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Catherine Mary Burnette	for the <u>Masters of Art</u>
(name of student)	(degree)
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During World War II, the Allies successfully launched a propaganda campaign against Germany. Conducted under the leadership of the Psychological Warfare Department (PWD), these operations included radio broadcasts, loudspeaker announcements and dropping of leaflets. This study focuses on the leaflet, which was one of the PWD's most successful forms of propaganda.

First of all, this study looks at the leaflet's role in history and examine how it has been traditionally used in modern warfare. It then surveys the four main types of leaflets, civilian, news, surrender and general, disemminated by the PWD among Germans in both the European and Mediterranean theaters. This study includes a careful analysis of copies of leaflets actually disseminated on German civilian and troops. Each of the four types are evaluated according to their writing style, intended audience, contents and goal. This study also examines how the four types of leaflets complemented each others' actions, showing that the failure of one could effectively destroy the cumulative effects of the others. Finally, it will mention briefly how experience with leaflets in World War II still influences psychological warfare.

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# THE ART OF PERSUASION:

# THE ROLE OF THE LEAFLET IN PSYCHOLOGICAL

# WARFARE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Catherine Mary Burnette

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#### DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the loving memory of my Grandmother JESSIE BAUER

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## Introduction

During World War II, the Allies launched a war of words against Germany. This campaign was not fueled with conventional weapons, but with radios, loudspeakers and leaflets. Psychological warfare, as the weapon is commonly known, can be defined as propaganda used to persuade a given group of individuals to follow a designated plan of action. It was a weapon of modern warfare, used to attack the minds and emotions of both enemy soldiers and civilians, in order to break down their will to resist. Perhaps Paul Linebarger best defined its military role when he wrote, "Psychological Warfare seeks to win military victories without military force." (1) Its important role in the Allied military arsenal is summarized by a statement in a Allied psychological warfare promotional pamphlet:

> Propaganda is a proven weapon of warfare...Leaflets won't win the war alone. Radio won't win the war alone. Propaganda won't win the war alone. But...Neither will Bombs...Nor Bullets... Nor Bayonets...used alone. (2)

Psychological Warfare was directed at German civilians and troops in both the Mediterranean and European theaters. These operations were initially conducted under the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), a part of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ). Eventually, at the request of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the PWB operations were transferred to the Psychological Warfare Department (PWD), a newly formed division of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). (3) In order to avoid confusion, this study will classify all psychological warfare operations as part of the PWD. The PWD's role was well defined in order to insure success in their propaganda endeavors:

> To attack the enemy's morale, his will to fight and to make him easier to defeat.
>  To collect, prepare, supply, distribute and control propaganda.
>  To send these tools to combat areas, the enemy, enemy occupied countries, and areas occupied by our forces. (4)

By incorporating these goals in the form of radio programs, loudspeaker announcements, and leaflet droppings, the PWD attempted to attack the enemy's mind. Although not beyond criticism from the military, psychological warfare often received positive reviews from Allied Commanders. Perhaps General Dwight D. Eisenhower best described the importance of this weapon when he wrote:

> The exact contribution of psychological warfare towards the final victory cannot...be measured in terms of towns destroyed or barriers passed ....the expenditure of men and money in wielding the spoken and written word was an important contributing factor in undermining the enemy's will to resist and supporting the fighting moral of our...Allies in the occupied countries. Psychological warfare

has proved its right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal. (5)

This study will focus on one of the PWD's most effective types of propaganda, the leaflet.

Although leaflets were part of psychological warfare operations conducted by the Americans since the Revolutionary War, they did not to reach their maturity until the twentieth century, when they became an integral part of modern military warfare. (5) In modern warfare, leaflets gained a testing ground during World War I when they were used extensively by French, British, and United States' troops. They became especially important towards the end of the war when France disseminated 27,000,000, Britain 18,000,000 and the United States 3,000,000 leaflets. (7) Although these numbers were not excessive compared to those dropped in World War II, the leaflets did make an impression on the Germans, as a speech of Marshall von Hindenberg on September 5, 1918 indicates:

> The enemy conducts his campaign against our spirit by various means, it bombards our front, not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul. (8)

The fear of the written word's persuasive power was great enough to encourage leaders like Hindenberg to speak out against leaflets.

Because of the leaflet's success in World War I, this weapon of propaganda was immediately employed in World War II. In fact, the

Germans had learned from their World War I experiences and were among the first to utilize leaflets extensively in their military activities. Allied leaflet productions were often confused and misguided during the early months of the war. Due to military upsets such as the defeat of France in 1940, as well as the unorganized nature of the operations, early efforts often proved fruitless. But with the entry of the United States into the war late in 1941, the Allies were able to pull together and organize an effective operation. Therefore, between 1942 and the end of the war in May, 1945, leaflet operations not only increased, but were considered by the Allies to be highly effective. It was during this time that some 2.7 billion leaflets were dropped in the Mediterranean theater and some 6 billion in the Western European The PWD also measured their success through careful theater. (9) examination of recipient's reaction. Most of this was accomplished through German prisoner of war interrogations. Information such as quantity of leaflets found on prisoners and recollection of leaflets by prisoners, revealed to the PWD the effectiveness of their The PWD realized that leaflets cannot directly win operations. (10) battles, but they can effectively produce conditions conducive for military victories. This idea is apparent in the World War II pamphlet entitled, "Confetti: Combat Propaganda":

> Leaflets are the cutting edge of psychological warfare. A leaflet offensive is planned as a war of attrition. It rains on enemy troops until it bogs their fighting spirit and spoils their aim. A storm of leaflets,

ahead of our attacks can make bad fighting weather for enemy soldiers. (11)

By the end of the war, the PWD had compiled overwhelming evidence that their propaganda had directly affected enemy soldiers.

The leaflet's main role in World War II was to weaken the enemy's ability to win by attacking the morale of their soldiers, and can therefore be categorized by the separate situations in which leaflets were used, strategic and tactical. The strategic leaflet was aimed at the enemy as a whole, and sought to destroy not only the will of the German soldier, but the will of the German civilian. This type of leaflet did not seek instant results. Instead, such propaganda was considered long-range in effect, because it helped to prepare the enemy for eventual defeat. The second type of leaflet was tactical. Tactical leaflets sought immediate results and were mainly used in the front-lines, where they called for actions such as surrender, desertion or sabotage. (12)

The strategic leaflet was the first type implemented during World War II and the bulk of leaflets dropped before D-Day were of this nature. Their main objective was to present a set of long-range plans so that the German people understood the Allied position. Such leaflets, for example, often outlined Allied plans for the future of Germany, and explained the conditions of Allied military rule, so that the Germans knew what to expect when they lost the war. These leaflets were often extremely effective in creating tension between the German military and the civilian population. (13) Of the strategic leaflets dropped before D-Day, over 50% were directed at Germany. After D-Day that number rose to 90%. (14) These leaflets were designed to produce favorable conditions so that tactical leaflets could be successfully employed.

Tactical leaflets went into large scale production after D-Day operations. Unlike strategic leaflets, tactical leaflets were expected to motivate an immediate reaction. Their main purpose was to help implement a change in the military situation. (15) Tactical leaflets were especially successful when they were combined with military actions. They were guickly produced on the front-line in order to exploit such situations as Allied advancement against a specific town or an Axis strong hold. They were also effective during military maneuvering, in which German troops found themselves in a situation of retreat. (16) Often these leaflets contained messages counseling surrender, warning of Allied advances, and stressing the weakened state of Germany. The idea was to create panic in the soldier who would then be ineffective on the front-line. Although sometimes dropped on civilian targets, the tactical leaflet was mainly directed at soldiers. These leaflets worked especially well on the front-lines where soldiers could quickly take action and accomplish what the leaflet instructed. (17)

Another way which the PWD categorized their leaflets was by the type of propaganda incorporated within them. This propaganda can be divided into three main types: white, gray or black. White propaganda was used when the PWD wanted the enemy to know the origins of the leaflet. This method was most often employed when the leaflet contained direct orders from the Allies to either a German soldier or civilian. An excellent example of white propaganda is the *Passierschein* or "Safe Conduct" leaflet (see Chapter 3). Its main objective was to give the enemy soldier a direct order to surrender from the Allied high command. (18) Gray propaganda, on the other hand, was a mixture of propaganda and factual news. Such propaganda purposely did not identify its source so that the soldier or civilian would have to decide what to believe and what not to believe. It should be noted that the German knew exactly where they came from even if they were intended to be anonymous. (19) An example of this type of propaganda is the gray news leaflet *Nachrichten fuer die Truppe* (see Chapter 2). Finally, black propaganda was occasionally used by the PWD. Out of the three types, it was employed the least frequently and was described by the PWD in the following terms:

The German is being approached through deception and elaborately sustained fictions, calculated to throw if off its guard and to appeal to selfish, disloyal, individualist motives in the individual. (20)

Black propaganda was used by the Allies when they wanted to spread rumors, alter facts or create misgiving. For example, many of these leaflets tried to look like an order from the German high command to their soldiers.

Leaflets can also be categorized in terms of the audiences to which they were directed. In order to make each leaflet effective, the PWD realized that it was crucial to target audiences and determine the themes to which they would be most receptive. (21) Also, most leaflets were written so that they would have an effect

upon the greatest number of people. To accomplish this the message had to be straightforward and simple so that it could easily be related by word of mouth. Finally, most leaflets were written with a certain type of individual in mind. Martin Herz, chief leaflet writer of the PWD, described this person as the "Marginal Man." This person was skeptical of all type of propaganda that the Allies sent to him and required more than just a push in order to react to what he read. Therefore, Herz argued that if propaganda reached this individual, then it would have an effect upon everyone who encountered it. (22)

Leaflets and psychological warfare have been the topic of a number of historical studies. Books such as Carl Berger's An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets (see note 7), James Erdmann's Leaflet Operations in the Second World War (23) and David Lerner's Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany: The Skyewar Campaign. D-Day to VE-Day (24) are entirely devoted to the leaflet's role in psychological warfare. These studies, however, tend to do one of two things. First, they concentrated on the mechanical aspects of leaflet warfare and center on how leaflet operations were organized and how the leaflets were disseminated. Erdmann's book is the definitive study of the mechanics of leaflet operations. Second, most studies look at the leaflets role in psychological warfare by examining what types of leaflets were dropped, where they were dropped and what the main themes were. An example of this approach is Berger's book which does an excellent job of showing what types of leaflets were dropped in World War I and II and in the Korean conflict.

In contrast, this study will survey the four main types of leaflets, civilian, news, surrender and general, dropped by the PWD on Germans in both the European and Mediterranean theaters, to determine what the PWD intended these leaflets to accomplish, this approach will analyze the propaganda techniques revealed in their writing style and content. This study will also include a careful analysis of actual leaflets as well as an examination of what the PWD writers and staffs intended the leaflets to say. Finally, whenever possible this study will go a step further and, by using material such as prisoner of war reports and PWD records, evaluate whether or not the leaflets really met their goals. (1)

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(15)

Ibid, p. 12.

(16)

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Office of the Secretary General Staff: Records, 1943-45 (henceforth, SHAEF), File: Psychological Warfare, Reel: 6, Eisenhower Library. (17) C.D. Jackson, File: Cairo Algiers (1), Box: 6. (18) SHAEF, File: Psychological Warfare, Reel: 6. (19) Ibid. (20) Ibid. (21) C.D.Jackson, File: Paris (4), Box: 6. (22) Martin F. Herz, "Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall, 1949, p. 471-486. (23)

James Morris Erdmann, <u>Leaflet Operations in the Second World</u> <u>War</u>, Denver: Denver Instant Printing, 1969. (24)

Daniel Lerner, <u>Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany:</u> <u>The Skyewar Campaign, D-Day to VE-Day</u>, New York: Steward, 1949.

## Chapter 1 Civilian leaflets

German civilians were one of the main leaflet targets of the **Psychological Warfare Department (PWD)** during the latter years of **World War II (1944-1945)**. It was during this time that the Allies **became** increasingly aware that the attitude of the homeland had a **direct** effect on the morale of German front-line soldiers. The PWD **believed** that a massive civilian propaganda campaign could **indirectly** effect the soldier's will to resist. (1) They also believed **that** these leaflets were an important tool in persuading civilians to **comply** with Allied orders:

> The purpose of leaflets dropped on civilians behind the lines is to influence them to actions which will cause maximum interference with the enemy's military operations and thus assist the Allied advance. (2)

Finally, the ultimate role of civilian leaflets in psychological warfare was to create an atmosphere in the German homeland that was conducive for future Allied military rule.

In order to produce a leaflet which appealed to civilian audiences, the PWD's writers had to determine the most effective way to approach them. Chief leaflet writer Martin Herz described this task as a difficult one in his article entitled, "Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda in World War II." Herz found it hard to determine exactly how a civilian would react, because of the PWD's unfamiliarity with German homeland **Evaditions.** It was for this reason that most civilian propaganda was **ussed** on two different topics, mutual-interest situations and how **divilians** could help the Allied war effort. (3)

First of all, leaflets focusing on mutual-interest situations, **thore** commonly known as limited action leaflets, discussed how a **divilian** should react to immediate problems which arise in time of Usually they gave instructions on what actions civilians should take when their town became part of the front-line. Themes of these leaflets included ignoring any orders to evacuate the area, starting anti-Nazi campaigns, avoiding senseless destruction of their towns and asking the front-line soldiers how the war is progressing. (4) An excellent example of a limited action leaflet is "Drei Tonnen Sprengstoff" ("Three tons of explosives") (Appendix 1-This leaflet warned that the next drop made by Allies would **K**). most likely be bombs instead of leaflets:

> Drei Tonnen Sprengstoff were left behind at an aerodrome, in order that these leaflets may be dropped. One aeroplane flew here with no other load than leaflets. Why? Does the enemy have to economise with bombs? You know the Allies have enough planes and bombs to step up even more than already concentrated bombing warfare. No--the purpose of these leaflets is not to destroy lives, but to save lives. Therefore read this leaflet carefully. On the other side it carries three vital instructions for you and your family. (Appendix 1-K)

the back of this leaflet instructed the civilian audience on how to roid being killed under the heading of "Read and Consider Then: et!" (Appendix 1-L). These instructions emphasized that it was in the civilian's own interest to follow these orders to stop senseless restruction of life and property. The third instruction emphasized the fear of civilians that German soldiers were sacrificing themselves needlessly on the front-line:

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3. The men at the front are to fight the armored superiority of the enemy with naked hands. They are brave. But they are being sacrificed senselessly. In your own interest, therefore, follow this advice: CONVINCES THE SOLDIERS OF THE USELESSNESS OF THEIR SACRIFICES. THEY MUST CONSERVE THEMSELVES FOR THE JOB OF RECONSTRUCTION. (Appendix 1-L)

This leaflet called for civilians to encourage soldiers to stop resisting and bring the war to a speedy conclusion. Many leaflets mentioned the fear of "war prolonger":

> FIGHT THE NAZI PARTY! Millions of fellow-citizens are of your mind. The spy-system prevents them from declaring themselves openly. But this spy-system is weakening. You can recognize the truth and help spread it. Watch the war prolongers and remember the names of war criminals. (Appendix 1-S)

This leaflet played on the civilian's fear that the Nazi government was sacrificing them as well as the soldiers in order to prolong the war. Proof of this can be found in the March 19, 1945 Weekly **Intelligence** Summary which offers civilians an alternative to **Eccepting Nazi oppression.** (5) The PWD's writing team hoped that **this leaflet and others would have a direct effect on the civilian's thorale and help the Allies defeat the German homeland before too much life and property was lost.** 

The second theme which the PWD utilized in their leaflets concerned how a civilian could help the Allied war effort. Often known as capitulation leaflets, they were used as a guide to prepare civilians for a eventual Allied military take over, by encouraging them to think of themselves first at the expense of their Nazi party [oyalties. (6) The leaflet entitled "I cannot end the World War" perhaps best exemplifies the question of civilian capitulation:

> Thousands of Germans in Germanymen and women who will have the gratitude of a post-war Germanyfight silently against the war and the Party. They hinder the railway transport, they slow down war production, they help foreign workers and prepare themselves to be ready when Germany will be cleansed from the Nazis. Yes, it is true: You alone cannot end the World War - BUT YOU CAN HASTEN THE END. (Appendix 1-S)

Nazi rule had left many civilians feeling powerless to fight against the government's tyranny. (7) This leaflet argued that the civilian, unsure of his or her role in ending the war, should realize that the acts of even one person could help end the war that much sooner.

In order to assure that the two themes used by the PWD in their civilian propaganda would be successfully presented, the

**riters** had to follow a series of steps designed to produce an **liective** leaflet. This was especially important when addressing **ivilians** because so little was known about the recipients or how **ivy** would react to the propaganda. For this reason the PWD **iguired** writers to answer five questions in order to assure a clear **irgument**:

- (1) Who is being addressed?
- (2) Why are they being addressed?
- (3) When are they being addressed?
- (4) What effect is intended?
- (5) What action do we want? (8)

**Each** of these five questions was considered by the PWD in determining the content of their leaflets. If correctly followed, these steps established the tone needed to persuade the unknown eivilian enemy to comply with Allied authority. This made the process of planning a leaflet crucial to the end result. Most of the eivilian leaflet's power came from the ability of the PWD to speak to the audience's needs. (9)

First, the PWD leaflet writers determined to whom they wanted the leaflet to be directed. Unlike leaflets aimed at soldiers or military units, most civilian leaflets targeted a particular audience. The four most common audiences were: the general civilian population, different towns, specific groups of people, and the mayor of the community. (10) Each of these groups had its own unique fears and weaknesses which a cleverly written leaflet could easily exploit. Excellent examples of how the PWD successfully employed this technique are seen in leaflets addressed to the mayor Buergermeister. (11) The leaflet entitled "An den regermeister" (Appendix 1-G and 1-H) is an example of this type. PWD packaged this leaflet to resemble an official document in the Allied seal embossed in the corner. It was directed to the thest official of the town who was given an ultimatum from the led government either to comply or to risk death and destruction:

> American troops are advancing toward your town. In a short time they will have reached it. Resistance against our troops would lead to the destruction of your town. Speedy surrender, however, will save the town and its inhabitants from such a fate. (Appendix 1-G and 1-H)

y sending a direct order from the Allies to the *Buergermeister*, the WD hoped that the decision to surrender would be expedited.

Other civilian leaflets targeted specific groups such as: industrial workers, peasants, the general German public and a ipecific town. When the PWD specifically targeted a group, the purpose generally was to encourage capitulation to Allied orders. For instance, and example of a specific town selected as the target of PWD's head writers is the leaflet entitled "To the Citizens of Hamburg". This leaflet states that it would be a matter of weeks the Allied forces would be at their doorsteps, and encourages citizens to surrender before they become part of the front-line. (12) It also encourages the citizen to be loyal to town and family before party and state. The PWD hoped that by focusing on the citizen's

**t of the** Allies destroying their town they would be able to **purage** city officials to raise the white flag.

te Leaflets were also directed at specific groups of people such industrial or agricultural workers. These leaflets usually called isabotage and non-compliance with Nazi orders. Often industrial inters were counseled to keep machinery from operating at full intential, to save parts if machinery broke down so that they would vavailable for Allied use after the war, and to organize together to intend a plan for take-over of the factory. Peasants were usually intense a plan for after the war. (13) All of these actions called for intermans to choose between loyalty to the state or to themselves. intermany by encouraging that food be stock-piled and factories be intense in operable conditions.

Finally, the civilian population was frequently targeted. Most of these leaflets were intended to alleviate civilian's fears of Allied nule and the future of Germany as well as to encourage capitulation by the average person. "Deutsche Zivilisten! Amerikanische Truppen ind in Anmarsch auf Eure Ortschaft!" ("German Civilians! American troops are advancing towards your community!") is an example of this type of leaflet:

> In a short while, the American troops will have reached your town. The popelation has no reason to fear, for the American army does not wage war against civilians. (Appendix 1-C and 1-D)

the general German population was probably their largest audience inderessed. Leaflets of this variety told the Germans that they could inther capitulate or watch the end of Germany come nearer. (14) W The second question answered by PWD writers was why invitian leaflets should be written. Although there were many reasons why the PWD began a civilian leaflet campaign the most prominent one was that defeating Germany required defeating it as a whole unit. To concentrate propaganda on just the soldiers left the homeland vulnerable to Nazi rule. Therefore, it was significant to focus a concentrated propaganda effort toward civilians who lived under constant Nazi censorship of news about the war and Germany's eminent defeat. (15)

Because of Nazi inaccuracy in reporting homefront news, PWD writers tried to address the lies and rumors disseminated by the Nazi press. One rumor was that the Allies would not treat civilian prisoners fairly because, unlike soldiers, they were not protected under the Geneva Convention. (See Chapter 3, Surrender Leaflets) It was obviously important to refute such rumors. The rumor concerning treatment of civilians was especially difficult for the **PWD** writers to undermine, because it was partially based on fact. Without making direct promises, the writers assured civilians that, regardless of specific protection under the Geneva Convention, their human rights would not be violated. The PWD tried to quiet the German fears by explaining that all civilians would be protected by the laws and regulations imposed by Allied rule after the war. (16) Eventually, near the end of the war, the PWD began to include civilians in the ranks of those who fell under the Geneva Convention

mations. (17) They attempted to convince the populace of their fection under the Geneva Convention by instructing the mayor to render his city in military fashion. The leaflet entitled "An den formachts Kommandanten oder Buergermeister" ("To the Army mander or Mayor") included this message:

## WEGUARANTEE

The Safeguarding of Personal Property Treatment according to the Geneva Convention The local Army Commander or responsible civilian official can send fully empowered parlementaires with a white flag to the nearest Allied command post for the purpose of negotiating a surrender. In case of attempted trickery, no mercy will be shown. (Appendix 1-A and 1-B)

The third step followed by the PWD when writing civilian leaflets was to determine when a particular campaign would occur. Often this question determined the theme of the leaflet. Usually PWD writers considered this question only when they were directing a leaflet campaign towards a specific area or group of people. Standard leaflets such as "German Civilians! American troops are advancing toward your community!" (Appendix 1-C and 1-D) and "An den Buergermeister" (Appendix 1-E and 1-H) could be used at any time or place. But this often was not the case with civilian leaflets. In order to make them as pertinent as possible to a given Allied military situation, many leaflets were written with a specific action in mind. Such leaflets were used to forewarn German civilians of such upcoming actions as Allied advance or a possible threat of Allied bombing or invasion. (18) As Frederick Sondern explains in his article entitled "General McClures' Newsboys," leaflets such as "Warnung An die deutsche Zivilbevoelkerung im Rheinland und im Ruhrgebeit" ("Warning to the German Civilian Population in the Rhineland and the Ruhr", Appendix 1-M and 1-N) fit Into this category. In fact, Sondern states that these specific target Inaflets were widely disseminated during the last months of the war Allied military action reached the German homeland. (19) Warnung An die deutsche Zivilbevoelkerung im Rheinland und im Iuhrgebeit" was dropped on the civilians to alert them to an Impending invasion:

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The Allied High Command issued on 26 August 1944, addressed to the civilian population of the German regions west of the Rhine and in the French province of Alsace-Lorraine. Due to the rapid advance of the Allied armies and the pursuit of the disintegrating German units, the entire Rhineland and Ruhr have now become a rear area of military operations. In a very short time they may become a battle area. (Appendix 1-M and 1-N)

By dropping this leaflet in advance of Allied invasion of this area, the PWD gave civilians fair warning to prepare for either surrender or resistance.

The fourth question asked by PWD writers concerned the intended effect of civilian propaganda. Of the many reasons why the PWD determined that civilians should receive Allied propaganda, perhaps the most important was the role that civilian leaflets yed in indirectly undermining the front-line soldier's morale. The **D** was quoted as saying that, "Allied propaganda has long **ognized** the role of civilians in spreading their defeatism **ongst** German soldiers." (20) Thus, civilian leaflets were **ended** to break down not only the civilian's morale and will to **ist**, but also the soldier's. Perhaps the best example of the **ntionship** between the civilian and the soldier is the leaflet **titled**, "Frage den Frontsoldaten!" ("Ask the Front-line soldier", **ppendix** 1-O and 1-P). This leaflet was used to encourage direct **ntact** between civilians and soldiers so that, by asking soldiers **hat** conditions were like at the front-line, civilians would better **nderstand** how to react when the homeland became a battleground:

> With the entry of Allied troops into Germany territory, the Homeland and the front have became neighbors. The home population can thus at last find out what experiences the front-line soldier has had in the West and how he thinks about the situation. The frontline soldier knows what it is like! (Appendix 1-O and 1-P)

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The leaflet then encouraged civilians to approach soldiers and ask them three different questions pertaining to the war:

> ASK HIM if it is possible to resist an overwhelmingly superior enemy for any length of time - no matter with how much bravery and readiness for sacrifice. Ask him - he knows the answer!

