Examined is a feature of the personnel management system of the United States Foreign Service. Lateral entry, the absorption of individuals into the professional diplomatic corps at other than the bottom grade, is traced from its origin with the very beginnings of the professionalization of the career service to the present day. Considered by the elite career system of the Foreign Service to be a threat to the career principle, lateral entry as a recruiting method has been consistently resisted in application. Support for this opposition has been found in constituent groups in Congress, the executive branch, and the private sector. Proponents have hailed the measure as a much needed expansion tool and as a method of infusing new blood and new ideas into a career system perceived as having turned stagnant and thus ineffective through conservatism and ingrowth.

The decades following World War II witnessed three periods in which massive attempts were made to expand the size and capabilities of the Foreign Service through integration into the system of auxiliary career systems in the
foreign affairs community. In the long term the results of these efforts have been brought into question. Lateral entry as a reform proposal has been directed toward the organizational structure. It now appears that the problem with the Department of State and the Foreign Service is not fully organizational but in great part one of lack of viable role. The decade of the 1980s has brought changes in the philosophy of management toward the basic problems of foreign affairs management. Lateral entry has been de-emphasized and may well be on its way out as a technique, together with attempts at a unified foreign affairs personnel system.
LATERAL ENTRY INTO THE FOREIGN SERVICE:
TIMES HAVE CHANGED

A Thesis
Presented to
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by
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: . . . OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

For our Nation is commissioned by history to be either an observer of freedom's failure or the cause of its success. John F. Kennedy

Among the problems that have confronted the Department of State since the events of this century revolutionized the role of the United States in foreign affairs none has raised as much controversy and posed such direct threat to effective diplomacy as those dealing with personnel.

The conduct of the foreign policy of the United States in a world of rapid change has become a matter of crucial importance to all Americans. Dramatic and far-reaching changes in the environment and conditions of great power diplomacy have occurred as the aftermath of two major World Wars and a disturbing number of lesser military confrontations. It is probable that a change has occurred in the very substance of diplomacy as a method of negotiation. This places a heavy burden on the Department of State, for the search for peace is primarily the task of diplomacy; and in the worldwide effort for peace American diplomacy must play a central role.

The role must be greater than a mere coalescent through which a balance is maintained in international relationships. The role demands leadership of unparalleled quality through which the world of tomorrow is created today.

Of continuing--and growing--concern are the character and quality of foreign affairs personnel and of their condition of employment and of operating procedures within the Department of State, the executive agency charged with principal responsibility for the conduct of diplomatic relations. In final analysis, diplomacy is diplomats.
Organizations understandably place considerable value on achieving the optimum use of their resources in order to accomplish program objectives. The failure of management to assign appropriate values would mean that resources would be wasted or that all objectives might not be achieved. The central and most valuable resource of the Department of State is the Foreign Service officer corps of the United States Foreign Service.

In the effort made since World War II to achieve an effective foreign affairs organization both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government have taken a remarkable series of measures to build toward a coherent and purposive foreign policy through recruiting and deploying a career group of top quality men and women committed to the wise conduct of such policy. Well intended measures for improved personnel policies have invariably peaked and faded away after a few years. Not only has there been difficulty in making proposed solutions work effectively, but there has also been difficulty in defining the problem in ways that point to real solutions.

The modern Foreign Service was created by the Rogers Act of 1924. The Act provided a fairly clear-cut charter for a permanent Foreign Service and created closed career or professional conditions for the amalgamated service which resulted from combining the formerly separate Diplomatic and Consular Services into the Foreign Service. The new Service was initially administered by personnel of the career service itself outside the framework of the general Civil Service.

There are important differences between a career service and the general Civil Service. In Harold Stein's words, it (the Foreign Service) became a "conscious and coherent group operating within but largely apart from the larger governmental structure. Usually called the 'Professional Service' or the 'Career Service' by its members, who look upon themselves primarily as 'political officers,' it has its own distinctive entrance and tenure procedures, its own salary system, its own sensitivity and code of privacy. It constitutes as it were a guild."\(^1\)

There are identifiable and significant consequences of establishing separate career services within the general government structure. Several are outlined below and are considered in this study.²

Members of a career personnel system must always work with other personnel within the organization who lack comparable career status. To the extent that the system approaches being an "elite" system, to that extent is it exclusive and preferential vis-à-vis the other employees. A consequence of the sense of unity, cohesiveness, and homogeneity within the career system itself is friction, difficulties of communication, and low morale with and among the other personnel of the organization.

A second consequence of a career system has to do with flexibility in the utilization of manpower to meet rapidly changing needs. A closed career system which contains a body of trained and experienced persons can readily adapt itself to certain kinds of changes in the short run through quick reassignments, transfers, even movements over thousands of miles. It is uninhibited by position classification, following a rank-in-person concept, and enjoys a degree of loyalty and discipline, sometimes legally enforceable, not common in the general Civil Service. But if it is called upon to meet sudden needs requiring different kinds of skills or to anticipate and prepare for basic changes in mission, rapid growth, or rapid re-education, it is very inflexible.

A final consequence is conservatism in the sense of resistance to change that might weaken the system. The conservatism envisaged is that directed principally to threats of change to the system itself, to its status in the general government, and to the career futures of its members. The system itself, because of its self-governing nature, will cause the perspectives of its older members, who are in leadership positions, to dominate the views of subordinate system members. Change, for whatever purpose, will be anticipatedly retarded.

Since World War II, the older career systems have been under considerable stress. All have changed in response to pressures from outside and within. The major challenges to these systems fall within four main classes: egalitarianism, the knowledge explosion, both technical and social;

management; and politics. Each of these has impacted on the Foreign Service career system. Specific strategies have been developed by both the Department of State and the Foreign Service to deal with these challenges.

No system built on the premise of bottom-level entry can equip itself internally with the vast array of knowledge and techniques to handle, in an effective and up-to-date manner, the problems in its established area of activity.\(^3\) The Foreign Service has been particularly cramped by this fact. The situation developed as foreign policy problems began to cut across geographical and functional lines. The traditional division of organizational responsibility was called into question, since a single department no longer could assert an exclusive right or capability to make policy. As a consequence, the policy process became one of shared responsibility and overlapping authority.

The capability of the Foreign Service to keep pace with the rapidly changing situation hinged in great part on its ability to absorb into the professional service different types of specialization and experience by lateral entry. In the stronger career systems such as the Foreign Service lateral entry is a last resort measure which often must be forced from the outside. Lateral entry is a threat to the essence of the career principle of the system itself.\(^4\) It permits entry into the system at other than the bottom level and thus causes a cascade effect in the blockage of promotions, assignments, and other benefits of the system to which members below the point of lateral entry would otherwise have been entitled.

The Department of State identifies in a positive sense the need to bring into the Foreign Service a selected number of highly qualified

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 158.

\(^4\)The closed career principle as here understood envisages a personnel system composed of people selected soon after completion of their basic education on the basis of competitive examinations who are expected and who expect: (a) to spend the bulk of their working lives in the same organization; (b) to be advanced periodically on the basis of competition with their peers and evaluation by their superiors to top grades in their organizations; and (c) to be protected in such competition from outsiders.
persons each year at the mid-career and higher levels. The Department recognizes that any career service, no matter how adequately staffed, can profit from infusion of "new blood" and "fresh ideas" from individuals who have had experience and who have formed their ideas and philosophy in a different environment. Members of the Foreign Service have regularly concurred with the Department on this matter although adding a caveat that lateral entrants should be a specific but limited number of experienced and highly qualified persons. Lateral entrants have been present in the Foreign Service officers corps since the late 1920s. The roots of the question of lateral entrance originate in the period of professionalization of the Foreign Service, 1905-1915. The number of lateral entrants peaked during the years of the Wriston Program, 1954 to 1958, when in less than four years more than 1,500 persons were brought into the corps. "Wristonization," as the program was called, was a program forced on the system from the outside.

Although it is probable that the Department of State will continue to recognize the value of acquiring Foreign Service officers through lateral entry, it is significant that the Foreign Service Act of 1980 does not contain specific provisions for lateral entry. The numbers of individuals who have entered the Foreign Service officers corps through lateral entry has dwindled significantly in recent years. Since 1975 lateral entry has been used almost exclusively as a discrete program for absorbing women and other minority group representatives into the Service at the mid-levels.

Considering the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and related developments, now appeared to be a propitious time for a comprehensive review of lateral entry as a discrete program. Proponents of reform both within and outside the Department of State and the Foreign Service officers corps have consistently proposed a more liberal use of lateral entry. Yet the career system itself, the Foreign Service, has defended itself from the widespread use of this strategy of accommodation from the birth of the Service to the present day.

In November, 1981, the Department of State provided responses to a series of questions on lateral entry which were posed as a portion of
Interest in this subject area was prompted as a result of performing a series of SPSS package cross-tabulation routines with data compiled in a social sciences program on American ambassadors. Methods of entry into the Foreign Service and world region of assignment as an ambassador were interrelated and the data summarized for all ambassadors appointed during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations. Data for political appointees was omitted. Utilizing the null hypothesis, it was assumed that there was no difference between method of entry with respect to world regions of assignment as an ambassador. Chi-square computations, using a conservative .01 level of significance, resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis. Ambassadors entering the Service through lateral entry were not assigned to posts in Latin America, the Middle East, and Communist countries at the frequencies expected. The questions posited by this relationship led to a review of the origins, development, and current status of the lateral entry phenomenon.

This study is an objective analysis of lateral entry as a personnel tool of the Department of State in the management of the Foreign Service. The history of this method of nonorthodox entry is traced from its origins to the current status under the Foreign Service Act of 1980. No effort is made to offer a solution as to whether or not lateral entry should be institutionalized within the personnel practices of the Foreign Service as a recruiting method. There are two fundamental reasons for declining the offer of a solution. The first of these lies in a belief that the Department of State remains without a principal role in the foreign affairs government. Striving year after year to protect a narrow area of foreign

5Department of State response was provided during a conference held November 20, 1981, at the Department of State, Washington, D.C.. Ruth Schimel, William I. Bacchus, and Frontis B. Wiggins, of the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel, and Margaret Barnhardt, Chief, Recruitment Division, Office of Recruitment, Examination and Employment, United States Department of State, discussed the subject of lateral entry with the author.
affairs responsibility, frequently referred to as international relations, the Department has not faced the inevitable conclusion that in the contemporary environment most issues are interdepartmental in nature. Without a viable role, how does an organization adequately plan for its manpower requirements? The possible answers to that question point to the second reason. The tenacity with which the Department's career systems have clung to an entrenched code of bureaucratic behavior has led to a reservation concerning the utility of the Department of State. If there were a strong conviction within the Executive Branch that the values, perceptions, and diplomatic practices traditionally associated with the Department offered an important resource vital to the cause of national security, then internal Departmental reform would occur without delay.\(^6\)

Excluding the Department and the Foreign Service, who really cares that there has been an inability to merge policy formation and operations? The inability to merge the two processes has directly affected the extent to which the Department has been able to recruit and retain the best possible candidates for the Foreign Service. Every American should therefore care, for personnel problems are preventing the Nation from tapping the rich professional resources of the Department of State.

The Department of State is at the official center of the foreign affairs government. However, the Department is only part of the foreign affairs government today, and by no means a predominant part. New institutional powers have emerged in the policy-making establishment. No attempt is made in this study to treat the personnel systems of other foreign affairs agencies. The Foreign Service of the Department of State is the sole focus of attention as the critical problem of personnel is deemed to lie within that agency. Other foreign affairs agencies have seemingly escaped the severity of the problem for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that they have been established either to administer particular programs, work on specific policy problems, or provide important policy

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support functions and instruments. The Department of State's mission requirements are measurably more complex and intricate.
CHAPTER II

THE BACKGROUND: A NEW DIPLOMACY

They (diplomatic positions) are places merely for the reward of partisans, places of refuge for worn-out, useless, second-rate politicians.

Representative W. Ranson Davis, 1834

In the foreign policy portion of his opening statement at his confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States possesses "... a full range of the instruments of effective statecraft ..." Secretary Haig described these instruments as including "a diplomatic corps second to none." Speaking to what he considered to be the urgent task of reestablishing an effective foreign policy consensus, Secretary Haig saw the need to underscore the role of the Foreign Service officer corps as a necessary condition to consensus in that

... the most consistent articulation of policy is wasted if the professionals who must execute it are divorced from its formulation and if their experience and skill are usurped in the name of confidentiality, haste, or political sensitivity. The career personnel of the State Department and the Foreign Service are an unmatched intellectual resource, and they will be around long after the President and Secretary of State are gone. If the United States is to act consistently and reliably in the world arena, it must use its career professionals. Their effective participation in policy-making is imperative.

Secretary Haig has become but the latest representative of an incoming administration to express concern about the problem of organizing our government for foreign policy. Few problems have been probed as often in this century as that of modernizing our diplomatic establishment.

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8 Ibid., p. 4.
9 Ibid., p. 3.
10
Since World War II alone more than a dozen major studies or proposals have appeared.10 The problem of foreign affairs organization has been considered from the broad aspect of total organizational reform to narrow reviews focused on specific areas such as personnel administration. Most of the studies of the last three decades have centered on the Foreign Service officer system as the foundation of the foreign policy structure, and as the portion of the structure most urgently in need of reform.

Reform movements have followed a pattern of Presidential leadership preceeding Congressional action. Each major legislative enactment has followed a period in which Executive Orders were utilized to formulate reform measures within the Department of State. Recommendations for reform have arisen from a number of sources and have been pursued under a variety of auspices and arrangements.11 Legislative enactments have subsequently provided a statutory base for reform gains and served as the springboard from which new reform proposals are launched. Yet, incongruous with the perception of reform as an instrument of organizational change, early in the third century of our nation's history Secretary Haig is warning that the absence of consistency, reliability, and balance as essential attributes guarantees an unsuccessful foreign policy. This inherent difficulty, according to the Secretary, has been complicated in the past decade by the breakdown of foreign policy bipartisanship and by the development of unnecessary division between Congress and the Executive Branch, and among executive branch departments themselves.12 Time will tell whether the Reagan Administration will respond to the foreign affairs experiences of previous administrations, whether emulation or avoidance was their aim, or overcome the legacy of "muddling through" and establish a need to go beyond it. Going beyond may necessitate defining a principal

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10 The appendix contains a list of these major studies.

11 Reform has been pursued under a variety of auspices and arrangements: a Presidential-Congressional commission (the first Hoover Commission); a Presidential staff agency (Bureau of Budget); a Presidential ad hoc group (the Dufflon study); an internal Foreign Service group (the Chapin-Poster study); committees appointed by the Secretary of State (the Rowe and Wriston Committees, the Macomer study group); outside groups under contract with a Congressional Committee (the Brookings Institute and Syracuse University); and outside groups organized with private support.

12 Department of State, Secretary Haig, Opening Statement at Confirmation Hearings, p. 3.
role for the Department of State that is both useful and feasible.

The development of a professional foreign service in the United States has been a gradual process. The first sustained effort to modernize our diplomatic establishment in this century arose from within the Department itself. The ranks of the reformers contained not only members of the establishment but other elements of the Executive Branch, members of Congress who perceived the urgency of reform, special interest groups such as the National Civil Service Reform League, publicists, businessmen, and interested private citizens. The first assumption of this and subsequent reform efforts was the necessity of a diplomatic service. The reformers therefore sought to change its existing structure to achieve greater and more effective performance.

The diplomatic establishment of the late nineteenth century was far removed in nature from that of today. One historian described the Department of 1898 as "an antiquated feeble organization, enslaved by precedents and routine inherited from another century, remote from the public gaze and indifferent to it. The typewriter was viewed as a necessary evil and the telephone was an instrument of last resort." The establishment consisted of the Department of State and the two overseas elements, the diplomatic and consular services. The public exhibited some confusion in distinguishing between these entities, frequently considering them to be a single unit, or at least the overseas services as one unit. The term "Foreign Service" was just beginning to be used to refer to both services.

The early overseas service of the United States was as unpretentious as the domestic establishment. The need for diplomacy had been apparent from the start as the Colonies formed themselves into the United States. Congress believed that they had earned themselves "a place among the rising powers of Europe" and felt the need to cultivate "a friendly correspondence and connection with foreign countries." A Department of Foreign Affairs was created by Congress on January 10, 1781, and a secretary appointed to assume the responsibilities for foreign affairs. A later law passed by

14 Ibid., p. 1.
Congress gave certain domestic responsibilities to the Department as well as foreign duties. President Washington approved this change which set up a Department of State with a Secretary of State at its head. A congressional act of April 14, 1792, provided legislative prescriptions for the Consular Service. Under the Constitution, the President has been given a share of the power in the appointment of "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls." This power of appointment is shared with the Senate under advice and consent provisions. Drawing upon these provisions a diplomatic service, assigned the task of conducting political relations with foreign countries, and a consular service, which dealt primarily with commercial matters and the needs of American citizens abroad, were created. At the very beginning of the Department's history certain personnel practices were adopted that adversely affected American foreign relations for many years. Little or no interchange took place between those serving within the Department at home and those in the services at overseas posts. No provision was made to encourage transfers between the Diplomatic Service and the Consular Service. These circumstances limited flexibility and interfered with the development of professionalism.

The low priority attached to the political aspect of foreign relations resulted in a tendency to depreciate the Diplomatic Service. The practice of the "spoils system"—the award of government appointments in return for political support—reinforced this attitude. The Consular Service, although subjected to the same deprecations, fared somewhat better in achieving status. A primary reason for this rested on the service's close relationship to growing financial and economic interests abroad and the interest group political pressure arising therefrom.

In 1900, the Department maintained 41 Diplomatic and 318 Consular Service posts. These statistics reflected extraordinary additions to the international political commitments of the United States. The expansion required an equally extraordinary series of changes within the Department ranging from increased annual budgets to internal reorganization. The

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15 U. S. Const. art. II, sec. 2.
most distinctive feature of these changes was a strong movement toward fully professionalized and democratized foreign services. The transformation in American foreign relations that began at the end of the nineteenth century forced the nation to recognize that it paid dearly for previous amateurism in the conduct of foreign policy.

Voices advocating reform had been active well before the turn of the twentieth century. The voices arose as a result of America's growing involvement in the affairs of the world. The public was becoming more aware of the direct relationship between their personal welfare (in terms of national security and individual economic opportunities) and their government's diplomatic negotiations and official commitments in foreign areas. As new functions and activities were identified as being within the general area of interest of the diplomatic establishment, new challenges were created for the professional group responsible for the conduct of diplomacy. The nature and scope of these challenges rapidly accelerated after 1900. In the nineteenth century the practice of the spoils system, government preoccupation with domestic affairs, public apathy, Congressional indifference, and the lack of a strong executive leadership had all acted to delay the establishment in America of a professionally trained and experienced foreign service able to draw from the varied segments of American society and committed to a career in the public service. Momentum thus developed to change the personnel system for foreign affairs. A reform movement with the persistence of the one which came into being is not generated out of small and unimportant considerations. Typically, the parties involved felt that issues of great moment were at stake, amounting basically to nothing less than the adequacy of the conduct of U. S. foreign affairs in extremely critical times.

16 The diplomatic establishment during the period discussed consisted of two distinct services: the Diplomatic Service assigned the task of conducting political relations with foreign countries, and the Consular Service which dealt primarily with commercial matters and the needs of American citizens abroad. Both services were within the organizational structure of the Department of State, wherein other substructures were formed to support their effort. These substructures are termed the Departmental Services.

From within the diplomatic establishment came a steady pressure for the creation of a career system.\(^{18}\) At the turn of the century the establishment was still without a bona fide merit system and other improvements essential to the development of a truly professional service. Correcting this problem was viewed as a requisite condition to improving the capability of the Department of State to carry out its traditional responsibilities for diplomacy.

Not infrequently in the early part of the century an analogy was drawn between the diplomatic profession and the military service. The latter, held to be an organization exhibiting staunch constitutional advocacy, and whose officers neither had nor desired a political future, was perceived as an organizational model for the diplomatic establishment. The fact that the major component of the military establishment was going through its own radical reform perhaps helped to emphasize the analogy. Selecting the United States Navy personnel system as the one most desirable for emulation, diplomatic establishment reforms to the present day have incorporated selected aspects of that system.

As the nineteenth century drew to a close a significant shift in reform proposals occurred which reflected in the Diplomatic Service. Reformers in the period after the Civil War had been ambiguous about the level of the Service that their reform measures encompassed. The new emphasis was clearly on restricting merit to the secretar yships leaving the ministerial level firmly rooted in politics. Exceptional secretaries from the lower service would on occasion be promoted to the upper, ministerial level. Some reformers still advocated an entirely professionalized service and continued to urge its adoption. Supporters of the half career and half political viewpoint prevailed.

There were those who felt that a diplomatic establishment was necessary but disapproved of the various reform proposals. A number of individuals actively defended the advantages of the spoils system in preparing candidates for the field of diplomacy. These dissenting voices

\(^{18}\) A comprehensive discussion of career systems is found in N. Joseph Cayer, Managing Human Resources, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1980), Chap. 4, and Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, Chap. 5.
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frequently found support in the silence of Congress and public apathy. After 1888, in response to changing international circumstances and the demands of the informed, distinct movements within and outside the service took place. Few sessions of Congress met without a resolution calling for an investigation of the two overseas services or the introduction of legislation to improve their organization. Although most attention centered on the Consular Service, the Diplomatic Service received its share of commentary.

The Consular Service during this period had the power behind it of America's number one interest group--business. It is probable that it was the demand of business for the reorganization of that Service on a permanent, efficient basis that led to the initial advances made in that Service. Diplomacy was viewed as necessary but the conviction that a trained diplomatic service was necessary was only growing.

Within this framework of rapid change the tendencies toward a merit service grew measureably. Men in increasing numbers who entered the service intending to make it a career found positive signs of the growth of a true career service, thus confirming their expectations. All of these developments needed the assistance of a sympathetic presidential administration. From 1888 to 1906, almost every President and his Secretary of State publicly supported the merit service principles for diplomacy and privately sought to assure the tenure of competent secretaries. Much of their support stemmed from the sheer necessity arising from the exponential growth of the foreign business of the United States. Frequent rotation of personnel, a characteristic of the spoils system, was causing a disruptive influence on American representation abroad and, as a consequence, the rise of considerable political pressure at home.

The turn of the century effort was catalyzed by Wilbur J. Carr (1870-1942), "The Father of the Foreign Service." Entering the Department as a clerk in 1892, he became Chief of the Consular Service in 1902, Chief

Clark in 1907, and served as Director of the Consular Service from 1909 to 1924. A believer in scientific management and administrative efficiency, Carr first undertook the reform of the Consular Service. Although a broad sector of government service had been removed from political patronage by the Civil Service Act of 1883 the Diplomatic and Consular Services were not under the Act. Carr strove to extend two features of the Act, professionalism and merit, to all aspects of the diplomatic establishment. Carr's efforts in the first decade of the twentieth century were assisted by the presence of a Chief Executive that embodied the movement toward the merit service in diplomacy. Theodore Roosevelt had long been interested in civil service reform and as early as 1894 had outlined the need for the merit principle in foreign affairs administration. While President, he extended the classified civil service to cover the non-career service employees of the Department of State. As the first President to think realistically in global terms, he was vitally aware of the necessity for competent foreign affairs information from trained observers and of adequate political representation abroad. In practice, Roosevelt was determined that effective secretaries would be retained in service and advanced through merit.

Elihu Root, who became Secretary of State in July, 1905, subscribed to Roosevelt's policy of the retention and advancement of competent secretaries. Root's appointment had been specifically made with a view toward reorganization of the administration of all branches dealing with foreign affairs. While previously serving as Secretary of War Root had gained valuable experience in modernizing outdated administrative machinery. The commitment to reform by Roosevelt and Root was more than shared by the Department of State.

In 1905, the cumulative pressures for reform from both within and outside the Department demanded the attention of the President and his Secretary of State. There was a nascent diplomatic career service growing without a basis in legislative enactments. The career principle had strong advocates within the Department and both Root and Roosevelt approved of and supported its application. The career principle had many opponents within
the Congress and the public sector, but theirs was essentially the opposition of apathy. Against this interplay of forces the first step was taken toward placing diplomacy on a firm career basis.²⁰

In the opening years of the twentieth century the Congress had refused all consular legislation. The time available for Secretary Root to devote to reform projects was cut short by the priority demanded by international complications. Still, Root and the President decided to adopt consular reform measures that would give a lead to Congress and establish a precedent for future reforms. Reform through Executive Order appealed to Roosevelt especially since his reelection in 1904 assured his continued presence in office. Reform through Executive Order would circumvent Congressional legislative inaction and at the same time satisfy some of the mounting pressures from business groups for an effective Consular Service.

Beginning first with a directive that related solely to the Consular Service, Root later became convinced that the opportunity was present to initiate the merit system in the Diplomatic Service. Two separate Executive Orders were drafted. Roosevelt subsequently accepted both orders and promulgated them on November 10, 1905. The consular order committed the Administration to three principles: admission to the Consular Service by examination; promotion solely on the basis of ability and efficiency; and opening the examination to all, not just to designees of the President as was the case under earlier Executive Orders.²¹ The first two principles had already appeared in earlier Executive Orders but the absence of the third principle rendered them ineffective. The diplomatic order applied principally to the secretaryships and provided that vacancies be filled either through transfer or promotion from some branch of the foreign service or "by the appointment of a person, 

who, having furnished satisfactory evidence of character, responsibility, and capacity, and being thereupon selected by the President for examination, is found upon such examination to be qualified for the position."  

The order did not extend the merit principle to the ministerial level. Root issued a departmental order on the same day establishing a Board of Examiners within the Department whose duty was the administration of appropriate examinations for entrance to the Diplomatic and Consular Services.

Two principles, both of which persisted later in legislative enactments, were accomplished through the diplomatic order: fitness for office, either by experience (ministerial level) or examination (secretaryships) and examination by a Board of Examiners authorized to see that the examination provision was carried out. By implication the order also embraced security of tenure.

A number of other features of the diplomatic order must be noted as the order was still a considerable distance from the demands of the reformers. The format of the reform, an Executive Order, provided no basis in statute and was binding only upon Roosevelt. The required examination, in essence just a qualifying test, was to be administered only to designees of the President. This allowed partisan considerations to continue. No clear-cut avenues of promotion were established as secretaryships were not graded. Finally, the provision permitting transfer or promotion from another branch violated the career principle, for entrants could always be transferred into the service over the heads of existing members. This feature, lateral entry, a controversial matter from the very beginning, was to grow into one of the most divisive issues of Departmental reform. During the years prior to the Rogers Act of 1924 the question of lateral entry lay submerged in the greater issue of first establishing a career service.

The fact that the order fell short of the anticipations of the reformers was probably an act of commission. Roosevelt was very much

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22 Good Government XXIX (November 1912), pp. 105-106.
aware that the service still harbored a number of individuals who lacked
the essential qualifications. He intended to change these individuals
whenever the need arose. A completely closed career system would prevent
him from appointing men from the outside. No doubt, President Roosevelt
also possessed a realistic view toward reform and desired to keep options
open for future efforts.

The Roosevelt order attracted little attention. Among the sup-
porters of professional diplomacy, however, it was received with enthusiasm.
Those who opposed the application of merit principles to the Diplomatic
Service remained silent. Root, who was concerned about the political im-
pact of applying merit to both the Diplomatic and Consular Services, was
agreeably surprised when violent objections did not materialize.

Although the Roosevelt-Root Diplomatic Service remains open to
valid criticism several genuine advances toward professionalization of the
Service were made. One of these was promotion within the Service. Long
afflicted by patronage, a change in administration normally had signaled
changes in secretaryships and consular representation. Political appoint-
ments had remained the order of the day despite growing public concern
over the quality of representation abroad. Nevertheless, certain members
of the foreign services developed special competence and pursued careers
of reasonable stability in diplomatic and consular assignments. Roosevelt
recognized the value of nonpartisan retention of such men and the necessity
of providing for promotion within the system. However, his view was
characterized by the apothegm "There is nothing greater than habit." Partisan acts were still very evident.

The principle of security of tenure did gain added credence. That
certain individuals were promoted within the system implies that they re-
tained their membership in the service. Roosevelt’s period as Chief Ex-
ecutive was marked by a decrease in original appointments as more and more
qualified men were retained in office. For individuals entering the services
under original appointment the examination process was refined and improved.

23 Ovid, Ars Amatoria. Bk. ii, 1. 345.
The 1905 Executive Order for the Diplomatic Service had long-term effects relevant to professionalization of the Service. Both the diplomatic and consular orders were the product of legislative-executive cooperation. Not only was Secretary Root effective in his relations with Congress but there were others within the Department of State, such as Carr, who had influential congressional contacts. The level of cooperation, which extended to the willingness of Departmental representatives to testify before congressional hearings, advanced the cause of a foreign service career system.

One example of these relations was the successful passage in April, 1906, of a law reorganizing the Consular Service. Partly a synthesis of previous bills on the subject, the Department's final draft on the proposed legislation contained merit and classification provisions, added a system of inspections, and provided several administrative prohibitions relating to hiring and accounting. The law as accepted eliminated Roosevelt's examination system and the merit provision and diluted the mechanism of classification. Roosevelt, accepting the advice of Root, Carr, and others, supplemented the new law with an Executive Order of June 27, 1906. The order contained three principles of significant note: creation of a Board of Examiners and admission to the Consular Service by examination; promotion solely on the basis of ability and efficiency (merit); and opening the examination to all, not just to designees of the President (thus the abolition of partisan considerations).

The 1905 order for the Diplomatic Service was not enforced long enough to generalize its effects on the Service. Perhaps one measure of its effect is found in the statistical fact that 39.1 per cent of those appointed had seen service either as a private secretary to a minister or ambassador or as a member of the Consular Service. The latter were not, however, cases of lateral entry. They had taken positions in the Consular Service to await openings in the Diplomatic Service. The statistic would indicate that there was some conception existent that the Service offered a career potential.

The growing responsibilities of the Department of State forced a thorough reorganization in 1909. Under the administration of President William H. Taft, slow progress toward professionalization was made. The pace of change quickened after Taft appointed as First Assistant Secretary Francis M. Huntington Wilson. Wilson, a long-time advocate of reform in the Diplomatic Service, succeeded in enlarging the number of leadership positions within the Department. One such position was a Director to administer the Consular Service, a position filled by Carr. Lines of authority were clarified permitting senior managers to make better use of personnel. Wilson undertook a major reorganization of the Department, effectuated by an Executive Order of November 26, 1909. Although many aspects of the reorganization, such as the geographical regrouping of reporting units, had long-term effects on the Service, the more extensive application of the merit principle was alone of immediate relevance.

Following the orders of 1905 and 1906, the 1909 order extended the provisions of the Pendleton Act of 1883 to the Diplomatic Service without placing the Service's personnel under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. A Board of Examiners was established within the Department to administer both oral and written examinations to prospective diplomats. The order further prescribed admission only to the lowest positions, security of tenure, and promotion by the merit principle. Original appointments were confined to the positions of third secretary of embassy, second secretary of legation, or first secretary in a single secretary legation. Vacancies in higher secretaryships were to be filled by promotions. Transfers from the Department and the Consular Service required an examination with no preferential treatment to be given except for exigencies of the service. An exception was made to this provision for upper salaried personnel. The lateral entry question continued to exist in the provisions permitting transfer.

