The People-To-People Program was developed in 1956 under President Dwight D. Eisenhower to promote global peace and understanding. Although it reached the hearts of thousands through its letter Writing and Sister City programs, it experienced philosophical and financial failures. This thesis examines the development, outcomes, successes and failures of the Program from 1956 to 1960.

The major findings of this study suggest that the Program's financial problems rested on its inability to gain grants from private sources. As the Program was unable to receive a substantial grant, it contradicted its government-free philosophy by accepting government money. Secondly, the Program's obscured priorities allowed it to become caught up in a Cold War public relations campaign. In addition, the Program started to lose its identity by copying other exchange programs and philanthropic organizations and taking credit for their achievements. In analyzing the Program, an attempt is made to explain how these problems developed. Specific examples from government documents and Eisenhower Library materials are presented to define the Program and its problems.
THE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PROGRAM:
1956-60

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I. Introduction

During the late 1940s and early 1950s a number of global changes occurred that were to push the United States government to increase its international cultural exchange programs. One dominant factor creating this change was the post World War II estrangement of the U.S. and Russia, known popularly as the Cold War. In an effort to counter the influence of the other country, the U.S. and Russia waged elaborate propaganda campaigns against each other. Unprecedented industrial production during the early fifties may have been advantageous to Russia's propaganda efforts. Russia's numerous Five Year Plans appeared to indicate a rapid industrial growth equal to that of the U.S., and aided in superseding America's space advances with the launching of Sputnik in 1956.

Incidentally, the Cold War was slowly transferred to third world countries in Latin America, the Middle East and the Orient. Subversive movements sponsored by both the Soviet Union and the United States which affected politically unstable governments in Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala provide a good example. Attention was centered on these areas as a result of the conditions through which the Cold War could be perpetuated. The 1954 CIA-backed military coup in Guatemala is an example of this intervention. In an attempt to save an American-owned corporation, (the United Fruit Company), from being split up
by a land reorganization plan, the Guatemalan government was
overthrown and replaced by a U.S. supported regime. It has
been suggested that the coup, in part, was the result of
Eisenhower's fear that Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz
and his regime were "dominated by Guatemalan Communists who
were loyal to the Soviet union."³ The Guatemalan coup not
only epitomized the extension of the Cold War to third world
countries, but it also signaled the downfall of the "Good
Neighbor" policy founded under President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. This policy was based on an attempt to avoid
United States military and economic intervention in Latin
America. Now as never before, America was threatened by the
possibility of watching its own "back yard" disappear behind
the Iron Curtain. When Vice-President Nixon was almost
killed by an angry mob in Caracas, Venezuela, during a South
American tour in 1958, the United States could no longer
ignore its problems in Latin America. The U.S. Democratic
party used this incident to suggest that the Republicans
"had squandered the influence and prestige of the United
States and were losing the battle with the Soviet Union for
the allegiance of the Third World."⁴

This "battle with the Soviet Union" to counter Soviet
propaganda against the United States and Soviet
attractiveness to unstable, third world countries became a
focal point in U.S. foreign policy. Nothing better
illustrates this than one of the many anti-Communist
pamphlets written by Americans during the fifties: a
document entitled "The Army of Compassion." It reads,

The world situation grows more and more terrifying. The defection of tens of millions of hungry people in Asia, Africa and Latin America to Communism is not a "possibility," it is a grim, dreadful fact. Half the world is hungry, angry, desperate, rebellious, groping for a hand to lift it out of the hell of hunger, and the Communists are offering it a hundred thousand hands!\(^5\)

Thus, the demise of America's "Good Neighbor" policy occurred simultaneously with the beginning of Russia's technological success that allowed her to pose as a benefactor toward third world countries. The outcome, exemplified by the feeling of fear from the quotation above, could have resulted in the bowing of third world countries to the newly created promise of Communism. As a result of this pressing situation, it appears as if the United States government felt compelled to offer proof of its friendship toward the rest of the world. This suggestion may be supported by the fact that the United States established an unprecedented number of cultural exchange programs (although not all geared toward the Cold War) during the post war era by both the federal government and private organizations.

From the beginning of his presidency in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower was forced to deal with the Cold War and the subsequent "state of emergency" feeling within the U.S. His answer, in part, was to initiate his own cultural exchange program which he hoped would solve many diplomatic Cold War problems. This plan involved not a secret government agency or government employees, but the work of thousands--if not
millions--of U.S. civilians. In many of his letters, pamphlets and speeches, Eisenhower stressed one underlying philosophy for what he called the "People-To-People Program" (referred to also as simply the Program or PPP). It suggested that the peoples of the world should skip governments altogether in a mass effort to reach further understanding. The focal point for creating this global re-molding project would be the common people, the masses of civilians who had in the past been given little responsibility in international relations. Perhaps it was Eisenhower's attempt to create a program that was in many ways the opposite of the secret agent/covert operation mentality that many nations associated with the U.S. government.

In order to prove the Program was truly an effort of "the People" it was paramount to demonstrate publicly its independence of any government organization. Eisenhower tried to achieve this goal by attempting to avoid the use of any government funding. Unfortunately, this government-free concept was short-lived when the Program ran into a complicated string of financial problems and vague priorities from 1956 to 1960. This resulted in a half-hearted weaning of the Program from the use of government money. Although there were some successful aspects of the Program's philosophy, the basis of it--to negate all forms of government support--fell short of becoming reality. As a
result, it is possible to conclude that between the years 1956 and 1960, the Program's ideals failed.

As with many cases of problem solving, analyzing the beginning stages of a development within an organization is one way to draw conclusions regarding its successes and failures. By utilizing this concept with the People-To-People Program, one may gain insight into its problems from the beginning in 1956 to the end of Eisenhower's presidency in 1960. Although it is impossible in this thesis to discuss in full the Program's ultimate successes or failures, such an approach may provide a broad base from which to view the Program's ultimate destiny.

What were these initial problems and to what extent did each dilemma contribute to the ultimate downfall of the Program? It is possible to pinpoint four main financial, organizational and ideological complications which the Program experienced during its early period. These include: 1) the Program's inability to secure private financial funding; 2) the Program's contradiction of its own basic philosophy of negating the government, since it had to turn to the government for funds; 3) the Program's lack of integrity and its unfortunate absorption into a plethora of established organizations; 4) the Program's clashing goals of attempting to create global peace and understanding, while at the same time acting as a public relations campaign to counter Russian, anti-American propaganda. These four points ultimately led to disunity and chaos within the
Program's central organization and created skepticism among prospective philanthropic funding organizations.

In order to begin looking into these predicaments, one must ask three broad questions concerning the Program's developmental years from 1956-1960: 1) What financial impediments did the Program experience and why were there so many? 2) Was the Program confusing and difficult to administer and if so, why? 3) To what extent did Eisenhower intend to use the Program in its original goal of increasing understanding between the U.S. and foreign nations and to what extent were he and other organizations set on making it merely a public relations campaign as a weapon with which to wage the cold war? By asking these questions, perhaps insight can be gained into the competency and validity of motivation for the People-To-People Program.

Cultural Exchange Background

No modern cultural exchange program has evolved without some debt to past cultural exchange developments. Thus, in order to fully understand the People-To-People Program, it is important to review its historical antecedents.

Although Eisenhower may be credited with the formation of the People-To-People Program, his idea was far from original. International relations and foreign diplomacy have occurred as long as nations and boundaries have existed. However, a sudden increase in a subgroup of
diplomacy, cultural relations, developed alongside the explosion of communications technology. With the globe electronically unified the conduct of diplomacy and cultural relations occurred instantaneously. As the evolution of international communications and travel matured, so did the depth and involvement of global, cultural understanding.

One can trace an increase in the U.S. government's participation in cultural relations to the international information programs begun in the early twentieth century. (In giving this background information, it is important to emphasize the profound influence that these pioneer exchange programs had on future exchange programs in the twentieth century.)

In 1917, shortly after America's entrance into World War I, journalist George Creel was appointed to head the Committee on Public Information, also known as the "Creel Committee." Acting as a forerunner for future cultural exchange programs, the CPI employed the nation's most talented writers to mold public opinion during World War I. Using anti-German slogans and "self-censorship" of the media, the CPI and its tactics, also known as "mind mobilization," succeeded in stirring anti-foreign resentment by altering and distorting the truth. The CPI was discontinued in 1919 and it was not until 1934 that the Information Service was created out of the Department of State's Division of Current Information (CI). Two other information programs were launched in 1938. The
Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation (IDC) and the Division of Cultural Relations (CR) were both organizations aimed at increasing more adequate communication between the U.S. and other countries.\textsuperscript{6}

Aside from the government's active role in the area of cultural exchange in the early twentieth century, there was also a successful effort to establish private cultural exchange programs whose objectives were also centered primarily on understanding and good will. One of the first privately organized programs based on "citizen diplomacy" was organized under the leadership of Dr. Jerome Davis, a divinity professor at Yale University. The program, entitled Promoting Enduring Peace (PEP), which still exists today, was started in 1915 when Dr. Davis traveled to Russia with the financial help of the YMCA. It was Davis's goal to improve living standards among prisoners in the many Russian Czarist prison camps. Ironically, Davis was caught in the 1917 revolution and amidst the confusion of the changing economic system, was forced to get Lenin's signature before he could withdraw the YMCA funds from a local Russian bank. During this unusual meeting with Lenin, Dr. Davis got permission to continue his work in Russia, which would later lead to the building of numerous libraries and other philanthropic contributions in the Volga region.\textsuperscript{7}

World War II ushered in yet another string of information organizations which not only played important roles in briefing the public overseas, but altered the use
of exchange programs. Many exchange programs experienced an increase in importance as they were transformed from a medium of understanding to one of persuasion. The first true ideological war, World War II could also be viewed as the first "cultural exchange war" since many programs were formed specifically to counteract Fascism and National Socialism in Europe. For the purpose of propaganda during and after the war, the U.S. government combined many cultural exchange programs into the Office of War Information (OWI), which started in 1941 under the guidance of playwright Robert E. Sherwood.

The postwar equivalent of the OWI was the United States Information Agency (USIA). The USIA, formed for the purpose of increasing international communication between the U.S. and other countries, had perhaps the most profound impact on the development of the People-To-People Program. The influence of the USIA became evident when its goals were incorporated to instill postwar American democratic ideals and values into defeated Germany and Japan. Under the USIA were also a number of smaller programs, the most well known of these being the previously-created Voice of America radio program (VOA). In the fall of 1942 the first radio waves of the VOA were sent across the Atlantic, creating yet another level of unprecedented American international communication. Finally, in 1944 the Office of Public Information was created to oversee the Division of Cultural Cooperation (CU) and the Division of International
Information (INI). The significance of these two organizations rests solely on their responsibility to spread "international cultural and informational activities."  