ASK HIM what the towns and villages of Western France looked like when one tried to defend them - and then, afterwards, when artillery barrages and carpets of bombs had broken the resistance. <u>Ask him - he knows the answer!</u>

ASK HIM if he wants his country to become a devastated battlefield, whether chaos and misery and mass suicide are preferable to an orderly entry of the Allies. <u>Ask him - he knows the answer!</u> (Appendix 1-O and 1-P)

Bach of the suggested questions ended with the words, "Ask him - he dia to reiterate that the soldier had already
Experienced first hand the horrors of war. The PWD intended to show how the Nazis had sacrificed their soldiers' lives needlessly.
Frage den Frontsoldaten" was so successful that a version known as "Ask the People at Home" was invented to use similar tactics on German soldiers. Both leaflets were disseminated to civilian and military audiences and were interchangeable at the front-lines. (21)

Another intended effect of civilian propaganda was to give German citizen a choice about what the future would hold for them and their community. Perhaps the most famous example of this type of leaflet is "Das war Duerwiss!" ("This was Duerwiss!", Appendix 1-T and 1-U). This leaflet argued that it was impossible to win against the Allies' overwhelming military superiority and that any attempt to resist would result in destruction of towns and loss of lives. (22) "Das war Duerwiss" called for civilians to surrender their town to the Allies or suffer the fate of Duerwiss:

> This was Duerwiss an erstwhile peaceful German village in the district of

Eschweiler near Aachen, which need not have been brought to ruin. Fanatics made a strongpoint out of Duerwiss. Thereby it became a military target for Allied bombers Within one day, the town was smashed to pieces by heavy bombers, fighter bombers, artillery and flame-throwing tanks. (Appendix 1-T and 1-U)

his message appeared under a picture of what was left of the small ommunity of Duerwiss. The leaflet was intended to send a owerful message to German civilians that the senseless estruction of this town need not have occurred. On the back of the aflet there was an explanation on how "Eure Heimatort kann erettet werden" ("Your town can be saved!", Appendix 1-V and 1-W) oppeared. Thus, the citizen had the choice of making their town a target or preserving it for the future:

> Avoid having your town razed to the ground! Talk with the Soldiers! Explain to them that defending the town means not only senseless selfsacrifice, but also a DEATH SENTENCE for your town. Avoid having your town made into a strongpoint. Help the soldiers to save themselves, and thereby your town, for a better future! (Appendix 1-V and 1-W)

The main power of the message was that each civilian had to decide, either to comply with Allied orders or to face the consequences of non-cooperation. (23)

Finally, the PWD writers determined what specific actions civilians should be encouraged to take. These actions, which were

anally given in a list form, often appeared on the backside of aflets to reinforce the message of non-compliance to Nazi rule appendix 1-E and 1-F, 1-I and 1-J). (24) Three of the most common ders were: to cease resistance, to stop needless Nazi destruction property, and to house refugees of the German Wehrmacht. The ain purpose of providing specific instructions was to reassure wilians about the correctness of any actions they undertook. ivilians were persuaded they need not fear Allied retaliation rovided that they followed the leaflet's orders. For example, aflets usually contained instruction on where an individual should ide in case of Allied invasion:

> Hide in your cellars, which afford protection to you. Remain in the cellars even after the first American troops have entered. Remain in the cellars until the American authorities express grant free use of the streets. (Appendix 1-I and 1-J)

**Some** leaflets contained more specific instructions about what to do **during** Allied takeover. An example of this type of message is found **under** the heading "Anweisungen!" ("Instructions"):

Hide in cellars which offer you protection. Remain in the cellars even after the first Americans units have entered your community. Send out a small group of parlamentaries (not more than 3) who will surrender the town to the American commander. All other citizens remain in their cellars until otherwise informed by the authorities. (Appendix 1-E and 1-F) y following these orders, a civilian could be assured that his life rould be spared. Often instructions involved not obeying Nazi orders ut complying with Allied wishes. Perhaps the most famous nonompliance order was the call for citizens to ignore Nazi evacuation rders and instead follow instructions contained in Allied leaflets. 25)

Often the leaflets directed civilians how to react in a certain ituation. For example, a series of leaflets sent to workers and port officials in various towns gave instructions specifically geared to heir situation. (26) In the hope of preventing further sabotage of tey German ports, these leaflets called on the workers to stop the ports from being destroyed, their reward being that the ports would be shut down for the least amount of time. The leaflet entitled "To he workers and port officials of HAMBURG!" is an example of this argument:

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In these last weeks of the war, the future of your town is in the greatest danger from fanatics who may make a last minute attempt to make the port unusable. The power of the men behind these fanatics is crumbling. It will be broken with the arrival of the Allied armies. It depends on what you do now whether your port will then be reopened at once. (Appendix 1-Q)

The back of this leaflet included a list of four actions which encouraged port officials and workers to take responsibility for the future of their jobs and their town's ports after the war.

Å. The effectiveness of the civilian leaflet campaign was only **by** known after World War II ended. There was little opportunity evaluate the effectiveness of civilian propaganda earlier because the limited contact between PWD interrogators and civilians until litary government was imposed. (27) Even then it remained ficult for the trained historian to determine how effective these fiets were. Perhaps the biggest barrier to obtaining concrete ridence lies in the fact that no distinction was made between **wilian** and military prisoners of war. Thus, interrogation reports tem to indicate that most of the prisoners interviewed were foldiers and not civilians. Nonetheless, there is some indication hat the PWD did call for civilians to be interviewed and questioned bout their impressions of leaflet warfare. (28) The evidence which is available generally comes from the PWD's own assessment of eivilian leaflet operations. PWD papers mention positive effects of the leaflets such as that civilians, unlike soldiers, could discuss the contents of the leaflets freely and therefore messages reached a much larger audience than the actual numbers of leaflets printed. (29) Also, PWD reports cite evidence that civilians who had seen leaflets were especially grateful for instructions and information concerning how to react in a crisis situation. (30) The chief argument for effectiveness of civilian propaganda lay in how thoroughly the civilians were able to effect the soldiers' fighting morale. The PWD repeatedly cited the interrelationship of civilian and soldier as substantial proof of the necessity of civilian leaflets. (31) Therefore, this interrelationship rather than numbers or

centages dictated the PWD's decision to continue civilian paganda operations.

Because, as indicated earlier, interrogation reports fail to tinguish civilians from military individuals, the most accurate tessment of the success of civilian leaflets comes from **insidering** the numbers disseminated. (32) The PWD kept an up-tote list of numbers of leaflets disseminated in their Monthly **togress** Reports. This source, for example, reports that in the first weeks of November, 1944, over 88 million leaflets were topped on both civilian and military targets. Again a report for the rst two weeks of December of the same year estimate that some **32** million leaflets were dropped. Of these 132 million, 19.2% were expressly directed at German civilians and 15.9% at German roops. The rest of these leaflets were directed at a general udience. (33) These figures suggest that civilian leaflet production often exceeded that of military leaflets. During the last few months of the war Allied civilian leaflet dissemination reached a high as Allied troops slowly moved towards civilian targets and inched closer to Berlin. Because of their military advance civilians became increasing important to the PWD's propaganda efforts. For example, in April, 1945, some 25,756,709 leaflets were dropped on civilian targets. (34) Such huge numbers were seen as proof of the PWD's own belief in their success rate. Another way to judge the success of operations is to look at the attitudes of Nazis towards the Allied civilian leaflet campaign. The Nazi government considered these leaflets dangerous and called for complete destruction of them. A

tement released by the Nazi government expresses their fear of full potential of these leaflets:

That it is absolutely forbidden to all citizens not only to remove but also to touch materials of any kind whatsoever dropped by or falling from enemy aircraft. Anyone who finds them must at once notify the nearest Italian or German military command or police post. (35)

byiously, the Nazi government feared the power of these leaflets provoke uprisings and encourage non-capitulation to Nazi rule. rom all of this evidence it is safe to conclude that, although their access rate cannot be measured in concrete numbers, civilian eaflets did have a marked effect on lowering the morale of the German homeland.

In conclusion, civilians were one of the main groups which the **PWD's** leaflet propaganda targeted during World War II. German civilians had no choice whether or not they became part of the war. They were in the path of the oncoming Allied forces and would eventually face the dangers of the front-line. The position of the German civilian was an unenviable one:

> They face death, at our hands, if they obey the Nazis; they face death at the Nazis' hands if they disobey them; they cannot protect themselves against the Allies great armies and air fleets but they could, if they adopted the best means of defence, attack and protect themselves against Nazis' weakening terror machine. There is only one road

to safety - active mass resistance to the hangman. (36)

erefore, it was essential and humanitarian for the PWD to begin a flet campaign directed at the German homeland with a twofold al. First, the PWD encouraged citizens to persuade soldiers to p fighting and save themselves and Germany for the future. In dition, PWD propaganda attempted to destroy civilian morale and epare German citizens for eventual Allied military takeover, by eaking the enemy's power over its people, one civilian at a time.

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# Chapter 1 Notes

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### Chapter 2 News Leaflets

The newspaper leaflet was an important part of the PWD's trall leaflet campaign. Used throughout World War II, these flets were one of the few alternate source of news available to rmans. They were published on a regular basis, either daily or tekly, so that the German soldier would begin to rely on them as a urce of information, as many did. (1) As one front-line German dier explained: "We are starving for anything printed. Whatever mes to us we swallow eagerly. The more your leaflets include, te more we welcome them." (2)

A variety of news leaflets related current information about e war, local interest stories and other world news. They were **designed** to look like an average German newspaper, printed in **blumn** form, with such familiar items as: headlines, feature tories, late breaking news items, and even sports and intertainment news. This was done in an effort to mislead the foldier into believing that these leaflets came from Germany and not from the Allied sources. (3) But despite a concerted effort by the **PWD** to pass these leaflets off as authentic German newspapers, most soldiers understood where they originated. (4) Nevertheless, there is much evidence that the news leaflets were preferred to any other type of propaganda, due in part to the fact that they did not overtly try to change the soldiers' mind. Instead they treated the reader as intelligent human being, who if given the correct information would act upon it.

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The effectiveness of news leaflets can be traced not to their barance, but to their ability to deliver news unavailable to many at-line soldiers. This conclusion is born out of the comments of U.S. 101st Airborne Division interrogator:

> The news that the troops get of the situation is from our propaganda leaflets which the P.W.'s are supposed to always be very anxious to get. He states that on having read them, most of them take the first opportunity to escape and desert. They are to believe everything that is in the leaflets. The only other source of information is through lectures by the unit commanders which are always highly colored and optimistic. (6)

In order to deliver up-to-the-minute news to German soldiers, the PWD's writing staff was on 24 hour call. Their job was to make a news leaflet not only informative, but also interesting. It was important above all that the contents of the leaflet be accurate. (7) But will use of blatant propaganda was discouraged, some facts were embellished. Unlike other leaflets, the news leaflet's task was not to call for action such as surrender, but to provide human interest stories and news items, which would indirectly cause the reader to question his role in the war. It must be kept in mind, on the other hand, that certain articles were written purely for propaganda purposes. To illustrate these aims this chapter will focus on four separate news leaflets. One of the main types of news leaflets, dropped on a daily ais was entitled Nachrichten fuer die Truppe (News for the **pops**) or "Nachrichten". Nachrichten was a "gray" leaflet (see **troduction**) published by the PWD from D-Day April 25, 1944 to **erman** capitulation on May 4, 1945. (8) Originally created to be **ted** in conjunction with operation OVERLORD, Nachrichten became **te** PWD's most successful widely distributed news leaflet, with **round** 500,000 copies dropped daily. In order to maintain the **mality** of the publication, the PWD employed a staff of around 25 **ditors**. (9) They were instructed to:

> ...provide German troops with an upto-date and detailed account of events on the German home front, about which they heard nothing - or at best, only half truths - on the official newsheets issued to them by trained propaganda teams. (10)

In addition to news of the homefront, *Nachrichten* gave information about Germany's military situation in the war, news otherwise unavailable. (11) The effectiveness of *Nachrichten* stemmed in part from its readers inability to distinguish factual from fictional accounts. This meant that *Nachrichten* was able to combine effectively unconfirmed subversive home land news with confirmed front-line information. (12) Therefore, when faced with the dilemma of what to believe, it proved easier for the soldier to accept a rumor as fact than to track it down.

*Nachrichten* received much of its success from maintaining a familiar format, which contained four distinct elements. The first was a leading article, which revealed how the Nazi Party was trying

prolong the war and destroy German values. (13) This article ally focused on current events in Germany. For example, the ture story of the July 21, 1944 issue carried the headline. enerale proklamieren Friedens-regierung" ("General proclaim a vernment of peace"). The background to this story was the July 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler's life. In order to make story more newsworthy, the PWD writers reported that Hitler ould soon be replaced because many Generals had called for a peace ettlement. This article's main point was that if a group of top **nking** generals were willing to stop fighting Germany must be osing the war. The PWD backed up their story on the generals with grent evidence about recent German defeats under the heading of, **Warum** es losgeht" ("Why it occurred"). This section gave the **German** soldiers seven concrete reasons why some of Hitler's eneral were calling for peace:

> (1) The Russian break through: the Soviet army advanced over 400 km in 4 weeks and is now only 15 km away from East Prussia. (2) The break through of the Atlantic Wall. The ever growing weapon capabilities of the Anglo-Americans. The casualties of the invasion: 130,000 German soldiers dead, missing and wounded, and over 60,000 imprisoned. (3) The break down and casualties in Italy. (4) Shortage of troops and artillery for a three front war. (5) The depletion of fuel resources. (6) The growing scarcity of ammunition on all of the fronts. (7) The break down of the air force and their inability to protect and defend the

#### the army and their country. (Appendix 2-A, author's translation)

ther lead articles related information about the home front: tallies cities that had recently been bombed, factories that could no figer produce needed equipment and areas that were now occupied the Allies. The intent was to convince the German soldier that e Nazi Regime was willing to prolong the war, even if it meant ertain death to the German people.

Another element featured in *Nachrichten*, located on page three of every issue, was detailed news about the home front. Page three often became the only link the German soldier had with news from the homefront. (14) An analysis of "Leaflet Operations in the Western European Theater", points out some of the subjects:

> The German soldier found startling and worrying news from home, suggesting the flagrant inequality in the sacrifices made by the man at the front and the leader at home, by the ordinary civilian and the party member. He learned about the scandals of reserved occupations, of the overworking of women, of conditions in children's camps, of "black marketing" in high quarters and of insincere and bombastic appeals for sacrifice by bosses and by wire-pullers hundreds of miles behind the front. (15)

Such information often confirmed the soldier's worst fears. This "voice from the homeland" featured a full range of topics, at least one of which was related to how the average German citizen was tected by the war. Other stories on this page included recent
torts of various cities, often describing the damage received by
lied bombing. For example, "Mitteldeutsches Industriegebiet
bombt" ("Middle Germany's Industrial Region Bombed") showed how
e German government was unable to stop recent Allied attacks on
teir factories:

## Factories are again without protection against Fighting Planes.

The people in the western, eastern, and southern parts of Germany again witnessed yesterday as thousands of bombs and Fighting Planes hit Germany, without German defence being able to do anything about it. (Appendix 2-C, author's translation)

This article goes on to lists the industries that were hit hardest by the bombs and stressed the importance of these industries to the German war effort. It gave concrete proof to a front-line soldier of Germany's depleting resources and inability to protect them.

The third element contained in all issues of *Nachrichten* was a **ipecial** feature section devoted to entertainment. This section **insured** that *Nachrichten* was not entirely propaganda. (16) It was **itso** intended to make the German soldiers homesick for the life that **they** had left behind. Regularly included in this section were sports **reports**, entertainment news and even songs. Perhaps the most **popular** item was the pin-up girl. To soldiers who had been denied contact with anyone outside of their own unit, these pin-up girls **represented** hope of returning home and seeing their loved ones. The **PWD** also thought that pin-up girls were good for morale, and **uded** them in an effort to endear the German soldier to the **chrichten** publication and to divert their attention from the war at **id.** The July 21, 1944, *Nachrichten* pin-up Else Knipschild was **ptioned**:

> Else Knipschild, Prima Ballerina of the Koeniglichen Opera in Copenhagen will perform next in Stockholm, where she now resides, after her daring escape from a Gestapo-prison in Copenhagen, with her one year old son. The beloved Dutch artist was held by the Gestapo after she was caught dancing the forbidden Ballet, "Soldier's Song", by Igor Stravinsky. (Appendix 2-C, author's translation)

The PWD hoped that the caption would anger German soldiers who the term of Nazi tyranny.

The forth and final characteristic of each Nachrichten leaflet was its commitment to bringing the German soldier up-to-theminute information about the different fronts, especially the Western front, where most of these news leaflets were dropped. These articles appeared on the front and back pages of the publication and presented a daily scorecard of Allied victories. (17) For example, on the back page of the July 21, 1944 issue of Nachrichten is an article entitled, "Keine Hilfe von aussen" ("No help from the outside"). It discussed the problems that German troops face when encircled:

> No more help comes from the outside, now that the whole German southern front has fallen back

towards the west. The encirclement has already caused the loss of artillery and fuel shortage. (Appendix 2-D, author's translation)

he rest of the article pointed out the danger the German troops here in. Such information lowered the soldiers morale, by showing im how much ground the German army was losing and emphasized hat it was only a matter of time until Germany lost the war.

Another example of a daily news leaflet was the one entitled oldaten-Nachrichten (Soldiers-News). Unlike Nachrichten, this new caflet was "white" propaganda (see Introduction), whose origin was cknowledged as, "The Royal Air Force and the U.S.A. Air Force". It was therefore especially important that Soldaten-Nachrichten be Because of this emphasis, Soldaten-Nachrichten avoided cliable. using the type of sensationalized stories, often found in the pages of Nachrichten. (18) Although Soldaten-Nachrichten began its publication earlier than Nachrichten, there is, however, no concrete evidence to suggest that Soldaten-Nachrichten was an early version However many of the problems associated with the of Nachrichten. former had been all but eliminated by the time Nachrichten appeared, indicating such a relationship. A study of the issues Soldaten-Nachrichten's dropped on Germany during December, 1943 reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the publication.

One of the strengths Soldaten-Nachrichten was with its thorough coverage of the German fighting fronts. For example, in the December 5, 1943 issue, an article entitled, "Ostfront" ("east front") **4** 1

**ntained** detailed news about the situation of the German army in

east:

During the past week, von Manstein's counter offensive on the Kiev salient has gained no new successes. The Russian encirclement of Toherkassy is drawing closer. All German attempts to break out have been thrown back with losses. The Russians have set up a new bridgehead across the lower course of the Pripet, and are threatening Moschir, the important traffic centre on the eastern border of the Pripet marshes. In White Russia the Russians have made important territorial gains in their advance on Rogatschev and Schlobin. (Appendix 2-E and 2-F)

This article, like similar articles which appeared in *Nachrichten*, painted a consistent picture of Allied success and German retreats. (19) Whether or not the German soldier believed every bit of this information was not important; the overall impact would be to slowly break down their will to resist. (20)

A second purpose of *Soldaten-Nachrichten* was to keep the German soldier informed of news other than at the front. Leading stories contained such information as: the performance of Allied weapons, meetings of the big three leaders and current bombing strategies of the Allies. (21) An example of the latter was in the December 5, 1943 issue, "Erneuter britischer Luftangriff auf Berlin", ("Renewed British air attacks on Berlin"). This article went on to explain that after a five day pause, the Allies once again began to bomb Berlin. The reasons behind this bombing were then stated: The British Minister for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, declared in Parliament: "Berlin is being systematically bombed because it is at the centre of 12 strategic railway lines. Berlin is the second largest inland harbour in Europe. In Berlin standor stood-the A.E.G., Rhein-Metall, Siements Schukert, Focke Wulf, Heinkel and Dornier Works. If I could choose only one target in Germany, it would certainly be <u>Berlin</u>. (Appendix 2-E and 2-F)

The impact of this article was strengthened by the inclusion of photographic evidence of bombing results, which often made the greatest impression on the German soldier. (22) The caption underneath a picture of Hamburg read:

> This is how Hamburg appeared after the Allied assault of July and August, 1943, where 9,500 Tons of Bombs were dropped. But in Berlin, around 13,000 Tons of bombs were dropped (during the same period) and (an additional) 7,000 Tons in November. (Appendix 2-E and 2-F, author's translation)

This picture implyed that if Hamburg could look like a rubble after 9,500 tons of bombs, Berlin must have suffered worse damage after more than 20,000 tons.

In addition, mixed with top stories of the day, *Soldaten-Nachrichten* often offered the reader a special look at how other soldiers were suffering in the war. These articles ranged from tallies of soldiers captured, wounded or dead to actual commentary aut the German soldier's sinking morale. They were especially
bective because they focused on the basic human drive to survive.
c) An article of this type appeared in the December 9, 1943,
c) Idaten-Nachrichten with the title, "Das Sinken der deutschen
c) iegsmoral" ("German War Moral is Sinking"). Cleverly placed under
c) ws of front-line conditions in Russia and on the southern front,
c) article focuses on the low morale of many German soldiers
c) the Russians:

General Weller, Commander of the Eighth Germany army fighting on the eastern front, has warned his troops against "Bolshevistic talk" and threatened severe punishments. Weller's special order runs as follows: "German soldiers now are making more irresponsible remarks than ever before. During the Poltava retreat. [,] German soldiers declared that they wished to lay down their arms, and, that after the loss of the Dnieper position, the war was lost in any case." (Appendix 2-G, 2-H and 2-I)

The thrust of this article was to confirm that it was natural to want to leave the war, and not sacrifice their lives.

Although Soldaten-Nachrichten was a credible news source, it was plagued with problems. The PWD writers often found it hard to find fresh news on a daily basis. The issue's of Soldaten-Nachrichten for December, 1943 demonstrate this problem. Coverage of the Teheran Conference was an obvious example. A least three separate issues (December 9, 10 and 11, 1943), carry an article entitled "Die Drei-Maechte Erklaerung" ("Declaration of the hree Powers") (Appendix 2-G, 2-H and 2-I is an example). This reticle dealt with the joint decision of Churchill, Stalin and coosevelt regarding the future of Germany and their plans for the par. In fact, the December 9, 1943 issue of *Soldaten-Nachrichten* sets the same format as a general leaflet of the same title dropped in German troops. (see Chapter 4, Appendix 4-K, 4-L and 4-M) Although repeating stories does not negate the message of the leaflet, it does show that leading stories were hard to find.

Another example which compromised the leaflet's credibility, was the use of the same photograph to illustrate two different events. A flagrant example of this is found in the December 14 and December 19, 1943 (Appendix 2-J) editions of Soldaten-Nachrichten. In the December 14 issue photograph of Allied fighter planes is printed with the caption, "Solche und aehnliche Maschines tragen zur Lahnmiegung des deutschen Verkehrs bei." ("These and similar planes have contributed to the paralysis of the German transportation system.") The caption of the same photograph in the December 19 issue reads, "Ein Verband amerikanischer Thunderbolts ueber Deutschland." ("A group of American Thunderbolts over Germany.") Although the location of these planes was not mentioned, the obvious repetition of the picture undermined the impact on German soldier who relied on Soldaten-Nachrichten.

The PWD also published a number of weekly news leaflets throughout the war. Perhaps the most famous of these was the "white" publication (see Introduction) entitled, *Frontpost*, produced and published in field conditions by the 12th U.S. Army. (24) In fact, early issues were quite frank: "The purpose of '*Frontpost*' is simple; persuade you, German soldiers, to cease fighting." This statement
mas negative. (25) Later issues, like the two included in the
ippendix, avoided outright mention of their purpose and instead
imphasized that the leaflet was a weekly publication for German
iddiers. Frontpost was used on all of the fronts, but was especially
iffective in the Mediterranean Theater. A report entitled,
iffective in the Mediterranean Theater. Theater," confirmed
itematical that Frontpost was the most valued item of propaganda received on
itematical that the states in Italy:

For many, the news on bombing of their home towns as they got from reading *Frontpost*, was the final reason for being fed up with the war. When more and more of Germany fell into the hands of her enemies, men learned only from Allied news leaflets about the capture of their home town. This was for many the final indication that they could give up without fear of retaliation on their families by the German public. (26)

The report indicated that most German soldiers from the Mediterranean theater who were captured and interrogated between 1943-45, listed *Frontpost* as their reason for exiting the war. (27) Overall, *Frontpost* can be described as the most effective weekly news leaflet produced by the PWD during the war.

Unlike daily news leaflets, weekly publications like *Frontpost* were not plagued by the necessity of getting up-to-the-minute news to the soldier. For this reason PWD writers could be more selective ewhat they included in these publications. For example, later itions of the *Frontpost* (April 10, 1945) spent an entire issue on a single topic of how one surrenders. (see Chapter 3, Surrender iflets) (28) However, most *Frontpost* publications talked imarily about what was happening in the war. Their articles, like isse in daily news leaflets, usually concentrated on the different iont and how the German army was faring. For example, a *Frontpost* ated from December 22, 1943 included a lead story on the Russian dvance entitled, "Dreifacher russischer Durchbruch", ("Threefold new] Russian breaks-through"). This article reports that:

> Russian "Winter Armies" Take Up Position. On December 21st, the German News Agency reported that the bridgehead of Kherson, on the Dnieper estuary, had been captured by the Russians. On December 20th, the OKW reported further Russian penetration attacks north and south of Nevel and hard fighting near Kirovagrad, 30 kilometres south west of Znamenka, which the Russians had captured a week earlier. (Appendix 2-K and 2-L)

This article played on German fears of Russian invasion of German territory. (29) The article included a detailed map showing exactly where the Russian armies had penetrated, giving the German soldier an even clearer assessment of the situation.

Issues of the *Frontpost* also regularly contained articles about world news as well as information about the home front. World news articles were intended to inform the German soldier of how e war was affecting other nations, such as the December, 22, 1943 sue of *Frontpost* which included information about the current ilitary position of Japan. This was especially important, as Japan d Germany were allies during the war. An article entitled, lapan's Heimatwaesser bedroht", ("Japans Inner Sea Threatened"), esents evidence that Japan was not doing well:

> The counter-offensive of the American forces against the Gilbert Islands is a danger thrust directly in our inner sea. States Toyko Radio These operations are an important part in the circle of the enemy's general counter-offensive against Japan. (Appendix 2-M and 2-N)

At the same time, *Frontpost* offered in many of their issues a **feature** entitled "Nachrichten aus der Heimat", ("News from Home"). This section received high acclaim from soldiers, who heard little **about** their loved ones left behind. Usually the news contained in **this** section showed the bleak situation that Germans citizens faced from their government. (30) For example, one article in the **December 8** issue focuses on the forced mobilization of women in Essen, a town located on the Ruhr River, for defense purposes:

Mobilization of women: The National Zeitung [newspaper] of Essen reports that the Essen Labour Office has issued its fourth call up of women, who, since June 1st, have been liable for registration for defense tasks. The paper says that this fourth summons is necessary because some women have taken advantage of the confusion caused by raids to avoid registering. (Appendix 2-Q and 2-R)

is article had a two-fold effect on the reader. First, it monstrated that Germany was in such a weakened position because Allied raids that women were now being forced to participate in e war. At the same time, this article provided the reader with a impse at how his loved ones were being treated by an sympathetic government, willing to sacrifice its citizens for eir own needs.

Finally, it is important to mention the bi-weekly news leaflet eldpost in same context as the leaflet Frontpost. Feldpost was the **PWD**'s abridged version of *Frontpost*. Most of *Feldpost's* stories rere taken directly from the pages of Frontpost. (31) Like Frontpost, Feldpost (Appendix 2-S, 2-T, 2-U and 2-V and 2-W, 2-X, 2-Y and 2-Z) was "white" propaganda presented to the German soldiers as, "Herausgegeben von der Amerikanishen Armee in Westeuropa". ("Published by the United States Army in western Europe.") The first and fifth issues of April, 1945 will serve as an example of this publication. All Feldpost's followed a similar First of all, the front page of every issue featured a fullformat. page article, that usually focused on how the Allies were winning the war. In the first April, 1945 issue of *Feldpost* the top story deals with the encirclement of the Ruhr, the industrial center of Germany which has almost been overrun:

> German attempts to break out, were beaten back with high losses for the Germans. British troops have just

about cleared Muenster. They captured Rheine and stand just short off Osnabrueck. According to front dispatches, the Germans have started to evacuate Holland. A new Allied advance into Holland threatenes to cut off the German routes of retreat... (Appendix 2-S and 2-T)

**tuded** in the body of this article is a detailed map of the Ruhr **tion**, which indicated that Allied troops were in a position to **troy** Germany's industrial capabilities. The map also offers a **tr** picture of areas (highlighted in white on the map) currently **ter** Allied control. This gives the German soldier solid evidence **t** Germany is close to losing the war.

Finally, the back page of every *Feldpost* contained news about war, the home-front and the world. These main goal of these **ticles** was to give the reader a quick glance at how Germany was **bing**. Their are a number of examples of this type of article in fifth april issue of 1945 (Appendix 2-W, 2-X, 2-Y and 2-Z) found under the heading, "Zeichen des Zusammenbruch's" ("Signs of Collapse"):

> General Von Erzleben stopped some 16 year old members of the Hitler Youth and brought them to the next army barracks. At three o'clock of the same day they were sent to the front. By five o'clock they were already taken prisoner. (Appendix 2-Y and 2-Z)

Another example found the first April issue of 1945, contained an excerpt from a German officer's diary which indicates that the morale of German officers is low:

1. 14. 45: The world is coming to an end! In the east, the winter offensive has now broken loose - now we are bound to collapse. This war can no longer be won. It is just a senseless murder - it is a crime. (Appendix 2-U and 2-V)

In conclusion, the effectiveness of the PWD's news leaflet **frations** stemmed from their ability to deliver up-to-the-minute **ws** to the German troops. The news leaflet filled a void in the **idier**'s life and offered him an independent source of information **out** what was happening in the world outside of his unit on a gular basis. (32) Without news leaflets like *Nachrichten*, **bidaten-Nachrichten**, Frontpost and Feldpost, many German soldiers **ould** have had a much limited view of the war.