Compared to the 1905 and 1906 orders for the Consular Service, many advances and similarities emerge. Several of the administrative advances and similarities emerge.26

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26 Ibid., p. 100.
features of the consular order were adopted for the Diplomatic Service. These included efficiency records and the scope of the entrance examination. The 1909 order virtually made the lower levels of the Diplomatic Service politics-free. The examination was revised and geared to the commercial aims of American diplomacy. A minimal concession was made to geographical representation, a rallying point for those urging democratization of the diplomatic establishment. Demonstrated efficiency became the sole criterion for promotion. The keystone of the new merit system was the cumulative efficiency record of every secretary.

Measured against the overall progressive nature of the 1909 order there were features which served as administrative barriers to sound career development. The age limit range (twenty-nine years) permitted personnel to enter the Service too late to make it a lifetime career. The examination system contained features which discouraged applicants. Lateral transfers had not been completely abolished, particularly in the upper Service levels. The promotion system stopped just below the ministerial level. There was now "the Service" and "the ministers and ambassadors."

Beyond the control of the Executive Branch, and therefore the order, were the inadequate wage structure and the absence of retirement provisions. Control over such measures rested within the appropriation authority of the House of Representatives. Senatorial control over the movements of secretaries from one post to another and up the promotional ladder were still in effect under the advice and consent provisions of the U. S. Constitution. And finally, the order had no base in legislation, without which Taft's successor could simply ignore it.

In December, 1910, Taft urged Congress to enact the merit provisions for both Services into law. He insisted that the extension of the merit

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27 "Democratization" of the Foreign Service is discussed in Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, and Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939.

through executive orders had had excellent results and to codify improvements. Representative Frank Lowden agreed to sponsor the necessary bill. With Wilson and Carr a measure was drafted which put the merit provisions of the 1906 order for the Consular Service and the 1909 order into statutory language. The bill also proposed other needed features.

The proposed legislation was introduced on January 11, 1911, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House. In the Senate on January 23, Senator Henry C. Lodge introduced a bill basically similar to Lowden's. Lodge's bill required the President to appoint all who passed the examination and promote only those within the service. Both bills were viewed as raising a Constitutional issue not theretofore addressed, a direct and positive limitation of the President's power of appointment. The question of whether or not it was competent for Congress to require the President to appoint to the lower classes of the foreign service only such as have passed an examination, and to limit the power of appointment to the higher grades to those who have served in some lower grade lat at the heart of the Constitutional issue. Congress adjourned without taking action on either bill. The National Business League, insistent on obtaining statutory permanence for the Consular Service, obtained sponsorship of a bill drafted by that organization in the next session of Congress. The bill required compulsory appointment and promotion in the Consular Service and made no mention of the Diplomatic Service. The Department would not support the legislation and the bill died in committee.

President Taft, in his Annual Message to Congress, December 7, 1911, made yet another plea for legislation covering the diplomatic establishment. The National Business League, the National Civil Service Reform League, the American Chamber of Commerce in Paris, and other outside interest groups revived their pressure for diplomatic reforms. Considerable use was made of the gains which had been made under successive executive orders and codification of those gains was demanded. As for the Constitutional issue, advocates of the legislation asked that the question be left to the Supreme Court. The Taft Administration appeared not to be destined to secure the needed legislation. Another attempt, the Sulzer Bill, introduced
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February 13, 1912, and reported out of the Foreign Affairs Committee in June 5, never could be maneuvered to the floor for a vote although supported by the administration. The combined forces of those opposed to the merit system or continuous diplomacy, patronage-hungry Democrats, and the divisions among the reformers themselves defeated the bill.

The Taft Administration had continued the previous administration's efforts to provide more solid foundations for a career service. On the basis of external evidence the four years under Taft strengthened the concept of professional diplomacy on the ministerial level and in the executive posts of the Department. Not content with the retention of qualified individuals and in-service promotions to retain such personnel, the department strove to obtain better qualified candidates for the service, to eliminate remaining traces of partisanship, and to develop a sense of career confidence. Recruiting efforts were directed toward men with the flexibility of mind that characterized the "generalist." The ideal secretary was one who was capable of handling all types of reporting and every duty of representation. Examinations were designed to identify such men.

The election of 1912 gave control of the Executive and Congress to the Democratic Party, a party that had been out of power and in the "patronage wilderness" for sixteen years. Their merit system resting upon Executive Orders issued under Republican administrations, members of the diplomatic establishment were naturally apprehensive. Although the Consular Service had established a nonpartisan reputation in the public mind, this was not true of the Diplomatic Service.

The course of the new administration toward the Diplomatic Service emerged slowly. However, pressures to force the administration's attitude began shortly after President Wilson's election. Attempting to place that attitude in perspective brought forth several conflicting observations. Wilson, having once served as a vice-president of the National Civil Service Reform League, was recognized as an advocate of civil service reform. However, a statement solicited from Wilson on reform did not mention the Diplomatic Service. It was known that Wilson, as an educator, appreciated

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30 Good Government, XXIX, pp. 105-106.
the need for career specialization. Further, the Democratic Party's platform claimed that "merit and ability should be the standard of appointment and promotion rather than service rendered to a political party."

Yet, Wilson was a minority President and head of a minority party. Political patronage was a time-honored practice under these circumstances. Further apprehension arose from examination of Wilson's "New Freedom" program. This program was directed toward domestic reform, not foreign involvement, and thus there was less interest in the administration of foreign affairs.

Wilson appointed William Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State. Bryan was known as an individual who understood and appreciated the need for party patronage. Bryan's aim in foreign affairs, such as it was, was the negotiation of conciliation conventions with the major powers, but did not envisage them requiring professional diplomats for either negotiations or enforcement. Other appointments within the Department of State added to concern regarding the Secretary. No man associated with the reform movement, save counsellor John B. Moore, was made an Assistant Secretary. Administrative control over the service was assumed by a spoils politician.

In July, 1913, nominations began for the ministerial and ambassadorial posts. Only three career ministers from the previous administrations survived the changes. Yet, there appeared to be a retention of the dichotomous concept of the Diplomatic Service, the upper ministerial level composed of ministers and ambassadors and the lower by secretaries. Patronage was utilized heavily in the upper level but did not seriously disrupt the lower level. It is probable that an agreement between Wilson, Bryan, and others preserved the merit system for the secretariats.

Public disapproval of the party's regression to patronage was great. There was general agreement that Bryan's wholesale dismissals had demoralized the service completely. Wilson received relatively little of the blame. Most congressmen and publicists believed that "Wilson handed over the appointments of the State Department and the appointments of most ministers to the tender mercies of Mr. Bryan as the price of protection of the Consular, and

31 Warren Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939, pp. 120-121.
partial protection of the lower grades of the Diplomatic Service. ... 32 Bryan came under heavy attack both by publicists and in Congress.

The mounting pressure against Bryan presented Wilson and others with several opportunities to restore movement toward a merit system for the service. The first of these occurred in the conduct of examinations for the vacancies in the secretarships. The examinations had been suspended when Bryan took office and a considerable backlog of applicants had been created. In October, 1914, examinations were held for the first time over a year and a half. This was followed by Wilson's appointment of career diplomat, William Phillips, to the position of Third Assistant Secretary within the Department. The appointment was over the objection of Bryan. An additional opportunity resulted from the resignation from a Diplomatic post of a Bryan appointee. To this post Wilson appointed a second career man.

One of Phillip's first tasks within the Department was to prepare legislation codifying the merit provisions of the 1909 Executive Order pertaining to the Diplomatic Service. With the help of Carr, Phillips drafted a measure for both services along the lines of the Lowden and Pulzer Bills of 1910 and 1912, respectively. The bill contained among its features for the Diplomatic Service the formal establishment of the Board of Examiners and the examination system, the use of efficiency records and compulsory reporting, and the appointment of secretaries to classes in a graded system. The bill was submitted in Congress by Representative Henry D. Flood and Senator William S. Stone. Bryan was absent from Washington at the time the bills were submitted and discovered that they contained the merit provisions upon his return. He objected in a letter to Wilson and Wilson agreed that making examinations for the Diplomatic and Consular Services might be an unwise move. Bryan was given permission to change that aspect of the bills.

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Action on the bills, as their predecessors, languished even though diplomacy remained under heavy criticism. The events of July and August in Europe provided the catalyst needed for bringing the bills to the attention of Congress. The opening days of World War I greatly expanded the role and responsibilities of both the Diplomatic and Consular Services, placing heavy demands on the officers therein. The bill before Congress, now identified as the Stone-Flood Act, was viewed as essential to expansion of the services. Bryan communicated his desire to amend the existing measures by eliminating the merit provisions. Flood desired to conform with Bryan's wishes for amendment but counseled him against any course that would delay the bill in Congress. Nevertheless, both Flood and Stone eliminated the merit provisions of the bills. Unanimously reported out of committee, Congressional action was slow paced on considering the proposed legislation. To criticism that the stripping of the merit principle was not in the best interests of the service, Flood argued that Executive orders could adequately protect the merit system in the face of any assault by spoils. Amendments introduced to restore the merit principles were defeated.

Two amendments, however, were accepted. The amendments provided for the following:

... any officer (secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, or consul) may be assigned for duty in the Department of State without loss of grade, class, or salary, such assignment to be for a period of not more than three years, unless the public interests demand further service, when such assignment may be extended for a period not to exceed one year, and no longer: Provided further, That no secretary, consul general, or consul shall be promoted to a higher class except upon the nomination of the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 33

Both of these amendments were positive movements in the direction of reform. The Diplomatic Service had been viewed as a service in exile whose expatriated officers had little or no opportunity to be assigned within the Department in Washington where their interests could be directly represented. The Act permitted appointment of certain diplomatic and consular officers to functional positions in the Department, rather than to

specific posts in the field. This step permitted reassignment by adminis-
trative transfer rather than Presidential appointment, and thereby en-
couraged the proponents of technical competence in the Diplomatic and
Consular Services. The requiring of Senate approval for promotions from
class to class was viewed as providing partial solution to enhancing
efficiency and minimizing the influence of excessive partisanship.

The years between the 1905 Executive Order and the Stone-Flood
act witnessed the establishment, in most respects, of a career in diplomacy.
It is for that primary reason that the period has been presented in such
detail. Subsequent major legislation would continue refinement of the
concept of a career foreign service.

With the passage of the Stone-Flood Act and the issuance of
implementing Departmental regulations, a system of examinations for en-
trance was instituted. The tests attempted to obtain candidates with the
service's particular qualifications. On the secretarial level, security of
enure and promotion by merit were fully accepted. Changes in political
power within the Executive and Legislative Branches had little effect at
the secretarial level. There remained, however, a block to promotions from
the secretaryships to the ministerial level. Exceptions to the use of
patronage at the ministerial level kept prospects alive that the blockage
would be removed. One legacy of the first Wilson Administration was the
stabilization of the ranks and the rates of promotion. In each of the steps
forward made through reform there was the influence of the career diplomat.
The period saw the service transformed from one arranged in separate units
of representation to one organized by classes and affording personnel up-
ward mobility. Perhaps more importantly there was a growing acceptance
by officers of the existence of a career concept. The concept was backed
by a substantial body of official and public opinion that would prevent,
if possible, any violation of the merit principle. On these foundations
the Department of State faced the many changes that accompanied World War I
and its aftermath.
CHAPTER III
FROM WAR TO WAR: AMALGAMATION AND COMPETITIVE DIPLOMACY

Good government came not from men of specialized training but from men of character. — Wo-jen, Memorial of March 20, 1850

In the years following World War I, for the first time since the earliest years of the nation, the American people gave increasing and sustained attention to foreign affairs. The war had drawn the United States into a number of international entanglements from which there was no retreat and which have continued to increase exponentially to this date. The war's influence on the Diplomatic Service was profound. As America analyzed the war's causes, conduct, and consequences, the views developed also required an opinion of professional diplomacy. Sir Harold Nicolson opined that America's judgment of the professional service rested upon the belief that it was possible to apply to the conduct of external affairs, the ideas and practices which, in the conduct of internal affairs, had for generations been regarded as the essentials of liberal democracy.34 "On the other hand," according to Nicolson, "when the Americans arrived as the dominant partners in the coalition, they brought with them their dislike of European institutions, their distrust of diplomacy, and their missionary faith in the equality of man."35

Political isolation no longer served the national interest. The rise of the "new diplomacy"—a term used to describe statecraft responsive to the desires of popular majorities—brought international politics and its practitioners fully into the consciousness of the people who had never before concerned themselves with foreign relations.36 The new assertiveness of the United States in world politics focused attention on the Department

35 Ibid., p. 84.
State and aided the efforts of those striving for improvement of the diplomatic establishment by again underscoring the need for extensive reform.

The long-range requirements of creating a career service gave way to the exigencies of the war between 1914 and 1918. The primary effort was directed toward securing sufficient personnel to staff the embassies and legations. Increasing demands upon the service could not be met by shifting Departmental personnel, via Senatorial confirmation, into the service or by drawing from the examination eligibility list of those waiting appointment.

Ilchman states that the problem of insufficient personnel was partially solved by certain institutional changes, temporary expedients, and pure good fortune. The institutional changes were as a result of the Stone-Flood Act of 1915. Authority to utilize personnel from overstaffed missions abroad in those which were particularly hard-pressed was the first major accomplishment. Through the provisions in the Act in which a secretary was appointed by commission to a category rather than to any particular post, mobility was achieved. One postwar commentator on the Act insisted "... many close students of the subject believe that during war conditions the conduct of our international relationships would have been dangerously impeded if the old practice had been continued." When the United States entered the war, closing missions to the Central Powers released further personnel. They were rapidly absorbed in co-ordinating relations between America and the Associated Powers.

Wilson, reviewing those career ministers who had been ousted in the opening years of his administration, requested that they return to serve without compensation at the major capitals. Four accepted and thus provided a key temporary expedient. Good fortune in the form of few resignations and a low death rate also aided the critical personnel problem. Resignations dwindled and the low rate was probably attributable to the patriotic appeal

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the service, exemptions from military duty for those holding, or about hold, diplomatic secretaryships, and improved salary positions.

Although partial solutions to the personnel shortages were a vital factor as America was drawn into the war, the only practical solution was permanent expansion in the size of the Diplomatic and Consular Services. Secretary of State Robert Lansing secured an increase in secretaryships from seventy to ninety-seven spaces, an increase of 38.5 per cent, between 1915 and 1918. The previous decade had seen an increase of only 45.6 per cent. In later calculations, it was concluded that the required increase in personnel for the immediate and postwar needs would be an additional twenty-five secretaryships. This increase was obtained before the conclusion of the war without opposition, raising the total number of secretaryships to one hundred and twenty-two.

In a four year period, the Diplomatic Service was confronted with the problem of recruiting fifty men to fill the increase in secretaryships. The examination process established under the Stone-Flood Act of 1915 was unable to provide fully qualified candidates for the service in that number. As all vacancies were filled, the only conclusion possible is that the pressures of war necessitated the admission into the service of candidates who would have been ordinarily rejected. Ilchman does not believe that this is implicit with a break-down in the examination system. Adjustments made in the examinations during the period 1916 to 1918 introduced variables that biased later efforts to objectively evaluate the examination system.

The faltering of the examination system was not accompanied by a return to partisanship. Only one secretary was appointed by Executive Order. A number of other factors served to knit the service more closely together, thus encouraging a secretary to think in terms of a career in diplomacy. The delay between certification and appointment was minimal, less than two months for the 1917 examination group. Promotions from class four to class three usually occurred within three years. A feeling

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40 Ibid., p. 136.
of fraternalism was promoted because of the mobility facilitated by the Stone-Flood Act and by its provisions for limited assignments in the department. This feeling was heightened by a sense of participating in vital occupation as a result of the war.

Encouragement was greatest on the issue of higher promotion. During the war, the Department, especially Under Secretary Lansing, increasingly recognized the value of a professional diplomatic establishment. Lansing secured congressional authorization for the President to "designate and assign any secretary of class one as counselor of embassy or legation." Though not involving increased compensation, the position allowed further recognition of the career diplomats and brought American practice closer to European. In appointments to the ministerial level as well, the career's interests were advanced. Unfortunately, few ministerial positions were open for appointments as political appointees retained their positions. However, in three of four vacancies that did occur between 1915 and 1918, career men were appointed. Career men were utilized in important positions within the department under the provisions of the Stone-Flood Act.

The Stone-Flood Act did not achieve all reform goals needed to create a foreign service career system, even when combined with other advances. Carr and others continued to agitate for further substantive changes. While the diplomatic establishment was attempting to adjust to wartime conditions, its character and the tools of its trade were attracting growing public attention. On this new situation, those who had earlier advocated the political necessity of professional diplomacy in a world of nation-states used the war as evidence for their major premise.

Two points accounted for a major portion of the increasing interest in the diplomatic establishment. The first of these was the accepted connection between the causes of the war and the professional diplomats which demonstrated the power of diplomacy. Commercial questions also attracted continuing attention to the diplomatic establishment. The war was transforming America from a debtor to a creditor nation and from an exporter of

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41 39 Stat. 252 (July 1, 1916).
42 Warren Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939, p. 158.
raw materials to one of manufactured goods. American business and industry turned to the government for aid, realizing that the spirit of competition in the world's markets would be overwhelming after the war. Commercial enterprise and the struggle to obtain markets and raw materials is not new to diplomacy. From early historical periods commercial ambitions and interests exercised an ever increasing influence upon foreign policy. However, in the post-World War I period of American diplomatic development, commercial ambitions and interests produced an alteration in diplomatic method. A new network of institutions and commercial attaches was created as the Diplomatic Service realized and others perceived that was not by itself trained to deal with such technicalities. The growth of "competitive diplomacy" was in later years to threaten the very existence of the Department of State.

With the war fervor still prevailing and an opportunity existing to mobilize some of the attention and good will toward the Diplomatic Service engendered by the war, the immediate postwar period appeared as the real time to put the service on the firmest base possible. To the list of those who strongly supported a professional diplomacy was added the name of Congressman John Jacob Rogers. Rogers was the staunchest advocate of professional diplomacy within the House of Representatives. Rogers introduced his first measure in January, 1919. It was a bill to "provide a system of promotion of efficient secretaries in the Diplomatic Service vacancies arising in the rank of minister." The Diplomatic Service was

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43 Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, (New York: Pyramid Books, 1944), p. 499. Not originated by Murphy, "competitive diplomacy" is a term used to describe the nature of diplomacy conducted by the foreign affairs government. The foreign affairs government is filled with "working level" officials who have direct control over specialized operations. They have detailed information about these operations, coupled with a strong influence on the amount and form in which this information is available to others. They have relationships with special clients whom the President's men must take into account, from exiles to foreign governments, from Congressional committees to large corporations. Such bargaining advantages permit officials to exert great influence in the formulation of foreign policy decisions, and thus they directly "compete" with the formal institutions of diplomacy.

still held by many to be a dichotomous service, seriously infected by
biases, with the upper field of ambassadors and ministers still resting
within the patronage system. The measure would constitute a permanent
injection into the system at the ministerial level. The congressional
session closed without action on the bill. Rogers was supported in his
efforts by Congressman J. Charles Linthicum, and by career officers of
the service. Even without the bill the first post war ministerial appoint-
ment of a career officer was made in 1919.

There were favorable steps in the direction of higher compensation
and more promotions as well. Compensation measures favorably considered
by Congress not only included salary but special allowances related to
transportation and changes of post. In this period, as today, advances
such as these were contained in the annual appropriations measures and
introduced as individual legislative proposals.

The real test of the career service came on the question of
recruitment. Anticipating that from among the thousands of men returning
from overseas, most of whom realized as never before the role of the
diplomatic and consular services, there would be adequate numbers of
applicants; it was soon evident that the conjectured number
was wrong. The number of individuals designated to take the first post-
war examination would neither serve the long-run interest of building a
strong service nor the need to reduce pressures on personnel remaining in
service. Several postwar examinations were considered failures as re-
cruitment measures.

In the midst of obvious recruitment problems, Rogers reintroduced
his bill with some modifications. Believing in the primacy of the economic
questions in postwar diplomacy and having an appreciation of the favorable
position which the Consular Service had with Congress, Rogers expanded his
bill to permit consuls general to be appointed to the ministerial level.
The balance of the bill remained essentially unchanged.

While the Diplomatic Service preferred the original Rogers bill,
the situation for the service was becoming crucial. Faced with recruiting
problems and with the flight of diplomats to higher paying positions in
ness and industry, the service had to create a demand for the career and encourage its membership simultaneously. Ultimately, events moved in two directions. They moved, first, toward strengthening the service's career position, and, second, paradoxically, in the direction of forcing the service to compromise its independence to the Consular Service. The latter is considered by the diplomacy purists to be antithetical to the best interests of a career in the Diplomatic Service.

The National Civil Service Reform League gave impetus to this movement. The League considered the postwar period an appropriate time to continue its program to remove patronage in the overseas services. Most domestic problems had been won, the League was capable of concentrating its efforts on the services. The assault was initiated through resolutions demanding the formal enactment of the merit provisions and through editorials in public media. In April, 1919, the League formed a committee to investigate and make recommendations for the reform of the entire foreign service. After consulting with the service's representatives in the Department a full report of findings was rendered in September.

The report's recommendations would have advanced the interests of the Diplomatic Service in almost every respect. To professionalize the service further, the report suggested that applicants should enter, after an examination and suitable probation, at the lowest level before the age of thirty, and that presidential and congressional designations and state quotas for recruitment should be abolished. It advocated improvements in the examination system. It also suggested that names of worthy members of both services be presented regularly to the President for merit promotions, and that ministers be appointed to grade and not post. Democratization was recommended through the usual remedies: higher salaries, residences, pensions, and post allowances. To further specialization, the report proposed that lateral transfer be permitted, after an examination, between the services.

The provision for lateral transfer continued to run contrary to the viewpoint of individuals in the Diplomatic Service. Lateral transfer

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From the records of the National Civil Service League, Report on the Foreign Service, p. 17.
examination or otherwise compromised the concept of professional diplomacy. Fusion of the two services in this manner was viewed as an unqualified abandonment of the career principle.

During the summer of 1919, Representative Rogers became concerned with the Department of Commerce's intention to establish an independent corps of commercial attaches. Such a corps would give institutional form to "competitive diplomacy." Individuals within the Department convinced Rogers that this issue was unimportant compared with the problem of the existing relations between the Diplomatic and Consular Services. It was suggested to Rogers that an effective, amalgamated foreign service might eliminate the need for such a corps of commercial attaches. Strongest support for amalgamation of the services came from Robert P. Skinner, consul general in London. Skinner, who had entered the Consular Service in 1897, was then, except for Carr, probably the most influential member of that service. Rogers asked Skinner to put his ideas into the form of a bill.

Rogers introduced Skinner's legislative proposal in November, 1919. The measure had three major provisions: it incorporated the Diplomatic Service and the Consular Service with a Board of Examiners proposed to deal with questions of recruitment and promotion; it created two classes of ministers and included them in the promotional hierarchy; and it recommended the creation of a system of scholarships for university students which offered two years of tuition in exchange for five years of service. The reaction of the Department's career diplomats was predictable. Opposition to the measure was strong. It was held that the Diplomatic Service should not be combined with the other service until such time as the diplomats had gained sufficient organizational strength to stand alone, if then. There was an apprehension that the weaker Diplomatic Service would be absorbed by the Consular Service and thereby lose its identity. Maintaining the independence of the Diplomatic Service was an objective shared by most career men in the Department.

A possible avenue of compromise was provided by Carr, although it still led toward the abandonment of an independent service. Carr, whose primary interest lay in the Consular Service, nonetheless maintained an
interest in the improvement of both services. Carr proposed to Under Secretary Polk that reorganization move toward a "single working unit." The stage before the single unit was one of interchangeability of personnel between the two services. To this end, an equalization of the scales of compensation was required as the Consular Service's compensation was below that of the Diplomatic Service.

When a Departmental clash appeared imminent, Carr proposed that it would be avoided by maintaining the functional separation of the two services and creating a general personnel classification of "Foreign Service officer." This classification would have a further advantage of being capable of circumventing the Constitutional restriction against binding the President's power of choice. "Foreign Service officer" was not included in the Constitution, and thus requirements for it could be established. The Constitutionality question had first arisen in 1911 as a result of bills introduced before Congress.

In December, 1919, Rogers introduced a draft measure prepared by Carr. Two bills on the issue were thus before Congress. Carr had retained Skinner's classification of ministers, most aspects of his scholarship proposal, and the enactment of his merit provisions. However, he substituted a general classified personnel hierarchy of nine grades for Skinner's "consuls" and "vice-consuls," titles by which all diplomatic and consular officers would be identified. Under Carr's proposal, an officer entered at the lowest grade via examination, advanced by ascertained merit, and was assignable to either consular or diplomatic posts.

Consular Officers would have accepted either of the measures. Both contained distinct advantages such as equalization of compensation and improved potential for recruitment. They also narrowed the social schism which kept them from the diplomatic world in each foreign capital. Both measures were administratively sound in terms of the problems that would occupy American foreign affairs after the War. They would also unify administration and provide definite economies.

Although greatly disappointed in the proposals, the Diplomatic Service would not lose completely on whichever measure was adopted. The primary gain lay with Congress. It was strongly doubted that the Diplomatic
service could gain sufficient support from Congress to establish itself on a permanent footing without fusion with the Consular Service. Amal-
gamation would align congressional and business opinion behind the newly created service. Further, the questions relating to compensation and promotion would be facilitated. Other benefits could be foreseen.

The two measures were not revolutionary. Although no precedents existed in the European diplomatic community, the United States had not historically maintained the two services as separate entities. In 1876, Eugene Schuyler, whose experience had mainly been at semi-commercial diplomatic posts, aided in the drafting of a bill which combined the positions of consul general in many areas with the secretary of the legation. The success of the bill was due more to its overtones of economy rather than its soundness as a principle of administration. The concept of complete amalgamation had been premature on that date. It was by no means uncommon, however, for a consul to be elevated to a ministerial position, thus crossing service lines. By early definition, this crossing service lines also constituted lateral entry.

The year 1920 was not encouraging for the future of an independent Diplomatic Service, although the service remained adamant in its desire to remain independent. Forces within the service set about the job of sustaining and strengthening the service through the use of public press and planning for future strategies.

Even with these efforts, all things pointed toward the end of an independent Diplomatic Service. The existing career attracted few candidates although the state of existing personnel was good. Support for interchangeability was given by the Secretary of State, and the bills authorizing it and amalgamation were sponsored by the one man who otherwise was the service's best friend in Congress. Public opinion also thought in terms of consolidated administration and of the primacy of commercial questions in postwar diplomacy.

The ultimate decision by diplomatic Service proponents to accept interchangeability if possible and amalgamation if necessary reflected

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pragmatic approach to the issue. The decision was accompanied by the
conviction that in the event of either solution the Diplomatic Service
would be found entering the new unit in as strong a position as possible.

The formation of a Diplomatic Personnel Committee within the Department to
facilitate personnel relationships between the Department and the service
members had eased problems of appointments and transfers. Secretaries were
encouraged by the Wilson administration's policy toward ministerial appoint-
ments. No appointments after the Armistice came from outside the Diplomatic

service.

When Congress adjourned in March, 1921, it had taken no action on
either bill. The nature of America's future foreign relations was very much
a doubt and was partially reflected in the congressional inaction. Changes
in the office of Secretary of State at the end of the second Wilson Admin-
istration had resulted in a caretakership by Bainbridge Colby. With a
Republican presidential and congressional victory in November, 1920,
representative Rogers was undoubtedly willing to postpone action until the
new administration had formulated its intentions. The Diplomatic Service
was thus given a brief reprieve until those intentions became clear.

The issue raised by every new administration, particularly those
involving a change of party, was the fate of the career diplomats who served
at the upper levels of the service. This did not become a major concern
in 1921. The Republican Party had been historically the one to favor pro-
fessional diplomacy. In the campaign of 1920, the party was committed to
government aid in the expansion of trade, and the Diplomatic Service was
an important tool in fulfilling this commitment. Harding's advisors on
foreign policy were Root and Knox, both a former Secretary of State and
both good friends of diplomacy. Harding's opposition to the League of
Nations left the diplomatic machinery as America's primary means of inter-
national communications. The payment of political debts was not a concern
as Harding had been elected by a large majority. Harding was known as an
advocate of the merit system and had personally expressed support for
professional diplomacy.

47 Ibid., p. 156.
The record of the Harding Administration supports the fact that diplomatic establishment was viewed favorably. In a report by the National Civil Service Reform League on Harding’s first year in office the report concluded, “An examination of the records of appointments in the diplomatic service . . . seems to indicate that an earnest effort has been to retain the service of men with experience and to appoint to diplomatic posts persons with qualifications in diplomacy.” In a letter to the report’s author repeated this conclusion by writing “As far as have gone into the records of the administration they show excellent compliance with the spirit of the merit system.”

But a favorable administration was limited in what it could accomplish for the service through Executive leadership. What was needed fundamentally depended upon Congress, and here the movement continued the direction of some form of structural reorganization of the diplomatic establishment. When the Congress convened, Rogers again introduced Carr’s proposed legislation. Skinner’s plan was abandoned as it was felt that the new Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, and the career diplomats who surrounded him within the Department would support the measure.

Roger’s new bill did not differ substantially from Carr’s first version. The two services would remain functionally separate but would draw from a common personnel source. The bill differed in three respects: retirement system was included; the scholarship scheme was dropped; and the provision incorporating the ministerial level into the promotional hierarchy was introduced as a separate bill. The latter action probably as the result of disagreement within the Department about the major reorganization provisions. Tying the promotion provision into the more comprehensive bill could potentially delay implementation of the measure, upon which there was agreement, until there was agreement on the reorganization sections. The Congressional session ended without any action being taken.

Early in 1922 co-ordination between Rogers and the Department continued toward the promulgation of acceptable legislation through which the

48 Ibid., p. 159.
49 Ibid., p. 159.
Diplomatic establishment could be reorganized. While these discussions are in progress, Rogers introduced a bill bearing the distinct stamp of the Department of State. In addition to many technical provisions dealing with appropriations, it contained a provision by which ministers would be appointed to classes instead of posts. This was an extension of the Stone-Flood Act principle to the ministerial level. The bill would have facilitated career promotions without implying that the entire upper service as going to be professionalized. Prevailing opinion still preferred an arrangement whereby a balance was achieved in the Diplomatic Service between amateur and professional. Further, the question of impairing the president's constitutional power of appointment was again raised by the proposal. The bill failed to receive any action. It was not reintroduced in the following congressional session as it was obscured by the attention shown the reorganization bill, the Department's decision to concentrate all attention on the Roger's measure, and deep congressional opposition to handing virtually every ministerial position over to career men.

The modern Foreign Service was created by the Rogers Act of 1924. The Act was the joint product of Rogers, who had labored in Congress for five years to produce the legislation, and Carr, then Director of the Consular Service and subsequently Assistant Secretary of State for 13 years.