It was also during World War II that a new way of viewing the United States' role in the world ensued. Under the guidance of a group of historians, political scientists and publicists, a new era was envisioned for the U.S. called the "American Century." These theorists believed that the United States' democratic "philosophy" was so obviously correct that any leader with foresight would choose this form of government as a model for his own country. Thus, to the "American Century" idealists, it was absolutely paramount that American citizens realize this "manifest destiny" and begin spreading the American way through "vigorous mission of persuasion." This form of thought influenced cultural exchange programs since they were the perfect medium through which to spread "the American way."

The development of information programs was brought another step closer to becoming modern international exchange programs when the Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402) was passed in January of 1948. This law defined international information during peacetime as developing "mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries." This new era in diplomacy was started in 1949 when the International Information and Educational Exchange Program (USIE) was set up to initiate exchange programs between the U.S. and
foreign nations. In 1951, working with a budget in excess of three times the amount of the previous year, the USIE increased its staff and activities "to build confidence in the United States and the Free World and to expose Communist aims."

On August 1, 1953, under President Eisenhower's Re-organization Plan No. 8, the USIA was officially established. Under the Re-organization Plan, the USIA would be placed under supervision of the State Department. This organization was responsible for its own distribution of information concerning overseas links and important transactions with foreign contacts.

There are two relevant points regarding the USIA which had important consequences for the People-To-People Program. First, it was through this government agency that the People-To-People Program's forty committees were to be linked to President Eisenhower. Under this setup, the USIA was also given a large staff with which to operate the People-To-People Program. Second, it was also the USIA which informally provided the People-To-People Program with its government money. The USIA initially launched the People-To-People Program with a $25,000 grant for its first six months. The Program was then expected to raise $5,000,000 through private sources to satisfy its financial needs. The significance of the USIA to the People-To-People Program is the fact that it exercised organizational and financial control over the latter which tied it directly
to the government. This undermined the Program's aim of non-governmental involvement.

In addition to the USIA's financial hold on the Program, it is also important to emphasize how early exchange programs—the USIA and OWI—came together to influence the People-To-People Program's philosophy. George Shuster in his article entitled *The Nature and Development of U.S. Cultural Relations*, emphasizes the marriage of many cultural exchange programs to the Office of War Information during and after the Second World War. He alludes to the fact that the most efficient propaganda for spreading U.S. democratic views in a war-torn and unstable Germany and Japan was through cultural exchange programs. As to the effects this had on later exchange programs, Shuster writes,

> What needs to be stressed is that the OWI led to the creation of propagandistic instruments which would continue to be of great use, however perplexing it might on occasion be to decide on how to employ them. The most impressive of these are the United States Information Agency or Services, and of course the Voice of America.¹⁶

Concerning the lasting effects of these programs, Shuster writes, "Indeed, this point of view remained dominant in the Congress and elsewhere for a longer time than most observers had foreseen."¹⁷

Since many of these programs were a product of World War II, the question arose regarding whether or not cultural relations should be separate from the government or be openly active in propaganda methods during the Cold War. Shuster alludes to this by stating, "For obvious reasons, a
program which relied solely on the mutual exchange of cultural achievement and experience came to seem impractical during the War and Cold War years."\textsuperscript{18}

In reviewing the history of U.S. cultural exchange, the VOA, the OWI and the American Century one can see that they all led to significant changes which would dominate future cultural exchange programs. Evidence indicates that many cultural exchange programs which developed as a result of these influences made the transition from passive modes of understanding to mediums of persuasion and were conveniently retained as combatants during the Cold War.

Exchange Programs and the Cold War

The influences of the Cold War on the beginnings of cultural exchange programs cannot be over emphasized. This ideological conflict which began immediately after the Second World War and continued well beyond the scope of this thesis, is one of the main reasons for the birth of many cultural exchange programs.

The Soviet Union, in pursuit of its intention to attract other countries to communism, created propaganda programs involving the work of creative, pro-Communist intellectuals from depressed and impoverished regions of the world. The Soviet Union employed these writers who equated the social and economic needs of their countrymen with the successes and promises of the Soviet Union. The most potent
appeal of this propaganda line was the idea that the Communist method was not only the most technically efficient system in the world but was, at the same time, radically dedicated to peace. The purpose of many American cultural exchange programs was to prove the Soviet system wrong by using similar methods to emphasize America's peaceful aims.

Many difficult obstacles had to be overcome if the U.S. was to prove its system's superiority over the Soviets. The Americans believed the most effective means of counteracting Soviet propaganda was to demonstrate to other countries 1) that Americans were as dedicated to peace as the Soviets; 2) that the United States possessed vast technological knowledge which it was willing to share with nations in need; 3) that the United States would educate other nations about the democratic way of life while at the same time accepting other nations' cultural backgrounds. The utility of cultural exchange programs is evident during this period since they multiplied in number and acted as the most efficient medium with which to accomplish these goals.

In reviewing the history of exchange programs, it is necessary to look back to the formation of the "Creel Committee," established in 1917. After this initial breakthrough, a number of pioneer exchange programs evolved throughout the 1930s and 40s. World War II, also viewed as the "cultural exchange war," ushered in another level of exchange programs under the Office of War Information, which attempted to reinstate democratic values into the defeated
Axis nations. It was also during the Second World War when
the "American Century" philosophy was originated, making
exchange programs even more important in spreading the
advantages of American democracy. Finally, the end product
of many pioneer exchange programs, the USIA, was formed,
creating a new level of informational exchange regarding the
U.S. and its motives. As a result of these forces, the U.S.
government increased its influence in exchange programs
which, in turn, were transformed into mediums of persuasion.
As the Cold War increased in intensity, many post-war
exchange programs were reformed to counter Russian anti-
American propaganda. The combined forces of the
international cultural exchange organizations, wartime
propaganda efforts, the "American Century" philosophy, the
USIA, and the Cold War joined together to influence the
ideology behind the People-To-People Program.
II. Program Philosophy and Organization

One of the reasons for initiating the People-To-People Program which did not receive mass publicity was the need to counter Russian propaganda. However, other more publicized justifications for the Program could be found in public brochures, pamphlets, and the press, which explained the official philosophy of the People-To-People Program. In discussing the Program's philosophy it is important to note that there was a gap between the Program's intended philosophy and its actual accomplishments. Many of the descriptions concerning the Program were merely blueprints which would not be realized.

Perhaps the best description of the Program came from the mouth of its author, President Eisenhower:

If we are going to take advantage of the assumption that all people want peace, then the problem is for people to get together . . . to leap governments— if necessary to evade governments—to work out not one method but thousands of methods by which people can gradually learn a little bit more of each other. 20

This quotation reflects Eisenhower's plan to use the Program as a diplomatic tool to probe for peace amidst the turmoil of the Cold War by the hand of America's citizens, not its government. This idea was based on the attitude that if people took the initiative in working toward improving relations between countries, then the role of government would be reduced. Eisenhower elaborated on his view in a conversation with Harold Macmillan in 1959 when he said,
I like to believe that the people in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than are governments. Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of their way and let them have it, and that is exactly the way we ought to think if we are going to think correctly.21

The People-To-People Program was based on an analogy of mediation in which people might settle a dispute between themselves, skipping the complex federal court bureaucracy. This same principle was to be applied to the world at large: people of different countries could solve differences through more efficient means. Rather than using presidents and bureaucratic diplomats as a means of solving disputes, the world could utilize the common citizen, as an "informal diplomat." Although the Program may have suggested a loss of confidence in government, it optimistically offered hope in tearing down ethnocentrism and building up universal peace in an ever-expanding world of belligerency.

The biggest step to establishing the Program’s "government free" philosophy was the idea that it would receive no government funding at any level. From the beginning of the Program, Eisenhower placed the highest emphasis on the fact that the Program was a "privately funded and operated organization." For example, a pamphlet that described the Program reads,

The People-To-People Program is a wholly private and a wholly voluntary project which has the blessing of the U.S. government. But it is not tied by either official or financial strings to any agency of government--and it is 100 percent not a party matter.22
A pamphlet regarding the Program's financial status states:

It cannot be emphasized enough that by definition the Program is private, and that any attempt at governmental control must be vigorously opposed as the greatest single threat to its success . . . any participation by the U.S. government must be on a purely advisory basis.23

Eisenhower's Past and the Program

In reviewing the Program's background and philosophy, it is equally important to examine the forces that may have influenced its designer, President Eisenhower. Discovering underlying reasons for Eisenhower's implementation of the People-To-People Program may aid in understanding its complicated and sometimes contradictory aims. Viewing the Program in this manner, it is possible to suggest three related experiences in Eisenhower's life which occurred during or soon after the second World War.

The first is Eisenhower's role as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces during World War II. One of Eisenhower's advantages upon entering the Oval Office was his experiences in witnessing war up close, something the majority of U.S. Presidents only hear about in briefings. Although rarely in combat during his early military career, General Eisenhower witnessed one of the most horrifying atrocities of World War II, a German concentration camp near the town of Gotha.24 It was perhaps these crucial years during World War II which persuaded the President to subscribe to the People-To-People
Program's objective of furthering global peace and understanding.

Secondly, it has also been proposed that Eisenhower developed the Program partly as a reaction to the Cold War. Although the Program's suggested use in the Cold War was to counter Russian propaganda campaigns, perhaps another reason may be attributed to Eisenhower's own experiences at the war's end. Since many scholars view this period as the beginning of the Cold War, it carries a significant point. When Berlin was considered the "main prize" at the war's end, both British and Russian troops, approaching in opposite directions, preferred to have the glory and political advantage of conquering the city first. Eisenhower, without thoroughly contemplating the political consequences of his decision, allowed Russian troops the honor of surrounding Berlin first. It was during this period, when unification between the superpowers was no longer needed, that the Allies began experiencing the resurfacing of tensions between East and West. (The significance of this situation was later epitomized by the historic division of this city by the Berlin wall, symbolizing the Cold War.) Although it would be ludicrous to blame Eisenhower, it is interesting to note that his presence and decisions during this crucial period in history included him as an active participant in the formation of the Cold War. It was later noted by the diplomat Robert D. Murphy that Eisenhower viewed his decision to allow Russia
to enter Berlin first as an embarrassing political mistake. It might be suggested that Eisenhower, later equipped with the power of the U.S. Presidency, made an attempt to repair as much as possible a political mistake he had made in the past. Perhaps the People-To-People Program was part of his diplomatic repair kit.

Finally, Eisenhower was later haunted as President by a unique form of "postwar anti-communism" that was in many ways a by-product of the Cold War. The Red Scare, which lasted from the late 1940s into Eisenhower's Presidency, created a magnified fear of Communist-inspired internal subversion. The situation was exaggerated even more when the Wisconsin Republican Senator, Joseph McCarthy, accused thousands of prominent U.S. citizens of being Communist sympathizers. Although this third factor was a domestic problem, it nonetheless points out the fear of Communism, another incentive for the development of the People-To-People Program.

