THE PEOPLE BE DAMMED:
THE TALE OF TUTTLE CREEK

A Thesis

Presented to

The Division of Social Sciences

EMPORIA STATE UNIVERSITY

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

By

James D. Genandt

July 1988

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

James D. Genandt for the Master of Arts

in American History presented on July 13, 1988

Title: The People Be Dammed: The Tale of Tuttle Creek

Abstract approved: 

This study focuses on a group of people living in the Blue River Valley of northeast Kansas, and their effort to stop the Tuttle Creek Dam and Reservoir. In this fight to save their homes, farms, businesses, churches, schools, and communities, the people took on the political power of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the big cities downstream, and the many small towns and rural areas affected by flooding.

The Blue Valley residents learned to organize themselves to perform various roles to strike back at the pro-dam forces. In particular, the creation of a study association to monitor governmental action on the big-dam proposal and the development of women into an active campaign force, made the anti-Tuttle Creek effort a notable grassroots political movement in the heartland of America.

This story is the result of interviews of major participants in the fight and their records, documents from several library and archival institutions, and newspaper reports from the time. From these accounts the fight of the Blue Valley is reconstructed to show, that though they were defeated on the issue of Tuttle Creek Dam and Reservoir, their argument for watersheds as the most effective means of attaining flood control and conservation of resources, is now the accepted practice.



Approved for the Major Division



Approved for the Graduate Council

PREFACE

The active participation of citizens in the American political process is a message emphasized in our education system. We are often taught that voting alone is not enough, we should also become informed on the issues and involved in the electoral and governing process.

Through much of the 1950s people living in the Blue Valley of Kansas made the decision to be active politically as the Army Corps of Engineers proposed to inundate the valley by building Tuttle Creek Dam and Reservoir. The Engineers were responsible for flood control projects throughout the nation and planned on Tuttle Creek to reduce flood problems downstream that affected the cities of Topeka, Lawrence, Manhattan, Kansas City, Kansas, Kansas City, Missouri, and the smaller communities and rural areas that were in the flood plain. The Blue Valley people fought back, but not just to try to preserve their homes, businesses, farms, schools, and churches. They also fundamentally disagreed on the method of how to attain flood control.

While the Corps of Engineers promoted big dams and reservoirs to reduce the damage from floods, the rural people pushed for the development of smaller detention dams spread throughout the upstream area. These watersheds would stop the water as it fell and would provide both land and water conservation. Though both of these methods were approved as national policy under the Pick-Sloan Plan, the Engineers had the overall authority to develop the plans and projects for flood control and deemed the big dam and reservoir plan as being necessary for the Blue Valley.

The men and women of the Blue Valley took on opponents who had more political savvy and power and were used to getting what they wanted.

Yet these Kansans developed strategies and techniques that gave the pro-dam forces all they could handle. Though those who favored the big dam would prevail, the effort of the Blue valley people was not without importance. Their courage, determination, and tactics served as the inspiration and model for other groups who would fight the big dam philosophy, and some of these later anti-big dam forces would be successful. In time even the Corps of Engineers dropped their method of the big dams to provide flood control on the tributaries of major rivers.

I am indebted to many people for their support, advice, and information in putting the tale of Tuttle Creek together. William "Bill" Edwards, a major participant in the anti-dam fight, welcomed me into his home for two interviews that serve as the core of the story. Bill Colvin also visited with me on the journalistic view of the events, the perspective outside of the valley. Former Governor and Congressman William Avery took time to share his perspective on the controversy and the assessment of the situation that he went through during the mid- and late-1950s. Doris and Leona Velen spent several hours answering my questions and going through their scrapbooks which contain hundreds of newspaper and magazine clippings and copies of literature the anti-dam forces developed during their fight. Staff members of the Truman and Eisenhower Libraries, the Kansas State Historical Society, the National Records Center-Kansas City Branch, and the Kansas City Office of the Army Corps of Engineers provided me with much information and leads to other sources while researching this study.

Several members of the faculty at Emporia State University also deserve acknowledgement for their support and assistance during both

this thesis and other coursework on my graduate program. To the members of my thesis committee-Dr. Tom Isern, chairperson; Dr. Loren Pennington, advisor; and Dr. Sam Dicks, who gave me the idea on Tuttle Creek--my sincere thanks for your review and comments. Others who provided encouragement are Academic Vice President Ed McGlone, former Dean of the Graduate School, Dr. James Lovell, Upward Bound Director, Linda Todoroff, and the staff of Project Challenge. To Zina Bryan, who put this work in final form, my gratitude and apology that it is so long.

I would also recognize the encouragement of the late Dr. Harold Durst. His personal interest in both me and this topic has a special meaning that no other person can know. More than a mentor and friend, Dr. Durst was a gentleman in the truest sense of the word.

Finally, I would thank my wife, Mary, and our families. They had to put up with me during this graduate program and their support was the key to getting through it. I cannot adequately express my appreciation to them. Mary, especially, had to put up with my travels, phone calls, and many hours of reading, writing, editing, and re-writing. She helped above and beyond the call.

To these people and those who I forgot to mention, thank you. I hope that my account of the story of Tuttle Creek will be of interest to all who read it and will serve as another chapter of history that is both local and national in character.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Notes are located at the conclusion of each chapter.

Chapter 1

The Damming of the Blue

Down near old Manhattan flows a river called the Blue,
The Army Engineers are there to see what they can do.
They want to spend a lot of money that's been taxed from me and you
To build a great big dam straight across the river Blue.
The rich Blue River Valley, the land we fought to keep,
Will soon be under water a hundred ten feet deep.
The Army boys are going to build a great big stagnant lake,
To heck with all the Farmers, it's for Kansas City's sake.
Just think of all the honest folks who'll be driven from their land
Because some big shot Army guy had this darned thing all planned.
Why don't they spend that money out upon the farm
And build a lot of little dams where the water does no harm.
And fix them with drainage tubes, so if comes a lot of rain
This threat can slowly drain away, that has these Army men insane.
Believe me, if this dam is built there'll be no merriment and mirth,
For this thing known as Tuttle Creek is the greatest shame on earth.

M.J. Lienemann[1]

The Blue River Valley of Kansas stretched north of Manhattan into southeastern Nebraska. It was the home to several thousand people, many of whom had roots going back three generations. In the spring and summer the fertile lowland area was plowed and cultivated for superior crop production; corn and wheat were predominant. After the fall harvest the livestock, cattle, and hogs were moved from the upper hills down to the lowlands for winter feeding. By 1951-52 a group of farmers and businessmen of the Blue Valley estimated the annual economic worth of agriculture in their area to be six million dollars. The people of the Blue Valley were scattered among farms and small towns and villages along the winding river. The valley and the hills were covered with trees that gave the area a blue tint when observed from the land alongside. Farmers were prosperous due to the good soil and plentiful water supply by rain and the river. Several communities were

located in the valley: the 1950 population of Bigelow was 375, Irving 279, Randolph 391, and Frankfort 1237. Others were so small that they were not identified in the federal census. These towns had businesses, churches, and schools. The people in and around the towns were a community of shared interests, needs, and pleasures. The Blue Valley ran through Marshall, Pottawatomie, and Riley Counties: 78 percent of Marshall County's population was rural, as was 100 percent of Pottawatomie's and 40 percent of Riley's (see map p. 6).[2]

The Blue River fed into the Kansas (or Kaw) River at Manhattan. The Kansas River then ran on by or through several cities--Topeka, Lawrence, on toward the Kansas Citys--before it emptied into the Missouri River. The water from the rivers was vital to both the rural and urban areas. At times there was not enough water; other times there was too much.

During the Great Depression the federal government took action toward the implementation of water control projects to battle both unemployment and drought conditions. Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to plan and submit for appropriation flood control projects throughout the nation. The Army was to perform this task in coordination and cooperation with the Department of Agriculture. The Missouri and Mississippi River Basins were early targets for such planning within the Engineers' jurisdiction. Among projects for the Missouri Basin was a Corps plan to control flooding on the Blue River of Kansas. The dam for this particular project would be built about six miles north of Manhattan on a small waterway known as Tuttle Creek.[3]

By the early and mid-1950s this flood control project had become a

controversial political issue. The Engineers were used to having their way, but the Blue Valley people organized opposition to the Corps' plan. Congress found itself caught between these two forces. Both the Blue Valley people and the Corps received active support from other sources. The people were assisted by individuals and groups who shared the beliefs that the Corps' plan was not valid and that the social and economic life of the area was more important than a big dam and reservoir. The Engineers received support from those who favored such a project to provide flood and water control, generally from the people who lived downstream, particularly in the cities. The elected officials in Congress from these areas were heavily lobbied for their votes either for or against appropriations for Tuttle Creek. Two Presidents of the United States were also involved. Both were from the Missouri Basin area of Kansas and Missouri: Harry S Truman, of Independence, Missouri, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, of Abilene, Kansas.

The story survives through the recollections and records of many participants in the conflict and the media coverage of the time. Personal interviews were conducted with several key participants. Many primary records and resources have been preserved by individuals and governmental repositories. Letters, telegrams, pamphlets, posters, scrapbooks, formal statements, newspaper stories and advertisements, and a movie provide the documentation for the Tuttle Creek story beyond participant recollections.

Through grassroots political techniques, homespun ideas, and the ingenious activism of women, the Blue Valley people fought on the political battlefield against the Army and the big cities. However,

the forces of nature would prove to be too powerful, too unpredictable, and too uncontrollable for the efforts of these courageous people. Still, their fight was not without significance, and that is the purpose of this story.

These people along the Blue River were from the country and small towns. They were farmers, teachers, businessmen, ministers, housewives, and children. Many were college educated. They carried on a campaign of public relations via newspapers, magazines, books, film, radio, and television; by telephone, mail, and telegram; by person-to-person and group appearances; and through car caravans, bus trips, and any other techniques that they thought might influence someone to support their fight against the Engineers and Tuttle Creek. They used their own money and raised other needed funds. Their time and energies were poured into this effort. The fight they made was more than just a defense of their lands and businesses. It was a protest against the procedures the government used in the planning and authorizing such projects. It was also an effort to spur a serious debate over national land and water management policies.

The tale of Tuttle Creek is one of local political action that grew to a national scale. It is the story of citizens versus the government and bureaucracy created by the people of the nation over time. It is record of a concerned populace that worked to influence national policy on natural resources. These people believed in the power of an aroused American citizenry. They believed that their cause was just, for in character and values they were everything that the American heartland was supposed to be: honest, gentle, humorous,

industrious, courteous, private, fair--working with the land in harmony with nature.

The tale of Tuttle Creek was important for three reasons. First, the Blue Valley people seized upon the opportunity to use the American political system for an effort they deemed necessary and right. Second, though not successful in their particular instance, they were successful--if indirectly--in influencing the thinking of future water projects related to flood control. Finally, their community life eptimoized small town life in rural America, a way of life that was hastened to its demise by Tuttle Creek Dam and Reservoir, though the demise was probably inevitable. Yet it was their sense of community that enabled these people of the Blue River Valley to make their effort and to accept their ultimate defeat and to go on despite it.

Tuttle Creek Reservoir with Affected Comminities Shown



Sources: "Stop Tuttle Creek Dam," Pamphlet showing Tuttle Creek Reservoir area and Communities affected by reservoir development, Velen scrapbooks, Manhattan, Kansas; Congressional Directory of the 83rd Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 642.

Notes for Chapter 1

1. M.J. Lienemann, "The Damming of the Blue" undated clipping, Howard S. Miller papers (hereafter referred to as Miller Papers), Collection 47.2, File 1.4, Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas. (The Kansas State Historical Society will hereafter be referred to by the abbreviation KSHS.)

2. Elmer T. Peterson, Big Dam Foolishness (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1954), p. 63; Census of Population-1950: Characteristics of the Population, Kansas (Volume II, Part 16, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 4, 11-24.

3. Peterson, Big Dam Foolishness. p. 31.

Chapter 2

Army Authorization and Organization of the Opposition

The Army Corps of Engineers were given authority by Congress in 1852 for river and harbor projects. In 1882 the Engineers began work along the Missouri River. By 1917 the responsibilities were expanded to include flood control planning. This authority was approved by Congress under the Flood Control Act of 1936. While the Engineers were theoretically under the supervision of the Executive Branch through the Department of the Army, in reality the Engineers developed their own policies and expected routine support from Congress. The Corps' projects were important to the Senators and Representatives whose states and districts benefited economically from such construction.[1] Former Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes described the Corps as:

> the most powerful and most pervasive lobby in Washington . . . . They are not only the political elite of the army, they are the perfect flower of bureaucracy. At least, this is the reflection that their mirrors disclose to them. Within the fields that they have elected to occupy, they are the law--and therefore above the law.[2]

Other than the economic benefits to an area due to construction, the Engineers also enjoyed broad support for the flood control aspect of their projects. Persons with homes and businesses along the lowlands often led the way to promote such projects. In response to their demands for flood protection, two general methods of control were developed. One method was the use of big dams and reservoirs, the other through smaller detention dams and land contouring to provide watersheds. The former method was primarily used on significant tributaries of rivers with flood histories. The reservoirs could be

wet or dry. Wet ones were permanent pools that could be utilized for irrigation, navigation, and recreation. Dry reservoirs comprised land not permanently inundated. Some part of these reservoirs might continue to be used for farming. Placement of the dams and pools was critical in both methods, but the placement of the big dams and reservoirs often provoked controversy. Luna B. Leopold and Thomas Maddock, Jr. commented on this controversy:

> Flood control has a land as well as an engineering aspect, and recognition of this fact in federal legislation has led to a dual attack on the problem of flood damage reduction. The upstream phase consists of conservation practices and structures on watershed lands. The downstream phase involves major reservoirs, levee systems, and related installations in major river valleys . . . . As a consequence of the fact that both upstream and downstream measures have a certain value, but that neither one nor the other provides completely adequate protection, a divergence of opinion concerning the relative importance of the various possible techniques for controlling floods has arisen . . . . The proponents of upstream engineering works and land management are aligned behind the flood control programs of the Department of Agriculture. Those who favor main-stem reservoirs and levees look to, and are spearheaded by the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army.[3]

Flood control along the Kansas River was an issue to the state and the Engineers as early as 1930. How such control could be integrated into soil and water conservation was a concern to the Chief Engineer for the State of Kansas, George S. Knapp. Nearly one hundred people gathered in August, 1930, in Topeka, to discuss the need for balancing flood control with proper conservation methods. This point was stressed by Knapp to his federal counterpart at the meeting, Lieutenant Colonel R.C. Moore of the Corps of Engineers. Moore had initiated the meeting to review plans and ideas for controlling the Kansas River. He told his audience that he wanted to hear what they

had to say concerning flood control on this primary tributary of the Missouri River.[4]

The Flood Control Act of 1936 recognized both upstream and downstream methods. The legislation also approved plans for both the Missouri and Mississippi River Basins to be in high priorities for flood control projects. One of the locations the Engineers first surveyed was a small creek that ran into the Blue River north of Manhattan. The Engineers believed that if flooding could be controlled on the Blue, then there would be fewer problems on the Kansas. The small creek near Manhattan was called Tuttle Creek.[5]

The Corps of engineers went into northeastern Kansas to conduct public meetings regarding a flood control project for the Blue River. These meetings brought out two opposing views. While the Engineers favored big dams and reservoirs, many of the people expressed opinions in favor of a system of levees to provide flood protection. The Engineers made projections of costs to complete their Tuttle Creek plan: $16.5 million would be needed for construction, $8.5 million for relocation of railroad lines and highways, $1.4 million for land acquisition, and $1.1 million per year upon completion for needed maintenance. The costs were justified, in the assessment of the Engineers, because the Tuttle Creek project would provide flood control for the Kansas and Missouri Rivers.[6]

In April, 1937, the Engineers held a public meeting in Topeka, at which they revealed that their plan for the Blue Valley would call for a reservoir area of 45,700 acres. At this time they proposed that it would be a dry dam, so that some of the acreage could continue to be

used for farming. The Engineers recorded no opposing comments to their plans at this meeting, and no mention of the meeting was made in the Topeka newspapers. However, the President of the Northern Kansas Conservancy District Council, W.E. Dannefer, subsequently wrote the Corps to ask for a map of the proposed Tuttle Creek and Milford dam and reservoir projects. The Corps, while telling him of the plans discussed in Topeka, said that such maps could not be furnished, as Congress had not appropriated any funds for the projects at this time, and therefore they were not official.[7]

the Washington, D.C., Corps Office notified its Kansas City District Office in July, 1938, that Tuttle Creek was the third priority of all flood control projects for the Missouri Basin. The Washington officials added that the plan was directly linked, in their elevation, to the number one priority for flood protection effectiveness--the Kanopolis Dam project. Congress had authorized the Tuttle Creek plan, but had not funded it due to other budget needs.[8]

Among the reasons no funding was approved was the effort of the Congressman for the area of Kansas where the project was to be located. Northeast Kansas, the First Congressional District of the state, was represented in the Congress by William Lambertson. He did not support the plan of the Engineers for the Blue River, nor did one of the state's United States Senators, Arthur Capper. Both officials were Republicans; in fact, the First District had always elected a Republican to serve it in the nation's capital. The active opposition of these two men to the flood control plan of the Corps seemed to convince other Congressmen that no appropriation should be approved for

the Tuttle Creek project.[9]

Despite Congressional denial of funds, the Corps believed that money would be available at some point due to the fact that Congress had authorized the plan. Thus they proceeded with detailed planning of construction, even during the Second World War. In December, 1942, the National Resources Planning Board requested the Engineers to furnish information on the population displacement that would result from the construction of Tuttle Creek. The Corps' reply was that of the 45,000 acres of land needed for the dam and reservoir, 85 percent would come from cultivated area. They projected that 217 families would be displaced from farms and 118 families would be forced to move from small communities. The Corps did not review the fact that in earlier testimony to Congress seeking project authorization, they had said no communities would be affected. This was to be a point of contention for the Blue Valley people that would spur their protest.[10]

Most of the people who lived on the farms of the Blue Valley were there due to either inheritance or marriage. Prominent among them was William P. "Bill" Edwards of Bigelow, one of several small towns along the river. The family had farmed land in the Valley since 1890. Bill Edwards took over the agricultural operation in 1935 after graduating from college. He was just one of several men in the area who began to pay attention to what the Engineers and the Congress were trying to do in their Valley. Another interested party was a farmer near Randolph, Glenn Stockwell. A graduate of Kansas State College in Manhattan, holding a degree in agricultural economics, he was a studious person who carefully researched an issue before forming and expressing an

opinion. He began to compile information on the Corps' plan. Stockwell also researched the method of flood control that he and most of his neighbors favored, that of upstream watersheds. Among the information he collected were speeches and sermons from the middle and late 1940s on the topic of land and resource stewardship. The other residents of the Blue Valley soon began to recognize the talent of these two men in developing a protest to the plan for Tuttle Creek.[11]

J.C. Christensen, another farmer near Randolph, contacted the Engineers in November, 1944. He inquired as to the organization of the Corps and the study process they had used to develop their plan for the Blue Valley. Brigadier General R.G. Crawford, Division Engineer for the Missouri River Omaha Branch, replied to Christensen's request:

> The investigation of projects to determine the advisability of their adoption by the Federal Government is one of the most important duties of the Department. However, in this connection, there are two particularly important considerations which should be understood. The first is that the Department does not initiate the investigation of a project; and the second is that the Department does not attempt to secure the adoption of a project which has been recommended by it to the Congress . . . . Then, when Congressional appropriations are made for its execution, its construction is pushed vigorously by the Engineering Department within the limits of the funds appropriated.[12]

Regarding the study done specifically for Tuttle Creek, Crawford told the Randolph farmer that the House of Representatives had approved a study for the Kansas river in August, 1931. In addition the Chief of Engineers had been instructed by Congress to prepare a comprehensive plan for flood control within the Missouri River Basin. These authorizations had led to the plan for Tuttle Creek. The Brigadier General also stated that when President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the 1938 Flood Control Act (which supplemented the 1936 legislation),

the Corps plan for Tuttle Creek had been approved, but no money had been appropriated. However, the Engineers were proceeding with plans for its construction because of the specific authorization, he said. Christensen was also informed that a series of public meetings had been held throughout the Kansas River area as early as 1930 and had continued in 1936, 1937, and 1944.[13]

The First District elected a new Representative in 1944, as Albert Cole, another Republican, replaced the retiring Lambertson. Cole continued his predecessor's stand on the Tuttle Creek plan, and in cooperation with other Kansas Senators and Congressmen, kept any appropriations from being approved throughout the balance of the 1940s. Many of the Blue Valley people felt that the dam would never be approved for funding and that their properties, communities, and way of life were in no danger.[14]

Actions were taken, however, both during and after World War II to renew the battle regarding Tuttle Creek. A part of the Flood Control Act of 1944, approved by Congress and the President, was the Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Plan. This was a combination of the two methods of flood control under direction of Colonel Lewis Pick of the Army Engineers and William Sloan of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation. The plan called for more than one hundred dams and reservoirs of varying sizes to be placed on the Missouri River and its tributaries. These projects would provide for irrigation, navigation, and recreational uses as well as flood control. Tuttle Creek was one of the projects included in Pick-Sloan.[15]

The Blue Valley people began to organize their opposition in 1946.

Farmers, businessmen, and others began to meet and plan what they could do to fight the big dam and reservoir. They represented not only the farmers, but also the residents of communities that could be affected by the Corps' project: Randolph, Irving, Bigelow, Cleburne, Stockdale, and others. Some of these people directed their protest and frustration toward the state's Governor, Frank Carlson. They believed that his active opposition to the plan was necessary to ensure that it would not be funded nor constructed. In replies to the Blue Valley people the Governor tried to indicate his understanding of their plight and to also point out that this was a federal issue over which he had little influence. However, in one answer Carlson stated, "At that time General Pick stated very definitely that the dam would not be built if the people did not want it."[16]

The Blue Valley people wanted the Corps' plan re-studied and evaluated. Albert Cole testified to both House and Senate committees and requested that Congress so instruct the Engineers. It was hoped that an alternate plan could be developed that would neither result in the loss of so much productive farmland nor affect any communities. The First District Congressman asked for a study to be made regarding the use of watersheds to provide adequate flood protection.[17]

The Army Engineers seemed to have the advantage in the controversy as to which method should be used. The cities downstream supported the Corps' project and used their political strength to continue pressing for appropriations. The Engineers also had the congressional mandate to oversee all flood control works in the nation, and they were convinced that Tuttle Creek was a significant part of the solution for

the Kansas and Missouri Rivers.

The Army hosted a dinner meeting in Topeka in March, 1947, for area businessmen and farmers. General W.E. Potter of the Engineers was asked to comment on the status of the Tuttle Creek project. He said that he had not planned on talking about the dam and reservoir, but he would relate recent developments about it. He went on to say that the latest report on the project had been forwarded to the Division Engineering Office and that it recommended:

> A very large Tuttle Creek dam, since residents of the Blue River Valley had declared that in the past if any dam is built in the Blue River Valley, it might as well be a big one.[18]

General Potter also stated that it would be six months before the report would go before the Congress. He said that even then appropriations could be delayed indefinitely if opposition formed and public protest continued. The issue was entirely in the hands of Congress and the citizens of Kansas, according to the General.[19]

The opposition that General Potter referred to was the Blue Valley Study Association. Formed by men of the Valley who had been meeting and monitoring the progress of the Engineers' plan, the group worked to gather information against the big dam and reservoir idea as well as to develop an alternative proposal relying on watersheds and better conservation practices. The leader of the group was J.A. Hawkinson of Bigelow. Glenn Stockwell and Bill Edwards were also active members. The study association lobbied both state and federal elected officials. The goal was to inform these officials and persuade them that the Corps' plan was not right for the Blue Valley, and that watersheds could work just as well as the big dam and reservoir plan.[20]

The Blue Valley Study Association (BVSA) also lobbied the Army Engineers, hoping that the Army would review their flood control plans and give more consideration to the watershed approach. The men of the Valley reminded the Engineers that these watersheds were also part of the Pick-Sloan Plan approved by Congress. J.A. Hawkinson wrote to the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors in February, 1948, and enclosed a petition with 3500 signatures of Kansans asking for a review of the small dam approach. The Valley leader told the Engineers that those who signed the petition "vigorously and unanimously oppose the construction of a single, large Tuttle Creek reservoir." Hawkinson also informed the Army that the Kansas State House of Representatives had approved the Pick-Sloan Plan only if Tuttle Creek was deleted from it. Finally, he used a statement made by the War Department on 7 June 1937 which said that a major flood control project on the Blue River was not justifiable in relation to the cost of construction and the economic production loss due to land acquisition and denial of further productive use.[21]

Later in 1948 the Bigelow farmer informed his study group that Tuttle Creek did not need the approval of the state legislature or the governor. Pressure on the state's Congressional delegation and other key members of the federal legislature had to be maintained to avoid an appropriation for the project. The anti-dam forces would need to continue to request that the Congress delete the big dam plan from Pick-Sloan. At a meeting of the BVSA in December, 1948, one member asked if attorneys should be retained to look into legal avenues to block the Engineers' plan, and whether if the dam and reservoir were

built, relocation costs would be paid by the federal government. An editor of the Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, present at the meeting, indicated that he was at work on a story about the Blue Valley fight to be submitted to Life magazine.[22]

In early 1949 the BVSA asked that the United States Department of Agriculture authorize watershed development along the Blue River for flood control. Hawkinson wrote to Congressman Cole and requested his assistance with this plea. The Blue Valley spokesman called the Tuttle Creek project a "blanket mortgage." The members of the study association were heartened by the letters of encouragement received from others who supported their fight against the big dam plan. This support came from individuals and groups outside of the Valley area. The Advertising Manager for the Case Farm Machinery Company, F.A. Wirth, wrote to the BVSA in January, 1949. He told the anti-dam forces that his company supported their effort to keep the Blue Valley prosperous agriculturally. He also suggested that the Kansans contact a newspaper editor in Oklahoma, Elmer T. Peterson, as he was outspoken for water and land conservation. Peterson believed in developing methods that would both provide flood protection and protect natural resources.[23]

Larry Ryan, the Kansas Secretary of State, wrote to President Harry Truman in March, 1949. He asked the Chief Executive to support the effort to delete Tuttle Creek from Pick-Sloan. Ryan's request was acknowledged by William Hassett, Secretary to the President. He informed the state official that the matter had been referred to the Bureau of the Budget for evaluation. Truman also formed a Missouri

River Basin Survey Commission to review the water projects proposed for the area. Hawkinson appealed to this commission for help in the anti-dam cause. He addressed the Missouri Basin Flood Control Conference Resolution Committee and asked for a review of the Engineer's plan. The Bigelow farmer informed the members of this committee that, though the Tuttle Creek plan had been authorized by Congress in 1938 and was an accepted part of Pick-Sloan, there had never been any funding approval. Hawkinson also told this committee that if it recommended a review of the Tuttle Creek plan, such a review was conducted, and the concensus was still in favor of the big dam plan, then the BVSA would withdraw its opposition. Later, he reported to the members of the study group that this committee refused to consider such a re-evaluation of the Engineers' plan. Hawkinson believed this was due to the influence of the committee members from Kansas City, and that these members blocked any serious consideration of the BVSA's appeal by telling the rest of the committee that the Kansas City group wanted Tuttle Creek and would block other projects desired along the Basin if the plan for the Blue River was deleted or delayed.[24]

The Blue Valley residents relied upon the support they had from Albert Cole. The Congressman had won re-election every two years since first taking office in 1944. The Valley people actively worked for him because of his constant opposition to Tuttle Creek; after all, it was his opposition to the project targeted for his district that had convinced other Congressmen not to approve appropriations. Early in 1950 Cole responded to a letter from Mr. H.E. Pfuetz of Randolph. The

Congressman reiterated his stand against Tuttle Creek. It was increasingly clear, however, that other members of the state Congressional delegation were not as opposed to the big dam plan. Only Representative Clifford Hope of western Kansas stood with his colleague from the First District. The other Representatives and the two Senators were either in favor of the proposal or noncommital. Frank Carlson had left the Governor's office for the U.S. Senate, and along with the state's other Senator, Andrew Schoeppel, voiced token opposition to the Engineers' proposal in the view of the Blue Valley people.[25]

As 1951 began, many of the people in the Valley felt as if a "black cloud" hung over them, according to one resident, Leona Velen. No construction had begun, no funds had yet been approved for Tuttle Creek. However, many of the farmers, businessmen, and housewives of the area felt that it would take little time for the Army to move in once appropriations were made. To save their land, homes, farms, businesses, schools, churches, communities, and way of life, these Kansans would need not only to lobby federal officials, but also to convince other citizens. Through individual and group meetings, through newspapers, radio, and a new form of communication--television--these people of the Blue Valley had to persuade others that their fight against the big dams and for the watershed method of flood control was right. The pro-dam forces downstream would be fighting for the construction of the big dam and reservoir. Those in favor would be formidable. The Kansas City forces wanting the dam would be able to raise money to generate publicity and

lobby elected officials to approve funding. The Blue Valley anti-dam group would also be taking on the Army Corps of Engineers. The Engineers were a powerful lobbying force in their own right and were used to having their way. As 1950 ended, a stalemate had been achieved by the anti-dam group. However, one side or the other would lose ground to forces beyond their control. Beyond the bureaucratic and political tugs-of-war were the forces of nature, specifically of flood and drought.[26]

Notes for Chapter 2

1. Kenneth S. Davis, River On The Rampage (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1953), p. 162.

2. Harold Ickes, Foreward to Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers And The Nation's Rivers, by Arthur Maass (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. ix.

3. Luna B. Leopold and Thomas Maddock, Jr., The Flood Control Controversy: Big Dams, Little Dams, and Land Management (New York: Ronald Press, 1954), pp. ix, 56, 83, 84.

4. Topeka Daily Capital, 15 August 1930.

5. Leopold and Maddock, Flood Control, p. 86; Paul Barber, Chief of Engineering Division, Kansas City Branch, Army Corps of Engineers, to Robin Blackman, 28 May 1976, in a personal letter from Philip Rotert, Chief of Planning Division, Kansas City Branch, Army Corps of Engineers, 25 March 1988. (Kansas City Branch, Army Corps of Engineers, hereafter abbreviated at KC-ACE.)

