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Abstract approved:  .

The thesis discusses the American planning and initial operations involving Germany's postwar reeducation. The purpose of this study is to examine the American perception of German education and the need to prevent future hostility through the reeducation of German youth. Also included is an examination of the intended goals of the first phase of occupation (1945-47). The American Departments of State, War, and Treasury Department debated between a "soft" and "hard" policy toward Germany after its defeat. With the help of several prominent scholars and refugees, the government created policies for the purposes of denazification and democratization that were to make an impact on Germany's educational system and society after the war.

REEDUCATION AND SCHOOL REFORM:

AMERICAN SOLUTIONS FOR GERMANY'S POSTWAR YOUTH

1943-1946

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Gregory E. Tiemann

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THE REEDUCATION EXPERIMENT MOVES INTO ACTION

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Reunited Germany is currently attempting to sustain its distinctive educational system by reforming the remnants of former East Germany's educational structure. Education under East German communist rule had one aim: creating loyal socialists. As a result, their school system declined in scientific research, critical thinking, and both vocational and academic training. [1] The reform efforts made by West Germany are experimental. Leading scholars are developing theories and objectives to reform the former communist system. The experiment involves conducting different educational methods and testing the results. The earliest findings from the experiments indicate that further reform will require changes for some East Germans in their fundamental beliefs, the ideological structure of the former school structure as a whole, and the prevailing social attitudes of educators and students.

Reunited Germany today believes itself to be a democratic model in leading former East Germany from socialist philosophies. Its modern educational philosophy focuses on two main purposes: *Bildung* (Ideals) and

Ausbildung (Training). [2] Like the archaic philosophies of William Von Humboldt and Georg Kershensteiner, the model consists of a practical, vocationally oriented training in which a student passes through one of three parallel tracks going from one level to the next through rigorous study. The education administration is working for the well being of the students by allowing them to understand their social responsibilities by respecting intellectual growth, identifying creditable viewpoints, being prepared for lifelong learning, and participating knowledgeably in the workforce. With the help of education, modern Germany presents itself to the world as a mature, solid nation, and an innovative leader in economics and world affairs.

In the past, West Germany's economic successes and international prestige have been associated with its high standards of education and the success of the schools in preparing students for the job market. Only through certain influences however, has Germany been able to develop a progressive, democratic structure to meet the needs of all students. Some influences that have led to this democratic development can be related to the social watershed period of the 1960s when the German political culture was highly progressive and liberal. Other reasons include the campaigns during the 1980s that allowed more students from different social classes to gain access to a higher education. One of the most significant catalysts however,

of the successful democratization of German education, was the defeat of Adolf Hitler, the ending of Nazi influence, and the subsequent change in the social environment inspired by educational leaders from the United States, France, and Great Britain in their zones during the post World War II occupation period.

A half century ago, on October 1, 1945, an educational experiment began in Germany for the purposes of reform. The United States had tried to understand the German mentality and the nature of their educational system by testing many possible reforms in the interests of preventing another war. Throughout the U.S. Zone, children from grades one through eight were brought from the rubble of the streets into elementary schools (*Volksschulen*). [3] This event was just a beginning of the positive reeducation of German youth under Nazi influence. During the next four years, the military government took an active role in finding suitable teachers and textbook material, developing a new philosophy of education along democratic lines, and reorganizing the internal operations of the Education Ministry of Germany in preparation for the time when authority would be restored to them.

In all four zones, the Allied forces became the agent of reeducation for the purposes of curbing militarism, nationalism, and elitism. The reeducation process went through two phases of operations: a fighting-in phase and a

post-hostilities phase. Although the two phases were intended for all Germans alike, the German youth were seen as a distinctive clientele by the Allies. The level of concern for converting the minds of the youth is reflected in one passage of the *Technical Manual for Education and Religious Affairs*, given to all officers in the German theater: "If it [education] is not carried out thoroughly the world may well witness the resurgence of an aggressive Germany." [4] Reeducation was a mission to turn German youth away from Nazi doctrine and toward the ideals of a democratic society. The process involved a careful understanding of the Germans and the elements that contributed to their social problems. From the *Handbook of Psychological Terms*, "reeducation" is defined as "the process of aiding the individual to relearn appropriate and efficient behavior patterns which have been lost." [5] For the allies, the word reeducation was used along with reorientation and democratization to describe their efforts in "removing certain mental and moral weaknesses" and teaching a new political and social philosophy. [6] Although the Allies never gave the term reeducation a precise definition, officials used it as a catchword to describe the efforts to first reach German POWs during the war, then German adults and youth after occupation took place. The methods of reeducation included propaganda, control of the

press, radio, and other information services, and all educational institutions.

Through defeat in World War II most German adults had seen the strength of their country crumble. The loss of homes, family members, and defeat of Hitler initiated the reeducation of Germans. An example can be found in a speech in 1945, by Dr. Hogner, the Minister President of Bavaria:

> We have again had a narrow escape - but we have had an object lesson which will remain now in the memory of many generations to come. We know now what the consequences are, when the foundations of human society are destroyed: the society of the free and equal, the spirit of brotherly tolerance, the respect for higher laws and political convictions of our neighbors. [7]

But for the German youth, reeducation meant going beyond the harsh realities of defeat. National Socialist education had debauched their minds; there was a need for a new curriculum.

What commitments did the United States Military Government make to execute a proficient program of reeducation? The statement of duty is described in the *Interim Directive for Military Government*: "You will exercise control of the existing German Education system to the extent necessary to carry out the above policy [denazification] and to avoid, as far as possible, an increase of administrative government."[8] The foremost aim was to eliminate all associations with Nazism and militarism. The exercise of control involved indirect administrative handling of new educational operations. The

purpose from the beginning of occupation was to relinquish responsibilities over to the Germans as soon as possible and to intervene only with discretion.

The United States faced a formidable challenge when they observed the German postwar educational system. Many school buildings in the larger cities were severely damaged. Others were overcrowded with refugees or used as hospitals. Many of the teachers had fled or had been drafted into the military. All teachers who were members of the Nazi Teachers Association had been summarily dismissed by the G-5 staffs of the occupation armies. Other problems included the shortage of denazified textbooks. The challenges were immense, but the United States was committed to finding solutions to the problems in its zone.

Immediate solutions were not possible. Tentative design of procedures had to be worked out first. Then those procedures had to be carried out with sensitivity as the consequences of not doing so could have been disastrous. In 1945 there was a battle for the control of the mind of the German youth - a battle requiring careful planning and sensitive implementation.

This is not a comprehensive study of all plans for American educational programs in Germany. Instead, this study focuses on the opinions of the planners and major issues to present the viewpoints and the meaning behind the educational reform. The concentration is on the debate over

policy prior to the end of the war and the central issues of the first phase of implementation including denazification, the reopening of schools, finding suitable textbooks and teachers, and the implementation of educational programs.

Footnotes

1. For an introduction to the Federal Republic's role in reforming East Germany's Education see Karlheinz Durr, "East German Education: A system in Transition." Phi Deta Kappan, (January 1992). pp. 390-95.

2. See Walter Wickremasingle, *Handbook of World Education*, American Collegiate Service, (Houston 1992). pp. 277-95.

3. *Report of the Military Governor*, 20 October 1945, Papers of Walter Bedell Smith, Box 44, pp. 19, Eisenhower Library.

4. ibid., p. 1.

5. Harriman, Philip, *Handbook of Psychological Terms*, (Totowa, 1965). p. 243.

6. Kellermann, Henry J, *The Present Status of German Youth*, Department of State Publication 2583, European Series 11, p. 1, 1947.

7. *Military Government Weekly Information Bulletin*, Office of the Directory, USFET, No. 15-30, Nov. 1945.

8. *Interim Directive for Military Government of Germany*, 31 August 1944, Papers of Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower Library.

CHAPTER 1

RESUME OF THE GERMAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: THE DEVELOPING PROBLEM

Since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the Germans have been highly conscious of their educational system with the solemn will to maintain its prominence. The German - Prussian system, like the systems of Britain and France, had become increasingly tailored to benefiting the state. The belief was that the better the government educated its citizens, the better the guarantee of their submission, their willingness to mobilize for the government's needs, as well as developing their ability for specialized work.

The German educational system, as in Britain and France, was the road for Germans to become a privileged member of society. Passage through school at all levels was a struggle to qualify for high ranking in school classification which came after the successful completion of exams. The German educational movement was greatly accelerated by the University of Berlin in the nineteenth century, which in turn influenced other educational institutions. A new national consciousness was created

involving a distinctive philosophy, science, and religion. This national pattern for education continues today.

The American Office of Military Government (OMG) recognized the German accomplishment in the opening statement of the *Handbook for Education and Religious Affairs*: "For generations, Germany has had an educational system of the first rank, even since 1933, regardless of changed aims and curricula, the educative process in Germany has been highly effective." [1] In addition to being aware of the high level of skill and thinking ability of German youth, the OMG was also aware that German students were deficient in other crucial areas. German youth had very little use for affective or behavioral skills such as the ability to form an opinion or thinking critically. The traditional German curriculum emphasized a submission to one set of beliefs with little room for questioning.

The reeducation effort by the American Government was more than a simple effort to end Nazism in all forms. As Saul K. Padover, a distinguished American historian and then Lt. Colonel, United States Army, Psychological Warfare Division, wrote in 1946: "The problem of reeducation, in brief, is not merely one of eradicating Nazism, but also of eliminating authoritarianism, militarism, Junkerism, and racism." [2] Since the German unification in 1870 most Germans had subscribed to ideas of authoritarianism, respected physical force and admired military virtues.

Padover pointed out in his report that, "Hitler had no difficulty in setting up his dictatorship based upon the 'Leadership Principle' because every German is accustomed from childhood on to obey implicitly some given authority."[3] German youth were educated to view themselves as superior in culture, race, and economics.

The old type of Prussianism was seen by the American experts as being very similar to Nazism in that it was hostile to the ideas of democracy. So, in addition to fighting nationalism and militarist attitudes, the OMG sought to reform the German class structure that separated the elite from the masses. But in 1945, there was no traditional social and educational environment within which the OMG could foster a democracy. The existing educational structure was a "dual system" that provided elementary education for the masses and secondary education for the upper levels of Germany's caste system. The notion of a comprehensive education had always been criticized by opponents who believed that the inclusion of all youth in one class of education would compromise its quality.