Program Organization

Eisenhower first publicly alluded to his plan for the People-To-People Program in a speech at Baylor University in the Spring of 1956. He said, "all peoples of the free world must learn to work together more effectively in the solution of our common problems" which could not be done merely "through paper work in a governmental bureau." Eisenhower
went on to tell his audience that they could "join with like-minded men and women in the many voluntary associations that promote people-to-people contact around the world. By means of them . . . solutions are approached by many avenues. Creative thinking is sparked. Mutual understanding is furthered."

That next Fall on September 11, Eisenhower formally introduced the People-To-People Program at a special White House conference. The President addressed an audience of forty newly elected representative committee members who were leaders in all aspects of America's professional, cultural and social community. In front of these people Eisenhower unleashed his plan to "bring the world to peace and understanding."

It was Eisenhower's intention at this conference to ask the newly elected forty members to act as leaders of forty individual committees, all under the heading of the "People-to-People Program." The man elected as President to head the forty committees was the influential Charles E. Wilson (former president of General Electric). Wilson was a prime candidate for the position due to his patriotic involvement with the U.S. government during wartime. Each committee was to be autonomous and was expected to initiate its own methods of operation in its own field. The duties asked of the forty delegates were described in an invitation sent to them by Eisenhower on May 29, 1956. In it he wrote:

I am writing to ask your help. Our government as you know, has relatively modest apparatus for trying to
make the United States' objectives and principles better understood throughout the world. I have asked congress for additional funds to strengthen this activity during fiscal '57. But clearly there will never be enough diplomats. 28

A pamphlet describing the Program stated, "A highly qualified professional staff is to be employed to assist volunteers in the implementation of the program in this country and to establish appropriate contacts abroad." The pamphlet went on to emphasize that the People-To-People Program would, "in no sense duplicate or compete with the activities of existing institutions. It will only supplement and enlarge upon these activities." 29

The People-To-People Foundation

In order to guarantee the Program's success in maintaining its privately financed status, it developed its own subsidiary group. The "People-To-People Foundation Inc." was introduced on February 4, 1957 for the sole purpose of raising funds from philanthropic organizations. Proceeds collected by the foundation would be given to the forty individual People-To-People Committees which could not support adequate funding on their own. The committee chairmen of the People-To-People Program acted as trustees for the Foundation. 30

The forty different committees and their prospective chairmen, many of them well-known to Americans, were as follows:
Advertising Organizations - Theodore S. Replier
Armed Services - Carter L. Burgess
Banking - Fred F. Florence
Books - George P. Brett, Jr.
Business Organizations - Harry A. Bullis
Cartoonists - Al Capp
Civic - Dr. George Shuster
Education - Albert C. Jacobs
Farm Groups - Allan B. Kline
Fine Arts Groups - David E. Finley
Foreign Affairs - Brooks Emeny
4-H Clubs - T.A. Erickson
Fraternal Organizations - no chairman
Handicapped - Major General L. Melvin
Hobbies - J.L. Lindquist
Hotel Industry - Robert K. Christenberry
Insurance - Frederic W. Ecker
Letter Writing - Anna Lord Strauss
Magazines - no chairman
Medicine and Health Professions - Dr. Louis H. Bauer
Motion Pictures - Y. Frank Freeman
Music - Eugene Ormandy
Nationalities Groups - John Slezak
Public Relations - Edward L. Lipscomb
Radio and Television - Frank Stanton
Religious Groups - Rev. Eugene Carson Blake
Science and Engineering Groups - Joseph W. Barker
Service Organizations - no chairman
Speakers - Cyrus S. Ching
Sports - Col. Edward P. F. Eagan
The Entertainment Industry - George Murphy
Travelers - Ralph T. Reed
Veterans - Capt. Edward V. Rickenbacher
Women's Groups - Mrs. William Barclay
Writers - William Faulkner
Youth - Arthur A. Schuck

A good example of how a particular committee operated is indicated by a book from the advertising committee. Since advertising is a great disseminator and manipulator of fashions, attitudes and ideas, this committee was regarded as an effective vehicle of social change. It was not only important for creating interest in America, but was regarded as ideal due to its influential forces of change in foreign countries as well. As an overseas Advertising Committee plan pointed out,

Such privately sponsored advertising relating America's interests with the economic, social and cultural interests of other countries has a psychological advantage over government information programs in that it carries a personalized humanistic relationship between the advertiser and the foreign reader. 31

Some of the ideas and objectives that the advertising agency planned to send out included: 1) American Capitalism, "as the new dynamic force for human progress" and 2) "Atoms for Peace", which reported on the latest peaceful uses of atomic energy in science, agriculture, medicine and industries
"which the U.S. shares with the world." Other international events in which commercial advertising could support U.S. participation included trade fairs, scientific, cultural and social conferences, conventions and festivals. It was also suggested that businesses and non-commercial organizations could "symbolize the affinity of American and foreign interests by commemorative advertising overseas on the occasion of American and foreign national observances and other significant events."32 One of these ideas that concerned France, for example, was to involve all American businesses operating in France, Franco-American societies, American cities affiliated with French cities and American veterans who served in France in paying honor to the French people on Bastille Day.33

Were the Committees Effective?

It is harder to determine what the advertising committee actually accomplished since no final compilation of attainments could be found. However, an annual analysis of the forty committees entitled the Review of People-To-People Committee Activities and a monthly journal called People-To-People News contain information regarding committee accomplishments. The annual review, dated July of 1957, said of the advertising committee's progress, "Basic research has been conducted-and in some cases work commissioned-on the following of the committee's planned
projects: advertising fellowships, advertising exhibit, and film on Communist propaganda.\(^{34}\) The newsletter dated August, 1958, reported,

The Advertising Committee is assembling an exhibit showing U.S. industrial development as reflected in advertisements. Exhibit material has been solicited from American companies. When assembled the advertisements will be shipped to the U.S. Information Agency's office in Ankara, Turkey for showing there.\(^{35}\)

The People-To-People Program experienced a number of other accomplishments and failures which should be discussed. However, it is important here to distinguish between the Program itself and its committees. Although the backbone of Program (including the foundation and its administrators) was in a constant state of disarray, some individual committees experienced success and had important diplomatic consequences. It would be an injustice not to mention the accomplishments of the Program along with its failures.

Although it is impossible here to review every committee accomplishment, a few of the more important Program attainments should be discussed. One of the most far-flung activities that was to come out of the Program was under the People-To-People Health Foundation, Inc. (Since tax deductible status from gifts was given to any committee willing to incorporate, many committees added the inc. to their name). It was under the direction of this committee that Project Hope was inaugurated. Project Hope, (an acronym for Health Opportunity for People Everywhere), was
the name for a self-contained, 800 bed floating hospital and crew, aboard a refurbished navy ship called the Consolation.

The goal of Project Hope was that the Consolation would not only aid the sick and needy but teach the latest medical technology to friendly nations. The ship consisted of a fully equipped medical unit including a permanent staff of twenty doctors, fifteen nurses, the required technical personnel (such as x-ray technicians and physio-therapists) and two dentists. In addition, other personnel were to be flown out to the ship for a four to six month period.

The Consolation first sailed from San Francisco on September 15, 1959 and arrived in Indonesia on October 19. Of the ship's stay, one write up reported,

In a stay of about two weeks at Djakarta, 66 patients were brought aboard and treated, four lectures and seminars were held daily for approximately 600 doctors and nurses, 20 major operations were performed, and some 2400 persons visited the ship. . . . After two weeks at Djakarta, the ship went on to Surabaya where 800 patients were treated, 1400 laboratory procedures were conducted, 70 lectures and seminars were held, 20 major operations were performed, and 6000 persons visited on board. 36

The press also received the ship in a favorable manner as this excerpt from the Times Of Indonesia stated,

It will be a long time before this act of American generosity is forgotten by us. Teach us and guide us so that we may transmit to our people the skills you have so painfully garnered. The East forgets many things but never loses its reverence for a teacher. 37

The financing of this enormous operation, which was to cost a total of approximately $3,500,000 for one year of operation, was the result of a mass effort to raise funds on
a purely private basis. For example, a report on the 
popularity of Project Hope within the U.S. stated that 4,797 
companies had supported the project through cash or other 
means. The Ex-Cell-O Products Corporation donated 
$200,000 to produce a motion picture about Project Hope and 
the Advertising Council produced a publicity campaign at no 
charge to the project that was worth several million 
dollars. 

Ultimately Project Hope succeeded in traveling in 
excess of 250,000 miles throughout the globe while its staff 
administered 19,000 major operations, immunized over three 
million people and trained 7,000 doctors and nurses. 
Although Project Hope and its ship was one of the most 
successful People-To-People Program organizations, by the 
early 70s the ship was too old and beyond repair to continue 
its rigid schedule. In 1974 it finished its duties as a 
floating hospital and was auctioned off to a dismantling 
company. 

Although the ship of Project Hope was docked, the 
organization continued its operation of helping other 
countries in need of medical aid as a land-based 
organization. As late as 1978 Project Hope received $6 
million through private donations and $2 million in 
government aid. This money was used for different social 
health care programs in thirteen countries in Africa and 
South and Central America. It also set up a project on a 
sixteen million acre Navajo reservation in Arizona which
included a school that trained the entire Indian-operated hospital staff. 40

In addition to the exceptional achievements of Project Hope, there were also a number of smaller feats accomplished by other individual committees. The most popular and successful of these were the Book Committee, the Pen Pal program, Tourists Abroad and the Sister City program.

The Book Committee played its role in international understanding by sending out thousands of books to foreign countries that contained a variety of different authors (foreign and American) and topics. Although the Book Committee was accused of being both a propaganda medium for the USIA and a spreader of books that gave the U.S. a negative image, the printed word was viewed nonetheless as an important distributor of American life and culture. 41 A report from People to People News dated August of 1958 stated that the Book Committee from the Hartford People-To-People council's latest book drive had collected 14,000 used books for distribution overseas. Also, a publishing company had donated 1,000 music text books that were to be presented to Sweden. The head office of the Metropolitan Life Insurance company had a goal of collecting 3,000 books and had surpassed that number by 7,000. The books were in the process of being sent to Thailand, Burma and Indonesia. The American Foundation for the Blind, another People-To-People Committee for the Handicapped, had collected for and donated
books in Braille and a Braille typewriter to the Rotary School for the Blind in Dacca, Pakistan.  