6. Lawrence Daily World-Journal, 7 October 1936; Douglas County Republican, 8 October 1936; KC-ACE, Memorandum to Chief of Engineers, Washington, D.C., 23 March 1937, NA Collection 586, Record Group 77, File 7063, National Records Center, Kansas City Branch. (Hereafter National Records Center, Kansas City Branch, abbreviated as NRC-KC, Record Group as RG.)

7. W.E. Dannefer, Letter to KC-ACE, 22 April 1937, and undated reply by KC-ACE. NA Collection 586, RG 77, File 7063, NRC-KC.

8. ACE, Washington Office, Memorandum to KC-ACE, 14 July 1938, NA Collection 586, RG 77, File 7063, NRC-KC.

9. William P. Edwards, personal interview with the author in Emporia, Kansas, 7 October 1986 and 25 January 1988 (hereafter referred to as Edwards interview.)

10. Chief of Engineering, War Department, Letter to National Resources Planning Board, 23 December 1942, NA Collection 586, RG 77, File 7063, NRC-KC.

11. Edwards interview; Doris and Leona Velen, personal interviews with the author in Manhattan, Kansas, 20 February 1988 (hereafter called Velen interview), T.S. Buie, Regional Conservator Soil Conservation Service, "The Earth is the Lord's and the Fullness Thereof," speech at Spurtanburg, South Carolina, 27 August 1944; O. Reeg, Pastor, sermon, Hebron, Nebraska, 2 May 1948; Adrian C. Fox, Soil Conservation Service, "Take a Look At The Land," speech, Lincoln Nebraska, 13 February 1949, Glenn Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Speeches 1944-50, KSHS (hereafter referred to as Stockwell Papers.)

12. R.G. Crawford, Brigadier General, ACE-Omaha Branch, Letter to J.C.Christensen, 6 November 1944, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-50, KSHS.

13. Ibid.

14. Edwards interview.

15. Program of Missouri Basin States Association Conference On The Pick-Sloan Plan, 10 and 11 August, 1983, Rotert Letter to the author, 25 March 1988.

16. Program of Missouri Basin States Association Conference On The Pick-Sloan Plan, 10 and 11 August, 1983, Rotert Letter to the author, 25 March 1988. Frank Carlson, Letter to C.J.D. Koester, 14 December 1948; Frank Carlson, Letter to E. Mabel Glurt, 31 March 1948, Frank Carlson Papers, Collection 92.15, File 18, Correspondence 1944-1953, KSHS.

17. Edwards interview.

18. C.C. Kilker, Secretary of BVSA, Memorandum of BVSA Meeting, 22 March 1947, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-53, KSHS.

19. Ibid.

20. Edwards interview.

21. J.A. Hawkinson, Letter to Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, 23 February 1948, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-1950, KSHS.

22. C.C. Kilker, Secretary of BVSA, Memorandum of BVSA Meeting, 2 December 1948; N.A. Harwood, Acting Secretary of BVSA, Memorandum of BVSA Meeting, 29 December 1948, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.4, Folder: Miscellaneous, KSHS.

23. J.A. Hawkinson, Letter to Charles Brannan, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, 11 January 1949; J.A. Hawkinson, Letter to Albert Cole, 19 February 1949; F.A. Wirth, Letter to J.A. Hawkinson, January 1949, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-1950, KSHS.

24. Larry Ryan, Letter to Harry S Truman, 8 March 1949, and acknowledgement by William Hassett, 19 March 1949, Truman Papers, PPF 310, General file 132 - Miscellaneous, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; J.A. Hawkinson, "Tuttle Creek vs. Pick-Sloan Plan," Report to BVSA, undated Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-1950, KSHS.

25. Albert Cole, Letter to H.E. Pfuetze, 12 January 1950, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-1950, KSHS: Edwards interview.

26. Velen interview.

Chapter 3

The Flood, Funding, Howard Miller, and the Blue Valley Belles

In 1951 Glenn Stockwell replaced J.A. Hawkinson as leader of the Blue Valley Study Association. Stockwell was a quiet man, but was highly respected for the manner in which he studied and formed his argument against the Engineers and Tuttle Creek. An able speaker on an individual basis, Stockwell was less effective before a group. For public speaking before groups and the committees of Congress, the Blue Valley continued to look to Bill Edwards. Both men possessed good writing skills. Stockwell concentrated on studying the dam situation, especially reviewing the proceedings of Congress. He tried to anticipate the actions of the Corps and the pro-dam Congressional forces so that counter-strategy could be employed by the Blue Valley.[1]

In May Stockwell contacted Jim Robinson, a reporter for the Topeka Daily Capital. He asked Robinson for assistance in assuring that the Blue Valley group would receive some attention to their side of the Tuttle Creek controversy. The Blue Valley leader mentioned that he and Bill Edwards would be in Washington soon to testify to the Senate Civil Functions Committee and that it was hoped, "Out of the chaos of Kansas may come a new water policy for the United States."[2] It was not just the proposed big dam that concerned the farmers, businessmen, and other residents along the Blue River; they also wanted to convince the Congress that their idea of watersheds and smaller detention dams would be just as effective. But the forces of nature played an unanticipated role in the political situation.

The spring of 1951 had been a wet one along the Missouri Basin, as precipitation had run far above normal. By June the area along most of the Kansas and Blue Rivers had received the amount of rainfall that usually occurred over an entire year. By the middle of June the rainfall seemed to have run its course, and it appeared that the summer would be normal. But the rain began to fall again on 9 July. The storm system homed in on northeastern Kansas and southeastern Nebraska, and did not move. For four days the area received heavy rains. Flooding occurred quickly. In Manhattan it was estimated that sixty percent of the city was under water up to eight feet in depth. According to eyewitnesses in the city, however, it was not the water coming downstream on the Blue that caused the problem but the backing up of the Kaw River into the Blue.[3]

Total flood damage in the affected areas of Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri was estimated at $750 million. The greatest loss in a single area occurred in the two Kansas Citys, where damage was estimated at $363 million. The Kansas State Board of Agriculture figured that more than $76 million in damage had occurred to farmland. This disastrous flood united the cities and rural areas downstream from the Blue Valley area to push harder than ever for the construction of Tuttle Creek.[4]

These groups received the benefit of other groups that previously had opposed or had been neutral on the big dam plan. The American Farm Bureau had been neutral prior to the flood and had begun to lean toward opposition. After the flood, however, the organization's president, Allen Kline, notified Glenn Stockwell that the Farm Bureau would not take any stand. An editorial in the Kansas City Star of 15 July stated

that while soil conservation was important, steps had to be taken to assure that the damage caused by such rainfall could never happen again. The Star said that the Tuttle Creek plan was the best solution to this problem. The cry was, "Never Again."[5]

The irreconcilable difference between the pro-dam and anti-dam sides was characterized by Leopold and Maddock:

> The areas flooded by reservoirs must be purchased either by agreement or condemnation. This procedure is usually objected to by the local community. When the area being occupied is some distance away from the protected area, there is no mutual interest between the two groups, and strong opposition to the Corps programs develops in many locations. This is the situation in the famous Tuttle Creek Dam controversy. The local communities on the Blue River have no concern for flood control for the downstream cities and can see no reason why the federal government, being essentially the only party with a direct financial interest, should injure them to confer benefits on cities downstream.[6]

Albert Cole began to feel pressure to review his opposition to the Engineers' plan. While he had opposed the plan since coming to Congress in 1944, the flood of July had heavily affected other parts of his district and of colleagues' districts. Cole struggled to remain firm in his opposition to Tuttle Creek. In a letter to Glenn Stockwell in August, he told the Blue Valley leader that his position was not easy for him to maintain. The Congressman said,

> I have not given up on the fight for real watershed control and flood prevention. I do not intend to do so, but the cause is a pretty lonely one at present.[7]

The Blue Valley people continued to receive support from other persons and organizations even after the flood. Five days after receiving Cole's letter, Stockwell heard from the Executive Secretary of the CIO, Anthony W. Smith. The labor official told the Kansas farmer that the CIO's Committee on Regional Development and Conservation had

gone on record against Tuttle Creek and Pick-Sloan. Smith added that CIO President Phillip Murray had contacted President Truman and relayed the labor group's position. The next day Stockwell heard from Benton J. Strong, President of the National Farm Union, relaying his organization's stand against the Corps' plan to the Blue Valley leader.[8]

President Truman was sent many letters from concerned citizens. The letters gave Truman both sides of the argument. Some favored the big dams, others favored the watershed approach. This correspondence was handled carefully. In response to one letter a Truman aide sent an in-house message that said:

> I agree that the attached correspondence should not be referred to the Corps for reply. I think that your suggestions that Budget might reply is a good one, if, as I assume is the case, they can assure the writers that the dam is in fact necessary . . . . I would suggest that you urge the Budget to answer these letters sympathetically, and not with dry gobbledygook.[9]

The Army Engineers were working at the same time to convince the Congress that the Tuttle Creek project was the answer to stop future flood damage. Some of the representatives of the Corps argued that if the dam and reservoir project had been in place, the damage from the 1951 flood would have been reduced significantly. General Pick stated on 25 July 1951 that "if we had had Milford and Tuttle Creek reservoirs we could have passed this flood by Manhattan and Topeka."[10] The pressure that the flood, the Corps, and the pro-dam forces were having on Congress was apparent in a letter from Cole to Stockwell on 16 August 1951. The First District Congressman told the Blue Valley leader that there seemed to be no opposition to Tuttle Creek in the Senate. The House was also under pressure from within to approve an appropriation

due to the effort of the Representative from Kansas City, Kansas, Erret Scrivener. Cole said that his opposition to the project in his district was about the only factor holding off funding for the construction of the big dam. He reiterated that the anti-dam advocates would need to continue an intense effort to oppose the corps. As Cole put it:

> By strong opposition I mean numerically strong. One member or fifty members of Congress can do nothing . . . . Again, I have explained this situation as carefully as I can in order that you may have the actual facts.[11]

The Engineers did not wait for an appropriation before starting surveys in the project area. Stockwell contacted Governor Ed Arn in late August 1951 and informed him that the Engineers had begun to move equipment into the Blue Valley. He wrote the Governor, "The farmers are refusing entrance on their land without a Federal Court Order . . . . We feel that the Army is attempting to breakdown our opposition." Stockwell added that he had learned of a siltation problem with the Corps' plan: it was estimated that only fifty to sixty years would be needed to silt up the dam completely. That same day Stockwell received a letter from William Voigt, Jr., the National Executive Director of the Izaak Walton League. Voigt informed Stockwell that the Izaak Walton League would stand behind the Blue Valley and help in the advocacy of watershed development. The League's first targets in this fight would be Senators Carlson and Schoeppel.[12]

Harry Truman received a telegram from Stockwell on behalf of the BVSA on 29 August. The message again pointed out the Valley's firm position against Tuttle Creek and implored the President to give consideration to the comments of the anti-dam letters he received.

Stockwell then notified all landowners in the Blue Valley to monitor any action that the Army took and to document it. He told them that signed statements would have much more effect in convincing others of the Corps' duplicity. However, he also warned the people that rumors would only hurt their own credibility in fighting the Army. If documented evidence were collected, it could be sent to Representative Clarence Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. It was reported to Stockwell that Representative Cannon was already upset with the Corps' behavior toward Congress. The Blue Valley leader asked that all such documentation be sent to him as soon as it could be confirmed.[13]

Other sections of Kansas began to take more interest in the Tuttle Creek controversy. A Wichita resident asked Glenn Stockwell for information about himself and the reasons for the Valley's fight. Stockwell's reply revealed his perception of the political aspects of the problem. In his opinion President Truman was strongly influenced by Roy Roberts of the Kansas City Star, who favored the construction of the dam and reservoir. Many Kansas Citians supported the plan for the industrial, business, and residential areas of the lowland around Kansas City that needed such flood protection. Stockwell responded that the people who lived or ran businesses in the low areas were not forced to do so. Therefore, why should they not move, instead of sacrificing the rich farmland of the Blue Valley for a project that would not be as effective as the Engineers claimed? Regarding the Corps, Stockwell told the Wichita resident:

> With them it is almost a personal feud. They have long resented the fact that a group of residents of the Blue Valley

> have stymied them. They have laid low for years waiting until a big flood.

Stockwell closed by noting that the land he farmed had been homesteaded by his wife's grandparents. He and his wife had three children, and Stockwell was fifty years of age. His daughter and her husband were helping with the farm operation while Stockwell and his wife worked to fight the dam.[14]

The Army Engineers were not content to wait for Congress to act on its own. They worked to convince more people, as well as undecided Congressmen, that their approach to flood control was the proper one and that Tuttle Creek was needed. Colonel L.J. Lincoln, District Engineer for the Kansas City Branch of the Corps, had a speech prepared in September 1951. Under the title, "Observations Concerning the 1951 Flood," Lincoln noted that the Senate had approved an initial appropriation for construction of the project on the Blue River, but that the House had not yet acted. Lincoln also stated that according to the estimates of the Engineers, had the Tuttle Creek project been in place before the rains of July 1951, the resulting flood would have been reduced by forty percent. He concluded his speech by saying:

> In closing, it is again emphasized by those of us responsible for the plans which have been generally discussed here, that it is dangerous to permit flood control works to linger too long in the formative stage, and that nothing can be done by the Corps of Engineers or any other agency toward realization of those plans without necessary action of the people through their Congress.[15]

While the Corps put forth this effort, the Blue Valley forces were also at work. They began to emphasize to the Army their proposed alternate method of flood control, watershed development. This approach

was advocated by the Department of Agriculture and was accepted by the Bureau of Reclamation under the Pick-Sloan Plan. However, simply talking about this alternative plan was not enough; it would need to be demonstrated in order to show others that it deserved consideration along with the Army's idea. The Secretary of the BVSA, F.W. Pfuetze, wrote to Ed Lohmeyer, of Greenleaf, Kansas, in October 1951 and said that land and water conservation had to be taught, for it would be difficult to enforce. In his opinion, if it was done voluntarily it would have more long-range effect than if it was forced. But few in the Valley took this advice to develop the alternative plan of flood control.[16]

While the Blue Valley and other anti-dam forces gained attention in rural areas, the Corps seemed to concentrate their effort in favor of the big dam in the cities and larger towns. As Kenneth Davis wrote in River On The Rampage:

> Small wonder that the loudest demand for Missouri River development was essentially a negative one, made chiefly by the cities. Stop this repeated flooding of urban areas! Keep the river away from our doors! Do whatever is necessary upstream to protect the wealth concentrated downstream! Kansas City, the most vulnerable to floods of all the valley's larger towns, was the most insistent in these demands, but other downstream towns joined in right heartily.[17]

In the late fall and early winter of 1951 the Army's tactics in the Valley were of high concern to Glenn Stockwell. He shared this concern with William Voigt, Jr., in November:

> I did not check in detail on other farmers but I know that some were tricked various ways. When some of the farmers consulted with their attorneys they were told that they had better sign as the Army could place tough appraisers in here and hold the price of land down. That has been the hardest point to overcome. Many farmers do not realize that our courts still stand over the Engineers even if the Executive department does not.

Stockwell closed his letter to Voigt by stating that the Army officials were tempting the farmers by offering money up front, immediately, for their land. But they also told the farmers that if they waited, the money would be delayed.[18]

Early in December 1951 the Kansas Watersheds Association held a conference in Topeka at the Jayhawk Hotel. The agenda for the meeting was prepared by Dwight Payton, editor and publisher of newspapers in Overbrook and Scranton, Kansas, a long time advocate of watersheds, and a firm opponent of the big dams. Members of the state's Congressional delegation were to appear at the morning session of the conference on 6 December. Later in the day the group was addressed by Wiliam Avery, a member of the Kansas House of Representatives. His remarks concerned the right and wrong way to develop flood control. A farmer near Wakefield, Kansas, Avery was a staunch believer in watersheds and other forms of land and water conservation. Also at this meeting to give presentations were William Voigt, Jr., of the Izaak Walton League, and Elmer T. Peterson, a newspaper editor in Oklahoma. Peterson was widely acknowledged as a leading spokesman for watershed programs as opposed to the big dam plans of Pick-Sloan. The participants and speakers shared ideas on water and soil conservation to promote effective stewardship of the land. Later that month Peterson received a letter from Irving Hill of the Lawrence (Kansas) Paper Company. Mr. Hill requested the Oklahoman's thoughts on the possibility of a film about the Tuttle Creek-big dam controversy.[19]

Harry Truman was lobbied late in 1951 by Representative Richard Bolling. Bolling, a Democrat, as was Truman, represented Kansas City,

Missouri. He favored the construction of Tuttle Creek and sought the President's personal assistance to get the House to approve an appropriation. He told Truman that this project was necessary and that without it there could be "enormous political repercussions" that could damage the chances of Democrats in the election year of 1952. While Truman pondered this request from Bolling, another letter arrived at the White House protesting Tuttle Creek. On the direction of the White House this was referred to the Budget Department for consideration.[20]

As 1951 drew to a close, the people in the Blue Valley realized they still had a hard fight on their ands. The United States Senate had approved money for the dam plan. It appeared that the House would delay approval only as long as Albert Cole stood firm in his opposition to a project in his district. The flood of July 1951 had given the pro-dam forces renewed zeal to fight. The dark cloud over the Valley seemed bigger and darker.

To one journalist of the area it was becoming apparent that the pro-dam forces had gained support due to the flood. Bill Colvin worked as an editor of the Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle. Prior to starting with that paper in 1952, he had been in the Topeka area, working for one of the capital city's papers, and in Parsons, Kansas. A native of Topeka, Colvin was familiar with the controversy that surrounded Tuttle Creek. While he worked for the Topeka Daily Capital from 1946 to 1950, Colvin became aware of the arguments of both sides. The Daily Capital was operated by the Capper family and would not take a position on Tuttle Creek; according to Colvin the Cappers' allowed the paper to take editorial stands only in favor of God, motherhood, and the flag. The

other newspaper in Topeka, the Journal, did take a pro-dam position, which reflected the feelings of most Topekans. In Colvin's view this was also the opinion of most people living in the Kaw river valley below Manhattan. The veteran newspaper reporter and editor was determined to present the ongoing story as objectively as he could. Colvin realized that many of the people in Manhattan who had been anti-dam before the flood were changing their view after the flood. Businesses seemed to be "less than open" about their position toward the dam. The people of the Blue Valley were good customers and investors and the Manhattan merchants wanted to keep them as long as possible, but also did not want to risk their stores from future flooding. Colvin attended meetings in the Valley, gave his opinion when it was sought, and wrote corresponding articles and comments to inform his paper's readers of the situation.[21]

The effort to educate and persuade the public, the media, and the politicians was continued by both the pro- and anti-dam forces in early 1952. William Voigt, Jr., used his position with the Izaak Walton League as a forum for the advocacy of watersheds and other means of conservation and flood prevention rather than the large-scale projects of flood control pushed by the downstream forces and the Army Engineers. Voigt wrote to J. Hammond Brown, Executive Director of the Outdoor Writers Association of America, and commented on the Corps plan. He told Brown that the Tuttle Creek project would result in the loss of use of fifty-five thousand acres, primarily productive farmland. To build the project, the Army estimated in 1949, sixty-eight million dollars would be needed. The projected annual benefit of the dam and reservoir on flood control was three million dollars. Voigt pointed out

to Brown that of this annual benefit estimated by the Army, over three hundred thousand dollars was due to the flushing of sewage down from Kansas City. Other benefits were projected due to the reduction of downstream flood damages and protection costs. The Izaak Walton League official asked if this was a fair trade-off with the forfeiture of yearly agricultural projection from the targeted area of six million dollars, as well as other economic losses of the Blue Valley. Voigt wrote:

> Came the 1951 floods, and the Army went on a propoganda rampage even worse than that of the turbulent waters of the Kaw. The Army brass even accused Congress of being to blame for the flood damage--in effect, that is, because Congress hadn't appropriated enough money so Tuttle Creek and a few other dams could have been built. They forgot that they didn't have perfected engineering plans for building them. They also forgot to mention that the rainfall pattern was such that even if their dams had been built in the Kansas River valley they wouldn't have halted the flood, because they were spotted in the wrong places to catch the downpour.

Voigt closed his letter by calling the effort of the Valley residents in opposition to the Army the "Blue Valley technique."[22]

The same day Voigt also wrote to Glenn Stockwell. He warned the leader of the Valley:

> In my opinion, the army folks will not make an all-out effort to discredit or circumvent the Tuttle Creek facts and make their construction program stick this election year. Now is the worst possible time for you people to become complacent. I believe you and all of the associates and allies you can assemble around you, should get on your horses and do a "Paul Revere" act as you have never done before.[23]

The anti-dam proponents received some assistance from remarks made by the Engineers. The Clay Center Times reported the comments of Dr. H.E. Myers, Assistant Dean of Agriculture at Kansas State College in Manhattan. Speaking before a meeting of the Clay County Soil

Conservation Association, Myers stated that high-ranking Army Engineers had privately said that their flood control projects would not have prevented the disaster of the 1951 flood.[24] Following this, the Valley learned that a hydraulic engineer at the University of Kansas had come to a similar conclusion based upon studies he made with the weather information and the plans of the Army. The 2 February 1952 edition of the Kansas Farmer reported that Professor J.O. Jones had concluded that the Army's big dam and reservoir projects would have had minimal effect on the previous summer's flood if they had been in place. The University of Kansas instructor also commented on the watershed and little dam alternative plan advocated by the anti-Tuttle Creek forces:

> One thousand such dams would cost less than seven percent of the estimated cost of one Tuttle Creek dam. Moreover, the benefits of flood control would be carried far up the valleys instead of being limited to the lower areas of the main river valleys.[25]

Groups favoring downstream flood control on the Blue River were also at work. On Valentine's Day the Railroad Engineers' Committee on Flood Control met in Kansas City. Thirteen railroads endorsed a resolution calling for the funding and construction of the Tuttle Creek project. Those who supported this resolution included the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad, the Union Pacific Railroad, and the Missouri Pacific Railroad. Colonel L.J. Lincoln, of the Army Engineers, also pushed for action to get construction underway. He spoke to the Kansas Society of Professional Engineers on 22 February 1952. He defended the expertise of the Corps in developing effective flood control projects and reminded his audience that Congress empowered the Engineers with the authority for all such projects throughout the

nation. He closed his remarks by telling the civilian engineers, "The Corps of Engineers builds dams that do not fail."[26]

In February the U.S. House of Representatives' Appropriations Subcommittee on Civil Functions held hearings on Tuttle Creek. One who testified against the proposed dam was Frank Mulken, representing the Izaak Walton League. Another person who testified was Albert Cole, but the Congressman's position on the big dam had changed.[27] The First District Representative had toured the flood area the previous summer and viewed the damage and destruction. The persistent argument of the Engineers and the pleas of the people who had suffered damage made Cole review his stand in opposition to the dam and reservoir. In a statement to the subcommittee the Congressman said:

> The issue then boils down to one point: Shall we have a Federal flood control project? Having answered "yes" to that question, and realizing that all official government opinion favors Tuttle Creek, I have come to the conclusion that we either take Tuttle Creek or nothing.
>
> I saw the horrible, tragic destruction of homes, farms and businesses caused by the 1951 flood. It is my duty as a Representative to do what I can to prevent future loss of life and property in my district.
>
> I have decided, therefore, to support the appropriation for Tuttle Creek Dam.[28]

The people of the Blue Valley had difficulty understanding why Albert Cole had changed his position. Bill Colvin, however, believed that the Congressman made an objective assessment of the situation and had come to his conclusion without bowing to pressure from the pro-dam forces. The Valley people were not so sure. But Colvin explained that the Pick-Sloan Plan of the Army was the only complete and comprehensive plan for flood control. The alternative method of the anti-dam forces had not been totally developed; to Colvin it seemed mostly talk and

little demonstration. The Manhattan editor explained Cole's final question to himself as echoing that of the flood victims after the disaster of July 1951:

> In the immediate aftermath of one of those horrendous, disastrous happenings people say: "My God, what could we have done to avert this?" Albert Cole made his decision to support the dam in good conscience.[29]

Congress did not act with speed to vote on the appropriation for Tuttle Creek. Meanwhile, the people of the Blue Valley targeted Cole for their frustration and anger. Many of the people were convinced that the Representative had given in to pressure from the Kansas City area and the Army. To Dwight Payton it was simply a matter of who had greater political power between the big cities and the rural areas. He wrote to a fellow reporter of the Wichita Eagle in early March and commented:

> I spent the major part of last week in Washington and can report that the Tuttle fight is still in balance. The Kansas City, Kansas gang lowered the boom on Al Cole and swung him over. Cole has been a favorite of mine, though I am not in his district, and it hurts a little to see him crack under pressure. For me this is another score against the Kansas City, Missouri political machine and the yoke of out of state control over Jayhawk political destiny galls to a raw, red burn.[30]

Elmer T. Peterson began to take a more visible and active role in opposing the big dam methods of the Corps. In a letter to the Brown County (Kansas) Soil Conservation District in April 1952, he stated his "bona fides" to be involved in the controversy. Peterson commented that he had lived near the Blue Valley area and had been a Kansas resident for over twenty-four years and still owned a farm nearby. The Oklahoma newspaperman later wrote to Glenn Stockwell and said that the Blue Valley fight was right and would prevail. Peterson stated that the

pro-dam forces would be "confounded" by the anti-dam effort. To these people it still figured that logic and common sense could sway the thinking of elected officials and, perhaps, even the Engineers.[31]

Harry Truman also took action in relation to Tuttle Creek during the spring of 1952. The President wrote to Senator Kenneth McKellar, Chairman of the Senate appropriations Committee. Truman told the Senator that the Engineers' projects for Tuttle Creek and Glen Elder in Kansas were necessary and that he believed his Missouri Basin Survey Commission would back his position on these and other projects under Pick-Sloan. The President also acknowledged a letter from the mayor of Manhattan which supported funding for Tuttle Creek.[32]

As the Congress moved closer to adjournment, no approval of an appropriation had yet been made. The pro-dam forces and those who opposed the project had lobbied hard, each believing their position was the right one for survival and for the best interests of national resource policy. In May 1952 the magazine Country Gentleman carried an article by Peterson. The title of the article became the slogan for the fight by the Blue Valley. "Big Dam Foolishness" raised the question of the effectiveness of the Corps' dam and reservoir plan versus the loss of fertile agricultural lands. The Oklahoma editor described the method he and the anti-big dam forces favored:

> We can do it by making full use of little dams and modern soil and water conservation practices which stop or slow down the water where it falls. And instead of inundating rich lands behind huge dams, this agricultural type of flood control makes farmlands more productive.

Peterson then described the groups involved in the controversy:

> On one side are the Army Engineers, driving hard to put across a costly big-dam program before the memory of last summer's terrible flood wears thin. Backing them are politicians with a keen sense of the pork barrel, a powerful tax-financed bureaucracy and some newspapers and business interests . . . . On the other side are the farmers organized into numerous watershed organizations, backed by many newspapers and unorganized citizens.

He elaborated on the advantage of the watershed approach, emphasizing the effectiveness and cost-efficiency. His conclusions were based on information from surveys done by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service (SCS). The SCS plans for little dams would cost one-third of what was proposed in big dams by the Engineers, and according to Peterson, the little detention dams would protect the lowlands sufficiently while keeping twice as much farmland in production. He contended that there was much less of a siltation problem with the SCS approach. He concluded the article by offering this opinion on the Army Engineers' credibility as related to the 1951 flood:

> For that matter the usual big dams won't do such a job anyhow. Professor Walter Kollmorgen, chairman of the department of geography at Kansas University, wrote in an article in the Topeka Capital: "The Pick-Sloan plan, even if . . . . completed in the Kaw Basin by July, 1951, would not have prevented our disastrous flood, or even minimized it substantially . . . . Waters from the second protracted rain would have found all the reservoirs filled and would have passed over the dams in such volume that disaster downstream would have been about the same."[33]

Reader's Digest reprinted the article in its July issue. The Blue Valley people had it reproduced in volume to distribute to show the logic of their argument against the big dam. "Big Dam Foolishness" and "Stop the Water Where It Falls" became the battle cries of the Valley. One of the housewives took the idea of having two young children pose in

their diapers with their backs to the camera. On the back of each diaper was one of the slogans, and the resulting photograph was repeatedly used for publicity about the fight against Tuttle Creek.[34]

A new approach toward President Truman was tried in May 1952. Doris Velen, an elementary schoolteacher in Manhattan, opposed the big dam. Doris and her sister Leona (also a schoolteacher) were involved in the Blue Valley fight, because they grew up on a farm near Cleburne. They still owned the land in the Valley and firmly believed that the Army's method for flood control was wrong. They had less to lose than many of the Valley people, but they devoted their evenings and weekends to help with the effort to defeat Tuttle Creek. Doris shared the same birthdate with Harry Truman. With the shadow of an appropriation looming larger than ever before, Miss Velen sent a birthday greeting to the President and included a plea for his help in stopping the big dam. The White House acknowledged her special letter to Truman, but informed her that the federal budget for the 1952 fiscal year did include funding for Tuttle Creek.[35]

Later in May Glenn Stockwell testified before the Senate Civil Functions Committee. After reviewing the Blue Valley's criticism of the Army's plan and relating the watershed alternative, the Blue Valley leader challenged the Senators to have the issue formally reviewed. He told the Committee:

> If Tuttle Creek is found physically sound from the engineering standpoint and economically feasible from a realistic comparison of the cost-benefit of ratio then it should be constructed for flood control only, since flood control is our paramount problem in Kansas.[36]

By June the political races began to attract some attention in the

state and the First District. From the Second Congressional District came the re-election announcement from Representative Scrivener of Kansas City, Kansas. The Topeka Daily Capital carried the declaration of the incumbent Republican and noted that Scrivener had spearheaded the drive to have Tuttle Creek approved for funding. He had been a member of the House Appropriations Committee since 1946. It was a good assumption that he would easily be re-elected and continue his effort for the dam. The same issue of the newspaper carried two other stories related to Tuttle Creek. On the third page, near the story on Scrivener, was a headline which read, "Flood Control Study Group Tours State." Truman's Missouri Basin Commission was to visit the site of the Tuttle Creek dam and conduct a public hearing in Kansas City. On page 12 was the headline, "Rep. Albert Cole Seeks Re-election." The story noted that Cole was seeking his fifth term, but there was no mention of Tuttle Creek or the flood control issue.[37]

The Missouri Basin Commission met in Kansas City on 3 June. The chairman of the Commission was James E. Laurence, editor of the Lincoln Star (Nebraska). The Topeka Daily Capital reported that of the various views presented at the hearing, two were expressed most often. One view favored the Pick-Sloan Plan for big dams and reservoirs; the other view supported smaller dams and watershed development to achieve the same goal of flood control. Colonel L.J. Lincoln defended the Engineers' proposal. Kansas Governor Ed Arn requested that any approval for either view be delayed until comprehensive plans by each side could be submitted to and studied by the President's Commission.[38]

The Blue Valley had several representatives testify against the

Tuttle Creek plan. Bill Edwards and Glenn Stockwell gave statements. However, the most impassioned plea came from Leona Velen. She asked that the Commission consider the intangible value of the Valley and what would be taken away if the Corps' project was built. The Manhattan schoolteacher said:

> Here you have a stable community life which has developed since the days when the pioneers first built their homes in this valley. Most of the farms still remain in the hands of the direct descendants of those who homesteaded there . . . . A survey shows that many farms in the Blue Valley have been in the same family for more than half a century. The average is over forty years and in one case the tenure is almost one hundred years. Generations of living and working together builds a powerful community pride and solidarity.