Modern German education stemmed from early nineteenth century's "popular awakening which was a response to Napoleon's attempt to impose French cultural domination. Out of German resentment for France, the German middle class developed a growing feeling of nationalism, a new ruling passion, and a new intellectual reasoning. German

intellectuals such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) idealized German cultural distinctiveness and promoted the development of a German national personality. In his "Address to the German Nation," Fichte attempted to rouse the Germans to resist Napoleon after the Prussian defeat at the Battle of Jena. Fichte asserted the right of rebellion for the purpose of safeguarding German knowledge and virtue. His emphasis on the German will and superiority prepared a new sense of patriotism that would eventually lead to unification and world influence. [4]

New thinking often betrays its origin. A system of ideas must penetrate all social and political institutions in order to be effective. One of the most important institutions is the school system. As Germany began unifying, more efforts were made to promote "national" literature, history, and culture. This new thinking in Germany had characteristics of jingoism and nationalism. By learning the idealist principles of national greatness and national symbolism in the schools, the youth grew into adulthood exalting their nation above all others. As Saul Padover explains, "Nationalism in Germany, as in all societies, served both as an instrument for those who wanted to overcome economic backwardness and as a means of assuring social cohesion during the passage from traditional to modern society." [5]

Fichte's push for a new German ideal had a significant effect on German education. Himself a university professor, Fichte advocated a system of education as a way out of the Prussian difficulties with French domination. By strengthening Germany's intellectual and moral grandeur, Fichte hoped to restore a national perception of economic and political grandeur. The Germans had a superior heritage, intellect, language, and individual soul, so he argued. As Hannsjoachim W. Koch points out, Fichte's belief in the purity and superiority of the German language and intellect "gave it immeasurable depth and a verile force of expression." [6]

Infused with enthusiasm and ambition, German philosophy became self-absorbed with a cultural idealism. Another famous advocate of this philosophy was Baron William Von Humboldt (1767-1835), who tried to implement German idealism and superiority in a newly established, state run system of education. As Prussian Minister of Public Instruction, Humboldt laid the foundation for the German *Gymnasium* and the University of Berlin. Fascinated by the Greek classical educational structure, Humboldt wanted to set up a similar system in Germany to foster classical thinking. Historian James Tent wrote, "Originally, the spirit of the most prominent secondary schools, the humanistic gymnasia, had intended to develop a harmonious personality through the teaching of Latin and Greek as advocated by Wilhelm von

Humboldt." [7] In Humboldt's plan, young boys would advance from one level of education to a higher level through intensive study of Latin, Greek, German, mathematics, and religion. Through the rigorous discipline, the intellectual potential of the select few would be developed. Under Humboldt, the Prussian educational system from 1817 on separated the *Gymnasium* and the *Volkschule*, and German education became a system of tracks.

The physical, institutional aspect of the German educational system proceeded with the same undemocratic conception of Humboldt's reforms. Since the Middle Ages, education had always been under the control of the individual *Länder* (or States). During the *Kulturkampf* of the 1870s, the constitution specifically left education in the hands of the *Land/Provinz* authorities. Consequently, a national ministry of education had never existed before the Nazi period. The administrative chain for the elementary and intermediate school passed from the *Reichsministerium* (Reich Minister), to the *Reichsgau* (Land Ministry), then to the *Landrat* (state parliament) which steadfastly maintained the right to develop its own school and university systems. The *Reichsministerium* passed all responsibility for the secondary schools to the Land Ministry (*Reichsgau Department)* then directly to the Senior principal of secondary school *(Oberstudiendirektor)*. Each *Land* had its own Minister for Education and under their authority they

set the general school policies within the *Land*, whether it be curriculum designs, examination mandates, or the appointing of teachers.

Although the *Länder* had satisfactory autonomy, their categories of schools were analogous to other states. After the Protestant Reformation in Germany, and particularly after the "Popular Awakening", two types of schools developed, the *Gymnasium* and the *Volksschule*. The Latin-based *Gymnasium* lead to the University level and the *Volksschule* prepared students for some kind of technical trade. The only common denominator of the two was their strong adherence to catechism and the study of the Bible. After Humboldt's reforms throughout the early 1800s, the secondary school had become more elitist through several measures, including the introduction of the *Abitur* Examination and the apportionment of the *Abitur* to Gymnasium students only.

As the differences between the *Gymnasium* and *Volksschule* widened, new schools developed. The *Realschule* provided a third scheme of education, providing a half-way option for students. In contrast to the *Gymnasium*'s idealistic study, the *Realschule* provided a more practical, vocational curriculum. Other versions of the secondary school appeared: the *Realgymnasium* (secondary school stressing modern languages, science, mathematics, and classical language) and the *Oberrealschule* (secondary school

stressing modern languages, science and mathematics). The *Grundschule*, developed at the turn of the century, provided a common four year elementary school for all students.

The educational ladder through the secondary school was difficult, completing exit examinations was the only advancement from one level to another. For the masses, the standard route was to go through eight years at the *Volksschule*, then subsequently, if finances allowed, to some form of vocational school *(Berufsfachschule)*. German schools of higher education were mostly limited to students of affluent socioeconomic status.

Americans and Germans approached education from two different perspectives. The German educational system traditionally determined the ultimate destination of a student when they reached the age of ten. The tracking system was designed to train certain groups for certain skills for the benefit of the country. In practice, financial or social position rather than academic achievement was usually the basis for being admitted to the exclusive secondary schools. The Americans traditionally believed more in the ideal of equal educational opportunity. These contrasts of American and German school organization played a key role later in the American reeducation policy.

After Germany's defeat in World War I, many Germans, with the encouragement from the United States, pushed for more democratic education. On July 31, 1919, Germany

adopted the Weimar Constitution, formally transforming itself into a fully democratic, though semi - federal state. In the republic, many were concerned about their educational system and believed that changes were needed. The Germans noticed the problem, proposals were made, and for the next decade the needs of many who had been neglected in the past were finally being addressed. By many American observors, the education of Germany was finally becoming democratic.

Article 146 of the Weimar Constitution stated: "The will of those entitled to education is to be considered as much as possible." [8] An inclusive education was envisioned with the introduction of the Foundation School *(Grundschule)*. For the first time in German history, all children were required to spend the first four years in compulsory schooling. The Weimar Republic also created the *Aufbauschule* to bridge the gap between elementary and secondary education and open the way for lower class children to have the opportunity for higher education and consequently, enter better professions.

The Weimar Constitution also abolished private pre-secondary schools. In the attempt to establish a common basic education, the dismantling of fee paying preparatory schools allowed the education of students without regard to the relative wealth of their parents. Private schools could only be opened if a special educational interest was involved (such as religion) or if a public school in the

precinct did not exist. [9] In most of Bavaria and in the Rhineland, public schools did not exist, therefore the private schools continued to operate.[10] The intention of the constitution to create equal opportunity for all German students was opposed by the old order.

The Weimar Constitution had a new emphasis on curriculum reform. Article 148, introduced moral education (citizenship, personal growth, and work proficiency). This emphasis on education didn't apply only to public schools. In 1918, the government, as well as political, religious, labor, and sport organizations, began to establish youth programs for providing proper direction and developing a positive future for the upcoming generations of youth. The aim of the German Republic was to develop a new spirit of German culture, rising from the bitter defeat of World War One. The longevity of these programs was short-lived because National Socialism soon came to dominate all youth activities.

Problems of Germany's educational past reached a crisis when Hitler came to power. The educational system of Germany came under central control and Hitler implanted nationalism and militarism in the curriculum of the schools. James Tent points out that "Under the Nazis, humanism and cultural attainment were nearly synonymous with degeneracy. They harped incessantly on nationalism, "soldierly" virtues, *Kameradschaft*, and devotion to the Führer and Volk." [11]

School administrators, teachers, and students had little choice but to go along. The Nazi party had successfully created *Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten* (Napolas), *Adolph Hitler-Schulen* (AHS) and other schools controlled by the SS which selected "the chosen" to learn the methods of the NSDAP. The traditional dangers that the Americans had always feared were realized as Germany's youth was incorporated into Hitler's plans.

The curriculum under Nazism incorporated carefully designed plans of indoctrinating youth. Germany's defeat in the Great War was presented in the new curriculum as a violation of Germany's rights by British, French, and American aggressors. The continuity of nineteenth century reverence for military glory and supernationalism was carried to a radical extremity. New philosophies of Germanic racial and biological superiority were taught along with geopolitics and world dominance. Since in the German culture students received the majority of their formal learning through the school environment, the teaching of Nazism for them became an orthodox and unchallenged curriculum.

Evidence of Nazi indoctrination was found by the allies when they examined textbooks during the occupation. Through every subject, Nazism sought to control every aspect of student thinking. In the natural sciences, biology was affected more than any other subject; including unverified

theories of the racial dominance and superiority of the Aryan race in its curriculum. Geography included the study of *Lebensraum* (living space) and racial expansion. Even non-behavioral studies such as mathematics included components of Nazi thinking. History included the study of the "world historical individual" by teaching Nazi mythology and the history of the NSDAP. Hitler also placed a great emphasis on athletics because of his belief in sound thinking through physical training - In *Mein Kampf* he states, "of most importance in the national educational plan is not the cramming in of mere knowledge, but the development of fundamentally sound bodies...In a national state the school must set aside considerably more time for physical training." [12]

The rise of Nazism cannot be blamed entirely on Germany's educational system. Grounds for the rise of Nazism can be found also in the desperate economic straits of the postwar period. Also every society has characteristics of xenophobia, class conflict, racism, and bigotry. The undemocratic German school system, however did cultivate superior attitudes in one group and inferiority in another. These attitudes made possible the submission of many to the authoritarian government of fascism. The Weimar Republic was an initial first attempt at reeducation, but the traditional elements were too strong and democratic attempts failed. Only after the Second World War, and the

total defeat of Germany, did the next attempt at identifying flaws in German society and democratizating their education begin again.

Endnotes

1. Office of Military Government United States. *Handbook For Military Government in Germany*. (1 September 1944) Chapter Seventeen, p. 1, box 35, Folder 5, Papers of Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower Library.

2. Padover, Saul K., Lt. Col., United States Army, Psychological Warfare Dept. *Education in Transition; Thirty - Fourth Annual Schoolmen's Week Proceedings*, University of Pennsylvania. (n.p., 1944).

3. ibid., p. 184.

4. Hannsjoachim W. Koch, *The Hitler Youth: Origins and Development 1922-45*, (London 1979).

5. ibid., pp. 34.

6. Hannsjoachim W. Koch, *The Hitler Youth: Origins and Development 1922-45*.

7. James F. Tent, "*Mission on the Rhine: American Educational Policy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1949*", History of Education Quarterly (Vol. 22, No. 3, Fall 1982), p. 264.

8. See "Articles of the Weimar Constitution Which Deal With Education" *Technical Manual for Education and Religious Affairs*, Appendix G, pp. 74, box 36, The Papers of Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower Library.

9. ibid.

10. In 1932, 679 private schools were in operation; 475 were still in existence in 1936, of which 240 were run by the Roman Catholic Church, Evangelical church and Jews. Source: Educational Statistics, State Dept Papers, Dec. 20, 1944.

11. James F. Tent, "*Mission on the Rhine: American Educational Policy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1949*", p. 264.

12. Hitler, Adolph. *Mein Kampf*. (Boston, 1943), p 452 (one volume edition).

CHAPTER TWO

AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF "THE PROBLEM"

THE EARLY PERIOD (1942-1943)

Americans in 1945 feared that the world might face again the reoccurrence of aggressive nationalism with the next German generation. If the modern aggressive mentality in Germany was an element of continuity with the past, could the Americans offer a solution to eradicate it? Nicholas Pronay points out that, "The United States was an ideological nation, the world's first and most successful one, and like any other ideological state it had an almost total conviction about its moral right to project its ideology and to impose it by every available means on others: was democracy not 'the last best hope of mankind'?"[1] This chapter focuses on the solutions offered by several American scholars and German refugees to the "German Problem" in an attempt to understand the American perspective that shaped latter policy. As Americans were preparing to impose their ideals on Germany, there were some who believed in the German ability to handle their own reeducation. On the other hand, there were others who feared Germany's prolonged quest for national unity and national destiny made it unlikely that the Germans would

ever bring about a successful democratization of their nation.

