	0.242	0.555	0.925	0.606	1.157	0.537	1.403
COMBINED MALES AND FEMALES (N = 60)								
Mean	53.550	46.417	51.167	54.200	52.350	46.633	51.167	48.067
S. D.	11.982	9.351	9.963	10.467	8.982	8.669	9.931	9.297
r	-.092	.080	-.171	-.095	.212	-.158	-.018	.144
<u>t</u>	0.700	0.613	1.324	0.724	1.652	1.222	0.137	1.109

^aNone of the correlations were significant at the .05 level; d. f. = N - 1.

determination ratio of the two variances to predict the amount of relationship would have been accomplished.³ (See Chapter 3 for a more complete discussion of the formulas used.)

The findings of this study indicated that there were no significant correlations between any of the fifteen (Achievement, Deference, Order, Exhibition, Autonomy, Affiliation, Intraception, Succorance, Dominance, Abasement, Nurturance, Change, Endurance, Heterosexuality, and Aggression) needs' T-scores on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule and the P scores on the Defining Issues Test at a .05 level of significance for two-tailed tests. One relationship came very close to significance; it was between the need for Achievement and level of moral development.

³John T. Roscoe, Fundamental Research Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 79-80.

Chapter 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this study was to test for significant relationships between personality needs and moral reasoning. This chapter presents a summary of this study and a discussion of the results and recommendations of this study.

SUMMARY

Kohlberg¹ has devised a moral development theory consisting of six stages in irreversible sequence. It is a developmental and cognitive approach to moral judgment. An important construct of the theory is that moral development is more related to a cognitive developmental process than related to personality. Rest² developed the Defining Issues Test, a test of objectively measuring moral judgment using Kohlberg's theory. This study correlated each of the fifteen needs on the Edwards

¹Lawrence Kohlberg, "The development of children's orientations toward a moral order: I Sequence in the development of moral thought," Vita Humana, 6, No. 1-2 (1963), pp. 11-33.

²James R. Rest, Defining Issues Test, Manual (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1974.) (Mimeographed.)

Personal Preference Schedule to moral judgment; no significant relationships occurred.

CONCLUSIONS

None of the personality needs on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule were significantly related (in a linear correlation) to moral judgment as defined by the P score on the Defining Issues Test. This supports the construct that moral judgment development is not directly related to personality. It indirectly supports the concept that moral judgment development is more closely related to the cognitive aspect of a person than to the personality aspect.

The fact that only junior and senior college students were used may have influenced the results. They were chosen with the belief that they would take the testing more seriously than other college students, and this desired maturity, as well as the greater stability shown in junior and senior students, does differ from the general student and other populations. The very limited sample of Midwestern college students may also have influenced the results.

The terms "situational ethics" and "values clarification" have become popular in recent years. This study has not previously referred to these concepts because little or none of the literature in this bibliography refers to them. Some would say that moral judgment is a

clarification of values as described by Kohlberg's six developmental stages. "Situational ethics" have been compared to "if it feels good, do it." This is very comparable to stage 2 moral reasoning. This study and the Defining Issues Test make the clarification of values simpler to do and more understandable.

The fact that personality was not related to moral judgment may have been due to the limited definition of personality used in this study. The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule and the fifteen needs measured by it are not a comprehensive measure of personality. Other tests with different personality variables, or the same personality variables measured differently, could produce results inconsistent with this study.

Another influence upon this study was the Defining Issues Test. This test is a verbal-cognitive measure of what one "thinks" one would do in a given situation. What one would actually do in a given situation of moral dilemma cannot be measured by the Defining Issues Test. Moral reasoning is just that, reasoning. Kohlberg's theory states that moral judgment is more closely related to cognition than to personality, and this study would support that aspect of his theory. But, is implying to do situational moral behavioral measurement on a verbal-cognitive test constricting the outcome and pre-judging that moral judgment is more cognitive than it actually is? To test whether moral judgment is more closely related to

personality or thinking, it may be biased to use a "thinking" test.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The most significant finding of this study was the lack of relationship between any of the fifteen personality needs and moral judgment. A relationship which came very close to significance was the one for males and females combined between the need for Achievement and moral judgment. This deserves further study.

Other correlation tests could also be used to determine other than linear relationships such as the Mann-Whitney U test and the Spearman rank coefficient. Deviations from the mean of the personality scores with absolute values could be correlated with moral judgment scores.

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