Of particular concern to Miss Velen was the Swedish settlement of Mariadahl. This small community in the Blue Valley was home to the oldest Swedish Lutheran Church west of the Missouri River. Also, the Mariadahl Children's Home was involved. Operating since 1879, it took care of children from less fortunate circumstances. The home was another example of the Blue Valley taking care of its own and helping others. After giving the Commission this background, Miss Velen concluded her comments:

> Courage, industry, thrift, and a deep religious faith in this heritage may have been received from Mariadahl in the Blue Valley. The material wealth of the valley and its potential resources can be estimated in dollars and cents. What about intangible values, the spiritual, cultural, and moral fibers of this community? Are they not important to American society? Perhaps they should be given greater consideration.[39]

The people of the Blue Valley and others who also believed in their cause held out hope that their arguments to the President's Commission would persuade the Commission, as well as Congress, to withhold funding for Tuttle Creek and to review the Corps' plan under Pick-Sloan. But

just days after Miss Velen's statement the Topeka Daily Journal reported comments made by the head of the SCS. Dr. Robert M. Salter, a member of the President's Commission, had surveyed the Kansas River area and said that only a combination of the watersheds advocated by the Blue Valley as well as the big dams advocated by the Engineers would achieve the proper amount of flood control.[40]

Three days later, on 11 June, the residents along the Kansas and Blue rivers learned that the Senate Appropriations Committee had approved ten million dollars to begin work on Tuttle Creek dam and reservoir. On 17 June the Daily Capital reported that the Senate approval mandated that the reservoir be a single-purpose (or dry) facility. The Sunday edition, three days later, stated that Senator Scheoppel believed seventy-two thousand acres would be needed for the entire project. He also commented that only twenty thousand acres would be permanently taken from agricultural production. The other acres would be available to some extent for farm use with priority to go toward former landowners. However, the House of Representatives had yet to take action on the Tuttle Creek proposal.[41]

While the Senate and House worked on what action should be taken, the Engineers responded to Peterson's attack on their flood control plans. The Topeka Daily Capital carried the Army response to the Oklahoman's earlier article, "Big Dam Foolishness." They said that his story was a "flood of misinformation." In a sixteen thousand-word retort the Army acknowledged that a bitter fight had developed over Tuttle Creek and the entire Pick-Sloan Plan regarding big dams and reservoirs. The Engineers said that this fight was not due to their efforts, but was

entirely due to Peterson and others who agitated the people in the affected areas. The Corps noted that the persons who spread such misinformation did so through their "stubborn determination" that "ignores real need."[42]

By July Congress was working toward adjournment. The House was slow in acting, and to most observers it appeared that Tuttle Creek might again fail to receive an appropriation. Still, the pro-dam forces did not give up. Willard Breidenthal, a prominent Kansas City businessman, wrote to the President, commended his support for the project, and asked him to continue to do so. Then the Daily Capital carried a story on Sunday, 3 July, that reported the approval of Congress for Tuttle Creek would be given just before Congress left Washington for the summer. The article stated that five million dollars would be granted for initial construction and land acquisition. According to estimates, the project would not be completed until 1958.[43]

By 7 July 1952 many members of the Congress had left to begin their summer vacation and work toward re-election. The national party conventions would meet later in the summer, and there was much excitement as the incumbent, Harry Truman, was not seeking another term. Each party looked forward to a new standard-bearer and renewed energy and enthusiasm for the fall general election. However, some members of Congress were still in the nation's capital conducting government business.

The Blue Valley people had not stopped contacting Congressmen. They had accepted the earlier advice of William Voigt and had kept up a steady, and sometimes heavy, stream of letters and telegrams to

Washinton. The implored these elected officials to oppose the big dam plans. As word reached the Valley that a final vote was possible on Tuttle Creek just before adjournment, the Valley people again moved into action. Using the party lines of the telephone service in their area, they were able to alert almost everyone in short order. The residents were told to write letters and put them out by their mail box by Saturday night, 5 July. Several volunteers then collected the letters by car and brought them into Manhattan. From there they were bundled together in a mail sack and taken to the airport so that the correspondence pleading for the life of the Valley would reach Congress as fast as possible. Nearby friends and family members who shared the same view were also asked to take part in this "Pony Express" mailing. They hoped that the flood of mail would convince Albert Cole and one of the two Senators to switch their positions and oppose the dam; it was doubtful the Congress would vote for a major project against the wishes of the state's elected officials.[44]

The Congress was set to adjourn by late in the afternoon of 7 July. Thirteen senators and sixty-seven representatives were still holding the legislative body in session. One of the measures they had to vote on that day was a $584 million appropriation bill for river, harbor, and flood control projects. Listed within this measure as a minor item was a $5 million request for Tuttle Creek. This "rump Congress," as stated by one observer, passed the bill and moved to adjourn and leave the hot, sultry hill in Washington. The Topeka Daily Capital carried this headline on its front page of the evening edition for that day: "Blue Valley Begins Fight For Its Life." The next day's edition carried a map

of the Corps' plan for Tuttle Creek. The reservoir would extend north from Manhattan to near Blue Rapids and Marysville.[45]

The people along the Blue River reacted with many emotions--shock, disbelief, bitterness, and anger. While there were a few who thought the Congressional action was the end of the attempt to stop the dam and reservoir, most of the people decided to continue the fight. To these people it appeared that the government had been irresponsible. The villains were not only the rump Congress but also the Engineers, especially as personified by General Pick. The pro-dam forces in the big cities, especially Kansas City, were also targets of their anger and thirst for justice. The controversy became even more one of rural versus urban, as Kenneth Davis noted:

> Dangerous stereotypes come into play when the issue becomes one of city vs. country. The city man sees his opponent as a country yokel as slow of wit as he is of speech, ignorant of all that lies beyond a near horizon . . . . The rural man sees his opponent as a city slicker incapable of the finer emotions, grossly materialistic, and as false as he is glib in the service of purely selfish desire.[46]

The Engineers hoped to move quickly to get the project underway before any fight the Blue Valley put up could take effect. The Corps figured that construction could begin within sixty to ninety days. By October the bids would be awarded. Three thousand acres of land would be acquired to allow work to begin at the dam site. State Highway 13 would also have to be relocated.[47]

But the Blue Valley did fight back. Dwight Payton, a firm supporter of the anti-dam forces, was President of the Kansas Watersheds Association. He was told by other Association members to do all he could to help the Valley people. The issues were many, the right to keep land

and home was just one: "To confront the right of eminent domain by challenging the existence of any public good is to hit at the heart of the situation . . . . and maybe work a miracle." This was one member's advice to Payton. Several residents immediately cabled or wrote Truman asking him to veto the entire appropriations bill. This would stop the construction of the project. But the President did approve the bill. The fight did not stop.[48]

However, there was one critical problem affecting the energy that could be put into the Valley fight. Wheat harvest was approaching, and the men were needed in the fields. Most of the men had to get the farm work done and ignore the dam problem. Glenn Stockwell was able to continue his research and fight because he had help on his farm, but he could not carry on an effective fight alone.

The fight now became the contest of the women of the Blue Valley. The farm wives, business wives, ordinary housewives, the schoolteachers (like the Velen sisters), and those who were older, the aunts and grandmothers, took on the responsibility to fight the Congress, the Corps, and the cities. Some were available to work on the effort every day, others gave their time on evenings and weekends. Some organization was in place due to the work of the women in churches and civic clubs. There was a cooperative leadership among the women. They shared their homespun ideas. Some were considered, developed, and used, others discarded, but they took action only after thoroughly preparing themselves on the issue.

Some of the women took on leadership roles. Mrs. Grace Stockwell and Mrs. Gladys Phillips were the primary organizers and speakers.

Leona Velen began to write a newsletter and other reports to be distributed for their cause. She was soon contacted by a woman from Kansas City who had started the United Amateur Press Association. This woman asked Miss Velen to submit reports for distribution.[49]

While the women prepared themselves and readied their strategy, others took actions available to them. Elmer Peterson wrote to an acquaintance of his, Milton Eisenhower, a former president of Kansas State College and brother to the Republican candidate for President, Dwight Eisenhower. Both were natives of Kansas, and the state took pride in their fame. Peterson asked Milton Eisenhower to use his relationship with his brother to assist the Blue Valley people in fighting Tuttle Creek if the former Army General were successful with the fall election and became President. Yet, at the same time, Andrew Schoeppel wrote to many of his Kansas constituents and gave them his reasoning for supporting the Tuttle Creek project. He reminded the people of the opinion of the head of SCS that both watersheds and the Corps' approach would be necessary to avert future problems such as the 1951 flood. Tuttle Creek was, therefore, in the best interest of Kansas and other states affected by those flood waters.[50] A few days later Elmer Peterson responded to this in a letter to Glenn Stockwell:

> You can't trust any of those politicians any farther than you could throw your favorite Hereford bull by the tail. They are all treacherous, so don't take them into your confidence. Keep your powder dry.[51]

By the end of July the Engineers had appraisers in the Valley. They soon completed work on four farms and began appraising two more needed to gain the information necessary for the immediate dam site. A

Topeka paper reported that the appraisers were treated cordially at all the farms. The presence of the appraisers made the Blue Valley people move toward a different source of hope than was usually recognized. On the Saturday evening of 26 July, some three hundred Valley residents gathered near the dam site and united their voices and thoughts in prayer, hymn-singing, Bible-reading, and recitation of special poems written for the occasion. Perhaps divine intervention would lead the way.[52]

The next day the women of the Blue Valley met at the Curtis Phillips farm in the afternoon. Mrs. Gladys Phillips and Mrs. Aileen Johnson shared an idea with the rest of the women: why not go see President Trumen when he was in Kansas City? It had been reported that he would spend several days there in August. Each women sent a telegram to Truman asking for an appointment to see him.[53]

While waiting to receive a response to their many requests, the women and the Blue Valley Study Association worked together to make sure that the women knew every detail of the issues involved. They went over the information compiled by Glenn Stockwell that pointed out the inadequacy and costliness of the Army plan and the efficiency and economy of the watershed approach. The goal, at least, was to have Truman hold up further construction on Tuttle Creek until a thorough review of both plans could be completed by the Missouri Survey Commission.[54]

Mrs. Edith Monfort, an active member of the Kansas Watershed Association, wrote to Dwight Payton at the end of July on the costs and benefits involved. Mrs. Monfort told the president of the state

organization that:

> The law of 1936 requires that the estimated costs shall be less than benefits, but there has been so much fuss over the country to the effect that agencies consistently underestimate costs in order to get their projects through that we are almost morally obligated to fight on that issue.
>
> Seems to me that the matter is almost past arguing the authorization anyway and that the logical point now is to fight condemnation on the grounds that in as much as costs to the nation will exceed benefits, there is no public good to be served and therefore no right to condemn property.

She concluded that after this cost-benefit point was emphasized, the anti-dam fighters should move to emphasizing the "Stop the Water Where It Falls" argument.[55]

Others did continue to work on the issue of original authorization, however. Bill Edwards was convinced that the authorization was the key to proving the inaccuracy of the Engineers' plans and predictions regarding the effectiveness of the dams and reservoirs. This original authorization was approved with the understanding that no communities would be affected. The plan Congress funded would inundate up to nine communities.[56]

The women had not heard from the President. However, the newspapers reported that the President would be at the Muehlebach Hotel in downtown Kansas City on 1 August 1952. That morning about twenty women from the Blue Valley were driven to Kansas City. The women decided to take the chance on getting to see Truman after they arrived at the hotel. They gathered in a hotel across the street from the Muehlebach and went over in groups of twos and threes to where the President was staying. They hoped to avoid undue attention until after they had a visit with Truman. Despite their caution the reporters at

the Hotel to cover the Chief Executive noticed the women and began to ask them questions about the reason they were there. While some of the women carefully explained their mission to the press, others sought out the assistants to the President and asked for an appointment to present their case to him. Truman sent word down from his suite that he would see two of the women as representatives of the group. Though the others were disappointed, the group quickly agreed that two should speak with the President. The other women continued to talk to the press and present their information on the fallacies of the engineers' proposals and the effectiveness of the watershed alternative. The women had prepared notebooks and albums to support their argument. They shared these with the press while Mrs. Gretchen Dreith and Mrs. Aileen Johnson met with President Truman. After twenty minutes the two women emerged from their meeting with Truman and were immediately surrounded by the press and other members of their group. The two ladies reported that the President had listened briefly to the argument and stated that the dams proposed by the Engineers were necessary for flood control. Truman had told them that the plans of the Army were in the best interests of the state of Kansas and the entire nation.[57]

A few days later Arthur Peine, editor for the Manhattan Tribune, wrote an article about these women and their purpose. Titled "They're Making History, Not News," it was a piece reprinted by many of the Blue Valley people for the way it neatly summarized their overall goal:

> These women are not pleading for their homes--which are simply incidental. They are not talking about the Blue River, or Tuttle Dam, or the State of Kansas--which are merely footnotes to the general theme of "national water policy." Are these women presumptuous in daring to lecture the President and the candidates on NATIONAL POLICY?

> Not at all. On the contrary, I think they are extremely modest. They claim to speak only on national water policy as it affects our agricultural Midwest. They are in fact talking the language of conservation, not only of our agricultural resources but of all resources: and not only of the Midwest, but of the whole Nation.[58]

The editorial also pointed out that the women were not going to stop after seeing Harry Truman. They were also working to see the nominees of the Republican and Democratic parties, Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson. A telegram had been sent to each candidate requesting a meeting to discuss Tuttle Creek and the big dam versus little dam issue for the nation. The fight of the women had just begun.[59]

Other residents of the Blue Valley directed their bitterness and argument toward the Congressmen of Kansas and the Army Engineers. The politicians, bureaucrats, and military personnel received some direct letters of attack, other critical letters were sent to area newspapers, so that more people would read of Blue Valley's complaint. The Topeka Daily Capital carried two such letters on its editorial page of Sunday, 3 August 1952. Mrs. Aileen Johnson of Garrison, one of the communities to be inundated, wrote that the voice and opinion of the people had been ignored, and the Blue Valley people had been deprived of their rights under the Constitution. Now the people along the proposed site were at the mercy of the Engineers. In her view the men of the Corps had "no regard or sentiment for personal property." Another resident of Garrison, Paul Burkland, echoed these comments in another letter. He also added a note of Biblical judgement for the betrayal of the people and of the natural resources that would be lost with the dam and reservoir:

> What has man profited if he gained the whole world yet lost his own soul? Tuttle Creek is a key project to famine and starvation, not flood.[60]

The same edition carried an article by Elmer Peterson in reply to the Engineers' retort to his attack on their flood control plans. The Oklahoman defended the figures that he had received from the Blue Valley Association. He said that these people were "composed of the highest type of citizenship in the area." The facts remained as he had earlier concluded: the watershed approach could withstand scrutiny. Peterson said that this had been confirmed by an independent engineer who was not connected with the Tuttle Creek issue. He then turned to the Congress and the Engineers and the action they had taken against the Blue Valley:

> The rape of fine, law-abiding, prosperous farm communities by the big dam cult, which ruthlessly rides over their protests, is an alarming element in American life. There are abundant proofs that it is uneconomic, unjustified and unpatriotic. It is repulsive to liberty-loving people.[61]

On the next day the same paper reported that the Army estimated a minimum of $80 per acre and a maximum of $325 per acre for the land to be acquired in the dam site area. Two days later the Engineers' plans were questioned by a new adversary, The New York Times. In an editorial called "Is This Dam Necessary?" the metropolitan paper commended the effort of the Blue Valley women in meeting with President Truman and agreed that the purpose was to gain more attention for national water and land policies, and not just flood control. The commentary went on to say that some of the big dams were probably necessary. However, in the case of Tuttle Creek, the argument and effort of the Blue Valley people, the fact that no appropriations had been made for thirteen years after the original authorization, and the questions raised on the Corps'

estimates of benefits and costs, led the urban paper to wonder if this particular dam was necessary.[62]

The next day the Clay Center Times ran a story with the headline, "Technicality in Bill May Give Anti-Tuttle Creek Forces Needed Loophole." The accompanying story said that the "Phraseology" in the appropriations bill mentioned funds for a dam on Tuttle Creek but did not specify any project for the Blue River. The Blue Valley Study Association was using legal counsel to review the funding's language and plan any legal means to stop construction due to the lack of specificity.[63]

Forty-eight hours later Colonel Lincoln of the Corps reported that bids would be asked within ten days. This spurred more letters to the editor in the 10 August 1952 edition of the Daily Capital. One writer compared General Pick to Cornelius Vanderbilt and the tycoon's exlamation: "What do I care about law! H'aint I got the power?" Two other letters were also aimed at the Engineers. One linked the action and power of the Corps to socialism: "It is but one short step to a modern serfdom." The other letter stated the problem in even more political terms: "There is but one answer to all this proposed devastation. You must choose. Are you a Communist? Or a true American?"[64]

Beyond these reactions there seemed to be a renewed sense of determination after the announcement of the Corps and their contracts. Another prayer meeting was held on a hillside. The Blue Valley people began to use such gatherings regularly to refresh their spiritual strength and belief that justice would prevail. The state watershed

organization attended one of the meetings to ask for donations to help fight against the big dam forces.[65]

The Blue Valley women had sent several telegrams attempting to arrange a meeting with the Republican candidate, Dwight Eisenhower, but they had received no acknowledgement or confirmation of such a meeting. One of the women, after learning that "Ike" would be in Denver for a few days, sent the nominee a telegram that said the group would be in Denver one of those days and would assume a meeting was confirmed unless they heard differently. This did get a response from Eisenhower through Senator Frank Carlson. The candidate agreed to meet with the women in Denver on 19 August.[66]

The women prepared to make a bus trip to Denver. As they did so, the Corps' progress in the Valley was reported in the newspapers. Construction work was set to begin on 1 October with the headquarters of the Engineers temporarily in Manhattan until facilities were ready at the dam site. Colonel Lincoln said that all necessary land to begin work had been acquired.[67]

The women worked almost non-stop to get ready for their trip. More notebooks and albums were put together, and large signs were prepared to go on the sides of the bus. A special scrapbook was prepared for the candidate. On Sunday, the day before the meeting, they left the Valley. In Topeka they were met by local press to get early publicity on their effort. Some of the women on the trip represented other parts of the state that were in support of the Blue Valley fight. During their meeting with Eisenhower, which lasted for one hour, the women sensed that the former Kansan was indeed in sympathy with their dilemma. After

listening to their presentation, he told them that the matter did deserve further review. He said that if he was elected in November, he would make sure such a review was done. He added that this would be accomplished if he had to do it himself. The meeting surpassed the wildest expectations of the women and the folks back in the Blue Valley. Spirits were high on the bus trip back home. The women were sure that the facts they had presented would persuade Ike to stop the Tuttle Creek mistake.[68]

As the women returned home, more national attention was given to the plight of the Blue Valley. The spiritual nature and the reliance of the people had come to the attention of The Christian Century. In its publication of 20 August it carried an article titled, "Can Prayer Stop the Engineers?" The story gave this view of the actions of the Valley people:

> After Manhattan's disastrous experience with a flood a few months ago, it might be thought that the people there would be grateful to have the dam built. Intead, having failed in an appeal to President Truman to stop construction from starting, they are now engaged in mass prayer meetings in which they call on the Almighty to upset the nefarious purposes of their "enemies" in terms which might come straight out of the Old Testament.

The magazine then carried some samples of the fervor reported in the Overbrook Citizen, a newspaper published by Dwight Payton:

> "A contest of mighty forces is declared for Kansas. The alignment is God versus Bureaucracy and Selfish Private Interests . . . . The surface promise of flood control bears Satan's brand that marks all untruth as evil."

The story concluded by calling for a conference to be sponsored by the National Council of Churches or the National Catholic Welfare Conference to review the issue on a national forum, as the Blue Valley seemed to

want.[69] Within a few weeks there appeared letters to the magazine commenting on this article. The comments were on boths sides of the question. The Executive Secretary of the Kansas Council of Churches agreed that such a conference would be fine, but should not be done just for Tuttle Creek, but for any area where a big dam was proposed. Another letter from Pennsylvania also supported the claims of the Blue Valley in fighting the dam. However, the minister of the First Presbyterian Church of Iola, Kansas, expressed a different view. Kenneth C. Miller wrote that he did not believe the watershed plan could stop the "Noah-like" flood of the summer of 1951, and:

> So, if those favoring the 'watershed plan' have new evidence, let them present it along with their fervent prayers. If not, can we not go ahead with the approved plans and assume that God has already spoken through honest men and has granted the prayers of those who have petitioned for adequate flood control.[70]

While the efforts of the women to see the Democratic nominee would prove futile, others in the Valley also became more politically oriented in their fight against the big dam. Bill Edwards was a prominent member of the state Republican party and was active in the county organization. In late August he sent a letter to the Marshall County Republican Party. The Bigelow farmer scolded the party for abandoning the Blue Valley in its fight against the dam, especially since the Valley people had always solidly supported the party. Edwards blamed the county and state party leaders and elected officials for letting the issue become so political. The letter was published in several area newspapers.[71]

By the end of that month the Blue Valley Study Association had made and placed signs throughout the roads of the Valley. Most of them used the slogan, "Stop Big Dam Foolishness." The men hoped that motorists

would see the signs, maybe stop to get more information, and go home to tell their elected officials to support the Blue Valley. If enough people could see the absurdity of the Corps' plan and the logic of watersheds, the fight could still be won, according to many of the Valley leaders.[72]

More support came from the editorial page of Bill Colvin and the Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle. He called the women the "Blue Valley Belles" and said that their argument did make sense. The plan of the Engineers was "a disgraceful and ultra-expensive blunder." However, Colvin wondered if Dwight Eisenhower would really fight the Army Engineers. Many of their officers had served under Ike's command during the Second World War. The Engineers had performed well, and some of the brass were friends of the former Army General. The Manhattan editor speculated that it would be difficult for Eisenhower to oppose these former comrades on the flood control issue.[73]

Governor Arn also acted in a manner that gave hope to the Blue Valley. Early in September he ordered the formation of an independent engineering commission "in an attempt to bring unity on the state's controversial flood control and land-water use problems." The residents of the project area had earlier requested such a panel from the Governor. They hoped that such a group would review the Army plan and the watershed plan and present a report based on its objective evaluation. They told others that they would abide by whatever findings such a panel arrived at. But the panel would need time to do such a study. In the meantime the Corps had an appropriation and authorization and continued to work on the Tuttle Creek project.[74]

Unseating Albert Cole as the First District Congressman did not seem to be a credible idea as the fall election of 1952 approached. The incumbent had seniority, was a party whip, and had won re-election by a margin of thirty thousand votes in the previous election. He had the solid support of the national and state party organizations. Most of the First District also supported him, and the First District had always gone Republican. An upset in 1952 was even more unlikely as the Republican nominee for President had favorite-son status, which would insure a good turnout that would be beneficial to other party candidates also on the ticket.

The Democratic candidate, Howard S. Miller, had gained the nomination in 1952 largely due to his long service and loyalty to the party. He was seventy-three years old and a farmer from Brown County. He had a law degree from the University of Nebraska, and he had been the Congressional candidate one other time. In 1936 Miller had run against William Lambertson. In that year's Presidential election, Kansas had also seen a native son, Alf Landon, run at the head of the GOP ticket. He had faced the incumbent, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Landon had been caught in the FDR landslide. Even Republican Kansas had supported Roosevelt, but in the First District Lambertson had easily defeated Miller. Miller filed before the appropriation for Tuttle Creek had been approved in 1952. He seemed a good candidate for the anti-Tuttle forces, as he was a staunch believer in watersheds and other conservation.[75] The Democratic candidate released a statement of his position on the dam controversy:

> A nation can survive any disaster of fire or flood or pestilence. But the loss of its soil it cannot survive . . . . What plan, then, shall we pursue. Shall we use the outmoded antiquated procedure of fifteen years ago, whereby 57,000 acres of the best land in the state will be inundated and several thousands of people driven from their homes, or shall we adopt the up-to-date procedure whereby we save soil and prevent floods, in one co-ordinated, scientific program. Dollars and sense counsel the latter course, which should solve the whole dam problem.[76]

This was the cornerstone of Miller's entire campaign. The Corps' plan was obsolete, while the watershed approach was both effective and economical. Because of his strong position he was to receive unexpected support in his election effort. The Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle reported on 17 September a conversation that had been heard: "I've never veered that much from the Republican ticket," said one man, holding his thumb and forefinger close together. "But this year I'm voting for Miller."[77]

While the Blue Valley had not yet come out for Miller, that same edition of the Manhattan paper carried an advertisement from the anti-dam forces. They urged others to exercise good citizenship by donating and helping to fight Tuttle Creek. The ad carried several slogans: "Save the Blue Valley and Kansas, Too," and "Our Fight Is Your Fight."[78]

While the political races entered the fall of 1952, a story in the Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle added fuel to the fire that burned within the anti-dam movement. The article reported that the contents of a letter between Senator Schoeppel and General Potter revealed the existence of an emergency fund to allow the Corps to go beyond the five million dollar appropriation approved by Congress. The story also reviewed the groups for and against Tuttle Creek. Those in favor of the

project included the Kansas City papers and the Kansas State Chamber of Commerce. Those allied in the fight against the dam were the Kansas Watershed Association, the Kansas Farm Bureau, the CIO, and the Kansas Livestock Association. Other groups were on the fringe. Many of these said they would support the project if the reservoir was approved as a multi-purpose, wet facility. They said that recreational use of such a reservoir would be a boon to the area's economy that would compensate for the agricultural loss. The next day's edition, for 19 September 1952, told of remarks made by the Corps' Colonel Lincoln. He requested that the Blue Valley Study Association assist the Corps in helping those people who would need to be relocated. The Army officer said that if the group really wanted to help and hold the best interests of the people at heart, it would cooperate and assure as easy a transition as was possible. The paper carried Stockwell's reply to the Army request. He said that the Colonel misunderstood the issue entirely and was again in error.[79]

By the closing days of September the campaign for Congress was heating up. The first ad from Miller appeared in the Clay Center Times on 25 September and was aimed at attracting the anti-dam vote. While the Blue Valley Study Association did not formally endorse Miller, many of the people did work for his cause by raising money through various fundraising events. These included bake sales, auctions, and sales of arts and crafts. A sale on Sunday, 27 September, raised $450. Some of the money raised went to the costs of printing pamphlets and posters to continue to educate others about the dam issue.[80]

By the first week of October the Engineers had begun work on the

land acquired for the dam site. There were no speeches or dedications as the ground was broken. The George Bennett Company of Kansas City was awarded $2.2 million for the first stage of construction, which included a 623-foot temporary bridge. The Corps had title to eight tracts of land. The Engineers were blasted publicly by Glenn Stockwell within the first few days of construction. He said that the tactics they had employed were "browbeating" and that they had repeatedly intimidated the landowners critical of the initial construction. They had also bypassed the large landowners who were willing to fight and concentrated their acquisition efforts on the small landowners interspersed between the larger ones. The next day Stockwell mailed a letter which revealed that the BVSA would publicly endorse Howard Miller by 21 October. However, many of the Valley people were already helping the Democrat.[81]

Bill Edwards and other men of the Blue Valley visited businessmen and bankers in an unofficial capacity. Most of these merchants were solid Republicans. The Valley men appealed to these merchants to think about supporting Miller in the election. Many of the merchants responded in an interesting manner. They told Edwards and the others to go out and stump the other parts of the First District for Miller. The merchants said they would support the Democrat over Albert Cole, but they would do so quietly and indirectly, a behind-the-scenes-approach.[82]

Miller's campaign, focused almost solely on the dam issue, appealed to many of these traditional Republicans. By avoiding a direct attack on Cole and the Republican party, Miller was able to attract this important support from the other side. By mid-October the Mercury-Chronicle reported that Miller was gaining in the polls.[83]

The churches of the Blue Valley also played a part in the campaign and on the issue of big dams. The October issue of the Rural Lutheran magazine featured a story about the Mariadahl community and the Tuttle Creek proposal. Written by Pastor Virgil Lundquist of Leonardville, "Another Side of the Story" was a concise summary of events over the past fourteen months. The article related the spiritual strength of the people in the Blue Valley and how their spiritual heritage had helped them persevere through the crisis. The minister also reported that the congregation of the Mariadahl Lutheran Church had adopted a prayer to close each Sunday's services. Printed in each week's bulletin, the prayer read:

> O Lord, in these days when the continued existence of our place of worship and our homes in this valley are threatened by other forces, we do especially pray for Thy guidance in this our common concern. Send Thy counsel to those in authority that Thy will might be made known to them, and that they might be given the wisdom and courage to do Thy will. If it be not Thy will that our lands and homes be spared, protect us from growing hard and bitter. Now, Divine Master, do we place our trust in Thee, knowing that all things work to the good of those that love Thee. Amen.