From the beginning of World War II, the American discussion regarding reeducation and the "German Problem" was carried on by groups of academics, especially social and behavioral scientists, and by refugee groups living in the United States. Public interest was quickened by the growing coverage in popular literature of Nazi educational policy and methods. Many of the scholars who studied the problem became analysts for different government agencies while others had their views considered by those agencies.

Among the influential scholars who gave attention to Germany's educational system were Robert Ergang and Stephen Corey. Ergang, former Professor of History, New York University, emphasized the historical pattern behind the German mentality and proposed two steps to redirect the educational system. The first step was to bring about total defeat to raise doubt about the German military might. The second step, was to teach the true origins of the war.[2] On the other hand, Stephen Corey, former Professor of Education at the University of Chicago, criticized the idea of American reform of Germany's educational system. He doubted the feasibility of a foreigner directing another nation's education. "The German teachers would be recalcitrant. We would face the same baffling problems in using German schools to make little democrats out of the little Nazis as

the Germans have faced in trying to do the opposite in some of the conquered countries." [3]

German refugees also had viewpoints on the reconstruction of German schools. Wartime refugees however, were denied the opportunity to serve on advisory committees. Even though most of their views were discarded in the reeducation debate, these refugees found a voice in the American Association for a Democratic Germany, an organization whose viewpoints were listened to by the Office of Strategic Services (wartime predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency). A branch of the former organization was the Council for a Democratic Germany, formed under the leadership of Paul Tillich. This organization was openly critical of Germany's educational system and proposed severe measures to restructure schools.

Paul Johannes Tillich was born in Starzeddel Brandenberg in 1886. He attended a humanistic secondary school in Königsberg-Neumark and learned the classical ideal of free thought. After completing theological studies at the University of Halle (1905-12), Tillich held teaching posts in universities at Berlin, Marburg, Dresden, Leipzig, and Frankfurt and became one of Germany's most prominent protestant theologians. Tillich's belief in free thought made him critical of Hitler and Nazism. After being barred from German universities in 1933, Tillich went into exile in

the United States and taught at theological seminaries in New York.

In his consideration of the German problem and the post-war education of the German people, Paul Tillich made a list of demands for reeducation. Tillich's "demands" reflect many of his personal presuppositions: he believed that if these demands were met, the character and attitudes of the German people could be radically transformed.

Tillich's first demand was that the victor nations not send tutors to the Axis nations for educational purposes. "The first demand for the post-war education of the German people is the acknowledgement that the relation of victors and vanquished is not an educational relation." [4] His belief was that any reform had to be based on "natural authority" and could not grow under the presence of Americans or other Allied educators. Tillich's second demand pointed out that the most effective educational lesson would come from showing the Germans the reality of their defeat. The idea was that German observance of their breakdown would bring about a realization of the weakness of the German past and a new interpretation of current elements in their society. [5] The third demand was for the Allied nations to refrain from psychologically or physically destructive measures. Tillich believed to do so would cause the rejection of any educational aim. [6] The fourth demand was that if the Americans wanted to create a democratic

nation in Germany, the Germans had to experience the social realities of a democratic nation.

Tillich prepared a sociological analysis of German society in his educational program. The analysis included distinctions between different age groups, class groups, and intelligence groups. [7] Tillich also pointed out that allowance should be made for certain distinctions among young people depending upon their home environment, war experience, and age. By analyzing different age groups, Tillich demonstrated how each could present a different problem.

According to Tillich's study, the youngest age group (ages 7-17 years) demonstrated some resistance to the ideology of Nazism. Supported by their families, churches, and underground activities, some adolescents had rejected Nazi demands for their allegiance. These groups did in fact rebel against the institutionalization of the Hitler Youth and formed their own groups in defiance. The second age group (ages 17-34) would be the most difficult to reeducate because of their fanaticism in following Hitler. The reason for their subservience can be traced to their formative experiences before the Nazi seizure of power. They had experienced the hardship of the German depression and saw Nazism restore Germany to world superiority.

Class differences were also an important factor in Tillich's studies of reeducation. For the lower class,

Tillich believed there was not much need for a reorientation of beliefs because a majority of the proletarian masses had preserved pre-Nazi traditions of the German labor movement and "must be considered more as an educational power than as objects of education." [8] The most difficult class for the Americans to reform would be the lower middle class. His reasoning was that the lower middle class were the supporters of German nationalism, Nazism, and "the tool of every reactionary movement in Germany." [9]

According to Tillich, different German intelligentsia groups also presented a problem in educational reform. Secondary school teachers were the "intellectual bearers" of German ideology. Therefore allowing their continued employment in the field of education should depend on their motive in joining the Nazi teacher's association and the degree of involvement in it. University professors and other intelligentsia were largely conservative and were looked at suspiciously by the leaders of the proletariat and harassed by the Nazis. Tillich believed the reeducation of the intelligentsia would be easy: "Bureaucracy, intellectuals, teachers will follow the 'democratic reaction' as willingly as they followed the 'autocratic reaction.'" [10]

Werner Peiser, former Minister of State for the Prussian Government, exiled to the United States, and former Professor at Loyola University offered views similar to

those of Tillich. His position was that the real challenge was educating German youth to distinguish between right and wrong instead of accepting the ingrained ideals of the German state. Peiser emphasized that the Germans in the past were incapable of education reform. His example was the Germans after World War I: "Ancient languages and history and geography were praised for glorifying the Hohenzollern regime, while the democratic institutions, the November movement, the constitution including the President of the Reich, Fritz Ebert, were ridiculed and taunted in the most shameless way."[11] Because of this failure in the Weimar Republic, Peiser emphasized that the Americans and Allies had to give direction and make the Germans adhere to a plan created by the allies.

Despite a variety of opinions from educational experts, the American Government failed to reach a consensus prior to the end of the war. One reason was that no single governmental agency was given the responsibility of setting goals and plans. In June 1942 the State Department formed the General Advisory Committee (GAC) which became the focus for civilian discussion and consultation on German education. With its constituency of prominent scholars and state department officials, the GAC studied the German problem and reached sketchy conclusions on how policy should be formed. In 1943 the GAC created individual "country" committees with the responsibility of forming policy for the

Axis Countries. The same year, the GAC formed an Interdivisional Committee on Germany. The committee was headed by David Harris, who became a significant influence in the discussion on postwar reeducation.

David Harris was born in Texas in 1900. Harris received his masters and baccalaureate degrees from Stanford in 1924 and 1925, and his doctorate in 1928. His doctoral dissertation dealt with Balkan diplomacy during the mid-1870s. Harris taught for two years at the University of South Carolina and in 1930 became an Assistant Professor in History at Stanford University, California. His field of study was modern European history, specifically international diplomacy in the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878.

His reputation as a history professor gave him credibility with the research staff in the State Department. In 1942, Harris became the Associate Chief of Central European Affairs in the U.S. Department of State. The Stanford University newspaper wrote about Harris' contribution to postwar policy: "David, as political advisor to principal officials, loyally spent two years endeavoring to preserve and advance both German and American interests in the divided nation." [12] He remained on the Department's staff until 1947. Harris' views figured prominently in the discussions of the Interdivisional Committee.

In June 1943, Harris presented a draft of his views on reeducation to the Interdivisional Committee for consideration. In the document, Harris gave his analysis of the "German Problem": "The Hitler regime has meant an ideological conditioning of the German people, systematic inculcation of most destructive and debasing parts of German intellectual tradition." [13] The "German Problem" according to Harris had also become an international problem, because Germany's idealist thinking hindered its ability to be peace loving or cooperative with other nations.

Harris' personal correspondence reveals his belief in the need for the American government to assume custody of the problem: "In a broad sense, [the] problem is to seek a fundamental repudiation of that type of nationalistic mentality which has reached its extreme development in National Socialism." [14] He gave three choices for establishing control of German education: laissez-faire, recognition of some German control, or complete military government. From his viewpoint, the German problem was like an infection which had to be stopped before another generation of youth became "infected" and repeated the aggressive tradition of its forbearers.

Harris' first step for reeducation was to discredit all Nazi teaching. Nazi teaching involved the following harmful principles:

> 1) Denial of Free inquiry; complete indoctrination and thought control, 2) Neglect of cultural and intellectual values, 3) Deliberate misinformation through distorted teaching of history, sciences, racial concepts, etc., 4) Inclusion of false and unethical ideals, 5) Subordination of instruction to the objectives of whole nation at war, and 6) Insulation of the German mind against foreign and cosmopolitan influences. [15]

Denazification was the foremost initiative. He hoped that by the lessons of disgrace, the young Germans would learn the benefits of the American political philosophy and the failure of their own. According to Harris, there could be no watering down of the proposed denazification program and it would have to take precedence over all other programs and had to be done immediately to reach the youth.

After denazification, Harris' second step was reeducation through conditioned experience. The process involved paying special attention to psychology in efforts to change German mentality. Harris suggested that every action by the Allied fighting forces, occupation authorities, and peace settlements would be an important model, influencing the Germans in either a negative or positive way. If the defeat of Germany was handled in an oppressive way as it was in 1918, it would spur further resentment.

The use of conditioned experience, according to Harris, was vital to the program for Germany. The allies had to reeducate the Germans in a manner that "conditioned" the German masses to accept democracy and new ethical

guidelines. The experience of the bombing of the Fatherland and Nazi fanaticism convinced many German youths of the failure of Nazism; the positive experience of reeducation would convince them to accept democracy. The goal was to promote an "Americanized" program, redirecting an otherwise self-destructive country that pursued power through totalitarianism and militancy.

David Harris's proposals were similar to the views adopted by the Interdivisional Committee on Germany. In the spring of 1943 this Committee began to meet, and by September produced the first official statement of American policy. In May 1944, the same specialists produced a position paper on education reform for the State and War Departments. Although many of the Committee's views did not prevail later in public policy, it summarized the issues of concern regarding German reeducation which circulated in State and War Departments. The Interdivisional Committee agreed with Harris that the German Problem should be approached by examining the negative input of the educational system and other opinion-forming agencies in Germany. The committee believed the problem was of prime importance because of the long indoctrination of the youth. The major issues examined by the Interdivisional Committee were: the degree of punitive measures by the Allies, social and mental therapy, imposition of restraints on educational

activities, reeducation through conditioned experience, and the degree of direct control over educational activities.

The issue of punitive measures was considered first. Had the Germans become so irrational that they were incapable of reform by themselves? Instead of just punishing war criminals, would it be feasible for the Allies to punish the entire nation? This idea, according to the document, was supported by few who approached the German problem from the educational viewpoint. Their opposition was based on the assumption that the German mind had been modified easily in the past and through education could be subject to modification again. Education by punitive measures was disapproved by the committee. Punishment would cause further resentment against, or further estrangement from the West. The committee called for a settlement which would minimize the bitterness among Germans by reducing controls.

The second proposal made by the Interdivisional Committee was for a program of social and mental therapy. The principle assumed that the German mind had been afflicted or had collective traits which had developed under National Socialism. "The basic assumption in this approach is that Germany is ill rather than guilty." [16] The action proposed in this measure included the segregation of unstable groups and training new leaders in a "sound core of healthy thought" which others might learn from. This view

was strongly criticized by Harris who believed that the plan was too intangible and too vague.