A committee that also experienced lasting success, involving thousands of youth, was the letter exchange committee. Many accounts have shown that people, motivated by the challenge to be an "ambassador-by-letter," had gone as far as writing to 25 people on a regular basis. Recreation magazine reported that in February of 1964, forty-five thousand people were taking part in the People-To-People letter writing program. This exchange of personal diplomacy through correspondence was organized in the letter committee's headquarters in Kansas City, where a volunteer staff of twenty received and organized one thousand letters of request for a pen-pal each week. Although most letters from foreigners were written in English, any letter written in a foreign language was translated (for the first time only) by a local volunteer group which represented ten different languages. The names of the writers of these letters were placed on a three-by-five card and filed according to special interests and hobbies and then matched to other people of similar interests. Of the 40,000 successful correspondences made each year, many were quite unique. For example, a German veteran of World War II who was a prisoner of war in Texas wanted to exchange letters with a Texan to find out how the state had changed. An Australian asked to be linked with an American who enjoyed collecting materials "to make pins for coat lapels."
Eventually, many of these requests were matched. For example, a man from India wrote to the headquarters asking for an American interested in beekeeping. Incredibly, a few months later, an American wrote asking for a correspondent interested in bees from the Middle East! There were also many written exchanges with countries behind the iron curtain, including East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland and Russia. These "eleven cent diplomats," named after the cost of an overseas stamp, epitomized the attitude of the People-To-People Program and many people throughout the world in attaining a new level of friendship and international understanding.

The field of international travel was also greatly expanded under the People-To-People Program. Formally known as the Citizen Ambassador Program, over eighty People-To-People tour groups traveled abroad each year in the form of informal diplomats in areas such as Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Ukraine, Norway and the South Pacific. Similar to the letter writing program, tours were arranged on the basis of similar interests and professions or memberships in certain organizations.

A good example of a citizen ambassador tour united on the basis of a similar profession is found in the June, 1969, issue of Parks and Recreation. This tour, made up of representatives from various facets of park and recreation agencies, private, federal, state and municipal, was based on the theme of exploring and discovering parks typical of
various regions and countries. Starting in Vancouver, B.C. Canada with a tour of its model parks, the delegation proceeded to explore parks in the Fiji Islands, Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand and Tahiti.47

The length of the People-To-People expeditions for the common tourist, made easily available through numerous tourist agencies, varied from a short trip overseas to a "People-To-People world tour." Many accounts were given of Americans who combined sight-seeing and travel with the noble cause of enhancing international relations. Harvest Years magazine gave an example of a woman from Madison, Wisconsin, who had traveled abroad on seven different occasions for the People-To-People cause. Another couple circumnavigated the globe to serve their part in the movement.48

Aside from diplomatic work achieved through informal citizen exchanges, colleges and universities also played a new and important role in the area of universal People-To-People understanding. A Readers Digest article entitled, "College Diplomats at Work" exemplified this movement. This article made the point that American citizens failed to realize the importance of how thousands of foreign students who attended American universities were treated by their American hosts. A 1965 statistic revealed that an estimated half of the 75,000 foreigners that were currently attending American universities were studying solely for positions of leadership in their own countries. Consequently, many
potential leaders possessed feelings of animosity toward the U.S. upon return to their country due to inhospitable American treatment. For example, four Kenyan students in a California college town who were refused housing were forced to live in unsanitary conditions in the basement of an old house. The People-To-People Program played a role in this scenario when the college adopted the People-To-People University Program Housing Committee. The Program publicized the embarrassing situation concerning the biased manner of the community and took each case to the Fair Housing Board, ultimately winning each student a fair priced, clean room.  

The People-To-People University Program was started by University of Kansas student Bill Dawson and three foreign students attending school there who realized the importance of hospitable treatment of foreign students. Dawson, who overheard three foreign students comparing their experiences at KU, was shocked at the level of animosity these students felt toward Americans. Not one of them had made an American friend in their three years of school.  

With the aid of Joyce C. Hall, president of Hallmark Cards and founder of the Hallmark Foundation, which supported the People-To-People Program, Dawson was able to turn his idea into successful reality. As of 1965 there were some 13,000 American students involved in the Program, which had by that time included 117 of the 317 colleges with enrollment of twenty-five or more foreign students.
Aside from the People-To-People Letter Writing Program, the program with the highest participation is the Sister City Program (which is still in existence). The Sister City Program represented better than any other committee the true meaning behind the People-To-People Program. It did this by being based on direct, private correspondence between people of different nations. The underlying goal of the Sister City Program was to link U.S. cities with other cities around the world in order to enhance communication, understanding and the exchange of culture and ideas. This was accomplished by matching towns or cities through a common interest such as a similar name, location, climate, or size. For example, Bristol, Connecticut, and Bristol, England, and Versailles, Kentucky, and Versailles, France, all were obviously united on the basis of a common name. A more unusual story behind the origin of a Sister City relationship between Wichita, Kansas, and Orleans, France, occurred as the result of World War II. In 1944, Orleans was liberated from Nazi occupation by the 137th U.S. Infantry regiment, which included three Wichita National Guard companies.51

Activities between two cities are centered around exchanges between its citizens, which include groups of students, tourists, teachers and city officials. A few of the Sister City committee activities include the study and comparison of cultures, the exchange of exhibits, concerts, parades and city hall affairs. The popularity of this
program is reflected in the number of U.S. cities that adopted sister cities, which increased from seventy-seven in 1959 to 360 by 1968.52

The Program's Weaknesses

Although the People-To-People Program's individual committees experienced a number of successful endeavors, there were a number of weaknesses which had unfortunate consequences for the Program. In reviewing the aspects of the Program's weak points, one must ask the question, how effective was the People-To-People Program's contribution to world peace and understanding from 1956 to 1960? We have already analyzed some of the Program's main accomplishments by various committees. However, in addition to these there were at least as many committees that accomplished little or nothing during the time period of this paper. In order to determine the People-To-People Program's ultimate success, it is equally important to review these shortcomings.

In August of 1957 a write-up entitled the People-To-People "Preliminary Report" was published which revealed the Program's development. It reported that the Program had made some progress but "not as much as the President hoped for--or as much as People-To-People Program leaders claim."53 For example, although the Book Committee developed in later years, its accomplishments for its first year in 1957 was written in one sentence: "Invited book
publishers to nominate book they think best describes nation as the friendly place it is.\textsuperscript{54} Another example was the Radio and TV Committee which reported that it had "met so far but have carried out no project."\textsuperscript{55} Along with these two examples the report also mentioned a number of other idle committees: "there are several committees--civic, religious groups, science and engineering groups, travelers--that are moving slowly in their organizing and planning."\textsuperscript{56}

Besides published reports, a personal account offers additional information regarding the Program's success. A memorandum from C.D. Jackson provides a review of his reaction to a three-hour Magazine committee luncheon he attended on September 5, 1957:

\begin{quote}
It was in absolute shambles, close to the worst I have ever attended . . . Barclay Acheson as Chairman is by now so ga ga that it is pathetic. Electric Charlie Wilson, boss of the overall People-to-People Program, made a very poor, unconvincing, and frequently incomprehensible blue sky presentation.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

Perhaps one major reason for the failure of many committees was the difficulty in finding willing volunteers to aid in committee activities. This significant problem is exemplified by the 1957 People-To-People Preliminary Report:

\begin{quote}
The PPP is moving away from the President's original hope that "the people" in People-To-People would be volunteers. On the contrary, says PPP: These volunteers will not do much alone . . . unless they are aided and stimulated by professional staff workers.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

We know that while some of the individual committees achieved success, others accomplished no more than deciding on a meeting time. In discussing the Program's
accomplishments and failures, it is also important to mention one organization that has not yet been discussed which had a significant impact on the People-To-People Program: the U.S. military.

People-To-People and the U.S. Military

Although many associate the military directly with war, the U.S. military ironically became one of the largest, most far-reaching organizations adopted by the People-To-People Program. U.S. servicemen, being strategically stationed all over the world, fit perfectly the mold of the "informal diplomat." Although the military may have been viewed as an untapped resource to the Program, there were two problems regarding the military. First, one could question whether or not the military violated the intention that the Program be privately operated. This is because the military, a direct arm of the U.S. government, may not have given its non-civilian employees a choice of whether or not to participate in the Program. Secondly, the Veterans Committee and the Armed Services Committee, both under the People-To-People Program, collaborated with organizations that possessed certain politically subversive goals or views toward other nations that in the end may have damaged the reputation of the People-To-People Program.

Perhaps the most appealing aspect of the U.S. military to the Program was its size. With an estimated four million
military personnel, civilian employees and their dependents, (almost 50% of this number stationed overseas) the military through sheer numbers created a huge resource for the Program. Also, unlike any private non-profit organization, the military, being based on a chain of command, guaranteed widespread involvement on behalf of its members.

Although the military was easily assimilated into the Program, it was also very hard to determine whether or not the military had previously been active in many areas that were since claimed as accomplishments of the People-To-People Program (a recurring problem that the Program was criticized for). Nevertheless, the Program claimed to have started many altruistic activities that involved the military.

The main objectives of the military's People-To-People Program were to set up and maintain comfortable community relations with local citizens and support national policy. These included 1) setting up an efficient two-way channel of communication between the community and the Army; 2) establishing a "World Wide Community Relations Program" where organized councils set up contact between servicemen and foreign citizens; and 3) orientation and information programs created specifically to teach the soldier proper conduct in a foreign country.

The activities taken up by the military in collaboration with the People-To-People Program were far
reaching. A few of the more successful accomplishments of military personnel on bases overseas included educational activities, sporting events, social activities and philanthropic endeavors. For example, in the *Review Of People-To-People Committee Activities* published in July, 1957, the Armed Services committee reported to have sponsored in each of the four services activities in language training, base-community activities on celebrations, sports, traffic safety and music lessons. The committee also sponsored a Defense Department motion picture starring Dorothy Thompson that oriented wives of servicemen on People-To-People activities they might participate in when they moved overseas.

A good example of one altruistic activity taken on by the military was found in the August 1958 edition of *People to People News* regarding an Airforce People-To-People Project in Zaragoza, Spain. It reported that a nine-year old boy suffering from leukemia ran out of the drug, aminopterin. Unable to receive the needed amount from the expected Spanish and French suppliers, he was expected to die. With 48 hours left in the drug's ability to keep the boy alive, U.S. Air Force officials contacted bases throughout Europe, and ultimately found the needed drug in a German USAFE Hospital in Wiesbaden. Lt. Joseph McGuire, stationed in Wiesbaden, was ordered to fly the drug in a T-33 jet to Zaragoza in time to save the boy's life.
Aside from active military personnel overseas, participating in the Armed Services Committee of the People-To-People Program, there was also a large network of veterans who put their time into the Veterans Committee. The Veterans Administration (which handled all veterans affairs) was another huge organization perfectly set up for the integration of the People-To-People Program. Boasting 19,600,000 veterans in the U.S. in 1953, this organization appeared promising to the People-To-People Program Veterans Committee.