The minister also reported on the regular hillside meetings that drew crowds of three hundred to five hundred people. To Lundquist, these people and their fight deserved more attention.[84]

At the end of October another article on the area appeared in the weekly The Lutheran Companion. Written by Doris Velen, the story concentrated on the attempt to save the Swedish heritage of Mariadahl and other early settlements of Swedish immigrants. Both of these articles were widely distributed to other Lutheran congregations to spur donations and intervention on behalf of the Blue Valley and the Miller campaign and to focus attention on the national water and land policies

of the Engineers.[85]

The churches in the Valley also made announcements on behalf of Miller and the anti-dam crusade. The church buildings were used for various campaign rallies and as places for the anti-dam forces to meet and share ideas. Many of the scrapbooks and albums the women used were put together at such gatherings.[86]

The women made the next move in the Valley fight. They organized two car caravans to tour the First District to campaign for Miller and generate more publicity for him and the dam issue. They were able to visit many communities, large and small, in the district. The cars had signs on the side supporting Miller and railing against the big dams. One car in each caravan carried a loudspeaker so that speeches could be made on the move and so that crowds could hear what the Belles had to say. The women also split into smaller groups and canvassed residential and business areas of most of the towns and cities they visited. They were almost always met with great enthusiasm and curiosity. As far as anyone in the district could remember, this was the first major political effort by any group of women. The newspapers and radio stations covered their activities because the women were news beyond what they were asking people to do for Miller and the anti-dam movement.[87]

The chairman of the Riley County Republican party, Charles Arthur, said that he believed Albert Cole would have a difficult time winning that county due to the efforts of the women and other Valley people. It was also suggested that a straw vote in Manhattan revealed Cole drawing less than fifty percent and Miller rapidly gaining on the incumbent.

Bill Colvin thought that the women were making the difference. He characterized the Belles as a previously unseen and unmatched political movement. They were well prepared on the issue and were always courteous, never antagonistic. In his view they were not taken seriously by the men of the First District when their effort began, but their determination, persistence, and knowledge of what they were talking about soon earned them respect and admiration. More importantly, they were winning converts to their cause and support for Howard Miller.[88] Another review of the role of the women and the effect they had was seen in an editorial of the Clay Center Dispatch:

> They have made a masterly study of the situation, so thoroughly understand it, and have their hearts so wrapped up in it they can talk convincingly of their ideas . . . . The next time a group of these women are in this area for a public meeting every citizen of the county owes it to himself to learn their story.[89]

Howard Miller's campaign was also effective. He toured the First District relentlessly, emphasizing the watershed issue and not blaming all the problems of the world on the Republicans. He did not personally attack his opponent. Rather, he attacked the Corps and the Congress as being unresponsive to the needs and wishes of the people. He often said that the bureaucracy was to serve the people, not be their master. His speaking on behalf of watershed and other conservation methods was credible, as he was a farmer who practiced those methods himself. He also said the farmers who practiced such land and water conservation methods in their operations should receive a tax break to cover their expenses, as they were promoting good stewardship of the earth's resources. On Saturday, 25 October 1952, the Democratic candidate challenged his opponent to a debate on Tuttle Creek. He offered to

let the Congressman name the place and time. Albert Cole declined the invitation. Miller also gained the endorsements of the state's CIO and the National Association of Manufacturers. Their support was based on the economic value of the Blue Valley. They deemed this to be of greater benefit to the Great Plains and the nation than the "limited" protection of the Corps' dam and reservoir.[90]

Albert Cole defended his decision to support the dam. He reiterated his belief that both the big and little dams were necessary and that he had not seen any evidence that would convince him otherwise. He also said, "No member of Congress will get up on the floor of the House and really oppose major dams for flood control." Most of the newspapers of the bigger towns and cities in the First District supported Cole. Cliff Stratton of the Topeka Daily Capital wrote that he would hate to see the incumbent lose on "a misunderstanding of the Tuttle Creek problem." But the Congressman did not tour the Blue Valley area during the campaign. His absence did not go unnoticed. The fact was often pointed out to and by the press and relayed to other voters in the district. According to Bill Colvin, Cole was warned that his strategy was not working in the Valley and was also helping Miller throughout the rest of the First District, but the Representative felt secure in the traditionally Republican center.[91]

As the general election campaign closed, the rate of advertising in the newspapers increased. So did the number of letters and comments in the papers, as both sides of the issue hoped to sway whatever undecided opinion there might be. The GOP placed ads that stressed the need to return Cole to Washington to work with Eisenhower. If Ike was

successful in capturing the White House, the ads implied, he should have fellow Kansas Republicans in Congress to help him. Other ads depicted Cole alone emphasizing his seniority in the House and his knowledge of tasks that needed to be done for Kansas and America. The state party gathered most of its candidates and did caravans by car throughout the state to seek votes. The largest trip was undertaken the weekend before the election. Seventy-five candidates toured nine Kansas counties. At one stop Congressman Cole told the audience, "This is the year of decision, for unless we stop the trend toward socialism, you and your children might lose many of your liberties."[92]

The Army Engineers were also involved to the end of the political race. Colonel Lincoln asked a group of Topekans to form a citizens' organization to help the Army assist the people in the Blue Valley make the transition that was required when they had to move from their land and homes. Glenn Stockwell replied by attacking the Colonel for "intruding in civilian political campaigns." The President of the Kansas Farmer's Union, James Patton, also blasted the Corps. He said that their flood control plan was not realistic, especially with regard to Tuttle Creek and the value of the farmland that would be taken out of production.[93]

The advertisements of Howard Miller were almost always of an anti-dam image. Some were more pointed against Cole, and these were usually sponsored by the "Blue Valley Women." The Clay Center Times of 30 October carried an ad on page three paid for by "Interested Blue Valley Republicans." The heading for the ad was, "Why Albert Cole Should NOT Be Re-Elected To Congress." A group of Manhattan businessmen

also sponsored an ad that said, "It's Not Too Late, Stop Tuttle Creek & Big Dam Foolishness." It also said that Congress would not approve future appropriations if the First District's Congressman opposed the project. That was Miller's position.[94]

Not all of the comments in the papers were ads, letters, or editorials. On the front page of the Blue Rapids Times for 30 October was an area marked off on the lower left-hand side. The caption in the area was a reminder to vote for Howard Miller and stop Big Dam Foolishness. Both Miller's and Cole's names were listed as if on a ballot. There was a check mark in the spot next to Miller's name.

While the Republican candidates for various offices toured some of the state's counties on the last weekend, the Blue Valley people set up information stands on the roads leading into the Valley area. They gave literature about Miller and the dam issue to motorists. The Clay Center Dispatch of Saturday, 30 October 1952, carried a story on how the Tuttle Creek project would affect the people of the Blue Valley. The story said that farmers, laborers, businessmen, and retired persons would all have a loss of income or of livelihood due to the Engineers' project. Readers were exhorted to "fight big Dam Vandals."[95]

On Sunday the Topeka Daily Capital had several letters to the editor about the Tuttle Creek issue. Both pro and con arguments were presented. Some of the writers berated Albert Cole, some praised the common sense of Miller. One farmer closed his letter by saying, "I still say when the Good Lord wants to put it over the top, the Tuttle Creek Dam won't stop him."[96]

On Monday, the day before the election, the same Topeka paper had

an ad sponsored by various watershed organizations of the First District. They asked for people to vote for Miller for Congress and Eisenhower for President. The ad also told its readers:

> In the closing days of the 82nd Congress, Albert Cole allowed himself to become a tool of the Kansas City pressure groups and switched his support to the Socialistic-Communistic trend of Big Dam Foolishness and sold his district down the river.[97]

On Tuesday, 4 November 1952, the turnout of voters was heavy. There was great interest in the Presidential fortunes of Dwight Eisenhower. There was also high interest in the race for Congress. Few people predicted victory for the seventy-three year old farmer of Brown County. Though he had good support among the voters of the Blue Valley, this would not be enough to counter a strong Cole vote in the rest of the district. Howard Miller needed to run close to Cole outside the Blue Valley. If he did so, one of the reasons would be the efforts of the Blue Valley Belles and the Blue Valley Study Association.

Dwight Eisenhower carried Kansas easily. He also swept to office throughout the rest of the nation. Many Republican Senators and Representatives were elected to give the GOP control of both houses of Congress.

In the First District of Kansas, which encompassed thirteen counties, thousands of voters went to the polls and voted for either Albert Cole or Howard Miller. The incumbent carried his opponent's home county. The challenger carried the incumbent's home county. Albert Cole won six counties. Howard Miller took seven counties. The incumbent carried the most populous county in the district--Shawnee, the home of Topeka--but his margin was slim and not enough to stop Howard

iller. Miller won 51 percent of the total vote. Despite a Republican andslide for a native son running for the White House, the First istrict of Kansas had elected a Democrat to Congress for the first time ver. The sole issue was the dam to be built at Tuttle Creek. Albert ole, who had been re-elected by thirty thousand votes in 1950, lost by our thousand in 1952.[98]

Newspaper stories in the next few days carried stories recounting stonishment at Miller's victory. The headlines often pointed out the ole of women in the upset. One of the Belles was quoted as saying. "I ore out a pair of shoes and two baby-sitters, but it was worth it." he 5 November 1952 Topeka State Journal carried an announcement on its ront page that said, "The man who'll represent the First District in ongress--the unknown Democrat from Hiawatha--is pictured on page 5. oward S. Miller's election came as such a surprise that pictures of him ere difficult to obtain." The other Topeka paper ran a story eadlined, "Water Policy Decided Vote." It gave the reasons behind iller's win through the views of Glenn Stockwell and Dwight Payton. hey said that the role of the women was critical in the ultimate uccess of the campaign. Payton commented on the Engineers, "I have ome to recognize that decisions of the Pick-Sloan agencies are not ased on engineering facts, but on what is considered politically rofitable."[99]

After the election the participants in the Blue Valley fight wrote etters mentioning the amazing feat they had accomplished. Stockwell rote to William Voigt and said that beating Cole in the middle of the epublican landslide was almost beyond description. Elmer T. Peterson

sent a letter to the President-elct. He told Eisenhower the story of Miller's election and the reasons behind it. Peterson confided to Ike that he was confident the native Kansan would come through for the people of the Blue Valley upon becoming Chief Executive of the United States.[100] The Oklahoma newspaperman commented on his letter to Eisenhower and the acknowledgement he received when he wrote to Glenn Stockwell and others active in the fight for the Blue Valley. Peterson told these people:

> Frankly, I was skeptical about getting through the iron curtain which necessarily surrounds a president-elect . . . . However, I started my letter to Ike with the sentence, "I don't want a job," and that may have helped.
>
> Allowing for the customary amount of banana oil that every member of a palace guard has to use, I am still hopeful that Ike will see the letter.
>
> As you all know, the typical politician is far more influenced by fear of defeat than by the justice of any given cause. Our strategy, therefore, must be to remind Ike's palace guard that the margin of Republican majority in the two houses of Congress is very slim and precarious and they can't afford to lose many more Coles . . . . We can make this the most important single issue in the 1954 campaign and really stir-up the animals.[101]

Howard Miller also wrote letters to different people and recounted the story of his election and the controversial issue that caused it to occur. In one letter he said, "It was indeed a great victory; the victory of an issue, not of an individual." He sent a telegram to President Truman asking for his intervention to stop further work at Tuttle Creek in light of the election's meaning. Truman acknowledged the wire and told the Congressman-elect that the matter was in the domain of the Bureau of the Budget.[102] Miller repeated his effort to sway Truman early in December. He also sent a copy of this letter to Dwight Eisenhower for his information. Miller went into detail with the outgoing President as to why the big dam should not be built:

> If you have the patience to read further, I will now go briefly into the political phase of the situation. Through the years the First Congressional District of Kansas has been two to one Republican; yet I carried the District by a substantial majority on the sole issue of trying to prevent the completion of Tuttle Creek Dam . . . . There can be no question but that the vote for congressman was a referendum on the advisability of completing Tuttle Creek Dam.
>
> Are the American people, by an act of Congress, going to impose the construction of this dam upon the people of the First District of Kansas even though they have so decidedly shown their opposition to it? This is not the way American people like to do things.[103]

The election of Miller and the role of women also received national attention in Newsweek on 17 November 1952. The focus of the article was the Blue Valley Belles. The national magazine emphasized that the women helped elect the first Democrat ever to represent Congress from that district.[104]

As 1952 ended, the people of the Blue Valley looked back to a year and a half of hard work. They had taken on the Army Corps of Engineers, the Congress, the President, and the big cities that favored a big dam on their land. They had not yet stopped the project, but the election of Howard Miller had raised their hopes. The publicity that their work and his election had received might help stop the future appropriations needed to complete the big dam and reservoir.

Glenn Stockwell wrote to Howard Miller and the two U.S. Senators from Kansas in December. He urged the three elected officials to work together during the next session of Congress to stop Tuttle Creek and have the Pick-Sloan Plan reviewed. The Blue Valley leader also requested that these men seriously consider pushing the Congress to authorize more watershed development through the Department of Agriculture. On the last day of the year Stockwell received a letter

from Milton Eisenhower. The brother of the President-elect stated that he could understand the feelings and plight of the people in the Blue Valley, but he added, "I am not interceding in federal affairs, save in those few instances in which my judgement is requested." He expressed confidence that the Senators of Kansas would make the appropriate effort for the citizens of the Valley.[105]

The upcoming term of Howard Miller brought optimism to the Valley. The dark cloud seemed to grow smaller and lighter. However, they had only won one battle in a much larger war for their homes and their ideas on national land and water policy.

Notes for Chapter 3

1. Velen interview.

2. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Jim Robinson, 16 May 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence March-September 1951, KSHS.

3. Velen interview.

4. Phillip E. Meyer, "Tuttle Creek Dam: A Case Study in Local Opposition," M.A. Thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1962, Property Collection # 1600, pg. 23-25, KSHS; Roy Freeland, Memorandum to Ed Arn, Governor, undated, Ed Arn Papers, Archives Collection, File: Correspondence #10, KSHS (hereafter called Arn Papers).

5. Allen Kline, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 31 July 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence March-September 1951, KSHS; Kansas City Star, 15 July 1951.

6. Leopold and Maddock, Flood Control, p. 154.

7. Albert Cole, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 2 August 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence March-September 1951, KSHS.

8. Anthony W. Smith, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 7 August 1951; Benton J. Stong, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 8 August 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence March-September 1951, KSHS.

9. David Bell, Memorandum to William Hopkins, 6 September 1951, Truman Papers, PPF 310, General File 132: 1948-October 1951, Truman Library.

10. Leopold and Maddock, Flood Control, p. 90.

11. Albert Cole, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 16 August 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence March-September 1951, KSHS.

12. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Ed Arn, 28 August 1951, William Voigt, Jr., Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 28 August 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence March-September 1951, KSHS.

13. Glenn Stockwell, Telegram to Harry Truman, 29 August 1951, Truman Papers, PPF 310-Miscellaneous, General File 132, Tuttle A-F, Truman Library; Glenn Stockwell, letter, 30 August 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.4, File: Miscellaneous, KSHS.

14. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Bliss Isley, September 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence March-September 1951, KSHS.

15. L.J. Lincoln, Speech, 20 September 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: January-November 1951, KSHS.

16. F.W. Pfuetze, Letter to Ed Lohmeyer, 15 October 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence October-December 1951, KSHS.

17. Davis, River on Rampage, p. 135.

18. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to William Voigt, Jr., 15 November 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence October-December 1951, KSHS.

19. Kansas Watershed Association, Meeting Agenda, 6 December 1951; Irving Hill, Letter to Elmer T. Peterson, 12 December 1951, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence October-December 1951, KSHS.

20. Richard Bolling, Letter to Harry Truman, 18 December 1951; Emil Cyrene, Letter to Harry Truman, undated with attached acknowledgement, 19 December 1951, Truman Papers, PPF 310, General File 132, Tuttle A-F, Truman Library.

21. Bill Colvin, personal interview with the author in Manhattan, Kansas, 27 February 1988 (hereafter referred to as Colvin interview).

22. William Voigt, Jr., Letter to J. Jammond Brown, 18 January 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence January-March 1952, KSHS.

23. William Voigt, Jr., Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 18 January 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence January-March 1952, KSHS.

24. Clay Center Times, 29 January 1952.

25. "Flood Control Where?" The Kansas Farmer, 2 February 1952, article in scrapbooks of Doris and Leona Velen (hereafter called Velen books).

26. Resolution of Railroad Engineers Committee on Flood Control, 14 February 1952; Colonel L.J. Lincoln, Speech, 22 February 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Speeches, January-April 1952, KSHS.

27. Frank Mulken, Statement to U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Civil Functions, 26 February 1952,

Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Speeches, January-April 1952, KSHS.

28. Albert Cole, Statement to U.S. House Appropriations Subcommittee on Civil Works, February 1952, Pamphlet V, KSHS.

29. Colvin interview.

30. Dwight Payton, Letter to Marcellus Murdoch, 4 March 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence January-March 1952, KSHS.

31. Elmer T. Peterson, Letter to Brown County Soil Conservation District, 2 April 1952; Elmer T. Peterson, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 17 May 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence April-June 1952. KSHS.

32. Harry Truman, Letter to Kenneth McKellar, 25 March 1952; Harry Truman, Letter to Z.R. Hook, 13 May 1952, Truman Papers, PPF 310, General File 132, Tuttle A-F, Truman Library.

33. Elmer T. Peterson, "Big Dam Foolishness," Country Gentleman, May 1952, Velen books.

34. Davis, River On Rampage, p. 172; Velen interview.

35. William P. Hassett, Secretary to the President, Letter to Doris Velen, May 1952, Truman Papers, PPF 310, File: 1952-V, Truman Library.

36. Glenn Stockwell, Statement to U.S. Senate Civil Functions Committee, 19 May 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Speeches, May-December 1952, KSHS.

37. Topeka Daily Capital, 3 June 1952.

38. Topeka Daily Capital, 4 June 1952.

39. Leona Velen, Statement to the Missouri Basin Survey Commission, 5 June 1952, Velen books.

40. Topeka Daily Capital, 8 June 1952.

41. Topeka Daily Capital, 11 June 1952, 17 June 1952, 20 June 1952.

42. Topeka Daily Capital, 17 June 1952.

43. Willard Breidenthal, Letter to Harry Truman, 3 July 1952, Truman Papers, PPF 310, General File 132, Tuttle A-F, Truman Library; Topeka Daily Capital, 6 July 1952.

44. Velen interview.

45. Virgil Lundquist, "Another Side of the Story," Rural Lutheran, October 1952, Velen books; Topeka Daily Capital, 7 July 1952, 8 July 1952.

46. Davis, River On Rampage, pg. 175-176.

47. Topeka Daily Capital, 12 July 1952.

48. Edith Monfort, Letter to Dwight Payton, 11 July 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence July-September 1952, KSHS; Matt Connelly, Appointments Secretary to the President, Letter to Elmer Kunze, 19 July 1952, Truman Papers, PPF 310, General File 132, Tuttle A-F, Truman Library.

49. Velen interview.

50. Elmer T. Peterson, Letter to Milton Eisenhower, 18 July 1952; Andrew Schoeppel, Letter, 18 July 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence July-September 1952, KSHS.

51. Elmer T. Peterson, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 25 July 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence July-September 1952, KSHS.

52. Topeka Daily Capital, 24 July 1952, 29 July 1952.

53. Mrs. Curtis Phillips, Telegram to Harry Truman, 30 July 1952; Mrs. G.G. Johnson, Telegram to Harry Truman, 31 July 1952, Truman Papers, PPF 310, General File 132, Tuttle A-F, Truman Library.

54. Velen interview.

55. Edith Monfort, Letter to Dwight Payton, 30 July 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence July-September 1952, KSHS.

56. Edwards interview.

57. Velen interview.

58. Manhattan Tribune, August 1952, clipping, Velen books.

59. Velen interview.

60. Aileen Johnson, Letter; Paul Burkland, Letter, Topeka Daily Capital, 3 August 1952.

61. Topeka Daily Capital, 3 August 1952.

62. Topeka Daily Capital, 4 August 1952; New York Times, 6 August 1952.

63. Clay Center Times, 7 August 1952.

64. Topeka Daily Capital, 9 August 1952; Roberta Lindblad, Letter, A.R. Dean, Letter, Topeka Daily Capital, 10 August 1952.

65. Topeka Daily Capital, 10 August 1952.

66. Velen interview. Topeka Daily Capital, 15 August 1952.

67. Topeka Daily Capital, 17 August 1952.

68. Velen interview; Topeka Daily Capital, 19 August 1952, 20 August 1952; Velen interview.

69. "Can Prayer Stop The Engineers?" The Christian Century, Volume LXIX, Number 34, 20 August 1952, p. 940.

70. "Prayer and the Engineers," The Christian Century, Volume LXIX, Number 37, 10 September 1952, p. 1033.

71. Edwards interview.

72. Velen interview.

73. Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 26 August 1952.

74. Clay Center Times, 4 September 1952; Edwards interview.

75. Edwards interview.

76. Howard S. Miller, Statement, undated, Velen books.

77. Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 17 September 1952.

78. Ibid.

79. Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 18 September 1952, 19 September 1952.

80. Clay Center Times, 25 September 1952; Velen interview.

81. Topeka Daily Capital, 8 October 1952; Glenn Stockwell, Letter August Beilman, 13 October 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence October-December 1952, KSHS.

82. Edwards interview.

83. Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 17 October 1952.

84. Virgil Lundquist, "Another Side of the Story," Rural Lutheran, October 1952, clipping, Velen books.

85. Doris Velen, "Crusade to Save a Church," The Lutheran Companion, 29 October 1952, clipping, Velen books.

86. Velen interview.

87. Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 21 October 1952; Topeka Daily Capital, 21 October 1952, 22 October 1952; Blue Rapids Times, 30 October 1952.

88. Topeka Daily Capital, 21 October 1952; Colvin interview.

89. Clay Center Dispatch, 1 November 1952.

90. Clay Center Times, 23 September 1952; Topeka Daily Capital, 26 October 1952; Peterson, Big Dam Foolishness, p. 63.

91. Topeka Daily Capital, 23 October 1952, 24 October 1952; Edwards interview; Colvin interview.

92. Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 2 November 1952; Topeka Daily Capital, 30 October 1952, 2 November 1952.

93. Topeka Daily Capital, 31 October 1952.

94. Topeka Daily Capital, 30 October 1952; Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 30 October 1952, 3 November 1952.

95. Topeka Daily Capital, 2 November 1952; Clay Center Dispatch, 1 November 1952.

96. Topeka Daily Capital, 2 November 1952.

97. Topeka Daily Capital, 3 November 1952.

98. Topeka Daily Capital, 6 November 1952.

99. Ibid.

100. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to William Voigt, Jr., 6 November 1952; Elmer T. Peterson, Letter to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 9 November 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence October-December 1952, KSHS.

101. Elmer T. Peterson, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 20 November 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence October-December 1952, KSHS.

102. Howard Miller, Letter to Otis Allen, November 1952, Howard W. Miller Papers (hereafter called Miller Papers), Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek 1952, KSHS; Howard Miller, Telegram to Harry Truman, 15 November 1952, and acknowledgement by Truman, 9 December 1952, Truman Papers, PPF 310, General File 132, Tuttle A-F, Truman Library.

103. Howard Miller, Letter to Harry Truman, 5 December 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1 File: Correspondence October-December 1952, KSHS.

104. "Ire in Tuttle Creek," Newsweek, 17 November 1952, p. 30.

105. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Howard Miller, Frank Carlson, and Andrew Schoeppel, 22 December 1952; Milton Eisenhower, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 31 December 1952, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence October-December 1952, KSHS.

Chapter 4

The Democrat in the Republican Congress

Early in 1953 two Kansans began new jobs. While Albert Cole readied himself to be director of personnel for the Republican National Committee, Howard Miller prepared to be Congressman for the First District. The primary task for the freshman Democrat was to stop Tuttle Creek. He sought not only to stop further funding, but also to delete the authorization for the dam and reservoir project. He had to act quickly, for by 1954 he could count on a stiff re-election challenge from the Republican party.

His task seemed even more formidable than before the election. Though Miller had been one of the few Democrats elected in the Eisenhower landslide, he now faced a Republican-controlled House and Senate. Thus, he was not only a freshman Representative, but in the minority party as well. It did not seem likely that he would get many, if any, favors from the leaders of the House. In fact, Congressman Erret Scrivener, who had led the fight for Tuttle Creek in the House, was now a senior member of the majority party. To the pro-dam forces of Republican Kansas, Tuttle Creek seemed secure.

Yet what Howard Miller requested from his colleagues on Capitol Hill was unusual. The Democrat asked that money <u>not</u> be spent in his district. He said that the majority of the people he represented did not want the Army's project. However, the individuals and groups that favored the flood control plan would fight just as hard to maintain appropriations and construction. Once again, the conflict seemed to

come down to the country versus the city, rural versus urban. It was a contest of political strength as well as logic, persuasion, and conviction.

Miller did not wait to be sworn into his position before beginning work to fight the flood control project. He wrote to Glenn Stockwell on the first day of the new year and informed the Blue Valley leader that his three secretaries had instruction to collect all the information they could on the Engineers' plan. Miller also said that his staff was to gather information on the Blue Valley: facts about population, agricultural production, value of buildings, schools, and businesses could all be vital to the task at hand.[1]

Stockwell replied to his ally in Washington, reminded Miller what the Blue Valley had already accomplished, and sketched future plans which emphasized the role of the Blue Valley Belles. He wrote the new Congressman that the anti-dam forces planned on using the women as much as possible and on getting them as much publicity as possible, because it appeared that politicians at all levels were worried about their influence. Stockwell mentioned the national publicity that the women, the issue, and the candidate had generated through the upset election. He urged the value and interest from this publicity be used for maximum effect. Stories could be carried in various magazines and newspapers to alert Congress to give consideration to Miller and his request to stop Tuttle Creek. Stockwell specifically mentioned a story carried by The Christian Science Monitor.[2]

This was not the only publication that had given consideration to the Blue Valley saga. Articles or comments had appeared in The Saturday

Evening Post. The first story had appeared in February, 1952, and was related to Elmer Peterson's argument published in the Country Gentleman.[3] The Post's first issue of 1953 carried a short comment titled, "The People Watch Their Servants More Closely Than Some Suggest." It reviewed the history made by the First District of Kansas in the 1952 election and noted:

> There were no personalities. There was one paramount issue between the candidates--Tuttle Creek . . . . A vigilant and aggressive electorate, when stirred to action, can get what it wants even in the face of powerful opposition.[4]

While Miller and Stockwell plotted action to fight the dam, the Corps of Engineers worked to insure more funding for their project. The Omaha Branch of Corps released information on 9 January that revealed an appropriation request in the President's budget for FY1954 of $15.8 million for Tuttle Creek. According to General W.E. Potter, this request would allow 26 percent of the project to be completed with regard to land acquisition, relocation, and earthwork.[5]

The Engineers were also at work in the Blue Valley, and their efforts involved more than work on the dam. Miller received a letter from Mrs. Lucille Johnson of Manhattan on 18 January. She told her Representative:

> Seemingly our opponents are working hard so there must be a chance for us. The Army Engineers are working hard to infiltrate and divide, but are not having too much success. They try to get people with little, worthless lots to have them appraised or optioned. Upon investigation you find that it's people who do not live in the valley or some who want to move out for some reason . . . . Some, being curious or wanting to speculate, do not realize they are aiding the cause of the Engineers.[6]

The Blue Valley people worked at other ideas to keep their fight and the flood control issue in the public eye. One project that was

being planned was a film to be made later in the year. The other main event was one developed by Fred Germann of Alta Vista, Kansas. Germann, a farmer, wrote to Stockwell in January and wondered whether a tour of the Valley for newsmen of the Great Plains, and perhaps some of the national press, would help keep the cause out front. If the press could be convinced of the logic of the Valley's argument and alternative plan of watersheds, perhaps their stories would help Howard Miller not only defeat more funding but also delete the authorization.[7]

The Blue Valley Study Association retained the services of a Wichita law firm to research and monitor any legal means to block any more construction and appropriations for Tuttle Creek.[8] The firm told the citizen group that the longer construction continued the harder it would be to justify stopping the project. The attorneys said that if the project was not halted soon:

> the best argument the engineers will have against you in Congress is that so much of the government's money, including time of government officials and engineers, has been invested that it would be too late to stop it.[9]

A similar argument was being used by the pro-dam forces in lobbying Congress to continue funding. The need for the project to protect the downstream cities and low areas from floods was still paramount to these individuals and groups. One letter making this point was sent by the President of the Missouri-Arkansas Basins Flood Control Association, William C. Calvert, in January, 1953:

> If bills of this type were successful it would mean a very serious blow to the entire flood protection program since there is practically always some opposition to projects on the part of local people. Certainly Congress would want to stay back of a plan once it has been started . . . . We know that you would like to have this information in order to render a right decision when this matter comes up for consideration.

Calvert then added comments titled, "Answers to Statements Made By Opponents to the Construction of Tuttle Creek Dam." He first addressed the claim by the Blue Valley people that they had not been well represented in Congress. Calvert noted that the House and Senate had made use of a joint committee to deliberate the project and that no public hearings had been held by this committee:

> When the Joint Conference Committee reaches an agreement it is usually accepted by both the House and the Senate. No Congressman or Senator from Missouri or Kansas, nor their Governors, opposed the appropriations. In a democracy the Senators and Congressmen represent the majority desires and thinking of the area.