The third proposal pointed out the problems of military government placing restraints on educational activities. Specific measures mentioned included: selection of teaching staff, inspection of textbooks, and censorship of all propaganda sources. The goal was to eradicate unhealthy concepts such as: racial intolerance, militarism, German superiority of culture, excessive nationalism, and the fundamental Nazi views of amoralism and nihilism. Although the subcommittee approved some form of control, there was concern about the ability of an international committee to effectively carry out such responsibilities.

Gradual re-education under the German administrators was the fourth proposal. Advocates of this proposal believed a free hand would blunt resentment and allow the Germans to develop their own responsible leadership. A foreign teacher or even an exile brought into the classroom would have no understanding of the recent national German experience. The critics of this proposal brought up the failure of the Weimar period and the limited experience of democracy in the past. George F. Kennan, who later became ambassador to Germany, wrote Harris, "I think the letter and connotation of the word "democracy" are both seriously compromised in Germany, and will scarcely be accepted by this generation as an acceptable substitute for a concise

and constructive teleology of German national development."[17] The belief by the Americans was that Germany did not have the tradition of a democratic state and could never develop a democracy on her own.

The political subcommittee, after much debate, decided formal education should be left to German teachers and not the direct tutelage of the victor nations. But, the rest of the program had to be controlled by the military government. How much autonomy the Americans could give the Germans would be determined by the conditions of the re-education period and the progress of Germany toward a stable government and society.

The last proposal by the committee was re-education through conditioned response. Like Harris' proposals, this solution was based on the idea that the reformation of schools and the willingness of the German people to conform to democratic ideals would be influenced by positive and negative incentives in the reeducation program. The attempt to reeducate had to take into account social, economic, and political circumstances in which the German people lived.

The emphasis was on encouraging economic recovery and reducing the amount of control so that indignation would be kept to a minimum. Positive programs included supporting distinguished German educational leaders who could formulate clear statements of objectives for the new education, the selection of reliable German teachers, and the

reorganization of the schools. Other positive programs proposed were comprehensive reform of curricula, providing educational opportunities for all social classes, and the encouragement of new youth programs.

The Interdivisional Committee also believed that the United States should coordinate its educational goals with other Allied countries. It believed that a general watch over all educational activities was needed in the earlier phases of occupation. It proposed an advisory Educational Council to assist influential Germans but ultimately supervision that rested on the Germans themselves. Future directives would be formulated by an International Education Organization which would represent the will of the United Nations. This proposal for an international organization is interesting because it not only had the purpose of coordinating Allied policy with Germany, but with all international educational systems. The lesson of Germany would be a lesson for all.

> The reeducation of the German nation can never be achieved by unilateral fiat of the victors; it can be effectively conceived only as a special phase of a general policy designed to purify the educational systems of all nations of the excesses of narrow and short-sighted nationalism, of racial intolerance, and of the perversion of scientific truth in the national interest. [18]

Throughout the reeducation planning period, the American planners, on most issues, agreed with the British Government's plans for occupational policy. The British and

Americans agreed early in 1943 that an international charter for education should be adopted allowing young persons equal access to educational opportunities at all social levels. [19] However, the British were stronger in their opinion that reeducation should be left to the Germans themselves. A War Cabinet Paper on "The Future of Germany," dated August 8th, 1943, states: "Efforts from without to convert the Germans will merely harden their unrepentant hearts. Germans alone can re-educate their fellow-countrymen, and Germans will make the attempt only if they are themselves convinced that the future of their country lies in cooperation with her neighbors." [20] British planning agencies believethere was interest by the allies in promoting the principles of popular democracy but that the "change in heart" must come from the Germans themselves as they realized the disastrous results exemplified in the loss of two world wars.

Reeducation planning involved not only immediate concerns but also short-range and long-range goals. The immediate objectives were to establish a means of control and to bring the children back into the schools as soon as it was possible. The short-range goals were to prevent future German belligerence and to psychologically affect the German mentality. The long-range goals were to democratize the school structure, to prepare the German youth to be future leaders in the international community, and

eventually to turn over total responsibility of education to the Germans themselves.

All of the scholars and officials were united in their opinion that there was a need for coordinated allied action in the area of German educational reform. As David Harris and other scholars suggested, it was not only the Germans who should attempt to solve the German problem. All influential participants in the reeducation debate denounced destructive measures and proposed that the occupation powers initiate educational reforms with more indirect influence. Although no concrete definition of method existed in these early discussions, a better understanding of the German people and "the problem" had emerged.

During the discussions regarding postwar Germany, the Allies watched Italy fall, Japan withdraw in the Pacific, the Germans retreat from their Eastern campaigns and to succumb to what General Dwight D. Eisenhower termed, "the great crusade across Europe." Victory was in sight, but as hostilities came to an end, educational planners were far from confident of the effectiveness of their views. Could a policy be developed to prevent Germany from embarking another episode in international aggression? Controls might be imposed on one generation but was the fire going to break out again in the upcoming generation of youth, many of which spent their whole life under an extreme nationalist system?

FOOTNOTES

1. Nicholas Pronay, "To Stamp Out the Whole Tradition" in *The Political Reeducation of German and her Allies After World War II,* ed. Nicholas Pronay, (Totowa, New Jersey, 1985).

2. Robert Ergang, "Reeducating the Germans, *Current History, Vol. 46, (July 1943), pp. 326-30.*

3. Stephen M. Corey. "Should We Take Over Their Schools?" *School and Society*, Vol. 58, 23 October 1943, pp. 321-3.

4. Paul Tillich, "The Post-War Education of the German People," Papers of David Harris, Box 2, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. p. 2.

5. ibid., p. 3.

6. ibid., p. 3.

7. ibid., p. 4.

8. ibid., p. 5.

9. ibid., p. 6.

10. ibid., p. 6.

11. Werner Peiser, "The Educational Failure of the Weimar Republic," *School and Society*, Vol. 58, 16 October 1943: pp. 289-92.

12. George Knoles, J.E. Sterling, W. Vucinich, "Memorial Resolution: David Harris, 1900-1975," Campus Report, December 17, 1975.

13. See correspondence of CAC-167 Preliminary A Meeting, 4 May 1944, Papers of David Harris, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.

14. ibid., p. 1.

15. See p. 2 of the Proposals for the Interdivisional Committee, Papers of David Harris, Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace.

16. ibid., p. 5.

17. Dept. of State. Division of European Affairs. Memo to David Harris on document CAC 167, Preliminary A, "Germany: Occupation Period: Reeducation," 4 May 1944, Papers of David Harris, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace.

18. CAC-167 Preliminary A, 4 May 1944, *Views of the Inter-Divisional Committee On Germany*, Papers of David Harris, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and peace.

19. See article "British Ask Curbs on German Schools," New York Times, 27 May 1943.

20. Discussed in the Foreign Office on May 25 1943. Memorandum obtained from the *War Cabinet Papers on the Future of Germany,* (8th August, 1943), David Harris Papers, Hoover Institution of War, Revolution, and Peace, p. 8

CHAPTER THREE

MOMENTARY SOLUTIONS ON ENTERING GERMANY

1944-1945

During 1943-1944, while German forces retreated in Italy, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and France, the Allies made preparations to battle the last ditch efforts of the German *Wehrmacht* inside the fatherland. While many in the American military and government were thinking only of "unconditional surrender" and total defeat, others were thinking ahead to controlling Germany after hostilities. The United States was about to finish its second costly war with Germany in less than half a century. The most fundamental objective was to prevent another. Some Americans feared another war because the mentality of German youth had been indoctrinated by single-minded Nazi propaganda. The choice, for them as the war ended, was either to permanently subjugate the German people, or their reeducation.

This chapter will present the difficulties for the Americans in creating postwar policy, the responses of the American Departments of State and War and individual participants, and the eventual formation of American policy statements for the solution to the "German problem." The discussions carried on by these Departments and other

scholars focused on the complex issues surrounding reeducation and eventually created temporary solutions.

In March 1945 the Americans were still unclear on how reeducation would be carried out. Even during the final battles in Germany, debate continued between different departments in the United States government over specifics on civil affairs. Field Commanders and civil affairs staffs had to rely on monthly reports as temporary guides in procedure. The delay in policy was due to the lack of coordination with British postwar planners and between American departments, the low priority of reeducation in postwar plans, and the debate over the severity of postwar policies. This lack of a policy led to problems when they entered Germany.

The first American reeducation proposals emphasized cooperation with Great Britain. Unlike the American government, the British government had reached agreement on most post-victory plans. On July 3rd 1944, a Draft Directive on the Re-education of Germany circulated through the British War Cabinet and the Armistice and Civil Affairs Committee. Shortly thereafter, representatives from the British Political Intelligence Department and the U.S. State Department formed a coordinating committee to produce several guidelines for reconstruction. As the Allies were advancing into Germany, the coordinating committee attempted to settle an inter-allied policy for the General Advisory

Committee and General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters (SHAEF). The German historian Lothar Kettenacker suggests that there were many instances where General Eisenhower and his staff at SHAEF found more credibility in directives originating from Great Britain rather than the United States. [1] Unlike the Americans, the British were able to give clear solutions for problems (i.e. textbook provisions and the screening of teaching personnel).

The main objective of the British regarding German reeducation for the initial phase of occupation was "to avoid as far as possible any increase of administrative difficulties in Germany." [2] In the past, Britain had maintained its imperialist rule in countries by indirect control to avoid high costs and the need to use the military. While the British wanted to foster popular democracy in Germany, including freedom of opinion, speech, press, and religion, they also believed in minimal intervention with the German educational system. "We should interrupt the machinery of education as little as possible. To do otherwise would be inconsistent with the ideals we profess, and would complicate the tasks of Allied Military Governments." [3]

The ideas put forward during 1943-44 by the British and Americans differed on several views. In the *Proposals for the Re-education of Germany*, made by the Joint Commission of the London International Assembly and the Council for

Education in World Citizenship, the American representatives demanded of the educational system a restructuring to allow more German students access to higher education. In the same proposals, the British were less interested in structural reform and more interested in denazifying and demilitarizing. [4] Another example of discrepancy between American and British plans was the administration of reeducation affairs. The British proposed that a High Commissioner be appointed by the newly created United Nations. This official would assume control at the earliest possible moment and would have control of education in all zones in post-war Germany. The American branch of the Commission did not call for such a step. They favored control for a Regional Government Coordinating Office and the *Länderrat* (German State Governments). [5]

Although there were some joint efforts, the British and Americans eventually produced their own reeducation policies. Consequently, when lines were drawn, different policies were applied within each zone instead of in Germany as a whole. The British and Americans did agree on military government management and treating Germany as one economy. However, their views were too divergent for a common policy regarding reeducation.

Inside the U.S. Government, the State, War, and Treasury Departments attempted to come to agreement on a common policy. The State Department's initial

responsibility was to formulate policies on information control, cultural activities, and relations with German educational authorities. Assistant Secretary of State Archibald Macleish was in charge and assigned personnel to oversee cultural and information affairs. Through his leadership, the General Advising Committee (GAC), formed two years earlier, became the center for preparing studies on peacetime needs. Many prominent educators helped provide information on reeducation. The leading member of the GAC was John W. Taylor. Taylor's qualifications were typical of GAC Personnel: he was a former educational administrator (in America), a Phd graduate from Columbia Teachers College where he wrote his doctoral dissertation on Weimar Youth Groups, and a former teacher in Berlin. Other prominent members of the GAC included Laurance Duggan of the Institute of International Education, William G. Carr of the National Education Association, George Zook from the American Council on Education, and Paul Tillich from the Council for a Democratic Germany. After the occupation of Germany began, the State Department advised the War Department on how to implement policies.