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(4)	Ibid, File: Army File, Hollander, Richard, Box:	4.
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c 28)	Ibid.	
<b>29</b> )	Ibid, File: Cairo-Algiers (1), Box: 3.	
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91)	Ibid.	
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## Chapter 3 Surrender Leaflets

The surrender leaflet was another important part of the ychological warfare campaign against Germany. Its message was simple one: the enemy soldier should lay down his arms and give "the fight. Martin F. Herz, one of the chief leaflet writers of the WD, explained the philosophy of the surrender leaflet as follows:

> In addressing appeals for surrender to enemy soldiers it is desirable to provide plausible rationalization for action it is desired the audience should take. (1)

For most soldiers there was a need to supply an excuse for urrendering that would not make them feel guilty about their actions. Soldiers also needed to be reassured that they would be treated well as prisoners of war. Therefore, the chief job of all surrender leaflets was to create an attractive but realistic depiction of surrender. This chapter will focus on surrender leaflets dropped on German troops between 1942-1945.

Before a surrender leaflet could be successfully written, it was imperative that a definition of surrender be established because it could take on many different forms. Martin F. Herz outlined the three forms of surrender which most soldiers undertook: desertion, surrender, and capture. Desertion required that a soldier voluntarily remove himself from a situation which he believed dangerous. A soldier who deserted was labeled a coward and often received harsh punishment if caught in the act. Surrender, on the other hand,

ined the soldier's honor. It usually occurred at a low point in the ster's morale and was considered a spur of the moment decision, a soldier often later regretted having made. Finally, the soldier **b** was captured not only retained his honor, but was guilt free but his actions. Most soldiers preferred to be captured because was an involuntary action carried out by the Allies who forced soldier to comply with their wishes, not his own. (2) The PWD **termined** that a soldier felt most secure about surrendering when e imaged it as the result of actions he was unable to control. Thus. caflets must present surrender as an involuntary act. Prisoner of war reports, such as one filed in November of 1944, confirmed the WD findings. When asked why they had been captured, most **soldiers** replied in one of two ways: they had been overwhelmed by Allied superiority and were captured in their troop's retreat or they had been sold out by their officer and their own cowardly nature. (3) By incorporating these findings into the surrender leaflets, the PWD was able to create a leaflet which gave the soldier a way to exit from an unpleasant situation.

In its efforts to write a successful surrender leaflet, the PWD sought to discover the main excuses which soldiers used when surrendering. The only method readily available to obtain this information was to consult interrogations of prisoners of war. For that reason, the PWD set up a system of collaboration between their writers and prisoner interrogators. (4) These interrogators asked individual soldiers their reason for surrender. (5) The most typical excuse gleaned from a series of interrogation reports filed with the PWD in late 1944 and early 1945 was Allied military superiority. (6) apprisoners of war believed that the Allies had more advanced
appons than Germany, and that continued fighting would only
appriate ourage harsher retaliation on the Allies' part. Such insights were
approrated in a leaflet entitled, "One Minute that Might Save Your
a. (Appendix 3-A) This leaflet gave the enemy soldier six
berent reasons why surrender was the best way to remain alive.
best second reason used Allied superiority to emphasize the
apprative nature of the decision:

2. With the collapse in the West, North and Southeast the decision had been reached: Germany has lost the war. (Appendix 3-A)

This statement undermined the soldier's morale in two ways: by stressing that the Allies were winning and by stating that since Germany had already lost the war, continued fighting was futile. Besides Allied superiority, German soldiers cited several other reasons for surrender such as: that they had been cut off and forced to surrender; that in retreat they had fallen behind; and that they had lost their will to resist and allowed Allied soldiers to take them over. (7) An example of this reasoning is found in the leaflet entitled "To German Units Separated from their Command,":

> German soldiers who are cut off and separated from their units as well as separated from their higher echelons, are to give themselves up to the nearest Allied unit. (Appendix 3-I)

**Incorporating rational arguments into their surrender leaflets, PWD transformed them into an even more powerful persuasive ce**.

The content of the surrender leaflet was dictated by a dard format required of most leaflets and radio broadcasts to are to for the purpose of clarity and conformity to PWD delines. The following questions outline that format:

- (1) What to do and how to do it ?
- (2) What would happen to them if they obeyed instructions?
- (3) Why they should obey? (8)

conforming to these requirements, the surrender leaflet embodied clear and exact argument which enabled the vulnerable German Idier to understand what laying down his arms really entailed.

First, a surrender leaflet provided the enemy soldier with etailed instructions so that his intent was understood by the Allied nit to which he surrendered. Most surrender leaflets followed the bove mentioned format, for example "What is to be done?" (Appendix 3-B), "Verhaltungsregeln" ("Rules of Conduct", Appendix 3-J and 3-K) or "Rettung" ("Safety", Appendix 3-C and 3-D). The first point made by all of these leaflets was that an individual soldier's actions were different than those of a group. This point was crucial because, according to the Hague Convention, a group was required to surrender in military fashion which meant that they surrendered through the actions of their commanding officer who was required to raise a white flag and report to the nearest Allied officer or command post. On the other hand, an individual (or group of fewer **5** persons) was to disarm himself, raise his hands, and turn self over to the nearest Allied soldier. Such action was far less mal than group surrender. Often a leaflet would specify that a dier "do nothing" and instead wait for Allied troops to come and t him. Many leaflets inserted the line, "Stay where you are, and will pick you up on the way." (9) This argument was effective tause most soldiers feared being labeled deserters and found liting for capture to be more appealing. It was important to clude detailed information in surrender leaflets, because the terman soldier considered surrender to be a more honorable action if by were under the impression that specific rules were involved in he's conduct.

Most leaflets also explicitly explained how a soldier should ppear physically when surrendering.

YOU CAN SURRENDER, BY RAISING your arms, approaching the Allies and crying ,"Ei Soerrender." Make it quite plain that you are giving up. Take off helmet, web equipement. Wave a handkerchief or leaflet. (Appendix 3-C and 3-D)

Such information was intended to put the soldier's mind at ease and create a positive attitude towards surrender. The PWD also consulted Allied soldiers about what they considered to be a friendly physical appearance. It was because of such inquiries that the request for helmets to be removed was included in the leaflet. Since the German helmet was easy to recognize, Allied soldiers tended to shoot first and ask questions later. (10) Leaflets also warned enemy **diers** that they needed to demonstrate clearly that they were **rendering**. For example in "Rettung", it was stated:

Make it unmistakably clear you are quitting, Fanatics who fight on despite their hopeless situation, are lost. (Appendix 3-C and 3-D)

nother method employed by the PWD to help a German soldier feel anfident was to make sure that he understood how to say the words "Surrender" to his enemy. For that reason, most surrender leaflets and the phonetic spelling of "I Surrender" or "Ei Soerrender". Inowing that he would be understood built the German's confidence ecause it insured that misunderstanding of his accent would not be the cause of his death. (11)

The second question answered in the body of the leaflet was what would occur if the soldier decided to obey the Allied request to surrender. This information alleviated the fear about the consequences of surrendering. Since the beginning of the the war, the German high command had cautioned that Allied propaganda should not be trusted. In fact, Joseph Goebbels, who was the propaganda minister of Germany, was quoted as saying:

> It ought to be below our dignity to read what these enemy leaflets say. These leaflets are weapons and we must be careful with all weapons. (12)

For this reason, ranking officers of the German army spread rumors about Allied treatment of prisoners, in order to combat the effect of Allied propaganda. Perhaps most damaging to PWD operations was rumor that the Allies did not take prisoners, implying that upon ture soldiers were shot, no questions asked. (13) Therefore, it tame essential that the contents of the leaflets emphasize the h about how the Allies treated their prisoners of war.

To insure that such rumors were undermined, most surrender flets contained a section called, "Behandlung von Kriegsfangenen" ("Treatment of Prisoners-of-War", Appendix 3-B and pendix 3-F). This section assured the soldier that he would be fated well, because fair treatment was guaranteed by the Geneva envention. The following is a typical list of what was included:

> 1. IMMEDIATE REMOVAL from the battle zone Base camps are ready to receive you. 2. DECENT TREATMENT. according to the Geneva Convention, you are treated like soldiers. 3. GOOD FOOD. you receive the same nourishment as we, the best-fed army in the world. 4. HOSPITAL CARE. your wounded and sick are treated just like our own. 5. MAIL CONNECTION. You can write four postcards and four letters home per man per month. 6. RETURN HOME. after the war you are returned home as soon as possible. (Appendix 3-G and 3-H)

Each of these promises were included to reassure that surrender was the correct choice. Even so, many soldiers were skeptical about whether they should believe the contents of the leaflets. One German soldier commented in his interrogation that: Enemy propaganda is quite a proposition. In the region of Metz we found some leaflets, discussed them, and laughed about them. We said to ourselvessomething maybe true about them. It is, of course, known that treatment of prisoners of war is descent, but certainly we would not believe everything in these leaflets. It did turn out in the end, however, that everything was in fact quite true. - Sturman S.S. Div. Gitz v. Berlichingen (14)

owards the end of the war, the PWD realized that fewer soldiers rere surrendering than previously. An investigation determined that rumor was spreading that because the war was drawing to a close, ose who continued to fight for the Axis cause would be first to be ent home. Later surrender leaflets addressed this rumor by serting the fact that all soldiers would be made prisoner of war refore returning home. (15) Thus, as in all leaflets the purpose was o alleviate the fears a soldier might have in saying the two words, "I Surrender."

Finally, every surrender leaflet answered the question of why a soldier should obey the Allied command to surrender. The most prominent argument employed by the PWD was that to surrender insured life over death. This argument played on a soldier's worst fear, that death was just around the corner. Most soldiers had everything to live for. They had left behind families and loved ones who lives would be devastated by their death. An excellent example of a leaflet which emphasized this fear is one entitled "Two Words that Saved 950,000 Lives" (Appendix 3-F) which explained that the oldier had two choices: surrender or death. Naturally, the two ords that a soldier needed to remember in order to live were, "I herrender." The leaflet argued that the soldier who surrendered bined the ranks of 950,000 other prisoners who were now in safety and emphasized that these prisoners were now assured of seeing heir homes and families again. The argument concluded:

> For you also TWO WORDS show the road home TWO WORDS: "Ei Soerrender" (Appendix 3-F)

à.

Later versions of this leaflet increased the number of men who had surrendered to 1,000,000 (Appendix 3-E). Another leaflet which emphasized the appeal of life over death was more blunt in its message:

> Why die in the last days of the war? STOP FIGHTING (Appendix 3-C and 3-D)

This leaflet also argued that since Germany had already lost the war, the soldier should realize that his death would not be able to change Germany's defeat into victory. Each of these leaflets was effective in providing the soldier with an excuse for getting out of the war.

A type of surrender leaflet which achieved fame on its own the Passierschein or in English, the safe conduct pass. The safe conduct pass must be examined separately ppendix 3-L) cause of the unique role it played in the PWD's leaflet operations. est of all, this leaflet differed from other surrender leaflets in its mat. Each safe conduct pass carried a message of surrender **hitten** in both German and English to convince the enemy soldier at if he saved this leaflet, no misunderstanding of his intent to rrender would occur. This leaflet resembled an official document, paring the stamps of both the British and United States Army, hich made its message seem even more important. Safe conduct esses were also inscribed with either General Eisenhower's ignature or the signature of the commander of the army unit which The PWD believed that if the Passierschein appeared ent them. official, a soldier would be more likely to act upon the call to urrender and that because soldiers were trained to obeying orders they might find it easier to lay down their arms if the Allies commanded them to do so. One historical account commented that the safe conduct pass accomplished its appearance of authority so effectively that it looked more like a college diploma than a propaganda leaflet. (16).

The power of the *Passierschein* is evident from the numbers of soldiers who carried one to insure good treatment if captured. A study released in September, 1945 examined the effects of Allied propaganda on enemy soldiers and concluded this about safe conduct passes: 63

The effectiveness of propaganda is also partly expressed in the percentage of German soldiers carrying safe conduct leaflets on them when surrendering. For it is safe to say that most men who keep these leaflets do so in the belief that they will get captured sooner or later and that they will then be treated better by showing the safe conduct. (17)

**b**other indication of the *Passierschein's* power was seen in the fear created among German officials. This fear manifested itself in any different ways. An excellent example comes in the form of a **b**ck version of the *Passierschein* produced by the German ropaganda team. This counter-propaganda attempted to show the erman that his act of surrender was one of disloyalty to his bountry:

> The German soldier who carries this safe conduct passage is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to go into captivity for the next ten years, to betray his fatherland, to return home a broken old man and very probably never see his parents, wife and children again. (18)

Like the *Passierschein* the German's printed their message in both German and English, with General Eisenhower's signature appearing below the text. This tactic did not work, because most German soldiers believed that a safe conduct pass was the ticket to good treatment if captured. In fact, these leaflets became the rage on the front lines of enemy divisions. Often if a soldier possessed more

n one he sold them to other less fortunate soldiers. The price usually 100 Reichsmark and because of their popularity ckmarket printing of these leaflets was not unknown. (19) In **t**, a form of the safe conduct was used during the Korean War, ere it achieved similar successes. (20) As in the case of other rrender leaflets, the PWD was always looking for a way to **prove** the *Passierschein*. When a number of prisoner's of war mplained that they had not been able to find one, PWD writers ded information so that more than one soldier could use a pass. In short, the safe conduct pass exemplified the power of single **prrender** leaflets to exploit the vulnerabilities of enemy soldiers. k. The ultimate effectiveness of surrender leaflet operations emmed from the PWD's ability to judge when and where to use One reason that the surrender leaflet was so effective was hem. flexibility. This leaflet could easily be pre-printed, because the nessage of surrender was timeless. To meet the demands placed on eaflet operations, a message of surrender was often printed on one tide of a leaflet and the reverse side was later printed with war information. Usually news was chosen which would reinforce the message of surrender by providing evidence of problems in the German war machine. (22) It was important that a surrender message be backed up with news about Allied success, in order to show the enemy soldier that surrender was his only option. Another reason why the leaflets worked so well was that they were chiefly used on front line enemy troops whose morale was already vulnerable because of Allied victories. They were especially effective if these soldiers were in retreat and often a carefully

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anned leaflet was all it took to put a soldier over the edge when side was losing. (23) The PWD considered that if a soldier read leaflet, it was a success whether he surrendered or not. They sued that even if the soldier chose not to act, his morale was fected by the message. Therefore, much of the success of the rrender leaflet lay in the ability of the PWD to get the message to many soldiers as possible.

The success rate of the surrender leaflets was often cited as example of the effectiveness of Allied propaganda. The PWD **teasured** this success from the only two sources readily available them: interrogations of prisoners of war and captured enemy ocuments. (24) As already stated, these sources were not afallible, but they did give the PWD something to work with. **Perhaps** the most valuable measure of a leaflet's success was how **many** soldiers possessed one or more when captured. In fact, the **PWD's Weekly Intelligence Summaries of early 1945 usually** contained a running total of how many recently captured soldiers possessed surrender leaflets One such report estimated that 50%of the some 450 prisoners captured between February 25 and March 2 of that year had seen some form of surrender leaflet (25), a staggering number since the typical ratio of leaflets to soldiers was 1:6. (26) It can therefore be safely assumed that most of these soldiers had come in contact with a surrender leaflets earlier than 1945. It must be noted that this may be attributed to the fact that these figures were gathered at a later stage in the war. That they could later recall having seen a leaflet indicated that the PWD was accomplishing its mission of demoralizing the German army.

nother report mentioned that many soldiers wanted the leaflets so
ndly that they hide them in their shoes, although the the penalty in
re German army for being caught with Allied propaganda was death.
17) It is, however possible that many of these soldiers may have
nly wanted the leaflets as souvenirs. But whether the soldier kept
ne leaflets as a souvenirs or as guides for future actions does not
regate their importance.

In conclusion, the surrender leaflet was an effective part of he psychological warfare operations conducted by the Allies in the European theater during World War II. Its message worked because he PWD was able to correctly judge what a soldier needed to hear in order to be persuaded to surrender. After reading an argument which put surrender in a positive light, many enemy soldiers left the front lines and entered prisoner of war camps. The exact number of soldiers who were directly effected by the surrender leaflets may never be known and it is not important whether the leaflets were the deciding factor in a soldier's decision to stop. Perhaps C.D. Jackson, the civilian head of psychological warfare operations, best explained the surrender leaflets value when he said:

> We started from scratch in a game we knew nothing about. But enough evidence is now in to show that honest propaganda is as deadly as a bomber raid. And we are saving lives of American soldiers, for every enemy who surrenders with one of our pamphlets in his hand is one less to shoot at our boys along the front. (28)

success of the surrender leaflets can be measured in terms of that percents and numbers. Even one less enemy soldier or one re prisoner of war is important in terms of saving human lives, on h sides of the struggle.

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#### Chapter 4 General Leaflets

Previous chapters have focused on the three main types of lets which the PWD produced during World War II: civilian lets, news leaflets and surrender leaflets. Although these lets comprised the major portion of the PWD's operations, there re a number of leaflets which did not directly fit into any of let categories. These general leaflets were used primarily in sjunction with other PWD leaflet operations and played an portant part in the PWD's overall plan because they set up vorable conditions for future propaganda efforts. (1) Therefore, general leaflet's main goal was to break down the Germans' will resist by creating an atmosphere of distrust and disloyalty.

The PWD did not expect immediate results from the general aflet's as they did from the other types. General leaflets were attended to have long term effects on the reader. The PWD hoped hat constant exposure to their propaganda would slowly reduce the resistance level of even the most loyal Germans and cause them to reevaluate their position in the war. (2) In some cases the general leaflet's job was to pave the way for future leaflet operations. Because of this unique role, general leaflets are often not mentioned separately in PWD leaflet evaluations. Their success rate could not be effectively measured without reference to other propaganda for which they provided preparation. (3) Their job was not to encourage such actions as desertion or surrender, but to communicate specific information about the Allied war effort. One example was a leaflet operation just before D-Day designed to introduce this offensive. ring the weeks prior to the invasion, Allied aircraft disseminated out 20,000,000 leaflets which established who they were and hat the future would hold under Allied rule. (4) Although the PWD lized that these leaflets could not replace weapons, they believed at their propaganda would contribute to defeatism in Germany. his chapter will focus on three types of these general leaflets.

The first major type of general leaflet focused on attacking berman leaders. Their primary goal was to undermine both the oldier's and the civilian's confidence in the Nazi Party's ability to win the war. The Nazi party drew its power from people whose habit of obedience allowed them to continue a lost war. (5) Before propaganda which urged soldiers and civilians to end resistance could become effective, the PWD had to weaken the control that the Nazi government had over its people. (6) Therefore, they commissioned their writers to create a series of leaflets that fostered mental resistance to Nazi control.

This type of general leaflet focused on personal attacks on Hitler's ability as a leader and his willingness to sacrifice the German people for his own selfish causes. Hitler was not an easy target for the PWD to attack because of the hold that he had over the German public. Many Germans still saw him as the able leader who had brought Germany out of the depression. But as the war progressed and Germany suffered obvious defeats, Hitler's popularity began to wane. (7) An excellent example of how the PWD used a leaflet to exploit Hitler's failing popularity, is a leaflet entitled, "Es tut mir leid, dass ich nichts Nuetzlicheres schaffen kann...", ("I regret that I cannot do anything more useful...", Appendix 4-A and 4a quote from Hitler. This leaflet used Hitler's own words to be that he had lied to the German people. The back of the leaflet bed excerpts from a November, 8, 1943 speech in which Hitler a positive picture of the war. Under Hitler's statements the D writers inserted facts which painted an obviously different ture:

> "What difference does it make to us anyhow, if we have to give up once a few miles, or even a few hundred miles..."

> > On November 6, the Russians conquered Kiev. The German losses in the battle of Kiev amounted to 15,000 dead and 6,200 captured.

"I rejoice that the Almighty has granted us such enormous successes. It could as well have been just the other way around - That the war would have spread on to German soil."

From January, 1943, till October, 1943, far more than 100.000 tons of bombs were dropped on Germany. (Appendix 4-A and 4-B)

By drawing attention to loss of territory and destruction of **property**, facts that Hitler attempted to conceal, these leaflets **planted** the seeds of distrust. (8)

Another way in which these leaflets promoted distrust of German leadership was by attacking the Nazi party as a whole. Chief leaflet writer Martin Herz argued that to destroy Hitler did not

ecessarily mean that Germany was defeated. Hitler was only one ember of the Nazi war machine. Herz commented that only by ttacking the inadequacies of the Nazi system, would the Allies be ssured of total defeat of Fascism. (9) One way to attack the Nazi arty directly was to provide evidence of dissent among its cadership. An excellent example of this dissent was the July 20, 944 attempted assassination of Hitler which immediately became a **focal** point for Allied propaganda. The leaflet entitled "Eine Kleine Clique" ("A Small Clique", Appendix 4-C and 4-D) focused on the discontent behind this attempted overthrow. "Eine Kleine Clique" was a play on Hitler's July 20-21 radio broadcast where he insisted that only a small insignificant group of officers were involved in the putsch. (10) The PWD used this leaflet to inform the German public **about** why the putsch occurred and to identify the group of generals who had attempted to end the war. Among the names that appeared on the leaflet were such top military leaders as Field Marshall Erich v. Witzleben, commander-in-chief of the Reserve Army, and General Ludwig Beck, former Chief of the General Staff. As yet, Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's involvement was not known. Later evidence surfaced which linked Rommel to the attempt, but because of his popularity, Hitler thought it wise to allow him to commit suicide and have an official funeral. (11) But enough prominent officers were named to prove that the attack was not by a small group of insignificant individuals:

> Is that a "small clique"? Are they "irresponsible"? In any event, the above list of generals is one of

Wehrmacht officers who think differently, in military matters, from the political leadership. The "small clique" insisted that Germany must immediately end the war. (Appendix 4-C and 4-D)

back of the leaflet reported the obvious division among Nazi ders concerning Germany's position in the war. It was from this ision that the attempt on Hitler's life came:

> It is clear that there are only two sides in Germany now: The side of the war-prolongers and the side of the peace-hasteners. (Appendix 4-C and 4-D)

ine Kleine Clique" provided the German audience with evidence that important part of the Nazi leadership realized that the war was at and that it was useless to continue to fight. (12) The PWD also ted this situation to show that the German public now faced a milar decision of ending or prolonging the war. But unlike the pinion of generals who could be fired and rehired by the tovernment, the opinion of the public was crucial to the Nazis winning:

> In the end it is up to yourself, however, whether you make your own peace or get pulled down into the defeat of the regime. Your life is in your own hand. And with it, the future of Germany. For Germany will need you after the war. (Appendix 4-E and 4-F)

is message called for no particular action on the part of German iders. Instead it fostered mistrust of Nazi leadership and couraged German citizens not to be victimized by their overnment.

The second type of general leaflet produced by the PWD esented German soldiers with the truth about the war. The Nazi overnment was notorious for keeping information from the **lehr**macht. Although these men experienced the brutality of war est hand, many of them knew little about how Germany was etually doing in the conflict. Wehrmacht officers were in fact, acouraged by the Nazi officials to tell lies about German victories a order to keep the fighting morale of the soldiers high. (13) The WD recognized that by giving German soldiers access to the truth, many of them would become disillusioned with the war. Even those who stayed loyal to the cause would not be unaffected with Allied propaganda. (14) One German captain recognized the important effect that Allied leaflets had on his men, whether or not they believed the content:

> Your propaganda was disastrous. Even the little *Flugblaetter* (leaflets). After you read them you imagined you read the truth, that our government was lying to us. I felt like blowing out my brains. It was difficult to keep my men from reading the leaflets because they were everywhere. (15)

us, the goal of these general leaflets was to suggest to the idiers a series of reasons why they should feel betrayed by their vernment.

An approach often used in this type of general leaflet was **posing** the true nature of the German war machine by means of **omparison** to the Allies. The PWD realized that the Nazi **overnment** had concealed German weapon inferiority from their **en**. The leaflet "Die Wahrheit", ("The Truth", Appendix 4-G and 4-), for example focused on evidence of Allied air superiority, **ontradicted** Nazi leaders who had often bragged about Germany's **uperior** air power. (16) By demonstrating that it was only a matter **of** time until Germany would be destroyed by bombing, this leaflet **temoved** a source of comfort to many of their soldiers:

> Every letter and every newspaper from home shows that Germany can no longer be protected against the ever heavier air offensive which is smashing Hitler's war industry to smithereens. But all this is not much more than the beginning. THE ALLIED AIR SUPERIORITY GROWS GREATER DAY BY DAY. (Appendix 4-H)

General leaflets also commented on how the Nazis had lied to German soldiers about their country's industrial potential for producing weapons. These leaflets argued that, without factories to produce weapons, the soldiers' hope for promised reinforcements was bleak. (17) An example of this type of leaflet is "What are you still defending?": Germany factory plants, power-houses, railway stations, blast furnaces - the whole industrial machine that is supposed to supply the German soldiers with weapons now, and with a career and livelihood after the war is being smashed from both the west and the south. (Appendix 4-I)

This leaflet's job was to convince the soldier that the government's reapon arsenal was not only low, but was being systematically restroyed by Allied bombs. "What are you still defending?" also included a map depicting the magnitude of Allied air power with a caption reading, "600,000 kilo of bombs, on an average, are dropped on Germany every day." The other side of this leaflet entitled, " 'Zeit Gewinnen' - Wozu?" (" 'Gaining Time' - What for?", Appendix 4-I) gave examples of daily German losses due to Allied superiority. One of the facts focused on increased Allied aircraft production:

#### Every Day of War

increases the United Nations' superiority in material. England and America alone are now building four times as many aircraft as Germany. (Appendix 4-I)

Another point compared the Allies ability to replenish quickly frontline causalities, with Germany's inability to do the same:

Every Day of War

thousands of young Germans are being killed or permanently crippled on the Eastern Front. In each new German age-class there are 600,000 men, in each new Russian age-class two millions. (Appendix 4-I)

ch facts proved an obvious Allied military advantage in the war. Another successful approach in these leaflets was to give
diers a list of different items about which the Nazis had lied.
he PWD attempted to reinforce the soldier's fear of being
herificed in a hopeless war. "What is concealed from the German
bldier" (Appendix 4-J), is this sort of leaflet. It argued that the
fazis had concealed the casualties that the German army had
hered:

> 1. German War Casualties: In the first world war Germany lost 2,400,000 men killed and missing. At regular intervals the Kaiser's government published full nominal lists of the fallen. In this war Germany has lost far more than last time. But Hitler's government publishes no lists. (Appendix 4-J)

The soldier is then asked to question why such information has been intentionally kept from him. The reverse side of the leaflet, with a headline reading, "What can't be concealed from the German soldier," attempts to answer this question. Listed are six different facts that each soldier should now observe for himself:

The foreigners in the German army
 The failure of the German Luftwaffe
 Allied supremacy in artillery
 The failure of German U-boots
 The break-up of German family life
 The loss of the Ukraine
 (Appendix 4-J)

**his** list suggested to the soldiers that the government has made a **bit** of lying to them by obscuring the fact that loss of family, **untry** and home was inevitable. For example, the Nazi government **as** not beyond sacrificing German family life in an attempt to win **bit** war. This leaflet called for the soldier to recognize the dangers **at** his loved ones faced in the war:

#### The break-up of German family life:

In letters from home the German soldier reads how his womenfolk and parents are being packed off into arms factories, to work and live under perpetual air raids, whilst his children are housed with strangers. (Appendix 4-J)

The final type of general leaflet was used by the PWD to relate Allied plans for the future of Germany. These leaflets, which were primarily disseminated toward the end of the war, had two main objectives. (18) First, they were intended to condition Germans to accept Allied victory by providing evidence to the reader that the war was lost. (19) In the second place, these leaflets were used to relate information about the future Allied military takeover. (20) The PWD informed civilians and soldiers about how the Allied government planned to treat Germany in order to forge an important link between the Allies and the German public, whose mutual cooperation was necessary for a smooth ending to the war.