The Rogers Act codified the reform of the foreign services. Signed into law by President Coolidge on May 24, 1924, the measure marked success in the movement to provide a new career in foreign affairs. Apart from the new wage scale and the retirement system, the Act's most important sections dealt with the interchangeability of personnel. This principle was achieved by making the two services part of a unit called "the Foreign Service." The term "Foreign Service officer" was "deemed to denote permanent officers in the Foreign Service below the grade of minister, all of whom are subject to promotion on merit, and who may be assigned to duty in either the Diplomatic or the consular branch of the Foreign Service at the discretion

50 Ibid., p. 160.
51 The legal term "the Foreign Service" appeared in President Taft's Executive Order of 1909 which extended consular corps reforms to the Diplomatic Service.
It should be noted that ambassadors, the top level of the "amateur portion" of the former Diplomatic Service was not included in this definition. In addition to ambassadors and ministers, the Act created 9 classified and one unclassified ranks into which all existing diplomatic and consular service ranks were to be recommissioned without further examination.

The drawbacks of the Rogers Act were many, although most were unavoidable. The Executive-Legislative struggle over foreign affairs administration was inherent in the act. In order that interchangeability could operate, Congress required that a commission in either branch was to have the advice and consent of the Senate. A Foreign Service officer would either be commissioned in the diplomatic or consular branch of the service's separate and distinct actions and all official acts thereafter either performed as a secretary or consular officer. Concurrent dual commissioning was not yet fully a feature of the Service. The law failed to clarify the relationship of the two previous services to the new Foreign Service. Although Ilchman contributes this deficiency to "confusion on the part of the drafters," it is just as probable that the Act was deliberately worded to raise the Foreign Service "umbrella" over the separate services and thus deliberately obfuscate the issue. Subsequent congressional action to clarify this specific point would bear this premise out. In the interpretation of legislative acts, one cannot assume the intent of the legislature but is bound by the language of the statute. In the Rogers Act, the language of the statute leaves no doubt that the diplomatic and consular services were retained as branches of the Foreign Service. The provisions introduced as a separate measure, by which the ministerial level was to become part of the promotional hierarchy was dropped. This meant that the Rogers Act made no adjustment for a man to take a ministerial appointment and to retain his place in the career. To accept the former required a resignation from the latter. The danger therein lay in exposing the career


ater to the whims of an administration unsympathetic to professional
decency. There was, however, provision for the career minister to retain
retirement benefits.

With all its drawbacks the Rogers Act was in final analysis over-
whelmingly beneficial. At the apparent cost of independence the Diplomatic
vice secured entrance by examination for all who could qualify, security
renure, and promotion by merit. Similar gains were brought to the
ular Service. Among other measures, it established titles and grades,
ded for rank to be vested in the man and not in the principle of rank-
osition, called for the formulation and retention of efficiency records,
allowance for a retirement system, and established a class of "non-
er" vice-consuls and clerks. The Act made significant advancement
and freeing the diplomatic establishment from the political spoils
em and establishing a permanent (i.e., tenured) Foreign Service. In
scious effort to "democratize" the Foreign Service as an element of
higher public service in the United States, the Act set the salary
ile higher than the Civil Service scale.\(^5^4\) The necessity to possess
wate income to remain in the service had long been an undesireable
ature of a diplomatic career. The merger of the two services into the
ign Service clearly implied a monopoly in the foreign affairs field
the new entity and its parent structure, the Department of State.

Both the separate career systems and the general Civil Service
stem of public employment developed in the United States in part in
action against the political spoils system. The career system estab-
lshed by the Rogers Act was no exception. The Act did not delimit the
ower of the President to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers.
provide, however, that the Secretary of State recommend to the
ident the names of Foreign Service officers who warranted promotion
he grade of minister. Although the President under his constitutional
owers could appoint a consul or diplomatic secretary, a person so appoint-
ould not thereby acquire the career status of a Foreign Service
icer.

\(^5^4\) Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, Chap. 4.
Percentage limitations were placed on the number of officers in the six classes of the rank structure. Entry into the Foreign Service was by examination and subsequent appointment at the bottom or unclassified grade, accompanied by a period of probation in that grade. Section 5 of the Rogers Act provided an exception to entry by examination declaring that citizens having five years of continuous service in the Department of State were eligible for transfer to the Foreign Service in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President. An Executive Order signed by President Coolidge on June 27, 1924, provided that such persons could transfer laterally to any class, not just the bottom grade, upon recommendation of Foreign Service Personnel Board and with the approval of the Secretary of State. Outside of this exception, vacancies in all classes were to be filled by promotion from lower classes, based on demonstrated ability and efficiency.

Lateral entry, the incipient problem that first was brought to light in the Executive Order for the Diplomatic Service of 1905, was given concrete form in the Rogers Act and the subsequent Executive Order. The subject had been left untouched in the Stone-Flood Act of 1915. From the Rogers Act forward, lateral entry was to be treated in each of the next four major statutes affecting the Foreign Service. It is not specifically dealt with in the Foreign Service Act of 1980.

In 1928 a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations inquired into the administration of the Rogers Act. The subcommittee found that the application of the Act "had been approached in a manner far at variance with the purpose of the legislation." It concluded that an equitable union of the Diplomatic and Consular Services was far from consummated. The principal concern appeared to rest with favoritism toward diplomatic officers in the administration of promotions and the subcommittee was especially critical of the Foreign Service Personnel Board and promotion review machinery, both of which were dominated by members of the former Diplomatic Service. Self-promotion was a feature of the Board's actions.

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The subcommittee accordingly urged that the handling of Foreign Service personnel "should be wholly divorced from the personnel itself," and that a personnel bureau should be established in the Department, headed by an Assistant Secretary and staffed by officials not connected with the Foreign Service. Other recommendations were: the adoption of the U. S. Navy system of age-in-grade retirement in the lower grades; automatic ingrade salary increases for satisfactory service; and more liberal retirement provisions. A significant number of personnel management techniques used by the U. S. Navy were adopted by the Department.

Under the provisions of Executive Order No. 5189 of September 11, 1929, "officers and employees, after five years of continuous service in the Department of State, are eligible for appointment by transfer to . . . the Foreign Service upon the recommendation of the Foreign Service Personnel Board and with the approval of the Secretary of State . . . ." Although the intent of this Order was to liberalize the opportunity for lateral transfer it did not materially affect the number of individuals permitted entry into the Foreign Service under Section 5 of the Rogers Act. The first woman to transfer laterally from Departmental to Foreign Service did so under this order. 57

The recommendations of the Senate Subcommittee were partially incorporated into the Moses-Linthicum Act of February 23, 1931, which amended the Rogers Act of 1924. Carr had found that diplomatic officers had been less than enthusiastic in accepting the concept of a unified Foreign Service officer corps and thereby losing their favored, elite position. Not only were members of the former Diplomatic Service being obliged to associate themselves with consular officers but they had to accept Care, a civil servant in the Department, as their chief. Carr had by now been made an Assistant Secretary. The diplomatic officers' resistance and tactical resourcefulness in frustrating the intent of the Rogers

56 Ibid., p. 5.
57 Homer L. Calkin, Women in the Department of State: Their Role in American Foreign Affairs, Department of State Publication 8951, (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 89.
had essentially led to the Senate Subcommittee hearings in 1928.

Carr, who by the late 1920s was a person of considerable political
ascendancy and leverage, managed to get many of his reforms underpinned by
Executive Orders. Carr worked with interested Congressmen to press reforms
initiated by the Rogers Act and to supplement them with the Moses-Linthicum
Act. The new law, effective July 1, 1931, specified in detail the duties
and composition of the Board of Foreign Service Personnel which previously
had been established by Executive Order. Designed to overcome the favoritism
attacked by the Senate Subcommittee in 1928, the law required that Foreign
Service officers assigned to the Division of Foreign Service Personnel
thenceforth had to be officers of class 1 and were ineligible for promotion
or assignment to an ambassadorial or ministerial position during their
period of assignment or for three years thereafter. The Act sought to
eliminate what Congress considered to be self-administering abuses of the
Foreign Service. It delimited the Secretary's authority to assign Foreign
Service officers and to delegate responsibility and authority to subordinate
officers under his command.

The Moses-Linthicum Act did not eradicate the provisions of the
Rogers Act recognizing the diplomatic and consular branches. It sought,
however, to prevent these divisions from being used advantageously by their
members. The career diplomats who had interpreted the Rogers Act to their
advantage, perhaps sincerely, found their position in total disarray. In
its place was accepted the concept of an amalgamated service with free
interchangeability between career fields.

From the date of the Act forward the remaining barriers to amal-
gamation were removed. A single set of regulations for the Foreign Service
was issued in June, 1931. Dual commissions (diplomatic and consular) were
issued after that same year. This, however, does not mean that the schism
between diplomats and consular officers ceased to exist. The schism was to
continue for many years and vestiges of it may be found within the Service of
1981.

The Rogers Act established the concept of a career service for the
conduct of diplomatic and consular affairs administered separate from the
Civil Service. Career civil servants have much better tenure prospects and thus carry over from one administration to another. Within the general pattern of career systems, however, are what are referred to as open and closed career systems. Except for limited provision for lateral entry of departmental personnel, the Foreign Service was a closed system. Closed career systems are those in which higher-level positions are filled entirely through promotion from within on the basis of relative merit and standing in the system. Permitting lateral entry, albeit only for those who had gained significant corollary experience in other positions, is characteristic of open career systems. Lateral entry is supposed to make systems more dynamic by bringing in people with fresh ideas and approaches and thus eliminating the stagnation often created by the socialization process. The closed career system, a concept used for staffing the Foreign Service, raised certain questions concerning the nature of career services to which several groups gave attention in the mid-thirties.

To fully comprehend the concern with the growth of career systems one must recall that the merger of the Diplomatic and Consular Services into the Foreign Service under the Rogers Act clearly implied a foreign affairs monopoly by the newly created Foreign Service and the Department of State. The idea of a unified Foreign Service to handle all United States' foreign affairs abroad was broken in 1927 by creation of the Foreign Commerce Service for the Department of Commerce and in 1930 the Foreign Agricultural Service for the Department of Agriculture. The problems arising out of the coexistence of various "foreign services" were apparent—duplication of effort, friction regarding responsibilities and functions, and some confusion in the eyes of foreign officials as to who spoke for the United States government. The growth of "competitive diplomacy" was to recur during World War II on a vastly enlarged scale and continues unabated until the present day in the foreign affairs government.

The Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel was the first group to review the nature of career services. The Commission issued a

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The report did not deal with the Foreign Service at all. The Commission sought to stimulate interest in public service and, consequently, of the need for more positive approaches to the public personnel practices at federal, state, and local levels. An effort was made to dramatize the career concept of public service. Although warning against a closed career service, the Commission did come out emphatically for the development of a transferable, high-level administrative class in the United States Civil Service for staffing managerial posts in the departments, bureaus and agencies. Forty-five years later, after the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and the Foreign Service Act of 1980, each created a senior service, the government is still attempting to deal with this recommendation.

The period from 1906 to 1937 has been characterized as the period of "government by the efficient." In this period the public service provided a compatible base for the development of technology and specialization. Its emphasis upon objectivity, upon relating qualifications with job requirements, and upon eliminating as far as possible considerations of personality and individual belief from personnel decisions were perfectly consistent with the ethos of scientific management. It will be recalled that Carr, the leading figure in diplomatic and consular and later Foreign Service reforms was a practitioner of scientific management and administrative efficiency.

Scientific management had begun in the latter part of the nineteenth century as an assortment of techniques—loosely held as a "philosophy"—to make industry more efficient. Later it broadened its scope to encompass

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61 Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, pp. 70-79.
62 Scientific management was a technique initially designed to make industry more efficient. The parallel movement in public administration was a later innovation. Public and private scientific management utilized
ectors of private business and eventually parts of government. In application to governmental personnel, scientific management greatly contributed to the substance of civil service administration. The Commission, in actuality renouncing the principles of scientific management as applied to the public personnel function.

The Commission endeavored to discount the concept that "tenure the cure of spoils," believing that tenure, "when standing alone," is a dangerous thing. Although the Commission did not favor a closed career system, it promoted a concept of a career system in which entrance would be limited ordinarily to the lowest positions within a career service confined to young entrants. "A career cannot be said to exist if top positions are generally recruited from outside, from men who do not understand the work, and in such way as to create an effective bar to advancement from the bottom to the top of the service itself." It visualized movement between jurisdictions and between career services. The Commission acknowledged that there would be times when it would be desirable to bring senior positions from outside selecting persons with extensive practical experience. This practice was "no violation of the system provided the normal course of promotion is retained on a career basis." Congruently, there could be no career service without promotion from within. Upward mobility through promotion should be supported by a retirement program and other means of eliminating employees whose non-selection slowed advancement in general.

The Foreign Service career system reflected much of the Commissions philosophy of public personnel policy. However, its elite character, a characteristic deliberately built into the system with the Rogers Act, virtually prohibited the entry of qualified persons from other services.

many of the same tools and approached the subject with similar concepts. These included: rationality, planning, specialization, quantitative measurement, "one best way," standards and standardization. All of these added up to efficiency, meaning roughly the maximization of output for a given input, or the minimization of costs for a given output. The public service to be good had to be both politically neutral and efficient.


Ibid.

Ibid.
except at the bottom entry level. The Foreign Service was therefore prived of the full merits of lateral entry.

The President's Committee on Administrative Management issued second report germane to career systems of public employment in 1937. The authors of the report emphasized the desireability of extending theains registered through adoption of a federal merit system to the development of a sound career system of public employment. They considered the federal service to be so large and diverse as to justify the creation of a number of career services, but "knit together into a well-integrated career service system and built upon the existing merit system." 67

The report warned that career services "must be constantly on guard against the dangers of bureaucracy." It considered that the "greatest weakness of the present administrative career services appears to be their ingrown condition." This weakness was due in part to placing too much reliance upon promotion in a direct line. One answer to the problem was to expand promotional opportunities so that persons engaged in similar or broadly related occupations could move up without having to remain within a single narrow specialty. Another means was to encourage transfers across both organizational and career lines.

The authors contended that career services should not be permitted to become closed systems "when they clearly parallel similar work in other public jurisdictions or in private employment." 68 It was held that transfers between career services should occur in both directions without loss of status. A need was seen to strengthen public service capacities to deal effectively with the full range of problems in a period of accelerating change through bringing in to responsible positions persons educated in a variety of professional, scientific, and technical fields, especially

66 Personnel Administration in the Federal Service, (Washington: GPO, 1937). This is one of a number of major studies on organization and management of the federal government undertaken by the President's Committee on Administrative Management during the Roosevelt Administration.

67 Ibid., p. 73.

68 Ibid., p. 74.
These two reports reflected a growing concern with the need to vitalize public personnel administration as an essential tool of scientific management. The Foreign Service had already moved in the direction of a career service based on merit and professional development. The question was whether or not the service had moved too far toward a closed career service. Perhaps the ambience of the Service in this regard is best stated by Retired Ambassador Henry Villard:

The old service of the Rogers Act was frankly an elite corps. A superior education, a superior intellectual approach, a superior sense of responsibility and self-reliance, a superior flair for languages, all were important requisites for admission; those who made the grade took immense pride in their abilities and enjoyed a unique sense of camaraderie, akin to that found in the congenial circles of a close-knit professional club.

The operative issue was largely one of whether the Foreign Service would adopt into its personnel programs those elements of flexibility and responsiveness absolutely essential to meet the accelerating forces of change in international diplomacy.

The Foreign Service had for many years provided reporting services for various departments of the government, supplying information on commerce, finance, agriculture, and mining and minerals. As United States governmental and business interests increased overseas in the first decades of the twentieth century, and representation abroad kept pace, solutions to the problem of "competitive diplomacy" became more elusive. A unified approach to foreign affairs was lacking. Top officials of the Department of State considered that it was no longer possible to separate political, economic, commercial, and agricultural problems into neat compartments, but that they were all interrelated and had important implications for the conduct of foreign policy. Adhering to the concept that the Department had a monopoly in the conduct of foreign affairs, the growing need for the conduct of

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International negotiations was considered the business of the Foreign Service, regardless of the subject area.

On May 9, 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt forwarded to Congress Reorganization Plan No. II. A part of the plan dealt with the Foreign Service. Among other things, the plan provided for the transfer and consolidation of the Foreign Commerce Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service into the Foreign Service of the United States, under the direction and supervision of the Secretary of State. The purpose was to reduce expenditures, increase efficiency, and eliminate duplication of effort. Perhaps more importantly, it was believed that consolidation would have a positive effect toward answering the question generated abroad as to "who spoke for the United States government." Consolidation added two additional areas of specialty to the Foreign Service corps. The plan contemplated that Foreign Service officers would be selected to specialize in commercial and agricultural work and that the fullest utilization would be made of the experience thus acquired abroad "in the work of the Department of Commerce and Agriculture in this country." The Foreign Service officers so specializing were to be assigned for temporary duty to the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture both for the purposes of training and development and for utilization of their knowledge and experience. Conversely, both departments were authorized to designate personnel to render temporary service abroad as specialists or technicians. Although these individuals were not in the Foreign Service, they were to be given suitable commissions by the Department of State while serving abroad. The Departments of Commerce and Agriculture retained considerable influence in program matters and administration by specifying the information to be furnished by the Foreign Service and by handling its dissemination in the United States. Each department was authorized to designate a liaison officer to serve in the Department of State and to be concerned with the administration of the Foreign Service from the standpoint of his department's interest.

The President's Reorganization Plan was approved by Congress and became the Reorganization Plan of 1939, effective July 1, 1939. The officers of the Foreign Commerce Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service were generally transferred to the Foreign Service and acquired status as Foreign Service officers without having to undergo an examination. The lateral transfers did not have to fall within the percentage limitations imposed by the Moses-Linthicum Act of 1931 on the number of officers in the top classes of Foreign Service officers. The outbreak of World War II was to be a fair test of a unified Foreign Service. By the time testing assumed the dimensions of the problems to be considered were immense.

The Reorganization Act brought 105 Commerce officers and 9 Agricultural officers laterally into the Foreign Service officer corps. By definition these new officers were "specialists" within a career system that was by tradition "generalist" in nature, and in composition. Not yet fully reconciled to the amalgamation of consular service officers under the Rogers Act of 1924, the introduction of this additional group of extraneous actors onto the foreign policy stage impacted heavily on the "diplomats." Purists, those who considered diplomacy to be one of the stricter disciplines, began to express fear that the new specialists would in time take over the foreign affairs field and thus displace the long established generalists. Villard expressed the fear that the generalists would disappear and with them "the assets of perceptiveness, sound judgment, panoramic understanding, and intuition tempered in the fires of practical experience."

Once again, the Department of State's career Foreign Service system was reacting to the virus of lateral entry.

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CHAPTER IV

POSTWAR EFFORTS: REFORM OR CHAOS?

Every reform is only a mask under cover of which a more terrible form, which does not yet name itself, advances.

Ralph Waldo Emerson

The years between the passage of the Rogers Act and the outbreak of World War II in Europe in 1939 witnessed a return to isolation as the accepted political position vis-a-vis the world. Diplomats temporarily resumed their activities in much the same traditional manner as before the Great War. Thinking on foreign policy continued to stress the primacy of economic questions. The period represents a chronological unity in the administrative history of professional diplomacy in America. In contrast to the concerted reform efforts that occurred prior to 1924, the chaotic circumstances of World War II, and the rough winds of change in the years that followed, no significant departures were undertaken. This remained true even when events in Europe after 1937 indicated that the peace there was rapidly disintegrating.

It was generally believed that no reassessment of the Foreign Service was necessary. The Moses-Linthicum Act of 1931 had sought to eliminate what Congress considered to be self-administering abuses resulting from implementation of the Rogers Act. The abuses were indicative of the continued existence of a schism between the Diplomatic and Consular sides of the Service. Partly bound up in the nature and functions of the two careers, the cleavage also had deeper implications arising from the differing social backgounds of the members of the two services. Beyond


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a problem area, the Service benefited from the Act through sections that dealt with pay and allowances, an improved efficiency reporting system, incentives and rewards, and other personnel matters.

The professional Foreign Service, it was thought, was capable of handling every eventuality. Tendencies for change begun in the First World War and in the years before slowly continued their development. Moves toward professionalization and democratization were sustained, although influenced by the Great Depression of the 1930s. A clearer concept of a specialized nature of the Service emerged.

The advent of World War II and the rise of the totalitarian states was to shake traditional diplomacy to its foundations and clearly signal the need for a new order. The neglect of foreign relations that had characterized the interwar years dissipated rapidly with the onset of the war.

The war found the Foreign Service not equipped to handle with its members the multifarious technical tasks that arose. Most of these new functions related to America's information, intelligence, and economic activities abroad. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was anxious to preserve the Department as a policy rather than an operating agency. Hull's attitude was a part of the celebrated dichotomy between policy and operations. The historic diplomatic image is that of a "staff" agency, advisory to the President, and representing him in dealings with other nations. It does not encompass "operations," nor the supervision of operations of other agencies, nor the provision of day-to-day services to other agencies; nor direct relations with foreign peoples other than their governmental officials; nor "management" as generally understood in large bureaucracies. In the first decade and a half following World War II the response to the Department of State problem, in concept and to some extent in practice, actually rested upon two dichotomies: a clear organizational division within the Department between substance and administration, and a clear division organizationally between policy and operations in foreign affairs. In this period there was

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consideration of the problems of coordinating the enlarged foreign affairs apparatus and of problems of role and organization of the new functions, the Department of State, and its Foreign Service. The dominant view which emerged at these problems in a particular perspective. The view was that a basic distinction between policy and operations was viable, and that it was not only possible but desirable to separate the two. The Department would concern itself with policy; the new functions would be operated by other agencies under the policy guidance of the Department. Within the Department, there was a radical cleavage between "substance" and "administration," with the former meaning political and economic work and the latter the most mundane kind of service and support.

The dichotomous splits were to never become anywhere near complete and clear cut but nonetheless affected the actions of the Department. The influence of these dichotomies began to accelerate during World War II. Full gave complete concurrence to the creation of such foreign affairs agencies as the Office of War Information, Office of Strategic Services, Board of Economic Warfare, Lend-Lease, and Foreign Economic Administration. In the period after World War II, Secretary of State Dulles, continuing to follow this logic, concurred in Reorganization Plans 7 and 8 of 1953 which took the information program and various assistance activities out of the Department and created two new agencies, The United States Information Agency and the Foreign Operations Administration. The following year the Foreign Agricultural Service was again created for the Department of Agriculture, thus taking some foreign agricultural functions away from the Department. As these agencies organized they sent individuals and whole missions abroad. Nevertheless, the Department itself, since recruitment of Foreign Service officers had stopped for the duration of the war, found an inescapable need for expansion during the war even for its own limited co-ordinating task.

Under the career system that had been established by the Rogers Act and subsequent amendments the Foreign Service officer corps could not be expanded rapidly enough to meet these requirements. Although Section 5 of the Act provided for lateral entry into the service by Departmental employees, the provision was not utilized. Moreover, there may have been
disposition not to seek emergency Congressional authority to permit
temporary appointment at higher than entry levels into the career service so
that the Service could later resume normal peacetime activities without
violating the career principle. The Department secured the passage
of language in successive appropriations acts which permitted the
employment of qualified persons from outside for temporary employment.
These employees were hired under general Civil Service regulations but
benefited from the Foreign Service system of allowances. They were hired
to what was known as the Foreign Service Auxiliary. The Auxiliary con­
ained a variety of "specialists," including economic analysts, cultural
relations assistants, and information specialists. Relations between the
Service and the Auxiliary and the other wartime partners greatly varied.
Complaints were numerous on both sides. The problem of relationships be­
 tween the two groups was accentuated when with the termination of hostilities
it became clear that the postwar responsibilities of the Department and the
Foreign Service were to be far more extensive than in the prewar years.

With the end of the war the Auxiliary and other wartime agencies
were rapidly dissolved. In August of 1945, the major functions and em­ployees of three of the largest were transferred to the Department where
the process of liquidation was to continue. On May 1, 1946, the Office of
Foreign Service reported the composition of the Service to be as follows: 75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambassadors and ministers</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Service officers</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(home and abroad)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Foreign Service officers</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American non-career vice-consuls, clerks, etc.</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alien employees</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undifferentiated American and alien former war-agency employees, mostly Office of War Information</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the wartime staffs were reduced appreciably, some 4,000 employees were added to the personnel of the Department and the Foreign Service. Transfer to the Departmental Service was less complicated than the Foreign Service, since the employees in Washington were all under the same wartime Civil Service rules and salary scales. The problem of absorption into the Foreign Service was complicated by difference in salary scales and entrance examination procedures. Considerable resentment and misunderstanding occurred in this category which took months to resolve.

The requirement that the Department absorb a portion of the personnel of the wartime agencies into the Foreign Service immediately raised the issue of lateral entry. Lateral entry basically fulfills two functions: it permits rapid expansion or contraction under circumstances wherein the examination process and other recruitment methods are too slow, and it permits diversification thru acquisition of special skills to meet the needs of changing responsibilities. Over the general opposition of the Foreign Service officers themselves there has been considerable use made of the lateral entry method since World War II. Although by definition mergers or a "blanketing in" of personnel from outside the Service may be classified as a lateral entry program, no analysis was discovered during the course of this study which treats the liquidation of the wartime agencies from the standpoint of lateral entry beyond the premise inherent in the Manpower Act of 1946. The Act was intended to compensate for the cessation of recruitment activities during the war by permitting intake of officers laterally.

The numbers of foreign affairs agency personnel to be dealt with in the liquidation program raised great concern among the Foreign Service officers about the integrity of their career system. It involved entrance into the hitherto reserved field of foreign affairs of groups of government employees not recruited by special examination as they themselves had been and hence, by their definition, political appointees. The final indignity to many in the Foreign Service would be the "blanketing in" of a large number of persons who had not grown up in the career service. One Foreign

Service officer opined that such "blanketing in" would be a re-enactment of "The Betrayal of 1939." The latter was reference to the Reorganization Act of 1939 which merged the Foreign Commerce and Agricultural Services with the Foreign Service.

The impact of the war on United States representation abroad raised a series of questions in the minds of many as to the future character and function of the Foreign Service. The entire foreign affairs government was interested in the answers. Concern both within and without the Foreign Service existed over salary scales, grossly inadequate administrative services and training, limited appropriations, and other inadequacies in the laws and procedures affecting the Foreign Service officer corps from the standpoint of the welfare of the corps itself. Morale of the career service at the end of the war was low.

As during the First World War, the President had largely ignored the Secretary of State's advice on policy. The Department confined itself mostly to day-to-day operations. Secretary Hull proved influential in only one area--preparation of plans for postwar international organization. The Department provides its own analysis for this situation:

This situation stemmed from the Department's failure to organize for fully effective performance in wartime. Wartime decisions required coordination of political ends and military means, but the Department of State lacked the means--expertise and institutions--to exert dominant influence in the shaping of grand strategy. Like President Wilson before him, President Roosevelt turned to a coterie of trusted advisors.

Concern about the future of the Foreign Service was not solely limited to the welfare and effective opportunities of the Foreign Service officers and employees as individuals. Concern was likewise directed at the function and composition of the Service from the standpoint of its utility for the government and people of the United States. The problems believed settled by key legislation such as the Rogers Act and the Reorganization Act of 1939 were again raised. In view of the growth of the foreign affairs government, should there be a single unified Foreign Service? Should there be

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77 Department of State, A Short History of the U.S. Department of State, 1781-1981, p. 29.
Separate elite diplomatic establishment in the contemporary world? The efficacy of the service for commercial, economic, and information activities under assault. The appropriateness of the entrance examination system disputed. The proper management of resources and activities in the newly expanded Department was debated. The relationship between the Department and the Foreign Service underwent review.

As the tide of the war turned in favor of the United States, there was a resurgence of interest in the reform of the Foreign Service. The views Nicolson on the "American method" seem appropriate:

The misfortune of the American system is that no foreigner and few Americans can be quite positive at any given moment who it is who possesses the first word and who the last; and although the Americans in recent years have been in process of creating an admirable service of professional diplomats, these experts do not yet possess the necessary influence with their own government or public. The egalitarian illusions of the Americans, or if you prefer it their 'pioneer spirit,' tempts them to distrust the expert and to credit the amateur.

In tracing the evolution of American foreign policy in the postwar period to 1960, Gabriel Almond distinguishes three stages.79 As the evolution of foreign policy and of the personnel systems for United States foreign affairs are inextricably joined, the use of these stages forms a convenient outline for discussing the postwar development of career systems within the Department. Established to delineate periods of development, Almond describes the stages as:

1) the final years of World War II and into early 1946,
2) the period from 1946 to 1949, ushered in by the chill of the Cold War,
3) the decade of the 1950s, a period of "failure" and "deterioration" in which U.S. policy "turned into a hard shell of military production and deployments, security diplomacy, and a program of foreign aid that was assimilated into our security diplomacy."

Considering Almond's description, Harr believes that the period from 1961 to the mid-1960s constituted the next important stage of development.80

80 John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat, pp. 19-44.
The most important characteristic of this period was the abrupt reversal of the policy-operations dichotomy. In the words of McGeorge Bundy, I have deliberately rubbed out the distinction between planning and operation . . ..

The Department of State was placed in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic Mission and was expected to supervise all its operations. The Mission included not only the personnel of the department but also the representatives of all other United States agencies, a total foreign affairs government. The fifth stage in Harr's view began when the Vietnam War reached unexpected proportions and duration, and continues unto the present time. None would deny that the Foreign Service of 1980 will produce yet another stage of development. The fifth stage was characterized by a strong protest movement in the United States, an increased drain on the balance of payments, a surge of neo-isolationism, revisionist theories on the origins of the cold war, greater awareness on the limitations of power, and the growth of a stronger awareness of domestic problems.

Unlike the period prior to World War II, wherein proposals for diplomatic reform originated primarily through the efforts of dedicated individuals, the necessity and pressure for reform became self-evident in the incompetence of the diplomatic establishment to deal with the complex postwar international problems involving the nation. Even before the end of hostilities, the Department of State had initiated plans to determine how the Department and the Foreign Service might be better equipped to handle postwar problems.

As the war came to an end, there was an assumption that postwar reconstruction and prosperity would be achieved by the leadership and cooperation of the wartime great powers. The forum for these achievements was to be the newly formed United Nations organization. American foreign policy began to be formulated around this assumption.

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82 Ibid., p. 33.
The controversy between the professional Foreign Service group, which included their congressional constituents and other supporters, and the proponents of reform and reorganization within the foreign affairs government began again in earnest. The latter group lacked diplomatic establishment experience. The importance of the conflict between these two groups in the history of the Foreign Service should not be underestimated. Jack Walker, writing of reforms of the 1960s and 1970s stated, "The stresses of the past two decades have given us a political culture that encourages confrontation and the cult of personality; to some extent, it has also fostered civic selfishness. The common good has often been forgotten in single-interest politics and the angry, if sometimes idealistic, pursuit of group entitlements." Analysis of the final years of the war and into 1946 in the light of this statement provides an insight into the attitudes of the professional Foreign Service group and the future course of the conduct of foreign affairs. At stake was the adequacy of American diplomacy for the remainder of the twentieth century--and beyond.

In September 1943, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., former Lend-Lease Administrator, became Under Secretary of State. At the direction of President Roosevelt, Stettinius began to plan a major reorganization of the Department. The planning was undertaken upon recommendation of the Bureau of the Budget acting under its statutory responsibilities with respect to governmental organization. Stettinius concentrated on certain key deficiencies of the Department and carried out a major reorganization in early 1944.