He then answered a claim that the Blue River had not caused the flood of 1951 by saying, "Positively no one claims the Blue River alone caused the great flood. Definitely it contributed to it--and heavily."[10]

Howard Miller's first action in office was to contact Eisenhower's Director of the Budget, Joseph Dodge. On 23 January the Democrat sent Dodge a letter requesting an appointment to discuss Tuttle Creek and its funding. He mentioned that the Chamber of Commerce of St. Joseph, Missouri, had approved a resolution against the big-dam plan. Miller hoped that the President would agree that continued appropriations should be stopped and that the project's authorization should be reconsidered. Bolstering his request were similar comments to Ike from Blue Valley residents.[11]

The Blue Valley continued work to convince more people of the logic of their alternative plan and the folly of the Engineers' proposal. In February the residents sponsored a tour for members of the press. The Belles repeated their presentation to various civic groups and to local

and state officials. Many of the residents felt that these events did influence others to see their point of view.[12] Glenn Stockwell, on behalf of the BVSA, wrote to conservation groups scattered around the nation that might share land and water management views, hoping that these groups would come to the aid of the Valley. Stockwell said to them:

> The people of the First Congressional District of Kansas are fighting the old American way through the ballot box and need your support against the entrenched bureaucracy and Congressional inertia. It is your duty as a citizen to inform Congress of your viewpoint.[13]

Added to these actions was the decision of the Clay Center Chamber of Commerce approving a resolution against Tuttle Creek. The community's business leaders forwarded a copy of the resolution to President Eisenhower and asked for his assistance.[14]

The Army was still active in the Blue Valley, and some of its tactics were very disturbing to the residents. Mrs. Ruby Johnson of Randolph wrote to Miller in early February and told the Congressman that the Engineers had been taking pictures--photographs of abandoned and damaged buildings, and of unkept, land around the area. The Army was trying to pass off these pictures as an objective view of the area to be rescued by Tuttle Creek. The Engineers' proposal obstensibly would be doing the people a favor by forcing them out of such terrible conditions. The tactics of the pro-dam forces that William Voigt had warned of were increasingly in evidence.[15]

Dr. Reed J. Morse, Head of the Civil Engineering Department at Kansas State College, added to the pro-Tuttle Creek support. In a speech on 13 February he stated, "Soil conservation measures will not

prevent floods and in fact will have little effect upon the runoff that causes floods under the conditions that existed during 1951."[16]

On the nineteenth of the month the anti-dam forces received more official support for their cause. The independent engineering commission appointed by Governor Arn released its survey of the flood control plans. The members of this commission were Abel Wolman of Johns Hopkins University, N.T. Veatch of Kansas City, and Louis Howson of Chicago. They reported that, though they were not completely convinced that the watershed plan of the Blue Valley Study Association would be adequate, the plan of the Army was much too costly to be justified by the benefit that would be achieved. In the view of these engineers the alternative plan of watersheds, dikes, and levees would cost only one-fifth that of the Corps' plan and was worth trying before committing to the much larger investment of the big-dam plans.[17]

The Missouri Basin Survey Commission, originally appointed by Harry Truman, released its findings shortly after the beginning of the Eisenhower term. Regarding the Tuttle Creek project the Commission said, "Its studies suggested that Tuttle Creek Dam, even when accompanied with other projected dams, may not provide the Kansas Citys with the protection they seem to expect." The anti-dam forces were encouraged by the findings of these two commissions that represented the state and federal levels. But stopping funding was up to Howard Miller.[18]

Before the battle began on the budget request, the Blue Valley received still more publicity. The Farm Journal for April 1953 published an article titled, "The Battle of the Blue." Written by Paul

Friggens, the story was released several weeks earlier to Jim Robinson of the Topeka Daily Capital. The Topeka reporter had been trying to keep the Blue Valley's side of the story adequately represented in the state capital's press. The article was copied by the residents and distributed as a concise summary of the fight they were waging. Friggens wrote:

> The army is rushing a $90 million dam that somebody may have to junk! Two investigating commissions now condemn it as bad planning and rank waste. Congress is being pressed to stop the dam, and save one of the richest valleys in Kansas. Blue Valley farmers have put up a battle which has probably never been matched. That much must be admitted, whether you think they are right or not . . . . challenged the value of the big dams, and urged a watershed program instead. "Try it first, anyhow," they said. They poured out so much protest mail that the little Cleburne post office was hiked from fourth to thrid class . . . . Last fall, Army shoved out the first farmers and started the dam. What to do next? The dam-busters turned politicians! . . . . With only $1,600 campaign funds, and a political unknown, Blue Valley pulled the greatest election upset in Kansas politics.[19]

This article and the reports of the two commissions provided the BVSA and other anti-dam groups credible sources of opinion and expertise to back up their argument. This information was rewritten and sent to members of Congress, to the President, and to many newspapers, groups, and individuals. It was used in pamphlets and posters and advertisements, all designed to convince more people of the rightness of the Blue Valley cause and to urge others to act as responsible citizens and assist the anti-Tuttle Creek, anti-big-dam fight. The titles of some of the literature developed by the Valley residents revealed their emotion and reasoning on the issue: "Is Tuttle Creek Necessary?", "Keep Our Soil Home," and "Stop Tuttle Creek Dam." The subtitles of "Keep Our Soil Home" were especially illuminating: "We Must Be Vigilant," "Blue

Rivers Flood History Exaggerated," and "What Can You Do?"[20]

The Blue Valley Study Association created the pamphlet, "Stop Tuttle Creek Dam." The front page had a map of the planned dam and reservoir area, indicating all of the communities that would be inundated or forced to some degree to relocate. The towns that were earmarked for partial or complete destruction were Stockdale, Garrison, Randolph, Winkler, Cleburne, Irving, Bigelow, Barrett, Blue Rapids, Waterville, and Schroyer. The pamphlet cited information from the Kansas Board of Engineers, the Kansas State Legislature, and the President's Missouri Basin Survey Commission. It noted that the State Legislature had approved, in both houses, resolutions asking for Congress to stop Tuttle Creek until the conflicting views were resolved through a formal review and recommendation by an impartial group. The literature attacked the Corps of Engineers and ended by noting:

> In spite of these adverse reports and recommendations, the Corps of Army Engineers continue the current construction on Tuttle Creek Dam. They are attempting to silence the people of the Blue Valley by threats of premature flooding and land condemnation suits. The public relations department of the Corps are carrying on a program of vilification in an attempt to discredit the critics of their reservoir plan . . . . The Citizens of Kansas feel that the Corps is clearly exceeding their authority in their attempts to influence public opinion in Kansas.[21]

The BVSA, with the help of Howard Miller's Executive Secretary, Ernest Hohnbaum, monitored the appropriation request for Tuttle Creek as it proceeded through the Congress in the spring of 1953. The Study Association then passed word to others sympathetic to their cause. Glenn Stockwell sent out information on 1 May that said:

> On May 12, a sub-committee of the House Appropriations Committee will hold hearings on the Tuttle Creek question. The big dam promoters will be attempting to get Tuttle Creek's funds included in the President's final budget recommendations. A Senate Appropriations sub-committee may hold a hearing on Tuttle Creek about the same time, so those who testify may appear before both groups while they are in Washington. Please write to these appropriations committees before May 12 if possible and ask that no funds be voted.

Stockwell reminded others to tell their Congressmen to support H.R. 2730; this was a proposal by Miller to delete funding and de-authorize the dam and reservoir project in the Blue Valley. One group responded quickly to Stockwell's plea. On 8 May the CIO sent a telegram to members of the House Agriculture Committee asking that group to support measures promoting watersheds and other water and soil conservation practices. The Committee was to hold hearings on the alternative methods of flood control.[22]

Miller prepared for these hearings and the fight to stop Tuttle Creek. One of the members of the Kansas Governor's independent engineering commission offered the Representative some advice. Abel Wolman suggested that Miller stress three points regarding the big-dam proposals advocated under the Pick-Sloan Plan. First, Miller should point out that the Corps' plan would not achieve the amount of flood control that they claimed. Second, Tuttle Creek was not justifiable as it would destroy productive farmland to save other land of only one-half value. The third point was that Tuttle Creek should be stopped just due to its excessive construction costs. The Army's estimates on what it would take to complete the project ranged from $76-93 million.[23]

On 12 May the freshman Democrat appeared before the House Appropriation Committee. Miller reviewed the issue at stake and the

developments that had transpired in the Blue Valley and the First District over the past two years. He recited the names of the many groups that supported the anti-dam fight , and reminded the Congressmen of the findings of the state and federal commissions that had revieweed the Engineers' proposal. Miller asked that a more thorough review be made before any further money was spent on the Army's plan.[24]

The Kansas Farm Bureau submitted a statement to Congress. The agricultural organization pointed out the errors in figures presented by the Engineers regarding the 1951 flood, the role of the Blue River, and what difference the Tuttle Creek dam might have made. The Farm Bureau stated that the figures they used to dispute the Corps' information had been provided by the U.S. Weather Observer's Office in Topeka and the official report on the flood prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey. The farm group went on to state:

> The only conclusion that can be drawn from available figures is that Tuttle Creek Dam would have been a negligible factor in controlling the worst flood in the history of Kansas in 1951. Observers in the area needed only to see the evidence left by silt drifts and to observe the terrific rush of water coming down the Kansas River which held the Blue River virtually still to be convinced that Tuttle Creek Dam in 1951 would have been a monument to folly had it been built.[25]

The Army Engineers appeared before the Congress to urge that the project be continued. General W.E. Potter derided the opposition effort in the Blue Valley. He stated that one-third of the flood water that hit Kansas City in 1951 was from the Blue River.[26] His remarks drew the wrath of the usually calm Glenn Stockwell. In a letter he sent to the General on 19 May, the Blue Valley leader blasted the Army officer:

> Since when were you, a non-elective bureaucrat, authorized to speak for the people of Kansas in regards to the Tuttle Creek Dam? . . . . [it] places you in the role of political commentator for which you are no more qualified than you are qualified to be called an engineer . . . . you seem to persist in showing your arrogance and acting as if you were a little tin God, devinely endowed.[27]

The Kansas farmer-turned-political activist was further incensed that Potter continued to ask for funds even after the General's commander-in-chief, President Eisenhower, had approved withdrawing the request from his budget. Ike had agreed to Miller's earlier plea, through Joseph Dodge, to take away the appropriation request of the administration. Stockwell felt that Potter's action was just another example of the Engineers' disregard for anything and anybody but themselves.[28]

Two days after Miller's testimony the Clay Center Times ran a headline that said, "Kansas Editors Predict an End to Tuttle Creek Dam." Written by Harry Valentine, the editor for the paper, the article stated that most of the state's chief newspapermen believed support for futher funds for the big dam was political suicide in light of what happened to Albert Cole. Only the Congressman for the Kansas City area, Erret Scrivener, was exempt from this pressure.[29]

Perhaps the core of the argument made by the Blue Valley people against the dam and the process by which it had been authorized and funded was stated in a letter by Stockwell. Writing to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the anti-dam organizer said, "We are opposing it not so much because it would mean the destruction of our Blue Valley but because it represents the carnivorous appetite of the Army Engineers."[30]

Miller, Stockwell, and other persons and newspapers regularly

received the comments of Elmer T. Peterson. The Oklahoma editor and publisher often attacked the Engineers and their tactics, as well as the absurdity, in his mind, of their flood control plans. He also worked to convert his earlier articles into a book on the big-dam controversy. His research and conclusions were welcomed by the Valley people.[31]

Still, the Army worked to discredit the claims of the opposition. Officials of the Corps accepted invitations to appear before groups and offer remarks that usually included attacks on the Blue Valley and its supporters. The Corps also solicited the assistance of those they talked to in asking Congress for funding.

On 12 June 1953 C.R. VanOrman, Assistant Chief of the Engineering Division of the Kansas City Branch of the Corps, spoke at the Workshop on Conservation of Natural and Human Resources at the Kansas State Teachers College in Emporia. He told the participants that it was his intention to present the facts objectively on flood control and the controversy surrounding the Corps' plan. He also said:

> A few unthinking Americans, or perhaps I should say a few wishful thinking laymen, ignore the established facts and vainly try to extend the basic concept of soil conservation to solve the separate problem of major flood control . . . . We must be prepared, when necessary, to temporarily restrict production on part of our moderately good land in order to insure a more constant, high-level production on all the best land, and to guarantee uninterested transportation and manufacturing in the urban areas.[32]

The Valley residents did not give up their counterattack; indeed, they concentrated their efforts on three areas. First, through the lobbying and persuasion of Miller, and partly due to the nature of his election, the Congress in 1953 did refuse to approve funding for Tuttle Creek. However, Congress did not delete authorization for the project

as Miller and the people had hoped.[33]

Second, the people continued to get other individuals and groups involved in their fight, especially in promoting the watershed alternative and other related conservation practices. Letters continued to go to Congress urging reconsideration of Miller's plea to de-authorize the big-dam plan, and reminded the elected officials of the probable siltation and sedimentation problems of the big dams and reservoirs.[34]

Third, the people of the Blue Valley worked toward a movie about their home area. They had discussed the idea of putting their story on film earlier. Some of the Valley residents looked into the idea, and found that it was feasible.

A former Kansan had the necessary skills to produce such a film. Charles M. Peters was a film producer and director in Beverly Hills, California, who had already received some recognition for doing movies on social-political subjects. Two of his films were The Fallbrook Story and The L.A. Housing Story. Peters, agreeing to work with the Blue Valley people, worked on a script and the locations where scenes would be shot during the spring and summer of 1953. Filming began near Mariadahl in June.[35] Glenn Stockwell commented on the movie and the role it would play:

> Since the Valley story will have far reaching effects on land and water policies we feel that the making of this film is a civic duty to which we must obligate ourselves . . . . The theme of the story will be how a grassroots activity of the people can rectify national policies in America. It will be a message not of what we have done but how we accomplished it.[36]

The spiritual quality of the Valley people did not escape the

attention of the press. The Clay Center Times wrote about this and the part it would play in the film. The article told of the gatherings to sing hymns and seek devine guidance for their effort. These hillside events would be re-enacted for the movie for, "since spiritual power has been vital in preserving the unity and strength of the Valley, it is important to depict some scenes with this emphasis, residents state."[37]

After shooting scenes in the Blue Valley, Peters returned to California to finish the editing and other production work. No one in the Valley received an advance preview. The producer informed the people that the movie would be done by September or October. Knowing this, the residents began plans for a celebration of the movie's premiere. They decided to have the event at Randolph and scheduled a parade, speeches, and other activities to promote the anti-dam cause.[38]

With the appropriation battle won and Congress not in session, many of the people returned to doing the everyday things they had been used to before the interruption of the dam. Farms were busy with crops and livestock. Communities had many activities: ball games, auctions, ladies' meetings, church picnics, and so on. As September neared the excitement grew over the first showing of the movie about Tuttle Creek and the Blue Valley.

Friday, 18 September 1953, was the day of the big event at Randolph. Area newspapers had helped build interest in the preceding weeks with stories and announcements. Hundreds of people filled the small Kansas community to show their support for the Blue Valley and to view the movie made by their neighbors. The theme of the day was "Let Freedom Ring." Before the showings of the film began, a parade passed

through the town early in the afternoon. The parade was so long that it had to wind through many of the streets of the community. Some observers estimated that the parade was over a mile in length. The highlight of the parade for many of the people was the smallest entry. A young boy, ten or twelve years of age, pulled a little red wagon through the streets. Heaped in the wagon were copies of The Kansas City Star newspaper. A sign, attached to a stick in the back of the wagon, riding above the stacks of newspapers, said: "Here lies the Kansas City Star--and it lies, and lies."[39]

Showings of the film, entitled "The Tuttle Creek Story," began at four in the afternoon. Both the high school auditorium and the elementary school gymnasium were used to provide two showings every hour. School bells were rung to call a new audience to each site so as to provide an opportunity for the large crowd to see the movie. It had cost fifteen thousand dollars to make. Billed as a story of "democracy in action," the movie ran twenty-six minutes and was greeted with enthusiastic cheers of the audiences. Both the theme of the movie and the homegrown stars who had acted in it made the people proud of their hard work.[40]

Many of the viewers recognized mistakes and inconsistencies in the movie. Almost all of the film was shot outside to gain proper lighting. So most of the scenes that appeared to be inside were really outside, and the actors and actresses knew this. One scene revealed several of the Valley women at work writing letters to Congress. But the wallpaper behind the women was just paper hung over a wooden frame in a yard and, in fact, viewers could see over the top of this wall and spy the outside

of a house and the sky in the background. Another series of scenes showed the women calling on a wall telephone to alert others to show how quickly the Valley people could be notified and continue lobbying Congress. However, the telephone was not on a wall in a house, but was nailed to the outside of a lumber yard store.[41]

The movie was narrated throughout. Presenting the Valley and its residents in color, the story line quickly introduced many of the key characters: J.A. Hawkinson, Glenn Stockwell, Bill Edwards, and Howard Miller. Dwight Eisenhower was presented as a friend of the Blue Valley and the anti-big dam cause. The men and women of the Blue Valley were portrayed as meeting often to plan their strategy and tactics to fight the Army and the other pro-Tuttle Creek forces. Several of the men were seen speaking to large groups of other men. Those who spoke jabbed at the air with their fists and poked their fingers at the crowd to emphasize the work to be done. The American flag was usually prominent in the background. The women were seen meeting and planning as well. They wrote the letters and made the phone calls, and their bus trip to see Ike was given attention.

One of the Valley's older residents was also shown as the philosopher of the anti-dam group. Bill Sikes, a graduate of Kansas State College, pointed out the folly of the Engineers' plan for flood control. The value of the agricultural production of the Blue Valley was starkly contrasted to the fate the Army proposed for it. The Corps was depicted as Gestapo-like. Brown leather boots marched across the screen, with picks and shovels swinging alongside the legs of the men with the boots. The Engineers were deceitful and evil, going against

the wishes of the people and the government that was supposed to be served by the Army. General Pick was viewed as a stubborn and egotistical man who knew that his plan was the best no matter how much contrary evidence could be presented. His boots were seen stepping onto a map of the Blue Valley. His toe pushed the map into a hole, and water cascaded into the hole much as the dam and reservoir would also inundate the homes, farms, and communities of this area of northeast Kansas.

The story in the film then turned to the upset election of Howard Miller. His victory was justification for the effort made by the Blue Valley people. The alternate methods of watershed development and other land management to effect water conservation and control showed how the natural contours of the Valley would fit these strategies much more effectively than the Tuttle Creek plan. The movie closed with the re-enactment of the hillside gathering for prayer and the minister's benediction.[42]

The Blue Valley Film Committee was formed to distribute the movie, renting it for ten dollars per day or selling it for two hundred fifty dollars. The wording of the brochure used to promote the movie revealed much of the emotional and political views of the Valley people:

> Scenes that vividly portray how the people of the Blue River Valley of Kansas have valiantly resisted with simple democratic measures the thoroughly discredited big dam program proposed for the Kansas river basin.
>
> SEE! In color many scenes of Beautiful Blue Valley. FEEL! They are "Truly a good people in a good land." WITNESS! How fighting housewives of Blue Valley unhorsed a congressman who had appeared glued to the saddle.[43]

The quality and message of the movie surprised and impressed many who watched it. Bill Colvin, of the Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, noted

that it was a good piece of propoganda for the anti-dam cause and was a testimony to the hard work of the people of the Blue Valley. The money raised by the film's distribution went toward making more copies of it and for other needs of the fight such as the printing of literature and posters. The people knew that they had to continue to make the effort to convince Congress never to approve more funding and, the ultimate goal, to de-authorize Tuttle Creek.[44]

The events at Randolph put optimism into the air. Howard Miller addressed those in attendance and reminded them that the fight was not over. To save their Valley and to change national policy toward land and water management would still take an immense effort. The fight had to be carried not just against the Army Engineers, but also against the big cities. The Congressman told the people: "It is not to discourage you . . . . but rather to warn you to continue to work. I will stay with you to the end."[45]

There seemed to be some evidence of complacency among the people during the fall and winter of 1953. Funding had been stopped, and this had caused construction to cease. Imminent danger was over, and residents yearned for a return to a more normal life. The man they had elected to Congress to fight the dam had done a good job so far. Many of the other Senators and Representatives had taken a liking to the small, bald man with a twinkle in his eye. But he had not gained their approval to withdraw the authorization for the big dam and reservoir.

Those who supported the construction of the big dam and reservoir renewed their work to win back appropriations. The Army and the political and business leaders of the cities downstream maintained

contact with key members of Congress. In particular, the Engineers were used to having their way, and they seemed determined not to let some farmers and little towns stop them. Added to this was the consternation of the national and state Republican parties at the loss of a Congressional seat during an otherwise successful GOP year. These political activists were determined to prove that Howard Miller's election was only a fluke and would not happen again in 1954.[46]

Glenn Stockwell had some inkling of what would probably happen politically in 1954. He wrote to Ernest Hohnbaum on 14 November 1953, telling the Executive Secretary to Representative Miller his view on the strategy the Republicans would employ during the off-year election:

> I believe that the Republicans are beginning to realize that they will have a fight. I hear that they are trying to narrow the field down to one man and he an anti-damer. Also I believe that there will be no mention of Tuttle Creek this year so as to let the noise die down.[47]

Stockwell's speculation moved toward reality in early 1954. The 14 January edition of the Clay Center Times reported that a member of the Kansas State House of Representatives was being touted by the state GOP to run against Howard Miller. William Avery was a farmer in Wakefield and had been a supporter of water management for a long time. Thus, the paper reported, "Both Avery and Miller stand on the same side of the dam fence--against big structures unless their need is proven." The article also noted that Avery had toured other parts of the First Congressional District and had been favorably received.[48]

William "Bill" Avery was known and respected by many of the people along the Blue Valley. He had supported their fight against Tuttle Creek, and his views mirrored those of Miller. He had also been

instrumental in getting the State Legislature to go on record against the big dam and reservoir project until a complete assessment of the big dam versus little dam plans could be completed. The state Republican party was pushing Avery to declare for the nomination and run against Miller. Many of the Republican leaders felt Avery had an excellent chance to win the Congressional seat back, as the majority of the district's voters were registered Republicans. The dam issue would be neutralized, and the First District would put a Republican back in Congress.[49]

Avery was a graduate of the University of Kansas with a degree in political science. He was active in his community with the Methodist Church, the Lions Club, and the Farm Bureau. Many of his colleagues in the state legislature had also urged him to run for Congress, but Avery waited to make a formal announcement of his intentions. He enjoyed his farming and his work in the state legislature. Fifty years of age, he was married and happy with his family life.

The pressure to run for the nomination built for Avery. Republican leaders advised the Wakefield farmer that it was his duty to seek the post. President Eisenhower needed a First District Republican to help him in the Congress. Avery's views on land and water policy would then have a national forum. This urging, along with the receptions he received in touring the district, convinced Bill Avery to run in 1954. He was the first candidate to announce for the office. He did so on Kansas Day and was able to line up many important endorsements to give him an advantage over any primary candidate who might oppose him.[50]

While the Republicans planned their strategies, the Blue Valley

people and Howard Miller began to renew their effort to stop approval of any appropriation in 1954 as well as to delete the authorization for the project. Glenn Stockwell continued to make regular contact with members of key Congressional committees to remind them of the opposition of the Valley citizens.[51] Miller and Ernest Hohnbaum worked with Stockwell to monitor the pro-dam fight to regain funding. The Congressman, his assistant, and the Blue Valley leader continually assessed which way the Congressmen were leaning and lobbied accordingly. Stockwell was also being asked for his advice on how to stop bid-dam proposals in other parts of the Great Plains. He summarized the steps taken by the Blue Valley in one response. He said the effort had to be organized and logical and involve steps such as:

> 1. Write letters to every person and group that may support your cause.
> 2. Contact and visit as many groups with your argument as possible.
> 3. Get as many stories and positive contacts made with as many newspapers as possible.
> 4. See your Congressman and Senators, personally, as often as you can; letters should be sent regularly with updated information.
> 5. Visit with any candidate running for any office that may exercise influence.
> 6. See your Governor and explain the situation to him and ask for his help.
> 7. Know your project and your alternate plan so you can "talk intelligently about it."[52]

The Blue Valley Study Association put a slogan on its stationary: "If You Don't Save the Soil You Won't Need to Save the Cities and Industries." The emphasis in its effort toward the cities echoed in Howard Miller's newsletter of March 1954. Delivered to every member of the House of Representatives before an appropriations vote on Tuttle Creek, it reminded his fellow Congressmen that more than the opinion of the big cities of Kansas and Missouri should be given consideration.

Miller told the GOP-controlled House that the Kansas State Legislature, the Kansas Industrial Development Commission, and a majority of the voters in the First District remained opposed to the Army's project for the Blue Valley. The Clay Center Times the following week noted that Miller had been successful in stopping the House from approving funding for Tuttle Creek, but the authorization remained in place.[53]

United States Senator Thomas Hennings, Jr., Democrat of Missouri, introduced a proposal, after Miller's effort, to establish a Missouri Basin Commission. He suggested that such an agency could provide the research, evaluation, and planning to avoid future controversies such as Tuttle Creek. In a statement that accompanied his proposal the Senator said:

> The Survey Commission report also refers to the problem at Tuttle Creek, where there has been great controversy over placing reliance for all flood protection for the Kansas Citys on a single-purpose dam . . . . even though there is some question whether the potential sites could provide the degree of protection considered necessary to hold the flood of 1951. In a word, more comprehensive planning might well have provided a better answer for the critical problem in Kansas City.[54]

While Senator Hennings's proposal worked through the Senate in April 1954 the House had an opportunity to reconsider funding for the Blue Valley project in May. The Engineers had submitted information on flood control projects in the Kansas River Basin and noted that the Tuttle Creek was one of ten projects completed or underway. They implied that too much had already been invested to stop funding and construction.[55]

To counter this effort the anti-dam forces turned to one of their more eloquent and persuasive speakers, Bill Edwards. The Bigelow farmer

developed a comprehensive statement of the situation and presented it to the Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives on 11 May 1954. He reviewed the conflicts between what the Engineers had originally proposed (and Congress had authorized) in 1938 with what the Engineers proposed in 1952 and 1953, when funding was finally approved. Edwards noted that the acreage to be flooded fed thousands of people each year and that more than five hundred families would be forced to relocate if the big dam and reservoir were completed. Regarding the original authorization and information he said:

> There were no representatives of Kansas present from either side. Indeed, we knew nothing at the time of either the hearings or the proposed projects. he Committee seemed particularly concerned with the effect the building of these reservoirs would have on the land and people of the area . . . . Chairman Whittington then asked, "Would there be any towns or villages destroyed or required to be removed by the construction of either of these two reservoirs, Milford or Tuttle Creek?" To which the Colonel [Sturdivant of the Engineers] replied, "No." Yet in their hearing before the Sub-Committee on Civil Functions of the House, 2nd Session of the 82nd Congress, the Engineers stated there would be nine or ten towns and villages flooded by the construction of the Tuttle Creek project alone . . . . Gentlemen, is it possible that the original authorization for this project was made on somewhat inaccurate, misleading, technical information presented to the Committee back in 1938?[56]

Edwards then spoke about the Valley, the impact the Corps' plan would have, and the governmental process that was and should be involved in the situation:

> Nearly 35% of the best, or class one land of the three counties involved in the project, is within the reservoir basin . . . . these fertile, alluvial valleys furnish a dependable source of grains and livestock feed. The rolling hills bordering the valley furnish excellent pasture supporting a great livestock industry. But the key to that industry is the winter and the fattening feed raised in the valley. Loss of valley production would disrupt this industry, and the economy and management of a large surrounding area. This would reflect disaster to the thriving and prosperous perimeter towns. These communities

> would lose their trade territory and receive nothing in return . . . . There is more to building a reservoir than can be expressed in hydrological computations. There are social and cultural losses suffered from the uprooting of a substantial citizenry with their contribution to society. These losses, though not measurable in monetary terms, are none the less real . . . . Tuttle Creek Dam alone would not have stopped the 1951 flood . . . . The Engineers' figures show that this "key" structure in operation would have reduced the twenty foot overflow at Kansas City by less than a foot . . . . The Engineers' method of presenting their programs to Congress in a piecemeal manner, so that their scope and size cannot be reviewed, seems to be a fundamental part of the program itself . . . . And yet, each part of the program is part of the whole . . . . And each dam, as built, becomes the economic justification for requesting still further structures . . . . Who should make the flood control policy for Kansas--the people concerned, the National Congress, or an agency of the government which in turn is then given the power to carry out the policy they developed? When we try to unify flood control thinking in Kansas, we are told by the pro-dammers that the policy has already been decided--Pick-Sloan or nothing. When we protest to the Corps of Engineers, they reply, "Sorry, policy is not our department. We only carry out the mandates of Congress." When we contact Congressmen they say policy has not yet been formulated, and only a few projects have been authorized. It is all rather confusing . . . . Dare we to suggest that it is time to stop the present piecemeal approach to the problem, the present vague and illusionary ramblings, the present autocratic methods used with no regard for public objections, the present bureaucratic bungling with no attempt at local control or participation.[57]

The Bigelow farmer also told his audience of the various groups that supported the effort of the Blue Valley people, of the significance of Howard Miller's election on the dam issue, and of the feelings of the people in the district where the project was to be located. Flood prevention and control was necessary; the only question was on the method to be used.

After Edwards completed his testimony, he and Glenn Stockwell paid a visit to the Eisenhower administration's Director of the Bureau of Budget. They reiterated their position on Tuttle Creek and urged that the Administration support the people of the Valley. These leaders of

the anti-dam movement also met with several members of Congress to lobby more persuasively. Part of their effort was due to the fact that the House or Representatives was controlled by the Republicans and Howard Miller was a Democrat. The Blue Valley men wanted to tell many of the GOP Congressmen that the Blue Valley was usually Republican as well, but that on this issue they had supported Miller and would continue to do so because the big dam was wrong. They were prepared to find some hard feelings due to their support for Miller, but found that most of the Republicans had formed a friendship with the First District Congressman. Most of the Democrats were glad Miller had been elected and were willing to support his fight against the dam for the time being, but they were feeling pressure from their colleagues from the Kansas City area. No appropriations would be approved for Tuttle Creek now, but there was no guarantee for the future, and these officials were not so enamored with Miller as to de-authorize the big dam project.[58]

It seemed that the effort of the Blue Valley was making some headway with the Topeka Daily Capital. An editorial in the edition of 1 June concerned the role played by the Engineers:

> And perhaps this is a good time to raise the question: "Are the Army Engineers working for Congress or is Congress working for the Army Engineers?"
>
> Unless the Engineers show some interest in cooperating with local communities they might justly be blamed as the bottleneck that kept the valley from getting any kind of flood protection.[59]

Other documentation to assist the Blue Valley was also available in 1954. Elmer T. Peteron's book, Big Dam Foolishness, was published and became the Bible for the anti-big dam movement. The book was an expansion and clarification of the earlier writings Peterson had done on

the subject. It was both an indictment of the plan of the Army Engineers and an endorsement of the alternate proposal for flood prevention and control through watershed development and other land and water conservation methods. The author informed his readers that any flood control project had to be balanced by its affect on the local and national economy based on the land taken out of production versus the protection offered by the project. This was not usually done by the Army in relation to its big-dam plans, Peterson said.[60] He also stated the inherent weakness of the Army plan anywhere in the Great Plains:

> In the prairie plowlands, with a dam thrown across a major stream, the life of a lake, geologically, is only the twinkling of an eye. Authoritative geologists say that the average artificial reservoir's life in such areas is about 50 years . . . . Expressing the physical facts in common language, it is found that when muddy water strikes still average artificial reservoir's life in such areas is about 50 years . . . . Expressing the physical facts in common language, it is found that when muddy water strikes still water, due to an obstacle which prevents it from continuing in motion, the sediment is dropped to the bottom . . . . Obviously all this silt has to stop somewhere. There is a big dam downstream, and the water in the big reservoir is clear in the vicinity of the dam, showing that the deposit is made in the reservoir, or above it.[61]

Peterson used the example of Tuttle Creek and the Blue Valley to show the action taken by the Army and how people could react and effectively fight back. He had visited the Valley several times since the flood of 1951 and had also been in regular correspondence with many of the residents. His writings and speeches were widely touted by the Blue Valley people, and many of the shorter articles were reprinted and distributed by the anti-dam forces. His research and conclusions were seen as credible evidence to be used to fight the Engineers.