In reaching the first objective, there were many ways in which PWD writers could package this evidence. A method often used was 80

pping leaflets which contained official releases of the Allied ernment's position on the outcome of the war. These leaflets, ich emphasized that the Allied government had made it their nion to win the war, usually contained statements from one or of the big three leaders: Franklin D. Roosevelt, J.V. Stalin and nston S. Churchill. (21) Such quotes gave these leaflets an air of thority, and showed the reader that the message contained within an important one. The leaflet "Die Drei-Maechte Erklaerung" Declaration of the Three Powers", Appendix 4-K, 4-L and 4-M) is an ample of this type. It contains a statement of the three leaders ned at Teheran on December 1, 1943. The following excerpt from is statement but explains the Allied plan for victory:

> As to war -- our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reach complete agreement as to the scope and time of the operations to be undertaken from the East, West and South. The common understanding which we have reached guarantees that victory will be ours. (Appendix 4-K, 4-L and 4-M)

This message stated the determination of the Allied leadership to win the war and futility of continued fighting on the part of Germany.

Another technique employed by the PWD was providing concrete examples of why Germany could not possible win the war. (22) The PWD incorporated this approach by giving readers rmation about Allied victories and German defeats. An example ruch a leaflet is, "DIE LAGE...am 24. Maerz 1945" ("The rition...on 24th March, 1945", Appendix 4-N and 4-O) which relates formation about what areas had already been captured or would be mediately occupied:

> Western Front: During the last three day the Allies occupied, amongst many others, the following German towns: MAINZ, COBLENZ, PIRMASENS, BINGEN, WORMS, SPEYER, AND LUDWIGSHAFEN.

Eastern Front: The German troops encircled in the DANZIG area were pressed further back towards the Baltic Sea. ZOPPOT has fallen. Russian units are 5kms from GOTENHAFEN and 10kms from DANZIG. (Appendix 4-N and 4-O)

By showing that Allied troops were already inside Germany itself, "DIE LAGE...am 24. Maerz 1945" proved that the chances for a German victory were nearly impossible.

Secondly, this type of leaflet described what Allied military takeover would entail. Often this message concerned how occupation would directly effect the average citizen. (23) Such leaflets usually came in the form of an official announcement from the Allied government explained in detail how the Allies would establish control and the nature of their immediate plans for Germany. Most of these leaflets followed a format similar to "Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force NOTICE" (Appendix 4-P). This leaflet was a message from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, to the **sple** of Germany. Its objective was to explain that the Allied **litary** government would have total legislative, judicial and **ecutive** authority over Germany. This authority allowed the Allied **vernment** to suppress any opposition as well as to control the **then s** of communication:

> The immediate task of the Allied Military Government during the course of military operations will be to secure the lines of communication of the allied armies and to surpress any activities in the occupied areas of Germany which could impair the speedy conclusion of the war. (Appendix 4-P)

Another important statement within this leaflet concerned the Allied intention to destroy Nazism:

Simultaneously Allied Military Government will begin the task of destroying National Socialism. It will remove from responsible posts all members of the Nazi party and of the S.S. and others who have played a leading part in the National Socialist Regime. This process begins immediately upon the arrival of the Allied armies in each area and the inauguration of Allied Military Government. (Appendix 4-P)

This message was especially important to the average German, because it implied that Nazis and not all Germans would be punished and removed from office. Often leaflets of this sort gave details information about the fate of Nazi party members and leading members of the regime. They even mentioned that schools, factories d other businesses would eventually be purged. (24) The main job such leaflets was to show Germans that in order to be treated ell during occupation, complete acceptance of Allied military entrol was essential. These general leaflets outlined the path to st-war security.

In conclusion, the power of the general leaflet stemmed from ability to soften German resistance enough to prepare the way r future propaganda. The general leaflet's main job was to taintain constant communication with the enemy, by providing him rith news, information and valuable war facts. The best aplaination of the general leaflet's role can be found in a comment n the role of all leaflets:

> Even a leaflet which is considered unfavorable by the enemy will partially achieve its success by arousing wide discussion, and will in turn, cause much concern to the enemy commander. (25)

The PWD realized that by exposing Germans to general leaflets on a regular basis, German loyalty would eventually weaken.

## Chapter 4 Notes

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4)
    SHAEF, File: Psychological Warfare, Reel: 6
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 6)
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20)
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21)
     Ibid.
22)
     Ibid.
23)
     Ibid.
(24)
     lbid.
(25)
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#### **Conclusion/Epilogue**

The leaflet was one of the PWD's most effective forms of opaganda against Germany. Disseminated in both the European and editerranean theaters, it reached thousands of Germans untouched v other propaganda methods. In an assessment report of PWD opaganda operations, the leaflet received one of the departments ighest marks:

> There can be no question that the bread-and-butter weapon of psychological warfare is the leaflet. It is the only completely tangible weapon...the leaflet is the only weapon whose power to bring in prisoners is in any degree measurable. (1)

The main goal of these leaflet operations was to attack the morale of German soldiers and civilians, and to encourage capitulation according to Allied orders. Each of the four main types of leaflets mentioned in this study, civilian, news, surrender and general, complimented each other's actions. This meant that the failure of one leaflet could effectively destroy the cumulative effects of many other leaflets. (2) Although the surrender leaflet appears to have been the PWD's most successful leaflet, it depended heavily on preparation provided by the other three types. First of all, general leaflets set the stage for surrender propaganda, by creating an atmosphere of distrust and disloyalty among German soldiers of the Nazi Regime. News leaflets, on the other hand, provided up-to-theminute information about Germany's deteriorating position in the 87

**ar.** Finally, civilian leaflets aided the surrender leaflet by **uccessfully encouraging civilians to persuade German soldiers to top** fighting. Because of the other types of leaflets, the surrender **ta**flet's message did not fall on deaf ears.

There are many reasons why the PWD's leaflet campaign proved especially effective against Germany. One reason was that the Nazi Regime had used similar propaganda methods against their own citizens. Under Joseph Goebbels, who was considered by many to be the master of propaganda, the German public was conditioned to accept the written word as fact. This allowed Allies to successfully use this Nazi propaganda technique against their own Another reason lies in the fact that every German **be**ople. experienced first hand the horrors of war. In "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale", compiled by the United States morale was after the war, interrogators concluded that German extremely vulnerable due to constant air attacks. (3) This bombing had taken a toll on the once loyal German, and made him increasing willing to accept most forms of Allied propaganda.

The significance of leaflet operations did not end with World War II. The leaflet achieved similar successes in other wars, most notably Korea, where the United States, in conjunction with other United Nation members, dropped an estimated two billion leaflets. (4) The contents of these leaflets did not differ greatly from their World War II predecessors. In fact, three of the most widely distributed leaflets in Korea had direct World War II roots, the news leaflet, the civilian leaflet, and the surrender leaflet. (5) It must be kept in mind that the printed media was especially important in **forld** War II and Korea, because of the limited forms of other media **chnology available**. Unlike radio broadcasts which could be **mmed**, movies which could be tampered with, and loudspeakers **hich** reach only a limited audience, printed leaflets were easily **iseminated** to a wide area. Leaflets also had an edge over the other **iediums** because it was impossible for the enemy to destroy every **ie of** them.

Even with today's advanced satellite technology where instant communication plays an important role, the impact of a leaflet tampaign has not lost its place in modern warfare. The continued importance of the leaflet is apparent in its most recent applications. In February of 1993, United States' aircraft disseminated around 600,000 leaflets to remote areas of Bosnia. These leaflets first informed these individuals of United Nations food relief and then warned them to stay indoors for safety reasons when the air-drops occurred. They also provided the American government with a way to reach an audience outside the range of modern telecommunication. (6) This shows that the leaflet will still enjoy a place of honor in future humanitarian and war propaganda efforts.

### Conclusion Notes

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**1**)

2)

(3)

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## **APPENDIX CHAPTER 1**



Appendic 1-A: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (3), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library



To the Army Commander or Mayor: WE DEMAND UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER THAT MEANS Cease Firing Immediately Lay Down Your Arms Take off Helmet and Belt

Show White Flags

WE GUARANTEE The Safeguarding of Personal Property Treatment according to the Geneva Convention

> The local Army Commander or responsible civilian official can send fully empowered parlementaires with a white flag to the nearest Allied command post for the purpose of negotiating a surrender. In case of attempted trickery, no mercy will be shown.

# RESISTANCE IS SUICIDE YOUR ONLY SALVATION IS UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

The Commander of the American Troops

C 2 H 33 E

Appendix 1-B: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967. File: Paris (3), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library

Deutsche Divilisten! Amerikanische Truppen sind im Anmarsch auf Eure Ortschaft! In kurzer Zeit werden die amerikanischen Truppen Euer Städtchen erreicht haben. Für die Bevölkerung besteht kein Anlass zur Befürchtung, denn die amerikanische Armee führt nicht gegen Zivilisten Krieg. Um Euch und Eure Ortschaft vor Kriegsschäden zu bewahren. um Euch und Eurem Städtchen eine baldige Rückkehr zu einem geregelten Leben zu ermöglichen, müsst Ihr die umstehenden Vorschriften genau beobachten. Jeder Widerstand gegen unseren Einmarsch wird sofort gebrochen. Wenn Ihr aber die Befehle auf der Rückseite befolgt, dann könnt Ihr Euch und Eure Ortschaft in eine bessere Zukunft hinüberretten. Der Krieg wird über Euch hinweggehen. und Ihr werdet zu einem friedlichen Leben zurückkehren. Sollten sich in Eurer Ortschaft ausländische Kriegsgefangene und Arbeiter befinden. Russen. Polen. Franzosen. Belgier. Tschechen. Holländer und Italiener, dann gebt ihnen von den umseitigen Vorschriften Kenntnis. Auch für sie gelten die gleichen Bestimmungen. Der Befehlshaber der amerikanischen Truppen

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Appendix 1-C: C. D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

# German Civilians!



American troops are advancing toward your community!

In a short while, the American troops will have reached your town. The population has no reason to fear, for the American army does not wage war against civilians.

To save you and your community the destruction of war, to safeguard for you and your town a speedy return to an orderly life, you must follow the instructions on the reverse page to the letter.

Any resistance against our entry will be immediately broken. But if you follow the orders on the back page, you will save yourselves and your community for a better future. The war will pass you, and you will return to a peaceful life.

If there happen to be foreign PWs and workers in your community, f.i. Russians. Poles, Frenchmen, Belgians, Czechs, Dutchmen and Italians, you must pass on to them the instructions contained on the reverse page. These rules apply to them too.

> The Commander of the American Troops

Appendix 1-D: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

Anweisungen!

1. Wenn sich Soldaten in Eurem Städtchen befinden, versucht Euer Aeusserstes, sie zur Aufgabe des Widerstandes zu bencegen. Wenn Eure Ortschaft sich nicht friedlich ergibt, wird sie durch Kampjhandlung genommen. Und Kampjhandlung bedeutet Zerstörung.

#### •

2. Verweigert Eure Mithilfe für die Zerstörung all der Betriebe. Einrichtungen und Bauwerke, die Ihr in der Zukunst für Euer eignes Leben und Eure eigene Arbeit braucht: Landstrassen, Brücken. Wasserwerke. Elektrizitätsanlagen. Maschinen usw. Versucht. die Soldaten von der Zerstörung dieser Einrichtungen abzuhalten.

3. Entfernt vor dem Eintreffen der Amerikaner alle Wegsperren. Entfernt. wenn möglich, Minen und markiert Minenfelder durch deutlich sichtbare Zeichen.

#### •

4. Verbergt Euch in Euren Kellern, die Euch Schutz bieten. Bleibt in den Kellern, auch nachdem die ersten amerikanischen Truppen in Eure Ortschaft eingezogen sind. Sendet eine kleine Gruppe von Bevollmächtigten aus (nicht mehr als 3), die dem amerikanischen Kommandanten die Ortschaft übergeben. Alle anderen Bürger bleiben in ihren Kellern, bis sie von den Behörden anderweitig angewiesen werden.

#### •

5. Gewährt Mitgliedern der deutschen Wehrmacht, die den ' Kampf einstellen wollen und sich aller Waijen entledigt haben, Zuflucht in Euren Verstecken! Nach Einnahme Eurer Ortschuft müsst Ihr die Behörden sofort von der Anwesenheit deutscher Soldaten verständigen und die Soldaten der Militärbehörde zuführen.

Appendix 1-E: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

# Instructions

1. If there are German troops in your town, try your utmost to induce them to cease resistance. If your community does not surrender peacefully, it will be taken by military action. And military action means destruction.

Į.

2. Refuse to give assistance to and dissunde the soldiers from the destruction of all those establishments, installations and buildings, the use of which you will need for your future life and work, i.e. roads. bridges, public utiluties, machines, equipment etc.

3. Remove before the arrival of the Americans all road blocks. Remove, if possible, mines and mark mine fields by clearly visible signs.

4. Hide in your cellars which offer you protection. Remain in the cellars even after the first American units have entered your community. Send out a small group of parlamentaries (not more than 3) who will surrender the town to the American commander. All other citizens remain in their cellars until otherwise informed by the authorities.

5. Offer refuge to members of the German Wehrmacht who are willing to cease resistance and have already ubandoned their arms. After your community has been captured, you must immediately inform the authorities.

Appendix 1-F: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

an den Bingermeinten auf Ihre Stadt. In kurzer Zeit werden sie sie erreicht haben. Widerstand gegen unsere Truppen würde die Zerstörung Ihrer Stadt zur Folge haben. Rasche Übergabe jedoch wird die Stadt und ihre Bewohner vor einem solchen Schicksal bewahren.

> Deshalb, Herr Bürgermeister, hissen Sie die weisse Fahne auf dem Kirchturm oder dem höchsten Dach Ihrer Stadt als unverkennbares Zeichen der Übergabe und senden Sie sofort eine kleine Abordnung von Bevollmächtigten (nicht mehr als 3), die dem amerikanischen Kommandanten die Stadt übergeben.

> Für die Zivilbevölkerung besteht kein Anlass zu Befürchtungen, denn die Amerikaner führen nicht gegen Zivilisten Krieg. Aus Gründen der Sicherheit . . . . (Fortsetzung Umseite)

EINWOHNER! Überbringt diese Botschaft schneilstens Eurem Bürgermeister. Von ihrer sofortigen Befolgung hängt der Fortbestand Eurer Gemeinde, die Rettung von Haus und Hof in Eurem Heimatort ab. Beschwört den Bürgermeister zu handeln, und - SOFORT.

Appendix 1-G: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (1), Box: 6, Fisenhower I:h.

an den Bingen Meinten reached it. Resistance against our troops would lead to the destruction of your town. Speedy surrender, however, will save the town and its inhabitants from such a fate.

> Therefore, Mr. Mayor, hoist the white flag on the church steeple or the highest roof in your town as an unmistakable sign of surrender, and dispatch, without delay, a small delegation of plenipotentiaries (not more than three) to surrender the town to the American commander.

> There is no cause for anxiety among the civilian population, since the Americans do not wage war against civilians. For reasons of self-protection . . .

> > (continued on back page)

INHABITANTS: Hand the message immediately to your mayor. Upon its immediate compliance depends the continued existence of your community, and the rescue of your property in your home town. Implore the mayor to act, and to do so - IMMEDIATELY.

Appendix 1-H: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967. File: Paris (1), Box: 6. Eisenhower Library.

## Aus Gründen der Sicherheit

Aus Gründen der Sicherheit müssen die Einwoh. Besetzung durch die amerikanischen Truppen a. folgenden Vorschriften genauestens beachten:

1. Verbergt Euch in Euren Kellern, die Euch Schutz bieten. Bleibt in den Kellern, auch NACHDEM die ersten amerikanischen Truppen eingezogen sind. Bleibt in den Kellern, bis die Strassen von den amerikanischen Behörden ausdrücklich freigegeben worden sind.

 Die von den besetzenden amerikanischen Truppen vorgeschriebenen Ausgehverbote, von 6 Uhr abends bis
 Uhr morgens und von 11 Uhr vormittags bis 3 Uhr nachmittags, sind genauestens innezuhalten.

3. Waffen, Munition und Explosivstoffe aller Art müssen ehestens an die amerikanischen Truppen abgeliefert werden.

4. Gewährt Mitgliedern der deutschen Wehrmacht, die den Kampf einstellen und sich aller Waffen entledigt haben, Zuflucht in Euren Verstecken. Nach Einnahme der Stadt müsst Ihr die Behörden sofort von der Anwesenheit deutscher Soldaten verständigen und die Soldaten der Militärbehörde zuführen.

7A – D8

Appendix 1-I: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (1), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

### For Reasons of Self-Protection

For reasons of self-protection all inhabitants have to adhere to the following regulations after Americans have entered the community:

1. Hide in your cellars, which afford protection to you. Remain in the cellars even after the first American troops have entered. Remain in the cellars until the American authorities expressly grant free use of the streets.

2. The curfew hours, from 6 P.M. to 7 A.M., and from 11 A.M. to 3 P.M., which have been prescribed by the occupying American troops, must be strictly complied with.

3. Weapons, ammunition and explosives of all kinds must be surrendered to the American troops without delay.

4. Grant shelter in your hide-outs to members of the German Wehrmacht who have given up the struggle, and who have laid down their arms. Immediately upon capture of your town you have to inform the military authorities of the presence of German soldiers and hand them over to such authorities.

Appendix 1-J: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (1), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.



were left behind at an aerodrome, in order that these leaflets may be drapped. One aeroplane flew here with no other load than leaflets. Why?

Does the enemy have to economise with bombs? You know the Allies have enough planes and bombs to step up even more the already concentrated bombing warfare.

No-the purpose of these leafiets is not to destroy lives, but to save lives. Therefore read this leaflet carefully. On the other side it carries three vital instructions for you and your family.

**WARNING**: Planes cannot always in time drop instructions and advice to the civilian population. In your own interest, therefore, tune in to Radio London, Mescow or Luxembourg. Keep yourself and your neighbors informed about the warnings, orders and instructions of the approaching Allied armies.

These instructions are meant to shorten the war and to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.

Appendix 1-K: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

TRANSLATION OF WG 43

## READ AND CONSIDER THEN: ACTO

1. You are not a soldier. Still the Party is determined to sacrifice you on the Battlefield Germany, to prolong, for a short while, a war that has already been decided.

IN YOUR OWN INTEREST, therefore, follow this worning : AVOID THE VICINITY OF ALL FACTORIES, THOROUGHFARSS, AND RAILWAY LINES. BRING YOUR FAMILY TO SAFETY IN TIME.

2. The Party demands that you continue work until the very last moment. Then you are to expose yourself to the even greater danger of a Valkssturm battle.

IN YOUR OWN INTEREST, therefore, follow this instruction: EVADE THE VOLKSSTURM! HELP OTHERS TO DO THE SAME. LEAVE YOUR PLACE OF WORK IN TIME.

**3.** The men at the front are to fight the armored superiority of the enemy with naked hands. They are brave. But they are being sacrificed senselessly.

IN YOUR OWN INTEREST, therefore, follow this advice : CONVINCE THE SOLDIERS OF THE USELESSNESS OF THEIR SACRIFICES. THEY MUST CONSERVE THEM-SELVES FOR THE JOB OF RECONSTRUCTION.

Appendix 1-L:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.




### An die deutsche Zivilbevölkerung im Rheinland und im Ruhrgebiet:

- Des Affierte Oberkommando erliess am 26. August 1944 die umstehende Warnung an die Zivilbevölkerung der deutschen Gebiete westlich des Rheins und in der französischen Provinz Elsass-Lothringen. Durch das schneile Vorrücken der allijerten Armeen und die Verfolgung der in Auflösung befindlichen deutschen Verbände sind numehr das ganze Rheinland und Ruhrgebiet zum rückwärtigen Heeresgebiet geworden. In kurzer Zeit können diese Gebiete zum unmittelbaren Kriegsschauplatz werden.
- Angesichts dieser Tatsachen wiederholt das Alliierte Oberkommando die umstehende Warnung, die sich nunmehr besonders an die Zivilbevölkerung der obengenannten Gebiete richtet :

Appendix 1-M: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6. Eisenhower Library.

TRANSLATION OF WG




Appendix 1-N: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Leaflets SHAEF, Box: 5, Eisenhower Library.

Utsche Krleysgelausene den selt Seprember nicht verschifft. nach. Übersee FRAGE DEN Frontsolda Mit dem Einmarsch der Allierten auf deutsches Reichsgebiet sind Heimat und Front Nachbarn geworden." Die Heimatbevölkerung v kunn somit endlich feststellen, wus f
ür Erfuhrungen der Frontsoldat im Westen gemacht hat und wie er über die Lage denkt. Der Frontsoldat weiss Bescheid 1 ۰. <u>.</u> • FRAGE IHN ob es möglich ist, der überwältigenden Übermacht der Allierten auf die Dauer standzuhalten - und sei es mit noch soviel Tapferkeit und Opferheudigkeit. Frage ihn -• er weise die Antwort 1 🔅 • FRAGE INN wie die Städte und Dörler in Westfrankreich ausgesehen haben als man versuchte, sie zu verteidigen - und dann nachher als Bombenteppiche und Trommellever den Widerstand gebrochen hatten. Frage ihn er weise die Antwort l • • FRAGE IHN ob er will, dass seine Heimat zu einem wisten Schlachtfeld werden soll, ob Chaos und Elend und Massenselbstmord dem geordneten Einmarsch der Alliierten vorzuziehen sind. Frage ihn - er weiss die Antwort l DER FRONTSOLDAT WEISS BESCHEI ZG 75 K.

Appendic 1-O:

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Collection of 20th Century Military Records, 1918-1950, File: SHAEF Booklet, Box: 1, Eisenhower Library.



Appendix 1-P:

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Collection of 20th Century Military Records, 1918-1950, File: SHAEF Booklet, Box: 1, Eisenhower Library.



### To the workers and

### port officials of

# HAMBURG!

THE Allies are now threatening your town. German resistance in the West has collapsed.

In these last weeks of the war, the future of your town is in the greatest danger from fanatics who may make a last minute attempt to make the port unusable. The power of the men behind these fanatics is crumbling. It will be broken with the arrival of the Allied armies. It depends on what you do now whether your port will then be reopened at once.

These instructions have been issued to workers and

Appendix 1-Q:

C.D. Jackson: Papers. 1931-1967, File: Leaflets Paris (1), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

port officials of HAMBURG :

**1.** The following are needed for immediate reemployment: Stevedores, crane workers, drivers. storekeepers, dockyard workers, fitters, port and water police, custom officials, pilots, crews of tugs and ferries, lock-keepers, and masters and other employees.

**2.** Evade all attempts to mobilise you for further resistance.

**3.** Watch for and prevent where possible, all attempts to obstruct the ports and wreck their installations. Note whereabouts of charges and booby traps. Report them at once to the Allied troops on their arrival.

4. Stocks of food and fuel will be needed to tide you over the period of reorganisation. Resist any attempts to remove these stocks from your town.

Note these instructions carefully and pass them on. Further instructions will follow.

Appendix 1-R:
C.D. Jackson: Papers, 1931-1967, File: Leaflets Paris (1), Box:
6. Eisenhower Library.

Pass these facts on They are also intended for your neighbour.

-

### end the World

hasten the end. The time to act has come. youths dare to oppose the Party then you, No one can expect you to finish the war for too, can make your contribution. The time Germany. But you can decide for yourself is ripe.

No, alone you cannot do it. But you can to stop your own war effort. If half-grown

• TALK TO SOLDIERS! They are being told to fight on, to sacrifice themselvesand yourself-because you want it so, Do you ? Do you really believe that the continuation of the war helps Germany? No? Then go and tell the soldiers. That can be your contribution.

FIGHT COMPULSORY LABOR! Whoever works in factories or communications, helps to prolong the war. No more war-prolonging ! Slow down production ! If the battle approaches, bring yourself and your family to safety in time !

• FIGHT THE N.S. PARTY! Millions of fellow-citizens are of your mind. The spy-system prevents them from declaring themselves openly. But this spy-system is weakening. You can recognize the truth and help to spread it. Watch the war prolongers and remember the names of war criminals.

HELP THOSE WHO THINK AS YOU DO! It is equally important to remember the names of those who think as you do and to give them your help. Hide them: Help soldiers, foreign workers and Volkssturm deserters to save their lives for the peace to come. (Those harbouring members of the Wehrmacht will have to report them to the Allied Military Authorities immediately upon their arrival.) 

and women who will have earned the grati- prepare themselve to be ready when Gertude of a post-war Germany-fight silently against the war and the Party. They hinder the railway transport, they slow down war

Thousands of Germans in Germany-men production, they help foreign workers and many will be cleansed from the Nazis. Yes, it is true: you alone cannot end the World War-÷.,

### YOU CAN HASTEN THE

Appendix 1-S: C.D. Jackson: Papers. 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6. Eisenhower Library.




- ein einstmals

friedliches deutsches Dorf im Kreis Eschweiter bei Aachen. Diesem Dorf hätte die Vernichtung erspart bleiben können – aber es wurde von Fanatikern als Widerstandsnest ausgebaut. Dadurch wurde Dürwiss zu einem militärlschen Ziel alllierter Bomber. Innerhalb eines Tages wurde dieser Ort von schweren Bombern, Jagdbombern, Artillerie und flammenwerfenden Panzern niedergewalzt.

Kriegswichtige Ziele werden weiter, in steigendem Masse, von der allierten Luftwaffe bekämpft. Wer aber nicht im Bereich militärischer Ziele wohnt, kann verhindern, dass sein Heimatort zu einem militärischen Ziel gemacht wird.