The responsibility of the War Department was to execute policies created in Washington. During 1942-45 the U.S. Army recruited 200 educational administrators to become part of the G-5, Civil Affairs Division. These administrators were commissioned as officers after training in

Charlottesville, Virginia, on the campus of the University of Virginia. Some of these newly commissioned officers were deployed quite early in the Italian theater. Others were assigned to Civil Affairs staffs at army group, corps and division levels. Their duties included advising American occupation commanders and the staff of General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters, forming staffs of military governments across liberated areas, and providing field manuals for theater commanders. Harold Zink, a former military government officer, wrote: "The education officers of higher headquarters were not of the type to content themselves with mere planning, leaving to others the implementing of the plans. Indeed they spent much of their time visiting the field and conferring with the detachment officers in charge of education." [6] As the front moved closer into Germany, the need for these officers greatly increased; unfortunately, the military was unable to meet the demand.

The dissension within the U.S. Government was apparently due to President Franklin Roosevelt's weak efforts on behalf of occupation policy, possibly because of his ill health. [7] His only public policy toward Germany was "unconditional surrender." His usual stance was to support Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. In one excerpt from his diary, Morgenthau recalls seeing the Roosevelt the night before his death. Morgenthau recalled

informing the President of his plans and saying, "I have been strong for winning the war, and I want to help win the peace.' The President said, 'Henry, I am with you 100 percent." [8]

Secretary Morgenthau proposed that the occupation involve dismantling of German industry to prevent her from starting World War III. His belief was that Nazism in education had deep roots - "Those teachers have been indoctrinated with Nazi Philosophy; most of them did not need to go very far to embrace it, for they were the product of Fichte and Nietzsche and von Treitshke." [9] Morgenthau considered the State Departments plans to be "soft" because they leaned toward the idea of rebuilding Germany's industrial economy to win its citizens to the ideas of democracy - "The reeducation of Germany needs to be approached in a scientific spirit before it is safe to allow missionary fervor free rein." [10]

Morgenthau later produced what would be called the "Morgenthau Plan," which called for mandatory closing of German education schools and universities until an Allied Commission of Education had formulated an effective reorganization program. [11] His proposals, described as "harsh" by other departments, proposed punitive measures for defeated Germany and bringing it to a pastoralized state - "When the majority of the German people are small farmers, they will be a bit less susceptible to the lure of

militarism." [12]The Morgenthau Plan was the only position adopted and discussed by the Treasury Committee on Germany because Morgenthau's control over all dissenting views.

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) took the responsibility in assembling "country" units to handle the occupational administration and alleviate the use of combat personnel. In March 1944, a British-American coalition of experts created the German Country Unit (GCU). Later in 1945 the GCU separated into a U.S. Group Control Council (USGCC) and a Civil Affairs Division (CAD). After the summer of 1945, all of these groups were replaced by the United States Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) when wartime headquarters were no longer needed. The OMGUS had under it the Division for Education and Religious Affairs (E&RA).

During the summer of 1944, the GCU consequently ended making the USGCC the only creator of policies to be applied prior to defeat or surrender. They produced SHAEF and OMGUS manuals entitled, *Military Government Handbook Prior to Defeat or Surrender*. The handbook set the procedures for military government acting as an agent of educational reconstruction. It was later criticized by Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau as being too lenient. From his diary Morgenthau recalls after reading the Handbook, he wrote a memo criticizing its major points made. One of the excerpts Morgenthau found objectionable: "Your main and immediate

task is to get things running, to pick up the pieces, to restore as quickly as possible the official functioning of the Germans civil government." [13] In a recent study, Frederick Donnison points out the weakness of the Handbooks:

> There was little that was positive or constructive in these plans. Partly this was because in the first phase there would be little time for the application of more fundamental cures. Partly it was due to the determination not to attempt to remold the German education system from without. New ideas must be generated from within. [14]

As a result of Morgenthau's attacks, Roosevelt ordered the withdrawal of the Handbook. Consequently, the U.S. Group Control Council received less support for its views on German affairs, and the handbooks were temporarily set aside. The only directive to survive for education was the *Technical Manual for Education and Religious Affairs*, the only set of procedures available for British and American commanders entering Germany.

Consequently by the spring of 1944, theater commanders had no firm guidelines on United States policy. In March 1944, the State Department finally provided the War Department with objectives and long-range goals on German educational reform as set by the Interdivisional Committee. These were the only directives available to General Eisenhower's military-government planning staff at SHAEF. As in the case of SHAEF Handbooks, the Secretary of the Treasury attacked their credibility and they never reached the German Country Unit Officers. This was a typical

example of the dissension among the War, State, and Treasury Departments over the adoption of a Hard v. Soft Policy. The viability of any American occupation policy was a matter of winning the approval of the Interdepartmental Policy Committee (IPCOG). This was a problem because Morgenthau, with the support of President Roosevelt, could control IPCOG. Right up to May 1945, it looked as if the final policy might be the "Morgenthau plan."

A decision had to be made during the summer of 1945. Aachen, a German city located on the border of Germany and France, had been occupied since October 1944 and had requested permission to reopen its schools. What emerged as the temporary policy was the Joint Chiefs of Staff Resolution 1067 (JCS 1067). This Resolution reflected the Morgenthau plan; its intentions was to treat Germany as a defeated nation. JCS 1067 was more extreme than the recommendations of many of the initial planners who had advocated a more indirect role in reeducating Germany.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067 resolution called for democratization, denazification, decartelization, and demilitarization. The only reference in the document education was: "German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas." [15] In view of earlier concerns, this statement

seemed inadequate to serve as a guideline for school reform and youth reeducation.

The passage of JCS 1067 in June 1945 created a rift between the State and War Departments on the one hand and the Treasury Department on the other. Many officers found it to be too difficult to implement because of its harshness. According to the draft of the document the principle behind American policy was that no rehabilitation efforts would be made. [16] Unlike previous policies, JCS 1067 was able to escape the influence of Secretary Morgenthau because his influenced waned under the new president, Harry S. Truman. Truman refused to take him to any peace conferences and later dismissed him from his cabinet post.

When Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Union Premier Josef Stalin gathered in Berlin for the Potsdam Conference (July 16-August 2, 1945), the fate of Germany was a prime topic of discussion. An Allied Control Council, made up of representatives from the four Allied Countries, was created as the central organ in handling matters affecting Germany. As a result of agreements reached at the conference, the American policy toward postwar Germany moved away from the Morgenthau plan and Joint Chiefs of Staff Resolution 1067 (JCS 1067). The conference emphasized reconstruction and economic rehabilitation instead of dismemberment or reparations. In

the area of education, plans called for the victorious powers to enforce denazification and the eradication of other "harmful" traits. Positive policies would follow negative policies and would allow regular elementary schools *(Volksschulen)*, secondary schools and Universities to function again. [17] The Potsdam Conference's plans for postwar policy were not universally accepted however, but as mentioned by writer Arthur Hearnden, it was "no more than the formal expression of a minimum consensus." [18]

During 1945 the specific procedures necessary to fulfill reeducation goals were still unclear. The foremost objectives of the Americans were to establish a means of control and bring the children back into the schools. Americans agreed on a total purge of National Socialism. But what would come after the denazification phase was less clear; it would be decided after German authorities cooperated in the denazification process.

American educators and government officials viewed the U.S. role in German reeducation with a sense of mission. Their planning for the development of German reeducation reflected a variety of educational philosophies that were current in American education. The results of months of discussions, debates, proposals, policy formulation, and proposed solutions entered the testing ground as early as October 21, 1944 when the allied army occupied Aachen, the first German city to be subdued in World War II.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Lothar Kettenacker, "The Planning of 'Re-education' During the Second World War", in *The Political Re-education of Germany And Her Allies After World War II,* ed. Nicholas Pronay, (Totowa, New Jersey, 1985).

2. Dept of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Mr. Paul Gore-Booth, and Mr. Harley A. Notter, British Embassy, David Harris Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.

3. Dept. of State: Memorandum of Conversation, 21 Feb. 1944, The Reeducation of Germany, Mr. Paul Gore-Booth, British Embassy, David Harris Papers, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace.

4. See U.S. Dept. of State, Office Memorandum, 27 May 1944, From SEA to Heber R. Harper regarding British Plans regarding German Education, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace.

5. "British Ask Curbs on German Schools," 24 May 1943, New York Times., pp. 2.

6. Harold Zink, *The American Military Government in Germany*, (New York 1947), p. 156.

7. How President would have handled educational reform can be debated. Roosevelt could have been laissez faire in attitude either because of his favorable experiences in attending schools in Germany or because or his concentration on issues that he viewed to be more pertinent.

8. Henry Morgenthau Jr, *Germany is Our Problem*, (New York 1945), pp. 152-3.

9. ibid., 419.

10. ibid., p. 145.

11. ibid., p. 2.

12. ibid., p. 146.

13. John Morton Blum, *Roosevelt and Morgenthau: A revision and Condensation from the Morgenthau Diaries,* (Boston 1970), p. 576.

14. F.S.V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government: North-West Europe 1944-46,* (London 1961), p. 373.

15. United States Dept. of State, *Papers of Foreign Relations of the United States*, Diplomatic Papers, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Conference), Washington: GPO, 1945, pp. 751.

16. Blum, *Roosevelt and Morgenthau*, p. 387.

17. See United States Department of State, *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress 1945-46*. European Series 23. Publication 2783. Washington: GPO, 1946.

18. Arthur Hearnden, *Education in the Two Germanies*, (Boulder Colorado 1974), p. 35.

CHAPTER FOUR:

CONDUCTING THE GERMAN YOUTH EXPERIMENT

As the last remnants of the *Wehrmacht* submitted to the Allied armed forces, another submission was underway. The German countryside, townships, and cities were submitting to an Allied occupation government. With the surrender of German forces, Southern Germany came under the administration of the United States military while Great Britain acquired northeast territory, and the Soviet Union acquired the eastern area. Later these territories were divided into zones for each of these Allied countries; later France received parts of the British and American zones.

As Germany's military defeat emerged in 1944-45, her educational crisis deepened. The German people feared a wave of juvenile delinquency and organized clandestine activity would sweep over the country. [1] On many occasions youth raided American vehicles for food and cigarettes and later sold them in black markets. [2] Most German school buildings were either destroyed or occupied for non - school purposes, and teachers were absent. Consequently, the youth were unsupervised. The American military government's Division of Education and Religious Affairs faced a difficult challenge, with few clear instructions and insufficient personnel to handle the difficult tasks ahead.

The occupation involved two phases, a "Fighting In" phase and a "Post-Hostility" phase. As clarified by the *Technical Manual for Education and Religious Affairs:*

> The first one [phase] will be one mainly of destruction, destruction throughout the German educational system of Nazism, German militarism and all they connote. The second will be one of reconstruction. In the first phase, the initiative must be taken by Military Government. In the second, the Germans must build for themselves, subject, of course, to strict supervision. [3]

During the initial period of allied occupation (the "fighting in" phase), the control of the schools belonged to the theater commander. Under the orders of Supreme Headquarters (SHAEF), the theater commander's first aim was to destroy Nazism and all foundations of its ideology, including in the schools. [4] The schools were closed, all textbooks and teaching materials were impounded, and teachers suspected of being Nazis were either arrested or held for denazification screening.