Although many activities were undertaken by the Veterans Committee, the most prolific endeavor typical of this group entailed traveling abroad to re-unite squadrons or platoons on the same grounds over which they fought in World War I and II. It was not until June of 1957 that the national commanders of six major veterans groups (the American Legion, AMVETS, Catholic War Veterans, Disabled American Veterans, Jewish War Veterans and Veterans of Foreign Wars), which represented a total of six million veterans, were to agree on the final plans for an overseas trip. Under the leadership of Lewis Gough, the People-To-People Veterans Committee Co-chairman, the group embarked on a two week "good will tour" of France, Italy, England and Israel.63

In summary, as the largest organization involved in the Program, the U.S. military was also the most conveniently located. Four million servicemen strategically located
throughout the world took on the dual roles of working as informal diplomats and developing comfortable community relations while providing many sporting and educational activities. The American Veterans Committee added another possible six million participants to the People-To-People effort.
III. Financial Woes

A review of the Program's strengths and weaknesses would not be complete without examining its most outstanding problem, its finances. A chain of financial problems occurred when the Program, in an attempt to uphold its private status, failed to obtain grants from private sources. George Shuster alluded to this when he wrote of the People-To-People Program and its endeavors. He ultimately concluded that the Program's accomplishments were "only partially realized because adequate financing could not be obtained." After numerous rejections from private funding organizations, the Program began receiving financial support from the federal government and thereby compromised its private status.

One reason for this financial crisis was Eisenhower's unclear initial presentation of the Program. When he introduced the Program in September of 1956 in his White House speech, he was quoted as asking for additional funds from congress to strengthen the Program during the fiscal year of 1957. In doing this, Eisenhower contradicted the whole basis of the Program: its private financial status. As a result the Program got off to a bad start by accepting funds from the government. This issue was raised by the discouraged administrators of the People-To-People Program. They maintained that Eisenhower made the mistake of waiting to free the Program of government funds after he had already
introduced the Program as a private, non-governmental operation. In a re-application for a grant from the Ford Foundation, Charles Wilson wrote in regard to Eisenhower's delay, "Actually, the decision to make People-To-People, Inc. independent of government direction and control was not made until August 28 of this year" (1957). Consequently, the People-To-People Program existed almost one year before it was officially free of government control--from September 11, 1956 when the Program was introduced, to August 28, 1957, the date it was officially made independent. As a result, one year of confusion followed the birth of the Program. A year of government parenthood resulted in a parasitic relationship of the Program upon government funding. Threatened by bankruptcy, the Program was unable to detach itself from government support until 1961. Since Eisenhower's theme for the People-To-People Program was its separation from government money, the validity of its principal doctrine was in question. Apparently Eisenhower decided to give the Program a base sum of money (approximately $25,000 via the USIA, a rent free office and a small staff) to "jump start" it and had then planned to free it of government support. It is assumed that he then relied on private donations from "the people" to support the Program. However, a memorandum dated as early as October 21, 1957 from Frederick Fox, Special Assistant to the White House Office, to Abbott Washburn, a USIA official, reflects the futility of Eisenhower's hopes. It suggested the
Program had already moved away from Eisenhower's original wish that it would be run by "the people." It dis-regarded the Program's "privately funded" philosophy in saying, by its own definition, PPP is private in character—distinct from government activity. Unfortunately this definition has been corrupted. The PPP is now run by governmental officials on government money. The private People-To-People Corporation has not yet been able to raise enough funds to get off the ground. I hope the government-supported PPP will attempt to "wither away" and a new effort made to enlist widespread private support—the only way to restore the original hope and power of PPP. Spokesmen for PPP say they want to make their Program "entirely independent of government as rapidly as possible" but in the same breath they suggest some government help and government channels "will always have to be provided."67

This quotation not only expresses the futility of the Program's "government free" ideal but it also suggests a continued financial relationship between the Program and the government. In stating that the definition of the Program is corrupt, and that "some government channels will always have to be provided" the quotation provides evidence that the People-To-People Program was ultimately a failure of an idea.

The Program as Chameleon

It is now apparent that the Program's financial difficulties and dependence on government funding contributed to its failure to achieve its goals. In addressing this problem, it is possible to pinpoint five main reasons. First, the Program was plagued throughout its
early period by an aura of invisibility. A pamphlet that described the Program (quoted above) stated the role of the Program's different committees was to "develop not one, but thousands of methods of people-to-people contacts through every avenue of communication."\(^{68}\) Ironically, it was these "thousands of methods" of contacts—which the Program's leaders associated with success—that ultimately led to the Program's intangible, and, consequently, invisible side. For example, one main plan for the Program's success was to integrate it into an intricate network of smaller programs, which would saturate many philanthropic businesses and social organizations. The result of this move was that it blended the People-To-People Program into a camouflage web of other programs that had previously established names such as the 4-H Club and the Rotary Club. Consequently, as a result of these inseparable ties, the People-To-People Program was hard to see and define in its entirety. In the same manner that a chameleon changes the color of its skin to blend in with its surroundings, the People-To-People Program changed its character to integrate into whatever organization it could associate itself with.

The second reason for the Program's failures relates to the fact that there were already a high number of other previously established organizations focusing on the same goals as the People-To-People Program. As a result, perhaps there was no money or base of originality left from which the People-To-People Program could be launched. The number
of government exchange programs during the late 1950s was immense and does not include the activities of numerous private organizations. This number was enlarged even more when one includes the additional number of private organizations. For example, the International Educational Exchange Service of the State Department handled the exchange of 6,000 persons in 1957. The Institute of International Education, which had been in existence since 1919, involved 5,000 students and teachers annually in its exchange program. Others could be mentioned. The American National Theatre and Academy (ANTA) via the President's Fund and the State Department sent members of artistic groups overseas to display American cultural lifestyle. The National Agricultural Extension Service had been sponsoring International Farm Youth Exchange Programs since 1946. Still others included, The Experiment in International Living, The American Friends Service Committee, Rotary International and The American Association of University Women. The vast involvement in cultural exchange during the fifties is shown by the consequential monetary demand placed upon U.S. citizens. The federal government was already spending $40,000,000 on programs regarding international contacts, while the private sector was spending another unrelated $20,000,000 on similar programs.69

This increase in cultural exchange funding was one reason given by the Ford Foundation in rejecting funding for the People-To-People Program. The Ford Foundation wrote,
"the Foundation's outlays for international projects have been substantial in the past and in recent months have been further increased." 70

In the Program's preliminary report, the point was brought out (in a rather cynical manner) that since President Eisenhower endorsed the People-To-People Program and his name was associated with it, the Program had a tendency to "consider itself a rare category of projects with a special hold on the President." This report continued to express skepticism in the Program's utility by saying, "Someone should tell PPP that there are at least fifteen President's Committees in addition to thousands of other committees engaged in work vital to the free world." 71

In retrospect, were the People-To-People Program's exchanges really needed in addition to the hundreds of exchange programs on which millions of dollars had already been spent? Although it would be difficult to determine the People-To-People Program's usefulness relative to other exchange programs, it could be concluded, by looking back at the rejections of requests for funding by private sources, that the flow of money set aside for international exchange had already dried up. This suggests there was either no room financially in the area of cultural exchange or not a great need for another program of this type. Perhaps one could conclude that Eisenhower's People-To-People Program was in many ways stillborn.
The People-To-People Program's plan to integrate itself into the high number of previously established exchange programs added to a third problem. Apparently, in addition to emulating them, the People-To-People Program began taking credit for the accomplishments of other exchange programs. A document that discussed the Program's weaker aspects epitomized this problem:

Many of the successes claimed by PPP are the result of long-existing programs of "hands across the borders," like International Rotary, Student Exchange, traveling orchestras, letter writing, etc. The PPP has a tendency to take some credit for these and seems to want to gather all these traditional private channels into a vast "mechanism" using the "multiplier principle" with "massive" capabilities.  

The question which must be asked here is, how can one define or measure the success of a program that copies the work and claims the accomplishments of other organizations?

The next point is a good example of how the Program's chameleon characteristic led funding groups to become uninterested. Initially, the Program had been planning to use a significant grant from the Ford Foundation as the basis of its financial support. In February of 1957 Charles Wilson, President of the People-To-People Foundation, wrote a letter to Henry Heald, President of the Ford Foundation, applying for a grant of five million dollars. A part of the rejection by the Ford Foundation was sent by Heald on March 25; he wrote in reply,

The essential question posed for the Ford Foundation, was whether it could undertake to support this additional and major extension of international activity at this time. After careful consideration, the
foundation is forced to the conclusion, in view of other program commitments, that it cannot do so. 73

The severity of the People-To-People Program's financial losses were accentuated when the People-To-People Foundation re-applied to the Ford Foundation for a greatly reduced sum of $250,000 and was again denied. 74 The Ford Foundation's reason for refusing the Program was that "Most international projects undertaken by Ford are of a 'study' type whereas the PPP is a mass 'action' operation." 75 In emphasizing the People-To-People Program's "mass action" philosophy, Heald and the Ford Foundation were referring to its camouflaged, and poorly defined characteristic. This is evident in Wilson's reaction to a Ford Foundation Memorandum dated October 7, 1957. It read,

The memorandum appears to us to indicate a serious misunderstanding of the People-to-People concept and proposed implementation of the program. Granted that it was difficult to present so vast a program in precise detail, but the subsequent discussions with the Ford Foundation should have made the essentials of the program clear. 76

The fact that the People-To-People Program was turned down by an anticipated benefactor for a grant so small is evidence that the "essentials of the program" were not made clear.

Another example of the Program's failure to secure a grant due to its vagueness is found in a memorandum from C.D. Jackson who was present at a People-To-People Magazine Committee luncheon. According to Jackson, the Magazine Committee was going to ask Time Inc. for a grant. After
Jackson's review of the Magazine Committee, he wrote to Time Inc.: "If Time Inc. is asked for a company contribution toward the program, my vote would be a firm 'no' until they come up with something specific that is comprehensible and feasible." Thus, the very essence of the Program's plan, integrating itself into other organizations, contributed to its low public visibility. As this letter points out, the lack of comprehensibility and feasibility was a major cause of its financial problems.

In addition to the Program's low visibility, there was a fourth feature that made it unattractive to funding organizations. A pamphlet reviewing a few of its weaknesses pointed out that the Program had shown no clear correlation between theory and action. As the Ford Foundation made clear, the Program's goals of "increasing friendship and understanding were entirely too vague a basis on which to plan a program." In saying this, perhaps the Ford Foundation was indirectly suggesting that it was unclear as to where the People-To-People Program stood politically. This seems to be a logical claim since the Program never announced its political motives publicly. Had it done this perhaps it could have avoided two dangers which Program administrators later pinpointed as (1) becoming too politically active by the overzealousness of its novice recruits . . . who wanted to "save the world from communism by preaching the great American truth"; and (2) having no political consequence at all by becoming bogged down in
ineffective welfare and goodwill projects. As a result of this ambiguity, the Program meant something different to everyone involved in it. To counter this confusion, the People-To-People Program needed to prove its effectiveness by drawing a clear definition of itself; a visible focal point from which people could view the Program.