Appendix 1-T: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967. File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.



peaceful German village in the district of Eschweiler near Aachen, which need nor have been brought to ruin. Fanatics made a strongpoint out of Dürwiss. Thereby it became a military targer for Allied bombers. Within one day, the town was smashed to pieces by heavy bambers, fighter bombers, artillery and flame-throwing tanks.

War-important targets continue to be attacked by the Alled Air Force, with increasing fury. But those who do not live in areas of military targets can prevent their home towns from becoming military targets.

Appendix 1-U: C.D. Jackson: Papers. 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

### **Euer Heimatort**

المعقور المراجع وتراجع

### kann gerettet werden!

Verhindert, dass Euer Dorf oder Eure Stadt dem Erdboden gleichgemacht wird! Sprecht mit den Soldaten I Erklärt ihnen, dass Verteidigung des Ortes nicht nur nutzlose Selbstaufopferung bedeutet, sondern gleichzeitig für den Ort selbst ein TODESURTEIL darstellt. Verhindert, dass Euer Ort als Widerstandsnest ausgebaut wird. Helft den Soldaten, sich selbst und damit Euren Ort für eine bessere Zukunft zu erhalten l

Deutsche Soldaten! Der Krieg ist in sein allerletztes Stadium getreten. Vermeidet die Zerstörung dieses Dorfes oder dieser Stadt! Entzieht Euch den Befestigungsarbeiten! Nahen sich die Alliierten, so leistet keinen Widerstand. Rettet Euch und den Ort, in dem Ihr seid, durch Aushängen von weissen Fahnen I

Deutsche Offiziere! Sie treffen Ihre Entscheidungen auf Grund der militärischen Lage. Vermeiden Sie, dass Ihre Männschaft und dieser Ort geopfert werden wenn es militärisch nicht mehr gerechtfertigt erscheint. Setzen Sie sich mit Vertretern der Zivilbevölkerung zum Zweck der Übergabe ins Einvernehmen l

Der örtliche Wehrmachtskommandeur oder verantwortliche Bürgermeister kann zwecks Übergabebesprechungen bevollmächtigte Parlamentäre mit einer weissen Fahne ausserhalb des Ortes postieren, um die allierten Vorauseinheiten abzuwarten. Im falle von Täuschungsmanövern wird kein Pardon gegeben. Alle Waffen sind abzusammeln und die Truppen geschiossen den Alllierten zu übergeben. Genaue Befolgung der Genfer Konvention wird gewährleistet.

ZG 121

Appendix 1-V:

C.D. Jackson: Papers, 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: Eisenhower Library. 6.

# Your town can be saved!

Avoid having your town razed to the ground! Talk with the Soldiers! Explain to them that defending the town means not only senseless self-sacrifice, but also a DEATH SENTENCE for your town. Avoid having your town made into a strongpoint. Help the soldiers to save themselves, and thereby your town, for a better future!

**German soldiers!** The war has entered into its final phase. Avoid the destruction of this town! Evade fortification work! When the Allies come, don't resist. Save yourselves and the town by showing white flags!

German Officers! Your orders are given on the basis of the military situation. Avoid sacrificing your men and this town at a time when it no longer can be justified militarily. Cooperate with the civil authorities in surrendering the town!

The local Wehrmacht commander or responsible Bürgermeister can send parlementaires outside the town under the protection of white flags, in order to await Allied advance units and discuss surrender. In case of trickery there will be no pardon. All weapons are to be collected and troops are to surrender in a body. Strict adherence to the Geneva Convention is guaranteed.

NOTE ON TRANSLATION : In the German, "town" is sometimes transiened as "Dert over Stast", there being ne acceptable equivalent to the term. (Stast taxes in the idea of city. "Ort" is used in ZG121 wherever possible.)

Appendix 1-W:

C.D. Jackson: Papers. 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

### **APPENDIX CHAPTER 2**

MACHRICHTEN FUR DIE

## Generale proklamiere Friedensregierung Attentat auf den

### ERSCHIESSUNGEN IM REICH

Fibrer aus allen dret Teilen der We haben eine Proklamation an das deutschei Volk und die Wehrmacht erinssen, in der die Absetzung des Führers und die Bildung einer neuen Regierung bekanntgegeben wird, die sofort Friedensverhandlungen einieiten soil.

ule sofort Friedenverhandlungen einleites Unser des führers, die bes Bildung der Fri regerung mangewerts haben, befindes uch G feldmarschall von Rundisseit, Generalders Fallenhausen, Generstleidmarschall von Brauch Generalderen Halder und Generalfeldmarschal Bock, sowe eine Reiha anderer hobber Truppen die wegan derer Kritik an der vom Führer befol Knegstührung abgusgt wurden. Sie als wene aler sich wurden mit fehrems die fehrems die stregenen der laten Wennen zu der Oberamgeng gete die sie un einge Reihe Bestehen der Generalen fehrems die Stregenen der laten Wennen zu der Oberamgeng gete die sie un eingege Reihe Duschmannen die Gregen heiterig als arschall vog

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Appendix 2-A:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Paris, Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.





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Acht Tage drauf der Admiral Empfinder alles als Skandal. Der PI-Stab aber (ragt erbost : Mein Herr, sind sie denn noch b Trest

et genes. Then H.D Sie wissen alle gar Man beut da nicht Die H.Dv. jedoch Zwei jahre später in Berlin. Generale kommen, Generale ; Die Benker aber bleiben stehn Bezwegen einer speceren Zeit Die Wunder der Vergangenhei

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Wort des Tage

### Appendix 2-B:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Paris, Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.



Fast alies hat die HKA. : Gewenr, MG und KWK. ; Ihr fehit ner der Homunicu Der mit dem allen schlesse

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Mitteldeutsches Industriegebiet gebomb

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14

Rittarkrauzträger gastorben



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Die ersten 33 Anwärter für den Tschammer-Pokal

Fernsprech - Sabotage gegen Hoheitsträgers

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Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Paris. Box 6.

Autor ohne: Sprit werden für Partei beschlagnahmt:

Sport

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Appendix 2-C:

C.D. Jackson:

Eisenhower Library.

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rtill êrie- Altreich ter 111 H Sow jet-Panzer 15 km2

### **Hohe Stabe** verlassen . Paris

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PORTSETZUNG ---- LI Invasions-Front

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Attentat auf Führer-ein-

### Blitzschlag für das Reich

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NACHRICHTEN FOR DIE TRUPPE

### Die Alliierten stehen 15 km vor Pisa

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### SS bekämpft Freischärler in Masuren

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Appendix 2-D:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Paris, Box 6. Eisenhower Library.



**Erneuter** britischer Laftangriff and BERLIN

J M den Abuddstanden des 1.12, waren Jechwers bfilliche Bomber, nach ober Toerlin, Oberchi Elsselerten britteringerte sach zustetten, wird auferlin gemeider, das der Angriff seiner an konsentierer unt.

Warum Berlin gebombt wird Warum Berlin gehomht wird Sir Archibaid Sinclair, der britache dirfantteinneter, erziszerte im bri-reiten Abgrochiestenhaus: «Berlin ind gritemstisch gröben bit, weil es ne Zestrum ven U etrategischen benhanslingen ist, Berlin ist der reitgröbelt europasische Blance-nice, Mis Berlis debesende die AEG--, nebe Wilf-- Reisbene die AEG--, nebe Wilf-- Reisbene die AEG--, nebe Wilf-- Reisbene die AEG--, reite, Wie Gene ich auf sich der ersterbland wachlen karents, so mare surterbland Berlis, dase, vrehrend die siter lorgte hinza, dase, vrehrend die siter lorgte hinza, dase, verbred sit. im gleschen Zerlind ebeworten st. im gleschen Zerland blagworten st. im gleschen Zerland beworten st. ongen auf Berlin - sum Abwer somben, ronnen auf Be lagt und, rtia SUM A


## Territole Die E.A. F. und die U.S.A.A.F. The Paris & 12, 1913

### Montgomery durchbricht die Adria-Linie

Uto Actinite Labit Mill der Eroberung des Sangro-Markoshenzuges hat die britische EArmes einem entscheidanden Sieg errungen. Die Briten and den zurusekflutenden Deutschene bart sut den Fersen. Die 8. Armes idem Fersen. Die 8. Armes stoesst an einer 40 Km. breitem Front in Richtung Pescars vor-Die Deutschene haben antwerv Front Die t in Richtung ------Deutschen haben schwere Ichen- und Materialverlust en. Im Frontabechsitt der Menscheneriitten. amerika S. Armee w imerikanischen mhireiche Gefangene eing der Hinfasi arikaniechen variangene eingebr vision an und sind sum groe Tei Ocearreisher. Die Lande tiener werden von der allierter varie virienen unterter destache Sentierie-Di Walle Wirzhan anterner dentache Stastapaskt Pontaenere Km. oestlich ven Floren, sewie Kapellagertabrik in Turin wurden amerikanischen Fliegenden Festu ີ 19 ປະ nchen Fliegenden Festi m Erfolg angegriffen, mit e

Bit großen artog augegrütten, Wis joint bekanntgogeben wu haben die amerikaaischen Bember, lasseloh des schweren Angriffes Toalen von Skhvember, 5 feind Eriegsschiffe mit Sicherheit und 20 ï







MARSCHALL TECHANG. KANSCHEK, PRAESIDENT ROOSEVELT UND PREM Minister Ghurchill

### ZUR NORDAFRIKANISCHEN KONFERENZ

KUN FERENZ BENITS Minister Churchult, Fran-mièret Rosserveil and Marechail Teranang Kal-Ghot Maben eine twaal-det, Sal-Ghot Maben eine Twaal-det, Sal-Ghot Maben eine Twaal-det, Sal-Ghot Maben eine Millasmence Robon wurde eine millasmischen Robon wurde eine millasmischen Robon wurde eine millasmischen den miller im die Sal-na greut Jagat und teber die Mas-nan greut Jagat und teber die Mas-nan greut Jagat und teber die Mas-nahmen aach der Nielerlage Jacan. Amilien wirde falgendes belanntsvere-ben ihre drey allierten Machte Hain met der Arte and teber die Mas-nachten Keg am der Angelie Hain scherenzeitigen Zwecke imil beret beinerige iderbeiten Zwecke imil beret beinerige iderbeiten zwecke imil beret beinerige iderbeiter die es eit Beting des reisen Wachte zur die es eit Beting halter iderbeiter ihre die es eit Beting des freisen alter gest ihre ereiter Machte alter der die es eit Beting des freisen alter die die es eit Beting des freisen ihre Tehenbeite Chain wieder ihre senter alter ihre die es eit Hering des Freisen ihre fahler ereiter ihre senter alter ihre der die en eit Hering des Freisen alter gest ihre ereiter Kasette, des fahle der Ureiter ihreiter sen die Wert-Anan ereute hat, wie Rachte, Schenden der Creiteren eiter bestering die Gest eiter altierter bestering die en eiter ihreiter sen die Bestinger ihreiter die filteren wieder ihreiter sen die Bestinger ihreiteren and die Bereiter besten die Gesten die Ger weiter beiteren das die Gesten die Ger weiter beiteren besten die Gesten die Ger weiter beiteren besten die Gesten die Ger weiter beiteren besten die Gesten die Gesten die Ger weiter beiteren besten die Gesten die Gesten die Ger weiter beiteren besten die Gesten die Gesten die Sten besten die Gesten die Gesten die Sten besten die Gesten die Sten besten die Gesten die Gesten ternsteinen Teiken ism zereienen i remitt interermanellen die Zar Errich dieser Ziele verden die Zar Errich der Vereisten Nationen, die Schul der Vereisten Nationen, die sich Janan im Kristennend beiladen. Kamme – ohne Rechtscht zur e berlagsagziosen Kapitalatien Ja wenterloubtrege. res sam cereber tellen. Zar Er rden die drei a Zeit 2016 deg deg 107 107 n branch loss

forvnt, in der usm ersten Mal finnt die vielleicht wirstigste Reile studie anbliese urch in enger seitheiner Aufenanderfeits um die Monkaper-foritzwumene Unterviellenter erson follkomunene Unterviellung and die Kreigerichtranken Macchien pr-Vereinten Matimas, Genas wie "ma-herer Kamfersagen guweiterlich Variou-Vereinten Altimen, Genas me fers, here Kenfervenen sumsterlich Vartu-ten beitennier Erestnise auf ter-ableienen Kristrachanpiletten est-disteht is erwarten, dan sich 1967 an die Kenferen bald der Bezinn eine-zuersteilten anhältenden littesenera-uon gegen Jande ausrälleseen auf

#### ZASAMMENTREFFEN Churchil', Rooseveit und Stalin

Der anterkanneben Rundfunk 223 bekannt, dass Churchill, Russeret und Stalin im Mittleran Östen 2015 mengstreffen sind Harsehall Turter-kets eingstreffen,



I U Terinuf der letsten Worhe inte Tom Mansteins (legemolfeneite im Frontvorsorung von Kiew henne sogen Referer witselt, Rund um Tacherinet Alle deuts Ausbruchsternache warden verluin-Ausbruchsternache warden verluin-reich zögersblagen. Usber den Gater-Lasf des Friedt haben die Russen einer-sonen Bruchetwoof errichtet und ne-dreben Notair, das wichtige Cer-böhrzwerten aus Getrand der Pripet-segende. Im Weise Rumiaad laben die Russen bei ihrem Vormarech auf Russen bei ihrem Vormarech auf Russen bei ihrem Vormarech auf λu

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Appendix 2-E:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers, (1/2), Pox: 6 Eigenhower Library

#### Translation IVI GD 12/9

#### - PARTER AAR - THE ALTER AAA 190 000

### RENEWED BRITISH AIR ATTACK ON HERLIN

After a pauso of fine days, British heavy bombers were again over Berlin on the evening of the 2nd December. Although mo no details have been announced by the British, Berlin reports that the attack was heavy and concentrated.

### WHY BERLIN IS BOMBED

The British Minister for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, declared in Parliament: "Berlin is being systematically bombed because it is at the centre of 12 strategic railway lines. Berlin is the second largest inland harbour in Europe. In Berlin stand - or stood - the A.E.G., Rhein-Metall, Siements Schultert, Focke Wulf, Heinkel and Dornier Works. If I could choose only one target in Germany, it would certainly be <u>Berlin</u>." Archibald Sinclair added, that while the German Air Force during November had dropped only 120 tons of bombs on England, in the same period 13,000 tons of British bombs had fallen on Germany, of which 7,000 were dropped on Berlin.

### MEETING OF CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT and STALIN

The American radio has reported that Churchill, Roosevel and Stalin have met in the Middle East. Marshal Chiang Kai Shek and his wife have arrived in Chungking.

### MONT GOMERY BRE KS THROUGH THE ADRIATIC LINE

With the capture of the Sangro ridge, the British Eighth Army have won a decisive victory. The British are head on the heels of the retreating Germans. The Eighth Army is pushing forward on a 40 km. front in the direction of Pescara. The Germans have suffered severe losses in men and material. In the American Fifth Army sector, many prisoners have been taken. They belong to the <u>bith</u> Infantry Division and are mostly Austrians. The land operations received effective support from the Allied air force. The German base of Pontassieve, 15 km, east of Florence, and the ball-bearings factory in Turin were attacked with great success by American Flying Fortresses.

As has now been announced, A mexican bombers, during their attack on Toulon on the 24th November, such five enemy war ships with certainfy, and probably such a further five. Two armed merchant ships were severely damaged.

### EASTERN FROM

During the past week, von Manstein's counter offensive on the Kiev salient has gained no new successes. The Russian encirclement of Toherkassy is drawing closer. All German attempts to break out have been thrown back with losses. The Russians have sot up a new bridgehead across the lower course of the Pripet, and are threatening Moschir, the important traffic centre on the castern border of the Pripet marshes. In White Russia, the Russians have made important territorial gains in their advance on Rogatschev and Schlobin.

Appendix 2-F:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967. File: Leaflets Algiers. (1/2), Box: 6. Eisenhower Library.



IN den Abendstunden des 6.12. wurden die Beschlusse, der swischen Premier Minister Churchill, Praesident Roosevelt und Marschall Stalin in Teheran abgehaiten Konferenz, bekanntregeben, Der Wortlaut der amtlichen Erkiserung lasst klar erkennen, dass die Stunde das entscheiden-den Grossingriffes auf Hitlers europaeische Festung von den drei Staatsmachnern genau festgelegtwurde. Noch vor dem naechsten Sommer wird Deutschland die ganze Macht aller allierten Waffen au Land, auf der See und aus der Luft zu verspueren bekommen. Nach dem Sieg ueber Nazi-Deutschland stehen allen Voeikern der Erde, ob gross oder klein, die Tore offen, sich der Weltfamilie der demokratischen Nationen anzuschliessen und an dam Aufbau einer neuen Welt, frei von Tyrannei und Versklavung, Unterdruckkung und Unduldsamkeit, teil-zunehmen, Bie dahin aber, --- und dies geht aus der Erkinsrung ganz eindeutig hervor, - wird Deutschland mit staendig wachsender Macht vom Osten, Sueden und Westen her, ohne jede Ruecksichtnahme, beitaempft werden,

Nach Abschluss der Konferenz and Churchill und Rooseveit nach Kairo abgereist, wo sie - noch unbestastigten Meldungen zufolge - mit dem tuerkischen Minister-praesidenten Inond summmenetroffen sind. An dieser Bespregetroffen sind. An dieser Bespie-chung sollen auch der britische und tuerkische Aussemminister teilgenommen haben.

#### DIE KAEMPFE IN RUSSLAND

Weise-Russiand haben ossowskys Armeen no General I W Weiss-Ransland haben General Bakassowskys Armeen nordcostlich von (Jomei neuen Gelsenderywun er-neit, Im Abednitte von Tachernis-gow wurden mahrers, von destachen yongetragens Angriffe, mit schwertsen Vorginsten surjustgewichen, Stattwert-Vorginsten surjustgewichen, Stattwert-Norinsten surjustgewichen, Stattwert-Bassen die Statt Alexandryin, sewis weitare 15 dentsche Verteidigungssch-langen, Die von Smein auch Izumas-ka fuchrende Eisenbahnlinie wurde durphankistiem. lungen. ebrende nhnjtten.

#### SUEDFRONT

SUEDFRONT A der italienischen Ort- und Weerstenste dringen die allierten SArmes haben weitere Boehennelung griff wurde verlietenden berwichten Songen erobert. Ein deutschart Ugen trid wurde verlietende Berwichten Monter von hongen den Acro-Arren Songeriet und in Koestenaerstese wienen songert. Auch Ancons und Guini Auser erste deutschen Zerstoerern wirken bombardischen Gerwichten mig zie weiters schwart betreichter hiche Kussenhollften wurden erste tiche Kussenhollften wurden erste stridigerein aus der Gerste etten wurdes beschossen irter faun-liche Kussenhollften wurden erste ten and haben in der Sanpuskalt me-pointer bahen den Karo-Solit, sowie is Eine hahren den Sanpuskalt verste tridigerein aus der Gerste tridigerein aus der Gerste tridigerein ander solit, sowie sie Eine hahren der Gerste General weiters schwart beiteret General weiters schwart beiteret den Userhen Kriegsmorni General weiter Keingemennes Haipung erstellt. Den seine Friedes wirde Schwart der der schwart beitere der Userhen Kriegsmorni der genaussen baben den Zeit-fen den Schwart der der schwart beiteret der utsechen Kriegsmorni der schwart beiter der schwart beiter der schwart der feineriesen filteren der schwart beiter der der schwart beiter der schwart der feineriesen der der schwart beiter der schwart beiter erstellen mensen Bisten weiter auch den Zeit-ten der schwart beiter weiter auch der Schwart beiter ten erstellen mensen Bisten weiter weiter ten der schwart beiter weiter auch der Schwart beiter der erstellen mensen Bisten weiter weiter beiter erstellen mensen Bisten weiter weiter schwart der schwart beiter weiter weiter weiter weiter der schwart der schwart beiter der sc

Gentinchem HArlegsmorn Gentinchem HArlegsmorn and Veiler, Seumandant der an der Optiven kampfenien 4. deutseben vutischen Genprachens gewarts und schwers Straten ausgefröht. Weilere Bonderbafehl hat folgenden Wortleat: "Deutsche Soldaten machen jett mehr achtiose Bemerkungen. als je esvor Weehrend des Foltarz-Esschnette erhlarten destrebe Soldaten, dass so das Krieg obnehls veileren eu.

DIE DREI-MAECHTE ERKLAERUNG

Marsehalt Statin, Practicent Recovert und Premier Minister Court erfeigreisenen Absentuss der Teiterater Konferent

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rationen van der Gessei und aum rationen van der Gessei und aum Gehrechen des Krieges befreise wir Gemeinsen mit unseran dinional erten der Zatunti geberinnet. Biene der Zatunti geberinnet. Biene der Zatunti geberinnet. Biene der Zatunti geberinnet. Biene der Lein, derrei Voller, nieuto-mis anser eigenen Voller, nieuto-drusetnen eigenen Voller, nieuto-drusetnen der Undnidesskust gewin-derweiten der Geschracken um anne Ables, Sollten ale diesen Wunsch-Anstruck verleisen, werden vir us in name Malen. Botten der Jesenstrucken Nationen willkammet heisen, - Kaisen Under Brite hunn une devon abhalten Destessinge sind eine Kriegen-

Reingestamizen ann der Luit in ter-Reingestamizen ihn der Luit in ter-Roerne. Masch Bieven freunlichsfüllehen Kon-ferensen erkein unz mit Zeversicht dem Tage untgegen, im dem alle Voelker der Weite im Freue, ver Urtramen un-bertuchtigte Laben, ihren verschledenen bertuchtigte Laben, ihren verschledenen Weinschnen Und ihrem eigenen Gereit-nen enligerochend. Freihren, wering, und Wils sichenste ist ander Teories all Prinzielenen der Konformes alle President ihr ihr ficht fundierense alle President ihr ihr ficht fundierense alle President ihr ihr führt ihr ihr ficht im der Reich.

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Appendix 2-G:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967. File: Leaflets Algiers. (1/2). 5. Eisenhower Library. Box:



Vertrich: Die R.A.F. und die U.S.A.A

THE BEAT

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### ranslation for GB 9/12

### THE DECISION OF THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE

On the evening of December 6th, the resolutions made at the cheran conference between Prime Minister Churchill, President cosevelt and Marshall Stalin, were announced. From the wording of the official declaration it can be clearly recognized that the hour of the great docisivo attack on Hitler's fortress of Europe has been fixed. Before the summor breaks, the Gormans may expect the full wight of Allied arms to fall on Dirone by land; see and air. After the victory ovor Nazi Germany, the door will be open for all peoples of the earth, great or small, to join the world family of democratic mations, and to take part in the building up of a new world free from tyranny and slavory, oppression and intelerance. Until then, however, the declaration makes this quite clear Germany will be fought, irsevocably and with ever increasing power, from cast, south and west. 一 胡利尔拉拉拉拉 化合成 有效 计分子

After the conference was concluded, Ohurchill and Roosevelt travelled to Cairo, where, according to unconfirmed roports, they had a mooting with the Turkish Minister, President Inomu. The British and Turkish Foroign Ministers are said to have takon part in those talks.

### THE BATTLE IN RUSSIA

In White Russia, Gonoral Rokossowsky's armies have made new territorial gains north east of Gemel. In the Tcherniagov sector, soveral Gorman attacks with tanks and infantry have been repelled with severe losses. South west of Krementschug; the Russtans captured the town of Alexandria, and also 18 moro Gorman defensive positions. The railway line running from Smela to Znamenka was cut. . 1.141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141 - 141

### SOUTHERN FRONT A LE MARLES

In spite of florce Gorman resistance, the Allied troops are pushing forward on the cast and west coasts of Italy. Troops of the Fifth Army have conquered more heights. A Corman counter attack was repelled with losses. On the Eighth Army front, Montgemery's troops reached the Moro river. On Thursday, the coast road between Poscara and Hiulia Muova was offectively bembarded by British destroyers. Also Ancona and Benedetto were shelled; three onomy constal craft were sunk and two more severally damaged. The fire from the German ccastal batteries was ineffective. Allted bombers successfully attacked the harbour of Split and the railway station at Saloniki.

### GERMAN WAR MORALE IS SINKING

General Waller, Commander of the Eighth German army fighting on the castern front, has warned his troops against "Bolshevistic talk" and threatened severe punishments. Weller's special order runs as follows: "German soldiers now are making more irresponsible rumarks than ever before. During the Foltava retreat. German soldiers declared that they wished to lay down their arms, and, that after the loss of the Dnieper position, the war was lost in any case."

### Appendix 2-H:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967. File: Leaflets Algiers, (1/2), Box: 5. Eisenhower Library.

### DECLARATION OF THE THREE FORENS.

WE-- The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these rear days have in this, the capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our • common policy. Market and

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war -- our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and as have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. 

We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and time of the operations to be undertaken from the East, West and South.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace -- we are sure that our concord will win an enduring pence. He recognise fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisors, we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the co-operation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are deducated, as are our own peoples, to the climination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, ----their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untauched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

Me came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

(signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

J. V. Stalin -----

Winston S. Churchill.

Appendix 2-I:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967. File: Leaflets Algiers. (1/2), 5 Fisenhower Library Rove

LOATEN-SACEBICETEN

Vertrick: Die R.A.P. und die U.S



and admirate man

Deutschlands wachsende Transport-Schwierigkeiten

TROTZ schlecher Weiterbedin-gungen ist es der Royal Alz Force im Monat November gelus-gen (eindiche Eisenbahnziele im beschzien Europa erfolgreich ab-zugreifen und 130 Lokomotiven zu zerstoeren. Zahlreiche Gueterzeuge. Deschaefigt. Bei Angriffen auf Deutschlad selbet, wurden beinabe rielche Anzahl beschaefigt. Past 200 Lokomotiven zervicert und eine. Spielche Anzahl beschaefigt. Past 700 Gueterwaggons wurden wer-nichtet und nahr als 2000 beschae-digt. Beinabe 2000 Personn vag-guns wurden, getwiese vernichtet oder beschaefigt. Die zahlreichen Angriffa auf Berlin haben das ge-samte deutsche Eisentahneyvern selbwargererffen, das und sin 12 a im Ok

Se h w e f.- brechneidigt - vurture Swischen Juli und November hat der runsiche Vormarsch sur Er-beutung von 400 und sur Vernich-tang von weiteren 200 Lakomotiven gefushert. Dies bedeutet. dass Deutschiend, alles is allen, unge-beiter in Lakomotiven monatlich ren hat. In die, dem d system durch sche Partina uste, nicht m In d a. Ziffer deutsch reit rum TUE

Diese nuechternere Zilfern wi m weitaus mehr, als Dr. Goebei ed Dr. Gansanmoulers bechtr nde Reder zum Tag der denter .Di 3**7 - 1**16

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Appendix 2-J:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers. (4), Box: 6. Eisenhower Library.



### OSTFRONT: Dreifacher russischer Durchbruch

### Russische "Winterarmeen" beziehen Stellung

Das Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro berichtete am 21. Dezembei dass der Brückenkopf von Cherson im Mündungsgebiet des Dnjepr von den Russen erobert worden ist. Am 20. Dezember meldete das OKW fortgesetzte russische «Durchbruchsangriffe» südlich und nördlich von Newel, und « hartes Ringen » bei Kirowo, Kirowo liegt 30 km. von Snamenka, das die Russe-

vor einer Woche eroberten.