The theater commander decided when the schools would reopen. His authorization to reopen was based on his judgment for each individual school and their elimination of Nazi materials and teaching staff, the number of children who were at compulsory school ages, and the space available. Schools were reopened in the following priority: elementary schools, schools for children with disabilities, intermediate schools, and secondary schools. [5] The majority of younger age students returned to their schools first. The opening of Adult, Technical, Vocational, or Higher

Educational institutions were not under consideration by the E&RA branch at this time.

The second stage of occupation, (the "post-hostility" phase), came after the direct threat of enemy action ended. With the need for educational dismantling was largely over, thus the rebuilding process could begin. During this phase, the American Military Government set up an administrative apparatus of military personnel with defined tasks and responsibilities. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Theater Commander and Military Governor (SHAEF), and General Lucius Clay, the Deputy Military Governor, were responsible for carrying out policies designed by the State and War Departments. In the American zone, German authority was divided between the separate states of Greater Hesse, Bavaria, Wurttemberg-Baden, Bremen and the zone of West Berlin. At a higher level the Allied Education Committee, a central organ of all four zones, worked with individual state governments, and saw to it that direct policies in educational affairs were being carried out by local school precincts. Also, each state and local principality had education officers under the field branches of Education and Religious Affairs (E&RA). [6]

The role of the education officers in the E&RA branches was to supervise and approve educational policies made by the Germans themselves. They advised the State Education Minister who administered the schools. Also, the officers

helped in the nomination of the regional directors of education. Other activities included inspecting superintendent offices and schools.

It is important to point out that authority was given to the individual *Länder* instead of resting control in a central authority. Unlike the British, the American staff banned a zone-wide educational administration. The reason was that the American Military Government, in coordination with the *Länderrat*, wanted a government structure similar to the one before the Nazi takeover. During the Empire and the Republic there was no national ministry of education; schools were a concern of the individual state. Each state had differences in the legal administration and organization of schools. The Nazi party moved all educational matters to a central authority, which resulted in opposition from the different *Länder*, who preferred handling their own state affairs.

The relatively early transfer of power to state control occurred because many ranking education officers felt that the military government was insufficient to govern a zone-wide population. One reason was that all financial provisions for education were made by German authorities and only occasionally could the military government advance funds during a financial crisis. Also, the military government could not employ enough Americans to teach every

German child effectively; teachers therefore had to be German.

During the first phases of military government, the testing ground of the reeducation process was the city of Aachen. This city, located on the southern border near France, reopened its classes for first to fourth grade students in April of 1945. Unfortunately, the men selected for key positions by the military government detachment were found to be formerly affiliated with Nazi activities. When news of this reached the United States, the U.S. government and American public were alarmed. Reviewing the Aachen experience, the Office of Military Government decided that additional conditions would have to be met before other schools reopened in the future.

Most elementary schools across the American Zone opened on October 1, 1945, although in addition to Aachen some schools opened earlier, including: Wiesbaden schools (Aug. 10), Heidelberg schools (Aug 10), Rothenburg (Aug. 27), and Frankfurt (Sept. 3). Reports from the elementary schools indicated that 1,200,174 pupils between six and fourteen years of age were attending school on October 1st. But at the same time, 510,866 children of the same age group were not attending school. [7] Of the schools in operation, most were open only part of the day with very little curriculum involved.

Before the schools reopened, they had to first meet the number one priority of denazification. The *Technical Manual for Education and Religious Affairs* stated the objective: "to ensure the elimination of Nazi administrative, inspectoral and teaching personnel" (pp. 1). Denazification took precedence over any other procedure. Under this directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff barred all those with Nazi affiliations from holding public positions. Because almost every teacher belonged to the Nazi Teachers' Association (*Nationalsozialisticher Lehrerbund*), denazification in the field of education posed a problem for the Americans.

The Americans found that the Nazis had suppressed all of the teacher's organizations with the exception of some Roman Catholic ones. In August 1945, the American forces discovered 355,000 file cards in the city of Bayreuth with the complete membership records of the Nazi Teachers Association. [8] In other Nazi archives, they found similar records revealing that 98% of the German teachers were members of the Nazi Teachers' Organization. [9] This discovery was no surprise to the Education Affairs staff, but the material provided incentive for re-examining the level of involvement of teachers at all echelons of the German education structure.

The denazification proceedings of public officials were similar to the Nuremburg trials in that membership in the

Nazi party was deemed by the allies to be a crime. The denazification courts included members of the International Military Tribunal, Occupation tribunals of U.S. Judges and U.S. Military Government Courts of U.S. military judges. At the beginning of occupation, the responsibility of trying German educators fell on G-5 staffs. After the war, most of the teaching personnel went through denazification tribunals made up of German civilian judges to determine their degree of involvement in the Nazi party. By joint decision of the German lawmakers and military government, youth subjected to Nazi indoctrination would not be punished, but were required to fully participate in the denazification process.

The denazification of the German teachers resulted in a massive purge. Teachers charged with active participation in or support of Nazi Party activities were viewed especially meticulously. Most of the major offenders, such as members of The National Educational Ministry in Berlin, were tried by the U.S. Occupation Tribunals. At the result of an appeal by General Lucius Clay and others in military government, the lesser offenders came before Denazification Tribunals made up of German civilian judges.

Teachers were placed in three separate categories by their degree of involvement with Nazi activities. The categories were known as the "Black list", "Grey list", and "White list." [10] The "Black List" were either former administrative officials of all grades in National Socialist

teaching organizations, or former administrative officials in the National Socialist Party with the rank of *Ortsgruppenleiter* (local administrator) or higher. Also on this list were those who had been members of the S.S., leaders of the *Hitlerjugend* (Hitler Youth), agents of the Gestapo, or teachers employed in the special Nazi schools (*Napolas* and *Adolph Hitler Schulen*). [11] The punishment of these offenders involved imprisonment, heavy fines, confiscation of property, and permanent dismissal from any pedagogical or civic career.

The "Grey List" were the remaining categories of suspicious persons leftover from the "Black List." These individuals were teachers who entered the educational administration under the Nazi regime, headmasters of schools, other higher ranking officials. [12] Most on the "Grey List" were more moderate members of the Nazi party; their involvement was under investigation and they were deemed temporarily unacceptable as teachers. They were suspended from any appointment to educational institutions until the tribunal decided otherwise.

The "White List" were German educators whose character, social and political reliability, and non-involvement in the Nazi Party rendered them acceptable to be placed back in the schools. They were cleared immediately and after attending denazification courses in the summer, were on the school staff for the fall of 1945 when schools were reopened.

Most of the educators in this class were education officials known to have been dismissed or under suspicion by the Nazis because of their views on racial, political, or religious issues.

Those who survived the trials (either the grey or white list) had to fill out *Fragebogen* questionnaires on their political activities under the Third Reich. The *Fragebogen* helped the G-5 staffs and German administrators determine whether the teacher joined the Nazi party willingly or by compulsion. The disqualification of teachers by the *Fragebogen* was so far reaching that few teachers were able to teach in the fall of 1945. In Hessen, 55% to 75% of teachers were found unacceptable for teaching. Out of 1,791 teachers in the area, 842 were mandatory removals, 200 were recommended for removal, 276 under suspicion of removal, and only 452 passed the *Fragebogen* testing with no evidence of Nazi activity. [13] In Darmstadt only 15% of the teachers screened were found to be "untainted" by Nazism and could be used in the schools on October 1. [14] The heavy suspension of teachers suggests that the Military Government was strict in the screening of teachers as the opening of schools became certain in occupied areas. This severe approach to removing teaching personnel was highly criticized later on by many Germans and Americans. Writer John Gimbel points out that the problem was the "immense scope of denazification, the lack of sympathy with which individual

Americans and Germans approached the program, the attempt to apply categories as objective criteria for judging human action, the conflict in the field between desires for efficiency and the need for removing some who could make operations more efficient if they stayed." [15]

As schools opened, there were teacher shortages. In addition to denazification, another reason for teacher shortage was that many Germans had not returned from war service. In 1943 four out of five male teachers under forty-five years of age had entered military service; many never returned because of death or capture. [16] A further reason was that since 1936, the Nazis had forced many teachers in the *Volksschule* (Elementary) and *Hoehere Schule (Preparatory School)* out of the profession. The absence of faculty forced the American military government to make up the losses. [17]

The Education and Religious Affairs Branch took several measures to battle the problem of teacher shortage. In 1945-6 it had 140 educators sent over from the United States. But with 3,000,000 million Germans to educate, this meant only one educator for every 20,000 German students. The U.S. Education and Religious Affairs Branch was unable to convince the Military Governor of the need for more teachers because of the other pressing demands the Military Government faced. Harold Zink, former military government officer, wrote: "In the highest Army circles, education is

apparently regarded as quite important in theory, but it is nevertheless a cheap function that can be performed by a small number of junior officers." [18] The only solution left to the Education and Religious Affairs branch (E&RA) was to employ the Germans themselves. There were some German teachers who maintained their positions because of the combined intervention of military government officials, parents, and pupils. This meant using teachers dismissed by the Nazis despite the fact that they had been away from the profession for a long time.

The E&RA hired other Germans by creating crash courses in pedagogy run by military government detachments. To follow the traditional training courses for elementary teachers, the military government allowed the *Lehrerbildungsanstalten* (teacher education schools) to open. The problem was that the process of training a teacher took five years, then the graduate had to pass a first exam, become an auxiliary teacher, then pass a second exam to enter into the profession. The Germans needed teachers immediately; a longer delay it was feared would bring future problems. Throughout 1945-6, the American Military Government held to its principles in keeping purged teachers out of education. As time passed, the denazification review boards were pressed harder by the E&RA and *Länder* Governments to allow those teachers who had little

involvement in the Nazi party, as determined by the *Fragebogen*, to reenter the schools.

In addition to providing teachers, another priority in the *Technical Manual For Education Affairs*, was "to ensure that suitable buildings were made available" (p. 1). As with other problems in post surrender reeducation, finding an appropriate building was not easy. Many school buildings had been destroyed by Allied bombing. In Essen for example, 30 to 40% of the schools were put out of action by the first major raid of the city. [19] Those buildings not damaged had to be used for other means such as hospitals and housing for displaced persons. During the war some schools had been housed in unconventional places such as Inns, Cellars, and air-raid shelters.