The People-To-People Program's financial hardships were exacerbated when the People-To-People Foundation continued to experience a lack of success in fund raising. A letter dated April 12, 1958 from Wilson to Eisenhower read,

Dear Mr. President. I've delayed responding to your letter of January 25 in which you re-stated your confidence in our efforts to keep the PPP a non-governmental operation until I could report further progress. Unfortunately our attempt to secure the support of the Ford Foundation brought another rejection. Briefly put, Mr. President, the major foundations are disenchanted with the People to People Program. I regret to tell you, we've been unable so far to gain private, financial support for the PPP. This quotation not only reflects the Program's fundraising failure but it also raises a fifth reason for the People-To-People Program's financial chaos. Due to the lack of financial support, the fund-raising organization itself dissolved. It was this organization that was in charge of preparing the Ford Foundation grant proposal. As a result, not only was the Program without the five million dollar Ford grant, but it was also lacking the organization with which to secure further grants. On May 12, 1958, Charles Wilson wrote to the trustees of the People-To-People Foundation: "In spite of all out efforts, it looks as if
we'll have to abandon the Foundation and close our doors. Since all our previous fund-raising efforts have met with failure, there seems no other course before us."\(^81\)

With the dissolution of the Foundation, a new stage of the Program's failure can be detected. A letter from the USIA to Wilson suggested a devolution of the role of the Program's central body and an increase in responsibility to its individual committees:

> We are more convinced than ever that the real answer to the financial problem is to place responsibility squarely with the individual committees. Many will succeed. A few will either disband or will remain inactive until a success pattern is established. If there is a proper time for a national drive we think it is many months hence--after committees have raised funds on their own and are looking for greater public participation by expansion.\(^82\)

However, as this quotation suggests, many individual committees failed to raise enough money to make any significant accomplishments during the time period examined by this thesis.

Consequently, the People-To-People Program, without any success in attracting private financing (even with its own fund-raising foundation), set its financial sights once again on the government. Evidently the Program began to turn its financial frustrations toward the government by blaming the USIA, which had been controlling the Program. A letter written to President Eisenhower from Charles Wilson expresses the frustrations of the Program's President: "What we have not understood is why the USIA has persisted in maintaining a large staff to run the Program instead of
giving the Foundation a contract that would have enabled us to develop this project and raise funds." Wilson went on to describe how the Program could be salvaged, arguing that "the missing ingredient" was a contract substantial enough to enable the People-To-People Program to eliminate the USIA's control of the Program. Wilson further commented to Eisenhower regarding the control the USIA had in running the People-To-People Program,

This I believe is not in line with your views of how this program should be run. In short Mr. President if you want us to carry on the program it will be necessary to divert funds now used by USIA (or other agencies) in the form of a contract in an amount sufficient for its far flung activities. Or, if you want us to abandon the foundation and let government continue to direct the program we will accept your decision in good spirit.

Of this letter from Wilson to Eisenhower, three points can be made. First, it seems obvious that either way the situation turned out, the government would always remain in control of the Program. Whether it was given money through the USIA or given a grant by the government, it was still funded by the government. Second, (although no concrete documentation can prove this) one could suggest that perhaps Eisenhower and/or Wilson wanted the Program under government funding yet preferred to have it appear as a Program generated by private individuals. Third, at this point, the prolonged pattern of the Program, searching for private money but always coming back to its womb-like government environment, seemed inevitable. Two years after its inception, the People-To-People Program still experienced
financial and organizational havoc. It could be suggested that the failure of the Program's underlying ideal was as old as the Program itself.

In summary, these problems can be traced back to the commencement of the Program in 1956 when Eisenhower made the mistake of initially announcing the Program's private status, yet giving it government aid. A whole year of confusion resulted when it was unclear whether the Program was to be government financed or not. This problem merely worsened with the Program's chameleon characteristic of integrating itself into other established organizations while taking credit for some of their accomplishments. With many other exchange programs in operation and no philanthropic funding left, the whole reason for the Program's existence was in doubt. These problems were epitomized by the Program's biggest financial blow; the rejection by the Ford Foundation for a grant of five million dollars. The failure and subsequent closure of the Program's fund-raising foundation only exacerbated the financial dilemma. Finally, the combination of the Program's financial failure and the involvement of the USIA in running the Program ultimately meant the failure of the Program's government-free philosophy.
IV. Doctrinal Disunity

In discussing the Program's financial dilemmas, it was pointed out in the reasons for the Ford Foundation rejection, that the People-To-People Program possessed a "vague," open-ended definition of its goals. In allowing this policy of ambiguity to persist, the People-To-People committees and administrators allowed some organizations to attempt to use the Program to further their political agenda. Varying from right wing fighters of Communism to over-enthusiastic sellers of the "American way," these organizations and individuals created a political emphasis which deviated from the original goals of the Program. Consequently, two opposing points of view developed; one remained faithful to the original goal of achieving world peace and understanding, while the other focused on the countering of Russian propaganda. This may have created a disorderly, polarizing effect among its participants and the public which observed it. As the pamphlet previously referred to warned,

The Program demands much more study, foresight, and caution than most of its participants have considered necessary, for errors of neglect or oversight or overzealousness at this foundation-laying stage might jaundice and make suspect the natural human desire of all people to make friends with one another for a long time to come. 85

One of the first problems the Program had in this area was the fact that individuals not involved with the Program at all were using its name for their advantage. A
memorandum dated October 18, 1957 exemplifies this scenario. Apparently, an ex-congressman (whose name was not given) appeared in Germany using the People-To-People name to get first class attention from a government agency, the USIS. The German government in Bonn asked Washington if this man had the "blessing" of the People-To-People Program. The answer was a definite "no." After this incident, the Program made it clear that only those individuals cleared by the USIA through prior information were to be assumed true People-To-People representatives. However, no one could stop those who wanted to use the Program's name for their benefit, as the same memorandum states:

The one uncontrollable hitch is of course represented by the fellow who says, without any reference to anyone, that he is a bona fide People-To-People operator. Nobody can take the title from him if he wants to use it. But these free-wheelers do not get the backing of those responsible, or of USIA offices at home or abroad.

Although there are no detailed records of how many people used the People-To-People Program's name or what political consequence it may have had, this does provide one example of how the Program was misused.

A Reaction to the Cold War

Besides the individual act of a "free-wheeler" who used the Program for a personal benefit, there are other examples of political policies involving the Program which contradicted its original purpose, especially a reaction by
the People-To-People Program committees and administrators to counter Russian propaganda campaigns aimed at the U.S. The diverting of a part of the Program into a public relations campaign can be traced to its beginning stages during Eisenhower's People-To-People Program introductory speech. In it he stated "if our American ideology is eventually to win out in the great struggle being waged between the two opposing ways of life, it must have active support." By introducing the Program as one that might lead to the victory of American ideology in the conflict between "two opposing ways of life" it becomes obvious that the Program's role, in part, was planned for participation in a public relations campaign. The Program's apparent turn away from its original goal of creating cultural understanding is also evident in Eisenhower's speech when he said the U.S. had a weakness in making its "objectives and principles better understood throughout the world." This statement should be questioned by asking, if the Program was one of mutual understanding, should not the U.S. have concentrated more on understanding other countries as well? It became evident after reviewing literature written about the Program, that the term "mutual understanding" was rarely mentioned. Instead phrases were worded in a one-sided, demanding manner which asked other nations to understand the U.S. only. An article entitled, "Council Asked To Help Sell America" provides an example of this forced understanding. The article begins by stating, "The
International Council of Industrial Editors (a People-To-People committee) has been asked to help with an important selling job - an effort to make America's peaceful intentions and democratic ideals understood by people of other lands." This quotation elaborates on selling U.S. intentions but nowhere is the term "mutual understanding" mentioned.

The idea of wanting the rest of the world to understand the U.S. only was merely a smaller part of the Program's involvement in a public relations campaign as a reaction to the Cold War. The quotation above goes on to say,

Basic need for such a campaign goes back to the fearsome and familiar subject of world-wide-war the most important war, and the most significant of all the many our planet has seen. It is called a cold war, yet its final outcome, cold or hot, is certain to affect more drastically the lives and welfare of more human beings than any war in history.89

The Advertisement Council in an article entitled, "In Support of a People-to-People Friendship Program," also speaks of the Program's active involvement in the Cold War. In reviewing the United States' problems in foreign affairs, it states, "This pressing problem is made even more urgent by a Communist world propaganda campaign that continues to picture the United States and its objectives in deliberately distorted terms."90 This article reinforces the Program's participation in America's competition with Russia over which nation could look more promising to other countries. All of these examples shed light on the underlying reasons
for Eisenhower's development of the People-To-People Program.

Further evidence found in numerous publications that describe the Program supports this argument. A 1958 annual publication which reported the Program's planned activities entitled, "People-To-People Year," reads,

We know . . . that a vast well financed world-wide propaganda agency has been at work for many years at the people-to-people level promoting misunderstanding and hostility toward this country and its people. To combat this and to help build the road to an enduring peace is the purpose of . . . our activities. 91

Projects intended for use in the Program in the "Sell America" article provide further examples of how the Program was turned into a public relations campaign. Project no. e-4 suggests harnessing the technique of mail inserts:

The mail-insert device can be used at all times to provide a stream of selected information . . . as a means of sharing our knowledge with overseas organizations . . . and individuals, in addition to reflecting the American people's outlook on significant matters. 92

Project P2 entitled "Good-will Ambassadors" states, "Every American abroad has an excellent opportunity to counteract Communist propaganda. The American soldier, student, artist, etc., are all in a position . . . to make it easier for peoples overseas to understand Americans." 93 Another pamphlet regarding the Program's goals entitled, "The Objectives," described the Program as

Essentially a public relations program at every international level. It would include proper handling of all foreign visitors as well as helping them to understand and like the United States. It should stress importance of having their friends and relatives
and especially foreign born and naturalized citizens stress and sell the ideals of the United States. 94

In addition to individual committee pamphlets that mention the use of the Program, there were also conventions and organizations concerning the countering of Russian propaganda. An example of such a convention was a five day lecture series offered by the United States government, set up specifically for participants in the People-To-People Program. The series was entitled, World Ideological Conflict; "A short Course on the Clash of National Philosophies, on International Problems and Relations Between Peoples." This particular document has an elaborate description of the total five day seminar but the descriptive outline provides substantial information. Some of the scheduled lectures in the outline included the following: On April 8, 1957 at 10:00 a.m. was a lecture entitled, The World Communist Conspiracy - Philosophy and Impact. This particular lecture was led by Dr. Mose L. Harvey, Communism specialist of the National War College. The summary and content read as follows: "The world outlook of Marxism-Leninism. Review of the basic doctrines of dialectical and historical materialism. Semantics of Communism. Impact of Titoism on the Communist world. Effects of de-Stalinization." Another lecture scheduled for 2:45 the same day was entitled, The Strategy and Tactics of Communist Propaganda. It was led by Warren B. Walsh, Professor of Russian History at Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. The outline of this lecture covered the following: "Communist Party agitation and propaganda system and appeals, both within the Communist bloc and in geographical areas of the world. Integration of the propaganda and public opinion arm into the total revolutionary and subversion effort."  