N.R. '8.

Diese drei neuen Durchbrüche der Russen erfolgten unmittelbar, nachdem die grosse deutsche Gesenoffensive der 4. Armes von Hoths westlich von Kiew rum Stehen gebracht worden war. Hier wurde der grösste Teil der deutschen Panzerstreitkräfte eingesetzt.

Diese Kräftemassierung im Westen von Kiew brachte es mit sich, dass - laut einem Moskauer Bericht - die Deutschen weiter nördlich, im Westen von Newel. sur über 3 Infanterie-Divisionen. 3 Panzer-Division und 7 Sicherungsabteilungen verfügten. Durch den russischen Durchbruch in diesem Abschnitt sind alle deutscher Verbindungslinien im Kampfraun Leningrad bedroht.

Gleichzeitig setzten die russischen Armeen General Konjews und General Malinowskys ihren Vormarsch and Kirowo fort and gefährden dadurch die 1. und 4. deutsche Armes in der Ostecke des Dujeprbogens.

Die neuen russischen « Winterarmeen » sind noch nicht eingesetzt worden, doch heisst es in einem Moskauer Bericht, dass sie Ings der 800 km. langen Front Schlobin - Leningrad bereits ihre Stellungen bezugen haben.



### Star Bright VON WESTEN: BERLIN UND FRANKFURT a/M. VON SÜDEN: AUGSBURG

Des britische Luftministerium gibt bekannt, dass die RAF in der Nacht vom 20./21. Dezember über 2 Millionen kr. Spreng-und Brand-bomben auf Ziele in Frankfurt am Mae abgeworfen hat.

Am 20. Dezember unternahmen starke Verbände von Fliegenden starke Verbande von Fliegenden Festungen und Liberators der 8. amerikanischen Luftflotte, Opera-tionsbasis England, unter Thunderbolt-lägergeleit einen Tagesangriff auf Bremen.

In der Nacht vom 16./17. De-zember warf die RAF in weniger als 30 Minuten 14 Million kg. Bomben auf Industrieviertel von Berlin. Von diesem Angriff kehrten 30 Flugzeuge nicht zurück. Seit Anfang 1943 ist auf Berlin eine Bombenlast von 16 Millionen kg. gefallen, da-von allein 10 Millionen kg. in 6 Angriffen seit dem 18. November.

In Berlin sind zehn Prozent aller Fabrikarbeiter Deutschlands ha schäftigt, -- im ganzen Ruhrgebiet nur 71 Prozent.

Am 19. Dezember unternahmen starke Verbände alliserter viermoto-riger Kampfilugzeuge. Operationsbasis Süditalien. Tagesangriffe auf Innsbruck und Augsburg. Der Angriff auf Augsburg war der erste, der von Süditalien aus auf ein Ziel im Altreich unternommen wurde.

### SUDFRONT: Hauptquartler der 15. Armeogruppe,

Die 8. Armee hat an der adriatischen Küste die Landstrasse Ortona — Orsogna trots heftigen Widerstanda der Deutschen an vielen Steilen überschritten. Das Widerstands der Deutschen an vielen Stellen überschritten. Das III. Bataillon des 361. Pz. Gren. Regt. von der 90. Pz. Gren. Div. hat sich ergeben, und die beiden franzörische Truppen, die den tune-scherten Stellen State en State en gebusst. Seite der 5. Armee kämpfen jetzt hat sich ergeben, und die beiden franzörische Truppen, die den tune-

or. Desember 2943 : |Verluste erlitten, dass sie zu einem einzigen Verband susammenge Das schlossen wurden, 300 Pz Gren. Regt. derselben Division hat ein Drittel seiner Stärke eingebisst. anderen Bataillone haben so schwere 'sischen Feldzug mitgemacht haben.

Appendix 2-K:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967 File: Leaflets Algiers (1)

NO. S WEEKLY PAPER YOR SERMAN SOLDIEAS DEGENEERS STAR ST


EASTERN FRONT

RUSSIAN "WINTER ARMES" TAKE UP POSITION On December 21st, the German News Agency reported that the bridgehead of Kherson, on the Dnieper estuary, had been captured by the Russians. On December 20th, the OKW reported further Russian " penetration attacks " north and south of Nevel and hard fighting near Kirovograd, 30 kilometres south west of Znamenka, which the Russians had captured a week earlier.

These three new Russian breaksthrough follow directly on the halting of the great German counter offensive , by , von Hoth's 4th Army west of Kiew. of strength west of Kiev was that farther north, west of Nevel, the German forces consisted, according to a report from Moscow, only of two infantry divisions, one. armoured division and seven security units. The Russian breakthrough in this region threatens the communications of all German forces in the Leningrad sector. At the same time the Russian advance on Kirovograd, carried

out by the armies of Generals Konyew and Malinowsky, have further endangered the position of the German 1st and 4th armies in the eastern corner of the Dhieper bend.

The new Russian « winter armies » have not yet been in action; but it is reported from Moscow that they have already uken up positions along Soo km.



FROM WEST. AUGSBURG FROM THE SOUTH The British Air Ministry report that on the night of December 20th the R.A.F. dropped over 2000 tons of high explosive and incendiary bombs of largers in Frankfurt on Main On the preceeding day a strong force of Flying Fortresses and Liberators of the American 8th Air Fleet, based on England, attacked Bremen under an escort of Thunderbolts. On the night of December 16th the R.A.F. in less than 30 minutes dropped 1500 tons of bombs on industrial quarters of Berlin-From this attack 30 aircraft did not remm Since the beginning of 1943 Ber lin has received 16,000 ions of bombs, of which 10,000 have been dropped in six attacks since Novem-ber 18th. Ten per cent of all factory workers in Germany, inclu-ding foreigners, are employed in Berlin. In the whole Ruhr district only /i per cent. formations of Allied four-engined bombers based on Italy, attacked Innsbruck and Augsburg. The attack on Augsburg was the first carried out from Italy against Germany proper.

SOUTHERN FRONT: 1515. Army Broup Headquarters

December 21st., 1943.

On the Adriatic coast the Eighth Army has crossed the Ortona — Orsogna road, in the face of strong ognosition, in many places, and is within rifle range of both these towns. Of the 361st. Pz. Gren. Regt. of the 90th. Pz. Gren. Div. the grid hattalion has surrendered and the two other battalions

have been so depleted that they have been combined in a single unit. The zooth Pz. Gren. Regt.. of the same division, has lost one third of its number.

The Fifth Army, after three days of hard fighting, took San Pietro on the edge of the Liri plain. French troops who fought in Tunisia are now in action with the Fifth Army.

Appendix 2-L:

C.D. Jackson:

Papers 1932-1967, File:

Leaflets Algiers, (1),

### DIE GRÖSSTE DEUTSCHE OFFENSIVE VON 1943

NR. 8.

77.67 77.67

Generaloberst von Hoths fünt Wochen lang anhaltende Gegen-offensive westlich von Kiew was das grösste deutsche Unternehmen im Jahre 1943. Die folgende Liste der, einzesetzten Panzerdivisioner zeigt, wie sehr das OKW, um die sen Angriff zu stärken, die «Fes-tung Europa » von ihren Panzer reserven entblösst hat:

Die 1. Pz. Div., Standort Wei mar, wurde aus Griechenland zu nickgezogen.

nacamezogen. Die 7, Pz. Div., Standort Gera die 8, Pz. Div., Standort Kottbus und die 12, Pz. Div., Standort Stettia, befanden sich schon im Russland.

Die 25. Pz. Div., aus Westfalen. wurde aus Norwegen zurückgezogen, wo sie die einzige deut-sche Panzerdivision gewesen war sche l'anzerdivision gewesen war Die Adolf Hitler Division der Waffen-SS., sowie Teile der 16. Pz. Div., Standort Münster, und der 24. Pz. Div. aus Ostpreussen wurden aus Italien zurückzezogen.

### "Japans Heimatgewässer bedroht"

e Die Gegenoffensive der amerika nischen Streitkräfte gegen die Gilbert-Inseln ist eine direkte gefährliche Bedrohung unserer Heimatgewässer », erklärte der Sender Takia.

« Im Zuge der allgemeinen umfassenden Gegenoffensive des Feindes gegen Japan nehmen diese Operationen einen wichtigen Platz ein ».

### Churchills Gesundheitszustand

Premierminister Churchill. der an Lungenentzündung erkrankt war, hat seit zwei Tagen wieder normale Temperatur. Sein Allgemeinbefinden macht gute Fortschritte.

### Problem ,, Das

PRONTPOST

2.20 1. Die Schweizer Tageszeitung Basler Al den Oesterreichern alles e zuster menfressen n. - Zum Beispiel - and Nachrichten schreibt im Zusammenhang mit der von den Vereinigten Staaten, Grossbritannien and Sowjetrussland in Moskau unterzeichneten Erklärung, dass Oesterreich nach dem Krieg frei und unabhängig sein wird:

« Der Zusammenbruch des Faschismus und der Vormarsch der Alllierten in Italien könnten die « Oesterreich-Frage » schnell akut werden lassen.

Die Art der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beherrschung Oesterreichs durch Deutschland bat sich im Prinzip wenig von den in den anderen besetzten Ländern angewandten Methoden unterschieden. Die systematische Beseitigung des österreichischen Elements aus den leitenden Steilen in Staat und Wirtschaft und die gleichzeitige Durchaurning der Landes mit nicht weniger als 40 tausend reichsdentschen Funktio nären und Beamten haben zu einer immer wachsenden Erbitterung geführt. Oft wird den deutschen Frauen und Bumbenflüchtlingen vorgehalten, dass sie 

## Österreich

die Kurorte Kitzbühl und Obergurgl von Frauen hoher deutscher Funktionāre und anderer privilegierter Urlauber voll. Es fehlt dort an nichts. Aber unter den vierhundert Kurgasten in Oberurgl gab es in der Saison aur einen Österreicher.

Von den Geschäftsschliessungen wurden verdiente Anhänger: des Regimes und Reichsdeutsche nicht betrollen. Es kam deshalb vielerorts in Oesterreich zu turbulenten Szenen. Es soll auch tatsächlich zu Partisanenaktionen gekommen sein. In kleineren Orten kam es zu Anschlägen auf deutsche Verwaltungsbeamte und SS Manner. Vor allem in Kärnten erhielt die Partisanentätigkeit einen starken Auftrieb und Rückdeckung durch die Partisanen in Jugoslawien.

Von den Deutschen werden viele Verhaltungen durchgeführt, neue Konzentrationslager erstellt, und viele Todesurteile gefällt. Allein rund um Wien sind 30 000 Mann SS-Truppen konzen triert, die kein Hehl ans ihrer Bestimmung als Bürgerkriegs-truppe machen a. ppe machen a.

#### 승규가는 공격적 것도 중 Nachrichten in Kürze

Ans Algier wird amtlich berichtet. dass die wiederaufgestellte franzö-Kolonialtruppen

Der amerikanische Marineminister dass Amerika im Jahre berichtet. 71943 40 Flugzeugträger gehaut hat.

wurden Im Monat November weniger alliierte Schiffe als in irgend einem anderen Monat zuvor seit Wanrend der Mai 1940 versenkt.

sind Monate mehr letzten vier U-Boote \_ ala alliierte deutsche Schiffe versenkt worden,

> ., # ٠

General : Franco verkündete gestern in Madrid, dass die spanische Falangisten-Miliz aufgelöst- wurde und Massnahmen zur Auffösung der ganzen spanischen Falange getroffen wurden. (Diese Organider sation entspricht der faschistischen Partei in Italien und der national-sozialistischen Partei in Deutschland).

### Appendix 2-M:

C.D. Jackson: Daw.

Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (1),

### THE GREATEST GERMAN EFFOR OF 1943

Colonel General von Hoth's fiveeeks-long counter-offensive west f Kiew was the greatest German fort of 1943. The following list f armoured divisions taking part hows how, to support this attack, he O.K.W. stripped the "Fortress Enrope s'of its armoured reserves. The ist: P2. Div., garrison base Veimar. was, withdrawn from reace.

The 7th. Pz. Div., sarrison base sena, the 8th. Pz. Div., garrison ase Kottbus, and the 12th Pz. Div., garrison base Stettin, were tready in Russia.

The 25th. Pz. Div., from West-phalia, was withdrawn from Nor-way, where it had been the only

Genman armoured division Waffen-SS, parts of the 16th: Pz. Div., garrison base Münster, and the 24th. Pz. Div., from East Prussia, were withdrawn from Italy\_

### "Japan's

Inner Sea Threatened 19 / T The counter-offensive of the merican forces against the Gilbert Islands is a danger thrust directly our inner sea, > states .Tekyo lio. radio.

« These operations are an important part in the circle of the enemy's seneral counter-offensive against japen... 1.

### States - States Churchill's Health

Mr., Churchill, who has been suffering from pacamonia, has had a normal temperature for two days. and is progressing favourably,

### The Provensor Ausures

to the declara ion signed at Moscow by Am rica, England and Russia; that after the war Austria will be free and independent, the Swiss newspaper « Basler Nachrichten » ". The collapse of Fascism and the advance of the Allies in Italy might cause the Austrian Question . to become acute The way in which Austria is politically and economically dominated by Germany is little different from the methods applied in other occupied couuntries. The systematic removal of the Aus trian "element from leading positions in government and industry, and the simultaeous innndation of the country with no fewer than 40,000 Reich German functionaries and officials, have caused an ever increasing embit-terment.

"German women and refugees from bombing are often accused of " eating Austrians out of house and home ». For example, the

### Shorter News e It is officially reported from

Algiers that the reconstituted French Africans. 

reports that America has built 40 Falangist Militia would be dissolved: aircraft carriers in 1943.

ere sunk than in any month since

المردور المحمقة ويترشيه المتحقق فتحقق والمتحد المحاد المحاد

in the marker markers and the

in crowd Teres and the second

high German functionaries other privileged . holiday makers There is abundance of everything But of the four hundred visito to Obergurgle in the season ont one was an Austrian was when small businesses were shut, those of accredited hangers

on of the regime and of Reich Germins were not affected. This led in many parts of Austria to turbulent scenes. There is said actually to have been partisan activity. In small villages there were as saults on German officials and SS men. In Carinthia, especially, partisan activity received strong en-couragement and rear cover from the partisans in Jugoslavia. \* The Germans have made many arrests, new concentration camps have been formed, and there have. been many death sentences In Vienna alone there are about 30,000 .SS troops, who make it no secret that they are there to fight a civil war. . - -

May, 1940. For the last four months more German U-boats have been sunk than Allied ships.

. . Nar

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<u>, and the second s</u>

Second States and States and States and States

The American Navy Secretary day in Madrid that the Spanish and measures taken for the dissolution of the whole Spanish Falange. (This is an organization similar to In November fewer Allied ships the Fascist and National Socialist. Parties in Italy and Germany.) .

Appendix 2-N:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Box: 6. Eisenhower Library.

### Roosevelt, Churchill und Stalin treffen sich in Persien

### Der fürkische Aussenminister war zugegen

Die drei führenden Staatsmänner der Vereinten Nationen trafen sich in Teheran, der Hauptstadt Persiens. Nach ihrer Zusammenkunft, die vier Tage dauerte, veröffentlichten sie am L. Dezember eine gemeinsame Erklärung, in der unter anderem folgendes gesagt wird:

"Wir haben volle Uebereinstimmung erzielt über Ausmass und zeitliche Planung der Operationen, die von Osten, Westen und Silden erfolgen werden ».

Nach dem Kriege « werden wir mit allen Ländern, ob gross oder klein, tatkräftig zusammenarbeiten, deren Völker sich so wie unsere Völker mit Leib und Seele der Anfgabe geweiht haben. Tyrannei zu stürzen, und Sklaverei. Unteröffickning jind Onfählenmkeit aus der Weit zu schaffen ». «Keine Macht der Erde kann

#### " DIE HILFE SOTTES "

n n n ja Der « Osservatore Romano », das amtliche Blatt des Vatikans, verarteilte den Beschluss der Deutschen, alle Juden in Italien zu internieren und ihr Vermögen zu beschlagnahmen. «Diese deutschen Massnahmen,» schreibt die Zeitung, ewerden Tausende von Kindern, Franen, Kranken und Alten schwer treffen. Um die Hüfe Gottes zu verdienen ist es notwendig, Nächstenliebe gegenüber Allen zu üben ».

uns hindern, die deutschen Armeen in Lande und die deutschen U-Boote zuit dem Meer in vernichten und die deutschen Rüstungsstädte aus der Luft zu zerstören ».

An den Besprechungen in Teheran 1 Jahn and 1 der fürkische Aussenminister M. Mnemenozoglu teil. Nach ihren Abnise ans Teheran kehrten Roosaveit und Churchill nach Kairo zu einer Besprechung mit dem türkischen Präsidenten Indul zurück.

### auf Berlin in vier Stunden

Das britische Luftfahrtministerium gibt bekannt, dass während der letzten fünf schweren Luftangniffe auf-Berlin insgesamt 8 500 Tonnen Bonben abgeworfen wurden. Die Gesamtdauer dieser Angriffe betrug weniger als vier Stunden. Aber die gesamte Bombenlast war grösser als die, welche die deutsche Luftwaffe während der Jahre 1940 und 41 auf London geworfen hatte.

Jeder dieser Luftangriffe konzentrierte sich auf einen besonderen Industriebezirk von Berlin. Von dem jängsten Angriff, auf Charlottenburg, kehrten 41 Bomber der R.A.F. nicht zurück

In der Nacht vom 3. rum 4. Dezember warfen schwere Bomber der R.A.F. 1500 Tonnen Bomben auf Ziele in Leipzig. Von diesem Angriff kehrten 29 Bonten der R.A.F. nicht mutlek.

### BEIDEN FRONTABSCHNITTEN Hauptquarter der 15. Armeegruppe 8. Desember 1943. von einem Oberfeldwebei kom-

An der zdriatischen Küste rückte die VIII. Armee in der vergangenen Woche 15 km. vor, und nahm Lanciano und Fossacesia ein, wo zahlreiche feindliche Geschütze erbeutet wurden. Mehr als 1000 Gefangene wurden gemacht. Ein. Bataillon der 65. deutschen Infantriedivision wurde von einem Goerlandwerter Lohr mandiert. Nach sechstägigen heftigen Kämpfen hat die V. Armee die Deutschen aus ihren stark befestigten Bergstellungen westlich von Mignano geworfen und steht jetzt auf den Höhen, die dus Knie des Garigliano beherrschen.

Viele Gefangene wurden eingebracht.

Appendix 2-0:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Box: 6 Eisenhower Library WEEKLY PAPER FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS. DECEMBER SID

### なながいない。 1.444 Roosevelt. Churc and Stalin meet in Persia

Turkish Foreign Minister also present 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 -

The three leading'statesmen of the United Nations have met at Teheran, capital of Persia. After the conference, which lasted four days, they issued on December 1st. a joint statement, from which the following are excerpts: -:

" We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of operations which will be undertaken in the east, west and south.» e (After the war) we will seek went as from destroying the Gerthe co-operation and active partiman armies by land, their U-Boats cipation of all nations, large and. by sea and their war plants from small, whose peoples in heart and

sion and intolerance.»

1

"No power on earth can pre-

" TO MERIT GOD'S AID,, 

The German decision to

intern all Jews in Italy and to confiscate their property has been con-demned by the • Osser-vatore Romano •. official

newspaper of the Vatican. • The new German measures , stated the

newspaper in a leading

sands of children, wo-

men, aged and sick, who

are children of God. We

it is necessary\_40 practi-

se charity towards all.»

are forced to point out that to merit God's aid

article, will strike thou-

the air.» mind are dedicated, as are our The Turkish Foreign Minister, own peoples, to the elimination of M. Menemencioglu; was also at the tyranny and slavery and oppres-Teheran coference." After leaving Teheran, Roosevelt and Churchill returned to Cairo for a conference with the Turkish President Inennut

SOUTHERN FRONT

### 8500\*Tons on Berlin in four Hours

The British Air Ministry reports that in the last five beavy air attacks on Berlin altogether, 8.500 tons of bombs were dropped. The combined duration of these attacks was less than four hours. Yet the tota? bomb-load was greater than that dropped by the Cerman Luftwaffe on London in the whole year 1940-41. In each of these raids a differ-ent industrial area of Berlin was selected for concentrated bombasd ment. In the latest raid, on Charlottenburg, 41 bombers of the R.A.F. did not return. - On the night of December 3rd-4th. heavy bombers of the R.A.F. dropped 1,500 tons of bombs on targets in Leipzig. 29 bombers of the R.A.F. did not return

BOTH SECTORS 15th. Army Broup Headquarters

ALLIES ADVANCE O

- - December 8th., 1943: my On the Adriatic coast the 8th. Army has advanced 15 kilometresin the past week and has taken Lanciano and Fossacesia, where much enemy artillery wascaptured. More than a thousand prisoners have been taken. A battalion of the German 65th Infantry Divithe second s

sion was commanded by a. SET geant major. After six days of hard fighting the 5th Army has expelled the Germans from strongly fortified positions in the mountains west of Mignano and now overlooks the bend of the Garigliano river. Many prisoners have been taken. ى مى بىرى ئۇيچىن خان - -

### Appendix 2-P:

Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (1). C.D. Jackson: Box: 6. Eisenhower Library.

Eestern GERMAN RETREAT CONTINÚES

On December 7th Moscow reported further Russian advances in White Russia, south west of Tscherkassy and south west of Krementschug. - In White Russia General Rokossovky's army is fifteen kilometres from the important railway junction of Schlobin. South west of Krementschug, General Malinovsky's army has captured the railway junction of Alexandrija. For the last week the OKW has reported almost nothing further of

von Hoth's German counter-offensive west of Kiew, where eight German 'armoured' divisions had been employed. On December 3rd, Moscow reported that the battle in this sector had died down.

The Swiss military expert Franz, Carl Andres wrote recently in the Zuerich «Weltwochen: "The Russian successes are the more impressive because they have been achieved without the use of the Russian winter armies. ار دون معید با و در در با می بادند. در است میرود از از مراد با میرود از روسی از است می داد. مراحب میرود از از مراد با میرود از روسی داد.

### - Post - War Benefits for American Troops

President Roosevelt has sent a message to the American Congress proposing that American soldiers, on their discarge after the war, should receive the following benefits :

Reasonable mustering-out pay.

A uniform system of unemployment allowances.

\*Payment of their contributions to the National Old Age Insurance during their period of service, Opportunity, for those who wish

to do so, to continue their education.

Strain.

#### castigates German genera Itler is That y Ary state

Artillery General you Seydlitz Kurzbach, the commander of the German 51st Corps who captured at Stalingrad, spoke on the Moscow radio on December 1st. He revealed Hitler's complete responsibility for the disaster of Stalingrad. a Hitler gave the order to holdthe Stalingrad front, a said Generalvon Seydlitz, « against the advice of all the German generals whose advice was asked. Amongst those consulted were Field Marshall yon' Manstein, General von Weichs and Armonred Troops General von appointed Chief of General Staff. Paulus. Even Hitler's own newly General' Zeitzier, apposed the Fuchrer's plan. Equally sharp criticism was expressed by the

mmi including Marshall you Richthofen at the beginning of December. The possibilities of supplying the isolated army were regarded as yery doubtful in view of the dif-ficulty of providing sufficient air strength and of the variable weather. These difficulties were especially emphasised by the Chief of Air Staff, Colonel General Jeschönek. a Only one man of all those concerned held a different opinion, and declared, with immeasurable irresponsibility: « My Fuchrer, 1 guarantee that the VIth. Army will be supplied.» That man was' Reichsmarshall Herman Goer-

#### from News Home 3.72

#### Germen soldiers

The Leipziger venesie : « Ger-ehten writes in an editorial ; « German soldiers on leave no lon understand the strange world at home, and revolt against it. They carry their resentment back to the front after their leave, because they. see many able bodied men doing peaceful work in the relatively homeland ». 201

### Hobilization of women.

The National Zeitung of Essen reports that the Essen Labour Office has issued its fourth call bave been liable for registration for defence tasks. The paper says that this fourth summons is neces sary because some women have taken advantage of the confusion caused by raids to avoid registering.

### Steel Output,

The British Ministry of Eco-nomic Warfare estimates that German steel output has declined by from 300.000 to 400.000 tons

month, i. e. by from 30 to 10 per cent of the total output. The Ruhr industry lost about two million\_tons of output in the first six months of 1943. 

### Wer expenditure.

Dr. Otto Schwarz, President of the Revenue Board, writing in the Rankwirtschaft, Calculates that during the first four years of .war Germany has spent 367,000,000,000 RM. Of this sum. 124 milliards have been covered. by taxes, 50 milliards from special revenues and 193 milliards from war loans. (In the first world war the total amount subscribed in Germany to war loans was 98 milliards.)

#### Petition to Hitler.

It is reported from Basel that rooo owners of small businesses in Saxony have addressed a peti-tion to Hitler asking him to stop the Party's present policy of liquidating all small concerns.

Appendix 2-Q:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Rove 6 Elasab

### Ostfront . DER DEUTSCHE RÜCKZUG HALT AN

Am 7. Dezember meldete Monkau weiteres Vorrücken der Russen sudwestlich von Tscherkassy und addwestlich von Krementschug, sowie in Weissrussland.

In Weissrussland steht Rokossovskys Armee 15 km. von dem wichtigen Eisenbahnknotenpunkt Schlobin. Südwestlich von Krementschug hat General Malfnowskys Armee den Eisenbahnknotenpurkt Alexandrija genommen.

Während der vergangenen Woche hatte das OKW fast nichts über von Hoths Gegenoffensive westlich von Kiew zu berichten, bei der acht deutsche Panzerdivisionen singesetzt worden waren. Am 3. Desember meldete. Moskau, dass die Kämpfe in diesem Frontabschnitt zum Stillstand gekommen and.

Der schweizerische Militärsachverständige Major Franz Carl Endres schrieb kürzlich in der Züricher « Weltwoche »: « Die russi-scher Sciolge sind um so einucksvöller, weil sie ohne Beteili-ung der reisischen-Winterarmeen rzielt wurden ». . .

---Vortelle für amerikanische Soldaten nach dem Kriege

In einer Botschaft an den amerikanischen Kongress schlug Präsident Roosevelt folgende Massnahmen für die nach Beendigung des Krieges abgemusterten . amerikanischen Soldaten vor:

Sie sollen bei der Abmusterung eine anständige Aussahlung erhal-ten. Es soll für sie eine allgemeine Arbeitslosenunterstützung geschaffen werden. Ibre Altersrentenbeiträge während der Dienstzeit sollen vom Staat getragen werden. Jedermann soll die Möglichkeit haben, sich weiterzubilden.