Prior to Stettinius' reorganization, all the administrative direction of the Foreign Service theretofore had come from two units in the Department, the Division of Foreign Service Administration and the Division of Foreign Service Personnel. On January 15, 1944, an Office of Foreign Service Administration, later called the Office of Foreign Service was established, as one of the constituent units of the Department. On the 1st of March

Planning Staff was established within the Office of the Foreign Service Administration. For the first time, however small and informal, there was a unit that had the responsibility for thinking about the future organization and operation of the Foreign Service as distinguished from the daily routine of operations. The Planning Staff filed a report on the Foreign Service with recommendations for its improvement with the Secretary in the fall of 1944.

Meanwhile, a major semi-official element of the professional Foreign Service group, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), had not been idle. The AFSA, both through its activities and the American Foreign Service Journal, enthusiastically discussed the steps being taken to improve the Service, with comments on pending legislation affecting the Service and extended discourse concerning the problems of the Foreign Service officers and employees.

Even during early discussions, it was generally agreed that the Rogers Act of 1924 and the various subsequent amendatory laws no longer formed an adequate basis for the operation of the Foreign Service. New and fundamental legislation was due. In December, 1944, Julius C. Holmes, a career Foreign Service officer who had served as a Civil Affairs officer with the military, was designated Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, the post formerly held by Carr from 1924 to 1937. Stettinius became Secretary of State on December 1, 1944. Both of these officials were receptive to the idea of a new basic legislation. On December 18, a Committee on Foreign Service Legislation was established within the Department and the period of active legislative preparation began.

The professional Foreign Service group realized that with the enormity of the problems facing the Service time did not permit the drafting of a comprehensive legislative proposal that would set the format of the Foreign Service for the postwar period. Many problems demanded prompter

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84 To use its own language, "The American Foreign Service Association is an unofficial and voluntary association of the members of The Foreign Service of the United States. It was formed for the purpose of fostering esprit de corps among the members of the Foreign Service and to establish a center around which might be grouped the united efforts of its members"
The pressures attendant to the responsibilities for shaping the future of the diplomatic establishment began to open the chasm between a professional Foreign Service group and the other proponents of reform. Smith Simpson, a retired Foreign Service officer and author of several works on Departmental reform, is highly critical of the efforts of Stettinius, "... whose impressive appearance was not matched by his intellect." Charging that Stettinius knew little about (1) the Department or the Foreign Service and the linkage between the two, (2) foreign affairs, especially upcoming postwar problems, and (3) the nature of diplomacy itself, Simpson alleges that the result of Stettinius' efforts was a focus on symptoms rather than originating deficiencies and upon organization rather than attitudes, skills, and performance. Few objectives were therefore realized through reorganization in Simpson's judgment.

Simpson recounts, perhaps with accuracy, that some of the more alert Foreign Service officers desired to seize the reins of reevaluation and reform before unknowledgeable outsiders got hold of them. Thus, as Stettinius focused on symptoms and organization, these alert officers focused on what they considered to be the true fabric of reform.

During the course of 1944, a bill, prepared in 1943, was introduced in the Congress to improve the status of American clerks and other non-career employees of the Foreign Service, to bring in at various levels, as a matter of emergency, 120 new Foreign Service officers in addition to those who would be recruited by examination at the end of the war, to authorize the detail of "specialists" from other government agencies, and, among other things, to remove the percentage limitations imposed by law on the various classes of Foreign Service officers.

for the improvement of the service." The Association publishes a monthly periodical, the American Foreign Service Journal, which is unofficial but considered authoritative. The AFSA is a strong lobbying group before Congress on matters affecting the Foreign Service.

86 Ibid., p. 21.
While the Congress was generally sympathetic to the bill, opposition raised to the proposal to bring in a sizeable number of new Foreign Service officers at various levels and outside the regular examination procedure. This lateral entrance was strongly opposed by Congresswoman Rogers, widow and successor to Jacob Rogers, sponsor of the Rogers Act of 1944. Congresswoman Rogers, her views widely but not universally shared in the ranks of the Service itself, believed that mass lateral entry of the type proposed would be an entering wedge for "politics." On the whole those officers who were aware of the questions being raised in Washington about future functions of the Service were anxious to secure enactment of a legislation permitting lateral entrance. They knew how long it would take to build up the middle and upper ranks of the Service by the slow process of examination and appointment at the bottom. They were concerned that a greatly understaffed Department would have to give up some of its functions to other foreign affairs agencies because of their own inability to handle the work. Some also believed that lateral entry would provide "new blood" in the middle and upper grades and thereby have a stimulating effect on the whole Service. Debate on the lateral entry issue was delaying passage of the bill. The controversial section was withdrawn from the legislation in order to obtain the other improvements that were urgently needed. A revised legislative proposal was offered and on May 3, 1945, the Bloom Bill was enacted putting into law all the other urgent reforms.

The Bloom Bill contained authorization to detail "specialists" from other government agencies to the Foreign Service. The provision was in the form of an amendment to the Moses-Linthicum Act of 1931. The following paragraph was added to the Act:

Sec. 10. (c) The Secretary of State is hereby authorized to assign for special duty as officers of the Foreign Service for nonconsecutive periods of not more than four years, qualified persons holding positions in the Department of State, and, at his request, qualified persons holding positions in any other department or agency of the United States who have rendered not less than five years of Government service, and persons so assigned shall be eligible during the periods of such assignment to receive the allowances authorized by the provisions of section 19 of this Act. Persons assigned under the authority of this
action shall be eligible to receive all benefits provided by civil-
Service law and regulation in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions as though they were serving in their regular civil-Service
positions and upon termination of their assignment shall be reinstated
in the respective department or agency from which loaned... 87

The relationship of this provision of the Act and the withdrawn
meas for lateral entry should not go unnoticed. Although the relation-
ship will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent chapter, it is
important to identify its rationality at this point. The provision was
new, having appeared in Section 5 of the Rogers Act. The text of Section
provided that appointments to the Foreign Service would be made after
termination and probation or, "after five years of continuous service in
Department of State, by transfer therefrom under such rules and
regulations as the President may prescribe..." 88 The Bloom Bill
extended the source to "any other department or agency of the United States."
A category of Foreign Service Reserve officer, created by the Foreign
Service Act of 1946, developed from this provision of the Bloom Act. An
additional provision of the Act established the basis for the Foreign
Service Staff officer corps.

The controversial lateral entry provisions, in revised form, were
submitted to Congress later in a separate bill known as the Manpower Act.
This bill encountered difficulties and did not become law until July 3,
1946. The Act provided for Presidential appointment, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, "not to exceed two hundred and fifty
persons to positions as Foreign Service officers." 89 The Act contained
a time limitation of two years from date of enactment. The increase in the
number of individuals to be brought in under this Act, the original pro-
posal was for one hundred and twenty, was intentional on the part of
Congress for the purpose of absorbing those individuals from deactivated
wartime foreign affairs agencies. With the Bloom Bill out of the way

87 U.S. Statutes at Large, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, Vol. 59,
Part 1, p. 103.
88 U.S. Statutes at Large, 68th Cong., 1923-1925, Vol. 43, Part 1,
p. 141.
89 U.S. Statutes at Large, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, Vol. 60,
Part 1, p. 426.
Committee on Foreign Service Legislation was able to turn its primary attention to the preparation of basic legislation. The Committee was able to receive more active support from above. Monnett B. Davis, a Foreign Service officer who had been Acting Director, was chosen as Director of the Office of Foreign Service. Davis' deputy was Selden Chapin, another Foreign Service officer commissioned after passing the first post-Rogers entrance examination. They took office on January 10, 1945. From this time until final approval of the Foreign Service Act proposal, Chapin's chief concern was with the new Foreign Service legislation. The Planning Staff was headed by Alan N. Steyne, another Foreign Service officer who was filled with enthusiasm and zeal for this long sought opportunity to establish the Service on a new and better footing.

Steyne's plans were ambitious. He developed an elaborate committee structure to accomplish the needed planning. Assistant Secretary Holmes continued to manifest his interest in the enterprise and managed to acquire access to President Truman who succeeded President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. Holmes obtained Truman's approval for the concept of a unified Foreign Service and for the need for basic improvements. The President also approved the elaborate committee structure developed by Steyne. With that appeared to be solid White House support, Holmes circulated a memorandum throughout the Department which invited legislative suggestions.

Chapin, in a memorandum to Steyne of May 3, told Steyne that the new legislation must be solidly founded on the career principle of the Rogers Act, but that provisions should be made for "specialists" who would be kept as a separate corps and not as an integral part of the career service. He opposed consolidation of the personnel system of the Foreign Service with that of the Departmental Service except in the event that the unified Foreign Service concept, adopted in the Reorganization Act of 1939, was abandoned, with a corresponding reduction in the role of the Department of State and the Foreign Service to policy co-ordinators. He directed the inclusion of a promotion-up, selection-out system somewhat like the U. S. Navy system, under which each officer would be allowed to
in any one grade only a specified number of years. If not promoted
at the end of the prescribed period, he must retire.

Except for the promotion-up, selection-out procedures and the
exception over the unified Foreign Service concept, Chapin's ideas were
representative of those held by most Foreign Service officers. Steyne's
staffing office developed 12 studies and 12 sub-studies which were
elaborations of a group of 29 major proposals and 18 minor proposals
that had been included in a summary memorandum for the Departmental Steering
Committee on June 30. While work was proceeding on draft legislation, a new
situation confronted Chapin and his associates.

On July 3, 1945, James F. Byrnes succeeded Stettinius as Secretary
of State. Six weeks later, Holmes resigned and was promptly succeeded by
J. J. McCarthy. McCarthy had no experience with the diplomatic estab-
lishment and his appointment caused consternation among the professional
Foreign Service group. Byrnes added a second unsettling circumstance by
requesting that the Bureau of the Budget prepare a report on Department of
State organization. The request revived the Stettinius organizational
form effort with which the professional Foreign Service group disagreed.
Though primarily concerned with the organization of the Departmental
Service, the requested report included recommendations for the Foreign
Service.

The Bureau of the Budget report of 1945 was transmitted to the
Department in August, 1945. Its brief treatment of the Foreign Service
was extremely disturbing to the professional Foreign Service group. Citing
the "sharp distinction" between the Foreign Service and the Departmental
Service in Washington "staffed by the regular Civil Service," the report
propounded steps that would lead to the amalgamation of the two to create
"a thoroughly united organization." The report stated:

Our government, however, has long since passed the stage in which
a closed elite corps was the only alternative to patronage, and the
staffing of a Foreign Service predominantly with men whose whole
career is spent abroad has revealed many serious weaknesses. Its
members tend to lose touch with the views of the United States.
Moving in restricted circles abroad, many have lost sensitivity also
to some of the social forces and classes of people with whom they should be familiar in their role as the eyes and ears of the United States Government abroad. Many do not develop the specialized skills and the interest necessary to carry out the positive policies which our Government in the future may adopt. Moreover, differences in the character of the work performed abroad and at home have been largely eliminated by the complete change in the character of world relations. Finally, the Civil Service today can provide adequate guarantees against patronage.

The Bureau did not prescribe an answer to the unification question. Proposed, instead, that the entire problem of barriers between the Foreign Service and the Departmental Services be studied, and that in the meantime Secretary achieve unity in operations "by consolidating the managerial staff facilities of the Department and by launching a unified program of personnel management." In substance, the report proposed that steps be taken looking forward to the consolidation of the Foreign and Departmental Services. The Bureau hoped that a study such as recommended would preserve the best features of the Foreign Service system while eliminating what was perceived to be barriers to effective recruiting and utilization of personnel under the Secretary's command. Numerous additional recommendations for improving personnel processes were advanced. McCarthy decided to adopt the policy of proceeding toward a unified Service and prepared a report to the Secretary that embodied most of the Bureau's recommendations.

Meanwhile, work on a new Foreign Service Act to replace the Rogers Act of 1924 had been underway several months before the Bureau of Budget submitted its report. The Planning Staff had been proceeding on different premises than the unified approach favored by the Bureau. Although favoring changes in the Foreign Service, Chapin and his associates did not contemplate total unification and stood strongly for maintaining the career principle of the Rogers Act.

Chapin was convinced, since the concept of a unified Foreign Service was to be retained, of the need for maintaining a Foreign Service separate

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90 "The Organization and Administration of the Department of State," Report submitted at the request of the Secretary of State by the Director of the Bureau of Budget, August 1945, p. 7.

91 Ibid., p. 6.
the Departmental Service. All legislative planning had proceeded with a concept of a separate service in mind. An impasse ensued. Chapin wasCarthy's subordinate and bound to McCarthy's decisions. The whole legislative project languished until McCarthy, suffering from ill health, resigned October 11 and was replaced by Donald S. Russell. Russell, like McCarthy, unfamiliar with the diplomatic establishment. Russell ultimately turned attention toward the problem of Foreign Service legislation. Originally aiding to stand on the policy established by McCarthy, Russell reversed a position in December and Chapin was instructed or authorized to prepare legislation based on a continuance of the established Foreign Service separate and distinct from the Departmental Service. Thereafter, that inclusion, although questioned, was never threatened. By this time the actual work on legislation was in somewhat different hands although still under the control of the professional Foreign Service group.

Those responsible for drafting the legislative proposal had decided by this time that the legislation should not be merely a further amendment of the existing statutory pattern, already unduly complicated by amendment, but a complete codification and revision of all legislation affecting the Foreign Service.92

Conceptually, the Act represented an endeavor to avoid the dual extremes of absorption of the Foreign Service by the Civil Service and maintaining a closed and privileged career system. In its report on the Foreign Service bill, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives emphasized that the "professional instrument established by this bill must be flexible. It must be responsive to the constantly changing needs of the government ... It has been agreed that the various components of the Service should be drawn into a better integrated structure and that conditions favorable to the growth of the caste spirit should be eliminated."93


The magnitude of the undertaking by the Department is indicated by the fact that the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as enacted August 13, 1946, has eleven titles and, in the slip law edition, runs to forty-seven pages. There are sixty-seven items in the repealer section that repeal previous legislation rendered obsolete or revised by the new law.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946 was an important restatement of the legislative charter of the Foreign Service. The Act was essentially designed to give Foreign Service officers themselves as an ideal foundation for an elite corps of "generalists" who would carry on the traditional functions of diplomacy. The professional Foreign Service group had for the moment cleared the day in their struggle with the Departmental reformers with limited knowledge of the diplomatic establishment. The Act, although remarkably flexible in practice, was the beginning of a new phase of the ongoing dispute over the Foreign Service system.

Of importance to this study was the mode of entry specified in the Act. The Act advanced the premise that there should be a professional and strictly non-political corps of disciplined and trained men selected primarily for entry into a career system on the basis of an open and highly competitive examination geared to measure their potential. As members of an elite corps, they should be enabled to make the Service their life career by having suitable incentives, including adequate salaries, allowances, retirement, and related prerequisites, and the opportunity to advance along the successive rungs of a career ladder to positions of leadership on the basis of comparative merit. Should they fail to demonstrate capacity to assume increasingly challenging duties, they should be enabled to transfer the Service's privileges and incentives elsewhere.

The distinction between "generalist" and "specialist," although the terms are susceptible to individual definition, has its basis in the answer to the question "What skills is it desirable that a Foreign Service officer possess?" In the early years of the Foreign Service it was widely held that an officer should be a "generalist," that is, a man who could handle any conceivable problem. The traditional role of the Foreign Service was one of representation, reporting, and negotiation, and the problems requiring management were viewed as being within these functions. From this it was argued that "the best education--the only really valuable education for that career, is a general education." By contrast, a "specialist" was an individual trained in a professional skill and possessing proper certification in that skill. Following commissioning, it was anticipated that
Foreign service officers should be developed through training and planned assignments to perform effectively whatever duties may be assigned to them. It is implicit that all officers serve wherever the Secretary of State assigns them.

The career Foreign Service should be supported by two additional professional groups, a Staff Branch containing a permanent corps of clerical, administrative, and technical assistants, and a temporary line group, to be known as the Foreign Service Reserve officer corps, containing "specialists" having status approximately equivalent to Foreign Service officers.

To uphold the career principle, any substantial intake of personnel at intermediate, middle, or higher grades was to be resisted, since lateral entry deprives those within the career structure of promotional opportunities and eventually would result in loss of recruitment sources. Lateral entry was not to be entirely precluded, but controlled as to numbers of lateral entrants.

The career principle of entry at the bottom is based on the belief that the business of diplomacy and long-term foreign service require a devotion to duty, a willingness to forego personal preference, the ability to adapt to a variety of environmental and work situations, and the acquisition of knowledge and skill within the institutional setting itself, and that these objectives and requirements can best be met by bringing in young persons of superior intellect as well as desirable personal qualities.

The "specialist" would work to integrate the specialist function into a coherent, focused effort. It has been generally held that "specialists" are better suited to personnel management under the Civil Service career system. The terms "generalist" and "specialist" do not have very precise meanings in the Foreign Service context. An important element of the debate over the years in the Foreign Service officer corps is status—high status versus low status fields. The political and economic fields are held as the mainstream of a Foreign Service career. Other fields are less prestigious, outside of the mainstream, and more narrowly "specialized." See William Cleven Veale, "Breakout: A Plan for Reforming Our Foreign Policy Institutions, Part III," The Foreign Service Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3, March 1981, p. 19, for a listing of specialties recommended for inclusion in a unified Foreign Service personnel system. Curiously, military affairs was not included in the listing.
is rationale finds precedent in the regular commissioned officer corps of the armed forces, and other similar career systems.

There is a basic contradiction to the career principle as applied to the Foreign Service, and a major portion of the struggle of the postwar period has been tied to that contradiction. The Department's own principal complaint has been that extraneous actors were crowding the foreign policy stage. Competitive diplomacy between the foreign affairs agencies and the Department of State has been the mode. Allison and others conclude that a serious effort must be made to define a principal role for the department that is both useful and feasible. The existence of an elite career group without a viable function is wasteful of resources.

Harold Stein in his case study of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 held that the new Act was not the product of a reform movement as the Rogers Act had been. The effort was more one of codifying previous legislation and Executive Orders and of elaborating, adding, perfecting. The Foreign Service officers achieved an Act which they felt embodied the best of the past, incorporated changes regarded as necessary out of the 22 years of experience with the career system since the Rogers Act, and equipped the Foreign Service to deal flexibly with the future. If not an act of reform, the Act of 1946 most certainly laid the basis for new initiatives at reform from both within and without the Department.

One of the limiting factors on our adoption of useful hypotheses regarding our theories of government is the prior necessity of directing our research toward answers to real rather than unreal problems, and to problems of significance rather than detail. In our evocation of the inquiring spirit, we strive to develop questions that deserve answers. The development of the Foreign Service Act therefore merits examination in one respect. It is at least rare for an employee group acting not as an outside organization but in its official capacity to be the chief determinant

97 Ibid., p. 729.
legislation for its own benefit. When new legislation is required for a general Civil Service or the military forces, various unions of federal employees and interest groups representing these career services play a vocal and frequently important part. But the directing force of the Executive Branch, and the other representative groups do not act as a direct representative of the prospective beneficiaries. The fact that the procedure used to promulgate the Foreign Service Act of 1946 was unusual deserves to have answers posited to the questions which are raised. That task is beyond the scope of this study.

There is a secondary respect in which the procedure was unusual. Not only did the closed career system group in the Department of State act as official representative of its own interests, it also acted as sole and, in effect, self-appointed representative for a much larger group of co-workers within the Department. These co-workers were serving in non-career positions in the supporting line, staff, and administrative professions.

The procedure used to promulgate the Foreign Service Act of 1946 was in the author's analysis no significant departure from the procedure used to formulate previous landmark Foreign Service legislation, such as the Rogers Act. In the foreign affairs government, the Department of State and the Foreign Service have a relatively narrow constituency. This is particularly true within the Executive Branch. If the career systems within the Department of State depended upon other elements of the Executive Branch to develop its proposed legislation, it would have most probably gone under the general Civil Service system shortly after the turn of the twentieth century. The intriguing issue is not that the Department developed its own legislation but that it was permitted such a wide latitude in doing so. Secretary of State Vance, testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in behalf of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, provided a long listing of the ills confronting the Foreign Service of today. Few were distinctive to the Foreign Service, but find a commonality with most organizations within the foreign affairs government.
Secretary Vance, in the following excerpt from his testimony, perhaps evoked the diplomats version of "a lawyer who defends his own case as a fool for a client":

And yet the structure of the Service has not kept pace. Obsolete, cumbersome, and frequently anomalous organizational arrangements and personnel distinctions have tended to sap its traditional strength and hinder its performance. 98

The career service was to prove extremely resilient during the controversies of the three and a half decades between the Acts of 1946 and 1980 and survive with sufficient strength to essentially dictate the terms of the new legislation.

CHAPTER V

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS GOVERNMENT:

COMPETITIVE DIPLOMACY, LARGE SCALE

Thus Wristonization came about. Being executed by bludgeoning the people rather than long-range planning, it stigmatized itself as less reform than long-range recourse to chaos. Smith Simpson

The United States and the Soviet Union, allies in World War II, emerged from that conflict as the sole powers capable of influencing the course of world events. By 1947, efforts to maintain cooperation between these two powers had broken down and the chill of the cold war soon emerged. George F. Kennan, a leading expert on the Soviet Union in the Department of State, developed the intellectual basis for what became known as the policy of "containment." Kennan concluded that, "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."99 It soon became apparent that there must be a political-military dimension to the policy of containment.

The evolution of containment resulted in a series of remarkable effects on the agencies most concerned with American foreign relations. So great was the nation's reliance on military capability that it almost seemed to be the only resource available to serve the cause of national security. The Congress, through the National Security Act of 1947, created the National Security Council (NSC) whose function it was to reach sound

Decisions relating to national security and to put those decisions into effect. The NSC in action reflected the fact that in the contemporary environment few national security issues could be dealt with by only one agency or department. American response to perceived military, political, and economic threats was to assume an ever-increasing share of worldwide responsibilities, develop new instruments of foreign policy, proliferate new agencies, and continue to articulate the "containment" policy.

Problems of coordination multiplied along with the growth of new foreign affairs agencies. The Foreign Service remained basically unchanged. In the period between 1945 and 1948, it did increasingly assume program responsibilities in either an operating or coordinating capacity. Members of the Foreign Service began to perform duties that went far beyond the traditional missions of political representation, negotiation and reporting. The Service was incapable, however, of manning all of the new functions; indeed, it would have been impossible for it to do so in such a short time with its normal method of recruitment from the bottom. In designing the Foreign Service Act of 1946, the professional Foreign Service group had maintained the concept of safeguarding the elitist career system whose members would enjoy special prestige and privileges. The Service was to be administered in accordance with high standards of entrance, advancement, and retention, and was to be subject to special duties and obligations not necessarily shared by others. The career principle ruled out any rapid expansion of the Foreign Service to meet accelerated demands of foreign affairs.

The Department of State, acutely aware of the smoldering issues, in 1948 worked out but did not implement a plan for reorganizing the Departmental structure to clarify the chain of command, effect a wider delegation of functions, merge the administrative offices of the Foreign and Departmental Services, and give new emphasis to an area organizational pattern, with provision for additional secretaries. The plan was developed

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100 John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat, p. 21.
nder the control of John Peurifoy, then Assistant Secretary for Adminis-
tration. Peurifoy had long been interested in consolidating the personnel
structure of the two services and in July, 1947, had communicated his think-
ing to the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

This channel of communication was reflective of another factor, the postwar
consolidation that overtook the diplomatic establishment along with the rest
of the federal government. In order to have a stronger basis for support,
A comprehensive study was undertaken of other foreign offices and services
by a committee composed of a Foreign Service officer, a Civil Service officer,
and a member of the Bureau of Budget. The study was completed in December,
1947, but no action was initiated to implement its recommendations regarding
unification of the Foreign and Departmental Services.

The first major postwar study of the Department of State occurred
as a part of the first Hoover Commission's massive review of the Executive
branch in 1949. The Hoover Commission was a bipartisan organization
created by a unanimous vote of Congress in July, 1947. The Lodge-Brown Act,
which brought it into being, conceived of the Commission's mission on the
highest possible plane. The Commission, in its study of the Department of
State, was supported by a Task Force on Foreign Affairs. The Commission's
final report did not include all Task Force recommendations. Recognizing
the complex character of modern United States international relations the
Commission pointed out that the Department of State had tended more and more
to assume responsibility for program operations, either as the direct operator
or as an active coordinator. In some instances the responsibilities had been
given to the Department because of the absence of any other agency in the
government to do the job. The situation was seen as throwing needless
burdens on the Department and the Secretary. Regular units of the Depart-
ment were viewed as not being equipped or oriented to handle such programs.

The Commission took the view that the Department should be concerned
with policy and not with operations: "The State Department as a general rule
should not be given responsibility for the operation of specific programs,
This is a clear statement of the policy-operations dichotomy which partially confounds the "generalist" versus "specialist" issue. One of the most frequent approaches to organizing foreign policy is to separate responsibility for "policy planning formulation" from responsibility for "operations." The usual aim is for the former to control the latter. The Hoover Commission recommended that these programs be separated from the Department and that the Department be the focal point for coordination of foreign affairs activities throughout the government. The Commission's foreign affairs Task Force recognized that the policy-operations distinction was "defective and illusory," because "operation alone of any given program involves policy decisions," some of the highest importance. In fact, specific operational decisions can influence our broader policy course to a marked degree. The Commission continued to uphold its recommendation by stating, "The State Department, since the war, has at all levels been too much concerned with 'details' and not enough with 'policy.'" This was seen as overburdening the Secretary's Secretary command structure with the "consequence that the entire department lives day-to-day, and policies tend to be determined in terms of short-range decisions."

Other studies of the time criticized this recommendation of the Commission, but it was clearly attractive to the career Foreign Service. Secretary of State since World War II appears to have considered program operations to be an important part of his--or his Department's--job. The policy-operations dichotomy grew in importance in the early 1950s. Secretary John Foster Dulles and others in the Department at that time apparently considered "operations" (defined as ongoing programs) as an encumbrance.

102 Ibid., p. 156.
103 Ibid., p. 165.
104 Ibid., p. 765.
be shunted aside, insufficiently important for their attention.

In his Memoirs, President Harry S. Truman added an interesting note to the policy-operations dichotomy:

"... the State Department is set up for the purpose of handling foreign policy operations, and the State Department ought to take care of them. But I wanted to make it plain that the President of the United States, and not the second or third echelon in the State Department, is responsible for making foreign policy ... the foreign service officer has no authority to make policy. They act only as servants of the government ..."

In the area of personnel, the major recommendation of the Commission for amalgamation: "The personnel in the permanent State Department Establishment in Washington and the personnel of the Foreign Service above certain levels should be amalgamated over a short period of years into a single foreign affairs service obligated to serve at home or overseas and constituting safeguarded career group administered separately from the general Civil Service." The consolidation should be mandatory, with the resulting Foreign Service corps existing outside the general Civil Service. The consolidated service should include all personnel except (1) at the top level, the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and others of comparable rank, the ambassadors and ministers; (2) certain technical personnel in the programs such as foreign information, for whom the existence of comparable overseas assignments seemed improbable; (3) at the lower levels, mechanical or subsidiary employees and all alien employees of whatever rank.

In calling attention to the fact that the diplomatic and consular areas were being served by two separate systems, the Foreign Service and the general Civil Service, the Commission maintained, "This division of forces between a Foreign Service centering on a separate corps of officers, mostly stationed abroad but partly in key positions in Washington, and a group of employees who work chiefly at home is a source of serious friction..."

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"increasing inefficiency." The danger of this arrangement was seen in the fact that Foreign Service officers serving long periods tend to lose contact with conditions at home and Civil Service employees who rarely, if ever, serve abroad often fail to understand other nations and appreciate foreign conditions.

The Commission proposed a four-category system for personnel: (1) a general (i.e., generalist) officer category with seven classes similar to the existing Foreign Service officer categories; (2) a special (i.e., specialist) category consisting of six classes of long-term specialists equivalent to the general officer category in regard to pay, retirement, and other benefits; (3) a staff category consisting of clerical, custodial, and minor administrative personnel; and (4) a temporary reserve branch, somewhat similar to the existing Foreign Service, designed to meet the needs of other departments and agencies as temporary or emergency needs of the United States in staffing special programs abroad.

The obligation for dual service, a problem not previously highlighted, was discussed by the Commission. The report recommended that members of the unified service should be pledged to serve at home or abroad as the needs of the organization might require. The Commission suggested that particular attention be given to equalizing the time spent abroad with that at home.

Both the Task Force and Commission reports proposed that Civil Service employees of the Department "should enter the new service on application and oral examination." They would be placed in an appropriate personnel category with the understanding that the examination process would take into consideration the need for personnel with special

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108 Ibid., p. 175.
109 "Dual Service obligation" relates to the requirement that members of the Foreign Service must pledge to serve both within the continental United States and abroad. Members of the Departmental Service (i.e., Civil Service) are employed to serve at home only, and are not subject to overseas assignments. Under this arrangement, a majority of desirable assignments at the top within the United States are filled with Departmental personnel because of the necessity for continuity. Dual service has remained a divisive point.
ills as well as general aptitudes, and skills of importance only to work at the Department in Washington. The Commission considered that those unwilling to enter the new service but who qualified for their present duties might be continued in some special limited service basis or might be given opportunities elsewhere in government service.

The Commission recommended that recruitment and promotion policies should be flexible in order to obtain and retain persons having not only special or general aptitudes but other qualifications, especially resourcefulness and executive ability. It was recommended that administration be geared so as to place more responsibility on young men in their first years of service. For the special officer corps, persons should be recruited and promoted essentially on the basis of their specialized abilities. Specialists should be recruited from elsewhere in the Executive Branch or from business, labor, and other services. There should be recruitment at all levels, not merely at the bottom level. Although lateral entry was not treated specifically within the Commission's report, the entire concept of amalgamation, and specifically this last provision, constitutes lateral entry by definition. The recruitment of general officers was anticipated to stress entry at the bottom level. Entry above bottom level was primarily for specialists.

The Department proceeded to act on the organizational proposals of the Hoover Commission. State Department task forces were set up to review the proposals. The Department prepared legislation to implement the reorganization and the bill was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 7, 1949. Under Public Law 73, approved May 26, 1949, the Secretary of State, or such person or persons designated by him (except where authority is inherent in or vested in the President), was to administer, coordinate, and direct the Foreign Service and the personnel of the Department. Any authority previously vested by law in subordinate officials (as distinguished from statutory boards) was withdrawn and vested solely in the Secretary, who was further authorized to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out his functions and to delegate authority for their execution to subordinate officials.
The 1949 reorganization established a single Office of Personnel. Director General was assigned as a staff advisor to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration. The divisions of Departmental Personnel, Foreign Service Personnel, the Foreign Service Institute, and Secretariat to the Board of Examiners were transferred to the new Office of Personnel, where they remain at the present time.

When the question of amalgamating the two services came up in the congressional hearings, Peurifoy stated that, even though the Hoover Commission had proposed the amalgamation, such a fusion was a long-range project and would require thorough study. Events were to prove him right.