With the success in stopping any appropriation in the 1954 spring

session of Congress, the Blue Valley and the entire First District of Kansas turned their attention to the political race for the Congressional seat. Howard Miller faced no opposition for the Democratic nomination. However, the Republican nomination was hotly contested by pro- and anti-dam candidates.

Bill Avery's early announcement had been crucial in lining up the support of many GOP leaders in the First District. His record as a state Legislator and reputation as a land and water conservationist rewarded him with strong support in the rural areas. His main opponenet was Doral Hawkes. Hawkes was an attorney in Shawnee County, the location of Topeka, the largest city in the First District. He was not unknown in the Republican ranks, as he had worked inearlier races and had been a candidate for other elected positions. Doral Hawkes was for the Tuttle Creek Dam and the other big dam projects in the Pick-Sloan Plan. Thus, the dam issue was the main issue in the GOP primary race of 1954. Subordinate issues revolved around agriculture, such as low prices for crops and wheat surpluses. Two other candidates in the primary were of little significance. The party believed that either Avery or Hawkes would be a strong candidate against Miller in the fall election. If Avery was to win the primary, in the opinion of many observers, then the dam issue would not be an issue in the general election. The Wakefield farmer would probably be able to defeat Miller due to the advantage of registered Republican voters in the First District. However, the GOP had felt safe with Albert Cole in the previous election and had been shocked by the outcome. They would not take Miller lightly in this election.[62]

Many of Miller's supporters in the Blue Valley from 1952 would again work for him in 1954. Some of these persons monitored the activities of the Republicans during the primary. Stockwell wrote to Hohnbaum and reported on a GOP rally held in Randolph in July. The Blue Valley leader told his Washington friend:

> We had the big GOP rally at Randolph today and I had better write you some of the details in case you did not have an observer there . . . . Hawkes came out flatly for the big dam and everything else . . . . My fear is that so many people have made up their mind to vote for Mr. Miller that they are not interested in the primary and will not vote. It puts us Miller Republicans in a tough spot. We can not very well campaign for Avery in the primary and then oppose him in the election.[63]

Miller and Hohnbaum replied separately to Stockwell within a few days. The Congressman was humble about the upcoming election:

> I wish to make it plain, Glenn, that my chief, almost my sole interest in the political situation is to promote soil conservation and flood protection in the United States and especially in the Kansas River basin. I am not too much concerned about who shall accomplish the job or receive the credit. Should Mr. Avery receive the Republican nomination, there would be two candidates running for the office of Congressman from the First District with very much the same ends in view. That would be a beautiful situation, and it would then be only a question as to which of the candidates could best to the job . . . . P.S. General Potter told my son, Wendell, in Omaha a few days ago, "We are going to kick your dad this time."[64]

Hohnbaum was blunt in stating his feelings to Stockwell:

> I am still willing to bet that should Mr. Miller be defeatd in November, regardless if by Avery or Hawkes, that you will have Tuttle Creek Dam in the first session of the 84th Congress.[65]

While the primary election campaigns were in progress, Leona Velen added to the documentation of the Blue Valley effort in the big-dam controversy. In May, June, and July she sent out a newsletter called Blue Valley Vistas. In each month's writing the Manhattan schoolteacher recited more of the Tuttle Creek story that had been carried on since

1951. She closed the May newsletter by summarizing the philosophy of the Blue Valley fight:

> "Why keep on after an initial appropriation is passed?" we were asked. To us the answer is clear--we are fighting for a cause that is bigger than our valley . . . . The Blue Valley is the stage where we will play our part in the struggle between Democracy and Bureaucracy.[66]

The June newsletter was subtitled, "No Surrender in the Blue Valley," and carried the story up to the general election of 1952. The final letter, in July 1954 told of the successful effort to elect Howard Miller and how the funding for the Tuttle Creek was defeated. Miss Velen related that the last thing the people of the area ever thought they would have to do was to fight the Army Engineers and the Congress to save their Valley. She told her readers:

> We had never fully appreciated these liberties until the forces behind the Tuttle Creek Dam threatened to molest our homes and invade our peaceful countryside. We won't call it tyranny--that term is foreign to democratic America--yet we sense a familiarity with some of it connotations in some of the events we have experienced. Let's say that democracy is on trial and it is our inexcapable duty and privilege to share in its defense . . . . It is indeed unfortunate that a government agency such as the Corps of Army Engineers should become so corrupt with its own power so that it can declare its program inevitably to be swallowed as a bitter pill whether the people like it or not. [67]

While the newsletters were not intended to influence the GOP primary, their distribution inadvertently seemed to assist Avery. But the Velen sisters, as well as most of the other Blue Valley Belles, were firm in their support for Miller.[68]

The Republican primary election was held on Tuesday, 3 August 1954. William Avery, the anti-dam candidate, defeated this pro-dam opponent by more than two thousand votes. Avery held onto the rural areas and did

well enough in the towns to offset Doral Hawkes's hold on Topeka. Of lesser significance in the First District, but of importance to the Blue Valley, was the primary win by Bill Edwads of the GOP nomination for the state legislature. With Avery's win it was a certainty that either Congressional candidate in the general election would fight Tuttle Creek. As Bill Edwards noted, those Republicans in the First District who were anti-dam, had worked for Avery in the primary, and had supported Miller in the election of 1952, would probably not go back to Miller, since they had their own party's anti-dam candidate. Party loyalties were strong. To Edwards it seemed "almost a foregone conclusion" that Avery would win in November. Yet the Bigelow farmer would work for the Democrat.[69]

Press reaction to the primary election came quickly. The Blue Rapids Times of 12 August carried pictures of Avery and Miller on the front page. The caption to the picture said, "Sure of An Anti-Dam Congressman in 1st District." A headline on the same page announced, "Another Slap at the Tuttle Creek Dam." The story called Bill Avery's victory the second protest registered by the voters of the First District against the big-dam plan of the Engineers. The Wakefield farmer's campaign was described as "a plain, cut crusade of anti-damers against the pro-damers." The paper also carried a comment by its owner and publisher, Herbert Hickman. He analyzed the recent events:

> In the nomination of Mr. Avery by a very decisive vote, it might be recalled that possibly no other candidate received the financial support for nomination that was lavished on Mr. Hawkes' campaign. Thousands of dollars was spent for advertisements in newspapers, road signs, radio time and literature in an effort to make Mr. Hawkes a winner. But when the people spoke through their ballots the collective voices of voters in this district

resounded the defeat that was the pro-dam candidate.

> The people of the District, and especially those in the Big Blue Valley, haven't forgotten the double-crossing they received at a former Congressman's hands, and have rallied in the support they have whole-heartedly given their present Congressman, Howard S. Miller. Now with two anti-dam candidates to ballot on the November election, it seems reasonably safe that the majority of the people in the district will receive the representation they want in Congress regardless of outside influences that have tried to dominate the district's representation in times past.[70]

The third page of the same newspaper carried Howard Miller's report from the House of Representatives. He informed his constituents that no action had been taken on his latest effort to de-authorize Tuttle Creek. He also commented on the GOP primary:

> The results of the Primary election in the First District proves that the plan for protecting the land and preventing floods by stopping the water where it falls is the preferred plan of flood protection of the people in our area. Big dams are out in the First District.[71]

Miller's Democratic colleagues in the House also reacted to the results of the Republican primary in the First District of Kansas. Miller's office received many letters from these Democrats, all with a similar message for the Congressman and the voters of his district. Representative Henderson Lanham of Georgia wrote to Miller and said:

> It surely seems to me that a vote against you and your defeat should be regarded as favoring the construction of the dam at Tuttle Creek on the Big Blue River. I say this because I know of the successful fight you made against the appropriation of funds for its construction.[72]

Letters from Congressmen W.R. Poage of Texas and Wayne Hays of Ohio offered like-minded analyses:

> Certainly you, and you alone, have been responsible for preventing the construction of the Tuttle Creek Dam on the Big Blue River in your District. I am convinced that the Dam is utterly unnecessary; and, I am convinced that the people of the First District of Kansas consider it not only a waste

> but a positive harmful use of public funds. I believe they will emphasize their views in this connection by re-electing you by an overwhelming majority. Certainly, should the people of your District vote to send someone else here in your place, we would necessarily construe it as a change in the local veiwpoint, and as an endorsement of the Tuttle Creek Dam.[73]
>
> As a veteran of three terms in the House, it is my considered judgement that your defeat would be a green light to the 84th Congress to proceed with the construction of this dam, which evidently the people do not want.[74]

Other letters of the same nature came from Congressmen such as Sam Rayburn, John McCormack, Jamie Whitten, Thomas Dodd, Lee Metcalf, and Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. However, there were those in Congress and the Blue Valley who felt that no big dam would be funded even if Bill Avery was elected. After all, the Republicans controlled both houses of Congress, and Avery was a Republican. Did it not make more sense to have the First District represented by a member of the majority party that of the minority? Kansas Senator Frank Carlson wrote to Stockwell in August 1954 and reminded the Blue Valley leader of this fact. Carlson said that Avery would "be in a position to successfully look into the matter affecting this District." But the Senator's reasoning did not sway too many of the anti-dam people in the Blue Valley from maintaining support for the Democrat.[75]

As the Congressional race entered the last eight weeks, the supporters of Miller revived many of the same techniques and strategies that they had used in 1952. The effort by the women, the Belles, was repeated. The party-line telephones were again utilized to pass important messages and plan activities among the women in the Blue Valley. Massive letter-writing campaigns were carried out to contact the voters of the First District. Thousands of signs, posters, and

leaflets were printed and distributed. Television was in its infancy, but radio ads were used to stir up support for Miller in the predominantly Republican area. The Belles returned to using their car caravans, touring the First District and knocking on the doors of homes and businesses, and making speeches on behalf of the Democratic candidate. They implored their fellow Kansans to vote for Miller as the best way to keep Tuttle Creek Dam from being built. They argued that he deserved to be re-elected because he had gotten the job done in stopping funding of the flood control project. The Blue Valley people also held open houses and set up information stands throughout the area. They were sure of Miller's commitment, but not as sure about that of Avery. The Velen sisters felt that the Republican candidate might give in to pro-dam pressures of the large communities because he wanted to make a career in politics. They were certain that Miller had no such aspirations and would continue to be firm in his opposition to the Engineers' proposal. He would also actively campaign for the adoption of the watershed approach to flood control and resource management.[76]

The GOP candidate also had many supporters who were as fervent as those for the Democrat. Some of these Republican supporters were in the Valley. One Avery advocate violated his own personal principle in going to work actively for the candidate. This supporter was Bill Colvin, the Manhattan newspaper editor. He had covered the Tuttle Creek issue since 1952 and had sought to be as objective as possible on the subject. He violated his cardinal rule because of his high opinion of Bill Avery. He believed that the Wakefield farmer could approach the flood and water conservation issue in a manner that would result in action in the best

interest of all the people in the district and the state. The newspaperman viewed Avery as "the one guy, that, if anybody could, could instill the soil and water conservation impetus up here if it was possible."[77]

The state and national Republican parties also wanted Avery to win in November. Vice President, Richard Nixon came to Topeka to campaign for the GOP Congressional candidate.[78] A large crowd gathered at the state capitol. One of those in attendance was Howard Miller. The New Republic reviewed the Republican rally in its October edition. In a short column titled "Nixon Visits Topeka" the magazine provided this information:

> Pressed hard against the rope which held the crowd back when Vice President Richard Nixon spoke from the steps of the Statehouse in Topeka, Kansas, September 16, was a small unassuming man of 75 years whose shrewd eyes twinkled in obvious enjoyment of the occasion. He was Howard S. Miller, farmer from Hiawatha, who in '52 did the impossible by defeating Republican Representative Albert M. Cole, thus becoming the first Democrat ever to go to Congress from Kansas' overwhelming Republican First District.
>
> Miller, who won against the 1952 landslide by 7,000 votes, has endeared himself personally to most of his district, displaying a shrewd, folksy personality dubbed by one observer "a combination of Will Rogers and Abraham Lincoln."
>
> His opponent this year is 43-year-old William H. Avery, Wakefield farmer, who won the Republican primary on an anti-Tuttle Creek platform, thus removing the central campaign issue of '52. Avery is a vigorous and personable young man; he has the backing of every major paper in his district; he'll have at least 10 times as much money in his campaign fund as Miller has; and most of the voters in his district vote Republican automatically. On the face of it, his triumph seems certain. Yet the Vice President found it necessary to visit Topeka to put his arm around Avery--clear evidence of Republican jitters over the farm vote.
>
> Adroit political jujitsu was demonstrated by Miller within seconds after Nixon finished speaking. To reporters he issued a statement in which he said, "I am happy to have the Vice President in the first district and to have him direct his attention to me. If the Republicans are running scared, what are they afraid of? Can it be they are afraid of the record? . . . . I am sure

the first district voters do not want a rubber stamp representative in Congress. If they do, I am not their man."[79]

There was little excitement in the campaign between Miller and Avery. There were few ads in newspapers as compared to 1952. Tuttle Creek, as a partisan issue, had been neutralized. Avery's advertisements laid claim to the need to give Ike all the Kansas Republican support possible. Though the Blue Valley Belles repeated their caravans and other activities, the uniqueness of the women's campaign was gone. They primarily emphasized that Miller had done what he was sent to Congress to do. While several Avery ads mentioned his youth, energy, and Republicanism, Miller's often were titled, "The Man Who Made Good On His Promises."[80]

Election day was 2 November 1954. Howard Miller, the first Democrat elected in the First District, carried only two counties against his GOP opponent. Bill Avery received overwhelming support from the many Republican voters of northeast Kansas. Many of the voters felt that Avery could do just as good a job, or even better, than the Democrat. However, some of the reasoning supporting Avery was soon proven to be in error. While the Republicans regained the First District Congressional seat in Kansas, they lost control of both houses of Congress. The Democrats won the majority in the House of Representatives, and Avery would be not only a freshman, but also in the minority party. Some of the First District voters wondered if the Democrats would take revenge for the area not returning Miller and approve funds to re-start construction on Tuttle Creek dam and reservoir.[81]

The outgoing Representative contacted the incoming Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn. Miller asked the Texas Democrat to remember that the new Congressman from the First District, though a Republican, was anti-Tuttle Creek, and therefore, the defeat of the Democrat should not be considered a vote favoring the big dam. Miller wrote:

> When the President--himself a Kansan of which fact many Kansans are proud--called upon his party members to vote for the Republican candidate, it was too much to resist . . . . I lost by 7,000 votes out of a total of 96,000. Something like 12,000 Republicans refused to Ike's bidding and crossed over and voted for me . . . . At some time in the near future I hope to inform you as to the true situation with regard to the flood problem here in eastern Kansas. The recent election doesn't show the true picture.[82]

As 1954 ended, the dark clouds seemed to reappear over the Blue Valley. Though the congressman-elect was on record as opposing Tuttle Creek, he, too, would be in the minority party when he began his term in office. The pro-dam forces looked forward to renewing their effort to refund the project and had every reason to believe they would be successful in 1955. The fight over the Blue Valley was not yet over.

Notes for Chapter 4

1. Howard Miller, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 1 January 1953, Stockwell Papers, Colelction 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-53, KSHS.

2. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Howard Miller, 6 January 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-53, KSHS.

3. Elmer T. Peterson, "The Army Engineers are Imposing Their Flood Control Ideas on Creeks," Saturday Evening Post, 23 February 1952, p. 12.

4. "The People Watch Their Servants More Closely Than Some Suspect," Saturday Evening Post, 3 January 1953, p. 6.

5. Press Release, Technical Information Branch, Missouri River Division-Omaha, ACE, 9 January 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.3, File: 1953, KSHS.

6. Lucille Johnson, Letter to Howard Miller, 8 January 1953, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek January-April 1953, KSHS.

7. Fred Germann, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 19 January 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: January-June 1953, KSHS.

8. Ratner, McClellan, Mattox, and Ratner, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 19 January 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: January-June 1953, KSHS.

9. Ratner, McClellan, Mattox, and Ratner, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 22 January 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: January-June 1953, KSHS.

10. William G. Calvert, Letter to Roy Weir, 26 January 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: January-June 1953, KSHS.

11. Howard Miller, Letter to Joseph Dodge, 23 January 1953, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek January-April 1953, KSHS; Edwards interview.

12. Clay Center Times, 5 February 1953.

13. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to various persons, 11 February 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-53, KSHS.

14. Clay Center Times, 12 February 1953.

15. Ruby Johnson, Letter to Howard Miller, 8 February 1953, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek January-June 1953, KSHS.

16. Reed J. Morse, Address: "Engineering Concepts of Complete Watershed Treatment," 12 February 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-53, KSHS.

17. Clay Center Times, 19 February 1953.

18. Missouri Basin Survey Commission, Report, 20 February 1953, p. 5, Eisenhower Papers, Central Files-Official, Box 211, Eisenhower Library.

19. Paul Friggens, "The Battle of the Blue," Farm Journal, April 1953, Velen books.

20. Leaflets and pamphlets, Velen books.

21. "Stop Tuttle Creek Dam," pamphlet, Velen books.

22. Untitled pamphlet, 1 May 1953, Velen books; CIO, Telegram to House Agriculture Committee, 8 May 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-53, KSHS.

23. Abel Wolman, Letter to Howard Miller, 10 May 1953, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek May-December 1953, KSHS.

24. Howard Miller, Statement to House Appropriations Committee, 12 May 1953, Stockwell papers, Collection 81.3, File: Speeches May 1952-58, KSHS.

25. "Statement of Kansas Farm Bureau Regarding Tuttle Creek Dam on the Blue River Above Manhattan, Kansas," Velen books.

26. Ernest Hohnbaum, Letter to William Wrather, 20 May 1953, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek May-December 1953, KSHS.

27. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to General W.E. Potter, 19 May 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.1, File: January-June 1953, KSHS.

28. Ibid.

29. Harry Valentine, "Kansas Editors Predict An End To Tuttle Creek Dam," Clay Center Times, 14 May 1953

30. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Editor-St.Louis Post-Dispatch 18 May 1953, Stockwell papers, Collection 81.1, File: Correspondence 1944-53, KSHS.

31. Edwards interview.

32. C.R. VanOrman, Remarks, 12 June 1953, Stockwell papers, Collection 81.3, File: 1953, KSHS.

33. Edwards interview.

34. Clay Center Times, 14 July 1953.

35. Velen interview.

36. "Will Film Valley's Fight," undated clipping, Velen books.

37. Clay Center Times, 4 June 1953.

38. Velen interview.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.; Clay Center Times, 17 September 1953.

41. Velen interview.

42. "The Tuttle Creek Story," Produced by Charles M. Peters, Beverly Hills, California, 1953.

43. "The Blue Valley Presents the Tuttle Creek Story." Velen books.

44. Colvin interview; Velen interview.

45. Clay Center Times, 24 September 1953.

46. Edwards interview.

47. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Ernest Hohnbaum, 11 November 1953, Miller Papers, Collection 47.1, File: June-December 1953, KSHS.

48. Clay Center Times, 14 January 1954.

49. Edwards interview; Colvin interview.

50. William Avery, personal interview with the author, Wakefield, Kansas, 5 March 1988.

51. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to members of the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on Civil Functions, 7 mary 1953, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1954, KSHS.

52. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Bryan Jennings, 12 March 1954, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1954, KSHS.

53. F.W. Pfuetze, Letter to Congress, 10 May 1954, Velen books; Howard Miller, News Release, 17 March 1954, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek January-June 1954, KSHS; Clay Center Times, 25 March 1954.

54. Thomas Hennings, Jr., Statement in the U.S. Senate, 19 April 1954, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.3, File: Speeches 1954, KSHS.

55. House Document #642, Summary Statement of the Army Corps of Engineers on the Kansas River Basin Plan, May 1954, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.3, File: Speeches 1954, KSHS.

56. William P. Edwards, Statement to the House Appropriations Committee, 11 May 1954, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.3, File: Speeches 1954, KSHS.

57. Ibid.

58. Edwards interview.

59. Topeka Daily Capital, 1 June 1954.

60. Colvin interview; Elmer T. Peterson, Big Dam Foolishness, p. 22.

61. Ibid. p. 69, 71.

62. Avery interview; Edwards interview.

63. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Ernest Hohnbaum, 8 July 1954, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek June-December 1954, KSHS.

64. Howard Miller, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 12 July 1954, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek June-December 1954, KSHS.

65. Ernest Hohnbaum, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 15 July 1954, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek June-Decmeber 1954, KSHS.

66. "Blue Valley Vistas," Newsletter, May 1954, Velen books.

67. "Blue Valley Vistas," Newsletter, July 1954, Velen books.

68. Velen interview.

69. Clay Center Times, 12 August 1954; Colvin interview; Edwards interview.

70. Blue Rapids Times, 12 August 1954.

71. Blue Rapids Times, 12 August 1954.

72. Henderson Lanham, Letter to Howard Miller, 10 August 1954, Miller Papers, Collection 47.1, File: Correspondence May-August 10, 1954, KSHS.

73. W.R. Poage, Letter to Howard Miller, 10 August 1954, Miller Papers, Collection 471., File: Correspondence May-August 10, 1954, KSHS.

74. Wayne Hays, Letter to Howard Miller, 10 August 1954, Miller Papers, Collection 47.1, File: Correspondence May-August 10, 1954, KSHS.

75. Letters, Miller Papers, Collection 47.1, File: Correspondence May-August 10, 1954, KSHS; Frank Carlson, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 16 August 1954, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1954, KSHS.

76. Edwards interview; Velen interview.

77. Colvin interview.

78. Ibid.

79. New Republic, 11 October 1954, Velen books.

80. Edwards interview; Advertisements, Clay Center Times, 28 October 1954, Blue Rapids Times, 28 October 1954.

81. Topeka Daily Capital, 3 November 1954; Edwards interview.

82. Howard Miller, Letter to Sam Rayburn, Miller Papers, Collection 47.1, File: Correspondence August 11-December 1954, KSHS.

Chapter 5

The Republican in the Democrat House

As the First Congressional District of Kansas prepared for a new Representative in 1955, a question going through many of the constituents' minds was this: would Tuttle Creek dam and reservoir be refunded, or would funding be denied and the project be de-authorized? The answer to that question was extremely important to the people of the Blue Valley. If the flood control project was approved for funding, many of these people would need to move to new homes, farms, communities, churches, and schools. Both the social and economic life of the area was at stake.

No construction had been done since 1953. Later correspondence of the Engineers noted:

> Work at the site was suspended in December 1953 because funds were not appropriated by Congress to continue construction. Although Corps of Engineers records make no note of the cause for this halt in the appropriation of funds, a group of residents in the project area known as the Blue Valley Belles is generally credited with persuading Congress to withhold funds from the project . . . . Funds were not appropriated for Tuttle Creek Lake in FY1954 or in FY1955. Funding was restored to the project in FY1956 and continued to completion of construction.[1]

With Howard Miller's defeat by the Republican candidate, and with control of the House of Representatives passing back to the Democrats, the pro-dam forces wasted little time in renewing their push to refund the project. Within the first week of 1955 Senator Hennings of Missouri requested that Eisenhower's Budget Office submit an appropriation of five million dollars to resume work on Tuttle Creek. He informed the Administration that the flood control project was vital to help protect

key industrial and defense areas of the Kansas Citys and the surrounding lowlands. Hennings's request provoked a response by Howard Miller to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Clarence Cannon. The former Congressman told Cannon that Bill Avery's election should not be viewed in the wrong way. The people of the First District still opposed the dam, said Miller, even though they sent a Republican to represent them in the House. Avery was anti-Tuttle Creek and should be supported by Miller's former colleagues. Cannon received similar letters from others in the Blue Valley. Glenn Stockwell told the Congressman, "Tuttle Creek is a symbol of the attempt to secure a sound national resource policy."[2]

Stockwell received a letter on 19 January from the Chief of the Resources and Civil Works Division of the Bureau of the Budget, Carl Schwartz, Jr. The bureaucrat told the anti-dam leader that the Eisenhower budget for the 1956 fiscal year did not include funds for Tuttle Creek. The people of the Blue Valley were in hopes that Ike's refusal to submit an appropriation request would be a strong signal to the pro-dam forces that they should stop trying to build the project. The Valley residents also knew that Miller was continuing to contact his former Congressional colleagues lobbying them to oppose the Engineers' flood control plan. The former Representative and others in the Blue Valley monitored the actions of Congress, working to keep one step ahead of the pro-dam forces.[3]

The political machines of the Kansas Citys were not idle. They moved to influence the House and Senate to restore funding for Tuttle Creek. Congressman Richard Bolling, Democrat from Kansas City,

Missouri, joined forces with Willard Breidenthal, a businessman from Kansas City, Kansas. They stepped up the effort to lobby Congress for the Army plan and had the full support of Representative Scrivener. Since Scrivener was a Republican member of the House, the pro-dam forces were pushing to gain bipartisan support for Tuttle Creek.[4]

By May 1955 Congress was beginning to wind down from its spring session. Proposals had come through various sub-committees to whole committees for a final vote before possible consideration by each house. The appropriations bills were also coming toward final action. Both the pro- and anti-big dam forces were in Washington to lobby for their causes. The Blue Rapid Times reported that the mayors of Topeka and Kansas City, Kansas, were pushing for funding for Tuttle Creek. Glenn Stockwell and Bill Edwards again met with different Senators and Representatives to ask for opposition to the Army's plan. The anti-dam leaders met with Avery to plan strategy and then concentrated on the Democratic members who had been on good terms with and had supported former Representative, Miller. Avery predicted that no appropriations would be approved and reiterated this belief on a visit back in the First District on 20 May. The Congressman gave some reasons for his opinion. First, the Eisenhower Administration had not requested any funding in the budget sent to the Congress. Also, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Clarence Cannon, had been on record as opposing the big dam projects of the Corps. Finally, Avery told his constituents that Congress usually respected the tradition of not imposing a project in an area where it was not wanted, especially if the Congressman was on record as also opposing the project. But the

First District Representative warned the people that Senator Schoeppel had requested funding of seven million dollars to resume construction on Tuttle Creek. Schoeppel's request had surprised Avery.[5]

The Kansas Senator's action did not go unnoticed in the Blue Valley. The Clay Center Times ran an editorial that chastized Schoeppel and stated that its opposition was supported by the local Chamber of Commerce. The newspaper commented that Schoeppel had not stated his position on the dam publicly during the previous year's campaign when he was seeking re-election. The editorial said "by that act [he] certainly double-crossed the voters who have a right to know where he stands on such a vital question." The paper also noted that the other Kansas Senator, Frank Carlson, had failed to go on public record with his position, either[6]

As May gave way to June the Tuttle Creek issue was still building steam in the Congress. Despite Avery's contention that no funding would be voted by the Congress, others doubted that the pro-dam forces would give up so easily. One visitor to Washington for the anti-dam cause came back from his visit convinced that the fight was far from over. State Senator R.G. Thomsen of Bigelow returned from lobbying against Tuttle Creek and began to publicize the pro-dam work being done by Frank Carlson and Andrew Schoeppel. Thomsen warned the people of the Blue Valley not to be complacent. He told them "that any statement made by them that purported the belief that the dam would be constructed was added propoganda for the pro-dam enthusaists."[7]

On Friday, 10 June, Representative Scrivener worked an appropriation request for Tuttle Creek through to the House floor. It

was slated for a vote by the entire House of Representatives the next week. Glenn Stockwell notified the people of the Blue Valley, and the anti-dam forces mobilized for action against this funding threat. Most of the residents of the Valley sent letters and telegrams to both Representatives and Senators. Others made plans to go to the nation's capitol and personally work to stop the approval for Tuttle Creek. The Blue Rapids Times noted the quick reaction of the people to Scrivener's action. Over five hundred people gathered within hours at the Randolph high school. They quickly approved of plans to send a smaller delegation to Washington by plane immediately, and a larger group by bus. More than fifty men and women prepared for the bus trip as Glenn Stockwell, Bill Edwards, and a few others flew on ahead to make appointments and other plans for the larger group.[8]

This trip, the activities and feelings of the people, and the results of Congressional action, were recorded in a log by one of the participants. Sara Diebert of Irving kept track of what happened on the way to Washington, while in Washington, and during the trip back home to the Blue River Valley. On Sunday, 12 June, the riders met the bus at various stops along the Valley and in Manhattan and Topeka. As the group at Randolph prepared to board as one of the first groups, the people noticed that signs were already in place along the sides of the Greyhound bus. The signs said, "Stop Tuttle Creek Dam," and "Kansas Grassroots Say--Stop Floods and Drouth the Watershed Way." By the time the bus reached its last boarding point it was almost full. As the last group loaded onto the bus, five chairs had to be set up in the aisle. The riders traded seats throughout the trip so that no one was burdened

with this temporary seating. There was evidence of hurried packing by some of the participants. One man was noticed with a toothbrush sticking out of his shirtpocket. As the bus left, the people who wuld remain to await the outcome of this anti-dam lobbying effort waved to the riders of the Greyhound. As Mrs. Diebert noted: "The faces of the people left behind were hopeful but not over-confident. We all realized . . . . how desperate our situation had suddenly become."[9]

A few miles down the road the sound of a typewriter could be heard as various members of the group took turns copying material to be handed out to the press and the Congressmen. As the bus moved on through Kansas City and Missouri, the riders sang songs, read scripture from the Bible, and prayed for their safety on the trip and the work they had to do. When they reached St. Louis at 1:30 in the morning, they stopped for the remainder of the night. Sara Diebert commented, "We did not fully realize that this was only the beginning of a grueling schedule which was to leave us exhausted."[10]

On Monday, 13 June, a reporter from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch talked to the Blue Valley people while they ate breakfast before continuing on toward Washington. The group elected an "executive committee" to coordinate the copying of material and plan action for their arrival in the nation's capital. They also discussed the strategies and tactics planned by Glenn Stockwell and Bill Edwards so that they might have the most effect while they lobbied Congress. The riders were in high spirits; they played little games and practical jokes on each other to break the monotony of work and travel. They worked so as not to get upset with each other; their unity was essential

for their effort to stop Tuttle Creek.