The People-To-People Program's public relations effort is perhaps best summed up in a 1957 publication of the, "One Day Conference On Problems Of Achieving An Adequate Overseas U.S. Information Program" at MIT which had intended to include the People-To-People Program in its application. It reads:

A high proportion of the Communist effort is spent in misrepresenting the legitimate purposes of the U.S. as clashing with the interest of other countries. As brought out in Point 2 of the President's statement, the information program can counter these misrepresentations "by depicting imaginatively the correlation between United States policies and the aspirations of other peoples of the world."  

The conference's plans for the Program are epitomized by the following quotation regarding the USSR: "Russia has transformed itself into a power in 40 years and symbolizes to these countries one image of how to industrialize, an image which must be counteracted by us."  

A.R.M.S. for Peace

One of the most informative programs regarding the People-To-People Program and anti-Communist activity is
found in the Eisenhower Library file entitled "White House Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs." It is important to emphasize the significance of this example which directly involved the People-To-People Veterans Committee. Consequently, this example reflects the Program's inconsistent political position which may have created views of skepticism from prospective funding foundations. Under the acronym A.R.M.S. For Friendship (American-Russian Military Solidarity), this organization was set up on the supposition that the estimated twenty to twenty-five million Russian veterans were the ideal group of Russian citizens which might be used to counter the aggressive Communist government. This idea was based on the fact that Russian veterans not only had a certain amount of political pull in their society but also were resentful of the Soviet government. At the same time, these veterans felt a nostalgic allegiance to American veterans due to their common experiences during the Second World War. It was believed by the A.R.M.S. organization that American veterans could tap into this emotional combination in an attempt to create a schism between the Russian military and government which (it was hoped) would produce a weakening effect on the Soviet regime.

Dated September 30 of 1957, the "A.R.M.S. For Peace" document stated that its objective was "To prevent a general war and to undermine the Communist-Bolshevik attempt at world domination by encouraging the Soviet military in their
legitimate national and patriotic ideals, thus denying their support to Communist objectives.\textsuperscript{98} Six basic assumptions concerning the Russian people, their government and veterans are included in this plan. They are as follows: 1) Russian citizens were mostly patriotic, were devoted to their country and its well being. 2) The desires of patriotic Russians were not incompatible with patriotic Americans. 3) In deep contrast to the national and patriotic interests of the Russian masses were the international goals of the aggressive Communist-Bolshevik Party. 4) Of the three basic forces in the Soviet Union which included the Communist Party, the secret police and the military, it was the military that most closely represented the Russian people. 5) The Soviet military held a "decisive position in the balance of power within the Soviet Union." 6) Russian veterans of war, who were "heroes of the nation" and were ignored and suppressed after the war by the party, were beginning to gain respect and influence not only in the Soviet army but in all aspects of Soviet life.\textsuperscript{99} The document concluded that it was the military that would provide the best medium through which the Russian government could be weakened:

Within certain groups in the Soviet Union (slave laborers, veterans, peasants, workers, nationalities, etc.) there are many who are opposed to and in conflict with the Party. Their opposition has not effectively manifested itself because it lacks the necessary organization and leadership . . . one effective power group other than the Party or the Secret Police, which is organized, cohesive, trained to act and which has its own leadership, is the military. Its strength and its support from the people is such that it could
challenge the Party. The military have a long history of actual conflict with the Party which dates from the beginnings of the Soviet Union to the present day. The A.R.M.S. delegation also concluded that it would be difficult if not impossible to get into personal contact with active Russian servicemen. This was because many members of the military were allowed only limited access to the military of other countries and were in many instances suspicious of their foreign counterparts. Consequently the A.R.M.S. delegates decided that "In order to achieve our objectives, it is concluded that our initial programs and approach should be to contact and influence those groups whose interests and affiliations are closely interwoven with the active military and the Armed Forces, the Russian war veterans."

The A.R.M.S. delegation gave some other interesting reasons for choosing the Russian veterans of World War II besides their influence on the Soviet military. These were as follows: 1) Veterans have an influence on the active military because of the important military positions they held by the late 1950s. This was because the experienced veterans were admired by younger soldiers and officers who had never experienced combat. 2) The majority of Russian war veterans were "disillusioned" with the Communist government after World War II when they did not receive the many earned and expected benefits from the government. 3) Many Russian veterans possessed common problems and sympathies with veterans of other countries. These included
war injuries and disabilities that created universal similarities which "transcend differences of nationality and language." 102

It was the intended plan of A.R.M.S. to send a delegation of American veterans to Russia, which they succeeded in doing in 1958 and 1959. Once again, the underlying point behind the coverage of these particular trips was to stress the fact that the delegation sent to Russia consisted of the People-To-People Program Veterans Committee. Although the effects these trips had on the Russian military/government relationship were probably insignificant, it could be suggested that by participating in the A.R.M.S. trip, the Veterans Committee may have compromised the People-To-People Program's reputation as an organization that was not originally intended for such subversive action.

Under the leadership of Lewis Gough, the Veterans Committee set out for the USSR to achieve the mission of visiting World War II battlefields on the Eastern Front ranging from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The group's main objective was to meet and visit with Soviet veterans of World War II.

The summary of this trip reported that the U.S. Veterans Committee was refused entrance to many of the desired locations on their sightseeing agenda (such as veterans hospitals and a factory). However, many cultural exhibits were shown to the tourists, including cathedrals,
Gorky Park, the Winter Palace and the Hermitage Museum and Art Gallery. The group also visited the World War II battlegrounds four miles from Leningrad. Another point of interesting significance was the manner in which the American veterans were extremely praised and admired by their old Soviet allies.

There were also a number of alternative ways in which the A.R.M.S. organization had planned to communicate with Russian veterans besides traveling abroad. One of these included the use of letter writing. (It is interesting to note that the organization which aided in the correspondence of these letters involved another People-To-People Program committee, the letter writing committee). Other methods of communication were suggested. 1) American veterans were to send Russian veterans gifts that would leave a deep impression on the Russian but would not offend or injure his pride. Examples of such gifts included ball-point pens and automatic pencils or lighters; disabled veterans could send Russian veterans gifts such as wheelchairs or artificial limbs and other devices to aid handicapped Russians. 2) A disabled veterans magazine was to be published completely in the Russian language. It was to contain articles that concentrated on the problems that disabled veterans experienced and the latest technology in American prosthetic and mental rehabilitation. 3) A ham radio program was also to be implemented which was to elaborate on the benefits of American veterans of war not available to the Russian
veteran. These included specifically expensive prosthetic devices, U.S. veteran benefits and rarely heard American songs chosen for their popularity among the Russian troops. 103

In addition to emphasizing relationships between Russian and American war veterans through letters, gifts and radio, A.R.M.S. also pushed the theme of "conflict between the Soviet Military and the Communist Party." In doing this, A.R.M.S. focused on the tragic years of forced collectivization where many military forces and peasants were united against the Party. They also reminded veterans of the purges of top military commanders and the brutal murdering by their own government of thousands of Soviet troops who surrendered to the enemy during World war II.

In conclusion, the main point derived from the A.R.M.S. organization was the fact that it went far beyond the People-To-People Program's goal of achieving peace and understanding through inter-personal, cultural exchange programs. A.R.M.S. openly sought to undermine the Soviet regime by attempting to create even more friction between the regime and its military. This was done by using the massive collection of Russian veterans as mechanisms through which to influence the younger active military personnel. Although many Americans viewed A.R.M.S. as an efficient means to weaken the Soviet military regime, one might conclude that it damaged the People-To-People Program.
In promoting programs like this, it is important to point to the Program's ambiguous political outlook. Program participants and individual committees allowed outsiders to attempt to use the Program, sometimes for anti-Russian propaganda endeavors. Besides the individual "free wheeler" who used the Program for a personal benefit, the Program itself was driven by an ethno-centric motive, the desire to promote the U.S. The emphasis on deterring Russian propaganda was epitomized by the creation of conferences specifically designed for People-To-People representatives. The Veterans Committee went so far as to involve itself in the organization, A.R.M.S. for Peace, which had the primary goal of creating a weakening effect in the Russian regime by stirring up past differences between the Russian military and its government. The transformation of the Program's underlying philosophy from working toward world peace and understanding to focusing on anti-Russian propaganda campaigns was a main reason for its ideological confusion.

Public Consensus

After reviewing the Program's ideological contradictions, some questions regarding public awareness of the program should be raised. For example, was the public informed about the many problems associated with the Program? What was the overall public viewpoint regarding the Program? Quite naturally the People-To-People Program
was inclined to create a favorable public view of itself, regardless of its shortcomings, in order to maintain the honor of its founder, President Eisenhower.

Although there were many articles written about the Program in journals, magazines and newspapers, the majority were short, objective pieces that quickly updated the reader on a specific event or accomplishment. After examining a wide range of articles from different sources, it is possible to conclude that the public was unaware of the Program's many problems. Of the few articles that exist on the negative aspects of the Program, only one editorial could be found which criticized the idea behind the Book Committee. There was also an article that reported the dissolution of the Program's funding organization, the People-To-People Foundation Inc. However, the information given in this article was misleading.

To illustrate the poor media coverage concerning the Program's problems, it is necessary to compare a June 10, 1958 New York Times article to Charles Wilson's letter regarding the failure of the People-To-People foundation. The New York Times reported,

The People-To-People Foundation, Inc., formed to implement a 1956 proposal by President Eisenhower to promote international understanding has been dissolved. Charles E Wilson, president of the nonprofit organization . . . said last night that the foundation had served its purpose. Mr. Wilson said the foundation now considered the committees to be "in good enough shape to go ahead on their own."
Two points in this article reveal blatant obscuring of the truth by Mr. Wilson. First, the main point behind the article, that the Foundation had "served its purpose" was completely false. The Foundation failed completely to raise any money for the Program. Second, Wilson's other reason for splitting up the Foundation, because "the committees were in good enough shape to go ahead on their own" was also untrue. The reason the Foundation was abandoned was because it failed to raise any money for the Program.

Proof of this contrast can be illustrated by comparing the New York Times article to Wilson's letter written to the Foundation trustees. It reads,

In spite of all our efforts, it looks as if we'll have to abandon the Foundation and close our doors. It appears now that it will not be feasible to hold this meeting since all our previous fund raising efforts have met with failure. There seems no other course before us.