In December, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson appointed a three-man committee to advise him on whether fundamental changes were required in the personnel systems and relationships of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. James H. Rowe, Jr., a former member of the Hoover Commission, headed the committee. The Rowe Committee studies the amalgamation proposal and made the following principal recommendations:

There should be a single personnel system applicable to all people under the direct administrative control of the Secretary of State. Such a system would provide a unified, flexible group recruited and administered under a common set of policies. . . . The integrated personnel system must take into account the interests of other Federal agencies concerned with foreign affairs.111

Several provisions of the Rowe Committee's recommendations are significant for this study. The first of these is concerned with the dual service obligation. The Committee was particularly concerned that the requirement of service at home and abroad by applied only to the extent necessary. It recognized that many positions at headquarters would be filled by persons not required or expected to serve overseas. In other words, Rowe and the Committee considered a single service and a unified personnel system as being predicated on broader considerations than overseas service requirements. In this respect it differed from the Hoover Commission concept and the Chapin-Foster plan which required that all members of the consolidated service serve at home or abroad according to the needs of the organization.

111 "An Improved Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs," Report to the Secretary of State by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel, August 1950, pp. 11-12.
The Rowe Committee recommended that immediate steps be taken toward integration by utilizing the lateral entry authority available to the Secretary which permitted Civil Service, Foreign Service Reserve, and Foreign Service Staff officers on a voluntary basis to enter the Foreign Service officer corps by examination. The Committee agreed with the Hoover Commission that the Foreign Service officer corps should be expanded.

The Committee recognized that for personnel management purposes high-ranking officers, including ambassadors, would constitute a separate group and that local employees working overseas would also be handled separately. Virtually all other American personnel would be divided into five career categories:

1. The Foreign Affairs officer group would include those concerned with policy matters and operations in such fields as political, economic, legal, consular, and public affairs. It would include generalists and program or functional specialists, but would exclude technicians in the narrow sense. This group would also include higher level general and specialized administrative positions, such as personnel, budget and fiscal, general services, and security. Persons entering this group should be able to look forward to a career which may extend to top executive positions.

2. The Foreign Affairs Clerical and Technical group...

It was suggested that these two categories of personnel should be used to accommodate both permanent and temporary personnel. The latter group would be used to help staff new programs of a continuing nature as well as programs of limited duration. In addition, temporary appointments would be made to enable other government agencies to recommend to the Secretary the temporary assignment to the Foreign Service of their employees either to supplement the regular Foreign Service or to perform functions abroad in behalf of the agencies. Under these conditions, the Committee felt that it was unnecessary to retain the Foreign Service Reserve officer category as such.

The Committee emphasized the importance of gearing recruitment to reasoned estimates of current and future needs for manpower and utilizing a full range of techniques to attract well-qualified candidates to the

112 Ibid., p. 17.
In regard to the use of lateral recruitment, the committee expressed the opinion that it be used only after thorough canvass had been made of the resources within the Service and above the bottom level. It was believed that untold harm would be done unless lateral recruitment were "properly geared to a qualifying process," which would include an oral examination, and a careful evaluation of loyalty, training, education, and experience. The Committee found that too few lateral appointments had been made in the Foreign Service and that, in contrast to professional recruitment, too many had been made in the Departmental Service.

The Rowe Committee report differed from the Hoover Commission report in certain key respects: (1) it fully supported a single service, (2) it did not set a time limit on completing integration, (3) all members of the single service were not to be required to serve interchangeably at home and abroad. Departmental officers declining integration were not to be penalized, and (4) the Foreign Affairs Service was to contain only two administratively prescribed categories in contrast to the generalists and specialists officer branches, supplemented by staff and reserve branches, as proposed by the Hoover Commission Task Force.

The two studies were basically similar in their emphasis on setting up a new service by statute outside the Civil Service. Both favored a liberalized lateral entry program to facilitate early integration of existing personnel into an expanded Foreign Service officers corps. Both urged more attention to specialization in recruitment and promotion, and in more generous use of lateral entry. The Rowe Committee report went further in the total of its recommendations than the Hoover Commission, but advocated approaching unification at a slower pace.

The decade of the 1950s opened on a rather dismal note for the Department of State. After a long and thorough study of the Rowe Committee proposals, the Department issued what Arthur G. Jones has termed "the ill-fated directive of March 1951." In a directive from the Deputy Under

The directive, not incorporating all recommendations of the Rowe committee, was selective in those it chose for implementation and made modifications where desired. The Department did not accept the principle of a single foreign affairs personnel system applicable to all of its employees. It proposed to integrate the Department and the Foreign Services only to the extent that common conditions of service might logically apply to members of an integrated service. Integration was to be pursued by a variety of means, the principal being to permit Departmental, Reserve, and Staff corps officers to enter the Foreign Service officer corps subject to examination and on a voluntary basis under somewhat liberalized ground rules over a period of three years. There was to be an appreciable increase in the number of exchange assignments with other departments and agencies. Thus individuals in the Departmental service holding Washington jobs for which overseas experience was desirable would be given temporary assignments abroad on a voluntary basis.

The Department believed that experience with this limited approach to integration would provide a basis for whether later complete integration should be tried. Congress was so advised.

The Foreign Service officer, Staff, and Reserve categories were to be redefined more or less along the lines proposed by the Rowe Committee. The Staff corps was to be used primarily to perform technical, technical-administrative, clerical, and closely related functions. The Reserve branch was to provide persons of specialized talent to supplement the career Foreign Service officers by filling a particular need not currently being met from within the Foreign Service officer category. The number of Foreign Service officers was to be increased by enlarging the entries at the bottom level and by making use of lateral entry from the Department, Reserve, and Staff.

114 "Directive to Improve the Personnel Program of the Department of State and the Unified Foreign Service of the United States," Department of State, 1951.
as the prime vehicle for staffing executive and professional posts of continuing nature.

To encourage lateral entry, a Departmental regulation limiting the number of vacancies that could be filled in this way was rescinded. Departmental, Reserve, and Staff personnel were urged to apply for lateral entry. Raised standards provided that a candidate had to compare only with the "average officer" of the class for which he was being considered. The lateral entry program was announced in April, 1951. By the November 1 closing date, 150 candidates had filed applications. Three years later, the Wriston Committee was to discover that only 25 had been taken into the Foreign Service officer corps. The Wriston Committee termed this performance "a miserable showing."

The lateral entry portion of the Personnel Improvement Program did not result in a significant increase in Foreign Service officer appointments. The primary reason was that the Department was unable to obtain vital legislation authorizing appointments above the entering salary rate of the various trades. Beyond the lack of implementing legislation, the various qualifying steps required for entry into the Foreign Service, such as the foreign language prerequisite and oral examination, took their toll of both potential and actual candidates.

The Department had placed the required legislative changes in a bill presented to the Bureau of Budget in June, 1951. The Bureau did not clear the proposed legislation until the following September, taking strong exception to several provisions. Following a revision of the draft legislation, the bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in October, 1951. Hearings on the bill were never scheduled, the legislation apparently being shelved until after the 1952 Presidential election. Before the new Eisenhower Administration took office, the Department drew up a more comprehensive bill, known as the Foreign Service Act of 1953.

The Personnel Improvement Program was not forcefully implemented and was an almost total failure. Had the program enjoyed reasonable

114 Ibid., p. 19.
The 1949 reorganization of the Department established a single office of Personnel to oversee the development and execution of personnel policies and programs for both the foreign and domestic services. Within the Office of Personnel, a clear line was kept between the two services by establishment of a Division of Departmental Personnel, concerned with civil service employees, and a Division of Foreign Service Personnel, for foreign service employees. The Foreign Service Institute exercised training responsibilities. The Secretariat of the Board of Foreign Service Examiners and a small planning staff were attached directly to the Office of Personnel. Thus, while the two personnel systems were brought under the overall direction, day-to-day personnel administration remained within separate personnel units. This organizational pattern was based on the conviction that the Foreign Service and the Departmental Service were dissimilar in their operational requirements.

Following a period in which several efforts were made to integrate the personnel system on more functional lines, a complete reorganization of the Office of Personnel was carried out in August, 1953. It had been long determined that the existing organization had discouraged rather than facilitated steps toward closer integration. The new organizational structure was along functional lines and affected both the Office of Personnel and its constituent units. Thus by 1953 a functional pattern of organization could be seen. However, no steps had been taken to bring about a real merger of the two separate services and personnel systems.

The Bureau of Budget contracted with the Brookings Institute to do a follow-up study on the Hoover Commission report. In a large sense, the Brookings' study issued in 1951 had its roots in the Bureau of Budget's own 1945 study. The Brookings' study took essentially the same point of view with more elaborate exposition. The report generally endorsed the previous proposals of the Hoover Commission and the Rowe Committee. The Brookings

saw as the "main limitation" of the Hoover Commission recommendation for an amalgamated Foreign Service "its failure to take the whole problem of overseas personnel into account." The study criticized the Rowe Committee report for similarly limiting its report to consideration of the personnel problems of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The Brookings approach on personnel is clear in the following:

There is need for development of a long-range program involving new basic personnel legislation, which would contemplate the creation of a foreign affairs personnel system inclusive of all, or nearly all, civilian foreign affairs staffs at home and abroad. This is the first major exposition of the idea of a unified Foreign Service in the sense of a system that would cover all significant civilian activities abroad as well as embrace the home and overseas staffs of all the foreign affairs agencies involved. The concept was compatible with the growth of the foreign affairs government and emphasized the need for mobility and interchangeability in staffs.

Following the reorganization of 1953, the next few years within the department can be characterized as a period of transition that affected the policy and operations role of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. From this period, three developments are significant: the establishment of the United States Information Agency, the establishment of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the re-establishment of the separate Foreign Agricultural Service. All changes recognized the realities of the foreign affairs government but were a step backward from the concept of a single foreign service as envisioned in the Rogers Act, the Reorganization Act of 1939, and the Foreign Service Act of 1946. The creation of these three new foreign affairs agencies immediately complicated the problem of compatibility of personnel systems and raised the possibility that other functional units would demand separation from the Department. It also gave rise once again to the problem of "competitive diplomacy." From the standpoint of personnel

118 John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat, p. 65.

119 "An Improved Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs," Report to the Secretary of State by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel, August 1950
ployed in the new agencies there was an expectation that they would enjoy the same personnel benefits and entitlements as the remainder of the foreign service community.

Two significant studies of foreign affairs personnel management were undertaken in 1954. One, conducted by a small group of government personnel specialists drawn principally from the foreign affairs agencies, dealt with personnel needs of the principal foreign affairs agencies of the government, including the Department of State. The group was headed by the President's Advisor on Personnel Management, Philip Young. The other was undertaken by a high level public committee appointed by the Secretary of State. This group had a more limited assignment, being asked to recommend measures to strengthen the professional service of only the Department of State and its Foreign Service.

Although it did not invent the concept, the Eisenhower Administration used the distinction between the policy-operations dichotomy as a rationale for separating operational programs from the Department of State. When reorganization Plans 7 and 8 of 1953 created the United States Information Agency and the Foreign Operations Administration, thus separating the information and aid programs from the Department, it was explicitly recognized that the matter of personnel systems was unfinished business.

The White House study was undertaken as a result of the President's message to Congress accompanying the reorganization plans. In the message, the President indicated the need for a basic reappraisal of the diverse personnel arrangements undergirding the conduct of overseas activities of the government. The Secretary's public committee, generally known as the Wriston Committee after its Chairman, Henry M. Wriston, was established in March, 1954, after the White House study had been initiated.

The White House Task Force took the same route as did the Brookings study in proposing a unified foreign affairs personnel system which "would apply initially to the State Department, USIA, and the Foreign Operations Administration," and which could be extended by Executive Order "to new
The report generally endorsed the proposals of the Rowe Committee. The proposed personnel system would be administered as the Civil Service. However, as Jones points out, not only was the report of the White House group never published, but "there is no indication that the Eisenhower Administration took any action on the report." The White House effort merely faded away, perhaps as a result of being upstaged by the fast action of the Wriston Committee and of the State Department in implementing the Wriston Report.

Because the Department adopted and vigorously implemented the Wriston Report, the program itself could adequately serve as the basis for volume. For present purposes, only a brief review of cogent provisions of the report is essential. The terms of reference for the public committee specifically mentioned the Hoover Commission, the Rowe Committee, and other groups, each of whom had made recommendations for reform. The Secretary's directive of March, 1951, was cited as having bogged down, and tangible progress toward amalgamation of the Foreign and Departmental Services had come virtually to a standstill. As its "primary objective" the public committee was asked to review the prior studies, "particularly as they relate to the merging of Departmental Civil Service personnel into the Foreign Service to the end that the Department and its establishments abroad may be staffed to the maximum possible extent by career personnel, specifically trained for the conduct of foreign relations and obligated to serve at home or abroad, thus providing a stronger and more broadly based Foreign Service." The committee was asked to keep its recommendations within the context of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 rather than proposing a new charter for the Foreign Service.

The committee delivered its report in May, 1954, and its main proposals lay within its terms of reference. The Wriston Report castigated

121 Ibid., p. 103.
122 John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat, p. 68.
123 U.S. Department of State, Toward a Stronger Foreign Service, Department of State Publication No. 5458, June 1954, pp. 59-60.
Department of State for failing to implement the 1951 directive, and for than adequate recruitment, training, lateral entry, personnel planning, assignment practices. It saw a larger service as one major need, to-ber with more tours of duty in Washington for Foreign Service officers, broadened base of recruitment, and much greater emphasis on specialization in the Foreign Service officer corps.

The Wriston Committee recommended a limited but substantial program "integration" rather than "amalgamation" for Departmental and Foreign service personnel through a liberalized lateral entry process. Its proposal essentially a restatement of the 1951 directive: "Integration as pro-ved by this Committee is a program for transferring many but not all Departmental, Reserve, and Staff officers into the Foreign Service officer corps." This was to be done by designating positions in Washington which require foreign and domestic experience as "Foreign Service" positions and ming the Civil Service incumbents into the Foreign Service officer corps. road, Reserve and Staff personnel doing work that could be considered at the officer level would also be taken in. The Foreign Service Staff officer category would then be primarily for personnel of "lower rank," the Reserve would be used for temporary specialists "to deal with unique problems," and Civil Service would be restricted to non-designated positions. Concurrently, recruitment into the Foreign Service officer corps would be expanded for entry at the bottom level.

Minor legislative changes necessary to make the plan workable were nickly obtained and the Department vigorously implemented the recommendations. om entry recruitment was expanded and, between 1954 and 1958, more than 1,500 persons entered the Foreign Service officer corps laterally from the other three categories in the process which came to be known as Wristoniza-

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before integration could succeed, authority was needed to permit Foreign Service officers above the bottom class to be appointed at any one of the salary rates prescribed for each class rather than only at the minimum

As provided by law, Congress granted the authority by Public Law 759, approved August 31, 1954, with three limitations: (1) not more than 500 persons could be appointed; (2) such appointments were limited to persons serving in the classified Civil Service or in the Foreign Service Reserve, the Foreign Service Staff, and (3) the authority was to terminate on March 1, 1955. The quota was sufficient to initiate the program but insufficient to assure its completion. The Department received additional lateral entry authority through Public Law 22 of April 5, 1955, along with a number of other legislative improvements in line with the recommendations of the Wriston Committee. However, Congress was still unwilling to permit unlimited lateral entry. Under the new law, lateral entrants were not to exceed a new limitation of 1,250. Of this number, no more than 40 could be persons not employed in the Department of State on March 1, 1955. Subsequent legislation raised the limitation from 40 to 175. These limitations had the effect of limiting lateral appointments from other government agencies to no more than one hundred seventy-five. Once the quota of 1,250 was filled, the department was required to ask Congress for additional lateral entrance authority. In the chronology of events related to lateral entry within the Department, the quotas granted by Congress under "Wristonization" are referred to as the direct lateral entry program.

The Department designated some 1,500 positions as "Foreign Service" positions, requiring experience at home and abroad, to be filled by Foreign Service officers. The integration was officially terminated on August 1, 1956. By that date, 585 Civil Service officers in Washington and 737 Staff and Reserve personnel had been certified for appointment as Foreign Service officers. Of this number, 1,147 were actually appointed.125

Harr, in his analysis of Wristonization, provides three basic reasons why large-scale action occurred at this time and not before.

1. Instead of disappearing, the reform pressure was building up, and it was doubtless concluded in the Department that something had to be done sooner or later. Particularly, the failure of the 1951 directive was an embarrassment.

2. The Department and the Service were in a dire situation. The budget had been cut and bottom-entry recruitment had ceased entirely for two years. A devastating reduction-in-force had just occurred. The Department and the Service were under attack from Senator Joseph McCarthy. Some of the problems that previously could be debated now seemed very real—constraints on specialization, inability to rotate FSOs (Foreign Service officers) into jobs held by civil servants, the small size of the FSO corps which had grown only in pace with the creation of new overseas posts and not in pace with the addition of new functions in foreign affairs.

3. The almost compelling conclusion is that the Wriston recommendations were rushed through to forestall what might have been much stronger medicine emerging from the White House Task Force. 126

The Wriston program was disruptive to many persons and controversial. In the whole, it was undeniably beneficial to the State Department and the Foreign Service. 127 Within the Department, the program remains the object of vigorous debate unto the present day. The Wriston effort did give the effect of buying time for the Department of State and the Foreign Service by effectively dampening the reform movement. In the midst of such an aggressive program, there was hardly time for proposing new schemes. Because the Wriston program did not solve the problem of administering two separate personnel systems in the Department, did not extend career status to employees of the information and aid programs, and did not fundamentally alter the Foreign Service officer system, it was inevitable that some of the problems it addressed would reemerge and perhaps inevitable that the reform movement would revive. 128

In April, 1957, the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, held hearings on the personnel practices of the Department of State. 129 The subcommittee acknowledged that it had been studying the progress of integration of Departmental and staff personnel during the previous 3 year period. The subcommittee felt it was time to "inventory"

126 John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat, p. 72.
127 Ibid., p. 73.
128 Ibid., p. 75.
from the legislation previously enacted in support of the integration program. Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, provided the key testimony for the Department. Henderson reported that the integration program was terminated August 1, 1956, and except for a relatively few problem cases the program was at an end. Thus, in spite of certain difficulties encountered, the Department had been able to complete substantially the integration program within the limited period recommended by the Wriston Committee. Important for this study, Henderson revealed that the Department was developing plans for a continuing lateral entry program to meet the needs of the Service over an extended period of time for officers at the entry level. Henderson outlined a series of difficulties for which the Department was actively seeking solutions. Included in these was the problem, while maintaining the career principle, of meeting the concurrent need for specialized competence through the Foreign Service Reserve and carefully regulated use of lateral appointments.

In July, 1959, congressional hearings were conducted on a number of bills relating to the administration of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, including three bills which would establish a Foreign Service Academy. Two bills proposed amendments to the Foreign Service Act of 1946, rapidly becoming a much amended statute. One amendment was specifically drafted to clarify and improve the provisions governing lateral entry to the Foreign Service. The amendment proposed would remove the existing numerical limitation of 175 “outsiders” who could be appointed to the Foreign Service officer corps (Public Law 828, 84 Cong.). The Department felt that the limitation was no longer necessary and that they should have discretion in deciding who should be brought into the corps. Removal of the limitation was viewed as essential in complying with Wriston program recommendations for a Continuing Lateral Entry Program. A second amendment proposed strengthening of the Foreign Service Staff officer corps by permitting lateral entry. The law as written made it necessary to bring new recruits in at the bottom of each class. Approval of lateral entry provisions would ease that situation, providing the Staff officer corps with
The capability of acquiring needed specialists. The bills containing amendments were enacted in 1960.

Eight years after submitting its first report, the Brookings Institute submitted a second comprehensive report, this time to the Senate committee on Foreign Relations. The centerpiece of the second Brookings' report was the establishment of a new Department of Foreign Affairs, a concept previously advanced in the 1951 study. Based on the foreign affairs permanent, the proposed department would encompass the Department of State, Department of Foreign Economic Operations, and a Department of Information and Cultural Affairs. The three departments would operate under a new and younger cabinet post headed by a Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

With such centralization of foreign affairs activity, the report concluded that an ultimate goal should be a single foreign affairs service. All intervening steps should be aimed at providing a personnel system capable of meeting the varying needs of the several foreign affairs agencies. Both the Foreign Service Reserve and lateral appointments at middle and higher grades would be used for acquiring specialists. However, in-service training would be used to develop specialization from within. The report contained various other provisions.

Thus, another study called for many of the same improvements urged by previous groups. Of special note was the emphasis on providing more adequate means for recruiting, developing, and promoting a variety of specialized talents required in the conduct of foreign affairs and the need for those agencies predominantly engaged in foreign affairs to work toward a single foreign affairs personnel system.

As the decade of the 1950s drew to a close the foreign affairs community remained filled with the rough winds of change. The new decade brought a change in administration and dominant political party. The aura of activism and ferment in foreign affairs brought in by the Democratic

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Administration foretold significant changes. The information and programs were now permanent fixtures of the foreign affairs government. Programs were being created. Most important, the reversal of the "policy-operations" dichotomy and the clear indication that the President acted the Department of State to manage both, and his clear expectation that ambassadors would fully manage their multi-agency missions, created need for a new look.

131 John E. Harr, *The Professional Diplomat*, pp. 75-76.
CHAPTER VI

MANAGEMENT EQUALS DIPLOMACY;

ASSUMPTION OF THE 60s, AND BEYOND

In retrospect it seems clear that in the years since the close
of World War II each decade has seen its attempted solutions to the
Department's organization problems. Thomas H. Etzold

The events of the 1960s posed new difficulties for the Department
of State. The concept of containment began to lose some of its utility as
rough balance of power was established in Europe and East Asia. As the
East-West tensions diminished, new strains developed along a North-South
axis. World War II had completed the destruction of the great European
colonial powers, and they rapidly withdrew from those areas of the world
where they had previously exercised political and economic authority.
Former colonial peoples in Africa and Asia reasserted their sovereignty.
Rising expectations in the Third World created new international issues
that greatly complicated the task of statecraft for the developed nations.

From a modest intervention begun in 1955 after the withdrawal of
France, the United States became heavily involved in Vietnam during the
Johnson Administration (1963-1969). The involvement again underscored the
need to make significant changes in the foreign policy of the United States.
In 1968, after three years of warfare that led to the introduction of more
than a half-million American troops into South Vietnam, President Johnson
decided to disengage from the struggle that had lost popular support at
home.

Next to the separation of "policy" from "operations" a second
frequently proposed solution to the problem of organizing for coherent
The late 1950s brought forth a lively organizational debate on this topic. The most sustained and enduring contribution to the debate was the series of hearings and reports begun in 1959 by Senator Henry Jackson, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate. The subcommittee underwent several name changes over the early 1960s and was variously known as the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations and the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations (from 1965).

Senator Jackson's "Final Statement" summarizing his subcommittee's initial inquiry concluded that "serious overstaffing in the National Security departments and agencies" made for "sluggishness in decision and action." His statement, issued in 1961, presented a concept to be followed rather consistently in subsequent statements, effective foreign affairs management. A study done by the staff of the Jackson Subcommittee, which specifically opposed solving problems by "radical organizational changes," expressed the belief that the necessary improvements in the foreign affairs area could come about by unclogging the administrative channels, relying on the American governmental system (particularly the line departments and the budgetary process), and steadfastly working toward better performance in key areas. 133

In a 1969 journal article, Andrew M. Scott, under the assumption "In every large formal organization informal organizations arise," reported his findings in a study of the Department of State. 134 Scott states "Reorganization by itself is not likely to lead to basic changes in the working style of the Department or in the type of policy products that come out of it. The central problem of the Department is cultural rather

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132I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform, p. 22.
133John El Harr, The Professional Diplomat, p. 103.
135Ibid., p. 7.
The implication from this observation is that unless a way is found to alter the Department's cultural patterns as well as its organizational patterns, reform efforts will be relatively limited in importance.

Harr in critiquing the article found one omission puzzling, the absence of any discussion of the role or mission of the Department of State Foreign Service officer corps against which to assess the "inadequacies." According to Harr, the Department of State has been confronted with a severe challenge from the early 1950s. The challenge is posed by the sequence of events, the logic of the situation, Presidential directives, outside study groups, and reform groups. The Department is challenged to exert vigorous leadership over the entire multi-agency spectrum of United States foreign affairs. Harr opines that few have perceived of the enormity of the gap between the nature of the role and the capability of the Department of State to fulfill it. Unlike other career services, such as the military, the Department is without a principal role that is both useful and feasible.

During the 1960s, the Department had three excellent opportunities to respond to the challenge. The first of these occurred when President Kennedy took office in January, 1961, and made it clear that he expected the Department to take charge of the foreign affairs community. But there was no program, no follow-through, just exhortation. As Scott observes, a Secretary of State, or a President, cannot simply "command" the culture to change.

The second opportunity came several years later in the form of an internal change effort that is little recognized or understood. It was initiated by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, William

135 Ibid., p. 7.
137 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
Crockett. Working from the Herter Report (1962), Crockett put together a comprehensive managerial strategy, most of it designed by an aide, Ward W. Barrett. In a sustained effort from 1963 to 1967, Crockett tried to get legislation for a unified Foreign Service that would have brought United States Information Agency and the Agency for International Development officers into the Foreign Service officer corps; institute a multi-agency programming system for foreign affairs that would have revolutionized the way of doing business and put the Department squarely in the leadership role; initiate a genuine research and case study program; develop a manpower utilization system; reorganize the Department to cut away layering and improve communications; work on attitudes in the informal organization by means of an organizational development program; and modernize the Department's worldwide information network.\textsuperscript{138}

The third opportunity for the Department came at the beginning of the Nixon Administration. With a new administration at the top, the possibility of generating enthusiasm over a new chance, a certain readiness within the subculture to respond, and a body of knowledge about what needed to be done born out of the trial and error of the past it seemed as if conditions were right for new reform. The major missing element was a sustaining manager with a managerial strategy and any evidence of desire in the White House to press for positive change.\textsuperscript{139}

Management became the keyword of the decade of the 1960s. Bundy described the role of the Secretary of State as "agent of coordination."\textsuperscript{140} An Rusk, Secretary of State in the Kennedy Administration, issued a challenge to the Departmental policy-making officers one month after the inauguration by exhorting, "We are expected to take charge."\textsuperscript{140}

The focusing on management in public organizations has constituted one of the four major classes of challenge to the older career systems.


\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., p. 101.

talent search was conspicuously successful in producing men of outstanding intellectual quality, only a few brought with them much experience the translation of objectives into action through large, complex organizations.

The second tactic was simply exhortation, lead by Secretary of State an Rusk. Many exhortative statements did not specifically attack the substance-administration dichotomy within the Department yet all by implication were addressing themselves to the managerial totality of the role the Department and its individual officers.

The third tactic was to modify the systems of operation in the department, an effort that was principally pursued by subordinate officers several echelons down the command structure. The effort included the modification of the personnel system and particularly the promotion criteria in the Foreign Service; the study and recommendations of the Herter Committee and the subsequent efforts to implement them; the effort to develop a graduate academy for foreign affairs personnel; the effort to develop a programming and budgeting system; and the effort to develop a manpower utilization program.

Discussions within the Kennedy Administration in 1961 regarding the government's foreign affairs organization resulted in the establishment of the Herter Committee, formally known as the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel. The committee was constituted in late 1961 at the request of the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. The Herter Committee differed from all previous study groups in that it was unofficial and privately sponsored. It was established under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and with financial support provided also by the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The committee's liaison with key officials in the main foreign affairs agencies was very close. It was believed that private sponsorship would give the committee greater freedom in its research and that its report would have greater impact.

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The Herter Committee sought ways to adapt foreign affairs personnel and management practices to the "new diplomacy." The "new diplomacy," said the committee, was characterized by an "arsenal of instruments" which included not only "traditional diplomacy," but "international law, intelligence, political action, technical assistance and various types of foreign economic aid, military aid programs, monetary policies, trade development programs, educational exchange, cultural programs, and, more recently, measures to counter insurgency movements." To employ these effectively, the foreign affairs government required action-oriented officials with "a high level of executive talent," a variety of "specialized competences," and a "zeal for creative accomplishment" in operating programs.

Leaving aside its detailed personnel proposals and the advocacy of a "National Foreign Affairs College," the Herter Committee made several basic recommendations. The first of these derived from three undeniable conditions--a "management" function that was being performed, the need for it to be performed, and the evidence of the past that neither the Secretary nor his principal deputy "can give continuous attention to the management of programs and activities of the Department of State and to their coordination with the programs of other government agencies engaged in foreign affairs." It was therefore urged that there be created "a new post of Executive Under Secretary of State," whose "primary responsibility should be to make sure that the resources of the Department of State and the other principal foreign affairs agencies are giving maximum support to the Secretary of State in his role as leader and coordinator." The recommendation advanced the concept that more systematic management was urgently needed, and that essential to this concept was the existence of a position charged with management responsibility.

To aid the "manager" in performing his function, the Committee recommended establishment of a foreign affairs programming system "whereby

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144 Ibid., pp. 4, 50, 53, 59.
145 Ibid., pp. 11-22.
146 Ibid., pp. 10-12.
foreign policy objectives are translated into programs of action to be undertaken in each area of foreign affairs activity." Such an effort was viewed as essential to move the United States from a reactive to an initiatory posture in its response to foreign responsibilities. Its assumption of manifold overseas responsibilities just before, during, and following World War II found the United States government organizationally, attitudinally, and culturally unprepared. The government met the problems with typical pragmatism: new agencies, separate and autonomous; new leaders and personnel from other than diplomatic backgrounds; ad hoc and usually temporary programs and budgets. The recommended programming and budgeting system that would be centered in the Department of State would comprehend most undertakings of all United States agencies overseas. It would, the Committee hoped, facilitate effective mergers of policy planning with operations, of administration with substance; it would make it possible for the Department to "take charge" in a responsible executive manner; it would strengthen the hand of the ambassadors in their relations with other agency representatives abroad.

To provide "a rational personnel framework for the conduct of foreign affairs activities at home and abroad," the third basic proposal was that the personnel systems of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency "should be organized and administered as a family of compatible systems reflecting substantial uniformity in personnel policies and coordinated personnel operations." Citing the Wriston Committee assertion that "The overriding requirement for an effective foreign policy is a rapid broadening of its personnel base," the Herter Committee specifically treated the subject of lateral entry in a number of personnel recommendations.

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149 Ibid., p. 65.
Recommendation 17, for example, was accompanied with a detailed commentary on the value of a system of lateral entry. Beginning with the Foreign Service Act of 1946, the Committee reviewed each subsequent program which had authorized lateral entry into the Foreign Service officer corps and the Department's utilization of the authority. A steady decline in the number of personnel recruited through lateral entry following "Wristonization" was noted. The committee observed that "The fact of the matter is that the Foreign Service Reserve category is now the primary vehicle for obtaining needed skills at intermediate and higher professional levels in the State Department."  

Considering that the use of lateral entry authority had been on a "relatively conservative basis," the Committee expressed a belief "that mid-career entry should be based on vigorous efforts to seek out and attract, on a highly selective basis, demonstrably superior candidates who are willing to have their qualifications assessed with those of others in fair and open competition."  