The Blue Valley group arrived in Washington on Tuesday, 14 June. They all work large sunflower badges as they walked into the lobby of the Congressional Hotel. Stockwell worked with the executive committee and divided the large group into ten small groups, each with a leader. On Wednesday these groups were to visit various Congressmen. Mrs. Diebert noted that Bill Edwards hoped the groups would appear to be the "greatest organized disorganization" ever to hit the capitol. The Blue Valley spokesman wanted the Congressmen to feel that the whole Blue Valley had showed up to fight Tuttle Creek. The groups began by meeting with members of the press on Wednesday morning. Then they moved on to the offices of the nation's elected legislators. One of the participants recounted that he had been talking about Tuttle Creek with an operator of one of the elevators in the House Office Building. Mrs. Diebert noted the man's observation:

> A woman in the elevator suddenly exclaimed, "I wish I'd never heard of Tuttle Creek Dam!" It turned out that she was Representative Cannon's secretary, and their office had been smothered with Tuttle Creek mail the last couple of days.[11]

At noon Edwards, Stockwell and a couple of other members of the Valley delegation met with a reporter from the International News Service in the House Press Gallery. They recounted the story of the fight against the Army and their flood control plan and their hope to influence national resource policy. Then these leaders met back at a room at the hotel they used for an information center and checked to see how the various small groups had done. Many of the groups had interesting and amusing stories to relate about their visits. Mrs.

Diebert noted some of these incidents:

> Curtis and Fred were very much taken by the words of another lady Congressman. She expressed the opinion that she had considered Albert Cole a top-notch Congressman, and she obviously resented his defeat at the hands of a Democrat. She said something like this: "I think it's a pity that office-holders have to listen to the wishes of the people."
>
> Mrs. Diebert's weary groups, conscientiously telling their story to one secretary, were told, "Now you girls know they're not going to build that dam today. Why don't you go sit down in the shade of a tree and rest yourselves."[12]

The groups continued to meet with members of the House throughout the afternoon. Again, these anti-dam lobbyists observed a bit of irony:

> No one who tramped the long corridors that afternoon could have failed to observe that there were no drinking fountains. All agreed with the sentiment which occurred to both Bill Edwards and Fred: "Billions for dams but not a (damn) cent for fountains!"[13]

Later in the afternoon Bill Avery spoke on the House floor about the funding request. Many of the Valley people sat in the gallery and listened. They then reconverged on the information center and were proud of what they had accomplished. One group had visited fifty-three offices. This group had included an eighty-year-old participant.[14]

The next day, Thursday, several members of the group continued to see some Senators and Representatives. A smaller delegation worked with Avery's Executive Secretary to make a recording to be distributed to radio stations through the First District of Kansas. Then others of the group called at the offices of the Kansas Senators, Carlson and Schoeppel. Though neither gentleman was in, the members said they were treated warmly by the respective staffs. Mrs. Diebert did comment, "As we talked through the halls we noticed the words Shelter Area painted on the wall, and we laughingly decided that that must be where Schoeppel was."[15]

The Blue Valley people discovered that the House would vote on the appropriation for Tuttle Creek that afternoon. They sent flowers to Avery's office and went to the House Gallery to watch and wait. Sara Diebert described what happened:

> We sat in the gallery watching our Congress in action for over four hours. Our impressions were not particularly favorable. We were surprised at the confusion and the lack of interest in the proceedings; we were chagrined at the practically dissolute appearance of many of the Representatives; and we were appalled at the way they were throwing our money around. For most of us, that afternoon wiped away a long-cherished illusion of a conscientious Congress . . . .
>
> The clerk reached page 20 by 4:30, but it was nearly 6:30 before Mr. Avery got the floor and made an impassioned speech against funds for Tuttle Creek Dam. Rep. Scrivener followed him, however, with a sob-story about the 1951 flood, and then Rep. Bolling made another pro-dam speech. A voice vote was taken after very short debate, and it was obvious it was against us. However, Mr. Avery demanded a division; the vote was 114-87.
>
> Immediately after the vote was announced we rose as a body and filed silently out of the gallery, down the austere hall, down the marble steps to the ground flood, down the outside steps, and along the sidewalk blindly towrad the hotel. Nothing was said; nothing could be said. All that could be heard was the sharp slicking of heels on hard surface.[16]

Assembled back at the hotel, the group prayed and then began to talk about what else could be tried to stop the big dam. Within a short time the people were again enthused. The keeper of the log noted, "The group which congregated in the office later in the evening was again full of hope and ideas: the old Blue Valley spirit had returned." Stockwell made a statement to summarize what the people had observed about their Congress: "There wasn't a man there that didn't know he (Avery) was right, yet there wasn't a man who would stand up and support him."[17]

On Friday, 17 June, many members of the delegation took a tour of Washington and the surrounding historic sites. Others called on Senator

Frank Carlson. Mrs. Diebert stated:

> They reported that Bill Edwards had done a superb job of "laying it on the line." Asked his impression of the interview. Fred summarized it very simply: "Oh, Carlson is not a monument of strength."
>
> This group also wandered into Mr. Avery's office and cheered them up in there. It was then that Mrs. Haugen, Mr. Avery's secretary, so highly complimented the delegation. She said in effect that never in her twenty years in Washington had she seen a group so well organized and so well conducted, or one which accomplished so much in so little time.
>
> Several went out to dinner and to the cinerama that last night in Washington. They returned with gay stories about the cab driver they had had. It seems he had taken them to the Ambassador Hotel by mistake, and they flattered themselves to think they looked like ambassadors. Asked if he had ever heard of Big Dam Foolishness, the cabbie had replied, "We've got plenty of it here."[18]

Despite the approval of the appropriation and the probable impact this would have on many of these people, they maintained a sense of humor. That last night in Washington one such incident occurred while another was reported:

> Lucille and Elmer were involved in an amusing situation that last night. Lucille was trying to compose a letter to Eisenhower. Since her room was too noisy for her to concentrate, she shut herself in the bathroom and sat down, still dressed in the bathtub to finish the letter. Her roommates determined to take a picture of her and went out to borrow a camera; the only one available with a flash attachment was Elmer's, so they used it (he did not, however, take the picture). It seems that as soon as we got home several persons took pains to explain to Mrs. Musil why that picture would be in the roll.
>
> Gladys also reported that that last afternoon in Washington, as she was leaving the Capitol building she fell flat and bounced down three or four steps. (As we all know, Gladys is chairman of the Publicity Committee.)[19]

The delegation re-boarded the Greyhound the next morning to begin the return trip. The smaller group that had arrived earlier remained in Washington to continue the effort to try and stop the dam. Mrs. Diebert recorded her feelings as the bus pulled out:

> With typical Blue Valley spirit, the bus departed. We had come to Washington with soaring hopes. We had worked valiantly, giving that little which it was in our capacity to give for The Cause. And then we had watched helplessly as our mission was miserably abused and out belief in democratic government monumentarily shattered. Yet we left as we had come, with high hopes and undaunted faith . . . .
>
> A meeting was held that night in a stifling little parlor of the hotel, for the purpose of reviewing the events in Washington so we would all give out the same "straight dope" when we reached home. Many persons contributed fine ideas to the discussion, and when it was over we felt prepared for the questions we would be asked at home. Suggestions were also made concerning letters to President Eisenhower and to the Senators on the Appropriations Committee.[20]

As the bus traveled back to the Blue Valley, different members of the delegation made plans to get press releases and other information out to the newspapers and radio stations of the area. Until the Senate also approved of the funding and the bill was signed into law by the President, there was still hope of stopping Tuttle Creek.

Others also recounted the action of the House on the issue. Representative Byron G. Rogers of Colorado wrote to Howard Miller on Sunday, 20 June, and told the First District Congressman:

> The evening before the vote Avery and Scrivener presented their stories and Scrivener was much more effective. He had stories of flood pictures which were impressive and all in all did a fine job.[21]

Bill Edwards also told of the work he and Stockwell had done. They concentrated on the Democratic members of the House who had served with Howard Miller and had supported his efforts to keep the Army plan from being funded. But the two leaders of the anti-dam movement found that most of these Representatives had changed their decision on the dam. Edwards recalled the visit they had with Congressman Lee Metcalf of Montana, who had worked with Miller the previous two years to halt

appropriations. As Edwards and Stockwell talked to him, they were taken aback by his comments. Metcalf said that he remembered the fellow that had served in Congress for the First District of Kansas. He was a very nice man, named Miller, if Metcalf could recall. He told the Blue Valley men that it was too bad the District had not returned that gentleman. He was always convincing in arguing against that big dam. But since he had been defeated, people in the District must now favor the project, as did most of the Democratic leadership. Edwards and Stockwell then realized what they would face with almost every other Democratic Representative on their list. In addition, the pro-dam forces had hired professional lobbyists to work Congress on their behalf. As Edwards recalled, these groups in favor of Tuttle Creek "seemed to have an inexhaustable fund of slush money."[22]

Miller had offered to come to Washington and work with Avery to fight the appropriation. While the GOP Congressman did not accept this offer by his predecessor, he did write to thank him for his advice and support.[23] The Former Representative also heard from Clarence Cannon. The Chairman of the house Appropriations Committee was blunt in what he wrote to Miller:

> Am in receipt of your letter of June 15 and delighted to hear from you again.
>
> You were elected to defeat appropriations for Tuttle Creek dam and you defeated them.
>
> You were rewarded by a grateful constituency by being defeatd for reelection. And naturally the appropriation for Tuttle Creek dam was approved.[24]

The farmer from Brown County, Kansas, also received a reply from Lee Metcalf. The Montana congressman gave Miller his explanation of what had happened:

> However, many of the Members of Congress had the same idea that I did, that is, that you were the prime spokesman for the opposition to Tuttle Creek Dam, that we identified your membership in Congress with the opposition to Tuttle Creek Dam, and that the failure of the people of your District to return you to Congress demonstrated that this was not the paramount issue that we were led to believe it was. If the people of Kansas want to prevent further action on Tuttle Creek Dam they will have the opportunity in the next election to show that they seriously desire this by returning you to Congress.[25]

The attention of both the pro- and anti-dam forces now turned to the United States Senate. Both sides of the controversy contacted the Senators and asked for support for their particular beliefs. The Blue Valley Study Association again mobilized to contact these officials, as well as to get others to let the Senators know of the widespread and numerous opposition to the Army's plan. Posters were distributed around the Blue Valley that announced, "ACT AT ONCE!" Phrases such as "Remember the Alamo," Remember Pearl Harbor," and "YOU MAY BE NEXT!" alerted the residents of the Valley to the danger that lurked from the big cities, the Engineers, and the Congress.[26] Another poster carried the heading, "WAKE UP KANSAS!" The text told citizens to act:

> Let's protest the ruthless dictatorial methods of June 16 in our House of Representatives. Must we allow the injustice of having issues settled by pork-barrel legislation? If democratic principles are violated in any area of American life, we all suffer. Shall we destroy our most valuable natural resource, the soil? The Blue Valley fight is a symbol of Democracy in Action--You have a stake in the outcome![27]

Glenn Stockwell wrote on 21 June to Senator Carl Hayden, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Stockwell told the Senator of the solid feeling of the Blue Valley people against Tuttle Creek and the flood control policy advocated by the Army Engineers. There was a better way to handle the problems related to floods, the Blue Valley

leader told the Senator. The Army plan needed to be stopped before further unnecessary money was spent for the ill-conceived big dams.[28]

The fact that the Valley people did not give up their effort to stop the dam was noticed in an editorial in the Clay Center Dispatch of 18 June 1955. The improbability of these people being victorious was also noted:

> There is little hope but that the Senate will go along with the House and approve the appropriation for the dam. The Army Engineers, with their little chore boy Andy Schoeppel doing their dirty work, have displayed entirely too much power for the citizens of the nation to overcome.
>
> But, rather than take this latest defeat in a passive way, it is our sincere desire that the people of the Blue and their many, many friends here and elsewhere in the nation, learn from the defeat and go on to greater victories than ever before.
>
> The strategy for the future needs considerable thought and study, but two things are sure--We must always keep an anti-dam Congressman representing this district, and we must elect anti-dam Senators from the state.
>
> Even with the latest appropriation, Tuttle Creek dam will be a long way from completed. Construction was stopped once, and it can be stopped again . . . .
>
> The Army Engineers have displayed an unholy power in getting this bill through the House. When a servant of the people and that is what the Engineers are suppose to be, become so powerful that they can tell the people what they are to have--not what do you want--then the people will suffer and that is just what we in the nation will now do.[29]

The Blue Valley Study Association also sent out a one-page notice to every individual and group on its mailing list. It reminded these anti-dam proponents of the short- and long-term effects of the big dams and suggested the methods to be used to fight the Army:

> The Blue Valley of Kansas is gravely threatened by destruction. $7½ million has recently been allocated to the Corps of Army Engineers to continue construction of Tuttle Creek Dam. Completion of the dam means that seven towns and villages, hundreds of farmsteads, and thousands of acres of the riches land in the state will be needlessly obliterated--needless because there is no reason why Tuttle Creek Dam should be built . . . . The only purpose it might accomplish would be to provide the water

with which Kansas City could solve its sewage disposal problem. And then they DARE to call the Blue Valley selfish . . . .

But beyond these personal and economic considerations, Tuttle Creek Dam bears an even greater significance. Its fate determines whether a government agency, coupled with greedy industrialists, shall have the power to destroy at will . . . . whether United States citizens shall be denied "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." It is tantamount to dictatorship of the moneyed and the powerful . . . .

THEN HERE IS WHAT YOU CAN DO TO HELP:

You can throw off any indifference you may have and board the anti-Tuttle Creek band-wagon. You can become informed upon the issue. You can write to your Senators, to your Representative, and to the other Kansas Congressmen . . . .

You can lend your whole-hearted support to the watershed program . . . . And finally--if you come to share our vital interest in the issue--then organize! . . . .

Above all, never forget this: It is YOUR government, and ours, which is giving its sanction to this injustice. Indifference to a festering government is a personal contribution to its crimes. Do you want such blood on your hands?[30]

Bill Avery had been in the habit of regularly reporting to his constituents in the First District about what items Congress was considering. His report of 23 June 1955 presented his analysis of the House action regarding Tuttle Creek:

In our District we have had an issue--Tuttle Creek Dam. To some it has meant their very existence; to others it has stood for principle; to others it has been a political mechanism. By now the headlines in the newspapers have given you the results of action by the House of Representatives concerning Tuttle Creek Dam. The principle involved in this issue is something I feel quite deeply. Since 1938, years before many who have politically screamed "flood control," I began study of the vital issue of flood control, water and soil conservation, not only for our district but for our state . . . .

One need not dwell on the history of Tuttle Creek Dam and its ramifications. As time progressed, whether right or wrong, the principle of Tuttle Creek though not a political issue has had political repercussions even to the halls of Congress . . . . Because I genuinely and sincerely believed that the theory of Tuttle Creek Dam and what it stood for was not the true solution for the benefit of our state, I stood up in opposition to its construction . . . .

The vote of the House of Representatives was based on a most unorthodox pattern. The appropriation was not recommended by the subcommittee assigned to study Kansas River projects.

> The funds were placed in the bill after the bill and committee report were printed. No recommendations or conclusions were offered by the Committee in support of this appropriation . . . . At this point I would like to again quote from my remarks.
>
> "The Corps of Engineers has withheld any local protection for Topeka and Manhattan until funds are appropriated for the Kaw Valley reservoir program . . . . However, in downstream areas friendly to their program, they have proceeded to build levees for local protection to use as trading stock for support for their reservoir program."
>
> To further bring out the unorthodox pattern that prevailed in the sequence of events, the Washington vistors from the Blue Valley as well as I had been assured considerable support from the Democratic side for my amendment deleting funds for Tuttle Creek from the appropriation bill. This support vanished almost completely when Speaker Sam Rayburn walked onto the floor to support Representative Bolling. This was one of the rare occasions of this session that Speaker Rayburn has come onto the floor while the House was considering bills in the committee of the whole . . . . Again, I quote from my remarks.
>
> "Lastly, you are voting on whether the wishes of a Congressman, elected to represent a district, will prevail over the demands of representatives of interests not in the district and mostly not even in the state."[31]

Glenn Stockwell was incensed with the action of the House Republicans, especially those on the Appropriations Committee. He did not feel they had assisted their freshman colleague from the First District in a strong enough manner. The Blue Valley leader sent a note to President Eisenhower's assistant, Sherman Adams. He chastised the White House for not helping to spur the House Republicans to fight against Tuttle Creek.[32] He also released information to the press from the Congressional Hotel on 29 June:

> The industrial and commercial interests of Kansas City, Topeka, and Lawrence are exerting terrific pressure in Washinton for the Tuttle Creek Dam. There is almost total disregard for the economic welfare of their agricultural trade areas. Evidently these cities have illusions of industrial prosperity . . . .
>
> Trade must rest on mutal good will and generally gravitates to those who show some regard for the welfare of the customers. The cities along the Kaw are destroying, at one blow, decades of favorable urban-rural relationships.
>
> I wonder at the ultimate consequences?[33]

Bill Colvin remembered the tactics of the pro-dam forces that Stockwell mentioned. These forces had effectively used lobbyists, as had the anti-dam side, but the cities and their business and industrual bases could contribute more money to monitor and gain the attention of various Congressmen who were crucial to funding approval. Those in favor of the dam also appeared to have a broader base of support. While the Blue Valley was largely alone in fighting the Engineers, the pro-dam forces were represented by the cities, the Engineers, and towns and rural areas along the lowlands. The Manhattan editor believed that Congress was persuaded of the merits of the project partly due to this broader range of persons and groups advocating the big dam and reservoir.[34]

The rest of the Blue Valley anti-dammers fought from their homes while Stockwell remained in the nation's capital. Near the end of July the Belles began a tour of the state reminding people of what was at stake in the Tuttle Creek issue. Their goal was to get other Kansans to write letters, send telegrams, and make telephone calls to pressure the Senate and the President to stop the appropriation for the big dam targeted for the Blue Valley.[35]

The two United States Senators from Kansas were the main targets of these efforts. The Valley people maintained a strong dislike for Andrew Schoeppel. Bill Edwards said that most of the Blue Valley folk referred to him as "Senator Claghorn"--a buffoon political character created by comedian Fred Allen. The character, and the Senator by interference, was just a lot of hot air with little actual good work.[36]

The anti-dam forces looked to President Eisenhower as the last hope

to stop Tuttle Creek. If the Senate also approved the appropriation, the people would lobby Ike to veto the spending bill that contained the funding for the project. Both Howard Miller and Glenn Stockwell were persistent in communicating this to the Chief Executive.[37] Stockwell reminded Eisenhower that this was a project that affected fellow Kansans who were already frustrated with their government that sought to take their land and homes:

> Mr. President, we have almost exhausted all means of protest available to a free people . . . . Is there no way in our American government for a project to be considered on its merits rather than by legislative logrolling?[38]

Eisenhower received numerous such comments in letters from the Blue Valley and others sympathetic to the anti-dam cause. Indeed, enough correspondence had been sent to the White House that it received special attention through the advice of Ike's staff. Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President, sent a memorandum to a fellow staff member on 11 July 1955. Harlow, responding to the Tuttle Creek letters and telegrams, instructed the other staff members.

> and tell them we <u>don't</u> want the Corps of Engineers answering. We musn't let ourselves get all swamped with these things . . . . Notify whomever refers these things to stop sending them to the Engineers, it's like waving a red flag at a bull.[39]

Penned across the bottom of the memo was "Tuttle Creek again!" The next day Harlow sent a related message to Fred Seaton, another member of the White House Staff, saying:

> I have, in your absence, moved all of this Tuttle Creek business out of the White House. It had reached such proportions as to become a serious hindrance. I made arrangements with the Bureau of the Budget to answer such letters direct . . . . in view of the fact that Miller might again run against Avery, maybe you will feel that we should take another tack.[40]

The reply written across the bottom of this note said that Miller's letter should be answered by the White House.

Meanwhile, back in the Blue Valley, the people worked to keep up their own spirits. Sara Diebert, who had kept the log of the trip to Washington, wrote a brief article titled, "Justice." Printed in several area newspapers, the comment was written as an obituary about justice for the common person against persons with more power and authority. She said that justice had been born in 1987 but had died in 1955 with the decision to fund Tuttle Creek. The Valley people returned to the hillsides along the Blue River and again sang hymns and prayed together, seeking intervention from the Almighty in case the politicians continued to fail them.[41]

James Robinson of the Topeka Daily Capital summarized the Tuttle Creek situation in mid-July in the article, "Tuttle Creek Tragedy: People v. Bureaucrats." It was reprinted by other newspapers and copied by the anti-dam forces for distribution. The reporter stated:

> Unless Congress suddenly decides to pay more attention . . . . the Blue Valley eventually must give up. Appropriation will follow appropriation and the time will come when the government will have bought up all of the land. Then there will be no more resistance possible.
>
> If that time arrives, the people of Kansas and of the nation will have lost more than 70,000 acres of their best land. They will have lost the power to control the government of their own creation.
>
> This is the essential tragedy of Tuttle Creek . . . .
>
> All this has been merely a result of the much greater basic struggle between the people and their servants--the bureacrats.
>
> The Army Cops of Engineers will deny they do anything more than follow the directions of Congress. But their actions prove otherwise . . . .
>
> The bureaucrats do not stop with lobbying Congress. They also lobby the people with the people's money, so the people will lobby Congress, also.
>
> As to who is in the majority, does it make any difference?

> Is right and wrong determined by counting noses? Is it selfish for a man to love his home and seek to preserve it?[42]

Without debate the Senate approved the appropriation for Tuttle Creek in the middle of July. Bill Colvin informed his readers that the Engineers simply outspent the anti-dammers to convince Congress and the people that the big dams and reservoirs were necessary for satisfactory flood control. He wrote that the Army would purchase strategic parcels of land in the Valley so as to divide the opposition.[43]

The approval of Congress for the funding seemed to seal the fate of the Blue Valley. Stockwell wrote to Miller commenting:

> If Eisenhower releases the funds for Tuttle Creek there is not much more use of fighting Tuttle Creek since we will have the same set up for next year. Two years from now even if we change Senators will be too late. We will continue to fight big dam foolishness but will have to change our tactics here at home so as to use our influence to serve some kind of orderly program in the land acquisition and attempt to salvage as much of our communities as we can.[44]

Bill Avery requested a meeting with the President to discuss the situation. Eisenhower agreed to talk with the First District Congressman, and he did listen to the plea to save the Valley. Bryce Harlow reported the result of the meeting in a response to a letter from Miller concerning the possibility of a veto. Harlow said that "the action taken was insisted upon by Congress, including the majority of the Kansas Congressional Delegation." Avery's plea had little chance of success. Bill Edwards noted that Ike did not have the power of the line-item veto and, therefore, would not veto the entire spending bill that included much more than just Tuttle Creek. Seven and one-half million dollars was now available to re-start construction and land acquisition in the Blue Valley. The Engineers immediately announced

that contracts would be let within thirty days and construction would start within sixty days.[45]

In the middle of these events a man named Ken Kerle wrote to Howard Miller. Kerle had worked for the Democrat and now sent his evaluation of the recent happenings to his mentor:

> I have just received word from a friend that the passage of Tuttle Creek Dam is virutally assured. If this be the case then I am heartily sorry for the good people of the Blue Valley and for Mr. Avery who, to judge by the hearings, did his level best to defend their best interests. It was just last week that my professor in public administration said "Nobody defeats the Corps of Engineers. They have one of the best lobbies on the 'Hill.'" I tactfully told him that I knew a gentleman who had held them at bay for two years and who could have done it again had he been returned to office. Unfortunately, this was not the case, and even more unfortunate was the fact that First District citizens failed to heed your warning, that a Democratic Congress would pay no attention to a Republican if elected particularly in view of the preceding circumstances. This is a lesson in government which the First District will remember for years to come.[46]

Reactions by some Kansans were of similar nature. The newspaper of Onaga reported, "if the Army engineers just want another monument to their vast array we suggest that they try an inverted pyramid in the middle of the Mohave Desert." The Waterville Telegraph reported that the latest study of the 1951 flood revealed that the Blue River could have only caused from two to twenty percent of the damage. The paper article asked if the Army's big dam plan for Tuttle Creek was not an act against God because of the social and economic value of the Blue Valley.[47]

Senator Andrew Schoeppel sought to explain his support for the project in a letter sent to most of his constituents and many newspapers in the state. The Senator stated that he had concluded that watersheds

alone would not be adequate for flood protection. Only with the use of the big dams and reservoirs proposed by the Army would there be sufficient protection.[48]

Bill Avery made one last attempt to stop the funding. He contacted the White House about the possibility of impounding the appropriation. Gerald Morgan, Special Counsel to the President, replied to the Congressman's inquiry on 12 August 1955 and stated:

> Because of the President's Constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the laws, I am strongly of the view that when Congress has appropriated funds for a particular project, the President cannot set aside the will of Congress and direct that no funds be spent on that project.[49]

The Blue Valley residents prepared for the resumption of the Engineers' flood control plan. Yet their argument against the dam had touched some people who had no stake in the controversy. One such person responded publicly in the Concordia, Kansas, newspaper. Wilfrid Hotaling wrote a long letter titled, "All Have A Stake In Our Government," and said:

> I have written to you primarily, to remind myself that government is my business and that either I run the government, or the government runs me. My responsibility for being a citizen of this state and this America does not end with casting my ballot on election day. My responsibility consists in doing something other than sitting by the side of the road.[50]

As September began, the Army released information on how the land acquisition and construction would proceed. At the same time some of the Blue Valley people still worked to change the decision of Congress. Bill Edwards described this as "a couple more chances, but there was little we could do about it." The Engineers, in Edward's estimation, would work to divide the anti-dam forces in the affected area. He

recalled, for example, that the Army let the town of Blue Rapids know that it would not need to be relocated, that instead levees would be built around the town to protect it. Since their town was safe, the opposition to the dam melted away. The businessmen of Randolph contacted Avery asking for his assistance in getting the most money possible from the Army to compensate for relocation. The Congressman agreed to do all that he could. Again, some opposition had been removed.[51]

According to the Velen sisters some "last ditch activities" were planned using the BVSA and the Belles. They were not going to give up, though they realized that even Bill Avery now conceded defeat to the Army. The activities that were discussed and planned were those that could be done without the support of their representative.[52]

One activity was the distribution of literature developed by the BVSA. The titles of many of these material conveyed their philosophy: "Flood Control . . . . In Reverse!", "Why Avery Failed on Tuttle Creek," and "Is Tuttle Creek Necessary?" The Belles set up the information stands on the roads around the Valley to help pass out this literature. Together the groups developed one last activity. An "open house" was planned and the theme was "The Coffee Pot Is On." Headquarters were at the VFW Hall in Randolph. The activity was held during the weekend of 22 and 23 October 1955. Posters were distributed and stories were sent out to newspapers and radio stations. The anti-dam forces listed information for tours, lodging, points of interest, church schedules, and talks about the watershed approach to flood control. Band concerts, a hymn-sing, and showings of the movie about Tuttle Creek were also

planned. Land tours of the Valley would take two hours, while air tours were available at a cost of four dollars per person. Signs were posted throughout the Valley and were coded to denote different things--black and white for points of interest, and blue and white to show watershed areas.[53]

Despite these efforts most of the people seemed to have given up on defeating the Army and its big-dam plan. Avery's position was clear in a letter he sent to Wilton Persons, Deputy Assistant to the President. The First District Representative stated:

> I did want to visit with you on some problems relative to the land acquisition for the Tuttle Creek reservoir . . . . For the most part this thing is going to work out, I believe, especially if the land acquisition program has enough flexibility for it to meet some problems in the Valley.[54]

Almost one month later Persons contacted Bryce Harlow. He told Ike's Assistant that the Engineers were willing "to cooperate in any feasible way." The Corps released information on the phases of land acquisition. According to their estimates the project would be completed by the summer of 1960.[55]

In late November the editor of the Blue Rapids Times wrote a story about a town in South Dakota that had been relocated for a similar type of project. He pondered whether this would happen to the affected communities of the Blue Valley. The resumed action of the Engineers would soon provide some answers.[56]

The Eisenhower Administration did propose more funds for Tuttle Creek in the budget it released in January 1956. Nine million dollars were requested for the project. The estimate of the total cost needed to complete the dam and reservoir stood at ninety-two million dollars.