Deutscher General beschuldigt Hitle General der Astillerie von Seyd litz-Karzbach, der bel Stalingrad kriegsgefangene Kommandeur des Marschall von Richtholan, Die is deutschen Armeekorpe sprach i Versorgungemöglichkeiten des ko am r. Dearmber am Sender Herten Armes wurden als ahr Moskau. Er enthällte, dass Hitler sweifelhaft erschtet in Hinblick die, vollkommene Verantwortung für die Katastrophe von Stalin-grad mkommt.

stalingradiront ist su halten », ragte General von Seydlitz, wgegen den Rat aller befragten deutschen Generale, Zugezogen zu dem. Kriegsrat wurden: Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein, General von Weichs und General der Panzertruppen von Paulus. Sogar der von Hitler selbst ansgewählte nouemannte Generalstabschef, Geder scharf übten Anfang Dezem-

die Beichlahaber ber die Belehishaber der Luff-waffe Kritik, darunter auch auf die schwankende Wetterlage und auf die Schwierigkeiten, ausreichende Flugkräfte bereitzustellen. Diese Schwierigkeiten wurden besonders von dem Chef des Luftstabes, Generaloberst Jeschonek, betont.

Till and

L-1213

Nur ein einziger unter allen Beteiligten war anderer Ansicht und erklärte mit grenzenloser Verantwortungslosigkeit: Führer, ich verbürge mich für die Versorgung der VI. neral Zeitzler, widersetzte sich Armeel ». tem Plan des Führers. Nicht min- Dieser Mann war Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering .

### lachrichten aus der Heimat

### solderen auf Urlaub.

Die Leipziger Nenesten Nach-ichten schreiben in einem Leitar-Die Leipziger Neuesten ikei : Deutsche Soldaten auf Urlaub erstehen die seltsame Welt in der Heimat nicht länger und lehnen sich digegen auf. Yon ihrem Urlaub nehmen sie diesen Verdruss mit an die Front, weik sie zu Hause viele Friedienstrangliche ; Männer mit denstribeit beschäftigt schen. Minner mit -----đ.,

rung der Frau **Nabilia** 

Die Essener Nationalzeitung be-ichtet, dass das Essener Arbeitsamt mm merten Male die Franen aufruft, die sich seit dem 1. Juni für den Dienst in Abwehrformationen hätten. einschreiben sollen. Die Zeitung erklärt, dass dieser vierte Aufruf notwendig ist, weil einige Frauen notwendig ist, weil einige Frauen die durch Luftangriffe verursachte Verwirrung dazu benutzt haben, der Einschreibung zn. entgeben. -

Stahlerzeugung.

Das britische Ministerium für Kriegwirtschaft schätzt, dass die deutsche Staälerzeugung um 300 bis 400.000. Tonnen pm. Monat, d.h. um bie 40 Prozent der Gesamter-

÷ ۲: zeugung surückgegangen ist. Die Ruhrindustrie verzeichnete für die sechs Monate bis zum 1. Oktober 1943 einen Produktionsrückgang von etwa z Millionen Tonnen.

#### Kriegszusgaben

Dr. Otto Schwarz, der Präsident des Reichsfinanzamts, berechnet -des Zeitschrift e Bankwirtschaft », dass Deutschland während der er-sten vier Jahre dieses Krieges 367 Milliarden Mark verausgabt hat. Von-dieser Summe sind-124 Milliarden durch Steuern gedeckt, 50 Milliarden stammen aus Sonderein-nahmen; und 193 Milliarden sind durch Anleihen aufgebracht worden. (Im ersten Weltkrieg betrug die Gesamtsumme der in allen Kriegsanleihen zezeichneten Beträge rund 98 Milliaruen Mark.)

#### Bittgesuch an Hitler. · · · · · \*\*

Es wird aus Basel berichtet, dass 1000 Eigentümer kleiner Unternebmen in Sachsen ein Bittgeruch an Hitler gerichtet haben, in dem sie ihn darum ersuchen, mit der behordlichen Schliessung der kleinen Unternehmen sufzuhören.

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967. File: Leaflets Algiers (1),

DER AMERI VON 5.4 . . . and breiter ě. ar den Ameril berten 8 2712 i der n "Arme m der amerikanisch . "N mten h. Tropp smerikanischen Ersten Armee vereinigt und somit gruppe B unter Feldmarschall Model sowie das gesamte eingekesselt. Fast 100 000 Seldafen der deutschen Siebe Armee sowie der Platten Tumersemen Asshruchsversuche warden blutig surlichge ien che Münster Boch t her Doici K259 K **Funktingten** Bonn Dillen itz Trappen haben Manster fast ganzlich gesäubert, Rheine erobert und stehen unmittelbar vor Osasbrück. Fromberichten zuloigs hat die Evskuierung Hollands durch die Deutschen bereits begonnen. Ein neuer alliierter Einbruch in Hoiland droht die deutschen Rückzugsstraßen abzuschneiden. Truppen der amerikanischen Dritten Armee kämpten in Fulda, Kassel und im Ramm von Würzburg. Die alliferten Panner stoßen nur auf leichten, desorganisierten Widerstand. Die französische Brste Armer stäft in Richtung Sigmaringen-Stuttgart vor. In einer Woche stellten im Westen 148 600 Deutsche den Kampt ein. Unter den fahlreichen gefangenen Generalen befanden sich General von der Sohu-len burg und Generalleutnant Graf von Oriota. Im Laufe des

ien burg und Generallentnant Graf von Oriota. Im "Laufe des Hingsten allierten Vormarsches wurden folgende deutsche Städte erobert: Frankfurt, Mainz, Mannheim, Gießen, Marburg, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, Duisburg, sowie eine große Anzahl kleinerer Städte.

Appendix 2-S:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967. File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Box: 5. Eisenhower Library.



about cleared Muenster. They captured Rheine and stand just short off Osnabrueck. According to front dispatches, the Germans have started to evacuate Holland. A new Allied advance into Holland threatenes to cut off the German routes of retreat. Troops of the American Third Army are now fighting in Fulda, Kassel and in the area of Wuerzburg. The Allied tanks are only meeting slight and disorganised German resistance. The French First Army is advancing in the direction of Sigmaringen - Stuttgart. In one week, 140,000 Germans laid down their arms in the West. Among the numerous generals that were taken prisoner are General von der Schulenburg and Lt. General Count of Oriola. In the course of the most recent Allied advance, the following German cities were taken: Frankfurt, Mains, Mannheim, Giessen, Marburg, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, Duisburg, and many smaller towns.

Appendix 2-T: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967. File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Box: 5. Eisenhower Library.

General Eisenhower befieh PARIS. - General Elenhower hat einen Betehl an Angehörige der Wehrmacht erlagen, Größe Telle der dentschen Streitkräfte, erklärte General Elsenho sind von ihren höheren Befehlastellen abgeschnitten und der Kontrolle des OKW entzogen. Einheiten wird befohlen, sich unter Befehl ihrer Offiziere in guter Ordnung zu immein und einen Unterhändler mit der weißen Fahne rum nächsten alllierten Gefechtsstand su entsenden. Versprengte Soldaten ergeben sich unbewalfnet, ohne Helm und Koppel.

#### 14(11)(11)(11)(11) Das Tagebuch des NSFO Russen Im Yormarsch auf Wien ذيد تدريد

29

Bati Zilpich. wurds das Tagsbuche des NSFO des IS. Batelionerian S. Regt. der Z. Pallehirmificer Division, LL. Being X., pus Lansphe bei Marburg getinden. Seine Division, bet sion, bet den Landsern als die "Wahnsläns-Division" bekannt.-ist ant 1000. Mann musmmengeschmolzen und im Ruhrgabiet eingekesselt. Der MSFO schriebe.

April-Nr.

\* 15 P. 16 19 19 19

NOSKAU. Die Abers Grense And them. ale b-City of Street auf a ...... A BARSOT . die 7 bur Mattersbu Wiener-Na Einheiten êt i Gras. Nordl Städte Neutra 🔆 foch befreit. B..... befreit, Die Russen beine sich unmittelber vor Brat Iava. An der "uchlesisch Pront eroberten die Russ Rathor und die Russ Peatung Glegau, Gdausk (Du zig) und Gdiugen wurd Bratle zig) ad ebentails erobert.

#### Hindenburgs Neffe

fordert Übergabe PARIS. - Albert .von. His donberg, din Nelle den Reichs präsidenten, hat einen Antre eit geriehtet an die Wehrmaelif ge in dem es beiltz Ah merschall Xvee WHied 1918 um Waffenstillstm suchte, handelle er mit Verantwortung Fund Plichtbewalt inan De land zu erhalten." Albert von Hindenburg war Officier.

Neue USA-Landung im Pazifik

FILL FUZALIK PEARL HARBOR. — Ame-rikasische Truppen sind auf der Insei Oklanwa. 560 km von den Japanischen Hauptren den japanischen Haupt-huseln unflerni, geinndet. Die Landung erloigte unter dem Schutz der größten Plotte. Schutz der größten Plotte, die je im Pernen Osten eins gesetzt worden ist.

Ei Sorrenden! Ei Sörrender!

Die Werte "I surrender" (El sörrender) haben über 1 200 000 deutschen Soldaten im Westen das Leben ge-reitet. "I surrender" bedestet: "Ich ergebe mich." Aler sind einige weitere Anschläche, die jenas Landsen behilf-lich sein können, die im Gefangenschaft gerates.

want in surrouder want to surrouder 71k We. woilen Schluß machen

dat on to track

Steist and dan LXW

C.D. Jackson, Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Appendix 2-U:

States and the second - 049 4KM Wel war V 17.5 1940 General Eisenhower Urders PARIS. - General Eisenhower has published an order to members of the German Wehrmacht. Large parts of the German forces, declared General R Elsenhower, have been cut off from their higher echelons and are no longer under control of the German High Command. Units are ordered to assemble in good order under command of their officers and to send an emissary with the white flag to the nearest Allied command post. Stragglers are to surrender unarmed, without helmet or web equipment.

1.4

1st April Issue

# The Diary of the NSFO

Near Zueipich was found the diary of the Net Soc. Guidance Officer of the 2nd Bu in the 5th Rgt. of the 3rd Paratroop Division, 2nd Lt. Heinz X. from Lansphe year Marburg. His division, which was know among the German soldiers as the "Insanity-Division" has been reduced to a strength of 1000 men and is now encircical in the Ruhr area. The NSPO writes:

reaseed to a strength of 1000 men and is now encircled in the Ruhr area. The NSFO writes: iii the Ruhr area. The NSFO writes: iii to Ruhr area. The NSFO writes: iii to Ruhr area the NSFO writes: iii to Ruhr and the Ruhr area the NSFO writes: iii to Ruhr and the Ruhr area the Stein-manger. the Ruhr area the Stein-inred Mattersharg in Bur-iared Mattersharg in Bur-iarea Mattersharg in Bur-iaread Matters

towards Vienna MOSCOW. - Russian tre have 'crossed the Amstria berder and are advancing in the direction of Vienna. After taking Oedenburg and Stein-

10 A. C.

**Russians** advance

ade

1944 ( III)

TRANSLATION Feldpost

ried margani yon pineeners asked for an instruction, he acted on his own respons-bility and out of his sense of duty, so that Germany might be saved." Albert yon His-designed in the sense of fast denisurg is a former officer.

Ei Sürrender! Ei Sürrender!

words "I surrouder" have saved the lives of ever The world "I survival" five love it will be love of our 1,200,000 German soldiers an the Westers Frent. "I sur-render" means: "I give myself up." Here are some further expressions that may be helpful to each soldier who saves himself by surrendering. (1. Prosunciation: 2. English: 3. German translation.)

<u>574</u> =

Juh kin kam aut san Yon can conte out be Ihr könnt herauskemmen



the Get on the truck Stelet auf den LEW New American Landing in the Pacific

PEARL HARBOR. - Ameri-PEARL HARBOR. — Ameri-can troops have landed on Okinawa Island, which lies 550 km from Japan itself. The landing operations were cov-ered by the largest fleet that was ever put into action in the Far East. The Americans have aiready split the Japan-ese on the island into two separate groups.


### Appendix 2-V:

C.D. Jackson. Papers 1932-1967. File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Box 5. Eisenhower Library.



# Massenübergabe im Westen


PARIS, — Der Zusammenhruch der deutschen Westfront äußert sich in der Massenübergabe hunderitsusender Truppen, die die amerikanische Kriegsgefangenschaft dem sicherun Tode vursiehen. Imgenant stellten in den ersten zwei Aprilwochen 548 000 dentsche Soldnice den Kampf ein Mehr als die Hälfte Deutschlands ist in allierter Hand. Die Amerikaner sind bis Leipzig und Halle vergerückt und stehen unmittelbar vor




Ghemnitz. Dresden ist bedreit. Durch ihren Versteß his unweit die tschechosiowakischen Grenne haber die Amerikaner Deutschland naher in zwei Teile gespalten und bedrehen die deutschen Nachschublinien zur Ostfront. In Söddeutschland wurden Bamberg und Bayreuth besetzt. In Nürnberg wird gekämpft. Nach Säuberung von Braunschweig haben die Amerikaner die Elbe bei Magdeburg überschritten und stehen im Anmarsch auf Berlin. Jena und Weimar wurden genommen. Em den. Oldenburg, Bremen und Hamburg sind unmittelbar bedroht. Der deutsche Ruhrkessel ist fast gänzlich beseitigt. 200 000 Deutsche streckten hier die Waffen. In Hoiland sind 90 000 Deutsche numehr abgeschnitten. Gleichzeitig sind die Russen im Osten über Seelow hinaus ebenfalls im Vormarsch auf Berlin. Iri Österreich rücken sie nach der Befreiung von Wien und St. Pölten auf Graz und Linz vor. In der Tschechoslowakei wurde Brinn befreit.

### Appendix 2-W:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967. File: Leaflets Paris (1), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.



the first two weeks of April, 148.000 German soldiers surrendered. More than one half of Germany is now in Allied hands. The Americans advanced up to Leipzig and Halle and are now immediately before Chemnitz. Dresden is being threatened. Advancing to a point close to the



Czechoslovakian border, the Americans have split Germany almost in two and are threatening the German supply lines for the Eeastern Front. In southern Germany Bamberg and Bayreuth were occupied. Fighting is taking place in Nuremberg. The Americans crossed the Elbe near Magdeburg after clearing Brunswick and are now advancing on Berlin. Jena and Weimar were taken. Emden, Oldenburg Bremen and Hamburg are immediately threatened. The German Ruhr pocket has been almost completely wiped out. In this sector 200,000 Germans laid down their arms. In Holland 80,000 Germans have now been cut off. At the same time the Russians. too, are advancing past Seelow in the direction of Berlin. In Austria they are advancing toward Graz and Linz after liberating Vienna and St. Poelten. In Czechoslovakia Brno was liberated.

Appendix 2-X:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Paris (1), Box: 6 Fisenhower Library



Papen mit Hitler und Gescheit , reichlichen Patrioten verhaftet und hin-Interne gesteilt hal. Während, des ersten Weitkriteges lettete er das deutsche Spinonove Retz in Amerika. In Hitlers erster The glerung war von Papen Vickanzier. Von die Gefreiung Wiener Berölkerung im Kampf 1934 bis 1937 wirkte er dis Tötensnöber füh fälle der Wiener Berölkerung im Kampf Gierreichs. Späler war er Hitlers Balacher und in den Schen Unterdrücker hervor. 16 in der Türkei, bis ihm vor kurzen der Vor dem Wiener Parlament wurde die Reisepas ausgehändigt wurde.

· OKID meidet Erfolg Am 13. April, dem Tage an n Westen 57 187 dentithe S affen streckien, meldets dem allein ebe Soldaten. Wallen strechten, meiden Gewienen OKW-Bericht: "Marine-Eampführen versenk-ien vor der Elste der Prischen Nehrung ein sowjetisches Schneibest."

#### Neue Hallen-Offensive

ROM. — Allilerte Truppen sind in Immoia eingedrungen and betinden sich im Anmarsch sut Bologna. Die amerikanische Fünfte Armee sieht im reschen Vorsteß auf den Kriegshafen Le Spezia.

Schörner neuer OB-Ost? LONDON- Litten Berichten rufolge, soll Generaloberst Beins Guderian als OB-Ost abgesetzt, verhattet und durch Feld-marschall Schörner ersetzt worden sein.

#### Scholtz-Klink verüht Selbstmord

BERN. - Aus der Schweiz wird gemeldet. aß die Reichstrauenführerin Scholtz-Klink in Stuttgart Seibstmord veräht hat.

#### Luftwafte erhält Gnadenstoß

LONDON. - Am 16. April wurden über 700 deutsche Flugzerige in der Luft und auf dem Boden von allierten Flugzengen zerstört. Baldur vs. Schräch hingerichtet MOST-U - Neufalm dir Moskauer Rund-funkt bekanntesb. den SS-Obersgruppenfüh-ter, Sepr. Dienicht-in Wien erschossen Baldur 100 Schliesch is Wien von öster-reichlichen Patrioten verhaftet und hin-derichter wurde verhaftet und hin-

IN KASSEL WURDEN 16-333. und der 116. Parzer bei seiner Vernehmung in jährige Hillerjungen von Ge-neral von Erzleben auf der Straße angehalten und in die nachste Wehrmachts-Barracke überührt. Am seiben Tage Bürgermeister von Ohrdruf, gänzlich eingestellt." Wa 3 Uhr woren sie an der Front. Um 5 Uhr belanden sie er zusammen mit dilierten sich in Kriegsgelangenschalt. MIIIärbehörden. das nahelier gende Konzeatrationslager in-gende Konzeatrationslager in-gene Landser erklärten, daß Bricken über die Leine nicht gesamte 130. Panzer-Lchr-Di-Isendorf gelangen genommen. Die Division war noch 3000 ALFRED KRUPP, LEITER ser die alten Brücken zer-Mann stark. Die Resie der der Krupp-Werke, erklärtelstören konnten.

Appendix 2-Y:

Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Paris (1), Box: C.D. Jackson:



Von Papen with Hiller and Goebbels Was repeat with littler and German espionage in America. In Hitler's first government, von Papen was Vice Chancellor. From 1934 to 1937 he was active as grave-digger of Austria. Later he became Hitler's ambassador to Turkey until he was handed the passport a short time ago. short time ago.

**Red-White-Red over Vienna** MOSCOW. — Marshal Stalin, in an order of the day, concerning the liberation of Vienna placed special emphasis on the assistance given by the Viennese population in the fight against the German oppressors. The Austrian mational flag was hoisted in front of the Viennese Parifament.

# Signs of Collapse

GENERAL VON ERZLEBEN, the 338th Division and of the stopped some 16 year old members of the Hiller Youth and brought them to the next urmy barracks. At three o'clock of the same day they were sent to the front. By suicide after he had inspected the nearby concentration camp loghther with American williary authorities. In the CON APRIL 15TH. THE camp longther with American wors taken prisoner in the Runr pocket near Isendorf. The situition consisted of 2000 aten once. The remnants of the Krupp Factories, declared could destroy the old ones.

Appendix 2-Z:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1932-1967, File: Leaflets Paris (1), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

# **APPENDIX CHAPTER 3**

TRANSLATION OF ZG73K



### which may save your life

Read the following 6 points carefully and thoroughly. They may mean to you the difference between life and death.

**1.** Courage alone, in these battles of materiel, cannot make up for deficiencies in tanks, planes and artillery.

2. With the collapse in the West, North and Southeast the decision has been reached: Germany has lost the war.

3. You are not facing barbarians who kill for the joy of killing, but you are facing soldiers who would spare your life.

4. But we can only spare those who do not force us, by senseless resistance, to use our weapons against them.

5. It is up to you to let us know your intention clearly, by raising the hands, waving a handkerchief, etc.

**6.** Prisoners-of-war are treated fairly and decently, without harshness—as becomes enemies who have fought bravely.

The decision is in your hands. However, if you should find yourself in a tough spot, remember what you have read.

Appendix 3-A:

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Collection of 20th Century Military Records, 1918-1950, File: SHAEF Booklet, Box: 1, Eisenhower Library.

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Appendix 3-B:

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Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Collection of 20th Century Military Records, 1918-1950, File: SHAEF Booklet, Box: 1, Eisenhower Library

# Worum in den letzten Tagen des Krieges sterben? SCHLUSS MACHEN!

. جمع می ایند

> DU KANNST DICH ERGEBEN, Du die Hände hochhebst, Dich den Allilierten näherst und ihnen "Ei sörrender!" (Ich ergebe mich) zurufst. Mache es ganz klar, dass Du aufgibst: Heim herunter, Koppel ebenfails. Schwenke ein Taschentuch oder Flugblatt.

> KANNST DU DAS NICHT, DANN warte bis der Angriff Dich erreicht hat. Oder bleibe zurück wenn dle anderen zurückgenommen werden. Vorsicht: Mache es klar, dass Du aus dem Kampf scheidest. Fanatiker, die trotz der hoffnungslosen Lage weiterkämpfen, sind verloren.

> KANNST DU AUCH DAS NICHT, DANN setze ailes daran, die Kampfzone zu verlassen. Wir wollen Dein Leben schonen. Wer aber weiterkämpft, kann nicht geschont werden. Bist Du bei Zivillsten, dann melde Dich sofort nach Eintreffen der Allierten den Behörden.

> > ZG 125

Appendix 3-C: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967. File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

# Why die in the last days of the war?



TRANSLATION OF ZG 125

**.** 

# <u>SAFETY!</u>

YOU CAN SURRENDER, BY RAISING your arms, approaching the Allies and crying "El sörrender". Make it quite plain that you are giving up. Take off heimet, web equipment. Wave a handkerchief or leaflet.

IF YOU CAN'T DO THAT, then wait until the attack reaches you. Or remain behind when the others are pulled back. Important: Make it unmistakably clear you are quitting. Fanatics who fight on despite their hopeless situation, are lost.

IF YOU CAN'T DO THAT EITHER, then try by all means to leave the battle area. We want to spare your life. But those who persist in fighting can't be saved. If you stay with civilians, be sure to report to the authorities upon arrival of the Allies.

Appendix 3-D:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967. File: Paris (2), Box: 6.

# ZWEI WORTE die 1000000 Leben retteten

**"EI SÖRRENDER"** sagten allein im Westen I 000 000 Deiner Kameraden, weil sie einsahen, dass ihre Lage hoffnungslos war.

**"EI SÖRRENDER"** bedeutete für 1 000 000 Deiner Kameraden, dass sie aus der Hölle der Materialschlacht in Sicherheit gelangten.

**"EI SÖRRENDER"** bedeutete für 1 000 000 Deiner Kameraden, dass sie die Heimat nach Kriegsende gesund und wohlbehalten wiedersehen.

Auch für Dich öffnen ZWEI WORTE den Weg in die Heimat. ZWEI WORTE: EI SÖRRENDER"

Appendix 3-E: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967. File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.



# that saved 950000 Lives

**EI SORRENDER**" said 950 000 of your comrades in the West alone, because they realized that their position was hopeless.

**EI SÖRRENDER**" meant that 950 000 of your comrades got out of the hell of a battle of material, into safety.

**"EI SÖRRENDER"** meant that 950 000 of your comrades will see home again, healthy and well, after the end of the war.

For you also TWO WORDS show the road home TWO WORDS:

# "EI SÖRRENDER"

Appendix 3-F: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (3), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.



EINZELNE SOLDATEN ODER KLEINE GRUPPEN ergeben sich, indem sie Waffen, Helm und Koppel ablegen, die Hände hochheben und entweder ein Taschentuch oder ein Flugblatt schwenken. Sind alliierte Soldaten in unmittelbarer Nähe, so sind diese mit "Ei sörrender" anzurufen. Passierscheine, wenngleich nützlich, sind nicht unbedingt erforderlich. Sammelplätze für Kriegsgefangene befinden sich entlang den Haupt- und Durchgangsstrassen.

Sofern die Übergabe in grösseren Gruppen erfolgt, hat sie unter Beachtung militärischer Disziplin durchgeführt zu werden. Der jeweils befehishabende Unteroffizier ist verantwortlich für die ordnungsgemässe Durchführung. Offiziere übergeben ihre Einheiten geschlossen, wenn möglich an einen alliferten Offizier ebenbürtigen Ranges. Sind Besprechungen erforderlich, so können sich laut Haager Konvention beglaubigte Parlamentäre mit dem nächstgelegenen alliferten Gefechtsstand in persönliche Verbindung setzen.

#### 

# Behandlung von Kriegsgefangenen.

1. SOFORTIGE ENTFERNUNG AUS DER KAMPFZONE. Stammlager stehen für Euch schon bereit.

2. ANSTÄNDIGE BEHANDLUNG. Auf Grund der Genfer Konvention werdet ihr wie Soldaten behandelt.

3. GUTE VERPFLEGUNG. Ihr erhaltet dieselbe Kost wie wir, das bestverpflegte Heer der Weit.

4. LAZARETTBEHANDLUNG. Eure Verwundeten und Kranken werden genau so behandelt wie die unsrigen.

5. SCHREIBGELEGENHEIT. Ihr könnt je Mann 4 Karten und 4 Briefe per Monat nach Hause schreiben.

6. RÜCKKEHR. Nach Kriegsende werdet Ihr so bald wie möglich nach Hause zurückgeschickt.

Appendix 3-G:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

# What is to be done?

SINGLE SOLDIERS IN SMALL GROUPS surrender by removing weapons, helmet and belt, raising their arms and waving either a handkerchief or a leaflet. If Allied soldiers are in the immediate vicinity, they are to be addressed by calling "Ei sörrender". Safe Conducts, although helpful, are not absolutely essential. Collection points for prisoners-of-war are located along the main highways and thoroughfares.

Where large groups surrender, this has to be carried out while observing military discipline. The ranking non-commissioned officer is responsible for its orderly execution. Officers surrender their units in a body, if possible, to an Allied officer of equal rank. If parleys are required, authorized parlementaires may be sent according to the Hague Convention, to contact the nearest Allied Command Post.

# Treatment of Prisoners.

1 IMMEDIATE REMOVAL from the battle-zone. Base camps are ready to receive you.

2. DECENT TREATMENT. According to the Geneva Convention, you are treated like soldiers.

3. GOOD FOOD. You receive the same nourishment as we, the best-fed army in the world.


4. HOSPITAL CARE. Your wounded and sick are treated just like our own.

5. MAIL CONNECTION. You can write four postcards and four letters home per man per month.

6. RETURN HOME. After the war you are returned home as soon as possible.

Appendix 3-H: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

### SUPREME HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ALLIED



- The rapid advance of the Allies has resulted in numerous German units being separated from their command and split up, thereby being unable to receive orders from their German superiors.
- In order to avoid needless loss of human lives, it is hereby ordered :

1. German soldiers who are cut off or separated from their units, as well as units separated from their higher echelons, are to give themselves up to the nearest Allied unit.

2. The highest ranking officer or noncommissioned officer at present remains responsible for the discipline of his men. Individual stragglers are to report with the usual signs of surrendering, as described on the other side. Contine :

Appendix 3-I:

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Collection of 20th Century Military Records, 1918-1950, File: SHAEF Booklet, Box: 1, Eisenhower Library.

# Verhaltungsmassregeln

# EINZELÜBERGABE:

Kleine Gruppen von nicht über 5 Mann ergeben sich, indem sie Waffen, Helm und Koppel ablegen, die Hände hochheben und entweder ein Taschentuch oder ein Flugblatt schwenken. Sind alliierte Soldaten in unmittelbarer Nähe, so sind diese anzurufen. Passierscheine, wenngleich nützlich, sind nicht unbedingt erforderlich. Sammelplätze für Kriegsgefangene befinden sich entlang den Haupt- und Durchgangsstrassen.