Waiting for prospective candidates to apply, or for an interested official to encourage someone to make application, was viewed as unacceptable. It was recommended that each foreign affairs agency "systematically tap all potential sources, including universities, other Federal agencies, state and local governments, private business, labor organizations, and so forth."  Coordination of middle-level recruitment efforts between the primary foreign affairs agencies was seen as essential in order to avoid unnecessary duplication.

The Herter Committee recognized that great harm could be done to the career principle if mid-career entry standards were less than exacting. Therefore individuals selected for such appointment should be required to demonstrate high qualifications in his field or fields of competence. In the case of the Department of State, the Committee considered that lateral appointment should normally range up to not more than 25 per cent of the total number of career officer appointments in a given year.

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150 Ibid., p. 77.
151 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
152 Ibid., p. 78.
The Committee's final three recommendations constituted a "course of action" to bring its program into effect, calling for legislation, administrative action, and stepped-up interagency personnel research. The legislation would include a measure authorizing the position of Executive Secretary, a bill creating the National Foreign Affairs College, and a bill creating the personnel system, to be called the Foreign Affairs Personnel Act of 1963.

Extending over a four year period, major efforts were made to implement the provisions of the Herter Committee report. The three basic proposals made by the Committee were to recur in future reform efforts. It would the Herter Committee's emphasis on Department of State leadership and its tendency to define the leadership problem mainly as a need for better "management." The Secretary of State and other top Departmental officials made no major effort to carry out these reforms, or even to deal in any systematic way with the problems which they highlighted. The leading proponent of reforms recommended by the Herter Committee was Crockett. Crockett's efforts went well beyond the Herter Committee proposals.

Crockett saw his mandate as much broader than had most previous occupants of his office. But the Department had traditionally separated "substance" and "administration" and Crockett's official sphere was the latter. Although Crockett was given considerable freedom of action, Secretary Rusk remained generally uninvolved and therefore uncommitted to Crockett's initiatives.

One of Crockett's efforts was the adoption of a broader Foreign Service personnel system. This aim was pursued through the Hays Bill of 1965. Crockett, in mapping out his change strategy within the Department, fully realized that any large-scale reorganization or merger to create an enlarged Department of State had been ruled out. Therefore change programs would have to be designed with an eye to compensating for this by overcoming problems of parochialism, stereotyping, and poor communication that are likely to exist when a number of foreign affairs agencies are working in the same general area. The Hays Bill tended in this direction...
envisioning a common personnel system which all foreign affairs agencies could use on an equitable basis.

In the first session of the 89th Congress, Crockett began work on two legislative fronts. In the first, he worked closely with Chairman Hansays of the House Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations to produce the package of draft amendments to the Foreign Service Act of 1946 that came to be known as the "Hays Bill." On the other, he worked with the leadership of the United States Information Agency on a plan to integrate career officers of that agency into the Foreign Service officer corps. On April 13, 1965, President Johnson sent a list to the Senate identifying 760 Information Agency officers with his endorsement for the "advice and consent" of the Senate to appoint these individuals as Foreign Service officers.

In early May, 1965, Johnson sent a letter to the Speaker of the House citing the United States Information Agency list and stressing the importance of the Hays Bill as "another vital step" in a program to strengthen the personnel capabilities of the foreign affairs agencies. The President characterized the bill as creating "a single foreign affairs personnel system, broad enough to accommodate the personnel needs--domestic as well as overseas--of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency, and to cover appropriate personnel of other agencies engaged in foreign affairs." The bill would create a new category of professional career officers to be called "Foreign Affairs Officers." This category, to be exactly like the Foreign Service officer category in all respects, would differ only in that it would be intended primarily for domestic service. In other words, the group would replace the Civil Service in the foreign affairs agencies. Other measures in the bill would liberalize lateral entry procedures, apply the selection-out principle to the entire Foreign Service, and eliminate restrictions on the re-appointment of members of the Foreign Service Reserve.

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The Hay's Subcommittee reported the bill out with minor changes. It passed the House on September 9 and went to the Senate, where the session ended before it was considered. Meanwhile, the U.S. Information Agency nominations had also not been acted upon by the Senate. The Committee on Foreign Relations reported favorably, but the majority leader failed to bring the list to the floor for a vote before the session ended. In the new session of Congress, neither the list of appointments, which had to be resubmitted, nor the Hays Bill fared well.

Although the Hays Bill was permanently tabled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the fall of 1966, the principles contained in the bill were to reappear in later acts. Almost all of Crockett's efforts were on the defensive by the time he left the Department in 1967 and were one by one essentially abolished by his successors.

With the benefits of hindsight, some of the reasons can be identified for the general lack of success of the imaginative and daring change efforts of the period 1963-1967. The costs of the Vietnam war and the goldflow problem created an obvious shortage of money. Another was the generally inert and unexperimental nature of the larger Department of State culture. Influential senior and retired Foreign Service officers lobbied against the reform efforts. Another problem was that the Crockett-sponsored change program was encumbered with a large number of minor projects and tinkerings that detracted from the major projects. Major projects were never quite connected together, or in some respects were out of synchronization with one another. The fundamental difficulty in the way of effective change in the Department was the lack of a strong, concerned managerial focal point above the administrative level of the Department. Crockett retired to the rewards of private industry. Once again, rotation of officers, resignations, and retirements set in and dissipated patiently assembled staffs. The effort quickly disintegrated.

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Returning to the Departmental culture, there was a lack of understanding and commitment to the change efforts within the greater part of the Foreign Service officer corps. Some of the responsibility here, however, must be laid to the sponsors of change. Until late in the period there was inadequate recognition of the need to work for the involvement of the Foreign service officers. As events progressed, the Foreign Service officers took the initiative next and involved themselves in Service reforms.

Scott states that the “tempo of the change can be increased only if the subculture is placed under severe pressure.” One such source of pressure is internal—from within the subculture itself. The interest in reform developing within the subculture was a direct result of the growing tension within the Department created by the incongruity between the background and career experiences of its personnel and the roles they are called upon to occupy within the Department’s bureaucracy. The tension between expectations of Foreign Service officers and the requirements of their roles within the organization is chiefly a reflection of one central fact: the Department of State... is an immense, complex and highly organized bureaucratic structure. Although bureaucracies do not under normal circumstances find it easy to engage in self-renewal, the reform movement undertaken by the Foreign Service officer corps was an effort from within.

In 1966 an organization of young Foreign Service officers known as the Junior Foreign Service Officers Club, created nearly a decade earlier as a social group, began to address itself to the problems of the Foreign Service. As could be anticipated, their initial interests lay in improvements to the conditions of employment. Over time its interests broadened and deepened, with concern about more fundamental problems of the career system, including a desire to participate in a restatement of the profession of diplomacy.

157 Frederick C. Mosher and John E. Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Policy Leadership: An Attempted Innovation, p. 192.
The group of officers forming the Club organized themselves into a sort of political party in 1967 and won what had previously been a pro forma election for the key offices within the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA). The same general group repeated the triumph for Association offices in early 1970. As a result, from 1967 onward the new reform movement within the Department of State received another boost from a hitherto unlikely source—the AFSA.

In several respects the "Young Turks," as they were inevitably named, represent a marked departure from the subculture which had existed within the Foreign Service. They were attracted rather than repelled by the "new diplomacy," being members of the new generation, and placed heavy blame upon the Department and the Foreign Service officers corps for failing to adapt to a changing world. Still "careerists" in the sense of pursuing the interests of the Foreign Service, they saw these interests not as the preservation of the purity of the narrow, elitist career group, but as a much enhanced responsiveness and openness to the broad issues and changes which affect the conduct of foreign affairs.

Several workshops were arranged within the Department in which the "Young Turks" met with selected older Foreign Service officers. Out of these workshops emerged a clear statement of complaints and ideas of the younger officers. The Club was expanded, and work committees were formed to study the major problems. Support was received from a small group of "Middle-aged Turks," who echoed many of the concerns of the younger officers, and who steered the efforts of the less experienced group.

In 1967 these two groups joined forces, expanded their number, and took over the AFSA as has been previously described. There were indications that many of the senior members of the Foreign Service were beginning to listen to the activists. Even before the takeover of the AFSA, the voice of the activists had been heard within what had been a bulwark of traditionalism, the Career Principles Committee of the AFSA. Because of their growing strength pains had been taken to assure that the activists were well represented on the committee.
In 1968, AFSA released a report by its Committee on Career Principles entitled *Toward A Modern Diplomacy*. The report was considered to be very progressive, almost radical in many respects. The report centered on strengthening the broad foreign policy role of the career service, and only secondarily on the management of foreign policy from theantage point of the administration.

The report supported such traditional objectives as restoration of the statutory independence of the Board of Foreign Service. The statutory authority of the Board had been transferred to the President under Reorganization Plan No. 4, 1965. Its major organizational recommendations were generally replications of those in earlier reports by other groups. The level of analysis in the report was quite uneven. For example, in keeping with the main theme of this study, the report in its narrative specifically identified lateral entry as a useful personnel tool. Starting from the premise that the Foreign Service Act of 1946 was "an extraordinarily flexible and adaptable instrument" that created a Foreign Service providing an almost ideal instrument for the implementation abroad of this expanded national role," the report stated:

Two elements had been included which permitted an expansion or contraction as the needs of the nation might dictate. The first was the creation of the Foreign Service Reserve which could bring in for limited periods either additional manpower or special expertise not available from within the Foreign Service. The secondary was authority, granted by Section 517, permitting lateral entry into the Foreign Service, except at the highest level, of additional Foreign Service Officers who might be required to meet the nation's needs. Such entry was to be effected upon examination and after a period of testing either in the Reserve, the Staff Corps, or elsewhere within the United States Government. 158

From this the Committee reasoned that since the Act provided such an ideal instrument for the implementation abroad of the nation's inevitably expanded role, "the reasons why it was not so utilized warrant careful consideration." The discussion that followed concluded that the Foreign

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158 *Toward a Modern Diplomacy*, A Report to the American Foreign Service Association, August 1968, p. 3.
service had its own variant of the "Horse Cavalry Colonels" who found their way into personnel, the Board of Examiners, and the Inspection Corps, where they exerted a cumulative influence to prevent the full implementation of the "marvelously flexible provisions of the Act."159 Whatever the motivations, it is historical fact that there was great resistance to the use of authority to bring in Reserve Officers, and even more to the use of section 517 for lateral entry.160

Yet, no specific recommendation was made by the Committee regarding lateral entry. The Committee recommended that the Department "return to the basic foreign affairs structure created by the Congress" in the Act with the first step being "the restoration of the statutory independence of the Board of Foreign Service." It was recommended that the Nixon Administration recognize that the next priority after the Board of Foreign Service was to create an adequate manpower utilization and planning mechanism.161

But the report's inadequacies were outweighed by its virtues. It was, for one thing, a clear articulation of judgements and interpretations from within the Foreign Service itself. More importantly, it was first evidence of strong Foreign Service support for significant reforms. It endorsed the Departmental leadership role, the idea of broad service with broad perspectives and responsibilities, and other reform concepts.

Earlier reforms had died from disinterest among both career officials and top Departmental leadership.162 Seeking to reverse this situation, AFSA leadership was active in the field just after the 1968 Presidential elections talking to potential "Secretaries of State." Nixon's choice, William P. Rogers, unfortunately, was not on their list. Nixon's clear decision to build a White House-centered foreign policy system utilizing Kissinger and a working staff came as a major blow to AFSA's efforts. To this was added

159 Ibid., p. 4. The term "Horse Cavalry Colonel" derives from the case of Colonel "Billy" Mitchell and the later example of Admiral Rickover. Colonel Mitchell's case is said to have exposed to critical view the influence of the "Horse Cavalry" syndrome in resisting change within the military service. The "Battleship Admirals" were held as having the same effect on the Navy.

160 Ibid., p. 5.

161 Ibid., p. 56.

162 I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform, p. 175.
The effects of a slow start by the new Departmental leadership. The major ambition of the "Young Turks" to bring the Department and the Foreign Service into the center of the foreign policy-making and management had to be indefinitely postponed.

By 1967 the Vietnam war had created an atmosphere of dissent not only between the White House and the Congress but also between these branches and the American people. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was not fully disposed to take any positive action in the foreign affairs field at a time when they were so deeply in disagreement with the White House. It was in the period 1967-1968 that the fifth stage of the evolution of foreign policy and of personnel systems designed to support the foreign affairs program began.

In the early years of the Nixon Administration a significant reform commitment on the part of certain top level Departmental officials did develop. Elliot Richardson, the first Deputy Under Secretary of State, became interested in organizational matters within the Department. In May, 1969, he assumed the chairmanship of the Board of Foreign Service, the first individual of his rank to hold that position. On July 3, 1969, he announced formation of the Planning and Coordination Staff to improve staff support of the principal Departmental officials and strengthen the Department's contributions to the National Security Council system. And on January 14, 1970, Deputy Under Secretary William B. Macomber, Jr., announced the appointment of thirteen task forces composed of Departmental employees to study and make recommendations on a wide range of personnel and management problems.163

163 The subjects covered by the 13 task forces were (1) Career Management and Assignment Policies Under Functional Specialization; (2) Performance Evaluation and Promotion Policies; (3) Personnel Requirements and Resources; (4) Personnel Training; (5) Personnel Requisites; (6) Recruitment and Employment; (7) Stimulation of Creativity; (8) Role of the Country Director; (9) Openness in the Foreign Affairs Community; (10) Reorganization of the Foreign Service Institute; (11) Roles and Functions of Diplomatic Missions; (12) Management Evaluation Systems; (13) Management Tools.
Macomber hoped to capitalize on the reform interest in the career ranks which was being evidenced by such manifestations as the "Young Turks." At the same time, he intended to avoid Crockett's problems of having his innovations identified with externally recruited "managers" rather than with professional diplomats. Two hundred and fifty career officials were recruited for the task forces. The results of their efforts were published in December 1970, under the title Diplomacy for the 70s, together with a thirty page summary.

Although not directly related to the effort put forth by the "Young Turks" and AFSA, Macomber's undertaking was similar in that it came from within the Foreign Service officers corps. Concurrent with the release of Diplomacy for the 70s, Macomber's office released a list of 505 separate recommendations contained in the reports, and the Department's tentative action plans on each. Somewhat over half were approved for implementation. Most of the rest were reserved for further study and decision within a 90 to 180 day period.\footnote{164 Department of State, Newsletter, January 1971, pp. 20-43.}

In general, the individual Task Force reports frankly presented past Departmental and Foreign Service inadequacies. Macomber's speech announcing the reform program did not shrug off the obvious difficulties by admitting "Some outsiders say that we cannot do the job from within. Implicit in my remarks today is the conviction that this is wrong."\footnote{165 Department of State, Diplomacy for the 70s, Department of State Publication 8551, 1970, p. 587.}

Macomber continued to outline the following situation:

At the conclusion of World War II the State Department and the Foreign Service played a major part in developing acceptance among their fellow citizens of the new role America was necessarily to play in the postwar world. But organizationally and managerially the State Department and Foreign Service had, and have had ever since, great difficulty in adjusting to the requirements of that new role. This has been true despite the valiant efforts of a number of our more farsighted colleagues. As you know, we are an organization which has traditionally been comfortable with policymaking and with negotiating and promoting that policy abroad. We have understood the importance of tact, sensitivity, and persuasiveness. But we have tended to be intuitive in management
In retrospect, it is clear that these change resistant instincts have caused a great share of our difficulties.\footnote{166}

Seven of the task forces focused on how to recruit, train, develop, and promote career officials so as to develop more of the new breed of diplomat-manager required for effective reform and encourage their rise to the top. Only one of these, Task Force VI, Recruitment and Employment, dealt directly with the question of lateral entry. Task Force VI made the following recommendations regarding the recruitment of non-specialists at mid-career and higher levels:

1. Use the lateral entry system as an affirmative recruiting instrument to bring in a selected number of highly qualified persons each year at the mid-career and higher level.

2. Hire competitively on the basis of application documents and oral examinations.

3. Defer implementation until the current surplus FSO problem is solved.\footnote{167} (The Foreign Service was in the process of attempting to reduce the strength of the Foreign Service officers corps to comply with Executive Branch guidelines.)

The Task Force felt that any Service, no matter how well staffed, could profit from infusion of new blood and fresh ideas from men and women who have had experience and who have formed their ideas and philosophy in a different environment. This same point had been strongly recommended in both the Wriston and Herter reports. Section 517 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, stated the Task Force, was intended to provide a means of recruiting personnel who have already made their mark on the "outside," who have special or general talents of a high order, and who could bring into the Foreign Service not only professional qualifications, but outside experience and fresh ideas.\footnote{168} The problem was viewed as follows:

In point of fact, the lateral entry technique has rarely been used for this purpose. It has been employed on a small scale to recruit some administrative and consular officers or officers with special media skills. But cases of political or economic officers entering the

\footnotetext{166}{Ibid., pp 588-589.}
\footnotetext{167}{Ibid., pp. 264-265.}
\footnotetext{168}{Ibid., p. 286.}
Service through lateral entry are rare. Even including recruitment for the most specialized areas, less than 50 officers have been accepted for lateral entry in the past 4 years.  \textsuperscript{169}

Critics argued that lateral entry was unnecessary because the need for Foreign Service officers properly equipped for a specialized mid-career job could be met by training officers who came in at the bottom level by examination. They considered that it would be undesirable because it would mean additional competition for those who enter at the bottom and because availability of skills in those entering in mid-career would discourage training of Junior Foreign Service officers. Some concern was also expressed that lateral entrants would tend to be those who had not done well in other careers. They did not believe that even strict limitation on the numbers of lateral entrants would limit competition because, over time, even a limited number of entrants would create a bulge in each "cone" affected and above which the bulge would materially limit promotion from lower levels. \textsuperscript{170}

Proponents, on the other hand, were convinced that lateral entry could be used as an affirmative instrument to bring in new ideas and special skills and to preserve the openness of the system being recommended by Task Force IX without disrupting the pace of normal career advancement. They advanced a simple concept by which these two processes could be reconciled. The basic prerequisite would be to fix and announce the number to be sought each year through lateral entry. Such numbers would differ between "cones" and grades within "cones" based on the needs of the Service. Training within the Service would not, in all cases, provide the kind of qualifications which would be sought through lateral entry and, in any event, the bulk of people whom the Service would wish to recruit through this method would not be specialists, but rather what would be described as "stimulating generalists." The numbers of lateral entrants involved would not be such as to prejudice training of Junior Foreign Service officers.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p. 286.

\textsuperscript{170} "Cone" is a term used within the personnel system of the Department of State to distinguish a career track. The Foreign Service has four basic career tracks or "cones": political, economic, consular, and administrative.
Under Section 517 and applicable Departmental regulations, prospective entrants would have to serve at least 3 years as Foreign Service officers before they could qualify to become Foreign Service officers. It would serve as a trial period during which they and the Service could each test each other over. These individuals would have been recruited with the aim, not of providing the Service with a specialist for a limited period, but rather of ultimately adding a highly desired generalist to the Foreign Service officers corps.

After careful consideration and discussion, the Task Force agreed that the advantages of lateral entry definitely outweighed the disadvantages. It concluded that it would be desirable for a limited lateral entry program to be established as an affirmative part of the Service's overall recruitment plan. Task Force IX, dealing with openness in the foreign affairs community, noted the following:

The Foreign Service is organized on a closed-career hierarchical basis. Except for statistically negligible instances of lateral entry, one can reach the top of the profession only by entering at the bottom and systematically working up the career ladder.171

Recognizing that the overall objective of reform should be to create a flexible Foreign Service that combines the best qualities of a skilled professional corps with the broadening skills and viewpoints of other agencies and outside sources, the Task Force recommended:

1. The Department should set a specific percentage goal for lateral entry and build this percentage into the personnel structure. Lateral entry should be used to improve the openness of the Foreign Service and not to accommodate specific personnel problems. In addition, lateral entry policy should seek to encourage a "breath of fresh air" and not the entry of routinely qualified persons in foreign affairs related fields.

2. The Department should seek lateral entrants not only from outside sources but also through the process of interesting the best qualified individuals who express an interest in staying on with the State Department after a year's exchange from another agency.172

171 Department of State, Diplomacy for the 70s, Department of State Publication 8551, p. 381.
172 Ibid., p. 394.
The Macomber effort pointed up a broad problem area in attempting the "reform from within" approach. In order to maximize creativity and minimize vested interests, Task Forces were generally not composed of people with direct, present responsibility for the specific problems they investigated. While his tactics seemed to have been successful in getting task force members to think in terms of the Department as a whole, it meant that the completed reports faced the same obstacles as do studies by outside groups or consultants, specifically, the need to gain the interest of and win the commitment from those within the Department with specific responsibility for the operations to be affected. For this reason, it is noted that the implementation of recommendations proceeded much faster on the personnel management side, Macomber's recognized general sphere of responsibility, than on questions of Departmental organization and procedures which involved higher levels of management. The Macomber program in no way reflected a commitment of top-level executive management to carry out the reform proposals, despite the considerable effort and creativity which officials in the ranks had devoted to the process. Within both the Executive Branch and Congress there appeared to be a consensus that the problems of the Department of State and the Foreign Service could not be solved exclusively from within the Department, in part because many of the problems stemmed not from within the Department but from other departments and agencies over which the Department of State had no control. The "reform from within" failed to find or create an outside "reform constituency" which is essential to such a significant undertaking.

Although the Department's efforts were extensively publicized in the press as an example of self-analysis, admission of failures, and sweeping reforms, Diplomacy for the 70s drew considerable professional criticism. Campbell, in assessing the reform effort, concluded:

... How to change the system they are unhappy with, however, escapes them. All they can come up with are high-sounding, but mostly meaningless or self-contradictory slogans, a rhetorical rehash of the Kennedy and Johnson reform programs.

They do not get to the bottom of the problem, or even close to it, because they do not touch structure or size. They fail to redefine
state's relationship to the White House, the Pentagon, and the CIA. They speak broadly of "management," without ever defining the word, but not at all of diplomacy... 173

Ellis Briggs, a Career Ambassador, summed it up by stating "Once again the State Department has let slip an opportunity to lead the pelican of American diplomacy out of the wilderness, where it has wandered for thirty years." 174

Although Diplomacy for the 70s resulted in a number of internal reform actions within the Department and the Foreign Service, it did not lead to substantive legislation. The efforts of the "new reform movement" remained some distance from the center of the bureaucratic political system in which foreign policy is made. The reformers drew support from groups and places that often resisted change, and that in a fashion was a major gain. But they had a greater impact on the way the Department handled those matters clearly within its Departmental purview than on its role in the broader foreign affairs system, though the two are by no means unrelated.

No major "outside" effort to study the various aspects of the foreign affairs government has been made subsequent to Diplomacy for the 70s. An intensive study of the Department's personnel was made by the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commission). Concluded in June 1975, the Commission found that "the problem is not statutory." Yet, the next significant move by the Department was to introduce a new Foreign Service Act as a legislative proposal. The act, intended to be a companion measure to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, was designed to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the foreign policy arm of government.

The bill, submitted to both houses of Congress in June 1979, was directly responsive to a 1976 Congressional request calling on the Department to submit a "comprehensive plan to improve and simplify their personnel

The legislative proposal represented three years of studies within the Department, suspended only during Congressional consideration of the Civil Service legislation in 1978, and greatly intensified in the seven months prior to its submission to Congress. Secretary Vance, providing initial hearing testimony on the legislative proposal, stated that the Department was "submitting a bill which will substantially strengthen the Foreign Service." 175

The major features of the bill were summarized by the Department as follows: (1) first and foremost, the bill linked the granting of career tenure, promotions, compensation and performance pay, as well as retention in the Service more closely to the quality of performance; (2) the bill recognized a clear distinction between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service; (3) it approved the management and efficiency of the Service by reducing the number of personnel categories from more than a dozen to two; (4) it placed employee management relations on a firmer and more equitable basis; (5) it underscored a Departmental commitment to mitigating the special hardships and strains on Foreign Service families, and advancing equal employment opportunities and fair and equitable treatment for all without regard to race, national origin, sex, handicap or other such consideration; (6) it would improve the economy and efficiency of government by promoting maximum compatibility and interchange among agencies authorized to use Foreign Service personnel.

The reaction of the American Foreign Service Association to the proposed legislation presented an insight into the relative strength of the organization in effecting matters related to the career service. Called to testify on July 9, 1979, the key paragraph of AFSA's testimony was the following:

Because of the strongly expressed concern of the career Foreign Service regarding such comprehensive legislation, AFSA does not endorse this act. On the other hand, it does contain some provisions which

could help the Foreign Service deal with its problems. We believe that the most useful service we can perform today for the Service and the Congress is to provide a detailed commentary on the bill, identifying provisions we approve as well as those we seek to change or wish to clarify in the legislative history. 176

Despite repeated probes from members of Congress, both in the Senate and in the House, AFSA representatives did not state whether or not they supported the bill. Rather, they encouraged the Congress to protect the provisions AFSA supported and to amend the provisions AFSA opposed. AFSA testimony focused on the impact of the legislation on the uniqueness of the Foreign Service, up-or-out and performance, pay comparability with Civil Service, international development, the Foreign Service Staff corps, protection of the Career Foreign Service against political abuse, and legislated labor-management relations. With regard to the latter point, AFSA is the primary bargaining unit for Foreign Service personnel.

AFSA's position on lateral entry was contained under the caption "Protection of the Career Service." The Association testified that the Career Foreign Service had suffered in the past from political abuses such as the appointment of an excessive number of Non-career chiefs of mission, many of them unqualified; substantial numbers of Schedule C, Civil Service, or otherwise non-career appointments in Washington; and easy lateral entry into the career Service itself of those enjoying political patronage or whose skills were already in ample supply within the Service. These actions were considered bad for the Career Service and contrary to the national interest because they reduced career promotions and assignment opportunities, and made the career track the slow track to success in the foreign affairs agencies. Morale and performance within the Service were therefore harmed and recruitment into the Service retarded.

The bill did, in the opinion of the Association, contain some improvements over the existing situation. AFSA was seeking further improvements.

Like the Act of 1946, the proposed Foreign Services Act of 1980 did not treat lateral entry as a specific topic. Rather, the matter is found within the sections establishing appointment authority. The Act of 1946, as amended, had authorized a relatively wide latitude in both presidential and secretarial appointments, although the Congress imposed limiting parameters on such appointments. With statutory authority to promulgate and issue implementing regulations and directives, the Department, under executive guidance, treated lateral entry as a specific subject. Thus, Section 517, Title V, of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, authorized appointment of Foreign Service officers in classes 1 through 7, inclusive. As lateral entry, by simple definition, is entry above the bottom level, Section 517 authorized lateral entry. The subject is treated specifically in 22 CFR 11.11, such regulation having been promulgated by the Department of State to further define the Department's appointment authority.

The Association supported those provisions of the proposed legislation which delineated between Foreign and Civil Service, anticipating that by again separating these services on the basis of worldwide assignment availability the situation involving assignment of Foreign Service officers in Washington would improve. Similarly, the clear distinction between career candidate appointments and other limited and temporary appointments above bottom entry level would prevent political appointees from "slithering unnoticed" into the career service when their party or patron leaves office.

Declaring the applicant as a career candidate required the individual to serve competitively for a trial period of service prescribed by the Secretary and limited initial appointment to salary class 4 or lower. Decisions of the Secretary to offer a career candidate a career appointment would be based upon the recommendations of boards established by the Secretary, and composed entirely of members of the Career Service, which would evaluate the fitness and aptitude of career candidates for the work of the Service. Personnel holding limited or non-career appointments above the bottom level would be retained for specific time periods after which the appointment could not be extended or renewed. These provisions were retained and strengthened in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 as enacted.
The language on appointment of Chiefs of Mission, various aspects of limiting non-career members of the Senior Foreign Service to 5 per cent, and middle-level lateral entry for Foreign Service officer candidates for other than specific functional needs of the service were opposed by the association. Each of these items dealt specifically with lateral entry threats to the career principle. The Association proposed amendments and legislative history to strengthen these aspects of the legislation. They were careful to point out that insofar as middle-level lateral entry programs were concerned, they did not oppose lateral entry programs which emphasize recruitment of minorities. The Association specifically supported such a program in a 1975 agreement with the Department. However, the Association contended that the Department violated the agreement by hiring in total disregard of functional needs or the impact on promotional opportunities in the junior Service ranks, which contain increasing numbers of women and minorities.

With the exception of that portion of the proposed legislation dealing with entry levels for Foreign Service officers, AFSA gained additional advantage toward protecting the career service in the bill that was signed into law. The proposed bill remained before Congress until August, 1980. In that period of slightly more than one year, the change in attitude of the AFSA toward the legislation is perhaps best summarized by contrasting two separate comments of Ken Bleakley, President, American Foreign Service Association, to members of the Foreign Service community. In a speech given in September, 1979, Bleakley stated:

Many of the problems facing the Foreign Service today could be cured by returning to the principles and procedures of the 1946 Act from which successive administrations have strayed. We would have preferred this administration to have moved vigorously two years ago to halt the erosion I just outlined by using the ample tools available under the Act. They argued instead that the need for fundamental reaffirmation of a separate Foreign Service in the light of a Civil Service Act was great, and that the amendments needed in light of legal challenges to our system were extensive. State's leadership chose to propose a new Act whose initial formulation was so flawed as to be almost universally unacceptable throughout the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service responded with detailed, well-reasoned criticism of the proposal, and the Secretary of
State listened. The bill submitted by the administration to Congress in June, while still seriously deficient, is a substantial improvement over the earlier draft and closely parallels the 1946 Act.\footnote{Ken Bleakley, "The Future of the Foreign Service," The Foreign Service Journal, Vol. 56, No. 11, November 1979, p. 41.}

Exclaiming that "Erosion of the Foreign Service of the United States stops here," Bleakley asserted that a strong, unified Foreign Service had the opportunity to shape its own destiny. During a briefing on "How the Foreign Service Act of 1980 Affects You," held for a group of Foreign Service officers in October 1980, one year later, Bleakley discussed the history of the Foreign Service act and said, "The Act gives us a mandate to develop the kind of Foreign Service that will provide members a useful and satisfying career, a chance for professional development, and compensation equal to our risks and responsibilities."\footnote{Editorial comment, "The Foreign Service Act of 1980," The Foreign Service Journal, Vol. 57, No. 11, p. 23.} "However," he added, "how we use this mandate is up to us--it's only a piece of paper now."

Recognizing that full implementation of the Act would necessitate a supplementary request to the Office of Management and Budget for funding, APSA pledged to take a future active role in the budget process. Effective utilization of the people of the Foreign Service was viewed as requiring increases in the resources of the nation that it devotes to this vital component of its national security.\footnote{Editorial comment, "The American Foreign Service--200 Years Old and Looking Toward the Future," The Foreign Service Journal, Vol. 58, No. 1, January 1981, p. 16.}

The Foreign Service Act of 1980 was approved October 17, 1980, and became effective February 15, 1981. As of November 1, 1981, only two changes affecting the Foreign Service have appeared in official public documents. The first of these was contained in the Federal Register and specified the delegation of certain personnel authorities of the Secretary of State to the Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel of the Department of State. These titles normally repose in a single individual. The second, Executive Order 12299 of March 17, 1981, revoked the Executive Order issued by President Carter which established...
the Presidential Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Appointments. The Board was established to, whenever requested, make confidential recommendations to the Secretary of State and the President as to the qualifications of individuals for an ambassadorial post for which non-career individuals were being considered, and such other advice as the President shall request. A novelty of the Carter Administration, the Board did not comment on all nominations since the President and the Secretary of State decided which countries should go to career service officers and which should involve multiple candidates from non-career persons among whom the Board was to choose one for recommendation to the White House.