The motives for Wilson's desire to keep the public uninformed regarding the real reasons for the Foundation's breakup were found in a letter he sent to Governor Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's chief White House aid:

I had sent forth the views of some of the Trustees and others in the letter prepared. In view of this and the probability that the Foundation will "fold," I simply did not want such a letter in circulation. We have knowledge of too many agencies that "suspect" we are going out of business and newspapers who are trying to interview officers of the Foundation and others. The Future of the "Cause" is the paramount issue. For me, I believe in it too strongly to want any bad publicity to hamper its future.

Although the New York Times article was innocently published, it provides a prime example of how the President
of the People-To-People Program blatantly misinformed the public about the Program's financial problems.

Aside from misleading information regarding the Program, one article was found that presented an opinionated view of the Program. This particular article, found in Commonweal magazine, criticizes one of the People-To-People Program's endeavors, the "Bookshelf" plan. This consisted of sending books abroad in an attempt to spread the democratic way of American life. Sam Hynes, Commonweal's journalist, suggests that in comparison to the likes of the Frenchman Tocqueville and the Englishmen Bryce and Brogan, who had brilliantly described American culture, American writers had been criticized for their inability to describe their nation and have in many ways "accentuated an already distorted view of America."107

The problem of sending books overseas, Hynes argues, is two fold. The first problem addresses the fact that many American authors of books sent abroad such as the Tropic of Cancer, The Grapes of Wrath, Sanctuary, and A Farewell to Arms do not represent mainline American culture while many other novels simply have nothing to do with America. Hynes holds that literature is an art form and is most powerful when it brings out the extremes in society. As a result, many American novels which reflect this extreme give a distorted view of the typical American. He also contends that the actual list of books that were to be sent overseas were "incompatible with the expressed intentions of the
plan." He points out that half a dozen titles, such as The God That Failed, Darkness at Noon, 1984, and a biography of Lenin, had little if any direct relation to "the full picture of a free, vibrant, peace-seeking America." In conclusion, it is safe to suggest that the public was misinformed about the Program's financial problems and ignorant regarding its contradictory ideologies.

The Program After 1960

Although the People-To-People Program has experienced a string of financial and ideological hardships, it continues to exist today, although it operates at a much lower level of involvement and is seldom publicized in the media. Apparently in 1961, after President Eisenhower left office, a point was made to purify the Program's authenticity as a truly private, non-political organization. Under the sponsorship of President Kennedy, with the cooperation of Eisenhower, the Program severed its connection with the State Department and its financial ties to the government. Since 1961, under the new name of People To People International, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush have all acted as honorary chairmen of the Program.

Since very little information can be found regarding the Program's activities in the 1970s, 80s and 90s it is difficult to determine the entire outcome of its modern
existence. The recent information that has been found on
the Program focuses primarily on tourist and scientific
exchanges.

Of the organizations under People To People
International, one of the most prolific remnants is the
This program is focused primarily on the subjects of science
and technology, including the areas of medicine, economics,
agriculture, natural resource development and environmental
problems. Based on the traditional ideals of the Program,
it was believed that this organization could not only solve
problems of science but fuse cultural differences as well,
to a higher level of understanding unattainable by
governments alone. This exchange program, which is
conducted with over fifty countries, consists of bilateral
and multilateral meetings between specialists who engage in
seminars, discussions and briefings on particular topics.
Some of these meetings have included such subjects as the
"first Sino-American symposium of management of HIV disease"
held in November of 1990 in Beijing. Over 400 health
specialists were involved in discussions on increasing
cooperation between certain agencies and educating the
public. One of the most recent meetings of high
importance involving the People To People Citizen Ambassador
Program occurred in 1984 which involved a medical exchange
between China and the U.S. Under the leadership of Dr.
Panayotis G. Iatridis, the People To People Medical
Education Delegation to The People's Republic Of China was an important gathering of the two nation's top medical professionals. The goal of the delegation was to review the education of China's medical schools and compare them with the schools of the United States and Canada. The primary reason for this exchange was to help the People's Republic of China update medical knowledge which was allowed to falter under the reign of Mao Tse Tung during his cultural revolution. The delegation's specific objectives were to determine 1) the number of medical schools, students, physicians and hospitals involved in the medical educational system of China; 2) to investigate the "premedical" requirements for admission to medical schools; and 3) to gather information concerning teaching, research and administrative methods in medical schools. The U.S. delegation made up of fifteen of the nation's top medical school doctors spent the period of May 18 to June 8 giving seminars and lectures and interviewing Chinese medical school educators. The delegation concluded that The People's Republic of China had made much progress in the last ten years and predicted that in the next ten years it will be a "forerunner of biomedical research, medical education, and medical health delivery." 112

Thus, since the advent of John F. Kennedy's presidency, the attempt has been to disassociate the Program from the State Department. In accomplishing this, it is now closer to the People-To-People Program's original philosophy.
V. Conclusion

In assessing the People-To-People Program's history from 1954 to 1960, it is important to point out four crucial lessons learned in the art of private, nonprofit cultural exchange. The People-To-People Program's success depended upon three underlying forces: 1) Its ability to maintain a clear, visible definition of itself, both ideologically and physically; 2) its effectiveness in attaining private grants and 3) its originality. Only then can a private organization be successful. In addition to these three general requirements, it is also important to re-emphasize that many exchange programs of this nature were all competing for the same philanthropic and cooperative grants. If a certain organization is hard for the public to understand or sometimes involves itself in a form of politically extreme activity, then its chances for success are minimized (unless the government steps in). The People-To-People Program could be placed in this category.

In tracing the background of the Program, one must go back far enough to find the underlying forces that ignited the sudden increase in the United States' interest in cultural exchange. Known as the first war of ideology, World War II could also be viewed as the first war of cultural exchange. This was because many cultural exchange programs during this period were integrated into the Office Of War Information to serve propaganda purposes in post-war
Germany and Japan. It was also at this time that the "American Century" philosophy was adopted by many intellectuals. This idea, based on preaching the United States' democratic way of life throughout the world, may have influenced and redefined America's attitude toward cultural exchange. With the advent of the Cold War, existing cultural exchange programs were integrated into a new layer of programs incorporated to battle Soviet-created, anti-American propaganda. Many of these post World War II programs influenced the development and definition of what was to become the People-To-People Program.

Another important factor of influence over the Program was its "mentor," financial supplier and liaison to President Eisenhower, the United States Information Agency. Throughout Eisenhower's presidency, the Program was in its financial grasp. After reviewing the basic philosophy behind the Program it is evident that its attachment to the USIA was one of its main weaknesses. By receiving funds from this government agency, the Program's private status was compromised during its early period.

Eisenhower's whole reason for implementing the People-To-People Program was to promote peace and understanding between nations, by means of "the People" without the aid of government money. However, its basic approach of omitting the government altogether and using only private funding was destined to experience problems from the beginning. The causes for these reasons are many. Perhaps one of the
biggest mistakes Eisenhower made in starting the People-To-People Program was to ignore all the other cultural exchange programs already in existence. In addition to this, Eisenhower started the People-To-People Program on a massive scale with an overwhelming forty committees. His People-To-People Program not only had to compete with other programs for private funding, but it also overlapped on their activities. As a result, the chances of every People-To-People Program Committee appearing original and visible to funding organizations and the public were nil. In fact, many of the People-To-People Program committees simply mirrored existing organizations. Consequently, an embarrassing situation was developed when the People-To-People Program began taking credit for the accomplishments of other philanthropic or cultural exchange programs. These features led the People-To-People Program to develop a characteristic similar to that of a chameleon, where it copied organizations, making itself invisible to the public. A series of financial problems ensued as funding organizations were no longer interested in financing a program that could not be seen or defined. The lid to the Program's financial vacuum was sealed tight when its own fund-raising organization, the People-To-People Foundation Inc., had to be dissolved due to its failure to raise money.

Not only did the Program take on a shapeless figure but it also developed an unclear political consensus. This also had an effect on the Program's financial problems as it was
one of the reasons for the Ford Foundation rejection. As a result of this lack of clarity, the Program was also exposed to the influences of programs aimed at countering Communist propaganda campaigns. The A.R.M.S. for Peace delegation epitomized the deviated use of the Program by including the People-To-People Veterans Committee on its trips to Russia. The subversive, anti-Communist quality of this trip was evident in the delegation's goals which were based on weakening the Russian government by stirring up past military injustices committed by the Russian government. Other influences including Conferences such as the World Communist Conspiracy-Philosophy and Impact, created specifically for People-To-People participants, sponsored lectures on anti-Communist propaganda methods. As more conferences and organizations either used the Program or made politically extreme plans for it, potential funding groups such as the Ford Foundation viewed the Program with increasing skepticism. The fact that it could not attract any funding (even after the creation of its own funding foundation) exemplifies this skepticism on the part of funding organizations, which was one of the reasons for the Program's return to government money. Thus, it could be suggested that the People-To-People Program from its beginning in 1956 to 1960 failed not only in the attempt to create a clear, original image, but also in maintaining its philosophy of operating on a private basis, without the aid of government financing.
End Notes

1United States Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-87, Department of State Publication 9627, August 1987, p. 64.


3Ibid, p. 4.

4Ibid, p. 3.

5Quote from anti-Communist document "The Army of Campassion" Box 16, Principal File, Joyce Hall, Post Presidential Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower Library.


9Ibid., p. 2.


14Ibid., p. 2.
15 Charles Wilson to Eisenhower concerning the raising of $5 million privately for the Program, April 3, 1958, Official File, Box 932, Folder 325, White House Central Files, Eisenhower Library.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 10.

19 Ibid.


21 Eisenhower to Macmillan concerning the Program, 1959, Official File, Box 932, Folder 325, White House Central Files, Eisenhower Library.

22 Ford Foundation memorandum, re-application of People-To-People Foundation for grant, October 7, 1957, Official File, Box 931, Folder 325(7), White House Central Files, Eisenhower Library.

23 Pamphlet emphasizing the private aspect of Program in "General Conclusions and Recommendations", Box 5, Folder 6, OCB Series, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Library, p. 5.


Wilson's patriotism (which may have influenced the Program's anti-communist stance) is evident by the fact that after working forty years to become GE's president (at a $175,000 annual salary), he resigned a year and a half later to accept an $8,000 annual salary as a member of the War Production Board during World War II. After the war Wilson returned to GE as president, only to resign to help the government combating Communist forces in North Korea. That Wilson possessed an anti-communist sentiment is reflected in his statement "I abhor intolerance and communism and the more I see them at work, the more I abhor them". Current Biography, The H.W. Wilson Company, New York, 1951.

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58 Memorandum for Abbott Washburn, USIA, from Frederic Fox, Special Assistant to the White House Office, concerning the Program's movement away from original hopes of Eisenhower, August 8, 1957, Box 5, Folder 6, OCB Series, White House Office, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Library.


60 Ibid., p. 59-63.


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