### GRUPPENÜBERGABE:

Sofern die Übergabe in kleinen Gruppen erfolgt, gelten dieselben Bestimmungen wie oben. Für grössere Einheiten ist laut Haager Konvention vorgesehen, dass Offiziere ihre Mannschaft unter dem Zeichen der weissen Fahne an den nächsten alliierten Offizier (wenn möglich, ebenbürtigen Ranges) übergeben. Sind Besprechungen erforderlich, so können beglaubigte Parlamentäre sich mit dem nächsten alliierten Gefechtsstand in persönliche Verbindung setzen.

Appendix 3-J: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Collection of 20th Century Military Records, 1918-1950, File: SHAFE Booklet Box: 1

TRANSLATION OF ZG60

# **Rules of Conduct**

### INDIVIDUAL SURRENDER:

Small groups of not more than five men surrender by putting away weapons, helmet and belt, raising their arms and waving either a handkerchief or a leaflet. If Allied soldiers are in the immediate vicinity they are to be called. Safe Conducts, though helpful, are not absolutely necessary. Collection points for prisoners-of-war are to be found along the main highways and thoroughfares.

# **GROUP SURRENDER:**

- . . .

Insofar as the surrender is accomplished in small groups, the same rules as above apply. For larger units, it is provided in the Hague Convention that officers may surrender their men under the sign of a white flag to the nearest Allied officer, if possible of the same rank. If parleys are necessary, accredited parlementaires may communicate personally with the nearest Allied command post.

Appendix 3-K: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Collection of 20th Century Military Records, 1918-1950, File: SHAEF Booklet, Box: 1, Eisenhower Library

The of his genuine He is to looked after, he fnoved from to recei ation the da HEADQUARTERS THE ARMY GROUP. ..... ÷. 3 NA . .

PASSIERSCHEIN. An die britischen und amerikanischen Vorposten: Der deutsche Soldat, der diesen Passierschein vorzeigt, benutzt ibn als Zeichen für seinen ehrlichen Willen, sich zu ergeben. Er ist zu entwaffnen. Er muss gut behandelt werden. Er hat Anspruch auf Verpflegung und, wenn nötig, ärztliche Behandlung. Er muss so rasch wie möglich aus der Gefahrenzone entfernt werden.

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Appendix 3-L: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (4), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

# **APPENDIX CHAPTER 4**

1943 Es tut mir leid, dassich nichts Notzle theres schatten kann.

AM 8. NOVEMBER 1943 SAGTE HITLER: ...Was bedeutet es schon fuer uns. wonn wir einmai ein paar Kilometer aufgeben muessen oder selbst ein paar hundert Kilometer .....

AM 8. NOVEMBER 1943 SAGTE HITLER: ...Ich freue mich vor dem Ailmaechtigen, dass er uns so ausgedehnte Erfolge geschickt hat. Es haette auch genau so sein koennen, dass sich der Krieg auf deutsches Gebiet gewaelzt haette. AM. 6. NOVEMBER eroberten die Russen KIEW. Die Verinste der Deutschen in der Schlacht um Kiew betrugen: 15 000 Gefallene. 6 200 Gefangene.

VON JANUAR 1943 BIS OKTOBER 1943 wurden weit mehr als 100 000 Tonnen Bomben ueber Deutschland abgeworfen.

"Wenn jemals unser Volk zerbrechen wuerde, dann wuerde ich darueber keine Traene weinen. Dann wuerde es nichts Besseres verdient haben," SAGTE HITLER am 8. NOVEMBER 1943.

**\_** w.

Appendix 4-A: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (4), (Front)

Translation of German Leaflet G. W.

1943

« I regret that I cannot do anything more useful... »

(Back)

On November 8, 1943, Hitler said :

« What difference does it make to us, anyhow, if we have to give up once a lew miles, or even a lew hundred miles... »

> On November 6, the Russians conquered Kiev. The German losses in the battle of Kiev amounted to 15,000 dead and 6,200 captured.

On November 8, 1943, Hitler said :

" I rejoice that the Almoghty has granted us such enormous successes. It could as well have been just the other way around — that the war would have spread on to German soil ",

> From January, 1943, till October, 1943, far more than 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Germany.

« IF EVER OUR PEOPLE SHOULD BREAK, I WOULDN'T SHED A SINGLE TEAR. IN THAT CASE, THEY WOULDN'T HAVE DESERVED ANYTHING BETTER, » SAID HITLER ON NOVEMBER 8, 1943.

Appendix 4-B: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (4), Box: 4, Eisenhower Library.

# **CLIQUE 3** In seiner Radio-Ansprache hat Hitler zugegeben, dass der Friedens-Putsch von deutschen Offizieren organisiert worden ist. Göring nannte in seiner Ansprache die Männer hinter der Bewegung "eine kleine Clique von ehemaligen Generalen".

Hier sind die unbestreitbaren Tatsachen: Hitler und Himmler haben die militärische Leitung des Krieges gänzlich aus den Händen der Berufsoffiziere genommen. Unter den von Hitler abgesetzten Generalen sind:

Generalfeldmarschall Fedor v. Bock, Generalfeldmarschall Walter v. Brauchitsch, Generalfeldmarschall Ewald v. Kleist, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter v. Leeb, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List, Generalfeldmarschall Fritz Erich v. Manstein, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd v. Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Erich v. Witzleben, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck, Generaloberst Freiherr v. Falkanhausen, Generaloberst Fritz Fromm, Generaloberst Fritz Fromm, Generaloberst Fritz Halder, Generaloberst Erich Höppner, Generaloberst Richard Ruoff, Generaloberst Adolf Strauss.

Ist das eine "kleine Clique"? Sind sie "gewissenlos"? Jedenfalls handelt es sich bei den obenstehenden Generalen um Wehrmachts-Offiziere, die in militärischen Belangen anders denken als die politische Führung. Die "kleine Clique" bestand darauf, dass Deutschland den Krieg sofort beendigen muss.

Es ist klar, dass es in Deutschland jetzt nur mehr ` zwei Seiten gibt: Die Seite der Kriegs-Yerlängerer und die Seite der Friedens-Beschleuniger.

76 15

Appendix 4-C: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967. File: PWD Rear, Box: 9, Eisenhower Library. Chverse

#### A SIML CLIQUE ?

In his radio opecal, Hitler (duitted that the place jutcoh had been organised by German officers. Geering, in his speech, called the den behind the movement a "shall clique of former generals."

Here and the incontrovertible Frets: Hitler and Himler have taken the Mulitary conduct of the war entirely cut of the hands of the professional officers. Among the generals sacked b Hitler are the following:

> Gen rol Field Marshal Feder v. Bock, General Field Marshal Ealter v. Brouchitsch, General Field Marshal Ealter v. Brouchitsch, General Field Marshal Wilhelm Mitter v. Leb, General Field Marshal Wilhelm List, General Field Marshal Gerd v. Aundotedt, General Field Marshal Gerd v. Aundotedt, General Field Marshal Erich v. Witzleben, Colonel General Indwig Deck, Colonel General Fritz From, Colonel General Fritz From, Colonel General Fritz Maker, Colonel General Fritz Maker,

Is that a "small clique"? Are they "irredponsible"? In any event, the above list of generals is one of Wehrmacht officers who think differently, in willtary matters, from the political lastdership. The "small clique" insisted that Germany wast impediately end the war.

> It is clear that there are only two sides in Garmany now: The side of the war-prolongers and the side of the packe-hasteners.

Appendix 4-D:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: PWD Rear, Box: 9, Eisenhower Library.

# FEST STEHT FOLGENDES:

1 Dass die deutsche Generalität am besten weiss, wie die militärische Lage ist.

 Dass die deutsche Generalität zu der Einsicht gelangt ist, dass Deutschland den Krieg verloren hat.
 Dass die deutsche Generalität daher verlangt hat, dass der Krieg beendet wird.

4. Dass die deutsche politische Führung nicht Frieden schliessen kann ohne unterzugehen.

5. Dass die deutsche Generalität, als ihrem Verlangen nicht entsprochen wurde, selbst handeln musste.

6. Dass die Friedensbewegung nicht von einer "kleinen Clique" stammte, sondern von erfahrenen Generalen.

### DU WEISST JETZT BESCHEID:

Heute weisst du, was die deutsche Generalität in den letzten Wochen selbst erkennen musste : dass Deutschland die militärische Niederlage nicht mehr vermeiden kann. Und dass die politische Führung nicht gewillt ist, daraus die Konsequenz zu ziehen. Warum? Weil sie weiss, dass das Kriegsende ihr eigenes Ende bedeutet.

## WAS IST ZU TUN?

DIE HEIMAT tut, was sie kann, um den Frieden zu beschleunigen. Trotz Gestapo, trotz Hinrichtungen und Massenrepressalien haben Deutschlands Arbeiter erkannt, dass die Räder der Kriegsmaschine nur durch Massen-Arbeitsverweigerung stillgelegt werden können.

DIE FRONT selbst hat oft Gelegenheit, den Frieden zu beschleunigen. 50 000 deutsche Soldaten weigerten sich, auf der Cherbourg-Halbinsel Selbstmord zu begehen. Im Osten ergab sich die gesamte 4. Armee in hoffnungsloßer Lage auf Befehl von Generalleutnant Müller.

Letzten Endes liegt es aber an dir selbst, ob du für dich selbst Frieden schliesst oder dich in den Untergang des Systems mitreissen lässt. Dein Leben Tiegt in deiner eigenen Hand. Und mit ihm die Zukunft Deutschlands. Denn Deutschland wird dich nach dem Krieg brauchen.

### Appendix 4-E:

4

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: PWD Rear, Box 9, Eisenhower Library.

#### Reverse

THE FOLLOWING IS CERTAIN: A CARACTER STATE

- 1. That the Gerran generalcy is the best position to know the military situation.
- 2. That the German generalcy came to the conclusion that Germany has lost the war.
- 3. That the German generalcy therefore depended that the war be stopped.
- 4. Thit the German political leadership cannot make peace without parishing.
- 5. That the German generalcy, when their demends were not mut, had to act themselves.
- 6. That the peace movement did not originate with a "small clique" but with experienced generals.

#### YOU NOW KNOW THE SCORE!

Today you know what the German generalay had to recognise themcolves in the last weeks: That Germany cannot evoid military defeat. And that the political heddership is not willing to draw the consequences from this. Why? Eccuse they know that the end of the war means their own end.

#### THE IS TO BE DONE?

THE HOMELAND are doing that they can in order to haston the peace. Lospite Gertapo, despite executions and hast reprisels, German workers have realised that the wheels of the war machine can only be stopped by refusal to work, on a mass scale.

THE FRONT itself often has an opportunity to harten the peace. 50,000 German soldiers refused to commit suicido on the Cherbourg Peninsula. In the East, theentire 4th army surrendered in a hopeless situation, on order of Lieutenant General Millor.

In the end it is up to yourself, howev r, whether you make your even peace or get pulled down into the defect of the regime. Your life is in your own hend. And with it, the future of Germany. For Germany will

Appendix 4-F: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File PWD Rear, Box 9, Eisenhower Library.

#### Reverse

THE FOLLOWING IS CERTAIN: The state of the s

. . . . . ....

- 1. That the Gerran generalcy is the best position to know the military situation.
- 2. That the German generalcy came to the conclusion that Germany has lost the war.

- 3. That the German generalcy therefore demended that the war be stopped.
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Appendix 4-F: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File PWD Rear, Box 9, Eisenhower Library. Heute sind die eillierten Luftstreitkreefte mit ihren viernistorigen Riesenbombern und ihren modernen englischen und amerikanischen Jaegern der Luftwaffe weit veberlegen.

Alle Fernkempfflugzouge Deutschlends, zusammen genommen, weeren nicht imstende, die zwei Millionen Kile Bomben ebzuwerfen, die die R.A.F. bei einem einzigen Angriff auf Dertmand oder Hamburg oder Berlin abwarf.

In den Endphasen der Schlachten in Tunesien Lund Sizilien mussten die deutschen Soldaten in ihren Splittergraeben so gut wie ohne Luftsicherung kaempfen.

In solcher Loge sind elle Opfer und elle Tepferksit der deutschen Infanteristen vergebens.

Denn die Kriegsverloengerer in Berlin haben heute nur noch einen Gedenken : Den Teg der unvermeidlichen Niederlage hinaussuschleben. Das sollten die deutschen Soldeten in ihren Splittargresben wissen. Und sie sollten erich deren denken je kuerzer der Krieg deuert, deste besser die Folgen fuer des deutsche Volk.

Das weiss die deutsche Fuehrung ganz genau, wenn sie die deutschen Soldaten in den Kampf schickt.

GE - 198

# Die Luftwaffe kann den deutschen Soldaten keine Luftsicherung mehr geben!

Mit eigenen Augen sah jeder deutsche Soldat auf Sizilien genau wie in Tunesien, dass die geschwaechte deutsche Luftwaffe heute nicht mehr imstande ist, die Infanterie zu beschuetzen.

Jeder Brief und jede Zeitung aus der Heimat zeigen, dass Deutschland nicht mehr gegen die immer wuchtigere Luftoffensive geschuetzt werden kann, die Hitlers Kriegsindustrie in Stuecke schlaegt.

Aber dies alles ist nicht viel mehr als der Anfang. DIE UEBERLEGENHEIT DER ALLIIERTEN LUFTSTREITKRAEFTE WIRD VON TAG ZU TAG GROESSER WERDEN I

GE - 100

Appendix 4-G: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (6), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library. Translation GE-100.

#### THE TRUTH!

ł

Today the Allied Air Forces with their four-engined giant bombers and their modern English and American fighters are far superior to the Luftwaffe.

Germany's total bomber strength would not be able to drop the 2,000,000 Kilos of bombs which the R.A.F. dropped in the single attacks on Dortmund, Hamburg and Berlin.

IN THE FINAL PHAGE OF THE BATTLES OF TUNISIA AND SICILY, GERMAN SOLDIERS HAD TO FIGHT IN THEIR SLIT TRENCHES PRACTICALLY WITHOUT AIR PROTECTION.

In this sort of situation all the sacrifice and courage of the German infantryman is useless.

The "war prolongers" in Berlin have only got one idea today: to postpone the day of unavoidable defeat. That is something which the German soldiers in their trenches should know, and they should also think of this: the shorter the war, the better the consequences for the German people.

THE GERMAN LEADERSHIP KNOWS THAT PERFECTLY WELL WHEN IT SEMDS THE GERMAN SOLDIER INTO BATTLE.

#### Reverse.

#### THE LUFTWIFFT CAN NO LONGER GIVE AIR PROTECTION TO THE GERMAN SOLDIER.

Every German soldier in Sicily and in Tunisia saw with his own eyes the weakened Luftwaffe is now no longer capable of protecting the infantry.

Every letter and every newspaper from home shows that Germany can no longer be protected against the ever heavier air offensive which is smashing Hitler's war industry to smithereens.

But all this is not much more than the beginning.

THE LILIED AIR SUFERICRITY GROWS GREATER DAY BY DAY.

Appendix 4-H:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (6), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

#### ( " GAINING-TIME " FØR WHAT?

Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Sicily and now Ituly. The Voign, the Don. the Donetz. the Dnieper and now the Beresina. On both fronts the German soldier has been in almost continual retreat for a year.

ZEIT GEWINNE

Yet he is ordered to fight on - « to gain time », say his officers. To gain time for what ?

#### Every day of war

thousands of young Germans are being killed or permanently rippied on the Eastern Front. In each new German age-class there are 600,000 nen, in each new Zussian age-class two millions.

#### Every day of

at the present-rate, 600,000 kilo of bombs, on an average, are dropped on Germany every day. (Bomb-load in November: 18 million tons.)


Every day of war increases the United Nations' superiority in material. England and America alone are now building four times as many aircraft as Germany.

#### Every day of wer

the SS and the Gestapo, by their shootings of hostages and their mass-reprisals against civilians in nine occupied countries, are making it more difficult for post-war Germany to regain an "conourable place amongst the nations.

German soldiers, that's what you're fighting on for - 'to increase the chaos and misery in your own country, now and after the war.

G.B.da



German factory plants, power-houses, railway stations. blast furnaces - the whole Industrial machine that is supposed to supply the German soldier, with weapons now, and with a career and livelihood after the war is being smashed from both west and south. .

# What are you still Defending?

Whilst the German soldier holds out on the soil of Italy, up in the sky pass the Allied bomber formations to smash the German war machine in his rear. Every week fewer aircraft. guns, tanks and locomotives are being built in Germany: Two thirds of all German fighters are now in the west. But that's not enough.

600,000 kilo of bombs, on an everage, are dropped on Germany every day.

Appendix 4-I:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Box: 5. Eisenhower Library.

# What is the set concealed from the German soldier \_\_\_\_\_\_

the state and the state of the In the first world war Germany lost suco coo men killed ent published full ad At regular intervals the Kaiser's governa of the fallen. Sair alf a country with S stallad with In this war Germany has lost for more men than last time. Hitler's government publishes or this. (or there a light the set of the set o

In October, 1943 America built 3,638 aircraft. England and Ag together are building four times as many aircraft as German .

#### 3. Allted ship building:

In the nine months up to September, 1043, Allied shipping by six million tens. × ;- ± '

#### 4. Allied war-aims:

ROOSEVELT (7.10-12) . We shall touch no hair on the head of the ordinary man in the Axis countries.s. CHURCHILL (so.d.40): « The branking of the Nazi rule will immediately bring to all peoples in Europe, including the Germans and Austrians, bread, peace and irrendom. STALIN (31.1.1): elt would be stupid to identify the Hitler clique with the German people and state. History tescas that Hitlers come and go, but the German people and state remain.»

G.B.4.

# What can't be sconcealed from the German soldier

#### Now that the youth of Germany is bled white. Hitler Poles, Crechs Snd Slovenes into Germi 1.00

2. The failure of the Bormon Laftare The Alline Air Yours makes sweine me The Alline an .....

مىيىنى . مەلىيىنى . . . . . . 3. Allied supremony in artilizerst. De investion of the German area industry in the Ruhr and now also farther case in Germany-ic series its after lins eastern and southern fronts.

4. The latters of Garman U-heats: Men of he toth Panzer-division saw with their own eres the huge teets of Allied ships off Salerno,

5. The break-up of German family Mas In fetters from home the German toldier tands how his venentelk and parents are being packed of into atms factories, to work and live under pergetual air raids, whilst his children are housed with strangers.

#### 8. The less of the Ukralaet

A giance at the map shows what Germany has lose this year: the remary of the Ukraine, the industry of the Donets basin-all the plunger for which Hitler paid millions of German lives.

63.

Appendix 4-J:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967. File: Leaflets Algiers (4), 6, Eisenhower Library. Box:



# DIE DREI-MAECHTE ERKLAERUNG

W IR. der Praesident der Vereinigten Staaten, der Premier Minister Gross-Britanniens und der Premier der Sowjet-Union. sind wachrend der vergangenen vier Tage zusammengetroffen und haben in der Hauptstadt unseres Bundesgenossen Iran unserer Politik die gemeinsame Form und Bestaetlgung gegeben.

Wir geben unserem Willen Ausdruck, dass unsere Voeiker wachrend des Krieges und des darauffolgenden Friedens zusammen arbeiten werden.

Was den Krieg betrifft, haben unsere militaerischen Staebe an unseren Besprechungen teilgenommen und gemeinsam haben wir unsere Plaene fuer die Vernichtung der deutschen Streitkraefte ausgearbeitet. Ueber die Ausdehnung und den

Appendix 4-K: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Box: 5, Eisenhower Library. Zorpunkt der vom Osten. Westen und Sueden geplanten Operationen wurde eine vollkommene Einigung erreicht.

Die hier erzielte gemeinsame Verstaendigung verbuergt ans den Sieg.

was den Frieden betrifft, sind wir sicher, dass unser Vertrag einen dauernden Frieden gewachrleisten wird. Wir sind uns der hoechsten Verantwortung, die auf uns und allen Vereinten Nationen ruht, voll bewusst, einen Frieden zu schaffen, der das Einverstaendnis der ueberwachtigenden Masse der Voelker der Erde herbeifuehren soll und die kommenden Generationen von der Geissel und dem Schrecken des Krieges befreien wird.

Gemeinsam mit unseren diplomatischen Beratern haben wir die Probleme der Zukunft ueberprueft. Wir suchen die Zusammenarbeit und die aktive Teilnahme aller Nationen, ob gross oder klein, deren Voelker, ebenso wie unsere eigenen Voelker, sich mit Herz und Seele der Ausrottung von Tyrannei und Versklavung, Unterdrueckung und Unduldsamkeit, gewidmet haben. Sollten sie diesem Wunsche Ausdruck verleihen, werden wir sie in einer Weitfamilie der demokratischen Nationen willkommen heissen.

Keine Macht der Erde kann uns davon abhalten Deutschlands Heere zu Land, seine U-Boote zur See und seine Kriegsfabriken aus der Luft zu zerstoeren.

Unsere Angriffe werden haerter und haeufiger werden.

Nach diesen freundschaftlichen Konferenzen sehen wir mit Zuversicht dem Tage entgegen, an dem alle Voeiker der Welt ain freies, von Tyrannei unberuchrtes Leben, ühren verschiedeaen Wuenschen und ihrem eigenen Gewissen entsprechend, fuchren werden.

Wir sind hier mit Hoffnung und Entschlossenheit zusamnen gekommen.

Wir verlassen die Konferenz als Freunde in der Tat, im Geist und die Ziel.

> FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT J. ) STALIN WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

Geseichnet. Teherun, 1. Dezember 1943.

(17195

Appendix 4-L: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Box:5, Eisenhower Library.

#### DECLARATION OF THE THREE FOTERS

WE-- The President of the United States, the Frime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our detomaination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

is to war-- our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and time of the operations to be undertaken from the East, West and South.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be curs.

and as to peace-- we are sure that our concord will win an enduring reade. We recognise fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Mations to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peaples of the world and banish the securge and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the co-operation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intelerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can provent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by son, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Energing from these cordial conferences we lock with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences

We came here with hope and determination. We loave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

(signed) Franklin D. Rousevelt J. V. Stalin Vinet m C. Churchill.

Appendix 4-M:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Leaflets Algiers (1), Box: 5, Eisenhower Library.

# DIE LAGE .... am 24. März 1945

# WESTFRONT

Auf einer 350 km breiten Front, von NIMWEGEN bis LUDWIGSHAFEN, stehen die alliierten Armeen am RHEIN.

Britische Truppen haben bei WESEL den RHEIN auf breiter Front überschritten. Laut deutschen Berichten haben die Amerikaner bei OPPENHEIM, südlich MAINZ, einen dritten Brükkenkopf erzwungen. Der Brückenkopf bei REMAGEN erstreckt sich jetzt in einer Breite von ungefähr 50 km von BONN bis NEUWIED.

In den letzten drei Tagen wurden unter vielen anderen die folgenden deutschen Städte von den Allijerten besetzt: MAINZ, KOBLENZ, PIRMASENS, BINGEN, WORMS, SPEYER und LUDWIGSHAFFN.

In der vergangenen Woche fielen allem auf dem Fronrabschnitt südlich der MOSEL über 100.000 deutsche Kriegsgefangene in allierte Hände.



In den Kämpfen südlich KOENIGSBERG wurden von den Russen unter anderem Kriegsmaterial 204 Panzer und Sturmgeschütze. 1050 Kraftfahrzeuge und 633 Eisenbahnwaggons erbeutet.

Im Raume von DANZIG wurden die dort eingeschlossenen deutschen Truppen weiter an die Ostsee zurückgedrängt. ZOPPOT ist gefallen. Russische Einheiten stehen 5 km vor GC-TENHAFEN und 10 km vor DANZIG.

Westlich und südlich von OPPELN Inden Marschall KONIEWS Truppen die deutschen Stellungen durchbrochen und sind 40 km weich bis PEUSTADT vorgedrungen. Deutsche Marlinste betrugen 30.000 Tote und 15.000 Kriegtgelangene. Ueber 400 Ortrihalten wurden von den Pristen erobert.

. .

Appendix 4-N: C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library. THE POSITION ... on the 24th March, 1945.

#### W.ESTERN FRONT

On a front 350 kms wide, from NIJMEGEN to LUDWIGSHAFEN, the Allied Armies are on the RHINE.

British troops have crossed the RHINE near WESEL on a broad front. According to German reports the Americans have succeeded in establishing a third bridgehead near OPPENHEIM, SOUTH of MAINZ. The bridgehead at REMAGEN now extends to a length of almost 50 kms from BONN to NEUWIED.

During the last three days the Allies occupied, amongst many others, the following German towns: MAINZ, COBLENZ, PIRMASENS, BINGEN, WORMS, SPEYER and LUDWIGSHAFEN.

Last week, in the sector SOUTH of the MOSELLE alone, the Allies took more than 100,000 German prisoners.

EASTERN FRONT

In the fighting SOUTH of KOENIGSBERG the Russians captured 204 tanks and mobile guns, 1050 motor vehicles, 633 railway trucks, and much other war material.

The German troops encircled in the DANZIG area were pressed further back towards the Baltic Sea. ZOPPOT has fallen. Russian units are 5 kms from GOTENHAFEN and 10 kms from DANZIG.

WEST and SOUTH of OPPELN, Marshal Koniev's troops have breached the German positions and advanced 40 kms to NEUSTADT. German losses were 30,000 killed and 15,000 prisoners of war. More than 400 places were staken by the Russians.

REVERSE

Map showing Western and Eastern fronts as on 24 Mar 45.

Appendix 4-0:

C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Paris (2), Box: 6, Eisenhower Library.

TP "VISLATION OF ZGOO

# <u>SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,</u>

### ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE



- Allied Military Government is established in the Theatre under my command, to exercise in occupied German territory the supreme legislative, judicial and executive authority vested in me as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and as Military Governor.
- 2 The immediate task of Allies Military Government during the course of military operations will be to secure the lines of communication of the allies armies and to suppress any activities in the occupied areas of Germany which could impair the speedy conclusion of the war.
- 3 Simultaneously Alliei Military Government will begin the task of destroying National Socialism. It will remove from responsible posts all members of the Nuzi Party and of the S.S. and others who have played a leading part in the National Socialist Regime. This process begins immediately upon the arrival of the Alliei armies in each area and the inauguration of Alliei Military Government.
- 4 The civilian population will as far as possible continue in their normal occupations. Detailed instructions to them will be issued by Allied Military Government in each area.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force

Appendix 4-P:

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C.D. Jackson: Papers 1931-1967, File: Leaflets SHAEF, Paris, Box: 5, Eisenhower Library. I, <u>Catherine Mary Burnette</u>, hereby submit this thesis/report to Emporia State University as partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree. I agree that the Library of the University may make it available for use in accordance with its regulations governing materials of this type. I further agree that quoting, photocopying, or other reproduction of this document is allowed for private study, scholarship (including teaching) and research purposes of a nonprofit nature. No copying which involves protential financial gain will be allowed without written permission of the author.

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\_\_\_May 18, 1993

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