There is no doubt that the idea of the Board had potential. If for no other reason, it enabled the President to tell an insistent candidate that the candidate's non-selection to an ambassadorial post was as a result of the Board's action, and not the President's. Also, at least in theory, the Board could delve into the backgrounds and qualifications of nominees. But the composition of the Board, which was heavily weighted in favor of politicians, representatives of minorities, and others who knew little or nothing about diplomacy, was disappointing from the beginning, notwithstanding some excellent and well-qualified members in its ranks. The Board approved, even recommended, some of the individuals whom the career service held as unqualified appointees of the Carter Administration.

The Department of State publishes its internal directives in a series of volumes of the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). Volume 3 contains the appointment regulations. These publications are not available for distribution external to the Department. Implementation of the Act of 1980 has begun through the issuance of new sections to the manual. The new Act is anticipated to seriously change the nature of lateral entry appointments to the Foreign Service officer corps.

180 Joint Committee Print, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Foreign Affairs, Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1978, Volume I, Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders, 1979, p. 635.

CHAPTER VII

THE LATERAL ENTRANTS: AN ENDANGERED SPECIES

It is time to put the State Department back in the great Victorian building just west of the White House—the only Washington building worthy to house a foreign ministry.

Joel Barlow

Lateral entry is a term with a deceptively simple definition. There are two basic ways to enter the Foreign Service officer corps: (1) examination entry, which is the orthodox process of entry at the bottom salary class upon passing the prescribed written, oral, physical, foreign language, and other examinations, and (2) lateral entry, which is entry above the bottom salary class and outside the regular examination process, although lateral entrants have been subjected to examinations of varying kinds. Political appointees and other categories of non-career personnel are not included within either of these definitions.

Research has shown that although, with minor exception, every major study of the Department of State since 1945 has made specific mention of lateral entry the term lacks a precise, useable definition. Meaning of the term varies with whether the author opposes the concept or is a proponent of its use, the time frame in which use of the term is made, and other factors. For example, since 1975 the term has generally been used with the Department's affirmative action program through which women and members of other minority groups have been admitted to the Foreign Service. The Affirmative Action Mid-Level Hiring Program has resulted in the lateral entry appointment of 105 individuals to the Foreign Service from its inception in 1975 through September 25, 1981 (Table 1).
### Mid-Level Hiring Program

**For Women and Minority Group Members**

(1975 through September, 1981, all categories)

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Hispanics</th>
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<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
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*Through September, 1981

Of the total 105 Officer Candidates who have entered under this Program, 73 entered at Class 3 (formerly Class 5), 25 entered at Class 2 (formerly Class 4), and 7 entered at Class 1 (formerly Class 3).

Department of State, September 25, 1981.

**Table 1**

The roots of the lateral entrant issue in the Foreign Service reach deeper into the history of the Service than World War II. Few researchers into the personnel system problems of the Department would disagree that lateral entry was institutionalized with the enactment of the Rogers Act of 1924. The primary basis for this belief perhaps lies in the fact that the Foreign Service as a career system measures its existence from that Act forward. Diplomacy in America, however, can be traced to 1775 when the Congress established the Committee of Secret Correspondence to communicate with prospective supporters abroad and sent emissaries to other governments. In 1781, to this rather austere beginning of a diplomatic service, was added the beginnings of a consular service. Reflecting America's interest in commercial and economic affairs abroad, the consular service...
was to grow and develop as a career system at a faster pace than the diplomatic service. Only one nation in the nineteenth century steadily refused to consider its diplomatic missions as permanent and their members as constituting a career service. It was the United States. 182

Although the historical development of the diplomatic and consular services is beyond the scope of this study it is nonetheless germane to understanding the beginnings of the lateral entry issue. Lateral entry is a function of recruiting into a career system. A career system is an employment system built upon a given specialization of preparation, knowledge, and skill for which one systematically prepares in his junior years, which provides his first major job, and which assures him continuous employment through progressive levels of responsibility until his retirement or death. This concept encompasses the "career principle" which, if violated by management, is considered by the employee as a betrayal of trust. The basic sources of personnel to staff a career system is critical, not only to the effectiveness of the system itself but to the welfare of its employees.

The diplomatic service for the major portion of the nineteenth century did not constitute a career system. In the final decade of the century, America's changing world relations found the diplomatic service unprepared. The service was bound by an antiquated system of appointments and threatening inflexibility. It was chronically either shorthanded or very much overstuffed for its mission. No classification and grading system existed and salaries were inadequate. Members were not selected for their qualifications for diplomacy, and they, in turn, entered the service for reasons quite apart from desiring to serve the nation. The service was spoils-ridden and could offer no prospect of permanent tenure or promotion by merit. 183

The consular service, in this same period, was probably in worse shape than the diplomatic service. The consular service was a mixture of a

a limited merit service, a salaried service, and one based on consular fees for compensation. Those compensated by fees had the right to engage in business. Inequities were rife. The consular service, furthermore, was much larger than the diplomatic service, and this personnel potential made it a prime target for spoils.

Within the twentieth century, the years between a Presidential Executive Order in 1905 and the Stone-Flood Act of 1915 witnessed the establishment, in most respects, of a career in diplomacy. The statutory basis for the creation of the Foreign Service began with the Consular Act of 1906.

Although the United States had not historically maintained the diplomatic and consular services as absolutely distinct, the reduction of the concept of interchangeability to statutory form in the Stone-Flood Act caused considerable consternation within the diplomatic service and its constituency. In use through Executive Orders years prior to the Act, interchangeability is the lateral entry nexus to Foreign Service officer corps history. From a practical standpoint, career diplomats feared being swallowed up by the numerically larger and better organized Consular Service. Movement from the Consular Service into the Diplomatic Service would increase competition for promotions and for assignment to upper service posts. Emotional issues existed as well. The diplomats argued that the consul's training, education, and general background made him unsuitable for diplomacy. Above all, the diplomat wished to avoid the possibility of consular duty, a position considered to be not only "pedestrian" but socially inferior. The Diplomatic Service, as it developed into a career system, was struck by a greater degree of elitism than the Consular Service.

The Diplomatic Service actively resisted interchangeability through succeeding legislative enactments, executive orders, reorganization plans,

184 Interchangeability was an early form of lateral transfer. Transfers were permitted from the Department of State and the Consular Service into the Diplomatic Service. Limitations were imposed in the form of an examination, except for individuals above a set income. No preferential treatment for transfers was permitted "unless the exigencies of the service imperatively demanded it." The same concept permitted transfers from the Diplomatic Service into either the Department or the Consular Service and between the Consular Service and the Department.
and the foreign affairs realities of World War II. Slowly acceding to the
amelamation of the Diplomatic and Consular Services under the Rogers Act
of 1924, officers of the political "cone" continue to resist forms of
lateral entry. The political "cone," the highest status component of the
Service and the present day descendant of the Diplomatic Service, has
gained support in this resistance from the economic, consular, and
administrative cones. Various methods common to organizational theory have
been utilized to fend off the perceived debilitating effects of lateral
entry.

Lateral entry as a function of recruiting produces lateral entrants.
From that rather simplistic statement one must proceed to expand the concept.
Lateral entrants can be considered as "numbers" or as distinct, separable
individuals. Dependent upon the purpose for which the recruiting function
is planned and executed, stress will be either on the "numbers" or on the
individuals. The Department's Affirmative Action Mid-Level Hiring Program,
for example, came under heavy criticism by the Association in mid-1979.
One reason for the Association's opposition was phrased in the following
manner:

The figures for the earlier years for these programs were annual
ceilings, not "target levels" or multi-year targets. The concept of
making up the cumulative "shortfalls" from previous years in effect
converts these ceilings into quotas, and the emphasis on achieving
these quotas, backed up by the Secretary's personal intervention, seems
to have introduced a "body count" attitude among working level officials
charged with meeting the quotas--an attitude which threatens to exhalt
numbers above quality. (Underlining mine for emphasis.)

The AFSA proposed as an alternative that there be an overall ceiling
on all Foreign Service reserve officer lateral entry appointments, political
or otherwise, to program direction or the four "cones" normally filled by
Foreign Service officers. In any one year, the ceiling would not exceed 10
per cent of promotion opportunities to the grades of FSO-4 and FSO-5. Applicants
could be from outside the Foreign Service, or from other Foreign Service

185 No Author given, "Affirmative Action Procedures," The Foreign
pay plans. Hires would be only to cones in which the Department was in relatively short supply, and into which career Foreign Service officers are normally allowed to transfer. The program would not be limited to women and minorities, but the Department could emphasize the hiring of women and minorities so long as they were individually qualified for positions in which the Service was in short supply. AFSA was in essence rejecting the Department's emphasis on the "numbers" needed to achieve its affirmative action goals and attempting to substitute stress on quality. Though not an original axion, the Department has described quality as "No service can be stronger than the people it recruits." 186

Realistically, no fine line can be drawn which separates "numbers" from the individuals who comprise the numbers. There will always be distinctively qualified persons who will rise above the numbers which produced him. However, knowledge of this distinction is important to understanding the lateral entry question.

In the AFSA argument against the Department's Mid-Level Hiring Program, the counting of all lateral entrants against the overall ceiling would protect the career Service from one of its most basic concerns about any lateral entry program—not the prospect of additional women and minority colleagues, but the negative impact on career opportunities. 187 The Department had been recruiting against an annual affirmative action target of 20 per year. As Table 1 indicates, this quota had not been met. The Department clearly intended to recruit the shortfall as additional annual quotas.

The Association was calling into perspective, albeit from a biased viewpoint, the fundamental question as to whether lateral entry is an expansion (and thus, conversely, a contraction) tool or a means of absorbing into the career field different types of specialization and experience, the so-called "new blood" and "fresh ideas."

Deputy Under Secretary Macomber, in his address "A Program for the Seventies," repeated a persistent charge of critics of American foreign

186 US Department of State, Diplomacy for the 70s, p. 23.
policy when he stated: "Since that creative period following World War II . . . our record for producing new ideas of long term significance is not a notable one." The problem of the stimulation of creativity was pondered by Task Force VII of Macomber's effort to modernize the Department from within. One of the findings of the Task Force was that "the Service makes little or no effort to seek out unusually creative candidates in its recruitment program, to determine the applicant's potential for creativity in the written or oral examination, nor to train officers in the techniques of creative thinking." The Task Force strongly believed that creativity was essential to the effective performance of the Department's work, and that the Department must therefore recruit officers with a capacity for creative thinking. The Task Force recommended "that the Department make more effective use of the lateral entry provisions of Section 517 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 as a means of promoting the infusion of new blood and fresh ideas into the Service." Irrespective of what it is by definition, lateral entry into the Foreign Service officer corps has provided a significant proportion of total manpower since at least the Wriston program of the mid-1950s. As Table 2 indicates, the total induction of lateral entrants in the service peaked in 1955 and has declined thereafter. With the implementation of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 it is anticipated that the percentage of lateral entrants will continue a downward trend. The large intakes of lateral entrants in 1947, 1954-1957, and 1971-1973 result from the War Manpower Act, the Wriston program, and The Management Reform Program, respectively. It is unlikely that programs of this magnitude will occur in the future.

The source of statistical data used in this study is varied. Unfortunately, the statistical and personnel accounting methods of the Department of State do not provide sufficient basis for reconstructing the precise numbers and identities of lateral entrants taken into the Foreign Service

188 U. S. Department of State, Diplomacy for the 70s, p. 298.
189 Ibid., p. 293
190 Ibid., p. 325.
officers corps since the Rogers Act of 1924. The use of computers for storing personnel data did not begin until the mid-1960s and no effort was then made to place information from non-current files into a program. The Department holds, and finds agreement in the fact that the costs of such programming weighed against its actual or potential value negates such efforts. The Department does not continue to separately identify a lateral entrant in the active service once the individual has attained tenure. Upon tenuring, the individual becomes a Foreign Service officer and is accounted for solely within the appropriate classification. Maintaining separate identity as a lateral entrant prior to tenuring is a function of training and assignment. Brought in at the mid-career or higher level, the lateral entrant, to be competitive with his contemporaries who are examination entrants, must rapidly absorb that training and experience missed in bypassing the lower levels of the career service. Identifying lateral entrants beyond the tenuring point becomes a matter of individually screening personnel files or other information sources. For those individuals no longer with the active service through death, retirement, or other reason, the task of identifying the lateral entrants becomes Herculean, both from a standpoint of manpower required and the question of legality in view of current laws protecting personal data in possession of the government.

Three primary sources of data have been used in this study. The first of these is a computer data bank maintained by Dr Phillip Kelly at Emporia State University which contains the total population of ambassadors for each presidential administration from Truman through Carter. The data bank establishes 16 categories of information (variables) by which ambassadors can be compared utilizing the SPSS package. Tables prepared for this study drawn from the data bank are identified by the code Ambassadors.

The second data source is a random sample of Foreign Service personnel drawn from the annual Biographic Register previously published by the Department of State. Publication of the Register ceased in 1974. The aggregation of comparable data from other sources poses a difficult task. For that reason, the random sample was drawn at 4 year intervals from 1950 forward, terminating in 1974. The choice of years falling at the mid-point
of each presidential term represents an effort to avoid the turbulence normally experienced in Foreign Service personnel during the early portion of each new administration. The sample error, estimated at ± 5 per cent, is considered acceptable. Tables prepared from the random sample are identified by the code Sample.

Tabular data provided by the Bureau of Personnel, Department of State, constitutes the third source. Such materials are clearly identified.

EXAMINATION AND NON-EXAMINATION ENTRANTS TO FSO CORPS
(By Year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Examination</th>
<th>Non-Examination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952 (No Data)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Department of State.

NOTE: Data is incomplete for Examination Entrants for 1955-1963 (A), and for Non-Examination Entrants for 1968-1975 (B). Figures for Examination Entrants (A) is number certified; actual entrant numbers were considerably lower. Non-Examination Entrants (B) are somewhat higher.

TABLE 2
Table 3 reflects the results of the random sample made from the Biographic Register with respect to method of entry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>SAMPLE TOTAL</th>
<th>% EXAMINATION ENTRY</th>
<th>% LATERAL ENTRY</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3,985</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,728</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample N=3985

Table 4 has been prepared from the ambassador file to provide a comparison between the use by the various presidential administrations of the three sources of Foreign Service personnel for the selection of ambassadorial appointees.

PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION - AMBASSADORS
(By Type of Entry)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF ENTRY</th>
<th>TRUMAN</th>
<th>EISENHOWER</th>
<th>KENNEDY</th>
<th>JOHNSON</th>
<th>NIXON</th>
<th>FORD</th>
<th>CARTER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXAM</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATERAL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-CAREER</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1,139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ambassadors N=1139

NOTE: Figures in parenthesis are percents of total for each administration.
Comparison of Table 3 with Table 4 would indicate that lateral entrants were not represented at the ambassadorial level in equal proportion with their numbers within the Foreign Service except during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. In making this general comparison it should be kept in mind that Table 3 is drawn from a random sample with an acceptable degree of error and Table 4 is prepared from the total number of ambassadors during the administrations indicated.

Although the prevailing conception of lateral entry may be of large numbers of outsiders brought in laterally at mid-levels, the actual situation is somewhat different. Of the 1976 total of 892 lateral entrants (Table 5), only 53 entered the Foreign Service directly from the outside, and virtually all of these were from other parts of the government bureaucracy. The largest category by far, 517 or 58 per cent of the total, were former General Schedule (Civil Service) employees of the Department of State, 215 were formerly in the Foreign Service Reserve category, and 5 in other categories such as the Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited or special programs. The 215 lateral entrants in the Foreign Service Reserve category is not completely revealing as the appointment authority for the Foreign Service Reserve has been used for a number of purposes. It includes former permanent and temporary Foreign Service Reservists, some of the latter of whom would be considered "political," and Foreign Service officer candidates who entered through Mustang and bottom entry Equal Employment Opportunity programs. An analysis of personnel records on a case by case basis would be required for definitive findings.

The large year to year variations in the intake of lateral entrants (Table 2) may have been inevitable given the perceived needs at various periods. If this presumption is correct, planning a successful overall policy toward lateral entry intake would be most difficult if routinization is the goal. If the variations in intake actually resulted from fulfilling perceived personnel needs to meet increasing or changed requirements, the concept of the past use of lateral entry solely as an expansion tool would be supported. Whether for expansion or to bring in new ideas and skills,
lateral entry has provided a substantial source of recruitment.

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER CORPS
(By Mode of Entry, Selected Years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method of Entry</th>
<th>Operative Dates</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1976 (Jan 31)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Entrance Exam</td>
<td>1924 - present</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2303</td>
<td>2384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5, Rogers Act</td>
<td>1924 - 1946</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganization Act (Commerce and Labor)</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Act</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>67**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 517, Foreign Service Act - 1946</td>
<td>1946 - 1954</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Improvement Program</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>6165</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Lateral Entry (Section 517)</td>
<td>1954 - 1958</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>595**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wriston Program</td>
<td>1958 - Present</td>
<td>3670</td>
<td>3507</td>
<td>3476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Maximum of 6 from Personnel Improvement Program; Minimum of 61 from Section 517 provisions.


NOTE: Numbers are those remaining in service for the years indicated, not total number who entered by various programs.


1976 figures developed from data provided by Foreign Affairs Data Processing Center, U. S. Department of State.

TABLE 5

Proponents of the lateral entry system are convinced that it can be used as an affirmative instrument to bring in new ideas and special skills and to preserve the openness in the system without disrupting the pace of normal career advancement. They advance a simple concept by which these
two processes, openness and career principle, can be reconciled. The basic prerequisite would be to fix and announce the number to be sought each year through lateral entry. Beyond the number, special skills could differ between cones and grades within cones based on the needs of the Service. The planned intake of lateral entrants would have minimum impact on the advancement of those already within the Foreign Service.

It is recognized that training within the Foreign Service will not, in all cases, provide the kind of qualification which would be sought through lateral entry and, in any event, the bulk of officers whom the Service would wish to recruit through this method would not be specialists, but rather what would be described as "stimulating generalists." The numbers involved if properly planned, would certainly not be such as to prejudice training of junior Foreign Service officers.

The Foreign Service Act of 1980 retains the necessary Departmental authority to utilize lateral entry as a recruiting process although the language of the Act does not identify it specifically. A discrete specific lateral entry program would have to be promulgated by the Department and published as a part of the Code of Federal Regulations or other publication having the force and effect of law.

Lateral entrants have frequently been characterized by critics as "second raters," individuals who have failed in other callings, and beneficiaries of political patronage. The Foreign Service unquestionably contains individuals who may fit those descriptions. However, a more logical and informative approach than labelling can be found in evaluating the characteristics of lateral entrants as compared to examination entrants.

Current literature which compares the "success story" of lateral entrants with that of their contemporary examination entrants contains a misconception in need of righting. Harr, in analyzing Departmental executives in the period 1954 to 1962 utilizing mode of entry as the discriminator identified the following as a trend:

Lateral entrants have been of increasing importance in staffing executive positions. They were outnumbered by examination entrants
in 1954 and 1958, but by 1962 they were substantially in the majority, providing more than 60 per cent of the FSO executives in three of the four job categories with the exception of Chief of Mission.\(^{191}\)

Often quoted in other works, this "trend" loses lustre when the data provided by Harr is superimposed on a graph reflecting the composition of the Foreign Service officer corps by mode of entry for the period 1950 to 1974 (Figure 1). The Harr "trend" is only relevant to the extent that the appointment to executive positions reflected the mix of examination and lateral entrants within the Service. The sharp rise in executive positions held by other categories (non-career Foreign Service) in the periods 1958-1962 reflects the use by the Eisenhower Administration of a significant number of non-career appointments in executive positions. The Eisenhower "trend" continued through the Carter Administration.

**STATE DEPARTMENT EXECUTIVES**

**MODES OF ENTRY**

\[\text{PER CENT SAMPLE} \]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{EXECUTIVE POSITIONS} \\
\text{BY OTHER CATEGORIES} \\
\text{EXECUTIVE POSITIONS} \\
\text{BY LATERAL ENTRANTS} \\
\text{EXECUTIVE POSITIONS} \\
\text{BY EXAMINATION ENTRANTS} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[\text{Years} \]


\[\text{A - Examination Entry} \quad \text{B - Lateral Entry} \]

\[\text{1 - Executive Positions held by examination entrants} \]

\[\text{2 - Executive Positions held by Lateral Entrants} \]

\[\text{3 - Executive Positions held by other categories} \]

**FIGURE 1**

---

Information provided by the Department of State also contends that lateral entrants are disproportionately found in the Executive and Program Direction areas (reflecting longevity of many of those who entered in the 1950s), and in the Administrative and Consular cones (which were the overwhelming specialities of those converted into the Foreign Service officer corps during the Management Reform Program of the early 1970s). The political and economic areas remain heavily the preserve of those who entered the Service at the bottom. Table 6 presents the Department of State's actual figures in this area. Although lateral entrants are 25.7 per cent of the total Foreign Service officer corps (1976), they are shown to provide 36.7 per cent of those in the Executive and Program Direction area, 60 per cent of all Administrative Officers, and almost 38 per cent of Consular Officers. On the other hand, only 14.5 per cent of all Economic/Commercial Officers and 10.5 per cent of all Political Officers entered by the lateral entry route.

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER CORPS
(By Skill Area and Mode of Entry)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill Area</th>
<th>No./% Exam Entrants</th>
<th>No./% Lateral Entrants</th>
<th>No./% Total FSO Corps</th>
<th>Lateral Entrants as % Total FSO Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive (Program Direction)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>229/8.9</td>
<td>344/38.6</td>
<td>573/16.5</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consular</td>
<td>305/11.8</td>
<td>182/20.4</td>
<td>487/13.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>695/26.9</td>
<td>118/13.2</td>
<td>813/23.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>1099/42.5</td>
<td>129/14.5</td>
<td>1228/35.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>58/2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>62/1.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U. S. Department of State
Variations in total percentages due rounding.
1976 Data

TABLE 6
The skill area specialization for the sample is shown on Table 7. The economic, consular, and administrative skill areas contained a total of 38 per cent of lateral entrants. Collapsing those skill areas on Table 6 reveals that the lateral entrants provided 34 per cent of the total. An identical but sharper downtrend is noted in the Political and Other skill areas. This trend can be considered largely the result of the age of lateral entrants from the Wriston Program. The impact of age on survivability within the Foreign Service system (death, retirement, selection-out) for Wristonees and those from the War Manpower Act can be noted from a comparison of Tables 8, 9, and 10. Taking the minimum age group for lateral entrants (30-34) and the last major absorption year for the War Manpower Act (1948) and the Wriston Program (1958), lateral entrants would be in their mid-60s and mid-50s, respectively. Adding the birthdate from Table 10 places 76 per cent of lateral entrants from the sample beyond 60 years of age. Assuming that lateral entry is not pursued as a specific program under the Foreign Service Act of 1980, and that appears probable, the passage of the Wristonees from the career system through normal attrition will cause all representative statistics related to lateral entrants to plummet rapidly.

**FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER CORPS**

**Skill Area Specialization - Sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill Area</th>
<th>Examination No.</th>
<th>Examination %</th>
<th>Lateral No.</th>
<th>Lateral %</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic-Consular-Administration</td>
<td>1549</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2509</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>1103</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1387</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>2728</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1257</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3985</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample
Variation in total percentages due rounding.

TABLE 7
FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER CORPS

Age at Entry - Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entry Age</th>
<th>Examination</th>
<th>Lateral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-24</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49-plus</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 2728 100 1257 100 3984 100

*Not statistically significant. Equal 1% in Examination category.

Variations in total percentages due rounding

Source: Sample

TABLE 8

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER CORPS
Lateral Entrants by Year of Entry
(Sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. Entrants</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. Entrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 1257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample

TABLE 9
FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER CORPS

Mode of Entry by Birthdate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthdate</th>
<th>Examination No.</th>
<th>Examination %</th>
<th>Lateral No.</th>
<th>Lateral %</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1920</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1924</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1929</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1934</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-1939</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-1944</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1950</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2728</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1257</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3985</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sample

*Not statistically significant.

TABLE 10

Many assertions exist about how successful non-examination or lateral entrants have been in competition with examination entrants. A primary factor in this assertion is the claim that lateral entrants have a higher combined level of education and experience than their contemporaries, have not been socialized into the Foreign Service subculture, and are therefore more competitive. The pattern is mixed and care is needed in analysis, since the picture varies considerably depending upon the type of measure used. Strong evidence that lateral entrants were in fact possessed of the "new blood" characteristics of above average qualification and experience would support the use of lateral entry for purposes other than an expansion tool.

Success is difficult to measure in terms that are useful. For the purpose of this study, measurement against the career principle is deemed appropriate. The career principle violation is the most cited objection by examination entrants to lateral entry. The career principle anticipates
regular advancement through the grades to the top if qualified. Lateral entrants are present in disproportionate numbers in the senior grades of the Foreign Service (Chief of Mission through Class 3), while Classes 4 through 8 contain fewer proportionately than examination entrants. Perhaps most striking is that 19 of 44 Chiefs of Mission, or 43 per cent are lateral entrants. Given the fact that most lateral entrants entered at the middle grades, this is not surprising, but it does call into question the assertion that the system is biased in terms of promotion against all but examination entrants. Table 11 provides the distribution of examination and lateral entrants by class.

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS CORPS

Current Class of Examination and Lateral Entrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Total % of Total Service</th>
<th>% of Exam in Class</th>
<th>Total % of Total Lateral</th>
<th>% of Lateral in Class</th>
<th>Lateral Entrants as % of Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3476</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>2584</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U. S. Department of State

NOTE: Lateral entrants form 25.7% of the total service.
Percentage deviations from 100.0 due to rounding.

1976 Data
average for the same 10 year period. When the selection-out rate for one
group approaches double that for the other there is cause for concern.

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS CORPS

Average Time in Class and Age of 1976 Promotees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Total Promoted</th>
<th>Promotees as % of Class</th>
<th>Exam Promotees as % of Class</th>
<th>Exam Promotees</th>
<th>Lateral Promotees as % of Class</th>
<th>Lateral Promotees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 to 1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 to 3</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 4</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 to 6</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 to 7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U. S. Department of State.

Promotees as % of Total FSO Corps: 15.7%
Exam Entrant Promotees as % of all Exam Entrants: 16.1%
Lateral Promotees as % of all Lateral Entrants: 14.2%

TABLE 13
## FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS CORPS

Selection-Out: Comparison of Examination and Lateral Entrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Examinees</th>
<th>Identified</th>
<th>Lateral</th>
<th>Overall Totals</th>
<th>Separated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Ranking</td>
<td>TIC</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Low Ranking</td>
<td>TIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>133</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U. S. Department of State

NOTES: Developed from data provided by PER/PE.

Disproportionately more lateral entrants were identified for Selection-out via TIC compared to low ranking.

During the period covered, the % of lateral entrants as a % of the total service varied from 34.3% to 25.7%, with an average of about 30%. Thus lateral entrants were 1.7 times as likely to be identified for selection out as examinees, and 1.8 times as likely to be separated.
There are several possible explanations for this variation in selection-out rates. The career system may be biased against lateral entrants, a frequent charge. This possibility seems less likely over time as lateral entrants have become a standard fixture in the system. There is also the possibility that standards applied for entry in these programs have not served their purpose of insuring that only competitive individuals are brought into the system. Much of this could be attributed to massive lateral entry programs where all or virtually all individuals in a particular category were encouraged to become Foreign Service officers, regardless of their individual talents. Finally, the lack of basic preparation normally received during the junior years of employment in the system may weaken the competitiveness of lateral entrants. This is particularly true if a sustained effort is not made to bring the lateral entrant up to professional standards in the first few years following appointment. If the career system and the individual are to benefit from the lateral entry program, the conclusion is inescapable that pre-entry screening must take place with reference to particular individuals and be followed up by adequate training, as long as selection-out is employed.

Indicators of professional and educational background, although not without worth, have very limited value as a determinant of success of Foreign Service officer personnel in and of themselves. In part this results from the eligibility and examination requirements for entry into the Foreign Service officers corps. The basic eligibility requirements are that applicants must be at least 20 years of age at the time of examination, a United States citizen, and available for worldwide assignment, including Washington, D.C.. Successful candidates are subject to a full background investigation and must be able to meet rigorous medical requirements. No specific educational background is required, and no special course of study is recommended. However, the Department cautions that most, but not all, successful applicants have a bachelor's degree. In recent years, about 65 per cent have had advanced degrees in international relations, economics, business administration, law, journalism, and other fields. Foreign Service officers have graduated
from hundreds of large and small colleges and universities, and many have
had valuable work experience in various fields before their appointment. 192

The written examination employed by the Department until recently
was more of an academic hurdle than a device for identifying and selecting
the best possible candidates for the Foreign Service. The examination's
emphasis is now shifting from measuring academic achievement to testing
aptitude for Foreign Service work. The oral examination assessment procedures
are based on current job analysis of Foreign Service work and the knowledge,
skills, abilities, and personal characteristics considered necessary to
perform that work. Applicants who succeed in the examination and selection
process are given probationary appointments as Career Candidates for a
period of 4 years.

The selection process therefore assures a certain degree of evenness
in the academic and prior professional experience of candidates who are
accepted for appointment. Short of starting from this "evenness" and
proceeding with an evaluation of each individual to ascertain what he does
in fact with his preparatory experience little can be determined that is
useful.

Since 1975, most if not all of the lateral entrants have been recruited
through the Mid-Level Hiring Program for Women and Minority Group Members. The
basic eligibility requirements for this program are identical with examination
entrants with significant exception. The applicant must possess a minimum
of 9 years' professional work experience at the professional level in a field
related to one of the functional areas of Foreign Service work. Academic
studies can be substituted for part of the required experience, particularly
if the studies are related to Foreign Service work. No written examination
is required. The Board of Examiners arranges for a comprehensive oral
examination which includes an assessment of the candidate's oral and
written communication skills; knowledge of American history, government,

192 U. S. Department of State, "Foreign Service Careers," Department
of State Publication 9502, 1981.
and culture; familiarity with current events and international affairs; and other matters relevant to the candidate's qualifications for appointment.

Provision for lateral entry is built into the Foreign Service career system through the statutory language of appointment authority. Therefore, lateral entry can be effected at any time through the preparation of a certificate of need. The certificate of need is documentation of the existence of a specific need of the Foreign Service for the services of an individual possessing special qualifications. The entry eligibility requirements for such an individual are normally specified by the appointing authority. The certificate of need is not a frequently used method of recruitment, and does not constitute a discrete program for lateral entry.

Table 15 provides tabulated data for the Management Reform Lateral Entry Program of the early 1970s. This program stemmed directly from the Macomber effort at reform from within the Department and provided for the lateral entry of a significant number of Departmental personnel of supportive activities within the career system. The largest group of entrants in this program came from the Foreign Service Staff officers. Of the total number of applicants for lateral entry through this program only 60 percent were certified for appointment in the examination process. Certification for appointment is not coterminous with appointment. Appointment is contingent upon the occurrence of vacancies within the Foreign Service career system, and appointments are made from an eligibility list. The point to be derived from Table 15 is that in a discrete lateral entry program involving personnel of supporting activities of the Department, approximately 4 out of each 10 applicants were either found not qualified or failed the eligibility requirements upon examination. Those who were certified for appointment and subsequently appointed could be assumed to possess reasonable educational and professional background.