Bill Avery's report from Washington made no comment.[57]

Later that month the mayor of Randolph went to Washington to seek as much relocation assistance as possible from the federal government. The residents of the small town had decided to relocate the community on a nearby hillside. Many other communities that would be totally or partially inundated put up no fight. Their fate was decided by the continued work of the Engineers. Since even Ike now supported the project, there was even less chance for Avery to fight it. As a Republican Congressman he felt the need to support Eisenhower, and for his future political ambitions he could not stand against his party. The Blue Valley people knew that Howard Miller did not have other political ambitions except to fight the big-dam ideas for flood control. For Avery the issue was one of political reality; for Miller it was a crusade.[58]

Miller was interested in running against Avery in the 1956 election. He had remained active as leader of the Kansas Watershed Association, and this had provided a forum to advocate water and soil conservation methods. Miller contacted Stockwell early in 1956 and inquired if the people would work for him. It was not going to be easy, as Avery was still on record as opposing the project and he was a Republican in the GOP-dominated First District. Miller also heard from James Robinson, the Topeka newspaper reporter. Robinson wondered if Tuttle Creek was still a credible issue. He was of the opinion that since many of the people had accepted the dam as a fact, the project was no longer a political controversy. Perhaps the only viable issue in the situation now was the tactics of the Engineers. But by the

time Robinson contacted Miller, the former Congressman had decided to run and try to make the dam the issue.[59]

When Howard Miller announced his plans to seek the office he had once held, he reviewed the Tuttle Creek controversy for the voters. He told the people that he had offered to help Bill Avery fight the appropriation in 1955, but that the Republican Congressman had declined the assistance. Miller noted:

> Congressman Avery, whose business it was to prevent such action, expressed great surprise. So far as I know he had done little or nothing to prevent it . . . . I understand that Congressman Avery seeks to exonerate himself of his dereliction by laying the blame upon a Democratically controlled Congress. Let me remind you that it was a Republican Congressman who offered the motion, both in committee and on the House floor for the appropriation to build Tuttle Creek Dam.[60]

Slowly Miller worked the issue to reflect more of the responsibility of government, both those elected to it, and those who served within its bureaucracy. Tuttle Creek was just one example of the folly of a national policy that had been approved for use throughout much of the nation. Glenn Stockwell continued to collect evidence on the absurdity of the big dam and what the Army claimed it would be effective in doing and preventing. L.D. McDonald, a consulting engineer to the Blue Valley Study Association, told Stockwell:

> I have spent considerable time in reviewing reports on Flood Control plans of the Missouri River Basin and have failed to find any report prepared by capable engineers in private practice that agrees with the Army that their plans are justified or give assurance of full flood protection.[61]

Stockwell agreed with the points Miller was making about the government. He wrote to the Democratic candidate:

> Tuttle Creek is no longer a controversy over the proper means to develop our water resources but a question of the proper

> function of government. Is it the proper function of the Federal government to ram Tuttle Creek down the throats of Kansas when we have expressed objections . . . . the Army Engineers are overly cautious in the Valley. They have not started a big force although they have let contracts for a lot of work.
>
> Avery does not have a lost of fight. He feels licked before he starts.[62]

The Blue Valley Study Association and the Belles would support Howard Miller in the fall election. They responded with enthusiasm and whole-hearted agreement as the candidate attacked Congress and the Engineers. Regarding the Army, Miller said:

> but I do object, in the name of the people of this valley, in the name of the Congressional District and of the State of Kansas, to their abuse of that power. I do object to the creature presuming to rule over its creator.[63]

Outside of the Blue Valley, however, Miller received little attention or consideration. Only the affected area believed that the aging farmer could again pull an electoral upset and then succesfully fight the Congress, the Corps, and the President. Miller received active support from many of the church congregations in the Valley. In June two churches in Randolph and Cleburne hosted a barbeque for the Democrat candidate. The church bulletins announced, "We know of no one who has accomplished more for the cause of the Blue Valley." These people saw no conflict of church and state having these religious bodies so actively involved politically; the congregations were like communities with just as much at stake as the surrounding towns.[65]

However, the effort of the Blue Valley Study Association and the Belles was not effective in 1956. The Democrat could not repeat his success of 1952. The election of 1956 was a Presidential one, and Dwight Eisenhower was running again. Bill Avery was able to use this

popular Kansan to make the case that Ike still needed as much loyal Kansas support as possible. Tuttle Creek Dam was not a dominant issue. There was another factor that made the big dam and reservoir less of an issue by the fall of 1956: the summer had been dry. The idea of a large reservoir full of water to be used by towns and cities downstream as well as irrigation by farmers was appealing to many of the residents around the area. Also, there was talk of making the reservoir a multi-recreational facility. While the plan to have such an area for fishing, boating, and swimming had had little appeal during the war emergencies of the 1940s and the early 1950s, by 1956 peace had been secured. The attitude of the people in the area had changed to one of enjoying leisure time. The reservoir could draw tourists and other traffic into the area to make up for the economic loss of agricultural production. Avery and Colvin both agreed that the drought, and this change in thinking toward recreation, were critical in many people's acceptance of Tuttle Creek Dam and Reservoir.[66]

These developments and the attitudes of many of the Blue Valley people who had previously fought the dam now worked on behalf of Avery's re-election. Some formed the Blue Valley Friends, who claimed Tuttle Creek was no longer an issue and Avery deserved to continue to serve the First District in the Congress. By election day this was confirmed, though the final outcome was closer than many Republicans had expected. Avery won with fifty-three percent of the vote; Eisenhower was also re-elected.[67]

The First District Congressman worked with Senator Frank Carlson to make sure the Army would construct a wet-dam at Tuttle Creek. This

would make possible a permanent pool of water that could be used as a multi-recreational facility. But in so doing there would also be a permanent loss of farmland. Glenn Stockwell and the Study Association opposed this plan in the hope that as much land could be saved for farming as was estimated under the dry-dam plan. Besides, the dry-dam approach was the one that had been approved by Congress under the original authorization and had been subsequently funded. Later, the Blue Valley leader learned from Avery that the permanent pool would be built by the Engineers, though it would probably be smaller than originally planned. This would allow some greater percentage of land to continue to be available for agriculture. The Corps continued to acquire land and build the dam and clear the land for the reservoir. Some of the people gave in and made it easy for themselves and the Army. Others fought through the courts either to get more money or to stall the inevitable as long as possible. The government always won, ultimately, because of the right of eminent domain.[68]

The group of people actively fighting the big dams grew smaller as Tuttle Creek came closer to completion. Those in the affected area who had lost their lands and homes relocated to other areas and began new lives and businesses. Those who stayed in the area were also busy adapting to new surroundings. Others quit opposing the dam as the drought continued into 1957. The reservoir took on new meaning to many. These people believed that the dry spells were "more frequent than the devastating floods . . . . This is what really tipped the scales. It wasn't political, it was old Ma Nature," said Bill Colvin. The need for a source of water overcame a great deal of the original opposition.[69]

Bill Avery continued to help the people in the Blue Valley get as much assistance as was possible from the Federal government, and worked to insure that the reservoir would be a fine multi-recreational facility. He tried to get the Engineers to take a more conciliatory approach to the people in the Blue Valley. As both Avery and Colvin remembered, the Corps usually acted "arrogant as hell" toward the people they were forcing out in the Valley. But through the efforts of Avery and Carlson the Army did "tone down" its tyranny over the anti-dam people. During the latter 1950s, in fact, the Army took an impersonal approach by contacting land owners by letter and informing them of the acquisition proceedings and dates the land would have to be vacated.[70]

The Mariadahl Lutheran Church celebrated its 95th anniversary in 1958. The members knew that the church would soon be closed and destroyed due to the flood control project. There would be no centennial celebration. Thus, the 1958 event was both a happy and sad affair. In the parking lot was one momento of the fight that had been waged by the anti-dam forces. The sign said "Stop Big Dam Foolishness."[71]

Bill Edwards served in the Kansas State House of Representatives through most of the 1950s. In the winter of 1959 he received a letter from the Army informing him that he would have to be moved off of his land by March 1960. This would be right in the middle of the legislative session. Edwards appealed through the courts for a delay in the acquisition of his farm. He was granted a special dispensation to allow him to remain on his land until summer.[72]

As the Corps advanced up the Blue River Valley, more of the people moved out. Many were near retirement age, and the relocation just hurried this event in their lives. Those in their forties and fifties found the transition harder to make; it was more difficult to start over in another town or on another farm. Those who were younger had an easier time adjusting to the move away from the Valley. Most of those who moved stayed in Kansas or went north into Nebraska. These places still felt close to the roots of the people; it was still the Great Plains, and home.

They left behind a culture and way of life that was slowly disappearing anyway. Even if Tuttle Creek had not be constructed, life was changing for many of the people in these small Kansas communities. The populations were aging and the younger people were often moving out on their own. The pressure of the big dam and reservoir made little difference to their plans. Though the limestone architecture of the Valley gave an image of permanence, the ages of the people that remained revealed the reality that would happen to many other similar areas, with or without a dam project.[73]

The Corps prepared a report on Tuttle Creek in 1960. It revealed that 42,176 of 59,600 total acres needed had been acquired. Over three thousand people would eventually by relocated, two thousand of these from the small communities that had been inundated. The report also stated:

> Courts have been exceptionally lenient with former owners of lands being acquired and have permitted occupancy beyond the date requested by Corps, requiring that telephone and utility services remain in operation later than scheduled and that reservoir cleaning operations be delayed in some areas . . . . Although

> there was intense early opposition, there was also strong support. Intense opposition has dwindled and with current progress of land acquisition and construction, attitude of valley residents changed to calm reasoning and lacks emotionalism that governed past actions. No opposition has appeared at recent hearings.[74]

This same report noted that Congress had approved the reservoir as a multi-purpose facility. The Congressman for the area had been in support of appropriations for the project in recent years, and he had also commented on the fact that there was no opposition at recent meetings concerning the project and its funding. The Army estimated that all land acquisition and relocation would be completed by 1962 or 1963.[75]

The fight was over. The Blue Valley people had won several important battles against overwhelming odds and forces, but they had lost some important ones as well and had lost the war to keep their lands, farms, homes, communities, schools, churches, and businesses in the Blue Valley.

Notes for Chapter 5

1. Paul D. Barber, Letter to Robin Blackman, 28 May 1976, enclosed in personal letter from Phillip Rotert, KC-ACE, 25 March 1988.

2. Blue Rapids Times, 6 January 1955; Howard Miller, Letter to Clarence Cannon, 13 January 1955, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek January-June 1955, KSHS; Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Clarence Cannon, 24 January 1955, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1955, KSHS.

3. Carl Schwartz, Jr., Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 19 January 1955, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1955, KSHS; Edwards interview.

4. Colvin interview.

5. Blue Rapids Times, 19 May 1955; Clay Center Times, 26 May 1955.

6. Clay Center Times, 26 May 1955.

7. Blue Rapids Times, 9 June 1955.

8. Velen interview; Blue Rapids Times, 16 June 1955.

9. Sara Diebert, Washington Log, Velen books.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Byron Rogers, Letter to Howard Miller, 20 June 1955, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek January-June 1955, KSHS.

22. Edwards interview.

23. William Avery, Letter to Howard Miller, 15 June 1955, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek January-June 1955, KSHS.

24. Clarence Cannon, Letter to Howard Miller, 16 June 1955, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek January-June 1955, KSHS.

25. Lee Metcalf, Letter to Howard Miller, 20 June 1955, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek January-June 1955, KSHS.

26. "Act At Once," pamphlet, Velen books.

27. "Wake Up Kansans," pamphlet, Velen books.

28. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Carl Hayden, 21 June 1955, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1955, KSHS.

29. Clay Center Dispatch, 18 June 1955.

30. "What You Can Do," pamphlet, Velen books.

31. William Avery, "Your Office in Washington," Newsletter, 23 June 1955, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.3, File: 1955-58, KSHS.

32. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Sherman Adams, 24 June 1955, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1955, KSHS.

33. Glenn Stockwell, Press Release, 29 June 1955, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.3, File: 1955-58, KSHS.

34. Colvin interview.

35. Blue Rapids Times, 30 June 1955.

36. Edwards interview.

37. Howard Miller, Letter to Dwight Eisenhower, 9 July 1955, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek July-December 1955, KSHS.

38. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Dwight Eisenhower, 9 July 1955, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1955, KSHS.

39. Bryce Harlow, Memo to "Nicky," 11 July 1955, Harlow Papers, Staff Files, Box 23, File: Tuttle Creek Reservoir Project, Eisenhower Library.

40. Bryce Harlow, Memo to Fred Seaton, 12 July 1955, Harlow Papers, Staff Files, Box 23, File: Tuttle Creek Reservoir Project, Eisenhower Library.

41. Sara Diebert, "Justice," Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 13 June 1955, Blue Rapids Times, 14 July 1955.

42. James Robinson, "Tuttle Creek Tragedy: People v. Bureaucracy," Manhattan Tribune News, 14 July 1955.

43. Bill Colvin, "Engineers Indicate New Tuttle Money to Buy Strategic Land," Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 17 July 1955.

44. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Howard Miller, 17 July 1955, Miller Papers, Collection 47.2, File: Tuttle Creek July-December 1955, KSHS.

45. Avery interview; Bryce Harlow, Letter to Howard Miller, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1955, KSHS; Edwards interview.

46. Ken Kerle, Letter to Howard Miller, 18 July 1955, Miller Papers, Collection 47.1, File: 1955, KSHS.

47. Clipping from Onaga newspaper, July 1955, Avery Papers, Collection 137.21, File: Tuttle Creek Clippings, July 1955, KSHS; Clipping, Waterville Telegraph, July 1955, Avery Papers, Collection 137.21, File: Tuttle Creek Clippings, July 1955, KSHS.

48. Andrew Schoeppel, Letter, Topeka Daily Capital, 31 July 1955, KSHS.

49. Gerald R. Morgan, Letter to Bill Avery, 12 August 1955, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: correspondence 1955, KSHS.

50. Wilfrid Hotaling, "All Have A Stake in Our Government," Concordia Blade-Empire, 24 August 1955.

51. Blue Rapids Times, 1 September 1955; Edwards interview; Blue Rapids Times, 29 September 1955.

52. Velen interview

53. Pamphlets, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, KSHS; "Use This Map," Pamphlet, Velen books; Velen interview; "Blue Valley Open House," Poster, Velen books.

54. Bill Avery, Memorandum to Wilton Persons, 4 October 1955, Harlow Papers, Staff Files, Box 23, File: Tuttle Creek Reservoir Project, Eisenhower Library.

55. Wilton Persons, Memorandum to Bryce Harlow, 2 November 1955, Harlow Papers, Staff Files, Box 23, File: Tuttle Creek Reservoir Project, Eisenhower Library; Blue Rapids Times, 20 October 1955.

56. Herbert Hickman, "The Re-Birth of Pollack, South Dakota," Blue Rapids Times, 24 November 1955.

57. Blue Rapids Times, 19 January 1956.

58. Blue Rapids Times, 26 January 1956, 16 February 1956; Velen books.

59. Howard Miller, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 13 February 1956, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek 1956, KSHS; James Robinson, Letter to Howard Miller, 21 March 1956, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek 1956, KSHS.

60. Howard Miller, Speech, Miller Papers, Collection 47.2, File: Speeches 1938-56, KSHS.

61. L.D. McDonald, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 20 March 1956, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1956, KSHS.

62. Glenn Stockwell, Letter to Howard Miller, 8 May 1956, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: tuttle Creek 1956, KSHS.

63. Notes on Tuttle Creek, Miller Papers, Collection 47.2, File: Undated Speeches, KSHS.

64. Richard Bolling, Newsletter, 25 May 1956, Miller Papers, Collection 47.4, File: Tuttle Creek 1956, KSHS.

65. Church Bulletin, Mission Covenant Churches of Randolph and Cleburne, 24 June 1956, Miller Papers, Collection 47.1, File: 1956, KSHS; Velen interview.

66. Edwards interview; Colvin interview; Avery interview.

67. Blue Rapids Times, 25 October 1956; Cliff Stratton, Undated note, Miller Papers, Collection 47.1, File: 1956, KSHS.

68. Topeka Daily Capital, 14 January 1957; Bill Avery, Letter to Glenn Stockwell, 1 February 1957, Stockwell Papers, Collection 81.2, File: Correspondence 1957, KSHS.

69. Colvin interview.

70. Colvin interview; Avery interview; Edwards interview;

71. Velen interview.

72. Edwards interview.

73. Edwards interview; Velen interview.

74. "Data for Testifying Officers on FY1961 Civil Works Budget Tuttle Creek Reservoir, Problems and Information," 1 January 1960, KS-ACE, pg. 11, 13.

75. Ibid., pg. 12, 13.

Chapter 6

The Right Idea at the Wrong Time

Down near old Manhattan lies a river called the Blue,
The Army Engineers are there to see what they can do.
They want to spend a lot of money that's been taxed from me and you
To build a great big dam straight across the river Blue.
The rich Blue River Valley, the land we fought to keep,
Will soon be under water a hundred ten feet deep.
The Army boys are going to build a great big stagnant lake,
To heck with all the Farmers, it's for Kansas City's sake.

Tuttle Creek Dam and Reservoir is located six miles north of Manhattan, Kansas. The reservoir was designed to extend for almost fifty miles north, but in the spring of 1988, it was nowhere near that size. Siltation and downstream use of the water had dried up much of the reservoir. As a multi-recreational facility it is not a showcase. Some people, including former residents and engineering experts, have predicted that the total life expectancy of the project before siltation takes over will be only fifty to sixty years after completion. The siltation problem seemed inevitable in such flood control projects. It was the result of current, wind, rain, and settling, the silt having moved against the dam and the flood control benefit having been lessoned.[1]

Some of the Valley land is still available for agricultural production, but the economic output of the area is much less than what it was before the dam and reservoir were completed. A few of the communities were relocated; others have permanently disappeared except in the memories of those who lived through the fight. Many of the people who battled big dam foolishness have died. Yet enough are alive

to capture the emotion, calculation, and action of the Blue Valley fight.

What effect did the Blue Valley Study Association, the Blue Valley Belles, and the other forces that fought the Army, the cities, and big-dam plan have? Was Tuttle Creek inevitable? Were the people right in their belief that the use of big dams and reservoirs to fight floods was not the best approach?

Such questions recur among the many Blue Valley people who, though defeated over two decades ago, still communicate with each other regularly. In 1985 a reunion of these people was held. They met in Randolph at the Blue Valley grade school. Over two hundred were in attendance, representing thirty-four Kansas towns and eight other states. The movie made in 1953 was re-shown, and many still laughed at the inside angles they knew about the making of the film. This event was the idea of Bill Edwards, who has remained at the center of communication of those still alive.[2]

Many of those attending the reunion enjoyed talking about "Tuttle Puddle," which was what most of the locals called the flood control project due to the siltation problem. The former Valley residents also commiserated over the end of the small community life they had so enjoyed. The social activities were missed, but at least the friendships of these people had been maintained. There was still a sense of family, partly due to the work they had done together to fight the Engineers and the other pro-dam advocates.[3]

The effort that they had made, especially that of the women, seemed to have made some difference. If they had failed to stop Tuttle Creek,

they had at least learned to work together and draw on those sources of strength available in the Valley. It came primarily from the church activities that had initially bonded these people to work as one unit and was carried over into the anti-dam fight. They could and did act independently from the government that threatened them. This spiritual quality also allowed the people to handle the defeat of their effort and the resulting adjustment to new circumstances.[4]

Their effort may have been flawed and doomed from the beginning. Though some of the Valley residents knew of the authorization passed in 1938, the Second World War distracted them from getting organized early to fight the Engineers' project. The study association, with the leadership of Hawkinson and Stockwell, did several important things in getting some action taken, but the people did not get behind the stop-the-dam effort until after the flood of July 1951. By then the pro-dam forces had quite a bit of information to use to justify their demand for flood control. The Blue Valley effort was made too late, but did need to be made, to protest the big-dam policy approved by the Congress.[5]

Why don't they spend that money out upon the farm
And build a lot of little dams where the water does no harm.

The anti-dammers honestly believed that the Pick-Sloan policy for big dams throughout the Missouri River Basin was the wrong approach for promoting flood control and soil conservation. The Blue Valley people were not a bunch of clodhoppers, as many in the urban areas seemed to think. For the most part they were intelligent and college-educated. They did research to get the facts to prove their points, primarily that

the big-dam method was ineffective and too expensive as compared to the watershed alternative. The watersheds could be developed in the Valley area where the land was already naturally contoured. Instead of one big reservoir that deprived the people of most of the Valley land, the farmers would benefit by several smaller detention dams spread around the area. There would be control of flooding problems due to heavy rains without the loss of any great amount of productive land. Fighting for their homes would have been enough justification for most people, but the Blue Valley folk wanted to change the water and soil policies of the United States.[6]

Bill Colvin believed that the anti-dam forces gained a "pyrrhic victory" with the election of Howard Miller in 1952. He was elected mostly due to the uniqueness of the Belles and the switching of many normally solid Republican voters. Miller was sincere in wanting to stop Tuttle Creek, but he only succeeded in delaying the inevitable. The Manhattan editor concluded that the initial appropriation of 1952 insured that the project would ultimately be built. The damage caused by the 1951 food was too great for most political officials to ignore. The Army Corps of Engineers at least had a complete plan ready to use to try to stop any such future disaster. The Blue Valley residents talked of an alternative, but never really presented it in detail. The unprecedented effort made by these people, especially the women, gave the voters and the Congress the excuse to try a different approach, but only temporarily. To that extent, the Valley people had an influence. But Tuttle Creek had to be built. The fact of electing a Democrat, for the first time, to a Republican-controlled Congress in 1952, and then

reversing the situation just two years later, simply added to the irony of the Tuttle Creek controversy.[7]

Colvin also noted that the effort made by the anti-dam forces had one other flaw. "Their vision was tunneled right at that structure sitting there," said the newspaperman. They were too focused on the dam and the Army, rather than on the complete development of their alternative in the light of the political pressures felt by the elected officials at all levels of government. This was also the analysis of Bill Avery as he reviewed the events in retrospect. The Blue Valley group failed to look beyond the short-range problem and seemed to have an attitude of "only I'm right." They did not anticipate the tremendous evidence being used by the pro-dam forces. According to Colvin, they did not get into the other fellow's shoes. Of course, neither side was willing to talk and consider any possible compromise. The Manhattan editor stated these things in his comments at the time and in conversations with the residents of the Valley. He also shared these feelings with Avery. With the anti-dam forces, his advice was not heeded.[8]

Another reason for justifying the project and making its construction inevitable was the need for a water supply during the dry spell of the mid- and late 1950s. This need was what finally convinced Avery to support the dam and reservoir while also working to get as much relocation aid as was possible for those who would have to move out of the way of the project. The added benefit of the multi-recreational use of the reservoir made the plan easier for the Congressman to accept, too. These advantages were stressed by the Engineers. Despite their

denial that they ever lobbied for funding for a project they had only surveyed, the Corps did know how to play the political game effectively. But never had they come across an opposition effort like that of the Blue Valley. The legend of the Belles is still an event remembered and passed on in the Kansas City office of the Corps of Engineers. But did the work of the Belles, the Blue Valley Study Association, and others who fought the dam, have any influence on the evolution of the flood control policy?[9]

Again, the Army makes no official acknowledgement of such influence. Bill Colvin commented, too, that the Engineers would never admit to anything "as a direct result of the Tuttle Creek issue." Bill Edwards recalled that some official of the Corps did admit that the effort of the Belles and the rest of the Blue Valley people did change the way the Engineers approached future projects. They were more careful of public opinion and sought local acceptance of a plan before pushing their way though.[10]

There is also some evidence of the change in the Corps philosophy on how to achieve effective flood control. In 1969 the Deputy District Engineer of the Kansas City branch stated:

> The public has been slowly coming to greater awareness of the need for recognizing the rivers' rights. This awareness has led to a new trend of thought and action in terms of the broader concept of flood damage prevention rather than the single action of flood control.[11]

Six years later the Engineers were more specific about what their future policy would be in this area. In a speech to the Missouri-Arkansas Basins Flood Control Association Major General John W. Morris said that dams were now seen as a last resort for flood control

and prevention. The Kansas City Times reported on his remarks and noted:

> While it was once perfectly acceptable to stop flooding by building a dam to control the excess water, attitudes have changed greatly, he said . . . . The problems of the past are no different from today, he said, but the solutions must be.[12]

The public change in the Engineers' policy appears to give the argument made by the anti-dam forces credibility. This was also noticed by the Farm Journal. The magazine had published "The Battle of the Blue" in 1953. In 1972 reporter Gene Logsdon wrote an article titled, "The Battle Over 'Big Dam Foolishness.'" He pointed out that though the Blue Valley farmers had lost their fight, they had showed the way to win the overall war. Their effort had provided the strategy and tactics that had been used by other groups fighting similar projects, and some had been successful in completely stopping the Army.[13]

These items seem to indicate that the Blue Valley people were right in their fight to stop Tuttle Creek Dam and Reservoir. The policy they opposed has now been acknowledged as being inadequate to solve the problem of flood control and prevention. Siltation has nearly ruined the effectiveness of Tuttle Creek and other similar big dam facilities. Their multi-use benefits are much less apparent.

The battle to defeat the big dam in the Blue Valley was lost, and it has long been over, but perhaps the people gained more than they realized by losing. An editorial in the Waterville Telegraph after the 1985 reunion said:

> The battle brought many people close together in a kind of bond that is usually reserved only for soldiers who fight in great wars . . . . Tuttle Creek has changed everything around here. Some people think for the best, others think the communities upstream were hurt. Regardless, it is history and the World goes on.[14]

Notes for Chapter 6

1. M.J. Lienemann, "The Damming of the Blue," undated clipping, Miller Papers, Collection 47.2, File: 1.4, KSHS; Edwards interview.

2. Velen interview; Scandia Journal, 10 October 1985.

3. Waterville Telegraph, 10 October 1985; Edwards interview; Velen interview.

4. Velen interview.

5. Edwards interview.

6. M.J. Lienemann, "The Damming of the Blue," undated clipping, Miller Papers, Collection 47.2, File 1.4, KSHS; Edwards interview; Velen interview.

7. Colvin interview.

8. Colvin interview; Avery interview.

9. Avery interview; Colvin interview; Russ Robertson, KC-ACE, personal interview in Kansas City, Missouri, 28 December 1987.

10. Colvin interview; Edwards interview.

11. Topeka Daily Capital, 10 July 1969.

12. Kansas City Times, 15 September 1975.

13. Gene Logsdon, "The Battle Over Big Dam Foolishness," Farm Journal, August 1978.

14. Waterville Telegraph, 10 October 1985.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

All of the research for this study was primary in nature. The books cited were written and published during the Tuttle Creek controversy.

Articles

"Can Prayer Stop The Engineers?" The Christian Century, 20 August 1952, p. 940.

"Ire in Tuttle Creek." Newsweek, 17 November 1952, p. 30.

Peterson, Elmer T. "The Army Engineers Are Imposing Their Flood Control Ideas on Creeks." Saturday Evening Post, 23 February 1952, p. 12.

"Prayer and the Engineers." The Christian Century, 10 September 1952, p. 1033.

"The People Watch Their Servants More Closely Than Some Suspect." Saturday Evening Post, 3 January 1953, p. 6.

Books

Davis, Kenneth S. River On The Rampage. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1953.

Ickes, Harold. Forward to Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers And The Nation's Rivers, by Arthur Maass. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951.

Leopold, Luna B., and Maddock, Jr., Thomas. The Flood Control Controversy: Big Dams, Little Dams, And Land Management. New York: Ronald Press, 1954.

Peterson, Elmer T. Big Dam Foolishness. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1954.

Correspondence

Rotert, Philip. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Kansas City Branch. Letter to the author, 25 March 1988.

Film

Peters, Charles M., Producer. The Tuttle Creek Story. Beverly Hills, California, 1953.

Government Documents

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population, 1950, Volume II, Characteristics of the Population, Kansas, Part 16.

U.S. Department of Defense, Army Corps of Engineers-Kansas City Branch. "Data for Testifying Officers on FY1961 Civil Works Budget Tuttle Creek Reservoir, Problems and Information," 1 January 1960.

Interviews

Each person noted below was interviewed by the author.

Avery, William. Wakefield, Kansas. 5 March 1988.

Colvin, Bill. Manhattan, Kansas. 27 February 1988.

Edwards, William. Emporia, Kansas. 7 October 1986 and 25 January 1988.

Robertson, Russ. Kansas City, Missouri, 28 December 1987.

Velen, Doris. Manhattan, Kansas. 20 February 1988.

Velen, Leona. Manhattan, Kansas. 20 February 1988.

Manuscripts

Abilene, Kansas. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Eisenhower Papers: Central Files-Official, Box 211; Bryce Harlow Papers.

Independence, Missouri. Harry S Truman Library. Truman Papers: PPF 310, General File 132.

Kansas City, Missouri. National Records Center. NA Collection 586, Record Group 77.

Manhattan, Kansas. Doris and Leona Velen. personal scrapbook collection.

Topeka, Kansas. Kansas State Historical Society. Ed Arn Papers, William Avery Papers, Frank Carlson Papers, Howard S. Miller Papers, Glenn Stockwell Papers, Pamphlet V-Statement of Albert Cole.

Newspapers

Blue Rapids Times, 30 October 1952, 12 August 1954, 28 October 1954, 6 January 1955, 19 May 1955, 9 June 1955, 16 June 1955, 30 June 1955, 14 July 1955, 1 September 1955, 29 September 1955, 20 October 1955, 24 November 1955, 19 January 1956, 26 January 1956, 26 January 1956, 16 February 1956, 25 October 1956.

Clay Center Dispatch, 1 November 1952, 18 June 1955.

Clay Center Times, 29 January 1952, 7 August 1952, 4 September 1952, 23 September 1952, 25 September 1952, 5 February 1953, 12 February 1953, 19 February 1953, 14 May 1953, 4 June 1953, 14 July 1953, 17 September 1953, 24 September 1953, 14 January 1954, 25 March 1954, 12 August 1954, 28 October 1954, 26 May 1955.

Concordia Blade-Empire, 24 August 1955.

Douglas County Republican, 8 October 1936.

Kansas City Star, 15 July 1951.

Kansas City Times, 15 September 1975.

Lawrence Daily World-Journal, 7 October 1936.

Manhattan Mercury-Chronicle, 26 August 1952, 17 September 1952, 18 September 1952, 19 September 1952, 17 October 1952, 21 October 1952, 30 October 1952, 2 November 1952, 3 November 1952, 13 June 1955, 17 July 1955.

Manhattan Tribune News, 14 July 1955.

New York Times, 6 August 1952.

Scandia Journal, 10 October 1985.

Topeka Daily Capital, 15 August 1930, 3 June 1952, 4 June 1952, 8 June 1952, 11 June 1952, 17 June 1952, 6 July 1952, 7 July 1952, 12 July 1952, 24 July 1952, 3 August 1952, 4 August 1952, 9 August 1952, 10 August 1952, 15 August 1952, 17 August 1952, 19 August 1952, 20 August 1952, 8 October 1952, 21 October 1952, 23 October 1952, 24 October 1952, 26 October 1952, 30 October 1952, 31 October 1952, 2 November 1952, 3 November 1952, 6 November 1952, 1 June 1954, 3 November 1954, 31 July 1955, 14 January 1957, 10 July 1969.

Waterville Telegraph, 10 October 1985.

Thesis

Meyer, Phillip E. "Tuttle Creek Dam: A Case Study in Local Opposition." M.A. Thesis, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1962.