Even though many schools opened on October 1, 1945, there was the problem of maintaining the buildings in suitable condition. The construction or maintenance of buildings was postponed because construction funds were needed for housing refugees, displaced persons, and citizens. Also, funds for the schools were minimal as the military government gave higher priority to the building of factories and other facilities for rebuilding the economy. During the winter of 1945, Germany experienced a severe shortage of coal - the only source of heat and electricity for the school buildings. Because of the dwindling coal allotment, a wholesale closing of schools threatened. For

many areas, the only workable solution was having children attend school in two or three shifts a day and bring sticks of wood to heat their own classrooms. [20]

The Germans determined the types of schools that were to open. The *Länderrat* decided to reestablish the school system of the Weimar Republic. This meant reestablishing several types the Nazis had eliminated: the *Gymnasium* (classical school of Latin and Greek), the *Realgymnasium* (school of modern humanities), the *Oberreal Schule* (curriculum emphasis on math and science) and other various private pre-secondary schools. The basic framework the Americans wanted to set up in their zone was the free compulsory elementary school (*Grundschule)* for children six to fourteen years of age, the two intermediate schools of the *Mittelschule* (lower level-four years) and the *Hauptschule* (higher level-6 years), and the secondary schools. The purpose was to democratize Germany through a single track of equal educational opportunity. The German government was providing financial assistance to students and end tracking based on income in the schools. The school systems however, failed to meet the American plans of thoroughly democratizing their educational structure.

A third priority stated in the *Technical Manual for Education and Religious Affairs* was that before schools reopened they had "to provide suitable textbooks and other teaching material" (2). Because the existing textbooks were

so heavily impregnated with Nazi propaganda, many were unsuitable. For a few months after reopening, schools were issued older pre-Nazi books. The task of sorting and selecting German textbooks fell to Columbia University's Teacher's College, which possessed a large selection of German textbooks, dating from 1910. [21] Many other textbook replacements were relics of the Weimar Republic and were suspect for containing militarist statements. The War Department microfilmed selected texts and sent them to the Civil Affairs Division of SHAEF, who made the final decision on publishing. By September 1945 the Military Government was able to produce 5,450,000 texts on reading, arithmetic, history, nature study and literature.

Emergency stocks of textbooks thus created during 1945-6. The number of books published was based on the estimated school enrollment. Because paper stocks and other printing supplies were critically low, it was difficult to supply sufficient texts for the entire U.S. Zone. Early supplies often allowed only one text for several students to share.

With the question of textbooks, also came the issue of curriculum reform. In Germany's traditional educational curriculum there were basic principles that the United States was attempting to change. Like the teaching profession, curriculum had to undergo denazification. Biology, geography, history, and even math were looked at closely for Nazi influences. [22] The American military

government rejected all textbooks that glorified militarism or military practice in war, favored the doctrines of National Socialism, or promoted racial discrimination. The most controversial subject to reincorporate in the scope of curriculum was history. Because of concern over nationalist and militarist emphasis, especially interpretations of Germany's entry into war, history books had been completely banned in the distribution of emergency textbooks. When the schools opened, it was the responsibility of the German administrative authorities to provide the E&RA officials with a copy of the syllabus of each class. No military athletic organizations were to be operated. Among the prohibited physical activities, because of their militaristic connotation, were aviation, parachuting, gliding, fencing, firearms, and para-military drill. [23]

In attempting to establish a sound German educational system, the American Military Government also set up auxiliary organizations to contribute to the reeducation effort. Education service centers were established in nine locations to help German educators learn and discuss modern teaching methods with international experts. The Military Government also set up programs for the public libraries, which had decayed as an instrument of political education during the Nazi era. Library materials were denazified and public libraries managed to regain their essential purpose of freely disseminating ideas.

Perhaps the most significant auxiliary program of the American Military Government for the reeducation of youth was the German Youth Activities Program. Youth groups had a long tradition in Germany. In the previous century, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, professor at the University of Berlin, had founded the fraternity movement (*Burschenschaften*) to inspire young boys to build themselves physically for the country's unity. Up to 1933 the youth movement developed associations with special interest in sports, music, handicraft, hiking and camping as well as social work. But by the end of the first year of Nazi rule all youth organizations, with the exceptions of a few Catholic ones, had either been banned or had to coordinate with the Nazi Youth. The Nazi Youth became the strongest social influence on youth for twelve years.

The Military Government recognized early in the occupation that the establishment of youth groups was important for the purpose of involving youth in positive activities. Youth Organizations were also a substitute for the Hitler Youth and nationally organized gangs formed under such names as Red X and *Edelweisspiraten*. In the summer of 1945, the military government employed children from twelve to sixteen years of age in clearing gardens, parks, and school buildings. The programs were successful in that they employed the idle hands of the youth and helped restore several public buildings. [24] The youth groups spread into

other areas of the zone. In October of 1945, the military government approved of the establishment of local youth groups supervised by local citizens.

The German Youth Activities program (GYA) was set up initially as a voluntary movement by the American army. It started as a friendly demonstration by G.I.s who offered their sports equipment or provided recreational facilities through army special services. By 1946 GYA was a military government program in which principal tactical commanders appointed youth activities officers in individual units. The GYA became one of the most successful program for encouraging Germany's youth to learn about democracy. By July 15, 1946, 477,734 German young people belonged to organized youth groups like the Boy Scouts which provided instruction in religion, hiking, sports. [25]

In April of 1946, the occupation government separated from the army, and the first phase of educational reconstruction had ended. For the first two years the American military had attempted to dismantle every facet of Nazism to precede to positive (and political) reeducation. The reeducation effort in 1945 was a lab that explored many possible solutions through trial and error. The results of this initial period were evaluated by a new U.S. Education team in 1946 that also brought about a new phase of educational reconstruction.

FOOTNOTES

1. Evidence of German concern for juvenile delinquency can be found in the USFET Weekly Information Bulletin, No. 6, 1 Sept. 1945.

2. See Hannsjoachim W. Koch, *The Hitler Youth: Origins and Development 1922-45*, (London 1979), p. 254.

3. *Technical Manual for Education and Religious Affairs*, p. 1, Box 35, Papers of Walter Bedel Smith, Eisenhower Library.

4. *Technical Manual for Education and Religious Affairs*, p.1.

5. ibid. pp. 3.

6. See Administrative Table, Appendix 3.

7. USFET Weekly Information Bulletin, No. 16, 6 Nov. 1945, pp. 14.

8. *Report of the Military Governor*, Sept. 1945, No. 3

9. *Technical Manual for Education and Religious Affairs*, p. 17.

10. The categories of German offenders from the education field were different than other fields of profession. Businessmen, civil leaders, etc. were placed in five fields with different sanctions: major offenders, offenders, lesser offenders, followers, and exonerated.

11. For the procedures of trying German officials in military and occupation tribunals see Handbook for Military Government in Germany, 1 Sept. 1944, Box 35, Folder 5, Chapter XVII, Papers of Walter Bedel Smith, Eisenhower Library.

12. ibid. pp. 748.

13. *Monthly Report of the Military Governor*, 20 Oct. 1945, No. 3, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers, Eisenhower Library.

14. *Monthly Report of the Military Governor*, September 1945, 20 October 1945, no. 3.

15. John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany*, (Stanford, California 1968), p. 102.

16. *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, 1 Sept. 1944, Box 35, Folder 5, Chapter XVII, Education and Religious Affairs, Papers of Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower Library.

17. See Appendix 3.

18. Harold Zink, *American Military Government in Germany*, (New York 1947), p. 152.

19. Handbook for Military Government in Germany, 1 Sept. 1944, Box 35, Folder 5, Chapter XVII, Education and Religious Affairs, Walter Bedell Smith Papers, pp. 739.

20. Headquarters USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference, No. 1, 18 December 1945. Walter Bedell Smith Papers, Eisenhower Library.

21. See Earl F. Ziemke's, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-46, 1950, p. 3.*

22. See Table in Appendix 5.

23. OMGUS Monthly Report No. 43, January 1949. pp. 585.

24. USFET Weekly Field Report, No. 16, 6 Nov 1945, pp. 14.

25. *Statistics on Organized Youth Groups, Youth Centers, and Youth Hostels*, OMGUS Monthly Report, No. 43, January 1949.

CHAPTER FIVE

AFTERWARD

The first phase of reeducation in the American Zone lasted until the summer of 1946. During this phase, the occupational government had been in control to ensure that the procedure agreed upon was followed. Its activities involved a political purge on an enormous scale. Also, this phase introduced the Education and Religious Affairs Branch (E&RA) that prepared the schools for opening and formed a new curriculum for political democracy. Despite the hardships of insufficient funding, shortage of adequate teachers, shortage of textbooks, and low priority status, the military government was able to quickly establish a fragile, but functioning school system as early as the first fall after the German surrender.

The second phase began in the summer of 1946 when a special United States Education Mission, appointed by the Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, visited the U.S. Zone. The mission report, presented to the State Department on October 12, analyzed the military government's efforts in educational reform and found some apparent weaknesses. The Education Mission found the first failure of the Military Government to totally denazify and democratize German education. There was no question of

intention. "The Mission finds that both the positive and the negative aspects of this program - both denazification and democratization - have been taken in dead earnestness in the American zone." [1] But they criticized the education military government's reform for not setting goals which would allow equal opportunity for all children in their school placement. This weakness was blamed partially on the education officials in military government and the German authorities who fought total democratization because it would mean lowering the average student performance. Many times in the *U.S. Dept of State Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany*, the phrase "battle must be taken up again" is repeated, urging new attempts to reach this goal. [2]

The Education Mission also found that youth attitudes still presented problems even after a year of occupation. There were instances of Nazi underground organizations such as the Radical Nationalists (RaNa) and other ex-Hitler Youth groups still in operation. [3] These organizations continued to harbor the beliefs of the Hitler Youth and assembled juveniles (in cities mostly) to sabotage allied equipment and commit other criminal acts. Other observations reported that large numbers of German young people were found to retain thoughts of violent nationalism, racial superiority and other Nazi doctrine principles. [4] For example, in the 1945-1949 OMGUS surveys, when Bavarian school children were

asked to name the greatest leaders of Germany, ten per cent named Hitler. [5] The Education Mission believed that the reeducation movement had not succeeded by 1946 in teaching German Youth the meaning of a democracy. "Democracy to these youths meant freedom for the people (23%) and government by the people (10%). Forty-eight per cent, however, had no opinion when asked what democracy meant." [6]

The Education Mission's initiative in evaluating German reeducation surfaced the contrasting interests of the Allies and their zones. In January 1947, when the United States was pushing for further reform in its zone, the British Zone returned all control of education back to the Germans. The Education Mission's interest in democratizing the traditional elitist secondary schools was not shared by the British and French. Historian Gregory P. Wegner writes: "In keeping their own traditional ties to elite secondary education, the British and French education officers did not express serious intentions of changing the structure of the Berlin-Gymnasium." [7] Wegner also points out that there were strong differences between the United States and other zones over interpretations of economics and Marxism in the curriculum. [8] The degree of American involvement in German reeducation became increasingly political instead of educational, reflecting the beginning of the Cold War. When the second phase began in 1947, only two of the four

occupiers were increasing their influence on German education - the United States and the Soviet Union.

The first phase of reeducation encountered many impediments which hurt the success of initial operations. One impediment was that the plans were so challenged by American and German critics that what was finally adopted was often vague and unrealistic. A second impediment was the availability of educational staff and materials. For example, in the U.S. zone up to 1946, because of the denazification purge, there were still between eighty to ninety students to every teacher. The Military Government was unable to provide sufficient personnel from the United States for the Education and Religious Affairs Branch because of low priority and funding. In 1946, the branch had only forty low-ranking education officers to shoulder the responsibility for 20 million Germans. The majority of funding for German reconstruction went to the economy which took procedure over efforts for democratization - for it would be difficult for Germans to see the benefits of democracy without being able to feed themselves. As Lucius Clay, the Military Governor the U.S. zone, repeatedly stated, "we still believe full bellies to be a first requisite to receptive minds." [9]

On the other hand, the initial operations in Germany can also be interpreted as successful. The military government was able to quickly remove unacceptable teachers

and teaching material from the schools. The first phase also prevented delinquency and crime by bringing students to classrooms and youth programs in very quick time. By January 1946, nearly 90% of all children (ages 6-14) were in elementary schools for example. [10] Despite its weaknesses it would seem that the reeducation program did help prevent the persistence of Nazism.