Tables 16 and 17 provide similar data for the lateral entry program in 1974 and 1975. It will be noted that the failure rate for certification was considerably higher than for the Management Reform Lateral Entry Program. The same assumption can be drawn from this data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Total Applications</th>
<th><strong>FSR</strong> (C)</th>
<th><strong>FSR</strong> (N/C)</th>
<th><strong>FSSO</strong></th>
<th><strong>GS</strong></th>
<th><strong>TOTAL</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74(7)*</td>
<td>37(5)*</td>
<td>532(16)*</td>
<td>18(1)*</td>
<td>661(21)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Applicants Determined Ineligible</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Applicants Examined</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Recommended</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Withdrawals and Disqualifications (After Recommended)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Cases being processed in BEX</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Certified for Appointment</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Number in parentheses represents that portion of the total which are repeat candidacies or second applications

**(C) - Career Status
(N/C) - Non-Career Status

Source: U. S. Department of State (Revised 12/75)
### TABLE 16

**LATERAL ENTRY PROGRAM**

(Statistics - Jan thru Dec 1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FSR</th>
<th>FSSO</th>
<th>GS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>(Min/FSRs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Total Applications</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Applications Determined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Applicants Examined:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Recommended</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Withdrew (No Exam)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Cases being processed in BEX</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Certified for Appointment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Department of State

### TABLE 17

**LATERAL ENTRY PROGRAM**

(January 1975 thru Dec 1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FSR</th>
<th>FSSO</th>
<th>GS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>(Min/FSRs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Total Applications</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Applications Determined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Applicants Examined:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Recommended</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Withdrew (No Exam)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Cases being processed in BEX (6 pending from 1974)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Certified for Appointment (4 from 1974)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Department of State
Therefore, in the absence of Congressional or Executive Branch pressure to assimilate lateral entrants as an affirmative personnel recruiting method, the Department is showing strong indications that it does not regard lateral entry as an effective broad based measure. Maintaining strict selection measures, the Department consistently rejects lateral entrants as a group, seeking only those with needed professional qualifications.
CHAPTER VIII

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: SNAPSHOT TAKING

Members of the Service serving under career appointments are career members of the Service. Members of the Service serving under limited appointments are either career candidates or non-career members of the Service.

Section 301(d)(1), PL 96-465

The facts presented in the preceding chapters highlights the problems of the Department of State as it has struggled in an effort to adopt lateral entry as an effective personnel management tool in the upgrading of the Foreign Service. Lateral entry is but one of the reform efforts undertaken by the Department since World War II in attempting to alter the basic pattern of Departmental activities and overcome or prevent the continued erosion of its position in the foreign affairs community. Periodically the Department has been reorganized in an effort to overcome its defects. It was soon discovered that reorganization by itself was not likely to lead to a basic change in the working style of the Department or in the type of output it produces. Structural change alone did not address the gist of action.

No organization of substantial size can consist solely of members of one profession. Always there must be supportive activities carried on by individuals who are not members of the elite profession. Within the Department of State, the professional elite of the Foreign Service officer corps constitute a minority of all employees. Within the corps there is

192 Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, p. 114.
further stratification based upon the skill areas. The high-status skill area is the political cone followed by the economic, consular, and administrative cones. The mainstream of a Foreign Service career is considered to lie in the political and economic cones.

Frederick C. Mosher provides a "still picture" of the composition of a hypothetical public agency, well-established and operating in a professional field. The model is well adapted for use in this study as an analytical tool for examining the Foreign Service (Figure 2).

The vertical dimension is organizational rank or level of pay, and may be assumed to equate very roughly with the level of day-to-day responsibility of the incumbents. The horizontal dimension represents the numbers of persons in each grade. The horizontal lines at the bottoms of the figures represent the normal and sometimes exclusive entering level of newly recruited persons when they are appointed to the various categories. The horizontal lines and points at the tops of the various figures represent the highest grade an individual in each category can expect to reach. For an employee to cross vertical lines from one category to another is usually difficult and, where professional standards are high and clearcut, may be impossible. When crossing occurs, the act is one of lateral entry. The diamond shapes of the elite profession (2) and of the other professional groups (4 and 5) are typical of most such groups in government where professionals are employed on a junior basis soon after completing their education and thereafter advance rapidly to journeymen-level work. As the schematic indicates, the bulk of the personnel are located within the middle grades. The exception is in the elite segment of the elite profession where the large number of individuals within the middle grades continues upward into the supergrades. Over the course of time, the normal progress of an employee in any category is upward, but obviously only a few will make it all the way to the top.

At the top of the schematic are represented the small number of political appointees, recruited from outside, who may or may not be

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193 Ibid., pp. 115-117.
KEY: 1. Political appointees from outside the agency
   a. The elite profession:
      2a. The elite segment of the elite profession
      2b, c, d. Other segments of the elite profession
   3. Staff professions
   4. Line professions
   5. Administrative professions
   6. Workers, including supervisors, sub-professionals, clerical, manual, and others.


FIGURE 2
professional (Block 1). With these are included some political appointees
drawn from the elite segment of the elite profession. Most of the very
top career jobs are also filled from this group, and almost all such jobs
are filled with individuals from the elite profession.

The schematic serves as an excellent vehicle to summarize the dual
personnel system and lateral entry problems as they have existed within the
Department of State over the past several decades. The coexistence of dual
personnel systems is one of the oldest problems in bureaucracy. In the
foreign affairs agencies one system recognizes the rank-in-person concept
necessitated by the requirement to accept world-wide assignment wherever
the needs of the professional service may dictate. The other system concerns
itself with the rank-in-position concept normally found in the Civil Service
and is designed to fill domestic employee requirements.

The problems of a dual personnel system are not unique with the
foreign affairs agencies. The Department of State has consistently held
over the years that it cannot effectively administer a dual personnel
system. The position appears to be indefensible in that other departments
seem capable of the feat. The military establishment yields the best
example.

Adapting Mosher's schema, the professional level Civil Service
employees under the dual personnel system are represented within Block 5.
Entry grade, and therefore salary schedules, have been traditionally lower
than for the elite profession. Block 6 would include a combination of sub-
professional Civil Service, Wage Board, and other employees at the journey-
man workers level. It is possible that both Blocks 5 and 6 might contain
employees of the elite profession who are in the lower grades and who are
engaged in support functions which are directly related to the mission of
the elite profession.

The career Foreign Service, Block 2, forms the elite profession.
Upon examining this group, distinct subgroupings emerge. The elite segment
of the elite profession are the political officers, Block 2a. Next most
prestigious are the economic officers of Block 2b. Together, these two
cones are considered the mainstream of Foreign Service activity and are
numerically larger than the other subgroups. Those entering through examination strive for assignment within these cones with the full realization that the challenges, and therefore the opportunities, lie in those areas. The consular and administrative officers, Block 2c and Block 2d, respectively, round out the elite profession. There is movement horizontally between the subgroupings although it is neither routine nor encouraged. Political and economic officers, as an example, may receive training and assignments in each cone and thus enhance their value to the Service. The same feature applies to consular and commercial officers.

The elite profession contains a second matrix of subgroups which does not strictly follow functional lines. The first of these groups is composed of officers who entered by the basic examination process and who are found throughout the various functions. They favor the political and economic fields and regard themselves as "generalists." They have reached relatively high grades at younger ages than the total service and very clearly form a high-status, powerful group in the Foreign Service officer corps. The second subgroup is composed of officers who entered the corps laterally (crossed a vertical line into the elite profession) and are found in every functional field but tend toward the consular and administrative fields. This subgroup is currently overrepresented in the upper grades, reflecting the longevity of those who entered the Service in the 1950s. They are underrepresented in the lower grades not only because lateral entry by nature is normally at the mid-level but because of a reduction in the number of lateral entrants entering the Service in recent years. Lateral entry officers have usually come from the Civil Service (Block 6). Their educational and professional background is comparable to or better than that of their typical examination entrant colleague.

A third subgroup is also composed of lateral entrants. In contrast to the previous group, these individuals are primarily found within the administrative field or in specialist areas of other fields. They would include those who entered laterally under the affirmative action program or similar programs. They may have a relatively low "specialist" status.
The major difference between the two subgroups of lateral entrants lies in the potential for the upper-status subgroup to be successfully socialized or acculturated into the elite segment. They rapidly assume the characteristics of the elite segment and actively compete. Under the Foreign Service Act of 1980, this subgroup will undoubtedly remain intact within the elite profession. The lower-status subgroup is not well-equipped to compete and hence tends to remain static.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946 provided for the creation of a Foreign Service Reserve and a Foreign Service Staff. Within the schematic the Reserve is represented by Block 4a and the Staff by Block 4b. Note the relative positions of the horizontal bottom lines on the schematic, indicating the structural relationship of these categories with the Civil Service and the Foreign Service officer corps.

Conceptually, the creation of the Reserve and Staff officer corps was designed to provide support to the career Foreign Service officers, namely, a permanent corps of technical, administrative, fiscal, clerical or custodial specialists (the Staff corps) and, in the interests of flexibility, a temporary group of specialists having status approximately equivalent to the Foreign Service officers (the Reserve corps). Neither the Reserve nor the Staff corps was to have the full status of the career Foreign Service officers. The Reserve corps was to be used as an expedient for dealing with a transitory problem requiring the use of specialists and necessitated by the foreign affairs developments following World War II.

Little has been written in analysis of the Reserve and Staff corps. This is perhaps an unfortunate oversight as a clear knowledge of these auxiliary arms would materially contribute to an understanding of the Department’s personnel problems and assist in interpreting its internal subculture. As a former Foreign Service officer, Senator Clairborne Pell, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and Chairman of the committee hearings on the Act of 1946, had a traditional view of the Foreign Service officer corps. Pell felt in particular that
it "should be an elite and relatively small corps with an outer corps of specialists." The Reserve and Staff corps came very close to this concept. Their creation was a point of active discussion in the hearings and in the interdepartmental coordination that occurred prior to approval of the legislation.

In the creation of the Foreign Service Reserve, there were those who saw in it an opportunity for manipulation to their advantage. Special Assistant Secretary McCormack of the Department's intelligence office, assumed that the representatives of his office abroad would largely find their place in the Reserve. Other Departmental offices and outside foreign affairs agencies who were not a part of the career Foreign Service saw the same opportunity. As a Reserve officer, noncareer Foreign Service personnel would be entitled to the same full privileges as the career service. As others fought for more prestige and improved benefits for the Reserve corps as a part of the new act, the career service began to voice objections as the features approached equality. Yet the career service perceived that the Reserve afforded an accommodation strategy against lateral entry. The establishment of parallel career systems is probably the most common device used to maintain the integrity of a system and, hopefully, the system's dominance of the organization.

As enacted, the Reserve was composed of two distinct groups: persons not in the employ of the government; and persons regularly employed in any government agency, subject, in the case of an employee of a government agency other than the Department of State, to the consent of the head of the agency concerned. Employment was for world-wide assignment. The Secretary of State held appointing authority. Original statutory provisions which required Reserve officers to have been a citizen of the United States for five years prior to appointment and restricted their tenure to nonconsecutive periods of not more than four years each were amended to require only citizenship status at time of appointment and extended tenure to nonconsecutive five year terms. The Secretary could extend the appointment or assignment of any Reserve officer for an additional five years beyond

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194 John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat, p. 89.
the original action when such was in the public interest. The latter provision was circumvented through annual appropriations measures which routinely extended Reserve officer appointments on a year-to-year basis.

Whenever the Secretary deemed it in the interests of the Service that a Reserve officer should serve in a diplomatic or consular capacity there was provision for presidential commissioning with the advice and consent of the Senate. In all other cases, appropriate rank and status analogous to that of the Foreign Service officers engaged in work of comparable importance was to be provided Reserve officers, to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. The Reserve officer received all the allowances, privileges, and benefits which Foreign Service officers were entitled to receive. In essence, the Reserve officer was a Foreign Service officer without tenure and without the worries of competitive promotion and selection-out. The Wriston Committee thought the term "Reserve" a misnomer, opining that the transitory situation which brought about its creation stubbornly refused to be transitory. The Committee nevertheless did not recommend that the category be abolished.

The Foreign Service Staff was not on a par with the Reserve. The Secretary held appointment authority and appointed Staff officers on the basis of qualifications and experience. Staff officers were required to be citizens at time of appointment and could be appointed for temporary or limited service, or to more permanent tenure following a prescribed probationary period. Employment was either for world-wide assignment or domestic. On recommendation of the Secretary, the President could, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, commission a Staff officer as consul.

Both the Reserve and Staff corps provided a source of lateral entrants into the Foreign Service. A distinct advantage accrued in using these auxiliary services as a source of lateral entrants. The time spent in the Reserve or Staff corps permitted the career service as well as the prospective lateral entrant an opportunity to evaluate the potential worth of lateral entry. A protective margin for rejection existed on both sides.
As new foreign affairs agencies were created they were permitted to use the Foreign Service Reserve and Staff categories as the basis of their own personnel systems. Use of the career Foreign Service officer system was restricted to the United States Foreign Service. The United States Information Agency, created by Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, was essentially staffed by Reserve and Staff officers. Not until the enactment of Public Law 90-494 in August 1968, was a separate Foreign Service Information officer corps established providing the agency with its own career system. Other agencies underwent a similar experience.

As time progressed, more and more use was made of the Reserve and Staff corps to accommodate personnel problems which arose within the Department. Categories of officers within these auxiliary foreign affairs career systems and the Department proliferated as the Department attempted to prescribe solutions to nagging problems of personnel management. Separate categories were established to accommodate both Reserve and Staff officers who were not available for world-wide service and assignment. These officers were designated as being available for domestic service only.

Most of the postwar studies of the Foreign Service recognized the danger of a career service becoming too narrow and ingrown, whether because of undue restriction on lateral entry, career officers spending too much time abroad, or carrying out too narrow a set of functions. But these problems were not seen as intrinsic to the nature of a career service, but as flaws to be overcome by appropriate reforms. As Mosher noted, the reports "apparently assumed as a given the desireability of a personnel system based on the closed career principle." The differences between the studies were over issues, including the incorporation of Departmental Civil Service officials into the Foreign Service, the relative values of the generalists and the specialists, the needs and especially the limits of lateral entry, and whether there should be one or several personnel systems for the Department of State and the other foreign affairs agencies. Many other issues could be added to this list but the point is clear.
Pressure to integrate the Foreign Service officer corps, Foreign Service Staff, Foreign Service Reserve, and Civil Service groups of the Department resulted in Departmental action in the 1950s. Under the Personnel Improvement Program the Department rejected the creation of a single personnel system in favor of a more limited integration program. The Department opted to bring persons from the Staff, Reserve, and Civil Service categories into the Foreign Service officer corps when they occupied positions that were regarded interchangeable with the Foreign Service positions. The program was not forcefully implemented and was almost a total failure.

The Wriston Program of 1954 had the same basis as the Personnel Improvement Program—integrating only persons from the Foreign Service Staff, Foreign Service Reserve, and Civil Service categories who occupied what was defined as "Foreign Service" positions. The Department designated 1,500 positions—requiring experience at home and abroad—to be filled by Foreign Service officers. The Wriston Program was vigorously implemented. It should be noted that the nature of the program—positions that were regarded as interchangeable—did not eliminate the Staff, Reserve, and Civil Service groups from existence within the Department. They continued to exist as personnel programs but were greatly affected by administrative procedures within the Department.

Public Law 90-494, August, 1968, also created a new category of Foreign Service Reserve officer. The Hayes Amendment to the act authorized the Department of State and the United States Information Agency to establish a category of Foreign Service Reserve Officer with unlimited career tenure. The law provided that Foreign Service Reserve officers appointed after the date of the Act could serve as such for not more than five years. During such period, no sooner than the expiration of the third year but no later than the expiration of the fifth year, such Foreign Service Reserve officer would be appointed as a Foreign Service officer, Foreign Service Information officer, Foreign Service Reserve officer with unlimited tenure (the new category), Foreign Service Staff officer, or terminated as a Reserve officer. Reserve officers already in the system who had completed
three years of service, or would complete at least three years of service before the expiration of a three year period from the date of enactment, could be appointed to the new unlimited tenure category. Some foreign affairs agencies, such as the Agency for International Development, were prohibited from using the new category. The law made it legally possible to change the application of the career principle fundamentally without further basic legislation. But there appeared little disposition on the part of the Department or the Service to reexamine the principle itself and its viability in the changing foreign affairs government.

Acting upon a central proposal in the Macomber management proposals "that all officer-level positions in the Department and abroad be brought into a unified personnel system," the Department asserted that the authority contained in Public Law 90-494 would permit the establishment of a career system of "Foreign Affairs Specialists," parallel to the Foreign Service officer and Foreign Service Information officer corps. The Foreign Affairs Specialist program was introduced in the Department in early 1971 and members of the Civil Service, Reserve, and Staff groups were invited to apply for acceptance. The program was introduced in the United States Information Agency in the late spring of 1971. The Foreign Affairs Specialists program proved to be a disappointment with the advantages proving to be more illusory than real.

In discussing the Foreign Affairs Specialist program, Departmental sponsors stressed the advantages of flexibility in assignments to be achieved but acknowledged that their goals were to bring all officers under selection-out and under mandatory retirement at age 60. In essence, the Department appeared to be attempting to substitute the Foreign Affairs Specialist system for the Civil Service System within the foreign affairs agencies. The extensive reports of the Stanton Panel on March 11, 1975, and the Murphy Commission in June 1975, not only examined the scope of the conduct of foreign policy but also drew attention to the shortcomings of the Foreign Affairs Specialist program. No longer did the concept of a unified Foreign Service seem a panacea. Under Congressional prodding, Deputy Under Secretary
Eagleburger and the Director General of the Foreign Service, Carol Laie, came to the conclusion that the program had been a mistake and that Civil Service recruitment should be resumed. A formal decision as to the future of the Foreign Affairs Specialist plan was suspended because of the change in Administration.

The Department of State ultimately made a decision to abandon the concept of a unified Foreign Service. The United States Information Agency, by now the International Communications Agency, undertook to dismantle the Foreign Affairs Specialist Program within its organization to the constructive advantage of all parties.

The Department of State, however, did not use the management prerogative to reorganize the Foreign Affairs Specialist program even though it had found that prerogative sufficient to institute the program. Instead, using the "clean cup, move down" concept from Alice in Wonderland, the Department promulgated a new Foreign Service Act under which it was hoped that the mistakes of the past could be reshaped by being forced into a new mold.

During the November 20, 1981, conference held at the Department of State, representatives of the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel provided answers to a series of questions posed regarding lateral entry. Although the concept of a unified Foreign Service has been at least temporarily abandoned, a Departmental spokesman who had assisted in drafting the Act of 1980 revealed that an effort was made to establish the Act as the Foreign Service personnel system for all foreign affairs agencies with the Secretary of State acting as the overall administrator for the system. No agreement could be reached on this point during Congressional hearings and interagency coordination. As a result, the personnel system described in the Act of 1980 is specifically utilized by the International Communications Agency and the United States International Development Cooperation Agency. Use is also permitted by the Foreign Agricultural Service and the Department of Commerce. Other foreign affairs agencies have their own personnel systems.

In response to a question regarding the current status of the lateral entry program under the Foreign Service Act of 1980, a Departmental spokesman advised that the principle of lateral entry is built into
the Department's basic personnel system. The principle exists in the
language of the appointing authority granted the Secretary of State by
Section 303 of the Act. Equal authority exists under Section 302 which
grants the President appointing authority to appoint individuals, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to positions as a chief of
mission, as an ambassador at large, as a minister, as a career member of
the Senior Foreign Service, or as a Foreign Service officer. Although
not a discrete program, lateral entry exists and will be very selectively
used. Contrary to belief, lateral entry rarely brings into the Foreign
Service officer corps a complete "outsider." Lateral entrants normally
originate from within government, and more specifically from within the
Department itself.

General provisions relating to appointments is contained in
Section 301 of the Act. The section prescribes citizenship requirements,
examinations to be administered, and veteran's rights. Key within the
language of this section of the Act are the following subparagraphs:

d(1) Members of the Service serving under career appointments are
career members of the Service. Members of the Service serving under
limited appointments are either career candidates or non-career members
of the service.

(2) Chiefs of mission, ambassadors at large, and ministers serve
at the pleasure of the President.

(3) An appointment as a Foreign Service officer is a career
appointment.195

Secretary of State Vance'a comment during the Senate hearings that
the Act would reduce "the number of personnel categories from more than a
dozen to two" finds definition in this section. The two remaining categories
are "Foreign Service officer" and "Member of the Service." The width of
the latter category would appear to be more definitional than a discrete
category. The Department intends to reduce the dozen or more personnel
categories that presently exist in addition to the Foreign Service officer

195 94 Stat. 2071, Sec 301.
category to this single designation. "Members of the Service" will be dichotomized as "career candidates" and "non-career members of the service." "Career candidates will be commissioned as a Foreign Service officer upon successful completion of a probationary period."

Under this section, lateral entrants are classified as "career candidates" and subject to the probationary period prior to commissioning. In essence, the career Foreign Service now has a greater degree of protection against the perceived evils of lateral entry and thus violation of the career principle than in previous legislation. This position is strengthened by the fact that the Department now recognizes a clear distinction between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service. This acknowledgement marks a return to the dual personnel system against which the Department struggled so mightily in the period following World War II. Title II of the Act of 1980 makes provision for the conversion of certain members from the Foreign Service to the Civil Service or other appropriate government career system.

Upon revision, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) which now contain specific provisions for lateral entrance (22 CFR 11.11) will no longer identify lateral entry as a discrete program. The revised regulations will be more restrictive of the use of this recruiting method. Departmental regulations published as a portion of the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) are being revised to reflect new policies on lateral entry. In general, the program is being de-emphasized in regulations.

It is anticipated that the affirmative action program, now effectively the primary source of lateral entrants, will also be de-emphasized in the future as the current goals of the program are met. Most lateral entrants produced by this program have been assigned to the administrative sub-functions of the Foreign Service. Requirements for mid-level hiring in this program will be phased out as the vacancies at mid-level are filled by recruitment or promotion from below. The Department has no short or long term projections for the numbers of Foreign Service officers
to be recruited through lateral entry. It is not considered to be a
discrete program for the recruitment of personnel. There are no plans
to fix and announce a number of lateral entrants to be sought each year
as an affirmative portion of the personnel recruiting program. Lateral
entry is held to be an active policy matter designed to meet specialized
Departmental needs. The interpretation given to this situation is that
the Department now views lateral entry under the "new blood" or "fresh
ideas" concept as opposed to numbers.

In addition to entrants through the affirmative action program,
the Department defines three additional categories of personnel under the
term lateral entrant: special hires to meet specific medium and long
term needs; one time hires for specific missions; and those entering the
Service as career candidates. This latter category is applicable to all
personnel entering the Foreign Service under the Act of 1980 whether by
examination or laterally. All individuals shall first serve under a
limited appointment as a career candidate for a trial period of service
as prescribed by the Secretary. Appointment to the career service is
by a board composed entirely or primarily of career members and contingent
upon an evaluation of fitness and aptitude following the probationary
period. No career candidate is guaranteed appointment to the career
service. Lateral entrants may also be appointed to the newly established
Senior Foreign Service, a component modeled after the Senior Executive
Service of the Civil Service.

The Department has neither constructed nor makes use of a model
for the typical lateral entrant. The possible exception to this is in the
case of those lateral entrants who are a part of the affirmative action
program. An occupationally defined model is used in recruiting and to plan
career development. Special interest in other lateral entrants terminates
with tenuring. It is only of interest to that point to assure that the new
entrant receives sufficient training and orientation to become competitive
at the mid-levels. Of particular concern is the competitiveness of the
lateral entrant at the senior service threshold. Mid-level promotions
are heavily dependent upon functional performance.

The Department does not maintain a special interest in the lateral entrant beyond the tenuring point. Tenuring may require a maximum of 5 years probationary service at the mid-level. The Foreign Service is primarily a generalist system. Some specialization has been sacrificed but there is a concurrent gain in breadth of experience which largely offsets the loss. Generalists are sought in recruiting efforts.

Lateral entrants are normally assigned directly to duties at a post following recruitment. Having been employed for their specialized knowledge and experience, the lateral entrant is not likely to need additional training following entry. No special training program exists through which the entrant must progress, excepting that process needed to acquaint him with the system and to aid in his development of systemic competitiveness. Throughout the Foreign Service, only language training is mandatory. On the job training is stressed more than formal classroom work. The Department has never adequately defined mandatory training as to need.

There have been past instances of political influence on the lateral entry program. The numbers of individuals who have obtained commissions as Foreign Service officers by this means has not been noteworthy. In fact, it is not unusual to secure a Foreign Service officer of exceptional quality in this manner. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 regularizes entrance into the Foreign Service by requiring all personnel seeking entry to be initially designated as career candidates. Should political influence be used to obtain status as a career candidate, the individual would nonetheless be required to pass through the probationary period during which qualifications would be carefully monitored. The levelling effect of the probationary period would screen out anyone who did not possess the necessary qualities to hold a commission in the Foreign Service regardless of how the candidate entered the program.

One intent of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 is to clearly distinguish between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service, thus reversing...
completely the process of integration begun in the early 1950s. The Act of 1980 contains provisions to convert certain specified positions within the Foreign Service to the Senior Executive Service or the general Civil Service. Availability for worldwide assignment is the critical factor in conversion. The conversion principally deals with Foreign Service Reserve officers with limited or unlimited tenure and Foreign Service Staff officers or employees whom the Secretary determines are not available for worldwide assignment. Under the Act, individuals in these categories who are available for worldwide assignment will be converted to the appropriate class of the newly established Foreign Service schedule or to the Senior Foreign Service, dependent upon the individuals class at the time of conversion. A three year period is established for phasing out those officers who are not available for worldwide service. No Foreign Service officers are automatically included in this conversion process. It is anticipated that a limited number of Foreign Service officers may request conversion to the general Civil Service or the Senior Executive Service. These instances would primarily be the result of their becoming unavailable for worldwide assignment through medical, family, or other such personal problem.

Only time will tell if the Department of State is successful in reducing its various categories of Foreign Service personnel to those of foreign Service officer and Member of the Service. This action, coupled with the conversion of many positions back to the Civil Service, will have an interesting effect on the analysis previously presented in regard to Figure 2 (General Schematic Diagram of Composition of a Professionalized Government Agency, page 156a). Basic changes would occur. The role of the Civil Service (Block 5) would be re-emphasized. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 which strengthened and modernized the conditions of employment as well as the management efficiency of the Civil Service in all departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the foreign affairs agencies, served to encourage the Department of State in its revision of the Foreign Service Act. The horizontal bottom lines of Blocke 2 and 5 may approach equality. Block 4a, the Foreign Service Reserve, and Block
The Foreign Service Staff, could be anticipated to disappear as accommodation techniques to protect the elite career service. The assets of the Reserve and Staff functions will either be converted to Block 5 (Civil Service) or Block 2 (the Foreign Service.) A period of three years has been statutorily prescribed to accomplish the needed conversions, such period to begin July 1, 1981.

CONCLUSION

Lateral entry, for all intents and purposes, ceased to be a point of major controversy in 1975. From that year forward in the Department lateral entry has been primarily associated with the Mid-Level Hiring Program for Women and Minority Group Members. Departmental statistics, other than for affirmative action, do not reflect significant lateral entry activity subsequent to 1976. A single lateral entrant is shown for that year.

For the first time in many years, hearings by the United States Senate and House of Representatives on a piece of major legislation dealing with the Foreign Service, the Foreign Service Act of 1980, did not contain significant debate over the question of lateral entry or expansion of the capabilities of the Department of State. That debate which did occur was limited to (1) basic assurance that the new Act continued to provide safeguards against lateral entry impacting on the career system adversely, (2) The exercise of severe control over non-affirmative action lateral entries to provide more promotion opportunities for the junior Foreign Service officers, and (3) alleged Departmental violations of the agreement with the American Foreign Services Association regarding the affirmative action lateral entries. There was also discussion of what the American Foreign Service Association considered to be excessive hirings of Foreign Service Reserve officers, especially for domestic positions. This situation is remedied in the Act of 1980.

The Department's decision to abandon the concept of a unified Foreign Service personnel system, although the subject still lurks, removed yet another fiery subject of debate. This decision is clearly reflected in the statement of the major features of the bill by Secretary Vance before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. "The bill," Vance stated, "recognizes the clear distinction between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service. It clearly limits Foreign Service career status only to those people who accept the discipline of service overseas." The Secretary continued to say that several hundred members of the Foreign Service in the Department alone had entered the Service without any real expectation that they would have to serve abroad, and who had not served abroad. The bill would convert these individuals to the Civil Service or the Senior Executive Service. The management efficiency of the Department would be improved. Departmental personnel laws would be consolidated, rationalized, and codified to meet current demands. There is evidence that this is being accomplished.

The history of the Foreign Service over the last 35 years when combined with recent developments indicates that lateral entry may have run its course as a reform measure. Lateral entry has served three purposes for the Department of State and the Foreign Service: (1) it has provided an expansion tool through which the Service was at least partially capable of meeting increased foreign affairs commitments; (2) it has supplied most of the staff for the administrative, consular, and smaller functional areas, although normal attrition is now diminishing that role; and (3) it has provided a means of accommodation through which the Department and the Service have met such varied requirements as persistent demands for the integration of the Foreign and Civil Service personnel systems and affirmative action programming.

An excellent case could be made for the point that many well-intended reform efforts brandished the sword of lateral entry without a full comprehension of the true value of the weapon, if any. Lateral entry, in these efforts, equated to strength in numbers and it was generally held that the Department of State was in part ineffective in its role because it lacked the necessary manpower to assimilate its rapidly growing responsibilities in the foreign affairs government.

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There is little evidence that lateral entry ever proved a wellspring of "new blood" or "new ideas" on the scope heralded by many proponents of the recruiting technique. Unquestionably many fine Foreign Service officers were obtained through lateral entry, a few rising to the highest positions within the Service and the Department. However, they were generally not recruited on that basis but rather as a "number" in one of the various integration programs, later to rise to prominence.

The great experiment with lateral entry may well be at an end. However, in the words of Carlyle, "Experience is the best of schoolmasters, only the school-fees are heavy." 197

197 Carlyle, Miscellaneous Essays, Vol 1, p. 137.
APPENDIX

STUDIES AND PROJECTS

1. "The Organization and Administration of the Department of State," Report submitted at the request of the Secretary of State by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, August 1945.

2. The Chapin-Foster Report of 1945 (internal to Department of State.)


4. "An Improved Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs," Report to the Secretary of State by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel, August 1950. (Rowe Committee.)

5. The first Brookings study (The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations, A Report Prepared for the Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, Brookings Institute, 1951.)


8. The report of the Secretary's Public Committee on Personnel, 1954. (The Wriston Committee Report.)

9. The second Brookings study (H. Field Haviland, Jr., et al., The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy, A Report for the committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, Brookings Institute, 1960.)


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