The German attitude toward American efforts in reeducation fluctuated. According to OMGUS surveys, most youth claimed to like school (98%). Germans viewed the American efforts in administration and denazification as necessary, rather than an agent of national humiliation. OMGUS surveys reported, "The number of respondents satisfied with the way in which denazification was being carried out declined from roughly half in the winter of 1945-1946, when the idea was new and relatively untried, to about a third from October 1946 to the following September, to about a sixth in January 1949." [11] After 1949 reeducation was less acceptable to Germans. Writer John Gimbel points out, "after 1949, reorientation had to contend with the gradually increasing authority of Germans, many of whom saw reorientation as pure Americanization or in the words of its most severe critic, 'character washing.'" [12]

The reeducation effort in 1945-46 did bring further changes to German education. In 1947, General Clay upgraded the education bureaucracy which brought further reforms such

as equality of educational opportunity, free schools, and the change of separate schools into more comprehensive schooling, and elementary teacher training in the University. In February 1948 the Civil Affairs Division gave education top priority elevating the education branch to division status, changing its name to Education and Cultural Affairs. In January 1946 elections took place in which German citizens took over complete running of the educational administration but were still under Occupational Government supervision.

Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s the American government offered cultural exchange programs that exposed Germans to democratic ideals. With the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 and through the next three decades, the United States offered ideas that produced many changes in the educational structure and curriculum of Germany and made Germany an international partner in the United Nations.

FOOTNOTES

1. William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs to the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, Oct. 12, 1946, Dept. of State, Publication 2664, European Series 16.

2. U.S. Dept. of State, Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, January 20, 1947, European Series 16, pp. 19-20.

3. See CCL-3763AA, July 25, 1946, Policy and Information Statement: Germany, Summary of Issues and Trends in Germany, David Harris Papers, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace.

4. Kellermann, Henry J., The Present Status of the German Youth, Dept. of State, Publication 2583, European Series II. p. 3.

5. Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949*, (Chicago 1970), p.87.

6. ibid., p. 87.

7. See Wegner, Gregory P. *Germany's Past Contested: The So*viet-American Conflict in Berlin over History Curriculum Reform, 1945-1948. Vol. 30, no. 1, Spring 1990. History of Education Quarterly, p. 3.

8. ibid., p. 87.

9. 31 January 1947, From Clay Personal for NOCE CC13662.

10. CCL-3763AA, July 25, 1946, Policy and Information Statement: Germany, Summary of Issues and Trends in Germany, David Harris Papers, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, pp. 22.

11. Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949*, p. 37.

12. John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany*, p. 257.

CONCLUSION

The reeducation of Germany's postwar youth was an opportunity as well as a challenge. In cooperation with the postwar German government, the American government used the school as the primary agency for the development of German culture. The German school became the most crucial area in which to develop roots of democratic values, attitudes, and political peace. Hannsjoachim Koch writes, "Germany's post-war youth grew up among the ruins, lived in them, queued among them, and indeed received its education in them." [1] But defeat alone would not be enough to re-educate the German people. Along with denazification and demilitarization, Americans believed a reeducation based on democratic principles was necessary to reorient Germans.

During the first phase of reeducation, the American plans to "rescue" Germany lacked any definitive policy. This deficiency can be traced to disagreements over policy among the American Departments of State, War, and Treasury, the other Allied powers, and even the Germans themselves. Arthur Hearnden suggests, "The rather negative character of American policy reflected at this point the predominantly punitive spirit of the 1945 policy directive [JCS 1067] and was further accentuated by the low status of the Education

and Religious Affairs section and its consequent inability to influence policy to any great extent." [2] The debate over policy centered around the issue of "soft vs. harsh" policy. Historian James Tent puts it quite correctly: "policymakers and policy implementers in both Washington and Germany displayed ambivalence about the general goals for Germany and for education reform in particular." [3]

Whether it can be considered "harsh" or "soft", the Americans tended to exercise closer control than the other allies in their zones. More than the British and French, the Americans wanted to replace the existing school system with a more comprehensive structure. The Russian zone was the only zone to change the educational system into a more comprehensive structure following their communist ideology. The Americans at first made little change in establishing a comprehensive structure because the more the United States pushed for changes, the more resistance they faced from the German education ministry. Changes came much later than 1945 and most of the initiative was taken from the Germans themselves.

The system of reeducation discredited Nazi ideology to the succeeding generation. To achieve this success, the United States utilized the contribution of many scholars who understood German beliefs, folkways, and values. Their input led to a policy which didn't attempt to impose a system of culture but introduced a humane way of living in a

democratic society - something no other policy option offered.

This study has examined the American commitment to German reeducation and its urgent need as the Second World War came to a close. Through demilitarization, decartelization, and denazification, and its reeducation program, the Americans in the first phase (1944-1947) labored to eradicate harmful elements of Nazism. History had placed German education in American hands enabling them to battle traditional German social thinking. The Americans believed that the German reeducation, with the youth as a distinctive clientele, was the long range answer to prevent future wars. A closing statement by Pronay: "With empathy, it could thus be argued that the 're-education' of the German nation was the Second World War itself." [4]

FOOTNOTES

1. Hannsjoachim W. Koch, *The Hitler Youth: Origins and Development, 1922-1945*, (London 1979), p. 254.

2. Arthur Hearnden, *Education in the Two Germanies*, (Boulder, Colorado 1974), p. 12.

3. James Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany*, (Chicago, 1982), p. 2.

4. ibid., p. 48.

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David Harris Collection

Box 1	Implementation of the Potsdam Declaration: Democratization and Denazification. Report issued by the U.S. Department of State.
Box 2	Post-war education, 1944 Private Draft for the Interdivisional Committee Views of the Interdivisional Committee Proposals by Paul Tillich
Box 3	United States, Office Military Government, 1946.

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APPENDIX 1



Occupied Germany, 1945–49

APPENDIX 2

GLOSSARY

PART I MAJOR SCHOOL TYPES

Volksschule	An eight year compulsory school, somewhat comparable to the American eight year elementary school. (Kindergartens are usually privately managed and not included in the definition of the traditional Volksschulen.)
Grundschule	The first four years of the Volksschulen, attended in common by all children.
Mittelschule	A six or seven year school starting at the close of the Grundschulen, preparing for government and clerical positions.
Hoehere Schule	An eight or nine year school starting usually at the close of the Grundschulen. Prepares for the Abitur.
Gymnasium	Traditional type of Hoehere Schulen emphasizing ancient languages and classics.
Realgymnasium	Hoehere Schule stressing modern languages, science, and mathematics, while retaining classical languages.
Oberrealschule	Hoehere Schule stressing modern languages, science, mathematics, and optional studies but not offering classical languages. Oberschule is similar to Oberrealschule and offers in addition a domestic science track for girls.
Aufbauschule	Hoehere Schule of the Realgymnasium or Oberrealschulen type but usually for six years starting after six or eight years of Volksschulen. Prepares for the Abitur.
Berufsschule	Compulsory vocational school for boys and girls from 14 to 18 years of age, supplementing work-experience of apprentices with theoretical aspects. Present practice is 4 to 12 hours of schooling per week for three years, starting at close of Volksschulen (two years for agricultural pupils). Numerous special types of vocational schools in the larger cities prepare for trade, clerical, domestic, and similar occupations.
Werkberufsschule	Vocational school supported by a large industry for its apprentice employees.
Berufsfachschule	Voluntary full-time vocational school for pupils over 14 years of age who have completed Volksschule; offering training in commerce, trade, domestic work, and handicrafts, including training for kindergarten and vocational school teaching.
Fachschule	Technical school for students over 17 years of age; offering advanced training in all trade and handicraft skills.
Hochschule	Institutions of higher learning, including universities, for admission to which Abitur is required.

APPENDIX 3



FIGURE 17 TEACHING STAFF PER 1000 PUPILS BY SCHOOL TYPE
U.S. OCCUPIED AREA 1949



FIGURE 18 TREND OF TEACHING STAFF PER 1000 PUPILS
U.S. OCCUPIED AREA SELECTED YEARS 1921-1949

APPENDIX 4



INCREASE IN SCHOOL ENROLMENT I
Elementary Schools

APPENDIX 5


TEXTS ANALYZED TO 1 SEP. 1945
SCHOOL
SUBJECT
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
VOLKS-SCHULE (ELEMENTARY SCHOOL)
AGRICULTURE
ARITHMETIC
BIOLOGY
ENGLISH
GEOGRAPHY
HISTORY
HYGIENE
LOCAL LORE
MUSIC
NAT. SCIENCE
READING
4-7
24
71
142 TOTAL
HAUPT- & MITTEL-SCHULE (INTERMEDIATE OR CENTRAL SCHOOL)
ARITHMETIC
ENGLISH
GEOGRAPHY
HISTORY
NAT. SCIENCE
PHYSIOLOGY
READING
LYZEUM, GYMNASIUM & OBERSCHULE (SECONDARY SCHOOL)
ARITHMETIC
BIOLOGY
CHEMISTRY
ENGLISH
FRENCH
GEOGRAPHY
HISTORY
LATIN
MIL. SCIENCE
PHYSICS
READING
VOCATIONAL
ZOOLOGY
SPECIAL SCHOOL
SPECIAL TEXT
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
NUMBER
APPROVED
CONDITIONALLY APPROVED
REJECTED

APPENDIX 6

STATUS OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

	1 October 1945	1 December 1945
Kreise in Zone	253	253
Kreise reporting	240	239
Pupils in elementary schools	1,200,174	1,648,883
Children (6-14) not in school	510,866	262,931
Percentage of children (6-14) in school	70.1	86.3
Teachers employed in elementary schools	14,176	20,676
Additional teachers needed for normal operations	16,896	12,246
Pupils per teacher	84	80
School plants in use for instruction	6,182	8,668
Schools located in temporary quarters	265	210
School plants used for purposes other than instruction	400	597

NOTE: Discrepancies which may seem to obviate the usefulness of some of the figures given above are apparently due to the fact that recent field reports give more accurate and detailed information than the earlier reports.

APPENDIX 7

CHART A



LEGEND: Number of Children in Elementary Schools, 1 October 1945.

Number of Children (Age 6-14) Not in School, 1 October 1945.

CHART B



LEGEND: Teachers Employed in Elementary Schools, 1 October 1945.

Additional Teachers Needed in Elementary Schools.

Teachers Screened and Available but Not Teaching.

1/. 240 out of 246 Kreise (Counties) reporting.
2/. All children (age 6-14) in Berlin District in school, 1 October 1945.
3/. See statistical table, page 2.

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Gregory E. Tiemann
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May 3, 1995
Date

Reeducation and School Reform: American Solutions To Germany's Postwar Youth
Title of Thesis

Doug Cooper
Signature of Graduate Office Staff Member

May 4, 1995
Date Received